hectares, which appears to be located within the ancestral domain of the
Talaandig tribe.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 181284, October 20, 2015
LOLOY UNDURAN, BARANGAY CAPTAIN ROMEO PACANA, NESTOR
MACAPAYAG, RUPERTO DOGIA, JIMMY TALINO, ERMELITO ANGEL, PETOY
BESTO, VICTORINO ANGEL, RUEL BOLING, JERMY ANGEL, BERTING SULOD,
RIO BESTO, BENDIJO SIMBALAN, AND MARK BRAZIL, Petitioners, v. RAMON
ABERASTURI, CRISTINA C. LOPEZ, CESAR LOPEZ JR., DIONISIO A. LOPEZ,
MERCEDES L. GASTON, AGNES H. LOPEZ, EUSEBIO S. LOPEZ, JOSE MARIA S.
LOPEZ, ANTON B. ABERASTURI, MA. RAISSA A. VELEZ, ZOILO ANTONIO A.
VELEZ, CRISTINA ABERASTURI, EDUARDO LOPEZ JR., ROSARIO S. LOPEZ,
JUAN S. LOPEZ, CESAR ANTHONY R. LOPEZ, VENANCIO L. GASTON,
ROSEMARIE S. LOPEZ, JAY A. ASUNCION, NICOLO ABERASTURI, LISA A.
ASUNCION, INEZ A. VERAY, HERNAN A. ASUNCION, ASUNCION LOPEZ,
THOMAS A. VELEZ, LUIS ENRIQUE VELEZ, ANTONIO H. LOPEZ, CHARLES H.
LOPEZ, ANA L. ZAYCO, PILAR L. QUIROS, CRISTINA L. PICAZO, RENATO
SANTOS, GERALDINE AGUIRRE, MARIA CARMENCITA T. LOPEZ, and as
represented by attorney-in-fact RAMON ABERASTURI, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated August
17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-MIN, and the
Resolution3 dated July 4, 2007, which denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioners, except for Mark Brazil and Nestor Macapayag, are members of the
Miarayon, Lapok, Lirongan, Talaandig Tribal Association (MILALITTRA), or
Talaandig tribe, who claimed to have been living since birth on the land located
at Barangay Miarayon, Talakag, Bukidnon, Mindanao, which they inherited from
their forefathers.
On the other hand, respondents, represented by attorney-in-fact Ramon
Aberasturi, claimed to be the lawful owners and possessor of an unregistered
parcel of agricultural land (Lot No. 7367 Cad 630-D), with an area of 105.7361
On March 3, 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria, with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary
Prohibitory Injunction with Damages4 (original complaint for accion
reivindicatoria) against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manolo
Fortich, Bukidnon (RTC). Docketed as Civil Case No. 04-03-01, the petition was
raffled off to Branch 11.
On March 20, 2004, petitioners Macapayag and Brazil filed their Answer,
alleging that respondents have no cause of action against them.
On March 23, 2004, the rest of the petitioners filed their Motion to Dismiss,
alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners alleged that
with the advent of Republic Act No. (RA) 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA), they, together with the rest of the tribe
members, assisted the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) in
the processing, validation, and delineation of their Ancestral Domain claim in
May 2003. On July 25, 2003, Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) No. R-
10-TAL-0703-0010 was issued by virtue of NCIP En Banc Resolution No. 08-
02003 to the Talaandig tribe over its ancestral domain in Talakag, Bukidnon,
containing an area of 11,105.5657 hectares. On October 30, 2003, President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo awarded the said CADT to the Talaandig tribe. As
awardees of a CADT, petitioners argued that NCIP has exclusive and original
jurisdiction over the case, as the subject matter concerns a dispute and
controversy over an ancestral land/domain of Indigenous Cultural Communities
(ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs).
On July 1, 2004, the NCIP through Atty. Melanie Pimentel, filed a Motion to Refer
the Case to the Regional Hearing Office-National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (RHO-NCIP), alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
On July 5, 2004, respondents filed a Motion to Amend and Supplement
Complaint from Accion Reivindicatoria to one for "Injunction, Damages, and
Other Relief," with the attached Amended and Supplemental
Complaint5 (amended complaint for injunction). On July 30, 2004, petitioners
filed an Opposition thereto.
On August 1, 2004, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended and
Supplemental Complaint, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case and to issue a writ of injunction therein.
On August 10, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Amend and
Supplement Complaint, and declared petitioners' Motion to Refer the Case to
the RHO-NCIP and Motion to Dismiss moot and academic as a consequence of
the grant of the said motion to amend and supplement complaint.
On August 17, 2004, petitioners filed a Manifestation praying for an ocular
inspection of the disputed land to determine the last, actual, peaceable,
uncontested status of the area.
On August 25, 2004, petitioners filed another Motion to Refer the Case to the
RHO-NCIP and Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.
On September 14, 2004, respondents filed their Opposition and Motion for
Judgment by Default.
On February 14, 2005, the RTC issued an Order6 resolving all pending incidents
before it, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's [herein petitioners'] motion to
refer the case to the RHO-NCIP and its manifestation for an ocular inspection
are hereby denied for being bereft of merit. Further, defendants [petitioners],
except Macapayag and Brazil, are hereby declared in default for their failure to
file their Answer to the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, let this case, as
against defendants Macapayag and Brazil, be called for pre-trial and ex-
parte presentation of evidence as against the rest of defendants [petitioners]
on May 2, 2005 at 9:00 o'clock in the morning. Furthermore, the injunctive
writ prayed for by the plaintiffs is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious.
Accordingly, defendants [petitioners], their agents and privies, or any other or
all persons acting for and in their behalves, are hereby ordered to observe,
maintain and preserve the status quo subject of the action and/or the relation
between the parties in order to protect the rights of the plaintiffs while the case
is pending in court and to cease and desist from performing any acts that in one
way or another contravene the tenor of this order, while awaiting final
determination of the instant suit or until further orders of this court.
Furthermore, to answer for whatever damage that defendants [petitioners] may
sustain by reason of this injunction order if the court should finally decide that
plaintiffs [respondents] are not entitled to the relief it prayed for, plaintiffs
[respondents] are hereby directed to put up a bond in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) executed in favor of the party
enjoined.
SO ORDERED.7
On April 12, 2005, petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
On August 17, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC's February
14, 2005 Order, which in turn denied the referral of the case to the NCIP, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby partly GRANTED.
The assailed Order dated February 14, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the order of default against petitioners, except Macapayag
and Brazil, is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The CA ruled that the RTC correctly granted the amendment of the complaint
and properly refused to refer the case to the RHO-NCIP. Based on the allegations
of both original complaint [accion reivindicatoria] and amended complaint
[injunction], the CA found that the subject matter of both complaints is well
within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The CA noted that the only substantial
amendment made was with regard to the nature of the action which originally
was one of accion reivindicatoria and then changed to one for damages. And
except for some amendments as to petitioners' alleged violent acts and the
prayer for declaration of their title to the subject property, the rest of the
amended complaint was basically the same as the original one, including the
reliefs prayed for by respondents. Anent the writ of preliminary injunction, the
CA held that the RTC's assailed February 14, 2005 Order is self-explanatory as
to why the issuance of the same was proper considering the circumstances of
the case.
On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of its
August 17, 2006 Decision.
Hence, this appeal on certiorari raising the following issues:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT A QUO OVER A COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION INVOLVING AN
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN OF THE TALAANDIGS.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTION OF THE
COURT A QUO ALLOWING THE AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT, THE SOLE
PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON THE LOWER COURT.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RESOLVING THAT EVIDENCE MUST BE
PRESENTED BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHEN IN THE ORIGINAL
ACTION FOR SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE IT, THE
COURT A QUO HAS ADMITTED THAT A CADT WAS ISSUED IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONERS.9
On the first issue, petitioners contend that the RTC has no jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. 04-03-0 for Injunction, Damages and other Relief, because the
105.7361-hectare land claimed by respondents is undisputedly within the
ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe over which a CADT has already been
issued. Petitioners insist that, even granting that the case is purely a personal
action, the NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over it as it concerns a
claim and dispute involving rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain.
On the second issue, petitioners argue that the amendment of the complaint
from accion reivindicatoriato injunction with damages was clearly meant to oust
the NCIP of its jurisdiction over the case and confer it on the RTC by concealing
the real issue in the case, which is the parties' conflicting claims over the
105.7361-hectare land in Miarayon, Talakag Bukidnon. According to petitioners,
the cause of action in the complaint for accion reivindicatoria is the claim of
ownership and recovery of possession of the said land which is undisputedly
found within the Talaandig tribe's ancestral domain covered by CADT No. R10-
TAL-0703-0010; hence, a claim within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of
the NCIP. Petitioners contend that respondents amended the complaint to one
for injunction to downplay the real issue which is the dispute over a land that is
within the Talaandig tribe's ancestral domain, and mainly capitalized on the acts
complained of, such as harassment, threats, acts of terrorism, among others,
supposedly committed against respondents.
On the third issue, petitioners fault the CA in ruling that whether the complaint
is one for Injunction or Accion Reivindicatoria, the RTC has jurisdiction because
nowhere in respondents' original and amended complaints is it stated that
petitioners were members of the ICCs or IPs and that the disputed property was
part of their ancestral domain. Petitioners take exception to the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint, as strict adherence thereto would open the floodgates to the
unscrupulous practice of litigants divesting the NCIP of jurisdiction by crafting
their complaints in such a way as would confer jurisdiction on their court of
choice. Petitioners contend that the literal averments of the complaint are not
determinative of the jurisdiction over the subject matter where the actual issues
are evidenced by subsequent pleadings; in certain cases, the real nature and
character of the pleadings and issues are not merely found in the complaint, but
also in the subsequent pleadings submitted by both parties. Petitioners stress
that although the complaint banners the subject matter as one for injunction,
the pleadings of respondents show that the subject matter is the conflicting
ownership claims over the land. In fact, petitioners point out that the records of
the case show that various pieces of evidence have been presented to prove that
the dispute involves conflicting claims over a land covered by a CADT.
For their part, respondents contend that petitioners do not have legal capacity
or standing and locus standi to file this petition, since they failed to make prima
facie showing that they are members of IPs/ICCs, or that they were authorized
to represent the Talaandig tribe. Respondents insist that based on the
allegations in their amended complaint for injunction and damages, the RTC has
jurisdiction over the subject matter which is a purely personal action and
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Respondents assert that the real issue is
whether or not petitioners are guilty of wrongful acts of violence, terrorism,
destruction, intimidation, harassment, etc., to justify a permanent injunction
and hold the latter liable for damages. Respondents also point out that
petitioners cannot invoke protection under the IPRA 8731, because the conflict
does not involve an ancestral domain and they (respondents) are not IPs so the
condition precedent before bringing a dispute before the NCIP cannot be
satisfied, i.e., exhaustion of remedies under customary laws by the parties.
The petition has no merit.
On the procedural issue raised by respondents, the Court disagrees with their
contention that petitioners do not have legal capacity or standing and locus
standi to file the petition, for failure to show that they are members of IPs/ICCs,
or that they are authorized to represent the Talaandig tribe.
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. In private suits, standing is governed by the "real parties in interest"
rule found in Section 2,10 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Such concept of real party-
in-interest is adapted in Section 2,11 Rule VI of the 2014 Revised Rules of
Procedure before the NCIP. That petitioners are the real parties in interest can
be gleaned from the Entry of Appearance with Motion to Refer the Case to the
Regional Hearing Office of the NCIP12 filed by the NCIP Special Transition
Team-Quick Response Unit (STRAT-QRU). The STRAT-QRU counsels alleged
therein that the respondents' complaint for recovery of ownership (accion
reinvidicatoria) sought to recover an unregistered real property situated in
Miarayon, Bukidnon, from petitioners, all of whom are, with the exception of
Nestor Macapayag and Mark Brazil, member-beneficiaries of CADT No. R10-
TAL-0703-0010 issued by the NCIP in the name of the Talaandig Indigenous
Peoples, located at Talakag, Province of Bukidnon. In support of their allegation,
petitioners presented a certification13 that the disputed land is within the area
covered by the same CADT, and the NCIP List of Beneficiaries of Talaandig
Ancestral Domain of Miarayon, Lirongan, Lapok, San Miguel, Talakag,
Bukidnon.14 In contrast, respondents failed to submit any evidence to dispute
petitioners' claim that they are members of the Talaandig Tribe. Hence,
respondents' contention that petitioners have no legal standing to file the
petition, is without merit.
In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has
jurisdiction over the respondents' amended complaint, foremost in the Court's
mind is the principle in "that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which
comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs
cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein."15
Under Section 19 of B.P. 129, as amended (Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980), the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and in all
civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein exceeds
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
On the other hand, the NCIP's jurisdiction is defined under Section 66 of the
IPRA as follows:
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall
have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs;
Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the
parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For
this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders
who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
petition with the NCIP.16
On the matter of NCIP's jurisdiction and of procedures for enforcement of rights,
NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, 1998, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (NCIP-IRR) of the IPRA, Rule IX, Section 1 states:
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. - All conflicts related to the ancestral
domain and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to the conflicting
claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties
through the application of customary laws in the area where the disputed
ancestral domain or land is located.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands where one of the
parties is non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through
customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the
Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP to be adopted
hereafter.
All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for Review to
the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order or
Decision.17
In line with Section 69 of the IPRA on the NCIP's quasi-judicial power to
promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases
filed before it, the NCIP issued Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9,
2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure (NCIP Rules),
which reiterates its jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs and enumerates the actions that may be brought before it. Section 5,
Rule III, of the NCIP Rules provides for the jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices
shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and
interpretation of the IPRA 8371, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer
(RHO):chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. Cases involving disputes, controversies over ancestral lands/domains of
ICCs/IPs;
b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed
consent of ICC/IPs;cralawlawlibrary
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of
customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or
rituals;cralawlawlibrary
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) ofR.A. 8371; and
e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
(2) Original jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing
Officer:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs
that have not been settled under customary laws; and
b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No.
8371;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the
Commission:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have
been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community as
provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is
filed within one (1) year from the date of registration.
Anent the condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP under
Section 66 of the IPRA, Sections 13 and 14, Rule IV of the NCIP Rules pertinently
provide:
Section 13. Certification to File Action. - Upon the request of the proper party,
members of the indigenous dispute settlement group or council of elders shall
likewise issue a certification to file action before the NCIP. In giving due regard
to customary laws, the certification may be in any form so long as it states in
substance the failure of settlement notwithstanding the efforts made under
customary law or traditional practices.
Section 14. Exceptions. - The certification shall not be required in the following
cases:
a. Where one of the parties is a public or private corporation, partnership,
association or juridical person or a public officer or employee and the
dispute is in connection with the performance of his official
functions;cralawlawlibrary
b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same
IP/IC Community, except when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction
of the Council of Elders/Leaders;
c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any
grave, imminent and irreparable damage or injury that may result if not acted
upon immediately; and
d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue the necessary
certification without justifiable reasons.18
Having spelled out the jurisdictions conferred by law to the RTC and the NCIP
over the subject matters of their respective cases, the Court now examines the
allegations in the original and amended complaints to find out which tribunal
may properly exercise jurisdiction over this case.
In their original complaint for accion reivindicatoria, respondents traced the
provenance of their title over said land to one Mamerto Decano, a Chieftain of
Talaandig tribe, by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on July 27, 1957. They
averred that, together with their predecessor-in-interest, they have religiously
paid the real estate taxes thereon since 1957 and that they have been in
physical, actual, open, prior, notorious, continuous, public and adverse
possession of said land in the concept of owners for more than 50 years, even
prior to June 12, 1945. They alleged that said land was declared alienable and
disposable since August 3, 1927 per certification of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. They claimed that by means of fraud,
stealth and surreptitious means, petitioners entered the said land, without
permission and against the consent of the landowners, caused damages therein
and harassed respondents by indiscriminately firing upon their farm workers.
They added that petitioners continue such harassment by means of armed men
frequenting the campsite and firing M-16 rifles at them during nighttime,
causing great fear and threat.
Respondents prayed before the RTC for the following reliefs, among others: (1)
to cause the preliminary injunction to be made permanent for the respondents
to enjoy possession of their property, free from threats of physical harm,
harassment and undue obstruction caused by petitioners; (2) to order
petitioners to respect and not to harass, intimidate and cause trouble to the
prior possession of respondents as the owners by virtue of right of title; (3) to
order petitioners to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees,
appearance fees and costs of suit; and (4) to declare respondents' title as having
become a vested right, and as such entitled to all right and incident of an
absolute owner.
In their amended complaint for injunction and damages, on the other hand,
respondents further alleged that sometime in November 2003, petitioners
harassed, intimidated, threatened, and fired high-powered rifles upon
respondents' farm workers to drive them away from the land, without legal or
justifiable reason. They added that, despite having hired private security guards
to secure and protect their property, these violent incidents were followed by
more acts of violence, lawlessness, harassment, terrorism to drive away
respondents from the land which they claim to lawfully own and possess.
Respondents prayed before the RTC for the following reliefs: (1) to order
petitioners and their representatives, to stop and refrain from committing acts
of violence, destruction, assault and other forms of lawlessness and terrorism
against respondents, and to maintain the peaceful possession and enjoyment of
the 105-hectare land by respondents as an attribute of ownership; (2) to
declare petitioners to have committed acts of violence, harassment,
intimidation, destruction, assault and other forms of lawlessness against
respondents, and to permanently order petitioners to stop and refrain from
committing similar acts; and (3) to hold petitioners jointly and severally liable
to pay respondents actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and treble costs.
After a perusal of the allegations and prayers in both original and amended
complaints, the Court notes that respondents neither alleged therein that the
parties are members of ICCs/IPs nor that the case involves a dispute or
controversy over ancestral lands/domains of ICC/IPs. Rather, the allegations in
respondents' original complaint make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil
action which involves an interest in a real property with an assessed value of
P683,760.00, while the allegations in their amended complaint make out a case
for injunction, a civil action which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
Court therefore finds that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the
amended complaint based on allegations therein was within the jurisdiction of
the RTC.
Meanwhile, contrary to petitioners' contention, the mere fact that this case
involves members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land is not enough to for it to
fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, to wit:
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. ~ The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall
have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs;
Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the
parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For
this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders
who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
petition with the NCIP.
A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between
or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can be gathered from the
qualifying provision that "no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless
the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws.
For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders
who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
petition with the NCIP."
The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be
brought before the NCIP, namely: (1) exhaustion of remedies under customary
laws of the parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through the
said certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is in recognition of the
rights of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict
resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other
customary laws and practices within their respective communities, as may be
compatible with the national legal system and with internationally recognized
human rights.19
Section 3 (f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a body of written and/or
unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and continually
recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this restrictive
definition, it can be gleaned that it is only when both parties to a case belong to
the same ICC/IP that the abovesaid two conditions can be complied with. If the
parties to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs which are recognized to have their
own separate and distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders, they
will fail to meet the abovesaid two conditions. The same holds true if one of
such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by customary laws
as contemplated by the IPRA nor governed by such council. Indeed, it would be
violative of the principles of fair play and due process for those parties who do
not belong to the same ICC/IP to be subjected to its customary laws and Council
of Elders/Leaders.
Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction
over claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise
between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and
disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same
ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a
non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of
Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to
Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, even if the
real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be located within the
ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which
shall have the power to hear, try and decide this case.
There are, however, exceptional cases where the NCIP shall still have
jurisdiction over such claims and disputes even if the parties involved do not
belong to the same ICC/IP, viz.:
1. Cases under Sections 52 and 62 of the IPRA which contemplate a situation
where a dispute over an ancestral domain involving parties who do not belong
to the same, but to different ICCs/IPs, to wit:
SECTION 52. Delineation Process. — The identification and delineation of
ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the following procedures:
xxxx
h) Endorsement to NCIP. — Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of
the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to
the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have
sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided,
That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently
false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in
case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due
notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The
denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases
where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of
ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the
contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a
preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full
adjudication according to the section below.
xxxx
SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts. — In cases of conflicting interest, where
there are adverse claims within the ancestral domains as delineated in the
survey plan, and which can not be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide,
after notice to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the
delineation of such ancestral domains: Provided, That if the dispute is
between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional boundaries of
their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be
followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further, That any decision, order,
award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter
pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation
of this Act may be brought for Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.20
2. Cases under Section 54 of the IPRA over fraudulent claims by parties who are
not members of the same ICC/IP, to wit:
SECTION 54. Fraudulent Claims. — The Ancestral Domains Office may, upon
written request from the ICCs/IPs, review existing claims which have been
fraudulently acquired by any person or community. Any claim found to be
fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community may be
cancelled by the NCIP after due notice and hearing of all parties
concerned.21
Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66
of the IPRA covers only disputes and claims between and among members of
the same ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the IPRA, as well as the basic
administrative law principle that an administrative rule or regulation must
conform, not contradict the provisions of the enabling law,22 the Court declares
Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR,23 Rule III, Section 524 and Rule IV, Sections
13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules25 as null and void insofar as they expand the
jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA to include such disputes
where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP. As the Court held
in Paduran v. DARAB,26 "[J]urisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the
Constitution or the law and rules of procedure yield to substantive law.
Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law.27 Only a statute can
confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies; rules of procedure
cannot.28 In the abovesaid exceptional cases where one of the parties is a non-
ICC/IP or does not belong to the same ICC/IP, however, Rule IV, Section 14 of
the NCIP Rules validly dispenses with the requirement of certification issued by
the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the failed attempt to settle
the dispute according to the customary laws of the concerned ICC/IP.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals Decision dated
August 17, 2006, and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-
MIN, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes,
Perlas-Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, and Del Castillo, JJ., on official leave.
Velasco, Jr., J., pls. see concurring opinion.
Brion, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 21-50.
2Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim Jr., with Associate Justices Teresita
Dy-Liacco Flores and Sixto Marella Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 56-68.
3Rollo, pp. 11-13.
4 CA rollo, pp. 29-42.
5Id. at 74-80.
6 Id. at 25-28.
7 Id. at 28.
8 Id. at 348.
9 Id. at 433.
10SEC. 2. Parties-in-Interest. - A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
11Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2014, Rule VI, Section 2. Real Party-in-
lnterest. - Every case must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party in interest who shall sue as "plaintiff or "petitioner". The person being
sued shall be referred to as "defendant" or "respondent."
In actions involving general interest, the real party-in-interest shall be the
ICCs/IPs or person/s authorized, through a community resolution, by majority
of the ICCs/IPs in the community to represent them.
A "real party-in-interest," as provided in Section 2, Rule 3, of the Revised Rules
of Court, and adapted herein, is the party who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
a. Cases involving disputes, controversies over ancestral lands/domains of
12 CA rollo, pp. 65-71. ICCs/IPs;cralawlawlibrary

