Dirk Robert Johnson

NIETZSCHE’S EARLY DARWINISM:

THE “DAVID STRAUSS” ESSAY OF 1873

In recent years, several studies have started to direct attention again at the
Darwinian connection within Nietzsche’s philosophy. In 1995, Daniel Dennett,
a prominent Darwinian, included a brief synopsis of Nietzsche’s Genealogie der
Moral in his examination of Darwin’s theory of natural selection. 1 Keith Ansell-
Pearson wrote, in 1997, that “at the very heart of Nietzsche’s outline of his
fundamental concerns in his major text, On the Genealogy of Morals, we find a
critical engagement with the Darwinian paradigm of evolution. The Genealogy is
a text steeped in nineteenth-century biological thought and ideas, and is unthink-
able without this heritage.” 2 Robert Holub (1995) claimed that “the notion of
the overman, while perhaps not derived from or exemplary of Darwinism - or
what Nietzsche understood under Darwinism - nonetheless partakes in the
general framework of evolutionary biology of the nineteenth century.” 3
A consensus on the nature of Nietzsche’s Darwinism has never crystallized
within critical reception. However, many contemporary studies do seem to agree
1) that Darwin’s theories decisively influenced Nietzsche at various levels -
even though the nature and extent of that influence may still remain indetermi-
nate; and 2) that Nietzsche somehow “got Darwin wrong,” or misappropriated
Darwin for his broader philosophical aims. Daniel Dennett’s comment in Dar-
win’s Dangerous Idea can be seen as representative of the latter position:
“Nietzsche’s references to Darwin also reveal that his acquaintance with Dar-
win’s ideas was beset with common misrepresentations and misunderstandings,
so perhaps he ‘knew’ Darwin primarily through the enthusiastic appropriations
of the many popularizers in Germany, and indeed throughout Europe. On the
few points of specific criticism he ventures, he gets Darwin utterly wrong.” 4

1 Dennett, Daniel: Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. Evolution and the Meanings of Life. New York
1995, pp. 461-67.
2 Ansell-Pearson, Keith: Viroid Life. Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition.
London 1997, pp. 85-86.
3 Holub, Robert: Friedrich Nietzsche. New York 1995, p. 57.
4 Dennett: Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, loc. cit., p. 182.
 Nietzsche’s Early Darwinism: The “David Strauss” Essay of 1873 63

I argue that Darwin’s importance for Nietzsche has, indeed, been underesti-
mated and merits critical reassessment. Contrary to many of the recent studies,
however, I believe that Nietzsche understood Darwin rather well and with much
greater sophistication, subtlety, and originality than the Social Darwinists or Dar-
winian popularizers of his time. The latter certainly holds true for the Nietzsche
of the Genealogie der Moral (1887). By that time, Nietzsche had begun to develop a
highly nuanced and multi-faceted rebuttal to Darwinist principles based on years
of engagement with Darwin. But it holds equally well for the early Nietzsche, that
is, the Nietzsche of the first Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung: David Strauss der Bekenner und
der Schriftsteller (1873). My examination will first look at the philological foundation
of Nietzsche’s early Darwinism, i. e., the possible sources for Nietzsche’s under-
standing of Darwin until 1873, the year of the first Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung. I will
then give a close reading of Section Seven of the “David Strauss” essay, where
Nietzsche offers the first sustained articulation of his “Darwinism.” I will conclude
by showing that this passage is the starting-point for a highly original examination,
and that Nietzsche’s early perspective had very little in common with popular ap-
propriations of Darwin in the culture at large. 5
In principle, Daniel Dennett’s observation that “Nietzsche probably never
read Darwin” 6 is probably not far from the truth. It is impossible to state with
any certainty whether Nietzsche had read either Darwin’s main work, the Origin
of Species (1859), or his later Descent of Man (1871). Nietzsche’s first extensive
exposure to Darwin probably came through his study of Friedrich Albert
Lange’s Geschichte des Materialismus. Nietzsche read the work shortly after publica-
tion in 1866. In the conclusion to a letter to Hermann Muschacke, in November
1866, Nietzsche wrote: “Das bedeutendste philosophische Werk, was in den
letzten Jahrzehnten erschienen ist, ist unzweifelhaft Lange, Geschichte des Mate-
rialismus, über das ich eine bogenlange Lobrede schreiben könnte. Kant, Scho-
penhauer und dies Buch von Lange - mehr brauche ich nicht” (KSB 2, Nr. 526,
p. 184). It would be difficult to contest the verdict that Lange “[hat, D. J.] für
die Entwicklung des philosophischen Denkens Nietzsches eine ebenso große,
wenn nicht größere Bedeutung gehabt […], als ein Jahr zuvor Schopenhauer,
wenngleich dieser als auslösende Kraft ungleich stärker wirkte.” 7 In a letter to
Carl von Gersdorff, in February 1868, more than a year and a half after his
initial reading, Nietzsche summarized the list of questions that interested him
in Lange:
An dieser Stelle muß ich nochmals das Verdienst eines Mannes rühmen, von dem ich
Dir schon früher einmal geschrieben habe. Wenn Du Lust hast Dich vollständig über

5 This is part of a larger project dealing with the development of Nietzsche’s thought in relation-
ship to Darwin and the Darwinian question.
6 Ibid., p. 461.
7 Janz, Curt Paul: Friedrich Nietzsche. Bd. 1. München 1981, p. 197.
64 Dirk Robert Johnson

die materialistische Bewegung unsrer Tage, über die Naturwissenschaften mit ihren
Darwinischen Theorien, ihren kosmischen Systemen, ihrer belebten camera obscura
etc. zu unterrichten, zugleich auch über den ethischen Materialismus, über die Man-
chester-Theorie etc. so weiß ich Dir immer nichts Ausgezeichneteres zu empfehlen
als “die Geschichte des Materialismus” von Friedr. Alb. Lange (Iserlohn 1866), ein
Buch, das unendlich mehr giebt als der Titel verspricht und das man als einen wahren
Schatz wieder und wieder anschauen und durchlesen mag (KSB 2, Nr. 562, p. 257).
Since Nietzsche had probably read so little of Darwin in the original, 8 it
would be fair to assume, as Dennett has suggested, that Nietzsche also must
have drawn a considerable amount of his knowledge of Darwinism from the
“popular” discussion of Darwin’s ideas in the culture at large. As Alfred Kelly
has pointed out:
Darwin’s own works never achieved any mass popularity in Germany. Like most great
books, The Origin was much discussed but little read. It was only indirectly, through the
popular accounts, that the public discovered Darwinism. But these were not thirdhand
accounts. Actually the public got closer to the “real thing” because from the begin-
ning professional scientists assumed the burden of popularization. 9
In all likelihood, Nietzsche “knew” Darwin both from specialized literature
and scientific debates 10 as well as from more popular accounts which, despite