13 Records, p. 262. b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed
consent of ICC/IPs;cralawlawlibrary
14 CA rollo, pp. 179-204.
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of
15Padlan v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 180321, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 91, 98. customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or
rituals;cralawlawlibrary
16 Emphasis added.
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and
17Id.

e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

18 Id.
(2) Original jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:
19 IPRA, Sec. 15.
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession,
20 Emphasis added. and settlement of land disputes, between and among ICCs/IPs that have not
been settled under customary laws; and
21Id.

22FortBonifacio Dev't Corp. v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue, et al., 617 Phil
358, 369 (2009).
23Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. - All conflicts related to the ancestral
domain and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to the conflicting
claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties
through the application of customary laws in the area where the disputed
ancestral domain or land is located.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands where one of the parties is
non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law
shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings,
Practice and Procedure before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter.
All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for Review to
the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order or
Decision.
24Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices
shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and
interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer (RHO):
b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No.
8371;cralawlawlibrary
(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:
a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate
of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently
acquired by, and issued to, any person or community as provided for under
Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year
from the date of registration.
25Section 13. Certification to File Action. — Upon the request of the proper
party, members of the indigenous dispute settlement group or council of elders
shall likewise issue a certification to file action before the NCIP. In giving due
regard to customary laws, the certification may be in any form so long as it
states in substance the failure of settlement notwithstanding the efforts made
under customary law or traditional practices.
Section 14. Exceptions. The certification shall not be required in the following
cases:
a. Where one of the parties is a public or private corporation, partnership,
association or juridical person or a public officer or employee and the dispute is
in connection with the performance of his official functions;cralawlawlibrary
b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/IC SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional
Community, except when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights
Council of Elders/Leaders;cralawlawlibrary of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the
NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their
c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council
grave, imminent and irreparable damage or injury that may result if not acted of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the
upon immediately; and same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent
to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. (Emphasis supplied)
d. Where the Coucil of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue the necessary certification
without justifiable reasons. A careful scrutiny of Section 66 of the IPRA would reveal that it is composed of
three parts: (1) the NCIP has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
26 444 Phil. 213(2006). rights of ICCs/IPs; (2) the requirement of exhaustion of all remedies provided
under the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs; and (3) a certification from the
27Paduran v. DARAB, supra, at 223. Council of Elders/Leaders as a condition precedent to the filing of a petition
with NCIP.
28Republic of the Philippines v. CA, 331 Phil. 1070, 1076 (1996).
The first part lays down the basis of jurisdiction of the NCIP. It can be gleaned
from this part that the law is silent if the parties should belong to the same IP/IC
Community. What the law only provides is that the NCIP has jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs.

CONCURRING OPINION The second part contains the proviso that should be followed before the NCIP
acquires jurisdiction over the case. Said proviso states: "Provided, however, That
no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted
VELASCO, JR., J.: all remedies provided under their customary laws."

The third part, on the other hand, refers to the certification from the Council of
Elders/Leaders as a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with NCIP.
I concur with the ponencia that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction
This is in relation to the second part requiring the exhaustion of all remedies.
over the case. Both original and amended complaints, accion reivindicatoria and
injunction, respectively, are incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus falling
The second and third parts of the provision should not be interpreted as
within the jurisdiction of the RTC. As correctly pointed out by the ponencia,
limiting the jurisdiction of the NCIP to claims and disputes involving rights of
"jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same
determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise
ICC/IP. The proviso only provides for a condition precedent. It is merely
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action."1 It
procedural and does not divest the NCIP of jurisdiction over parties not
cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties
belonging to the same IP/IC Community. As provided in Section 14, Rule IV of
or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.2
the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure4 of the NCIP (NCIP Rules), a
party which does not belong to the same IP/IC Community is exempted from the
However, I would like to submit some points for consideration which run
requirement of certification, to wit:
counter to the opinion of my esteemed colleague. It is my position that the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) has jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of Indigenous Cultural Section 14. Exceptions. The certification shall not be required in the following
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) regardless of whether or not they cases:
belong to the same IP/IC Community. This is pursuant to Section 66 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8371,3 otherwise known as "The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of a. Where one of the parties is a public or private corporation,
1997" (IPRA) as follows: partnership, association or juridical person or a public officer
 or employee and the dispute is in connection with the
performance of his official functions;cralawlawlibrary
b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong
to the same IP/IC Community, except when he voluntarily
submits to the jurisdiction of the Council of
Elders/Leaders;
c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks
to prevent any grave, imminent and irreparable damage or
injury that may result if not acted upon immediately; and
d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuses to issue the
necessary certification without justifiable reasons. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, it is my position that the NCIP has jurisdiction over the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs arising between or among
parties belonging to the same ICC/IP; and
b. claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs arising between or among
ICCs/IPs even if one of the parties does not belong to the same IP/IC
Community.
All cases and disputes where both parties are ICCs/IPs fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NCIP. Consequently, all cases and disputes where one of the
parties is a non-ICC/IP are covered by the jurisdiction of the regular courts
regardless of the subject matter even if it involves ancestral domains or lands of
ICCs/IPs. Moreover, the regular courts have jurisdiction over cases and disputes
as long as there are parties who are non-ICCs/IPs.
To limit the jurisdiction of the NCIP to claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs arising between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP would
be contrary to the purpose for which the NCIP was created. It must be pointed
out that the NCIP is an administrative body entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under its special knowledge and training. It is charged with the
implementation of the law, considering its competence, expertise, experience
and informed judgment. As such, the NCIP is vested with quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative powers. It is the primary government agency "responsible for
the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote
and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of
their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto."5 It is quasi-judicial
because it has jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the rights of
the ICCs/IPs.6 It is quasi-legislative because of its rule-making power.7 Because
of its expertise in the field of ICCs/IPs, it is better equipped than the trial courts
in resolving the claims and disputes involving rights where the parties are both
ICCs/IPs.
Anent the issue as to what customary laws apply in cases where the parties
involved in the claims and disputes do not belong to the same IP/IC Community,
the NCIP may apply the customary law common to both ICCs/IPs or that which
can be applied by analogy.
Furthermore, it must be pointed out that there is no need to declare the
following provisions as null and void:
i. The first and third paragraphs of Rule IX, Section 1 of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8371 which provide:
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral
domains and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to conflicting
claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties
through the application of customary laws in the area where the disputed
ancestral domain or land is located.
x x x xChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for Review to
the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order or
Decision.
ii. Rule III, Section 5 of the NCIP Rules which provides:
Section. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. The NCIP through its Regional Hearing
Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and
interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the
following:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):
a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral
lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;cralawlawlibrary
b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior
and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;cralawlawlibrary
 c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving
violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial
sites, sacred places, or rituals;cralawlawlibrary
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of
R.A. 8371; and
e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and
among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary
laws; and
b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act
No. 8371.
(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:
a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs)
alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to,
any person or community as provided for under Section 54 of
R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year
from the date of registration.8
iii. Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules which provide:
Section 13. Certification to File Action. Upon the request of the proper party,
members of the indigenous dispute settlement group or council of elders shall
likewise issue a certification to file action before the NCIP. In giving due regard
to customary laws, the certification may be in any form so long as it states in
substance the failure of settlement notwithstanding the efforts made under
customary law or traditional practices.9
Section 14. Exceptions. The certification shall not be required in the following
cases:
a. Where one of the parties is a public or private corporation, partnership,
association or juridical person or a public officer or employee and the dispute is
in connection with the performance of his official functions;cralawlawlibrary
b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/IC
Community, except when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the
Council of Elders/Leaders;cralawlawlibrary
c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any
grave, imminent and irreparable damage or injury that may result if not acted
upon immediately; and
d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue the necessary
certification without justifiable reasons.10
The abovementioned rules can be interpreted in harmony with the provisions of
the IPRA law. Said rules do not expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP but merely
enumerate the claims and disputes falling within its jurisdiction. Section 14(b)
does not automatically dispense with the certification required by law as the
parties may opt to voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Council of
Elders/Leaders. This is akin to a barangay conciliation proceeding under the
Local Government Code wherein the conciliation process is a condition
precedent that affects the sufficiency of the cause of action, not the jurisdiction
of the court.11
However, the second paragraph of Rule IX, Section 1 of the IRR of R.A. No. 8371
is not anchored on legal mooring. Said paragraph reads:
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to the ancestral
domains or lands where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or where the dispute
could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in
accordance with the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedures Before the
NCIP to be adopted hereafter. (Emphasis supplied)
As earlier discussed, Section 66 of R.A. No. 8371 is explicit that the NCIP's
jurisdiction is confined only to claims and disputes where the parties are both
ICCs/IPs. Such being the case, the second paragraph of Rule IX, Section 1 of the
IRR of R.A. No. 8371 should be declared null and void because it is contrary to
the provision of Section 66 of the IPRA. It is well-settled that an administrative
rule or regulation must conform, not contradict, the provisions of the enabling
law.12 A rule or regulation cannot modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is
intended to implement.13 Any rule that is not consistent with the statute itself is
null and void.14 Since the rule in question is at war with Section 66 of R.A. No.
8371, then it must be excised.
Anent the resolution of the substantive issue in the case at bar, I agree with the
ponencia that the RTC has jurisdiction over the instant dispute.
ACCORDINGLY, I concur to DENY the Petition for Review.
Endnotes:
I concur with the ponencia's conclusion that the RTC has jurisdiction over the
case. I write this Separate Opinion to express my own approach to the case, and
1Ponencia, p. 8. to elaborate on relevant points that may need emphasis.

2Gomez-Castillo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187231, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 499, 507. I base my concurrence on the following grounds:

3AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CREATING A
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, ESTABLISHING
IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES (1997).
(1) The CA correctly ruled that the RTC's February 14, 2005 order is not tainted
with grave abuse;cralawlawlibrary
(2) Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by law and the allegations
of the complaint.

4 Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9, 2003. (3) The National Council for Indigenous Peoples' (NCIP) jurisdiction over
disputes is limited to cases where both parties are members of the same ICC/IP.
5 Supra note 3, Section 38.
I also concur with the ponencia that the NCIP has jurisdiction over adverse
6 Id. Section 66. claims, boundary disputes, and cancellation of fraudulently issued Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Titles (CADTs), regardless of the parties involved. But I clarify
7 Id. Section 44(c). and emphasize my view that while the NCIP possesses quasi-judicial powers, its
jurisdiction is only primary, and not exclusive.
8 Supra note 4.
The RTC's February 14, 2005 order is
9 Id. NOT tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

10 Id. The present petition is an appeal from the CA's dismissal of the petitioner's
petition for certiorari . Hence, this Court must determine whether the CA
1'Heirs of Fernando Vinzons v. Court of Appeals, 315 SCRA 541, 548 (1999). correctly ruled that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the
February 14, 2005 order.
12Fort
Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 175707, November 19, 2014. The petitioners alleged before the CA that the February 14, 2005 order is
tainted with grave abuse because it: (i) denied the petitioners' motion to refer
13 Id. the case to the NCIP; (ii) declared the petitioners in default; and (iii) issued the
writ of preliminary injunction.1
14 Id.
Jurisprudence2 has traditionally defined grave abuse of discretion as follows:

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
SEPARATE OPINION refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
BRION, J:
Based on this definition, I share the view that the RTC did not abuse its
discretion, much less commit any grave abuse of discretion.