8 Aside from Wagner and Schopenhauer, whose works he had examined closely, and many of the
ancient authors, whom he had absorbed as a classical philologist, Nietzsche often based his
knowledge of important modern thinkers and philosophical movements on secondary sources
and on exchanges with specialists or representatives close to the respective positions. Nietzsche
was practically blind. Moreover, he suffered terrible agonies whenever he had to read any longer
texts, those which would pose no problems or obstacles for readers with normal vision. He
attributed the decline in his vision to his excessive reading habits in his earlier years. More than
most people, then, Nietzsche was dependent on oral readings and on verbal information and
exchanges with specialists for his knowledge of many contemporary issues.
9 Kelly, Alfred: The Descent of Darwin. The Popularization of Darwinism in Germany,
1860-1914. Chapel Hill 1981, pp. 21-22.
10 Nietzsche had become fascinated by the natural sciences as a young professor in Basel, where
several prominent scientists were directly engaged in the Darwinian controversies. There was
Ludwig Rütimeyer, for example, a professor of medicine at the University, who had academic
interests and knowledge that extended beyond medicine - to the fields of geology, paleonto-
logy, zoology, and biology: “Wieweit Nietzsche mit Rütimeyer, der seit 1855 auf Betreiben von
Peter Merian und Wilhelm Vischer als Professor an der Basler Universität wirkte, persönlich
bekannt war, läßt sich nicht mehr ermitteln. Aber dieser charaktervolle Mann wird Nietzsches,
nach echten Persönlichkeiten suchendem Blick kaum entgangen sein” (Janz: Friedrich
Nietzsche, loc. cit., p. 317). Though he was critical of Darwin, Rütimeyer ensured that the
Darwinian question remained alive and hotly contested during Nietzsche’s Basel years:
“Nietzsche erlebt in Basel, in der öffentlichen akademischen Diskussion, die ganze Spannung
des Konflikts zwischen Darwin und der Gegenpartei, die hier gewichtig vertreten ist, durch
Rütimeyer” (ibid., p. 320). Nietzsche had even read some of Rütimeyer’s articles and had recom-
mended them to Gersdorff. In one instructive reference, Nietzsche indicated that he favored
Rütimeyer over the more famous Darwinian proselytizer, Haeckel: “Tut die große Berühmtheit
des Naturforschers Häckel der größeren Ruhmwürdigkeit Rütimeyers irgendwelchen Eintrag”
(ibid., p. 317)?
 Nietzsche’s Early Darwinism: The “David Strauss” Essay of 1873 65

obvious distortions, gave fairly reliable synopses of Darwin’s key scientific prin-
ciples:
Contrary to what is often said, the popularizers usually did a fairly accurate job of
representing Darwin. Some simplification was inevitable and necessary - few could
follow Darwin’s often tortuous qualifications - but charges that the popularizers
vulgarized or sensationalized come from those who have labeled without bothering
to read. These charges do not stand up to close scrutiny. If the popularizers changed
Darwinism - and they did - they did so by going beyond Darwin’s works to philoso-
phize on their own. When Darwinism evolved into new Weltanschauungen in Ger-
many, it usually did so on a sound factual basis; it was just that the facts often
appeared in a context foreign to Darwin’s own more limited perspective. 11
I wish now to explore one exemplary passage from Nietzsche’s first Unzeit-
gemässe Betrachtung: David Strauss der Bekenner und der Schriftsteller, Section Seven.
Strauss’s Der alte und der neue Glaube was published in 1872. One year later,
Nietzsche was spurred on by the popular success of the work - and by
Wagner’s dislike of Strauss - to polemicize against Strauss and his supporters:
Strauss, who had already dismissed the Bible as myth in his Life of Jesus (1835), be-
lieved that Darwinism had finally cleared the way for a rational religion by proving
that man’s dignity came from his own efforts, not from God. How much more
dignified it was for man to have risen from animals than to have fallen from a state
of perfection! For Strauss, such a view led straight to the worship of modern scientific
culture. But he brushed aside the need for a formal church, “as if meditation were
only possible in a church, edification only to be found in a sermon!” That “New
Faith” was an individual declaration of independence from the past. It needed no
institutional expression. 12
Strauss “had accepted modern science, above all Darwinism, as the sole legiti-
mate path to truth.” 13
I will concentrate on five main components of Nietzsche’s critique. All five
reveal an aspect of Nietzsche’s thinking about Darwin at this time. In the first
example, Nietzsche criticizes Strauss for wrapping himself in the “shaggy man-
tle” of “our ape-genealogists” (i. e., German Darwinists), 14 while failing to think

11 Kelly: The Descent of Darwin, loc. cit., p. 8.

12 Ibid., p. 78.
13 Ibid., p. 74.
14 Nietzsche uses an interesting term here (“Affengenealogen”), which could associate him with
the Christian opponents of the Darwinist popularizers. Many of these conservative critics uti-
lized similarly prefixed terms (e. g., “ape-fanatics,” “ape-professors”) to smear and ridicule Dar-
win’s adherents in Germany. The subtlety of Nietzsche’s position in this section is that, while
he too ridicules the Darwinian proselytizers such as Haeckel by repeating the humorous epithets
of his Christian opponents - the popular Haeckel was often the hidden target behind the
numerous “ape-slanders” - he clearly does not side with the conservative rejection of Darwin.
Nietzsche rejects the proselytizers’ version of Darwinism - but based on an alternative, though
clearly sympathetic, reading of Darwin.
66 Dirk Robert Johnson