At the time the respondents amended the complaint, the petitioners had yet to
file their answers to the original complaint, hence, the amendment was still a
matter of right. The rule on amendments as a matter of right applies to a co-
defendant who has yet to file his responsive pleading, even if his co-defendants
have already done so.3 Thus, while Macapayag and Brazil have filed their
answers, the respondents still have the right to amend the complaint with
respect to the rest of the petitioners.
Likewise, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in declaring the petitioners in
default and in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.
The RTC declared the petitioners in default only after they failed to file their
answers within the period allowed. On the other hand, the writ of preliminary
injunction sought to maintain the status quo to prevent both parties from
committing further acts of violence; there is no caprice in maintaining the peace.
Nevertheless, default orders are issued on the presumption that the defendant
no longer opposes the allegations and reliefs demanded in the complaint.4 In
this case, the petitioners vehemently opposed the RTC's cognizance of the
complaint, and refused to file their answers because they believed that
jurisdiction belongs to the NCIP.
In the interest of justice, I support the CA in lifting the order of default to allow the
parties to try the case on the merits.
Jurisdiction is determined
by the allegations of the complaint
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by law and by the material
allegations of the complaint.5 Under these standards, the petitioner's argument,
i.e., that the NCIP has jurisdiction because the case involves the rights of
ICCs/IPs, is without merit.
As the ponencia pointed out, both the original and the amended complaints do
not allege that the respondents were ICCs/IPs, or that the dispute involves an
ancestral dominion.6 Hence, on the face of the respondents' complaint, the RTC
has jurisdiction over the injunction case.7
Neither am I impressed with the petitioners' argument that, where the actual
issue is evidenced by the subsequent pleadings, jurisdiction does not depend on
the complaint's literal averments. This Court has consistently ruled that
jurisdiction never depends on the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to
dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration.8
The NCIP's jurisdiction over disputes is limited
where both parties are members of the same ICC/IP.
I join the ponencia in ruling that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction
over disputes where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, or where the opposing
parties are members of different ICC/IP.
My concurrence is based on the following: (i) Section 66 contains a proviso
that limits the NCIP's jurisdiction; (ii) the RTC, not the NCIP, has
jurisdiction to adjudicate violations of ICC/IP rights; (iii) Congress had no
intention to apply customary laws to non-ICCs/IPs.
I. Section 66 contains a proviso that
limits the NCIP's jurisdiction.
The NCIP's jurisdiction is outlined in IPRA's Section 66:
SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices,
shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs:
Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless
the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary
laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the
same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent
to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. (emphasis supplied)
Section 66 is composed of three parts: the first states the NCIP's jurisdiction;
the second requires the prior exhaustion of remedies under customary law; and
the third states that a certification from the council of elders/leaders is a
condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.
The first part lays down the NCIP's jurisdiction, i.e., over all claims and
disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. The NCIP's jurisdiction is not
dependent on who the parties are, but on whether the dispute involves the
rights of ICCs/IPs.
However, the second part contains the proviso "Provided, However, That no
such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all
remedies provided under their customary laws." The third part begins with the
phrase "for this purpose"; the "purpose" referred to being the exhaustion of
remedies under their customary laws.
Jurisprudence tells us that the office of a proviso is to limit the application of the
law.9
Taking these considerations into account, while the NCIP's jurisdiction is
initially couched in general terms to include any and all disputes involving the
rights of ICCs/IPs, the second and third parts limit the NCIP's jurisdiction to
disputes where both parties have remedies to exhaust under customary laws.
Consequently, the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over disputes involving non-
ICCs/IPs because non-ICCs/IPs have no customary laws to exhaust.
The limitation likewise applies to disputes where the opposing parties are
members of different ICCs/IPs.
Each ICC/IP has its own set of customary laws and council of elders/leaders. To
require members of a particular ICC/IP to appear before the council of
elders/leaders of another ICC/IP would be to require the former to observe the
customary laws of the latter. This is repugnant to the right of each ICC/IP to use
its own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, and
peace building processes or mechanisms.10
II. The RTC not the NCIP, has
jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights
committed by Non-ICC/IP.
As I had earlier discussed, the first part of Section 66 shows that jurisdiction is
not dependent on who the parties are to the dispute, but on whether the dispute
involves the rights of ICCs/IPs.
Guided by the rule that provisos should not be construed to limit the main
provisions of the statute;11this Court must not read Section 66 in isolation but
must read it together with the related provision. In this case, the Court must
identify the rights of ICCs/IPs, and determine whether the NCIP is the proper
venue for the enforcement of these rights.
The IPRA grants ICCs/IPs rights: (i) over ancestral domains/lands; 12 (ii) to self-
governance and employment;13 (iii) to social justice and human rights;14 and
(iv) to cultural integrity.15 These rights are spread throughout several chapters,
mainly under Chapters III to VI.
It must be noted, however, that most of these rights are state policies, and only
the following are clearly demandable and enforceable: the rights over ancestral
domains and lands;16 the right against unlawful intrusion;17 the right to equal
protection and to nondiscrimination;18 the right against unlawful acts
pertaining to employment;19 the rights to religious, cultural sites and
ceremonies, including archaeological artifacts;20 and the right to withhold
access to biological and genetic resources.21
Section 72 of the IPRA provides that any person who violates the rights of
ICCs/IPs shall be punished "in accordance with the customary laws of the
ICCs/IPs concerned....without prejudice to the right of the ICC/IP concerned to
avail of the protection of "existing laws... [i]n which case" the penalty shall be
imprisonment and/or fine, and damages, "upon the discretion of the court"22
"Existing laws" refer to national laws as opposed to customary laws; while "the
court" refers to the regular courts as opposed to administrative bodies like the
NCIP.
Under Section 72, ICCs/IPs can avail of the protection under national laws and
file an action before the regular courts, in which case, the penalty shall be
imprisonment and/or fine, and damages. From this perspective,
Section 72 is a special penal law that applies to ALL persons, including non-
ICCs/IPs.
The phrase "without prejudice," however, fneans without limiting the course of
action that one can take.23 Thus, a recourse under customary laws does not take
away the right of ICCs/IPs to secure punishment under existing national laws. An
express caveat under the customary law option is that the penalty must not be
cruel, degrading, or inhuman, nor shall it consist of the death penalty or
excessive fines.24
Since the regular courts, not the NCIP, have jurisdiction over national laws, then
the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to punishment under customary
laws.25cralawred
The NCIP's power to impose penalties under customary laws presents two
important issues: first,whether it is legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs with
penalties under customary laws; and second, whether a member of a particular
ICC/IP could be punished in accordance with the customary laws of another
ICC/IP.
Laws that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures,
must be published.26
Most customary laws are not written, much less published. Hence, it is highly
unlikely that the NCIP or even the regular courts have the power to penalize
non-ICCs/IPs with these penalties under customary laws. A contrary ruling
would be constitutionally infirm for lack of due process.
Similarly, an ICC/IP cannot be punished under the customary law of another.
Otherwise, the former would be forced to observe a non-binding customary law.
Therefore, while the NCIP has jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights, its
jurisdiction is limited to those committed by and against members of the same
ICC/IP.
would be easier to resolve. But paano po
'yung if there would be a conflict between an
This view does not detract from the IPRA's policy to "protect the rights of
IP and non-IP.
ICCs/IPs." ICCs/IPs, whose rights are violated by non-ICCs/IPs or by members
of a different ICC/IP, can still file criminal charges before the regular courts. In
Mr. Raiz: Non-IP.
this situation, the NCIP's role is not to adjudicate but to provide ICCs/IPs with
"legal assistance in litigation involving community interest."27 Mr. Mercado: Because the assumption nga— oo, 'yong
sa civil law relations, may mga conflicts po
III. Congress had no intention to apply na possible na mangyayari. So, actually, sabi
customary laws to non-ICCs/IPs. ko nga, maybe we can do away with it. That's
one issue. xxx
Some might conceivably argue that Congress passed the IPRA and created the
NCIP precisely to bind non-ICCs/IPs to customary laws. Mr. Austria: 'Yong point ni Mike is very meritorious, 'yon
dapat, Dahil unang una, the IPs should
I do not agree with this view. themselves show to the other sectors kung
ano ba 'yon rule nila sa society.xxx
The records of the Senate and the bicameral committee hearings show that the
legislators focused mainly on: (i) the grant of Ancestral Domains/Lands to Ms. Damaso: Let's go back to that discussion on the
ICCs/IPs; (ii) the NCIP's organizational transition from its predecessor-agencies; creation of a separate office on planning and
and (iii) budgetary concerns. Section 66 's controversial proviso was not even policy, and research.
discussed on the Senate floor or during the bicameral committee hearings. I think it's more germane to mention those
points that Mike has enunciated earlier—
In the course of the bill's28 early development, the Senate technical working that this be a primary function of that office
group29 realized that it would be difficult for the NCIP to adjudicate rights of xxx continuing documentation of
non-ICCs/IPs under national laws, on one hand, and the rights of ICCs/IPs under customary laws customary law and other
customary laws, on the other. They were likewise concerned with the possible usage 'no for complete mediation or
conflict between the customary laws of contending ICCs/IPs. resolution, which would be derived from
the culture base of the IPs.
As a solution, the Senate technical working group proposed the creation of the
Office on Policy, Planning and Research (OPPR) and a Consultative Body that ....
will compile all customary laws, and assist the NCIP in its exercise of quasi-
judicial powers: The presiding officer: You were mentioning iyong other groups.
What about the commission? Should they be
mandated to do the research and to, you
Mr. Mike Mercado Sir, it's over and above the customs and
know, to compile such laws. Kasi yung
(representative of Sen. Juan tradition. What I'm trying to pointout is, it's
nakikita ko doon sa idea niMike is, like for
Flavier): the whole plan for the sector. Two issues po
example, kung may conflict iyong IPs and
ang sinasabi ko.Number one is regarding the
Non-IPs, paano mo sasabihin, although
need to put it down because we talked about
sasabihin natin na yung customary law nga
conflict of rights here...
yung mag-go-govern, pero paano natin i-po-
The Presiding Officer: ... With the Non-IPs. prove—-although kailangan natin i-
recognize na mayroon ganuong
Mr. Mercado: With the non-IPs possibly which would problem. Sabihin natin it's an oral practice,
happen. It would be easy if the conflict could it's an oral customary law pero mas
be between IPs of the same group. So it maganda siguro kung iyon nga kung i-
 compile mo tapos eto ganito yon. So mayroon
tayong pang...
Mr. Mercado: For example po on practical ground, I think
ang power is lodged with the Commission
which is collective in nature iyong mga
adjudicatory power. Assuming not all of
them would belong to one tribe, they would
belong to a different sector or group. I know
that it is being practiced and it's not written
down, so I have to make decision also as a
part of that Commission—as a
commissioner based on something, so I have
to also acquaint myself on the practices of
other groups because that is part of the
power of the commission to adjudicate. For
practical purposes only, how would I know
the practices of the particular groupings,
which I am supposed to adjudicate,
assuming that we only have 113 tribes or
groupings and we have five commissioners.
Those other five or those other
commissioners who are not aware of that
particular practice, to that they will depend
their judgment on. So, there is also a need
for this five commissioners to be familiar
with the practice of other groups because
they will make decisions also.
Ms. Damaso: Yeah, Mike, I think your point is to
compile, meaning document.
Mr. Mercado: Document only, hindi ho isabatas.
Ms. Damaso: But not to codify. It's a different ball game
to codify.
Mr. Mercado: Actually ginamit ko yung term, nag-usap
kami ni Didith, sabi ko, "it's compile
only". Because, it's beyond the power of
this commission to make codifications. But
'yung point kanina ni Datu Sulang is actually
going a step further. Kunwari like Muslims,
bakit nare-recognize na 'yong three
marriages Because there is four marriages
and they have specific law for that. If we will
not compile it, mahihirapan tayong ma-
attain 'yong level na 'yon na sana mas
maganda kung 'yong all practices, for
example on marriage sa iba't ibang tribes
ma-recognize rin ng law. Pero if we will not
document the practices, hindi natin maa-
attain 'yong level na 'yon. Kaya mas maganda
kung mayroon tayong documentation that
when legislators if and when they decide to
make it a law, mayroon silang existing na
gagamitin. xxx
.... ....
Ms. Chavez Couldn't NCIP hire or form a consultative
body from which each tribe will be
represented by a co-tribal consultant
aside from the documentation of
customary laws?Pwede ba 'yon
ganoon? Kasi kahit may documentation...
(emphasis supplied)
The presiding officer: Baka pwede isama sa IRR, implementing
rules and regulations 'yong mga tribal tribal
consultancy.
Ms. Chavez: Sa IRR.
The Presiding officer: Pwede naman siguro 'yon gawin. Anyway,
specifics na 'yon. General lang 'yong
functions na ilagay natin.
xxxx
While the IPRA did create the OPPR, and directed the NCIP to form a consultative
body, their functions had nothing to do with the NCIP's exercise of quasi-judicial
powers.
The OPPR's objective is to document customary laws for monitoring, evaluation,
and policy purposes to assist Congress in formulating appropriate legislations
benefiting ICCs/IPs.30 On the other hand, the consultative body's role is to advise
the NCIP on matters "relating to the problems, aspirations, and interests of the
ICCs/IPs."31
The variance between the deliberations and the law suggests that Congress
passed the IPRA without considering the inevitable conflict of rights under
national and customary laws. In my opinion, this casts doubt on whether
Congress did give the NCIP the mandate to settle disputes between non-
ICCs/IPs and ICCs/IPs.
It is true that the IPRA echoed our Constitution32 in "[recognizing] the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.33 However, I do not
subscribe to the idea that customary laws should bind non-ICCs/IPs simply
because Congress ordered the NCIP to compile them.
In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,34 former Associate
Justice Jose C. Vitug opined35 that customary laws should not apply to non-
ICCs/IPs simply because Congress parroted the Constitution:
The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows
Congress to provide "for the applicability of customary laws governing property
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domains." I do not see this statement as saying that Congress may enact a
law that would simply express that "customary laws shall govern" and end it
there. Had it been so, the Constitution could have itself easily provided
without having to still commission Congress to do it. Mr. Chief Justice Davide
has explained this authority of Congress, during the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Convention, thus: (emphasis supplied)
"Mr. Davide. x x x Insofar as the application of the customary laws governing
property rights' or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the
ancestral domain is concerned, it is respectfully submitted that the particular
matter must be submitted to Congress. I understand that the idea of Comm.
Bennagen is for the possibility of the codification of these customary laws. So
before these are codified, we cannot now mandate that the same must
immediately be applicable. We leave it to Congress to determine the extent of
the ancestral domain and the ownership thereof in relation to whatever may
have been codified earlier. So, in short, let us not put the cart ahead of the
horse."15
The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look closely
into the customary laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals, to
hew them to, and make them part of, the stream of laws. The "due process
clause," as I so understand it in Tañada vs. Tuvera would require an apt
publication of a legislative enactment before it is permitted to take force and
effect. So, also, customary laws, when specifically enacted to become part of
statutory law, must first undergo that publication to render them
correspondingly binding and effective as such, (emphasis in the original)
I share Justice Vitug's view. Laws must be published before they take effect. The
publication of all laws "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandatory.36 Without publication, non-ICCs/IPs would be deprived of due
process of law.37
The NCIP has Primary Jurisdiction over Claims
regardless of whether the parties are non-ICCs/IPs,
or members of a different ICCs/IPs.
I note that Section 66 applies only to "disputes" and not to "claims":
SECTION 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. — The NCIP, through its regional offices,
shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs:
Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless
the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws,
xxx xxx (emphasis and omissions supplied)
The word "claim" in section 66 relates to rights of ICC/IP over ancestral
domains/lands.38
Four sections in the IPRA are dedicated to the NCIP's jurisdiction over
"claims": first, Section 52 (h), which refers to the power of the NCIP Ancestral
Domains Office (NCIP-ADO) to deny applications for CADTs; second, Section 53,
which refers to the NCIP-ADO's power to reject applications for Certificate of
Ancestral Land Titles(CALTs); third, Sec. 54, on fraudulent claims; lastly, Sec.
62, which refers to the resolution of adverse claims.
Sections 52 (h) and 53 require the NCIP-ADO to publish and post applications
for CADTs/CALTs to notify all persons, including non-ICCs/IPs. Section 62
allows all interested persons, including non-ICCs/IPs, to file adverse claims over
disputes arising from delineation of ancestral domains.39
Under Section 54, the NCIP may, upon the written request of ICCs/IPs, review
existing claims and after notice and hearing, cancel CADTs and CALTs that were
fraudulently acquired by any person or community.40
In these cases, the NCIP has jurisdiction even if one of the parties is a non-
ICC/IP, or where the opposing parties are members of different ICCs/IPs.
The NCIP's jurisdiction is
primary and not exclusive.
Finally, I wish to point out that while the NCIP possesses quasi-judicial powers,
its jurisdiction is not exclusive.
The word "jurisdiction" in the first part of Section 66 is unqualified. Section 66
(then Section 71) of Senate Bill 1728 was originally worded exclusive and
original jurisdiction.41 During the Bicameral Committee Conference,42 the lower
house objected to giving the NCIP exclusive and original jurisdiction:
Sen. Juan Flavier: There is exclusive original. And so what do
(Chairman of the you suggest?
Senate Panel)
..... ....
Rep. Zapata Chairman, may I butt in?
(Chairman of the
Panel for the House
of Representatives):
Sen. Flavier: Yes, please.
Rep. Zapata: This was considered. The original, we were
willing in the house. But the "exclusive", we
objected to the word "exclusive" because it
would only be the commission that would
exclude the court and the Commission may
not be able to undertake all the review
nationwide. And so we remove the word
"exclusive", so that they will have
original jurisdiction but with the removal
of the word "exclusive" that would mean
that they may bring the case to the
ordinary courts of justice.
Sen. Flavier: Without passing through the commission?
Rep. Zapata: Yes. Anyway, if they go to the regular courts,
they will have to litigate in court, because if
its (sic) exclusive, that would be good.
Sen. Flavier: But what he is saying is that...
Rep. Zapata: But they may not have the facility.
Rep.______ Senado na lang.
Rep. Zapata: Oo, iyong original na lang.
Sen. Flavier: In other words, it's not only the
Commission that can originate
it, pwedeng mag-originate sa courts.
Rep. Zapata Or else, we just remove "exclusive original"
so that they will say, the National will have
jurisdiction over claims. So we remove both
"exclusive and original".
Sen. Flavier: So what version are you batting for, Mr.
Chairman?
Rep. Zapata: Just to remove the word "exclusive
original." The Commission will still have
jurisdiction only that, if the parties will
opt to go to courts of justice, then this
have (sic) the proper jurisdiction, then
they may do so because we have courts
nationwide. Here there may be not enough
courts of the commission.
Sen. Flavier: So we are going to adopt the senate version
minus the words "exclusive original"?
Rep. Zapata: Yes, Mr. Chairman, that's my proposal.
Sen. Flavier: No, problem. Okay Approved.
xxxx
The Bicameral Committee's removal of the words "exclusive and original"
meant that the NCIP shares concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts.
Thus, I agree with the revised ponencia that it would be ultra vires for NCIP to
promulgate rules and regulations stating that it has exclusive jurisdiction.
The NCIP's jurisdiction, however, while not exclusive, is primary.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from
determining a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction
of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience
and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.43
On the other hand, when Congress confers exclusive jurisdiction to a judicial or
quasi-judicial entity over certain matters by law, its action evinces its intent to
exclude other bodies from exercising the same.44
Having primary jurisdiction is not equivalent to having exclusive
jurisdiction. Thus, to avoid confusion, and to prevent future litigants from
claiming that the NCIP has exclusive jurisdiction, the Court should remind the
NCIP and other administrative bodies to refrain from claiming that they have
exclusive jurisdiction when no such jurisdiction is conferred by law.
Accordingly, the NCIP's Implementing Rules and Regulations, which state that
the NCIP has exclusive jurisdiction45 should be modified to read "primary
jurisdiction."
Conclusion
In sum, the law's intent is neither to grant the NCIP sole jurisdiction over
disputes involving ICCs/IPs, nor to disregard the rights of non-ICCs/IPs under
national laws. However, the NCIP maintains primary jurisdiction over: (i)
adverse claims and border disputes arising from delineation of ancestral
domains/lands; (ii) cancellation of fraudulently issued CADTs; and (iii) disputes
and violations of ICCs/IPs rights between members of the same ICC/IP.
For these reasons, I vote to grant the petition. The RTC should forthwith
continue with the injunction case.
Endnotes:
1Rollo, pp. 62-63.
2Marcelo G. Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 665 Phil. 267
(2011). See Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132753, February 15, 1999, 103
SCAD 430, 303 SCRA 186.
4 See Delbros v. IAC, G.R. No. L-72566, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 533.
5Mendoza v. Germino, 650 Phil. 81 (2010), citing Morta, Sr, v. Occidental, G.R. No.
123417, June 10, 1999, 308 SCRA 167.
6 Page 12 of the Ponencia.
7 Section 19 (1), Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
8Nuñezv. SLTEAS Phoenix Solutions, Inc, G.R. No. 1 80542, April 12, 2010, 618
SCRA 142.
9Borromeo v. Mariano, 41 Phil. 326 (1921), citing 25 R. C. L., pp. 984, et seq.; and
specifically, the leading cases of McKnight v. Hodge [1909], 55 Wash., 289, 104
Pac, 504, 40 L. R. A. [N.S.], 1207; McCormick v. West Duluth [1891], 47 Minn.,
272, 50 N.W., 128; Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist[1916], 26 Idaho, 222;
141 Pac, 1083, Ann. Cas. [1916 E], p. 282, where these principles concerning
provisos are applied.)
10 Section 15 of the IPRA.
11 Supra note 9.
12Chapter III grants the ICCs/IPs the right to own and possess their ancestral
domains/lands including the right to: claim ownership; develop; not to be
relocated; be resettled, and to return in case of displacement; regulate the entry
of migrants; access integrated systems for the management of inland waters and
air space; claim parts of reservations; resolve land conflicts in accord with
customary laws of the area; transfer lands to/among the members of the same
ICCs/IPs; redeem property sold to a non-member of an ICC/IP, whenever
necessary.
13Chapter IV grants ICCs/IPs the right to: use their own justice system, conflict
resolution institutions and peace building processes; determine their priorities
for development; form tribal barangays.
14Chapter V grants the ICCs/IPs the right to: equal protection of laws;
protection during armed conflicts; equal employment opportunities and
benefits; associate and to collectively bargain; basic services. In addition, IPRA
declares that ICC/IP women shall enjoy equal rights and opportunities with
men.
15Chapter VI grants the ICCs/IPs the right to: preserve and protect their culture,
traditions and institutions; access to education; practice and revitalize their
traditions and customs; restitution of intellectual property taken without their
free consent; maintain and protect their religious and cultural sites; use and
control ceremonial objects; repatriate human remains; full ownership, control
and protection of their cultural and intellectual rights; prevent access to
biological, genetic resources and indigenous knowledge without their free and
prior consent; receive from the national government funds earmarked for their
archaeological and historical sites.
16 Section 7 of the IPRA.
17 Section 8 of the IPRA.
18 Section 21 of the IPRA.

19 Section 24 of the IPRA.
20 Section 33 of the IPRA.
21 Section 35 of the IPRA.
22 SECTION 72. Punishable Acts and Applicable Penalties. — Any person who
commits violation of any of the provisions of this Act, such as, but not limited to,
unauthorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon any ancestral lands or domains as
stated in Sec. 10, Chapter III, or shall commit any of the prohibited acts
mentioned in Sections 21 and 24, Chapter V, Section 33, Chapter VI hereof, shall
be punished in accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned:
Provided, That no such penalty shall be cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment: Provided, further, That neither shall the death penalty or excessive
fines be imposed. This provision shall be without prejudice to the right of any
ICCs/IPs to avail of the protection of existing laws. In which case, any person
who violates any provision of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by
imprisonment of not less than nine (9) months but not more than twelve (12)
years or a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) nor
more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or both such fine and
imprisonment upon the discretion of the court. In addition, he shall be obliged
to pay to the ICCs/IPs concerned whatever damage may have been suffered by
the latter as a consequence of the unlawful act.
23 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionarv/without prejudice.
24 Section 72 of the IPRA.
25 Under Section 46 (g), the NClP-Legal Affairs Office (NCIP-LAO) shall conduct
preliminary investigations on violations of 1CC/IP rights and on the basis of its
findings, initiate the filing of appropriate legal or administrative action to the
NCIP. The Legal or Administrative Action that Section 46 (g) refers to is the
action to enforce punishment under customary laws.
26 See Tahada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985, 146 SCRA 446.
27 Section 46 (g) of the IPRA.
28The IPRA is the product of Senate Bill 1728 and House Bill 9125. The bill
originated from the Senate, and was the consolidation of four separate bills: S.B.
Nos. 343, 618, 1476, and 1486. Then as senator, former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo authored Senate Bill No. 618, which proposed the creation of
the NCIP.
29 July 30, 1996 Committee on Cultural Communities; Senate Technical Working
Group.
30 Sec. 46 (b) of the IPRA.
31 Section 50 of the IPRA.
32 The CONSTITUTION, Section 5, Art. XII.
33 Section 2 (b) of the IPRA.
34G.R. No. 135385, 400 Phil. 904 (2000); In this case, the divided Court upheld
the IPRA's Constitutionality.
35 Id., Separate Opinion.
36 Supra note 26.
37 CONSTITUTION, Art. Ill, Sec. 1.
38The IPRA classified claims as either communal or individual. The word
"claim" or "claims" appeared fifteen times in the IPRA in different sections and
sub-sections, all of which are connected with ancestral domains and
lands: First, under Sections 3 (a) in defining ancestral domain; second, Section
3 (b) in defining Ancestral Lands; third, Sec. 3 (e) in defining Communal
Claims; fourth, in Sec. 3 (h) in classifying ICCs/IPs; fifth, in Sec. 3 (j) on defining
individual claims; sixth, in Sec. 3 (1) in defining native titles; seventh, Sec. 4 on
the concept of ancestral lands; eighth, in Sec. 7 (a) on the right of ownership of
ancestral domains; ninth, in Sec. 7 (g) on the right to claim parts of
reservations; tenth, in Sec. 52 (d) on proof of Ancestral Domain
Claims; eleventh, in Sec. 52 (h) discussing when NCIP can favorably endorse an
action upon a claim on Ancestral Land; twelfth, in Sec. 53 in the Identification,
Delineation and Certification of Ancestral Lands; in sec. 54 on fraudulent
claims; thirteenth, in Sec. 62 on resolving adverse claims in delineated
ancestral lands; fourteenth, in Sec. 63 on the applicability of laws with respect
to claims of ownership of property disputes, and fifteenth, under section 66.
39SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts. — In cases of conflicting interests, where
there are adverse claims within the ancestral domains as delineated in the
survey plan, and which cannot be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide, after
notice to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such
ancestral domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among
ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral
domains, customary process shall be followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions:
Provided, further, That any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any
ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application,
implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for
Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of a copy thereof.
40 Section 54 of the IPRA.
41The Commission, through its Regional Offices, shall have exclusive original
jurisdictionover all claims and disputes involving rights of indigenous people:
Provided, however, that no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the
parties have exhausted all remedies under their customary laws. For this
purpose a Certification shall be issued by the Council who participated in the
attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which
certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the
Commission, (underscoring ours)
42October 9, 1997; Bicameral Conference Meeting on the Disagreeing
Provisions of SBN 1728 and HBN 9125.
43Phil
Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010,
635 SCRA 140, 153.
44Pua
v. Citibank, G.R. No. 180064, September 16, 2013, 705 SCRA 684.
45RULE III. The NCIP shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of the ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation,
enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the
following:
A. Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office:
(emphasis supplied)
1. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral
lands/domains of ICCs/IPs, except those which involve
oppositions to pending applications for CALT and
CADT;cralawlawlibrary
2. Enforcement of compromise agreements or decisions rendered
by ICCs/IPs;cralawlawlibrary
3. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8 (b) of
R.A. 8371;cralawlawlibrary
4. Interpretation, implementation, or enforcement of
Memorandum of Agreements (MOA) entered into by parties as
a result of the Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)
process;cralawlawlibrary
5. Cases involving Projects, Programs, Activities within ancestral
lands/domains being implemented without the required FPIC
of the affected/host IPs/ICCs;cralawlawlibrary
6. Petitions for annotation on CADTs and CALTs or cancellations
thereof, except notice of Us pendens and those that will result
to transfer of ownership;cralawlawlibrary
7. Actions for damages including, but not limited to, claims for
royalties and other benefits.
8. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and
among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary
laws; and
9. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
B. Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commission En Banc (emphasis
supplied)
1. Petition for cancellation of registered CADTs and CALTs alleged
to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any
person or community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A.
8371, provided that such action is filed within one (1) year
from the date of registration;cralawlawlibrary
2. Actions for cancellations of Certification Precondition (CP),
Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO), issued by the NCIP, as well
as, rescissions of FP1C-M0A; and
3. Any other case that deems to vary, amend, or revoke
previously issued rulings, resolutions, or decisions of the
Commission en banc.
CONCURRING OPINION
PEREZ, J.:
While I agree with the holding in this case that jurisdiction over the original and
amended complaint, accion reivindicatoria and injunction, before the court a
quo, correctly lies with the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): (1) an accion
reivindicatoria, a civil action involving interest in real property with an assessed
value of P683,760.00; and (2) an injunction, a civil action incapable of pecuniary
estimation, I offer my view on the complex nature of the jurisdiction of the
National Commission of Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) conferred in the Indigenous
People's Rights Act (IPRA), Republic Act No. 8371.
Even if in this case the complaint was amended from an accion reivindicatoria to
one for injunction, both containing allegations clearly falling within the RTCs
jurisdiction, petitioners insist and maintain that as indigenous persons, except
for two (2) petitioners, with the subject property claimed as their ancestral
land, the NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case. For the
petitioners, with a submission that the ponencia already dismissed, the mere
fact that this case involves members of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Persons (ICCs/IPs) and their ancestral land,
automatically endows the NCIP, under Section 66 of the IPRA, with jurisdiction
over petitioners' complaint. Even the NCIP is of the view of its original and
exclusive jurisdiction over both the original and amended complaints. Hence,
the two (2) Motions to Refer the Case to the Regional Hearing Office-National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (RHO-NCIP) filed by the NCIP Hearing
Officer before the court a quo.
I concur with the ponencia on the basis of the principle that "jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the
allegations in the complaint, and that the averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted." As clearly delineated
in the ponencia, upon a careful review of Section 66 and based on the qualifying
proviso, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to
the same ICC/IP. And, as clearly alleged by the petitioners in their complaint, the
defendants they impleaded are not indigenous people.
I submit that the jurisdiction of the NCIP ought to be definitively drawn to settle
doubts that still linger due to the implicit affirmation done in The City
Government of Baguio City, et al. v. Atty. Masweng, et al.1 of the NCIP's
jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties are not ICCs/IPs.
Jurisdiction is the power and authority, conferred by the Constitution and by
statute, to hear and decide a case.2 The authority to decide a cause at all is what
makes up jurisdiction.
The enabling statute, Section 66 of the IPRA, is the measure of quasi-judicial
powers the NCIP may exercise:3
Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall
have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs:
Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless
the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary
laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the
same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent
to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. (Emphasis supplied).
The conferment of such jurisdiction is consistent with state policy averred in the
IPRA which recognizes and promotes all the rights of ICCs/IPs within the
framework of the Constitution. Such is likewise reflected in the mandate of the
NCIP to protect and promote the interest and well-being of the ICCs/IPs with
due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions.4
The other provisions point out that the NCIP is the primary government agency
responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and
programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and
the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights
thereto.5Nonetheless, the creation of such a government agency does not per
se grant it primary and/or exclusive and original jurisdiction, excluding the
regular courts from taking cognizance, and exercising jurisdiction over cases
which may involve rights of ICCs/IPs.
Significantly, while Section 66 uses the word "all" to qualify the ICCs/IPs "claims
and disputes" covered by NCIP jurisdiction, it unmistakably contains the
proviso, that restrains or limits the initial generality of the grant of jurisdiction.
As outlined in the ponencia, the elements of the grant of jurisdiction to the NCIP
are: (1) the claim and dispute involves the rights of ICCs/IPs; and (2) both
parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. Both
elements must be present prior to the invocation and exercise of the NCIP's
jurisdiction.
We cannot, therefore, be confined to the first phrase that the NCIP shall have
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and
therefrom deduce primary sole NCIP jurisdiction over all ICCs/IPs claims and
disputes to the exclusion of the regular courts. If it were the legislative
intention that: (1) the NCIP exercise primary jurisdiction over, and/or (2) the
regular courts be excluded from taking cognizance of, claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs, the legislature could have easily done so as in other
instances conferring primary, and original and exclusive jurisdiction to a
specific administrative body.
Primary jurisdiction, also known as the doctrine of Prior Resort, is the power
and authority vested by the Constitution or by statute upon an administrative
body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific competence.6 The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction prevents the court from arrogating unto itself the authority
to resolve a controversy which falls under the jurisdiction of a tribunal
possessed with special competence.7 In one occasion, we have held that regular
courts cannot or should not determine a controversy involving a question which
is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal before the question is
resolved by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply
with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered.8 The objective of the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is "to guide a court in determining whether it
should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative
agency has determined some question arising in the proceeding before the
court."9
Additionally, primary jurisdiction does not necessarily denote exclusive
jurisdiction.10 It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and
comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its
view.11 In some instances, the Constitution and statutes grant the administrative
body primary jurisdiction, concurrent with either similarly authorized
government agencies or the regular courts, such as the distinct kinds of
jurisdiction bestowed by the Constitution and statutes on the Ombudsman.
The case of Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice12delineated primary and concurrent jurisdiction as
opposed to original and exclusive jurisdiction vested by both the Constitution
and statutes13 on the Ombudsman concurrent, albeit primary, with the
Department of Justice.
Paragraph (1) of Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions,
and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
does not exclude other government agencies tasked by law to investigate and
prosecute cases involving public officials. If it were the intention of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution, they would have expressly declared the exclusive
conferment of the power to the Ombudsman. Instead, paragraph (8) of the same
Section 13 of the Constitution provides:
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or
perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Accordingly, Congress enacted R.A. 6770, otherwise known as "The
Ombudsman Act of 1989." Section 15 thereof provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act
or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
Pursuant to the authority given to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 to lay down its own rules and procedure, the Office of
the Ombudsman promulgated Administrative Order No. 8, dated November 8,
1990, entitled, Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, to wit:
A complaint filed in or taken cognizance of by the Office of the Ombudsman
charging any public officer or employee including those in government-owned
or controlled corporations, with an act or omission alleged to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient is an Ombudsman case. Such a complaint may be the
subject of criminal or administrative proceedings, or both.
For purposes of investigation and prosecution, Ombudsman cases involving
criminal offenses may be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (I) those cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts
wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the
authority to prosecute, such cases.
The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any
Ombudsman case may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office
of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance,
either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
The prosecution of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the
direct exclusive control and supervision of the Office of the Ombudsman. In cases
cognizable by the regular Courts, the control and supervision by the Office of the
Ombudsman is only in Ombudsman cases in the sense defined above. The law
recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombudsman and
other investigative agencies of the government in the prosecution of cases
cognizable by regular courts.
It is noteworthy that as early as 1990, the Ombudsman had properly
differentiated the authority to investigate cases from the authority to
prosecute cases. It is on this note that the Court will first dwell on the
nature or extent of the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate cases.
Whence, focus is directed to the second sentence of paragraph (1), Section
15 of the Ombudsman Act which specifically provides that the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may
take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government,
the investigation of such cases.
That the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public
officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other
similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the provincial,
city and state prosecutors has long been settled in several decisions of the
Court. (Emphasis supplied)
In Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, decided in
1990, the Court expressly declared:
A reading of the foregoing provision of the Constitution does not show that the
power of investigation including preliminary investigation vested on the
Ombudsman is exclusive.
Interpreting the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of
the Ombudsman Act, the Court held in said case:
Under Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 aforecited, the Ombudsman has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan so that it may
take over at any stage from any investigatory agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases.The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent
with other similarly authorized agencies of the government. Such investigatory
agencies referred to include the PCGG and the provincial and city prosecutors and
their assistants, the state prosecutors and the judges of the municipal trial courts
and municipal circuit trial court.
In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all
investigatory agencies of the government duly authorized to conduct a
preliminary investigation under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the only qualification that the Ombudsman may take over at any
stage of such investigation in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction.
A little over a month later, the Court, in Deloso vs. Domingo, pronounced that the
Ombudsman, under the authority of Section 13 (1) of the 1987 Constitution, has
jurisdiction to investigate any crime committed by a public official, elucidating
thus:
As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function
and duty to "act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against
public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate x x x any act or omission of any
public official x x x when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13.) The Ombudsman is also empowered to
"direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take
appropriate action against a public official xxx and to recommend his
prosecution" (Sec. 13).
The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough
to embrace any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify
the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that
the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be
related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty.
Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for
the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from the
long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges' and fiscals'
offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and
through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss
investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers.
It was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to
investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether
or not the acts or omissions complained of are related to or arise from the
performance of the duties of their office. The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly
clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses "all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasancethat have been committed by any
officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of
office" (Sec. 16, R.A. 6770).
Indeed, the labors of the constitutional commission that created the
Ombudsman as a special body to investigate erring public officials would be
wasted if its jurisdiction were confined to the investigation of minor and less
grave offenses arising from, or related to, the duties of public office, but would
exclude those grave and terrible crimes that spring from abuses of official
powers and prerogatives, for it is the investigation of the latter where the need
for an independent, fearless, and honest investigative body, like the
Ombudsman, is greatest.
At first blush, there appears to be conflicting views in the rulings of the Court in
theCojuangco, Jr. case and the Deloso case. However, the contrariety is more
apparent than real. In subsequent cases, the Court elucidated on the nature of
the powers of the Ombudsman to investigate.