through the important and far-reaching implications of Darwin’s science for

traditional ethics:
Mit einem gewissen rauhen Wohlbehagen hüllt er [Strauss, D. J.] sich in das zottige
Gewand unserer Affengenealogen und preist Darwin als einen der grössten
Wohlthäter der Menschheit - aber mit Beschämung sehen wir, dass seine Ethik ganz
losgelöst von der Frage: “wie begreifen wir die Welt?” sich aufbaut (DS 7, KSA 1,
p. 194).
Nietzsche rebukes Strauss for failing to draw his personal ethics from the
implications of Darwin’s scientific notions for existence. If Strauss had truly
understood, appreciated, and agreed with Darwin and his ideas, Nietzsche ar-
gues, then he would need to base his moral code on two important constituents
of Darwin’s scientific thought: one, the Hobbesian-inspired “war of all against
all” (or in Darwin’s terminology: the “struggle for existence”); and two, Dar-
win’s notion of “survival of the fittest.”
But Nietzsche believes that Strauss is not capable of such a resolute, heroic,
and noble love of truth. Instead, he opts to avoid Darwin’s severe and rigorous
conclusions. Strauss fears, in fact, to alienate his disciples, who simply use Dar-
win as a means to attack established religion, superstitions, and discredited theo-
logical doctrine:
Hier war eine Gelegenheit, natürlichen Muth zu zeigen: denn hier hätte er [Strauss,
D. J.] seinen “Wir” den Rücken kehren müssen und kühnlich aus dem bellum omnium
contra omnes und dem Vorrechte des Stärkeren Moralvorschriften für das Leben
ableiten können, die freilich nur in einem innerlich unerschrockenen Sinne, wie in
dem des Hobbes, und in einer ganz anderen grossartigen Wahrheitsliebe ihren Ur-
sprung haben müssten, als in einer solchen, die immer nur in kräftigen Ausfällen
gegen die Pfaffen, das Wunder und den “welthistorischen Humbug” der Aufersteh-
ung explodiert. Denn mit einer ächten und ernst durchgeführten Darwinistischen
Ethik hätte man den Philister gegen sich, den man bei allen solchen Fällen für sich
hat (DS 7, KSA 1, pp. 194-95).
Nietzsche’s second critique relates to Strauss’s general and facile moral im-
perative: “’Alles sittliche Handeln […] ist ein Sichbestimmen des Einzelnen
nach der Idee der Gattung’” (DS 7, KSA 1, p. 195). Using Darwinian-inspired
terminology (“Gattung”), Strauss constructs a vague morality from the notion
that man is part of a larger, single human species, and that that knowledge must
ultimately help him stem his individualism. Sarcastically, Nietzsche rejoins: “In’s
Deutliche und Greifbare übertragen heisst das nur: Lebe als Mensch und nicht
als Affe oder Seehund” (ibd.).
Nietzsche critiques Strauss, specifically, because Strauss prefers to “preach
morality,” which is easy, rather than to explain the grounds for morality, which
would be infinitely more difficult and complex. Strauss’s objective should have
been to explain how various acts of human kindness, compassion, love, and
 Nietzsche’s Early Darwinism: The “David Strauss” Essay of 1873 67

renunciation, which undoubtedly existed in the world, could be explained on

the basis of Darwin’s conclusions:
Strauss hat noch nicht einmal gelernt, dass nie ein Begriff die Menschen sittlicher
und besser machen kann, und dass Moral predigen eben so leicht als Moral begrün-
den schwer ist; seine Aufgabe wäre vielmehr gewesen, die Phänomene menschlicher
Güte, Barmherzigkeit, Liebe und Selbstverneinung, die nun einmal thatsächlich vor-
handen sind, aus seinen Darwinistischen Voraussetzungen ernsthaft zu erklären und
abzuleiten: während er es vorzog, durch einen Sprung in’s Imperativische sich vor
der Aufgabe der Erklärung zu flüchten (ibd).
Third of all, these efforts to “flee explanations” allow Strauss “to skip with
ease away from” Darwin’s “cardinal principle” - “bei diesem Sprung begegnet
es ihm sogar, auch über den Fundamentalsatz Darwins leichten Sinnes hinweg-
zuhüpfen” (ibd.): namely, that existence is based on brutal struggle, in which
man constantly forgets he is part of a larger species while he attempts to assert
supremacy and secure survival for himself. Strauss’s homespun moralizing and
his free rendition of Darwin merely sugarcoat the radical implications of Dar-
win’s findings. These problematize the question of morality altogether:
Aber woher erschallt dieser Imperativ? Wie kann ihn der Mensch in sich selbst haben,
da er doch, nach Darwin, eben durchaus ein Naturwesen ist und nach ganz anderen
Gesetzen sich bis zur Höhe des Menschen entwickelt hat, gerade dadurch, dass er in
jedem Augenblick vergass, dass die anderen gleichartigen Wesen ebenso berechtigt
seien, gerade dadurch, dass er sich dabei als den Kräftigeren fühlte und den Unter-
gang der anderen schwächer gearteten Exemplare allmählich herbeiführte (DS 7, KSA
1, p. 196).
In the fourth example, Nietzsche criticizes Strauss for trying to project a
consoling and redemptive message into natural processes and to see them as
reflections of a divine master-plan. Nietzsche quotes from Strauss’s work: “’[Un-
ser Gott, D. J.] zeigt uns, dass zwar der Zufall ein unvernünftiger Weltherrscher
wäre, dass aber die Nothwendigkeit, d. h. die Verkettung von Ursachen in der
Welt, die Vernunft selber ist’” (DS 7, KSA 1, p. 197). In true Hegelian fashion
- Nietzsche: “in dieser Hegelschen Anbetung des Wirklichen als des Vernünfti-
gen, das heisst in der Verg ötter ung des Erfolg es” (ibd.) - Strauss inter-
prets natural history as the enactment of God’s will in the long causal chain of
necessity. This manifestation of unfolding reason in human history reconciles
all past actions - i. e., both examples of great good as well as evil - in the
culmination of the present moment.
Here, Nietzsche critiques Strauss’s ideal from the standpoint of science.
Nietzsche implies that Strauss ignores the methods and basic principles of mod-
ern science, including Darwinism, to which he and his followers otherwise claim
allegiance. “Honest scientists,” Nietzsche sustains, would in fact reject Strauss’s
interpretation, for they would consider it an unacceptable anthropomorphism
68 Dirk Robert Johnson