In 1993, the Court held in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, that while it may be true that
the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or
omission of any public official, the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate is
merely a primary and not an exclusive authority, thus:
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA
6770 to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public
official. However as we held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo vs.
Domagas, this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in
this case needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the
information and amended information here did not have the approval of the
Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval was necessary at
all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 (1990), the Court held that the
Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal acts or omissions on
the part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It must,
however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any
[illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA 550) is not an exclusive
authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense
charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the
Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence
upon the authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the
information or amended information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies of the government such as the Department of
Justice in connection with the charge of sedition, and the Presidential Commission
on Good Government, in ill gotten wealth cases, may conduct the investigation.
In Natividad vs. Felix, a 1994 case, where the petitioner municipal mayor
contended that it is the Ombudsman and not the provincial fiscal who has the
authority to conduct a preliminary investigation over his case for alleged
Murder, the Court held:
The Deloso case has already been re-examined in two cases, namely Aguinaldo
vs. Domagas and Sanchez vs. Demetriou. However, by way of amplification, we
feel the need for tracing the history of the legislation relative to the jurisdiction
of Sandiganbayan since the Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction is dependent on
the cases cognizable by the former.
In the process, we shall observe how the policy of the law, with reference to the
subject matter, has been in a state of flux.
These laws, in chronological order, are the following: (a) Pres. Decree No. 1486,
— the first law on the Sandiganbayan; (b) Pres. Decree No. 1606 which
expressly repealed Pres. Decree No. 1486; (c) Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129; (d) Pres. Decree No. 1860; and (e) Pres. Decree No. 1861.
The latest law on the Sandiganbayan, Sec. 1 of Pres. Decree No. 1861 reads as
follows:
"SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
'SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: '(a) Exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in
relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporation, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where
the penalty prescribed by law is higher that prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fme of P6,000: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that
offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed
by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or
a fme of P6,000 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court."
A perusal of the aforecited law shows that two requirements must concur under
Sec. 4 (a) (2) for an offense to fall under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction,
namely: the offense committed by the public officer must be in relation to his
office and the penalty prescribed be higher then prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00.
Applying the law to the case at bench, we find that although the second
requirement has been met, the first requirement is wanting. A review of these
Presidential Decrees, except Batas Pambansa Big. 129, would reveal that the
crime committed by public officers or employees must be "in relation to their
office" if it is to fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This phrase
which is traceable to Pres. Decree No. 1468, has been retained by Pres. Decree
No. 1861 as a requirement before the Ombudsman can acquire primary
jurisdiction on its power to investigate.
It cannot be denied that Pres. Decree No. 1861 is in pan materia to Article XI,
Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act of 1989
because, as earlier mentioned, the Ombudsman's power to investigate is
dependent on the cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. Statutes are in pari
materia when they relate to the same person or thing or to the same class of
persons or things, or object, or cover the same specific or particular subject
matter.
It is axiomatic in statutory construction that a statute must be interpreted, not
only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on the same
subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system. The rule is
expressed in the maxim, "interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi, " or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. Thus, in the application and
interpretation of Article XI, Sections 12 and 13 of the 1987 Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, Pres. Decree No. 1861 must be taken into consideration.
It must be assumed that when the 1987 Constitution was written, its framers had
in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter. In the absence of
any express repeal or amendment, the 1987 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act
of 1989 are deemed in accord with existing statute, specifically, Pres. Decree No.
1861.
R.A. No. 8249 which amended Section 4, paragraph (b) of the Sandiganbayan
Law (P.D. 1861) likewise provides that for other offenses, aside from those
enumerated under paragraphs (a) and (c), to fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they must have been committed by public
officers or employees in relation to their office.
In summation, the Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989
and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the
Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by
public officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent
with other government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and
state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may
take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government,
the investigation of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting
any investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of
penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction take over at any stage. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary
investigation on charges against any public officers or employees may be
exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city prosecutor or
their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized
Ombudsman prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are in effect
deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ Circular is a mere
superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the
Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed
with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of the
government and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised
Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had
been held in the Natividad case as not being contrary to the Constitution.
Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary
investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first
place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at
any stage of the investigation. (Emphasis supplied)
I referred to Honasan II to emphasize the point that the NCIP cannot be said to
have primary jurisdiction over all the ICC/IP cases comparable to what the
Ombudsman has in cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. We do not find such specificity in the grant of jurisdiction to the
NCIP in Section 66 of the IPRA.
Neither does the IPRA confer original and exclusive jurisdiction to the NCIP
over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs.
Here, I revert to the point on the investiture of primary and/or original and
exclusive jurisdiction to an administrative body which in all instances of such
grant was explicitly provided in the Constitution and/or the enabling statute, to
wit:
1. Commission on Elections' exclusive original jurisdiction over all elections
contests;14
2. Securities and Exchange Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-
A15 prior to its transfer to courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate
Regional Trial Court by virtue of Section 4 of the Securities Regulation
Code;cralawlawlibrary
3. Energy Regulatory Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases contesting rates, fees, fines and penalties imposed by it in the exercise of
its powers, functions and responsibilities;16
4. Department of Agrarian Reform's17 primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and its exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources;18
5. Construction' Industry Arbitration Commission's original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes involving contracts of construction, whether
government or private, as long as the parties agree to submit the same to
voluntary arbitration;19
6. Voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators' original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of the collective bargaining agreement and those arising from
the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies; 20
7. The National Labor Relations Commission's original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases listed in Article 217 of the Labor Code involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural; and
8. Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration's primary and
exclusive jurisdiction over all deportation cases.21
That the proviso found in Section 66 of the IPRA is exclusionary, specifically
excluding disputes involving rights of IPs/ICCs where the opposing party is non-
ICC/IP, is reflected in the IPRA's emphasis of customs and customary law to
govern in the lives of the ICCs/IPs.
Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to the special and limited jurisdiction
of the NCIP even if the dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no
power and authority to decide on a controversy involving as well rights of
non-ICCs/IPs which may be brought before a court of general jurisdiction
within the legal bounds of rights and remedies. Even as a practical concern,
non-IPs and non-members of ICCs ought to be excepted from the NCIP's
competence since it cannot determine the right-duty correlative, and breach
thereof, between opposing parties who are ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs, the
controversy necessarily contemplating application of other laws, not only
customs and customary law of the ICCs/IPs. In short, the NCIP is only vested
with jurisdiction to determine the rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs and
customary law in a given controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the
applicable law for each and every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an
opposing non-ICC/IP.
In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,22 the Court delineated the jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, specifically paragraph 3 thereof, as all money
claims of workers, limited to "cases arising from employer-employee relations."
The same clause was not expressly carried over, in printer's ink, in Article 217
as it exists today, but the Court ruled that such was a limitation on the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, thus:
The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission
is outlined in Article 217 of the Labor Code xxx:
"ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. — (a) The Labor
Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for
decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;cralawlawlibrary
2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms
and conditions of employment;cralawlawlibrary
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or
underpayment of-wages, overtime compensation, separation pay and other
benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for
employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity
benefits;cralawlawlibrary
4. Cases involving household services; and
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Labor Arbiters."
While paragraph 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is not
necessary to suppose that the entire universe of money claims that might
be asserted by workers against their employers has been absorbed into
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. In the first place,
paragraph 3 should be read not in isolation from but rather within the context
formed by paragraph 1 (relating to unfair labor practices), paragraph 2 (relating
to claims concerning terms and conditions of employment), paragraph 4 (claims
relating to household services, a particular species of employer-employee
relations), and paragraph 5 (relating to certain activities prohibited to
employees or to employers). It is evident that there is a unifying element which
runs through paragraphs 1 to 5 and that is, that they all refer to cases or
disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee
relationship. This is, in other words, a situation where the rule of noscitur a
sociis may be usefully invoked in clarifying the scope of paragraph 3, and any
other paragraph of Article 217 of the Labor Code, as amended. We reach the
above conclusion from an examination of the terms themselves of Article 217,
as last amended by BP Blg. 227, and even though earlier versions of Article 217
of the Labor Code expressly brought within the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiters and the NLRC "cases arising from employer-employee relations,'"
which clause was not expressly carried over, in printer's ink, in Article 217 as it
exists today. For it cannot be presumed that money claims of workers which do
not arise out of or in connection with their employer-employee relationship,
and which would therefore fall within the general jurisdiction of the regular
courts of justice, were intended by the legislative authority to be taken away
from the jurisdiction of the courts and lodged with Labor Arbiters on an
exclusive basis. The Court, therefore, believes and so holds that the "money
claims of workers" referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 217 embraces money
claims which arise out of or in connection the employer-employee relationship,
or some aspect or incident of such relationship. Put a little differently, that
money claims of workers which now fall within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money claims which have some
reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the phraseology of "all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs"
does not necessarily grant the NCIP all-encompassing jurisdiction whenever the
case involves rights of ICCs/IPs without regard to the status of the parties, i.e.
whether the opposing parties are both ICCs/IPs.
In all, for the reason that under the provisions of the IPRA, specifically Section
66 thereof, the jurisdiction of the NCIP is special and limited, confined only to
cases involving rights of IPs/ICCs, where both such parties belong to the same
ICC/IP, the original and amended complaint herein properly fall within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts, specifically the RTC. Thus, I concur in the
denial of the petition.
Endnotes:
1 G.R. No. 180206, 597 Phil. 668 (2009).
2Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. Nos. 154470-71 and G.R.
Nos. 154589-90, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA521 556
3 Id.
4 Section 39 IPRA.
5 Section 38 IPRA.
6Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125339, June 22, 1998, 291 SCRA 122,
132.
7 See Crusaders Broadcasting System, Inc. v. NTC, 388 Phil. 624, 636 (2000).
8Sps. Abejo v. Judge De la Cruz, 233 Phil. 668, 684-685 (1987).
9Fabia v. Court of Appeals, 437 Phil. 389, 403 (2002).
10Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of
Justice, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 46, 67.
11Supra note 9.
12Supra note 10.
13Republic Act No. 6770, known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989" and the
"1987 Administrative Code."
14 Article IX-C, Section 2, paragraph 2.
SEC. 2. The Commission on elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction, xxx
15Section 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the
Securities and Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other
forms of associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws
and decrees, it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving.
a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts, of the board of directors,
business associates, its officers or partnership, amounting to fraud and
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
and/or of the stockholder, partners, members of associations or organizations
registered with the Commission.
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations,
between and among stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of
them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are
stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their
individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; and
c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers
or managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations.
16 RA 9136, Section 43, paragraph u.
17Including the creation of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
board (DARAB).
18The DAR's jurisdiction under Section 50 of RA 6657 is two-fold: (1)
Essentially executive and pertains to the enforcement and administration of
laws, carrying them into practical operation and enforcing their due observance,
while the second is judicial and involves the determination of rights and
obligations of the parties.
19Except for disputes arising from employer-employee relationships which
shall continue to be covered by the Labor Cdde of the Philippines; EO No. 1008
or the Construction Industry Arbitration Law.
20 Articles 260-261 of the Labor Code.
21 Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 10, Section 31.
22 G.R. No. 80774, 244 Phil. 741, 747 (1988).
CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J..:
I concur with the ponencia in holding that respondents' action, alleged to be
involving a claim over the ancestral domain of an indigenous cultural
community/indigenous people (ICC/IP), does not fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).
A careful reading of Section 661 of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as
the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997, with particular emphasis on its
proviso will reveal that the jurisdiction of the NCIP is limited to disputes where
both parties are members of ICC/IPs and come from the same ethnolinguistic
group.
Thus, the assailed Decision dated August 17, 2006 and Resolution dated July 4,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-MIN must be affirmed.
The present Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 is an offshoot of a Petition
for Accion Reivindicatoria with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order or preliminary prohibitory injunction with damages3 (Original Complaint)
filed by respondents against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon on March 3, 2004, docketed as Civil Case No. 04-03-
01. This Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria was subsequently amended by
respondents into a Complaint for injunction, damages, and other
relief4 (Amended Complaint).
On March 20, 2004, petitioners Brazil and Macapayag filed their Answer to the
original Complaint, asserting that respondents had no cause of action against
them.5
On March 23, 2004, the other petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. They argued
that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the case. They asserted
that they were members of the Miarayon, Lapok, Lirongan Talaandig Tribal
Association or the Talaandig Tribe, and claimed residence in Barangay
Miarayon, Talakag, Bukidnon. They noted that on July 25, 2003, Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Claim No. R-10-TAL-0703-0010 was issued in favor of the
Talaandig Tribe through NCIP En Bane Resolution No. 08-2003. On October 30,
2003, this Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim was formally awarded to the
Talaandig Tribe by former President Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo. The Certificate
covered a total area of 11,105.5657 hectares in Barangay Miarayon, Talakag,
Bukidnon.6 Petitioners argued that as the case filed by respondents entailed a
dispute over the ancestral land of an ICC/IP, it fell within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the NCIP.7
On July 1, 2004, the NCIP filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional
Hearing Office - National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (Motion to Refer).
As with petitioners who filed the Motion to Dismiss, the NCIP insisted that the
Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction over the case.8
On July 5, 2004, respondents filed a Motion to Amend and Supplement the
original Complaint into one for injunction, damages, and other relief. Attached
to this Motion was the amended Complaint.9
On July 30, 3004, petitioners filed their Opposition to the Admission of the
amended Complaint. On August 1, 2004, they also filed a Motion to Dismiss the
amended Complaint, insisting on the Regional Trial Court's lack of jurisdiction. 10
On August 10, 2004, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order granting the
Motion to Amend and Supplement. The same Order declared the NCIP's Motion
to Refer and petitioners' Motions to Dismiss moot and academic.11
On August 25, 2004, petitioners filed another Motion to Refer and another
Motion to Dismiss.12
On September 14, 2004, respondents filed their Opposition and a Motion for
Judgment by Default.13