and an attempt to project human ethical categories into an indifferent process

guided solely by natural laws:
ein ehrlicher Naturforscher glaubt an die unbedingte Gesetzmässigkeit der Welt, ohne
aber das Geringste über den ethischen oder intellectuellen Werth dieser Gesetze selbst
auszusagen: in derartigen Aussagen würde er das höchst anthropomorphische Gebah-
ren einer nicht in den Schranken des Erlaubten sich haltenden Vernunft erkennen
(ibd.).
Strauss, however, “nimmt aber ohne Weiteres an, dass alles Geschehene den
höchsten intellectuellen Werth habe, also absolut vernünftig und zweckvoll
geordnet sei, und sodann, dass es eine Offenbarung der ewigen Güte selbst
enthalte” (ibd.). According to Nietzsche, Strauss’s eclectic “new faith,” with its
insistence that the manifold occurrences in the world reveal eternal goodness
and purposiveness itself, cannot be reconciled with the conclusions of modern
science.
Nietzsche’s fifth and final critique represents an elaboration on this latter
point. Nietzsche accuses Strauss of pouring “soothing oil” into the mechanistic
worldview and of playing “metaphysical architect.” But in truth, Strauss is
alarmed by modern scientific methodology and by its implications for his and
his followers’ faith. Instead of embracing science and the theories of natural law
in totality, Strauss and his followers dread the “rigid and pitiless mechanism of
the worldly machine” and seek refuge in metaphysics. Strauss does not have the
courage to tell his disciples that life is nothing but an indifferent mechanism
and that they, in turn, must beware of its crushing wheels. Strauss
wagt es nämlich nicht, ihnen ehrlich zu sagen: von einem helfenden und sich erbar-
menden Gott habe ich euch befreit, das “Universum” ist nur ein starres Räderwerk,
seht zu, dass seine Räder euch nicht zermalmen! Er wagt es nicht: so muss denn
doch die Hexe dran, nämlich die Metaphysik (DS 7, KSA 1, p. 199).
In the end, Nietzsche argues, Strauss’s philistines prefer Straussian metaphy-
sics to Christian metaphysics, because at least Strauss can make sense of their
reality and conditions, whereas Christianity expects them to believe in miracles:
Dem Philister ist aber selbst eine Straussische Metaphysik lieber als die christliche
und die Vorstellung eines irrenden Gottes sympathischer als die eines wunderthätigen.
Denn er selbst, der Philister, irrt, aber hat noch nie ein Wunder gethan (ibd.).
The following conclusions can be drawn from Nietzsche’s Darwinism in the
“David Strauss” essay. At this early stage, Nietzsche recognized that Darwin’s
scientific worldview necessitated a complete overhaul of traditional metaphysics
and ethics. He also understood that one could not separate Darwinism as cul-
tural phenomenon from Darwin’s naturalist-materialist paradigm. If one adhered
to Darwin’s naturalist perspective and his attempts to explain ethics and morality
on the basis of that naturalism, then one would have to proceed strictly within
 Nietzsche’s Early Darwinism: The “David Strauss” Essay of 1873 69

that framework. Morality, as Nietzsche states, could not be separated from the
way in which one perceives and examines the world.
Nietzsche shows himself to be interested in the ethical and the materialist
implications of Darwinist science - in other words, how the theories affect our
understanding of moral behavior and actions. He is less concerned with that
aspect of Darwinism which tended to receive the most popular and controversial
attention during his lifetime - and beyond: Darwin’s theories on the evolution
of species, particularly as they pertained to man’s descent from some ape-like
progenitor. In this section, Nietzsche, in fact, appears to disparage those Dar-
winian interpreters who focus on the evolutionary issue (“unsere Affen-Genea-
logen”), while he himself proceeds straight to the nexus that would dominate
his interest and would continue to animate his later philosophy: Darwinism’s
impact on ethics and morality.
Nietzsche’s division of Darwinism into two parts, i. e., the separation of
Darwin’s materialist and genealogical methodology from his theory of organic
evolution per se, would not change dramatically during the course of his future
engagement with Darwin. Indeed, the gap would only widen. The genealogical
and ethical dimension of Darwin’s ideas would grow in significance and eventu-
ally develop into the superstructure of the Genealogie. Darwin’s theories of evolu-
tion and man’s origins, on the other hand, would receive scant attention. When
mentioned at all, they would most often be ridiculed.
A further interesting dimension of Nietzsche’s position relates to Darwin-
ism’s impact on religion. Nietzsche reveals himself to be serious about the
materialist dimensions of Darwin’s science. He recognizes, for one, that Dar-
win’s scientific position undercuts attempts to project vague religious longings
into what should be considered an objective scientific process. Nietzsche is
ultimately critical of religious and scientific popularizers and proselytizers of
Darwin, like Strauss, who extract a monist religion from a loose, inconsistent,
and distorted (mis)reading.
But Nietzsche not only critiques the religious mystifications of people like
Strauss. More significant, he also defends traditional religion (i. e., Christianity)
from those who hide behind Darwinism in order to vent vulgar anti-clerical,
anti-Christian sentiments. If one considers Nietzsche’s own later anti-Christian
pronouncements, this line of defense may seem peculiar. But his early position
reveals two important and very interesting characteristics of Nietzsche’s thought,
ones that would not change significantly, even in later years. First, Nietzsche
was more critical of self-anointed free-thinkers and founders of new religions
than he was of tradition-minded, serious Christians. 15 Secondly, Nietzsche did

15 Nietzsche would later state: “die ernstesten Christen sind mir immer gewogen gewesen” (EH,
“Warum ich so weise bin” 7).
70 Dirk Robert Johnson

not assume, as others in his time did, that Darwin’s serious scientific position
necessitated the extreme anti-clericalism and anti-Christian fulminations of many
followers. The latter point is important for Nietzsche’s subsequent engagement
with Darwin, for it implies that Nietzsche could treat Darwinism as a positive,
critical, and conscientious perspective within the Christian tradition. In that sense,
Darwinism could represent the best and most intellectually challenging spirit of
that tradition.
At this still formative stage, Nietzsche focused immediately and directly on
the series of problematic issues, which did, in fact, preoccupy and animate the
moral imagination of Darwin himself. Nietzsche recognized, for one, that Dar-
win’s theory of struggle for scarce resources presupposed that man was a “crea-
ture of nature” (“ein Naturwesen”); he was thus subordinate to the same set of
natural laws as the rest of organic nature. Nietzsche also realized that Darwin’s
scientific perspective demanded a suspension of moral judgment. Traditional
Christian categories were not necessarily involved or grounded in the evolution-
ary mechanism. Man evolved, according to Nietzsche’s understanding of Dar-
win, because man constantly forgot “[dass, D. J.] die anderen gleichartigen
Wesen ebenso berechtigt seien, gerade dadurch dass er sich dabei als den
Kräftigeren fühlte und den Untergang der anderen schwächer gearteten Exem-
plare allmählich herbeiführte” (DS 7, KSA 1, p. 196).
Darwin’s evolution of higher forms had to proceed out of this amoral and
entirely natural struggle. Darwin focused on survival, not the desirability of a
specific moral outcome. Darwin’s adherence to strict scientific methodology and
a system of laws prevented him from making any assertions, moral or otherwise,
about the natural process itself. Such assertions, according to Nietzsche, would
be unscientific and would reflect “das höchst anthropomorphische Gebahren
einer nicht in den Schranken des Erlaubten sich haltenden Vernunft.”
Nietzsche’s perspective on Darwin also indicates that he understood that
Darwin’s theories need not imply a progressive bias in the evolutionary process.
Some commentators have critiqued Nietzsche’s view of Darwin on this point.
They contend Nietzsche proceeded from that central misunderstanding, i. e.,
that Darwin like many Victorians subscribed to a progressive notion of evolu-
tion and thus to an inscribed moral bias within evolution. 16 (Many first-genera-
tion German Darwinists did, indeed, subscribe to this notion.) Nietzsche’s rejec-
tion of Darwin, as these commentators argue, was therefore premised on a false
understanding of Darwin’s core proposition. As many Darwinists now seem to

16 “Darwin rather less than the Darwinists of the nineteenth century thought in terms of upward
evolution. [—] [I]t was a common enough idea, and one based, just as Nietzsche’s own criticism
of it was, upon an unwarranted insertion of a normative component into the notion of fitness
or unfitness” (Danto, Arthur: Nietzsche as Philosopher. New York 1965, p. 188).
 Nietzsche’s Early Darwinism: The “David Strauss” Essay of 1873 71

believe, Darwin envisioned a non-linear, branching model of evolution: “the

coral of life”. 17 Unlike his followers, these arguments contend, Darwin himself
rigorously avoided equating the evolutionary process with forms of upward
development, or progression. But a close examination of Nietzsche’s position
reveals that he grasped immediately this main implication of Darwin’s thought.
For one, Nietzsche recognized that Darwin concentrated on the process of
natural struggle and its outcome; Darwin did not project moral valuations into
his analysis. Secondly, Nietzsche criticized, instead, those interpreters who did
draw perfectionist religious inferences from Darwin’s system. He was also suspi-
cious and highly critical of the projection of Hegelian philosophical notions into
Darwin. Since Hegel can be considered the intellectual bridge to a progressive
reading of Darwin, Nietzsche, a strict anti-Hegelian, seemed to ally himself here
with a non-linear model of evolution. Thirdly, Nietzsche recognized that the
importance of Darwin’s position resided in its adherence to rigorous standards
of science. No implicit moral or ethical assumptions, no metaphysics - Chris-
tian or otherwise - should be associated with, or projected into, the workings
of nature. Therefore, Nietzsche did not associate Darwin’s idea of evolutionary
development with an implied notion of improvement, higher morality, or pro-
gressively superior forms, as some assume. Instead, Nietzsche adhered to a
strictly functional interpretation of Darwin’s theory of “struggle” and “fitness”:
he concentrated solely on the implications of natural struggle for the develop-
ment of the human species and the human mind.
At the same time, Nietzsche sensed that Darwin’s naturalist paradigm of
struggle disturbed traditional Christian religion. For, if only some form of the
“fitter” survives in the “struggle,” that is, if man, that “creature of nature,” has
only “evolved” by asserting untrammeled individuality against other “weaker
specimens” (Nietzsche: “schwächer gearteten Exemplare”), then how could one
explain and evaluate those examples of human goodness, compassion, kindness,
self-denial (i. e., “morality”), “die nun thatsächlich vorhanden sind,” on the basis
of the same Darwinian premises?
Nietzsche here touched upon the cardinal dilemma of Darwin’s theories for
the issue of man’s moral development. The entire first section of Darwin’s
Descent of Man is, in some form or another, devoted to a naturalist explication

17 In his early notebooks, “Darwin was thinking of irregularly branching, not linear, evolution.
Indeed, he speculated that in the animal world we might get three main branches (for land,
sea, and air), then have subbranches. ‘Organized beings represent a tree, irregularly branched’,
although ‘the tree of life should perhaps be called the coral of life, base of branches dead, so
that passages cannot be seen’. We know that a major implication of branching (considered as
fundamental) is that man is no longer a measure of all things, and Darwin is aware of this. ‘It
is absurd to talk of one animal being higher than another - we consider those where the
cerebral structure/intellectual faculties most developed, as highest’” (Ruse, Michael: The Dar-
winian Revolution. Chicago 1979, pp. 167-68).
72 Dirk Robert Johnson

of this very problem. But unlike the Straussian Darwinists, Nietzsche realized
that an answer to the question of morality had to be found within scientific
Darwinism, that is, on strictly Darwinian terms. One could not present a natural-
ist notion of struggle, then introduce reason and morality through alternative,
non-naturalist processes, i. e., through an intellectual deus ex machina.
This type of interpretation, common as it was at the time, could, in fact, be
reconciled with a progressive notion of evolution. Man’s superiority in terms of
reason and the moral sense could, in this particular analysis, be explained as
the result of a goal-directed, purposeful evolution. Furthermore, man’s present
superior condition could then be justified by fortuitous past developments, all
leading up to the present. But these forms of external and non-naturalist, i. e.,
moral, explanation were precisely the ones that the Origin of Species had radically
rejected and undermined. Nietzsche grasped this truly original component of
Darwin’s thought. Both their mature systems can be interpreted as alternative
explanations for the same key question.
How, then, does Nietzsche’s position relate to his Darwinist contemporaries?
In his analysis of Social Darwinism in nineteenth-century Germany, Hans-
Günter Zmarzlik argues that the first wave of German Darwinists, including
early representatives such as Büchner, Haeckel, and Strauss, were heirs to the
liberal 1848 tradition. Their notions of scientific evolutionism were correspond-
ingly tinged by a sense of “evolutionary optimism”: “The evolutionary optimism
that characterized the first phase in the application of Darwinist principles to
natural philosophy, social theory, and ethics was far more an expression of the
liberal, rationalist doctrines of the time than of Darwin’s theory.” 18 “Broadly
speaking,” Alfred Kelly concurs, “German popular Darwinism was a continua-
tion of the old eighteenth-century Enlightenment tradition. German Darwinists
sought to crush superstition, to inform, to liberate, and, indirectly, to democra-
tize. In a more narrow sense, popular Darwinism may profitably be viewed as
a cultural extension of the radical democratic spirit of 1848.” 19
A second wave of Darwinian interpretations emerged toward the close of
the century. These interpretations, now collectively referred to as “Social Dar-
winian,” reflected a shift in historical circumstances that helped foster darker,
more pessimistic, more brutal appropriations of Darwin:
A shift of accent in this direction took place when in a period characterized by the
second industrial revolution, by imperialism and the national uprisings in eastern
Central Europe, the doctrine of liberalism and with it men’s confidence in the natural