On February 14, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order denying the
Motion to Refer, declaring petitioners (except Macapayag and Brazil, who had
earlier filed an Answer) in default, and calling the case for pre-trial (against
Macapayag and Brazil) and for ex-parte presentation of evidence (against the
other petitioners). The court also issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction subject
to respondents' posting of a P100,000.00 bond.14
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals.
In the Decision15 dated August 17, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification (i.e., lifted the order of default) the Regional Trial Court's February
14, 2005 Order. In the Resolution dated July 4, 2007, the Court of Appeals
denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this Petition was filed.
Petitioners pray that the Court of Appeals' August 17, 2006 Decision and July 4,
2007 Resolution be reversed and set aside and that a decision be rendered
declaring that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction, enjoining the
Regional Trial Court from proceeding, ordering that the case be referred to the
NCIP, and declaring void the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the
Regional Trial Court.
Petitioners insist that the NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the
case as it involves the ancestral domain of an ICC/IP. They also assail the
amendment of the Complaint from accion reivindicatoria to one for injunction,
saying that the amendment was made merely to clothe the Regional Trial Court
with jurisdiction and to downplay how the case is ultimately concerned with an
ICC/IP's rights over its ancestral domain. Likewise, they claim that the NCIP
should not be deprived of jurisdiction merely on account of the Complaints'
failure to allege that parties to the case belong to ICCs/IPs.
This case concerns the issue of which, between the Regional Trial Court and the
NCIP, has jurisdiction over the case.
The case filed by respondents does not fall within the scope of the NCIP's
jurisdiction as laid out in Section 6616 of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act.
"Jurisdiction is the power and authority of [a] tribunal to hear, try and decide a
case."17Moreover, "[jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law." 18 It
could not be conferred by any other source, such as the parties' action or
conduct and "any judgment, order or resolution issued without it is void."19
The NCIP does not have jurisdiction over cases where one of the parties does
not belong to an indigenous cultural community.
Section 38 of the Act created the NCIP to carry out the policies set forth in the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Per Section 38, the NCIP "shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of
policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being
of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their
rights thereto." Section 39 provides for the NCIP's mandate to "protect and
promote the interest and well-being of the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their
beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions."
Chapter IX of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act pertains to the quasi-judicial
powers of the NCIP. Thus, Section 6920 expressly enables the NCIP to exercise
powers that are necessary incidents of this quasi-judicial power: the
promulgation of rules and regulations; the administration of oaths; the power to
summon parties, issue subpoenas, and contempt power; and the power to issue
writs of injunction. Section 6821 enables the NCIP to issue writs of execution.
Section 6722 provides for the mode of appeal from decisions of the NCIP. Section
7023 bars inferior courts from restraining proceedings in the NCIP. Section
6524 establishes a framework for resolving disputes by recognizing the primacy
of customary laws and practices.
Section 66 specifically provides for the jurisdiction of the
NCIP:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall
have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs:
Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the
parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For
this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders
who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a
petition with the NCIP.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Section 66's grant of jurisdiction is ostensibly cast in absolute terms:
"over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs."
However, further into Section 66 are two clauses that qualify the NCIP's
jurisdiction. First is the proviso that "no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP
unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary
laws. " Second is that "a certification . . . issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders
who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been
resolved . . . shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.
"
A cursory reading of these clauses shows that they state a procedural
requirement (i.e., exhaustion of remedies under customary law) and a formal
requirement (i.e., certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders) that
must first be complied with before the NCIP may take cognizance of a case.
However, these procedural and formal requirements are not all there is to the
qualifying clauses of Section 66.chanrobleslaw
II
Attention must be drawn to the proviso's choice of words. To reiterate, the
proviso reads: "Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the
NCIP unless the partieshave exhausted all remedies provided
under their customary laws."
The proviso uses the plural term "the parties." It also uses the plural "their,"
which is a possessive pronoun substituting for the noun phrase "the parties."
The use of the plural "the parties" necessarily means that the requirement of
exhaustion of remedies provided under customary laws is a requirement that
is not exclusive to a singular party.
The basic framework of adversarial litigation, as is the case in our a jurisdiction,
is one that entails two (2) parties: first, the one initiating or bringing the action
(i.e., the plaintiff/complainant/ claimant/petitioner); and the one against whom
an action is initiated or brought (i.e., the defendant/respondent).
Thus, for Section 66 to say that "the parties" must exhaust all remedies is to say
that both plaintiff/complainant/claimant/petitioner, on one hand, and
defendant/respondent, on the other, must comply. In a case brought by A
against B, both A and B must comply with the requirement.
Had Section 66 intended that compliance with the requirement by only one
party shall suffice, it should have used the singular "a party," similar language
like "either party" or permissive language like "a/the party/ies? Had Section
66 intended that the requirement must be complied with by a specific party, it
should have used specific language like "the petitioner."
One may point out that the plural "the parties" can be taken to mean two or
more of several petitioners, or two or more of several respondents where there
are multiple petitioners and/or respondents. This interpretation is untenable.
Precisely, it would find application only in situations where there are multiple
petitioners and/or respondents. To adopt this interpretation would, therefore,
be to unduly restrict and to render inutile under general circumstances the
requirement of exhaustion of remedies.chanrobleslaw
III
The phrase "their customary laws" is significant in two respects. First, "their" is
a plural possessive pronoun substituting for the noun phrase "the parties."
Second, "their" is a possessive determiner indicating possession (or otherwise a
sense of belonging) of the words that follow it.
Section 66's use of the phrase "their customary laws" is, therefore, to say that
"the parties" have customary laws. Considering what the phrase "the parties"
refers to (as explained previously), it follows that both the petitioner(s) and the
respondent(s) must have or adhere to customary laws in order that a case
between them may fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP.
Section 3(f) of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act defines "customary laws" as
follows:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms
shall mean:
....
f) Customary Laws — refer to a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages,
customs and practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and
observed by respective ICCs/IPs[.] (Emphasis supplied)
It is evident that only those belonging to ICCs/IPs have or adhere to customary
laws. Since Section 66 refers to parties having customary laws, it follows that
the NCIP's jurisdiction, as defined in Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples'
Rights Act, is limited to parties who belong to ICCs/IPs. It excludes those who do
not.
To hold otherwise is to summarily compel those who do not belong to ICCs/IPs
to adhere and subject themselves to customary laws despite their not having
"traditionally and continually recognized, accepted[,] and observed"25 these
laws. This runs afoul of fair play and violates their right to due process.
Thus, Section 66's qualifiers—as specifically worded—indicate that cases that
fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP must be limited to those where both
parties belong to ICCs/IPs.chanrobleslaw
IV
The requirement that both parties must exhaust all remedies provided under
their customary laws necessarily means that both parties must belong to the
same ICC/IP.
The word "respective" denotes "belonging or relating to each one of the people
or things that have been mentioned."26