18 Zmarzlik, Hans-Günter: Social Darwinism in Germany, Seen as a Historical Problem. In: Hajo
Holborn (ed.): Republic to Reich. The Making of the Nazi Revolution. Ten Essays. New York
1972, pp. 435-474, p. 440.
19 Kelly: The Descent of Darwin, loc. cit., p. 6.
 Nietzsche’s Early Darwinism: The “David Strauss” Essay of 1873 73

harmony and automatic upward trend of the social process ceased to be dominant.
This change of climate which began in the seventies throughout the Western world
and became more pronounced in the nineties was marked by a ‘naturalization’ of
political thinking and a brutalization of political methods. […] What only a short
while before was interpreted as a free competition of individuals, with the prize going
to the ablest and ethically best, was now looked upon literally as ‘struggle for exis-
tence’ - a permanent struggle for self-assertion through increased power - and not
primarily between individuals but between collectivities: social interest groups,
nations, and races. 20
“From here, it was only a step to the condemnation of Christian ethics
and the humanitarianism based on natural law that was the heritage of the
Enlightenment. Certain authors spoke openly of a ‘morality of pity’ or ‘humani-
tarian babbling,’ out of keeping with the new, harder era.” 21
Nietzsche’s early Darwinism seems to reflect this transition toward a harsher
assessment of Darwin’s findings. Nietzsche’s critique of Strauss and his follow-
ers can, on one level, be seen as a critique of the late liberal-progressive heritage
in German culture. Consequently, Nietzsche’s rejection of Strauss’s Darwinian
“faith” could be interpreted as a shift toward an irrational, anti-Enlightenment
program. The latter finds its parallel in a more general, late-century transition
toward the naturalization of politics and the rejection of the Enlightenment’s
faith in progress and reason. In that scenario, Nietzsche is not an “idealistic”
Darwinian, who projects normative components into his notion of a higher
man, an Übermensch. He is a proto-Social Darwinian - a harsh realist who argues
for brutal assertion, i. e., the will to power, and the permanent struggle between
“social interest groups, nations, and races.”
Interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy have fluctuated between these two
poles. Whereas many of the early studies emphasized Nietzsche’s proximity to
an idealized notion of higher human development, transcending though not
overturning Darwin’s science, later studies began to stress Nietzsche’s associa-
tion with a darker, amoral, irrational notion of will and natural struggle. The
latter perspective culminated in the official Nazi appropriation of Nietzsche, but
it continues to permeate both popular and scholarly perceptions of his philoso-
phy. It would not be an overstatement to say that the apparent ambivalence of
Nietzsche on the Darwinian question, that is, the continued difficulty in situating
Nietzsche on the spectrum of Darwinian interpreters (Social Darwinian, or
highly original Darwinian popularizer?), has contributed the most to the diver-
gence of opinions on Nietzsche and Nietzsche’s meanings.
Nietzsche focuses on the stark naturalism within Darwin. By pointing out
the discrepancies between Strauss’s Darwinian “faith” and Darwin’s scientific

20 Zmarzlik: Social Darwinism in Germany, loc. cit., p. 441.

21 Ibid.
74 Dirk Robert Johnson

principles, Nietzsche in effect positions himself on the side of natural science

even when that perspective fails to offer metaphysical consolation or to reconcile
him with Enlightenment notions of progress. Nietzsche’s position in the Strauss
essay brings him closer to Darwin’s own understanding of the scientific objec-
tive. Darwin rejected overtly metaphysical interpretations of the natural selective
process and sought to reduce his scope to concrete and verifiable scientific data
- even when those findings disturbed traditional religious notions of human
perfectability. Darwin always remained skeptical of the progressive readings of
natural selection within Germany, despite the fact that he was dependent on
zealous proselytizers such as Haeckel to promote the more general cause of
Darwinism. If Nietzsche discredited the idealizing renditions of many contem-
porary Darwinian popularizers, who equated Darwinism with liberal-democratic
aspirations, did that then bring him closer to the darker current of Social Dar-
winism? 22 Did Nietzsche’s rejection of optimistic metaphysical interpretations
of Darwin portend a transition toward a philosophical appropriation of Social
Darwinian naturalism?
I argued that Nietzsche focused directly on the key problem that Darwin’s
theory had first suggested: how could one explain the emergence of the moral
sense solely on naturalist terms? After years of allowing Darwinian popularizers
to expound their widely divergent theories on the basis of his findings in the
Origin, Darwin presented his own solution to the problem of morality and its
origins in the Descent of Man. Interestingly, Darwin took two decisive steps in
this work which problematized the crude Social Darwinian appropriations of
his theory. One, he claimed that the virtues of cooperation and altruism had
proven beneficial in natural selection, thus undermining one-sided efforts to
base biological fitness solely on the outcome of competitive instincts. Secondly,
he relativized the absolute primacy of natural selection in his system as a whole,
claiming now the significance of other theoretical factors, such as sexual selec-
tion. Although Darwin continued to emphasize theoretical differences with teleo-
logical readings of his theory, he equally seemed to distance himself from Social
Darwinian interpretations which valorized natural selection and which failed
to address the important role of cooperation and instinctual sympathy in the
development of a moral sense. 23

22 “Social Darwinism posits a causal or final relationship between the individual and natural (or
more precisely, scientifically interpreted) development. His personal worth is derived from his
biological origin and then from his biological efficiency. The inviolable and indivisible dignity
of man is degraded to the level of a variable, measurable against the standard of what is desirable
for the health of the people and subject to regulation by correction and planning. Thus almost
imperceptibly the individual becomes human material, and the road is open to state policies
that ultimately equate the right to live with biological utility” (ibid., p. 466).
23 Ernst Cassirer interprets Darwin’s self-critique in the Descent - where Darwin states that “he had
probably given too much weight to natural selection in earlier editions of The Origin of Species”
 Nietzsche’s Early Darwinism: The “David Strauss” Essay of 1873 75

By 1873, Nietzsche had not yet come up with an answer to this question;
but he had recognized it was a problem. Unlike Strauss and the first generation
of Darwinists, Nietzsche understood that Darwinism as a system could not offer
the metaphysical consolation of a traditional faith if one rigorously adhered to
its scientific premises. Progressivism or upward development, Nietzsche implied,
was not intrinsic to his system. Nietzsche’s reading had hit the dark nerve of
Darwinism. If Darwinism deprived morality of its metaphysical justification by
naturalizing struggle and making it the sole catalyst for human development,
then there was no implicit and necessary theoretical justification for the exis-
tence of “morality” at all. One could, in that sense, proceed directly to the
ultimate Social Darwinian conclusion without compromising the theory of natu-
ral selection. Survival as such could become the ultimate criterion of biological
“fitness”; it could contain its own “moral” justification. By eliminating a “‘moral-
ity of pity’ or ‘humanitarian babbling’” (Zmarzlik) and allowing natural survival
to be the sole determinant of “value,” i. e., “fitness,” Social Darwinians could
glorify racial, national, and class distinctions and could propose naked aggression
as legitimate means to secure survival in a brutal Darwinian “struggle for exis-
tence.” 24
Darwin, as I indicated, solved the problem by reasserting a moral component
into the equation. By positing an instinctual sympathy in man, Darwin could
show how more cooperative tribes could prove more successful in the “struggle
for existence,” and that their values, in turn, could be passed on through inheri-
tance. Nietzsche would not show himself satisfied with this solution. For him,
the “Darwinian revolution” had shattered the foundation for morality and a
reassertion of morality into a naturalist program therefore could no longer be
sustainable.

- as a sign that Darwin had recognized “he had retained too strong a belief in teleology” (Cassirer,
Ernst: The Problem of Knowledge. Philosophy, Science, and History since Hegel. New Haven
1950, p. 167). “These are important words,” Cassirer writes, “for they show with what critical clar-
ity Darwin himself, as contrasted with many of his uncritical adherents, judged his own work. His
emphasis was on the facts of evolution, not on his particular explanation of them” (ibid., p. 168).
But Cassirer only focuses on Darwin’s implied rejection of progressive readings of his theory. He
doesn’t take into account Darwin’s equally implicit rejection of Social Darwinism. The caveats in
the Descent also undercut the fetishization of natural selection by Social Darwinians, who certainly
did not emphasize an overtly teleological reading of Darwin, but who used the criterion of “fitness”
to justify any action that furthered objective “survival.” By distancing himself from some of his
earlier assumptions, Darwin attempted both to differentiate his understanding of natural selection
and to point attention to characteristics - such as cooperation and instinctual sympathy - over-
looked in one-dimensional applications of natural selection. Moreover, Darwin devoted the entire
second part of the Descent to the phenomenon of sexual selection, which further differentiated
his understanding of natural selection.
24 “The most essential contribution of Darwinism to the political thinking at the turn of the
century has rightly been held to be the brutality emanating from the idea of the struggle for
existence” (Zmarzlik: Social Darwinism in Germany, loc. cit., p. 455).
76 Dirk Robert Johnson

At the same time, this assumption did not lead Nietzsche to opt for a Social
Darwinian solution. Social Darwinians would still have accepted Darwin’s terms;
they would have accepted, which Nietzsche later did not, that nature through
natural selection determined the “fittest.” Rather, Nietzsche began to radicalize
Darwin. If morality had lost its metaphysical grounding, then morality itself
could only remain an interpretation. Struggle within nature, by extension, would
merely reflect the clash of divergent biological wills (or, the will to power)
without higher meaning or purpose. The outcome of this struggle would not
determine the “fittest”; this Darwinian interpretation, in fact, would reflect the
continuance of a “moral” perspective. Struggle was entirely open-ended with
each individual will seeking to project the best terms for its own survival; morality
was a means in that struggle, not its outcome.
At this stage, Nietzsche even went so far as to contradict the guiding premise
behind the theory of natural selection. In his famous “Anti-Darwin” passage in
Götzen-Dämmerung (1889), Nietzsche wrote: “Gesetzt aber, es giebt diesen
Kampf [um’s Leben, D. J.] - und in der That, er kommt vor -, so läuft er
leider umgekehrt aus als die Schule Darwin’s wünscht, als man vielleicht mit ihr
wünschen dürfte: nämlich zu Ungunsten der Starken, der Bevorrechtigten, der
glücklichen Ausnahmen. Die Gattungen wachsen nicht in der Vollkommenheit:
die Schwachen werden immer wieder über die Starken Herr” (GD, “Streifzüge
eines Unzeitgemässen” 14). The Social Darwinists could never have agreed with
this assessment. Their entire program was based on an unshakeable faith that
the natural selective process determined the fittest. If the weak consistently
overpower the strong, as Nietzsche contends (“die Schwachen werden immer
wieder über die Starken Herr”), then the Social Darwinian faith in the infallibility
of natural selection, and the ideological program on which it was based, would
be turned on its head.
If one adheres to the notion that Nietzsche remained a Darwinist, even
against his own clearly articulated disavowals (“Anti-Darwin”), then this passage
will remain strangely contradictory. Indeed, commentators have often had diffi-
culty with the logic behind this passage. Arthur Danto calls it “an untangled
pocket in his system, and an aberration from the overwhelmingly dominant
direction in his thought”: “One would think that strong is as strong does, and
that it is virtually inconsistent to say of x and y that x is weaker than y, but y
succumbs to x. But the truly incoherent element in Nietzsche’s thought is his
speaking as though an objectively better type of being can be talked of, whereas
it is wrong to take normative criteria as having the least bearing on how things
are to be judged in reality.” 25

25 Danto: Nietzsche as Philosopher, loc. cit., pp. 186-87.

 Nietzsche’s Early Darwinism: The “David Strauss” Essay of 1873 77

And yet, this passage in Götzen-Dämmerung is entirely consistent and coherent

within Nietzsche’s mature thought. The difficulty resides in ignoring the critical
development Nietzsche had undergone in the intervening years and in continu-
ing to equate Nietzsche’s late philosophy to Darwin’s vision of nature. If one
believes along with Darwin (and Danto) that “fitness” is the end-result of a
selective process, i. e., the outcome of a struggle in nature, then Nietzsche’s
notion that the strong succumb to the weak would make little sense: strong is
simply that which survives (“strong is as strong does”), without normative as-
sessment (i. e., that “fittest” necessarily implies “the best”).
But this interpretation fails to take into account the introduction to this
passage: “Was den berühmten Kampf um’s Leben betrifft, so scheint er mir
einstweilen mehr behauptet als bewiesen. Er kommt vor, aber als Ausnahme;
der Gesammt-Aspekt des Lebens ist nicht die Nothlage, die Hungerlage, viel-
mehr der Reichthum, die Üppigkeit, selbst die absurde Verschwendung, - wo
gekämpft wird, kämpft man um Macht” (GD, “Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemäs-
sen” 14). Thus, Nietzsche challenges Darwin’s system of nature; it is this view of
“reality,” this interpretation, which Nietzsche questions (“er [scheint, D. J.] mir
einstweilen mehr behauptet als bewiesen”), but which Danto (and the Darwin-
ists) unflinchingly equate with “reality” as such.
In the full passage, Nietzsche contrasts two non-overlapping visions of life
and nature. Within a Darwinian system that defines nature as a “struggle for
existence” (“der Kampf um’s Leben”), Nietzsche argues that life will work out
“zu Ungunsten der Starken, der Bevorrechtigten, der glücklichen Ausnahmen.”
But that understanding of struggle is a limited and constricted one: “er kommt
vor, aber als Ausnahme.” He then proposes an alternative. Here, where life is
not denied its amoral component and is considered open-ended and vital (i. e.,
“der Reichthum, die Üppigkeit, selbst die absurde Verschwendung”), the strong
remain dominant.
In effect, Nietzsche denies Darwin’s science its objectivity: “Man soll
nicht Malthus mit der Natur verwechseln.” Because Darwin and his followers
can only envision a “struggle for existence,” they can only identify with one
result: namely, the “fittest” emerging from struggle. If, however, one accepts
with Nietzsche that struggle is a particular interpretation of existence, and
that life can equally be considered open-ended and amoral, then struggle
only occurs at the interstices of power-projection: “wo gekämpft wird, kämpft
man um Macht”. Struggle as such neither defines life, nor does it yield
higher stages of “fitness.” 26 The “struggle for existence,” in other words, is
26 Nietzsche does clearly associate a normative component with strong and weak. But that is
because for Nietzsche strong and weak are constants, not the results of an adaptive process.
On the other hand, Nietzsche is entirely neutral about power-projection. The outcome of
power-projection (or “struggle”) does not determine the relative “fitness” of an individual will.
78 Dirk Robert Johnson

merely a restriction, a pocket, of Nietzsche’s greater “will to power”; it is

not synonymous with it. 27
These were the conclusions of the late Nietzsche. Sixteen years separated the
“David Strauss” essay from the “Anti-Darwin” passage in Götzen-Dämmerung and
fourteen years from the Genealogie der Moral, in 1887. The latter work represented
the culmination of Nietzsche’s engagement with Darwin; it offered an alterna-
tive to the origins of morality that both Darwin (in the Descent of Man) and his
followers (progressive Darwinists and Social Darwinians alike) had proposed on

One could argue that Darwin suggests the reverse. “Fitness” is not pre-determined in the
individual will but becomes determined through success, or survival, in the “struggle for exis-
tence.” Thus, Darwin seems indifferent to normative criteria as components within his equation,
though he does not seem to be indifferent to the outcome: (relative) “fitness” must emerge
from struggle.
27 Danto criticizes Kaufmann’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s use of Geist (“spirit”) at the conclu-
sion of the “Anti-Darwin” passage. Nietzsche writes here: “Darwin hat den Geist vergessen (-
das ist englisch!), die Schwachen haben mehr Geist … Man muss Geist nöthig haben, um Geist
zu bekommen, - man verliert ihn, wenn man ihn nicht mehr nöthig hat. Wer die Stärke hat,
entschlägt sich des Geistes (-“lass fahren dahin! denkt man heute in Deutschland - das Reich
muss uns doch bleiben”…). Ich verstehe unter Geist, wie man sieht, die Vorsicht, die Geduld,
die List, die Verstellung, die grosse Selbstbeherrschung und Alles, was mimicry ist (zu letzterem
gehört ein grosser Theil der sogenannten Tugend)” (GD, “Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen”
14). Whereas Kaufmann interprets Nietzsche’s use of “spirit” as a rejection of Darwin, Danto
rightly sees Nietzsche’s meaning in a more material, less “spiritual” sense. Nietzsche’s subse-
quent elaboration (“ich verstehe unter Geist”) uses Darwin-inspired naturalist categories to
characterize “spirit,” and Nietzsche’s usage is clearly intended to undercut and mock the more
exalted “spiritual” understanding of Geist within nineteenth-century tradition.
However, Danto further believes that Nietzsche’s engagement with Darwin-inspired natural-
ism indicates agreement with Darwin’s overall idea of evolution. Thus, Danto fails to convey
Nietzsche’s ultimate subversion of Darwinism. According to Danto, Nietzsche is making the
“point that ‘spirit’ is something the herd has, but which the strong do not need, although
through spirit the herd is able to triumph over the strong. Thus spirit leads to the debasement
of the species. Darwin is implicitly criticized for having thought that the ‘better’ - or the ‘fit’
- survive when it is the ‘unfit’ who do instead. If Darwin had not forgotten about spirit, then,
he would have seen that there is no progress but a deterioration through evolution. The species
gets worse and worse. This, I think it plain, is Nietzsche’s point” (Danto: Nietzsche as Philo-
sopher, loc. cit., pp. 187-88). And yet, Nietzsche nowhere makes it plain that he agrees with
Darwin’s notion of evolution. There is no congruence, as Danto seems to imply, between their
two models. On the contrary, Nietzsche’s point is that the weak as a collective will to power
have triumphed over the strong at this historical juncture. For that reason, the weak can no
longer recognize that the weapons they have needed to attain supremacy in this struggle against
the strong (i. e., all the weapons of “consciousness”) are associated with inferiority and weakness
(“man muss Geist nöthig haben, um Geist zu bekommen”). Not surprisingly, the weak can
now “discover” all those characteristics exalted in the term Geist, because they feel themselves
at the pinnacle of civilization and have obfuscated the origins of their own historical ascendancy.
But this historical condition is not a question of either progression or debasement of the
“species” as such, i. e., of evolution. It is, in Nietzsche’s terms, a reflection of a collective will
to power that has achieved temporary supremacy through the predominant interpretation of
inferior wills. This “struggle” does not lead to “fitness” or “unfitness,” as for Darwin. It is
simply a reflection of a constant, always occurring, open-ended clash of individual will(s) to
power.
 Nietzsche’s Early Darwinism: The “David Strauss” Essay of 1873 79

the basis of Darwin’s theory of natural selection. Nietzsche’s arguments in the

Genealogie did not locate him on the spectrum of traditional Darwinists; they
proceeded from a position beyond Darwinism. However, Nietzsche could only
break through the confines of Darwinian naturalism and hint at alternative philo-
sophical vantage-points by arguing within the theoretically established Enlight-
enment tradition of natural science upon which Darwin’s system was built.
Nietzsche himself had originally started from the same traditions and theoretical
premises in the “David Strauss” essay; this had led him to the Darwinian im-
passe.
But once he had detected decisive points of difference in the following years,
Nietzsche still had to articulate and convey his points of critique within the
culturally dominant paradigm of late-Enlightenment naturalism. That naturalism
had established the parameters of nineteenth-century debate through its natural-
ization of the “moral” question. Nietzsche’s rhetorical necessity, above all, has
led to the confusion surrounding his Darwinism. It has led commentators to
mistake his adoption of important Darwin-inspired terms (e. g., strong and weak
wills; higher types) for an agreement with Darwinian conclusions. The way out
of this critical impasse is to take Nietzsche’s mature anti-Darwinism seriously
and to unearth the fault-lines in the Genealogie between Nietzsche’s and Darwin’s
incompatible visions.