Section 3(f) of the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act conceives of "customary laws"
as "refer[ring] to a body of ... rules, usages, customs[,] and practices traditionally
and continually recognized, accepted[,] and observed by respective ICCs/IPs."
Thus, inherent in the Act's conception of "customary laws" is a recognition that
each ICC/IP has a set of continually recognized, accepted, and observed rules,
usages, customs, and practices that is distinct and separate from those of other
ICCs/IPs.
The recognition that ICCs/IPs have distinct customary laws is similarly a
recognition that each ICC/IP has a distinct dispute settlement mechanism
pursuant to their respective customary laws. To belong to a specific ICC/IP is,
therefore, to say that one adheres not only to a specific set of customary laws
but also to a specific dispute settlement mechanism applicable to that ICC/IP.
Thus, much as interpreting Section 66 as encompassing disputes where a party
does not belong to an ICC/IP runs afoul of fair play and violates the (non-ICC/IP
member's) right to due process, so does interpreting Section 66 as
encompassing disputes where the parties belong to different ICCs/IPs. As with
the former, to make such a conclusion is to summarily compel a party who
adheres to a specific set of customary laws and dispute settlement mechanisms
to adhere and be subjected to another set of customary laws.
Rule IV, Section 14 of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03, the Rules on
Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the NCIP (NCIP Rules) provides for
situations "[w]here one of the parties . . . does not belong to the same IP/IC
Community" as an exception to the requirement of a certification issued by the
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute.
This is a recognition that the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act does not provide a
dispute settlement mechanism where the parties belong to different ICCs/IPs.
However, even as Rule IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules does away with the
certification requirement, it cannot serve to extend the NCIP's jurisdiction to
disputes involving parties from different ICCs/IPs.chanrobleslaw
V rights thereto."
Extending the NCIP's jurisdiction to those who do not belong to an indigenous
cultural community or are not indigenous peoples finds no support elsewhere
in the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act.
Section 66 is the sole provision of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act that spells
out the NCIP's jurisdiction in respect of the exercise of its quasi-judicial power.
This court has defined quasi-judicial power as follows:
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the
power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It
is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by
the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative
body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an
act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying
out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies
are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action
and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are
affected it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due
process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.27 (Emphasis
supplied)
Judicial power, in turn, has been defined in Macasiano v. National Housing
Authority,28 as the "right to determine actual controversies arising between
adverse litigants."29 In Lopez v. Roxas:30
Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes
involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of
justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights.31
It is true that the other provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act pertain
to the competencies of the NCIP. However, a reading of these provisions will
show that they do not extend the NCIP's jurisdiction, in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial power, to those who do not belong to ICCs/IPs.
Section 3832 creates the NCIP and states its purpose as "the primary
government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of
policies, plans and programsto promote and protect the rights and well-being
of the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as the
Section 3933 articulates in broad language the mandate of the NCIP to "protect
and promote the interest and well-being of the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their
beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions."
Section 4434 provides that the NCIP shall have the "powers, jurisdiction and
function" provided therein in order that it may "accomplish its mandate."
Section 44 lists 17 of such "powers, jurisdiction and function":
(1) Item (a) identifies the NCIP "as the primary government agency
through which ICCs/IPs can seek government assistance and as the
medium, through which such assistance may be extended."
(2) Item (b) authorizes the NCIP "[t]o review and assess the conditions of
ICCs/IPs ... to propose relevant laws and policies[,]" a function which
is evidently not (quasi-)judicial in nature.
(3) Item (c) refers to the "formulat[ion] and implementation] [of] policies,
plans, programs and projects[.]"
(4) Item (d) permits the NCIP to avail itself of "the services and support"
of experts and consultants, whether from government or the private
sector.
(5) Item (e) places in the NCIP the authority "[t]o issue certificate[s] of
ancestral land/domain title."
(6) Item (f) enables the NCIP "to enter into contracts, agreements, or
arrangement[s]. . . and ... to obtain loans."
(7) Item (g) enables the NCIP "[t]o negotiate for funds and to accept grants,
donations, gifts[,] and/or properties . . . and administer the same."
(8) Item (h) makes the NCIP the "coordinator] [of] development programs
and projects."
(9) Item (i) enables the NCIP "[t]o convene periodic conventions or
assemblies of IPs to review, assess as well as propose policies or plans."
(10) Item (j) spells out the NCIP's advisory and reportorial duties vis-a-vis
the President of the Philippines, i.e., "[t]o advise the President of the
Philippines on all matters relating to the ICCs/IPs and to submit within
sixty (60) days after the close of each calendar year, a report of its
operations and achievements."
(11) Item (k) allows the NCIP "[t]o submit to Congress
appropriate legislative proposals."
(12) Item (1) spells out the budgetary duty of the NCIP, ie., "[t]o prepare and
submit the appropriate budget to the Office of the President."
(13) Item (m) relates to the "issu[ance] [of] . . . certification[s] as a pre-
condition to the grant of... authority for the disposition, utilization,
management[s] and appropriation by any private individual,
corporate entity or any government agency, corporation or
subdivision thereof on any part or portion of the ancestral domain[.]"
(14) Item (n) provides for the NCIP's appellate power, i.e., "[t]o decide all
appealsfrom the decisions and acts of all the various offices within the
Commission."
(15) Item (o) provides for the NCIP's rule-making power, i.e., "[t]o promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act. "
(16) Item (p) is a catch-all provision enabling the NCIP "[t]o exercise such
otherpowers and functions as may be directed by the President of the
Republic of the Philippines."
(17) Item (q) allows the NCIP "[t]o represent the Philippine ICCs/IPs in
all international conferences and conventions dealing with
indigenous peoples and other related concerns."
None but two (2) of these 17 "powers, jurisdiction and function[s]" are directly
related to the NCIP's exercise of its quasi-judicial power. These two (2) items
are item (n)—on the NCIP's appellate power—and Item (o)— on the NCIP's
rule-making power— which may be read vis-a-vis Section 69's investiture upon
the NCIP of the power "[t]o promulgate rules and regulations governing the
hearing and disposition of cases filed before it as well as those pertaining to its
internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of this Act." Neither of these two states that the NCIP's
jurisdiction extends to disputes where a party does not belong to an ICC/IP or to
those where the parties belong to different ICCs/IPs.
Item (m) enables the NCIP to exercise authority over those who not belong to
ICCs/IPs, i.e., "any private individual, corporate entity or any government
agency, corporation or subdivision thereof." However, item (m) refers
specifically to the "issuance of certification[s] as a pre-condition to the grant of
... authority for the disposition, utilization, management[s] and appropriation ...
on any part or portion of the ancestral domain[.]" It does not refer to the
"exercise of discretion in a judicial nature"35 and the "determin[ation] [of] actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants."36
VI
Reliance on the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act's Implementing Rules and
Regulations and the NCIP's rules in support of the assertion that the NCIP has
jurisdiction is misplaced. In extending the NCIP's jurisdiction, these rules
contradict statutory provisions.
Rule IX, Section 1 of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act's Implementing Rules
and Regulations reads:
RULE IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. All conflicts related to ancestral domains
and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as but not limited to conflicting claims and
boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the
application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain
or land is located.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of the parties is a
non-ICC/IP or where the dispute could not be resolved through customary law
shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings,
Practice and Procedures Before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter.
All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for Review to
the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order or
Decision. (Emphasis supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Rule III, Section 5 of the NCIP Rules, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03
reads:
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.—The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices
shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and
interpretation of R.A. 8371, including but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Office (RHO):
a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over ancestral
lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and
informed consent of ICCs/IPs;
c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of
customary laws or desecration of ceremonial sites, sacred places, or
rituals;
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371;
and
e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
succession, and settlement of land disputes, between and among
ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and
b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No.
8371.
(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:
a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/CALTs) alleged to
have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or
community as provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that
such action is filed within one (1) year from the date of registration.
(Emphasis supplied)
Apart from these, Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the NCIP Rules provide:
Section 13. Certification to File Action. Upon the request of the proper party,
members of the indigenous dispute settlement group or council of elders shall
likewise issue a certification to file action before the NCIP. In giving due regard
to customary laws, the certification may be in any form so long as it states in
substance the failure of settlement notwithstanding the efforts made under
customary law or traditional practices.
Section 14. Exceptions. The certification shall not be required in the following
cases:
a. Where one of the parties is a public or private
corporation, partnership, association or juridical person
or a public officer or employee and the dispute is in
connection with the performance of his official
functions;cralawlawlibrary
b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not
belong to the same IP/IC Community, except when he
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Council of
Elders/Leaders;cralawlawlibrary
c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition
seeks to prevent any grave, imminent and irreparable
damage or injury that may result if not acted upon
immediately; and
d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue
the necessary certification without justifiable reasons.
(Emphasis supplied)
These provisions support the conclusion that the NCIP has jurisdiction even
over cases where a party does not belong to an ICC/IP.
However, it is a basic principle in administrative law that an administrative rule
must conform to and not contradict the provision of an enabling law. In Fort
Bonifacio Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue:37
As mandated by Article 7 of the Civil Code,38 an administrative rule or
regulation cannot contravene the law on which it is based. . . . The rules and
regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that
have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the objects and purposes of the law, and should not
be in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
To be valid, an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict,
the provisions of the enabling law. An implementing rule or regulation cannot
modify, expand, or subtract from the law it is intended to implement. Any rule
that is not consistent with the statute itself is null and void.
While administrative agencies . . . may issue regulations to implement statutes,
they are without authority to limit the scope of the statute to less than what it
provides, or extend or expand the statute beyond its terms, or in any way
modify explicit provisions of the law. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an
administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence,
in case of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or
administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act does not extend the NCIP's jurisdiction to
disputes involving those who do not belong to ICCs/IPs. The precise wording of
Section 66 and the silence of the remainder of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
on extending the NCIP's jurisdiction bear this out.
Likewise, "[j]urisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law.40 No amount
of administrative rule-making can vest jurisdiction where neither Constitution
nor statute vests it.
Thus, Rule IX, Section 1 of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act's Implementing
Rules and Regulations, Rule III, Section 5, and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14 of the
NCIP Rules, insofar as they extend the NCIP's jurisdiction to disputes where a
party does not belong to an ICC/IP, must be deemed null and void. They are
inconsistent with the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act in that they modify and
expand the NCIP's jurisdiction as spelled out in Section 66. In light of this
discrepancy between a basic law and administrative rules, the basic law—the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act— must prevail.
VII
tribe."41 Thus, the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples may not exercise
jurisdiction over the case filed by respondents.chanrobleslaw
VII
Customary norms are as varied as there are tribes within ethnolinguistic
groups. If we are to animate the spirit of both the Constitution and the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, we should not stereotype all cultures as
homogenous or incapable of dynamic interfaces with each other. Customary law
is a descriptive label which should acknowledge that each tribe lived through its
own history and endogenously emerged their own set of norms reflecting their
values and lifeways. To say that the customary norms of the Kalinga are the
same as those of the Subanen betrays the same colonial mindset that
marginalized what our colonizers called as "Non-Christian Tribes" in the distant
past.
Neither should we straightjacket any culture as incapable of dynamic interfaces
or accommodation with other cultures. Various groups of indigenous
communities are able to work with the entirety of our legal system in
appropriate cases. This case, which involves a party not of their tribe, is
certainly one such case.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari . The
assailed Decision dated August 17, 2006 and Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-MIN must be AFFIRMED.
n

In sum, the requirements for the proper exercise of the NCIP's jurisdiction over
a dispute, pursuant to Section 66 of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, are as
follows:

(1) The claim or dispute must involve the rights of ICCs/IPs;

(2) Both parties must belong to the same ICC/IP;
(3) These parties must have exhausted all remedies provided under their
ICC/IP's customary laws; and
(4) Compliance with this requirement of exhausting remedies under
customary laws must be evidenced by a certification issued by the
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the
dispute, to the effect that the dispute has not been resolved.

In this case, it is not disputed that respondents do not belong to an ICC/IP. Their
sole interest is in their supposed ownership and possession of land which, in
turn, "appears to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig