APPELLATE COURT

OF THE

STATE OF CONNECTICUT
A.C. 40115

STEPHANIE SANS (f/k/a SZYMONIK)

v.

PETER T. SZYMONIK

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT APPELLANT

WITH SEPARATELY BOUND APPENDIX PARTS 1 AND 2

FOR THE DEFENDANT APPELLANT

PETER T. SZYMONIK
142 CHIMNEY SWEEP HILL ROAD
GLASTONBURY, CT 06033
TEL. (860) 614-7721
FAX. (860) 812-2092
EMAIL: szymonik@gmail.com

TO BE ARGUED BY
PETER T. SZYMONIK, PRO SE

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRO SE STANDARD OF REVIEW……………………………………………………………………iv

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES……………………………………………………………………..…vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………………………………………….vii

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS…………………………………………………………………………1

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND ARGUMENT

I. DID THE FAMILY COURT ERR WHEN IT ASSUMED JURISDICTION FROM THE
JUVENILE COURT, HELD HEARINGS AND ISSUED ORDERS WITHOUT FIRST
RESOLVING JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANT AND
BY THE STATE?................................................................................................................5
a. Preservation………………………………………………………………………………….5
b. Relevant Facts and Procedural History………………………………………………...…5
c. Applicable Law……………………………………………………………………………….6
d. Standard for Review………………………………………………………………………...6
e. Discussion……………………………………………………………………………………7
A. The family and juvenile courts are statutorily different. They provide different levels
of protections, supports and safeguards to children and parents who come before
them. When the family court assumed jurisdiction from the juvenile court, it held
hearings and issued orders damaging to and undermining the Defendant when the
family court, as a lessor court of equity, had no statutory authority to do so.

II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT HIS DUE PROCESS
AND CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS AND RIGHT TO ADEQUATE AND
PROPER LEGAL REPRESENTATION BY RESTRICTING AND PROHIBITING HIM
AND HIS COUNSEL FROM HAVING THEIR MOTIONS FILED AND HEARD?
a. Preservation
b. Relevant Facts and Procedural History
c. Applicable Law
d. Standard for Review
e. Discussion
A. The family court is denying the Defendant his fundamental due process, civil liberty,
constitutional and federally protected rights by denying him the ability to access
justice and to enjoy proper legal and legal representation by arbitrarily imposing then
denying request for leaves filed with his and his counsel’s well-articulated motions
and motions seeking to protect his children and his rights as a fit parent.

i
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN NOT DECLARING A MISTRIAL WHEN TESTIMONY
AND EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL DIRECT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT
WITH THE MINOR CHILDREN WAS PRESENTED BEFORE THE COURT?

a. Preservation
b. Relevant Facts and Procedural History
c. Applicable Law
d. Standard for Review
e. Discussion
A. The family court stated that if evidence of Plaintiff’s counsel personal involvement
with the parties’ minor children were presented before the court, it will need to
declare a mistrial. When this evidence was before the court, the court failed to
declare a mistrial. Plaintiff’s counsel, who did not have cleans hands before the
court, was allow to continue operating before the court having tainted the matter.

IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY HOLDING A FINANCIAL HEARING ABSENT
JURISDICTION, DENYING DUE PROCESS AND CONTINUANCES REQUESTED TO
PRESERVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, OPENING PRIOR JUDGMENTS ABSENT
AUTHORITY TO DO AND ISSUING FINANCIAL ORDERS BASED ON CLEAR
ERROR?

a. Preservation
b. Relevant Facts and Procedural History
c. Applicable Law
d. Standard for Review
e. Discussion
A. On August 26, 2016, Defendant prevailed in his appeal of the court’s October 2013
financial orders by finding that the Defendant’s due process rights and ability to
enjoy a proper evidentiary hearing were violated. The trial court repeated this same
error.

CONCLUSION …………………………………………………….…………… 29

STATEMENT OF RELIEF ……………………………………………………. 29

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 PRO SE STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pro Se litigants’ court submissions are to be construed liberally and held to less

stringent standards than submissions of lawyers. If the court can reasonably read the

submissions, it should do so despite any failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal

theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant’s unfamiliarity with rule

requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982);

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (quoting Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189

(3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992) (holding Pro Se petitions

cannot be held to same standard as pleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v. I.N.S., 58

F.Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999). Courts provide Pro Se parties wide latitude when

construing their pleadings and papers. When interpreting Pro Se papers, the Court should use

common sense to determine what relief the party desires. S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1582

(11th Cir. 1992). See also, United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 648 (3rd Cir. 1999) (Courts

have a special obligation to construe Pro Se litigants’ pleadings liberally); Poling v.

K.Hovnanian Enterprises, 99 F.Supp.2d 502, 506-07 (D.N.J. 2000). Defendant has the right to

submit Pro Se briefs on appeal, even artfully drawn, as long as a court can reasonably read

and understand them. See, Vega v. Johnson, 149 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 1998). Courts will go to

particular pains to protect Pro Se litigants against consequences of technical errors if injustice

would otherwise result. U.S. v. Sanchez, 88 F.3d 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Moreover, “the court is

under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any

possible theory.” Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1975)

(quoting Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1974)). Thus, if this court were to

entertain any motion, this court would have to apply the standards of White v. Bloom.

iii
Furthermore, if there is any possible theory that would entitle the Defendant to relief, even one

that the Defendant hasn’t thought of, the court cannot dismiss or uphold the trial court’s ruling.

The State of Connecticut has articulated a standard similar to that used in the federal courts. In

Cersosimo the Supreme Court stated: “It is a court’s established policy to allow great latitude to

a litigant who, either by choice or necessity, represents himself in legal proceedings, so far as

such latitude is consistent with the just rights of any adverse party. Cersosimo v. Cersosimo,

449 A.2d 1026 (1982)

iv
 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

I. DID THE FAMILY COURT ERR WHEN IT ASSUMED JURISDICTION FROM THE JUVENILE
COURT, HELD HEARINGS AND ISSUED ORDERS WITHOUT FIRST RESOLVING
JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANT AND BY THE STATE?

II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT HIS DUE PROCESS AND
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS AND RIGHT TO ADEQUATE AND PROPER
LEGAL REPRESENTATION BY RESTRICTING AND PROHIBITING HIM AND HIS
COUNSEL FROM HAVING THEIR MOTIONS FILED AND HEARD?

III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN NOT DECLARING A MISTRIAL WHEN TESTIMONY
AND EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL DIRECT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT WITH
THE MINOR CHILDREN WAS BEFORE THE COURT?

IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY HOLDING A FINANCIAL HEARING ABSENT
JURISDICTION, DENYING DUE PROCESS AND CONTINUANCES REQUESTED TO
PRESERVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, OPENING PRIOR JUDGMENTS ABSENT
AUTHORITY TO DO AND ISSUING FINANCIAL ORDERS BASED ON CLEAR ERROR?

v
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGES

Thaner v. Thaner HHD-FA07-4034225-S (2016)………………………………………………….…5

in re Mikas M., Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford, Docket No. CP10013378A (March
4, 2013, Burgdorff, J.)……………………………………………………………………………………6

Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, 231 Conn. 563, 570, 651 A.2d 1246
(1995)………………………………………………………………………………………….……….6, 7

Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. v. Blake, 186 Conn. 295, 297, 441 A.2d 183 (1982)………………..6

LaBow v. LaBow, 171 Conn. 433, 440, 370 A.2d 990 (1976)…………………………………....6, 7

Connecticut Steel Co. v. National Amusements, Inc., 166 Conn. 255, 263, 348 A.2d 658 (1974)
………………………………………………………………………………………………….……….6, 7

Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 45…………………………………………………………………………6

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, Supreme Court (2000)………………………………..….....14, 33

In re Tayler F., 296 Conn. 524, 553-54, 995 A.2d 611 (2010)…………………………………….14

Morera v. Thurber, 131 A.3d 1155 Conn. App. (2016)……………………………………………..15

Peters (N/K/A Szymonik) v. Senman…………………………………………………………………16

Simms v. Seaman, 69 a.3d800 Conn. Supreme Court (2013)…………………………………….19

Simms v. Seaman, 129 Conn. App. 651, 674-78, 23 A.3d 1 (2011)……………………………...19

Broaca v. Broaca, 181 Conn. 463 Ct. Sup. Ct (1980)………………………………………….23, 32

Bartley v. Bartley, 27 Conn. App. 195, 198 (1992)………………………………………………….23

Bruno v. Bruno, 132 Conn. App. 339, 350, 31 A.3d 860 (2011).and AC34033………...23, 24, 28

in re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn. App. 592, 602, 767 A.2d 155 (2001)………………………...23, 25

Mathews vs Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)...…………………………………………………...23, 25

Valentine v. Valentine, 149 Conn. App. 789, 803-804 (2014)……………………………23, 26, 30

Styrcula v. Strycula, 139 Conn. App. 735, 745, 57 A.3d 822 (2102)…………………… 23, 24, 26

Unkelbach v. McNary, 244 Conn. 350, 366, (1988)………………………………………………..23

vi
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S. Ct. 1187, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62 (1965)………….23, 24

Egan v Egan 83 Conn. App. 514, 518, 850 A.2d 251 (2004)…………….…………………...23, 25
Fleet National Bank v. Nazareth, 75 Conn. App. 791, 793, 818 A.2d 69 (2003)………………..28

Soracco v. Williams Scotsman, Inc., 292 Conn. 86, 91, 971 A.2d 1 (2009)……………………..28

Tanzman v. Meurer, 309 Conn. 105, 113, 70 A.3d 13 (2013)……………………………………..30

Mensah v. Mensah, 145 Conn.App. 644, 652, 75 A.3d 92 (2013)………………………………..30

Marshall v. Marshall, 119 Conn.App. 120, 135-36, 988 A.2d 314 (xxxx)…………...……………31

Favrow v. Vargas, 231 Conn. 1, 25- 30, 647 A.2d 731 (1994)…………………………………….33

CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK

Connecticut Practice Book § 25-26…………………………………….……………………….15

Connecticut Practice Book § 60-1……………………………………………………………….14

Judicial Code of Conduct, Canon 2.3, 2.6, 2.15……………………...………………………….2, 17

Rule 3.7 and 8.4 of the Professional Rules of Conduct………….…..………………………….2, 17

CONNECTICUT STATUTES

General Statue § 46b-12………………………………………………….…………………..………...6

General Statute § 46b-54……………………………………………………………………………….6

General Statute § 46b-129a………………………………………………………………………........6

General Statute § 46(b)-121………………………………………………………………….2, 6, 9, 26

PUBLIC ACTS

Public Act 13-166…………………………………………………………………………………...2

Public Act 14-3……………………………………………………………………………..2, 18, 19

FEDERAL LAW

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)………………………………………………………………2, 9

vii
Americans with Disabilities Amendment Act Act (ADAAA)…...………………………………….2, 9

Individuals with Disabilities Education ACT (IDEA)……………………..……………………….2, 10

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)………………..………………………….2, 10

ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual: II-1, 4200…………………………………………...6, 10

Social Security Act Title IV-D………………………………………………………………………....31

UNITED STATES CODE

U.S. Code 18 U.S.C. §242; 18 U.S.C. §245; 42 U.S.C. §1983………………………………..2, 31

THE STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS…………………………………………………..14

First Amendment

Fourth Amendment

Fourteenth Amendment……………………………………………………………..…………………24

THE STATE AND FEDERAL BILL OF RIGHTS…………………………………………………...14

viii
 NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS AND FACTS OF THE CASE

The Defendant, Peter T. Szymonik, appeals orders issued by the trial court on

January 6, 2017 and July 6, 2017 in his post-judgment marital dissolution matter.

Defendant’s concern is the welfare of his minor children and family of autism. Defendant

asserts that the state has infringed and interfered with his constitutional right to equally

parent, provide for, and manage the care, custody, and control of his minor children, ages

13 and 16 (the older child has autism.) Defendant is a 54 year old Polish immigrant who

enjoys dual citizenship and rights under international law. His first marriage of 16 years

was dissolved in 2008 and he remarried in 2014. Given his age, he is concerned about his

ability to earn to a living and provide for his children from his first marriage. He is

concerned about his ability to support his children from his new second marriage, including

a 10-year old stepson who also has autism, his new daughter who was born in 2016 and

another child he and his wife are expecting. Defendant worked in the legal and technology

industries and today works in the healthcare, his income provides for seven family

members. Defendant is the only one of the four parents of the four children impacted by

this matter who enjoys full time employment. His employment provides healthcare

coverage for all of the children, including both children with autism. Defendant has very

limited resources and a favorable ruling will allow him to focus those resources in favor of

his family and children from both marriages. In addition to his immediate family, Defendant

also provides daily support and care to his 83-year old mother.

Defendant appeals the trial court’s January 6, 2017 orders, which substantially

diminished his parental rights by altering the court’s October 11, 2013 parenting and decision

making orders and the equal parenting his children benefited from since 2008. He appeals the

court’s July 6, 2017 financial orders altering the court’s April 1, 2011 financial orders. The

1
financial orders undermined the appeal he filed in November of 2013 and prevailed on in

August 26, 2016 (AC 36301), when the Appeals Court found his due process rights had been

violated. The appeal took three years and forced the Defendant to expend thousands of dollars

to correct an obvious error by the trial court: issuing financial orders without holding a proper

financial hearing. Defendant is now forced to appeal a second time to correct another obvious

error the trial court is refusing to correct. (Plaintiff did not challenge the appeal.)

Defendant cites jurisdictional and procedural errors in the proceedings in this appeal.

Defendant asserts that for nearly three years, the trial court has violated his First, Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. He asserts that the court has refused to protect his rights as a fit

parent by refusing to enforce its own orders and preventing him (and his counsel) from filing

motions, impacting his right to proper legal representation. He asserts that the court exceeded

its statutory and legislative authority by imposing requests for leave restrictions on his filings in

violation of his right to Equal Protection and his First Amendment right to petition the court for

redress of grievances. He asserts that the state is infringing on his constitutional right to direct

the care, custody and control of his children. He asserts that his rights have been violated

under the state and federal Constitutions and state and federal disabilities and special

education law. He asserts violations of state statute including, but not limited to: CT Gen. St.

46(b)-121, Public Act 14-3 and Public Act 13-166. He asserts that rights to parent his children

have been infringed as a result of the court allowing it’s orders to undermined by an officer,

agent and proxy of the court in violation of Judicial Canons and the Professional Rules of

Attorney Conduct as well as U.S. Code 18 U.S.C. §242; 18 U.S.C. §245; 42 U.S.C. §1983.

This appeal takes place amid growing public and legislative awareness, frustration and

concern regarding state agencies and institutions which fail to properly respond to

circumstances adversely impacting children and families of autism and disabilities. Especially

when these children are exploited or subjected to abuse and neglect as result of family courts

2
and child protection agencies infringing on the right of fit parents to direct the care, custody and

control their own disabled children, forcing state and federal government (and taxpayers) to

assume the substantial social and economic costs that result from these infringements.

This is not conjecture or a trivial concern. In this matter, the Hartford Family Court

has refused to enforce its own parenting, educational placement and parental decision

making orders since March of 2015. The court allowed its October 2013 orders to be

ignored and violated by the Plaintiff with the direct personal aid and assistance of her

counsel. The children have suffered extreme emotional abuse, domestic violence, and

alienation and have been encouraged to skip hundreds of days of school when under the

Plaintiff’s control, in turn enabling and promoting her personal agendas at the expense of

the children. The state allowed this while by denying the Defendant his constitutionally

protected right to access and parent his sons and to ask the court to enforce its own orders

when the Plaintiff refused to transition the minor children to the Defendant. When the

January 6, 2017 orders were issued, Defendant had not seen his younger son for 11

months or his older son since June of 2015 – in direct violation of the court’s own parenting

orders. This occurred because the court barred the doors to the courthouse and prohibited

the Defendant and his attorneys from filing emergency ex parte motions to have their

grievances heard. These motions were filed to ask the court to respond to repeated

incidents of abuse and neglect occurring in the Plaintiff’s home. This outrageous situation

resulted in the Department of Children of Families (“DCF”), the Glastonbury Police, the

Glastonbury School System and the juvenile court all becoming involved. The court’s

failure to protect the Defendant’s legal rights to access the court and to equally access and

parent his own children has, to date, cost the town of Glastonbury and its taxpayers over

$200,000 and the State of Connecticut an estimated $1,000,000+ These are the

substantial legal and other costs the town and state have been forced to bear as a result of

3
older child with a disability not being able to access and benefit from the positive parental,

educational, medical and other supports he received from the Defendant and his family

members for years. This reflects the court and state abdicated any possible claim of acting

in the children’s (or public’s) interests. A significant concern given that there are disturbing

similarities between this matter and the factors which impacted a teenage boy with

Asperger’s Syndrome in the Sandy Hook tragedy. The January 6, 2017 orders violated

federal law by disclosing confidential medical information related to the disabled child into

the public Family Court file, which is now accessible to anyone. This violation would not

have occurred if the Family Court left the responsibility for the child abuse/neglect charges

in the statutory safety net of the Juvenile Court. Instead, the Family Court improperly

assumed jurisdiction and proceeded without the due process protections afforded to

families who have an open DCF petition, but do not have an open matter in Family Court.

Defendant and his family have worked tirelessly to provide a sense of normalcy and

stability for the children. Two Guardians ad Litem and a conflict manager recognized the

Defendant as the parent who meets the children’s educational, medical and wellbeing

needs – as has the trial court. DCF and the juvenile court both found the Defendant to be a

fit parent and not at fault for the circumstances which have adversely impacted his children

since the Plaintiff stopped following court custody orders in March of 2015 and her divorce

counsel opted to personally involve himself with the minor children, impacting the matters

before the court. The trial court has mislabeled this as a “high conflict” case and faulted the

Defendant’s efforts to protect his children. The “high conflict” label has no statutory

definition and is improperly applied to divorces involving a parent or children with serious

addictions, major mental illnesses or cases involving domestic violence or parental

alienation. Cases which the Family Court, by its own admission in before the state

4
legislature is not equipped to respond to or handle (Hon. E. Bozzuto). 1 Many of these

matters, including this one, involve parents who are struggling to care for children on the

autism spectrum and may disagree about how to best care for the child. To its credit, the

trial court issued very detailed parental decision making and conflict resolution orders in

October 2013 which were effective. They provided the parties, the children and both families a

sense of normalcy and relief from October 2013 until March of 2015, when the Plaintiff

stopped following those orders and the court prohibited the Defendant from filing motions to

address the immediate danger his children were in. This further emboldened the Plaintiff to

completely abandon those orders in June of 2015 and to deny the Defendant any access or

contact with his disabled child. Instead of applying consequences, the Family Court rewarded

her conduct in its January 6, 2017 orders. This presents a matter of substantial public interest.

If parents who flagrantly violate court parenting orders are rewarded with de facto sole

custody, public confidence in the Family Court is harmed. If a divorce counsel is allowed to

personally involve themselves in matters before the court and to assist in the violation of the

court’s orders, then the very integrity of the court system is threatened. The Center for Disease

Control recently reported that the rates of autism for boys have increased to 1 in 28. This

means our family courts will be asked to respond to over 110 custody cases involving children

with autism each year. This is not a trivial issue as the state is slashing services to children

with disabilities. Defendant seeks to restore his children to the normalcy and stability they

enjoyed under the court’s October 11, 2013 custody orders and April 11, 2011 financial

orders. Defendant requests relief that his constitutional rights as a fit parent be restored to

be equal to the Plaintiff’s rights, as demanded by the First and Fourteenth amendments.

1
Parental Alienation has been recognized by state proclamations issued by the two Governors
and in family matters. See Thaner v. Thaner HHD-FA07-4034225-S (2016) Hon. E. Bozzuto –
(Appendix A110-A116)

5
I. DID THE FAMILY COURT ERR WHEN IT ASSUMED JURISDICTION FROM THE
JUVENILE COURT, HELD HEARINGS AND ISSUED ORDERS WITHOUT FIRST
RESOLVING JURISDICTIONAL CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANT
AND BY THE STATE?

Preservation: Defendant filed motions in the juvenile, family and appellate courts challenging

jurisdiction. (In family, see #459.00, #459,01, #459.02, #462.00, #464.00, #465.00.) Defendant

challenged the Family Court’s jurisdiction during hearing on December 5, 2016 (See transcript.)

Defendant filed a petition to the Supreme Court in June of 2017 regarding issues of jurisdiction.

The state, through juvenile court Attorney for the Minor Child, filed motions with the juvenile and

appellate courts regarding proper statutory jurisdiction in August of 2015 and January of 2016.

Relevant Facts and Procedural History: On October 1, 2015, Defendant was forced to

withdraw three emergency ex parte motions he filed in 2015, asking the Family Court to hear

reports of emotional abuse, educational and medical neglect, and domestic violence occurring

in the Plaintiff’s home. The court prohibited Defendant’s counsel from filing these motions by

requiring that requests for leave be filed. Defendant withdrew his motions, with the support of

DCF, to defer to the Juvenile Court’s jurisdiction as the Juvenile Court statutorily provides due

process and constitutional protections over matters and claims of child abuse. The day after the

Defendant withdrew his motions, Plaintiff responded by filing by her own motions in family court

seeking sole custody and upward modification of child support. The court did not require her to

file a request for leave, reflecting judicial bias. After fourteen (14) months of inaction and

delays, the Family Court abruptly scheduled and held hearings on December 5-9, 2016 during

the pendency of an open juvenile neglect proceeding. The Family Court proceeded after

summarily ignoring or denying several motions to stay proceedings citing lack of jurisdiction

and procedural concerns. On January 6, 2017, the Family Court issued orders. Plaintiff did not

prevail on her motion seeking sole custody or her claims. The court did not fault the Defendant

for issues adversely impacting the minor children. Yet the court stripped the Defendant of

6
almost all of his parenting time for the first time in the children’s lives. 2 The court altered and

eliminated critical parental decision making, transition and other orders the court previously

ordered in October 11, 2013 to protect the minor children, notably the child with autism.

Applicable Law: CT Gen. St. §46b-12, CT Gen. St. §46b-54, CT Gen. St. §46b-129a(2)(A),

CT Gen. St.§46b-129a(2)(C), CT Gen. St. §46b-121(b)(1), federal ADA Title II Technical

Assistance Manual: II-1. 4200. See also in re Mikas M., Superior Court, Judicial District of

Hartford, Docket No. CP10013378A (March 4, 2013, Burgdorff, J.); Golden Hill Paugussett

Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, 231 Conn. 563, 570, 651 A.2d 1246 (1995); Baldwin Piano &

Organ Co. v. Blake, 186 Conn. 295, 297, 441 A.2d 183 (1982); LaBow v. LaBow, 171 Conn.

433, 440, 370 A.2d 990 (1976); Connecticut Steel Co. v. National Amusements, Inc., 166 Conn.

255, 263, 348 A.2d 658 (1974); Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 45.

Standard for Review: The Family Court erred by improperly assuming jurisdiction and issuing

orders related to the minor children which were pending before the Juvenile Court without first

resolving jurisdictional challenges. An abuse of discretion in the misapplication of law. The

court erred in entering orders violating the Defendant’s right to family integrity and infringing on

his ability to enjoy the equal care, custody and control of his children as a fit parent without

applying a balancing test or least restrictive means, a constitutional violation. The court erred in

first bifurcating then hearing two issues without allowing Defendant’s counsel time to prepare.

Discussion: "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be

disposed of no matter in what form it is presented ... and the court must fully resolve it before

proceeding further with the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Golden Hill Paugussett

Tribe of Indians v. Southbury, supra; see also Baldwin Piano & Organ Co. v. Blake, supra

2
Plaintiff and Defendant live in the same town and their homes are less than four miles apart.

7
("[w]henever the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the notice of the court or tribunal,

cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step

in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction" [internal quotation

marks omitted]). The family court was required to resolve the question of whether it had

jurisdiction over the subject matter, irrespective of the propriety of the procedural vehicle by

which it was raised. A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, an allegation that a judgment is

void, "can be raised at any time ... and the lack thereof cannot be waived.” LaBow v. LaBow,

supra; Connecticut Steel Co. v. National Amusements, Inc., supra; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. §

45, supra. The issue is a matter of significant public interest. The specific issue is that the

Family Court (a lessor court of equity) should not have assumed jurisdiction, held hearings, or

issued orders to address issues which were presented by the state before the juvenile court (a

court of evidence and law). Entire state statute and Practice Book sections are devoted to the

procedural differences between these two courts. Allowing these courts to exchange the

specific jurisdiction assigned to them is contrary to the state’s statutory scheme. The Juvenile

Court has statutory jurisdiction over matters involving child truancy, abuse, or neglect. The

Family Court should not have issued orders that stripped the Defendant of almost all of his

parenting time with his children to address the issue of chronic truancy under their mother’s

care. The Family Court’s orders represent a violation of Defendant’s constitutional right to

Equal Protection because the Plaintiff’s parental rights were protected and Defendants were

infringed. The Family Court set dangerous precedent by assuming jurisdiction, hearing issues

and issuing orders related to the minor children and claims made against the Defendant by the

state in the Juvenile Court.3 This creates an untenable precedent where parents and children

subject to a custody order are afforded fewer protections than parents and children not subject

3
In August of 2016, Defendant-Appellant asked the Attorney General to intervene in the family
matter, yet the state did not so. As such, the state abdicated its statutory authority.

8
to a custody order. The precedent allows any parent aggrieved or displeased by an abuse

and/or neglect petition filed against them in Juvenile Court can simply “forum shop” and seek

relief in the Family Court instead. Any divorced parent challenging state claims made against

them in the Juvenile Court can have their matter deferred to the Family Court where they would

be subjected to a far lesser standard of proof and evidence. The Family Court harmed the

Defendant by drastically reducing his parenting time during the pendency of an active juvenile

neglect petition, which undermined the Defendant’s position in the Juvenile Court and provided

cause for the Juvenile Court to dismiss the state’s claims against the Plaintiff. The Family Court

should have stayed hearings until it had the benefit of knowing the status of the children

resulting from the outcome of the state’s action in the juvenile matter, which did not occur until

July of 2017. Instead, the Family Court stripped the Defendant of almost all of his parenting

time with his children while the juvenile matter was pending. This undermined the Juvenile

Court’s (Hon. M. Dannehy) and Defendant’s position that children do not get to decide when

and how they go to school or if court parenting orders are followed. The state refused to

respond to the Defendant’s request that the state intervene in the family matter. This further

undermined statutory authority as the state failed to preserve the claims it made before the

Juvenile Court, yet received an outcome the state wanted in a forum where the state had no

appearance or standing. Further, even though the Family Court heard and issued orders

responding to claims the state made before the Juvenile Court, the state continued to pursue a

neglect petition – perhaps emboldened by Family Court stripping the Defendant of his parenting

time with his children. 4 The state continued to ask the Juvenile Court to (re)hear the same

claims the Family Court already heard and ruled upon and continued to pursue placing the

children into foster homes, a constitutional violation imposing undue burden on the Defendant

4
The Family Court did not find that the Defendant was at fault for the abuse and neglect.

9
and his family of disabilities. The Family Court’s orders were issued in violation of CT Gen. St

§46b-121, which is clear that the Juvenile Court, not the Family Court, is the proper forum to

hear matters related to minor children when a juvenile neglect petition has been filed.

The Family Court failed to use the balancing test required when the state wishes to

diminish a constitutionally-protected right, such as severely restricting the Defendant’s

parenting time. The court failed to establish a compelling state interest in depriving the

Defendant of his parenting time with his children (and to the magnitude that it did.) The court

failed to use least restrictive means taking far more parenting time away from the Defendant

than necessary to address any claimed state interest. Even if what the Family Court did were

deemed proper, the court stripped the Defendant of most of his parenting time during the

pendency of a state claim against him in the Juvenile Court. This changed in July and August of

2017, when the Juvenile Court found the Defendant not at fault and dismissed all of the state’s

claims against him. DCF, in separate evidence based hearings, also reversed the

substantiation it made against him. These events invalidated the basis for the Family Court

stripping the Defendant of his parenting time. The court should have taken corrective action by

responding to Defendant’s motions asking the court to restore his equal parenting time.

Instead, the court has refused to allow filing of these motions. The Defendant, his children and

their familial relationships continue to be harmed by this deprivation and state intrusion.

The court’s orders violated Defendant’s rights under the federal disabilities and special

education law as for the first time since 2008, the state denied the Defendant’s constitutional

right to enjoy equal parenting time with his minor children and infringed on his ability to be

involved and provide for the day-to-day educational, medical and other needs of his disabled

son. Even if the court deemed it necessary to limit the Defendant’s time to promote school

attendance, that infringement cannot be sustained indefinitely, as it violates the least restrictive

means of the constitutional balancing test. The state does not have authority to seize the

10
Defendant’s children beyond the amount of time needed to achieve the state interest. The

bedrock principle that parents and children have the constitutional right to ongoing, meaningful

companionship does not evaporate due to a child’s alleged refusal to attend school to avoid

parenting time with their parent. The court imposed what amounts to a de facto state seizure of

his children and termination of their parent-child relationship by refusing to allow the Defendant

to file motions to restore his equal access and rights. The court violated federal law by

releasing confidential medical information related to the child with autism into the public family

court file. This would not have occurred if the Family Court did not assume jurisdiction from the

Juvenile Court. Defendant cites from the federal ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual: II-1.

4200 for educational reference and consideration.

35. Threats to disclose, or disclosure of, disabled litigants’ confidential

information is a form of discrimination and violates the Constitutional right to
privacy. The Constitution also provides that no state shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws and provides
for Due Process of law. Disabled litigants’ right to confidentiality is inherent in
the entire ADAAA statutory scheme as well as protected under several federal
and state laws, including the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”). The ADAAA applies in conjunction with other federal and state
laws, provides protection at a level greater or equal to that provided by
other federal and state laws, and prevails over any conflicting State laws.

The Family and Juvenile Courts played “jurisdictional ping-pong”, yet state statute and the

Practice Book do not allow for “hybrid-jurisdiction” in family or juvenile matters. They do not

afford these courts authority to arbitrarily assign their statutory mandates and authority to one

another. The Juvenile Court refused to assume jurisdiction or to issue orders to address the

children’s chronic truancy when with the Plaintiff. At the same time the Family Court refused to

allow the Defendant to file motions asking the court to enforce its own orders and his rights as a

fit custodial parent so he could get them to school and tend to their proper medical care. The

Family Court’s refusal caused the state to pursue a neglect petition on the very issues the

11
Defendant was attempting to ask the Family Court to respond to. The court instead also

allowed Plaintiff’s counsel to undermine the court’s parenting, educational placement and

decision making orders and to operate before the court with unclean hands. Trial courts enjoy

wide discretion. Discretion does not extend to ignoring statutory mandates, barring the doors to

the courthouse, refusing to enforce court orders and allowing officers of the court to undermine

the integrity of the court and the court’s orders. The court rewarded the Plaintiff as a parent

twice substantiated by DCF for abuse and neglect as she allowed her children to skip over

300 days of school while losing her employment by not showing up for work 114 times.

This resulted in multiple mandated reports filed by the children’s school system and

medical providers. The court favored and enabled her in spite of finding that she obtains “a

high custodial advantage” by making false representations to the court (See #320.00 MOD

October 11, 2103, Page 17.) In contrast, the court found that the Defendant is a fit parent

who provides for the educational and medical needs of his children, notably his child with

autism. Yet the court engages in ad hominem attacks against him to justify denying the

Defendant his rights. The court faults him for being upset as the state ignores and enables

independent reports of domestic violence, abuse, neglect, alienation and exploitation his

children are subjected to at the hands of the Plaintiff and in her home. While he denied

access to the courts and his well-supported motions are systematically refused, ignored

and dismissed. Plaintiff did not prevail in her claims seeking sole custody. The Family

Court did not find that the Defendant was unfit or fault him for the children’s chronic truancy

when with their mother. The court did not find that the Defendant was responsible for any

act which harmed the children, nor was one even presented before the court. Yet the court

in effect stripped him of parental rights by removing nearly all of his parenting time. The

situation is akin to a criminal court awarding kidnapper custody of the child they kidnapped,

refusing to hear the parent whose child was kidnapped, then ordering the aggrieved parent

12
to pay the kidnapper.

The court’s October 2013 custody orders were issued after almost a year and half

worth of hearings and based on recommendations made by a GAL, a court ordered

conflict manager, the children’s therapist and consideration of the older child’s autism.

The Juvenile Court and DCF did not find fault with the Defendant after years’ worth of

evidence based hearings. Yet the Family Court altered the court’s prior equal access

orders based on five days’ worth of rushed hearings for which Defendant and his counsel

was given one day to prepare for as several motions to stay were denied. The court first

bifurcated, stating it would first hear whether there was a change in circumstance, then

hear the request to change custody. The court then abruptly issued ruling and changed

the nature of the hearings in the middle of the hearings. without affording Defendant or his

counsel time to prepare. The court stripped the Defendant of his ability to parent his

children relying on testimony of two social workers who admitted under oath that they had

no training or experience working with children with autism or subjected to alienation. His

parenting time was severely restricted without applying constitutional protections. The

rights of Defendant and his children are fundamental in nature and require the application

of strict scrutiny to deprive this right and to advance a state interest. The state itself

created and allowed a situation which allowed the children to skip over 300 days of school

when with the Plaintiff, without consequences. The state then prevented the Defendant

from filing motions to uphold his right to parent his children, to ensure their school

attendance and to provide for their medical care. The state then punitively stripped the

Defendant of his nearly all of his parenting time with his sons – effectively erasing him as

parent in his son’s lives.

13
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT HIS DUE PROCESS
AND CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHTS AND RIGHT TO ADEQUATE AND
PROPER LEGAL REPRESENTATION BY RESTRICTING AND PROHIBITING HIM
AND HIS COUNSEL FROM HAVING THEIR MOTIONS FILED AND HEARD?

Preservation: Defendant filed several well-articulated motions over a 34-month period of time

asking the trial courts to vacate the request for leave mandates imposed against his and his

counsel filings and to refused to file and hear motions for declaratory judgment. (See #447.00

#479.00 and #490.00 are recent examples, see also motions listed in Appendix Part 2.)

Relevant Facts and Procedural History: In August of 2012, the court arbitrarily imposed a

request for leave restriction regarding the filing of motions without first holding hearing to

establish basis to support such restriction. The court did not enforce this order until the

Defendant filed an emergency ex parte motion in March 2015 asking the court to respond to an

incident of domestic violence involving the police and the children in the mother’s home. Since

March 2015, the court has infringed in the Defendant’s right to access justice by preventing and

prohibiting the Defendant and three of his counsel from filing at least 30 non-frivolous motions

with the court, including emergency ex parte motions, motions for declaratory judgment and

motions for review of attorney misconduct. In contrast, the court has allowed Plaintiff and her

counsel to file motions and have hearings scheduled absent such restriction. Plaintiff’s counsel

has instead been able to engage the judicial machinery and have hearings scheduled by

sending emails to the court’s caseflow office, circumventing proper and required court

procedure and the clerk’s office. (See letters to clerk in the case file.) This violates Defendant’s

right to equal protection because the court has created two unequal classes of parent. One

parent is allowed to present and pursue her claims as the other is not and prohibited. This

segregation is a miscarriage of justice harmful to the Defendant and his children. The restriction

has barred the doors to the courthouse to the Defendant and his counsel since March of 2015.

14
Even in emergencies involving his children leading to their chronic truancy, DCF investigations,

attempts by the state to place his children into foster care and the erasure of his ability to

access and parent his children. In April of 2017, the Juvenile Court imposed this same

restriction on the Defendant’s filing. However, on June 20, 2017, the Juvenile Court properly

reversed itself by granting Defendant’s motion to vacate when Defendant cited constitutional

violations. Defendant’s counsel withdrew on June 6, 2017 citing her inability to properly

represent the Defendant’s and his interests, resulting from her inability to have her motions

heard. On November 7, 2017, Defendant’s limited appearance and former appellate counsel

expressed grave concerns to the court about his inability to have his motions filed and heard.

Motions he filed asking the court to review and correct obvious and grievous errors in findings

of financial fact which were harming the Defendant and his family of disabilities.

Applicable Law: The state and federal Constitutions and Bill of Rights. The First Amendment

guarantees the right to petition government and access justice. The Fourteenth Amendment

guarantees equal protection of the laws and prohibits the state from infringing on that right.

Standard for Review: The court violated the Defendant’s fundamental due process and

constitutional rights, and his right to adequate legal representation, by misusing requests for

leave to prevent and prohibit him and his counsel from filing motions. The standard of review

includes plain error constitutional violation, lack of statutory foundation and abuse of discretion.

Discussion: The fundamental right to be heard stems from the First Amendment and applies

to all citizens, whether they are pursuing a private interest or defending themselves in a

criminal matter. Denying the Defendant the ability to file motions infringes on his ability to

provide for the care, custody and control of his children, protected under the First Amendment’

association clause. The court’s refusal to recognize Defendant’s right to access justice enabled

the abuse and neglect of his sons and allowed his children to miss over 300 days of school

15
over an 18 month period. The court stripped him of his rights and ability to parent his children

when there was absolutely no evidence before the court that the children refused, or would

refuse to attend school, when with the him. This imposed undue burden on him as his family

was subjected to state and DCF involvement solely due to the Family Court refusing to allow

fair and proper hearing of the Defendant’s motions. Three of the Defendant’s counsel, including

appellate counsel, expressed their concerns to the court regarding their inability to have their

motions filed or heard, preventing them from afford him proper legal representation. The

Defendant has suffered further undue burden by being forced to repeatedly approach the

Appellate Court as a Pro Se party, and the substantial time and expense that involves, to

correct clear and obvious procedural and other error on the part of the trial court. Even on the

appellate level, Defendant had his appeal related to a serious issue of attorney misconduct

involving the exploitation of his disabled child dismissed (AC 39789) leaving the issue

unresolved to this day. The reviewing court denied a critical, time sensitive and well supported

Motion to Stay filed by the Defendant’s appellate counsel because it was filed one day late,

contrary to CT Practice Book §60-1. These infringements continue to cause substantial

financial and other harm to the Defendant and his children. The restriction is a violation of

Equal Protection, as other parents involved in the Family Court can have motions filed and

heard, including the Plaintiff, while the Defendant has been stripped of that right. There is no

statutory or constitutionally sound authority which allows the court to impose restrictions on the

filing of motions to deny access to justice. The restriction violates the First Amendment as the

court has not applied a constitutional balancing test, strict scrutiny or least restrictive means

prior to restricting the Defendant’s right to file motions. The court did not narrowly tailor and

refused to declare the Defendant’s rights. The imposition of the requests for leaves applied to

virtually every motion Defendant filed over 34 months, including emergency motions when the

children’s safety was at risk, is patently unconstitutional. There is no case law which allows the

16
court to even consider the imposition of such restriction without first conducting an evidentiary

hearing to establish if motions filed are frivolous. Further, the August 2012 restriction was

issued in response to the Plaintiff’s filings, not the Defendant’s filings.

“As a result of the Plaintiff’s sworn allegations, Judge Holly Abery-Wetstone

granted the [Plaintiff’s] ex parte application. Her order directed plaintiff to use
Connecticut and out-of-state authorities to regain custody of the children. She
gave Plaintiff sole custody and allowed defendant only professionally-supervised
access at his sole expense.

A hearing on the ex parte application was scheduled for May 2, 2012, but the
parties reached a written agreement (#286) that Judge Abery-Wetstone
approved. Plaintiff withdrew her application with prejudice. […]

The court finds this to be a shocking reversal. Plaintiff-under oath–implied in her

ex parte application that defendant was a kidnapper who routinely ignored court
orders. She gained the court’s approval and a huge custodial advantage over
defendant. Mere days later, she agreed that he deserved make-up time with the
children! The court reasonably infers from this dramatic turnabout that her
allegation in the ex parte application were – at best – exaggerated.” (Hon. J.
Charbonneau, October 11, 2013 MOD)

CT Practice Book §25-26 and form JD-FM202 are designed to allow motions to modify

custody or support to be filed after giving the opposing party a ten-day period to respond. They

have no statutory foundation, nor do they make reference to motions of any other kind.

Logically, if a request for leave to file is not opposed, there is no basis for a court not filing and

hearing the motion because there is no statutory or constitutionally sound authority which allows

a court to do otherwise. The court enjoys no authority to prevent filing simply because the court

may be displeased with the content of the motion or number of motions filed. In Morera v.

Thurber, 131 A.3d 1155 Conn. App. (2016), the appellate court reviewed the issue of request for

leaves. The court set precedent that if a request for leave is opposed, the court must schedule a

hearing. If a request for leave is consented to, there is no basis for the court to deny filing. If the

opposing party does not respond to the request for leave, logic dictates that there is also no

17
basis for the court to deny filing of the motion, as it is also unopposed. Instead, the court has

used the lack of response as basis to prevent and prohibit the Defendant (and his counsel) from

filing motions. Plaintiff does not oppose the request for leaves, being well aware that if left

unopposed, the court will deny them, preventing the Defendant motions from being filed or

heard. This leaves the Defendant in a constitutional “No Man’s Land”, providing no way for to

him to have his grievances heard. This allows the state (and the Plaintiff) to dictate which of his

motions and grievances will or will not be heard. This unconstitutional deprivation of a

fundamental right treats him as if he is a ward of state and subject to the whims of the state (and

the Plaintiff.) The court has even denied leaves filed with motions to ask the court to vacate its

request for leave mandate! The court has denied leave to file motions asking the court for

declaratory judgment, a fundamental due process and constitutional right. The court has denied

leave to file to ask the court to respond to reports of attorney misconduct and fraud before the

court. This violates of Equal Protection and is abuse of discretion and authority. On at least four

occasions, Defendant has been forced to contact the Family Court’s clerk’s office to inquire as to

why motions filed by Plaintiff’s counsel were not subject to the court’s request for leave

mandate, why no proper notice was provided and how Plaintiff’s counsel was able to schedule

hearings without filing motions with the clerk’s office. On December 5, 2016, Defendant moved

the Hon. J. Suarez to recuse himself from the matter due to bias. In 2011, Judge Suarez also

stripped Defendant’s wife of her parental rights to her autistic son, causing the child to become

non-verbal. Defendant’s wife testified about her case in multiple televised hearings before the

legislature and published a book on the loss of her parental rights. (Peters (n/k/a Szymonik) v.

Senman TTD-FA10-4012572 (2011Defendant expressed concern that his and his wife’s public

advocacy prejudiced the court.) Defendant was afforded less than five minutes to prepare for

the recusal hearing. The court allowed Plaintiff’s counsel to act as de facto counsel for the Hon.

J. Suarez and to examine the Defendant, with the recusal request being summarily denied.

18
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN NOT DECLARING A MISTRIAL WHEN TESTIMONY
AND EVIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL DIRECT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT
WITH THE MINOR CHILDREN WAS BEFORE THE COURT?

Preservation: In 2013, Defendant’s then counsel raised the issue of Plaintiff’s counsel turning

himself into a witness. From 2014 to date, Defendant has filed repeated motions and notices

regarding Plaintiff’s counsel’s misconduct and counsel not having clean hands. On October 12,

2017, Defendant filed a motion for judicial notice regarding the misconduct with the appeals

court, which was dismissed and denied en banc review, leaving the issue unresolved.

Relevant Facts and Procedural History: The court held hearing on September 22, 2016 to

review if Defendant could call Plaintiff’s counsel as a witness. The court failed to continue

hearing after recess (see transcript, Page 49.) Instead on October 4, 2016, the court issued a

memorandum of decision (#446.00) containing gross mischaracterization of evidence and fact.

The court denied a motion for articulation (#449.00) which forced Defendant to pursue an

appeal without knowing the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate a proper

appeal. The court took no action regarding attorney misconduct as required by Judicial

Canons. 5 On November 6, 2016, Defendant was forced to file an appeal. amended on

December 28, 2016 (AC 39789). On November 30, 2016, Defendant briefed the issue in

response to the court’s question of whether its December 2016 hearings should be stayed

pending the outcome of the appeal (#459.00). The court did not respond to the brief and

instead scheduled “endless hearings”, dismissing motions to stay and notice from Defendant’s

counsel that she had other court commitments and was unprepared to go forward. On January

6, 2017, the court issued a final judgment. On January 11, 2017, the Appeals Court heard

argument on its own motion then dismissed the appeal AC 39789 for lack of a final judgment

5
At no time has Plaintiff’s counsel denied his personal involvement with the disabled child or
challenged the claim that he has a personal financial interest in the matters before the court.

19
(such judgment having been issued on January 7 ,2017.) The Appeals Court took no action

regarding attorney misconduct. The issue remains unresolved to this day.

Applicable Law: There is no case law precedent, statutory or other authority, related a divorce

counsel personally involving themselves with a parties’ minor children (or children with an

intellectual disability), or injecting themselves in matters before the family court, or assuming a

personal financial interest, during the pendency of open court matters. Public Act 14-3.

Standard for Review: on July 14, 2016, the court stated that if evidence of Plaintiff’s counsel

involvement with the minor children were put before the court, “…that will leave [sic] to a

mistrial and we will need to start all over again.” and that the court would like to avoid that (Hon.

J. Suarez.) (See transcript Page 14.) Being made aware that the evidence was already before

the court, the court did not declare a mistrial. The court instead allowed Plaintiff’s counsel to

continue operating unfettered and unquestioned before the court in violation of the Practice

Book and ABA standards. An abuse of discretion in application of procedure and law .

Discussion: The trial court has allowed Plaintiff’s counsel, and an agent and officer of the

court, to the harm the Defendant and the integrity of the court. The court has done so by

allowing counsel to ignore the orders and authority of the court and to obstruct and harm the

Defendant’s rights and parent0child relationships. The court has allowed counsel to exploit the

disabled child’s intellectual disability and to personally involve himself with the child’s

educational and medical issues, tainting the matters and his client’s claims before the court.

Counsel has done so since at least October of 2015, reflected in evidence and testimony heard

before the court from a DCF social worker (see February 9, 2016 transcript.) It is reflected in

the three lawsuits counsel filed in the minor’s child’s name against the town of Glastonbury and

state and in federal court. Plaintiff’s counsel enjoys no authority to represent Defendant’s child

in these lawsuits over the objection of the Defendant, who has repeatedly noticed counsel to

cease and desist, yet counsel has ignored. Counsel has attempted to engage the disabled

20
minor child as a witness in legal proceedings that are patently inappropriate for a disabled

minor child to enter into and which would expose the child to risk of injury.

Defendant was recognized by the State Senate for his efforts in helping to pass Public

Act 14-3. He is an advocate for modernizing the family court system and for the fundamental

rights of parents and families of autism. Public Act 14-3 was passed to allow fit parents to retain

their parental rights during the engagement of family court guardians ad litem (“GALs”.) The act

was passed in response to thousands of complaints the legislature received from parents

regarding abuses within the Family Court GAL system, abuses which the Defendant and his

family suffered. In open defiance of intent of Public Act 14-3, Plaintiff’s counsel opted to

personally involve himself with the parties’ autistic child well beyond the scope of what might

even be expected or tolerated on the part of a court assigned GAL or attorney for the minor

child (“AMC”). When the Plaintiff moved to engage the Juvenile Court’s AMC in the family

matter, the Family Court denied the request. The court further refused to assign a GAL, stating

that it would be “impossible” given the history of the case. Yet the court had no issue with a

divorce counsel becoming personally involved with the parties’ disabled child and claims to be

representing the child’s interest – even claiming to somehow hold privilege over his actions on

behalf of the child. In Simms v. Seaman, 69 a.3d800 Ct. Sup. Court (2013), the court noted:

“…in its amicus brief, the Connecticut Chapter of the American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers (Connecticut Chapter), a highly respected organization
comprised of many of the finest matrimonial lawyers in this state, takes a similar
position, stating: "The Connecticut Chapter is committed to the rule of law and to
the uniform administration of justice. The interest of the [amicus] in this case is
the protection of the integrity of practice by attorneys in the family courts of
Connecticut. To allow attorneys immunity from claims for fraud based on their
actions in court, where attorneys should be at the height of their ethical vigilance,
would send the wrong message to lawyers. Moreover, it would send the wrong
message to the public who relies on the ethical underpinnings of the legal
system. Such a ruling would have a particularly pernicious effect on proceedings
in family court, where each party is so dependent on proper disclosure by the
other." The considerations that the amicus identifies are important ones. See,
e.g., Simms v. Seaman, 129 Conn.App. 651, 674-78, 23 A.3d 1 (2011) (Bishop,
J., concurring and dissenting)

21
 Simms v. Seaman involved attorneys who engaged in fraud before the court related to

financial matters and whose misconduct was discovered after the trial had concluded. In this

matter, Plaintiff’s counsel misconduct and fraud before the court involved his exploitation of a

minor child’s intellectual disability during the pendency of court hearings and to promote a

personal financial interest he assumed in the matters before the court. The judicial authority

has consistently refused to address this in accordance with Judicial Canons.

IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY HOLDING A FINANCIAL HEARING ABSENT
JURISDICTION, DENYING DUE PROCESS AND CONTINUANCES REQUESTED TO
PRESERVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, OPENING PRIOR JUDGMENTS ABSENT
AUTHORITY TO DO AND ISSUING FINANCIAL ORDERS BASED ON ERROR?

Preservation: Defendant’s brief filed June 22, 2017 (#488.00). Motion for Review Filed July 24,

2017. Letters to the court clerk’s office incorporated into the case file.

Relevant Facts and Procedural History: The court has historically recognized the matter’s

highly unusual financial circumstances, aspects of which are under permanent seal. The court

ordered that the Defendant pay $160/week in child support in the April 30, 2008 divorce decree.

In May 2009, the court modified its orders, ordering that he pay $100/week from his

unemployment checks. In April of 2011, the Defendant obtained access to an asset that the

Plaintiff waived all rights to at the time of the divorce. The court ordered that in exchange for a

one-time lump sum payment of $75,000, Defendant would pay $100/week in child support

when full time employed, as a day forward and prevailing support order (#467.00) The $75,000

could only lawfully be categorized as an advanced child support payment, as the Plaintiff did

not pay taxes on this windfall and Defendant did. The court did not find that the Defendant

owed child support or was in arrears. In June 2011, Plaintiff returned to court seeking contempt

and an increase in child support because the Defendant gained employment. Plaintiff did not

prevail. The court (Hon. M. Taylor) stated it had erred and should not have altered the parties’

agreement and order by adding “without prejudice” in regards to the Defendant’s future child

22
support payments. The court established as the “law of the case” that the April 2011 support

orders were not subject to modification due to the Defendant obtaining additional income. The

court acknowledged that it had erred in not crediting the Defendant for the substantial tax

burden the Defendant was forced to bear from the $75,000 payment, again recognizing that the

payment could only be an advance child support payment.

In October 2013 the court entered new financial orders which increased the Defendant’s

child support payments to $200/week. The court erred in not holding a financial hearing or

considering the April 2011 orders. Defendant appealed in November of 2013 and prevailed on

August 26, 2016. The Appeals Court found that his due process rights had been violated and

granted him a remand hearing. Plaintiff did not participate in or challenge the appeal. On

October 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Contempt (#418.00) alleging lack of compliance with

the court’s October 2013 orders and without referencing the April 2011 orders in her motion.

Plaintiff filed her motion aware that every court that reviewed the financial matters from 2013

through 2015, reinforced and established that the Defendant was not in contempt, did not owe

an arrearage and that the April 2011 support orders were in effect.

On April 19, 2017, the court held a status conference and issued discovery orders. On

May 26, 2017, Defendant filed motions to stay hearings and to vacate (#476.40) citing

jurisdictional issues. On June 5, 2017, the Defendant filed a detailed Motion for Continuance

(#478.00) and a Motion for Declaratory Judgment (#479.00). The court prohibited the filing of

these motions. The motion to continue’ s request for leave was denied the day after it was filed,

without affording ten days for the Plaintiff to respond. On June 6, 2017, the court held a hearing

during which the court granted Defendant’s counsel’s request to withdraw. Counsel cited her

inability to properly represent the Defendant, in part, as a result of relentless attacks she was

being subjected to by the Plaintiff. Defendant was without counsel and informed the court that

he would need to request a continuance of the court’s June 27-28 hearings in order to allow

23
him time to obtain new counsel and to obtain and present financial evidence to the court – a

due process and constitutional right, The court did not direct otherwise. On June 16, 2016,

Defendant filed motion to stay proceedings. The court granted a request for leave filed with the

motion on June 27, 2017, after the proceeding had already been held. The court did not hear or

respond to the motion when filed. On June 19, 2017, the court vacated its April 19, 2017 orders

and issued new orders. On June 20, 2017, Defendant filed the motion for continue (#485.00)

citing due process, procedural and other concerns, including his need for time to secure new

counsel, to be able to obtain and present factual financial information to the court and serious

work related issues. The court did not respond to this motion until the afternoon of June 26,

2017. On June 22, 2017, Defendant filed a brief (#488.00) citing due process, procedural and

constitutional concerns. On June 26, 2017 into June 27th, Defendant motions to stay and

continue with the trial and reviewing courts, citing the same concerns and informing the trial

court that he was unable and unprepared to go forward, but could appear at 4:00pm. Plaintiff

did not comply with the court’s orders and did not provide signed and sworn financial affidavits

for 2013 or 2017. On July 7, 2017, the trial court entered new financial orders, which the

Defendant appealed on July 10, 2017. From July 13, 2017, to date, the courts have refused

and denied motions filed by the Defendant and his limited appearance counsel asking the court

to stay and or open the court’s July 7, 2017 financial orders based on due process, procedural

and obvious error as the Defendant’s family of disabilities is being financially devastated.

Applicable Law: The state and federal constitutions. CT. Gen. St. §46b-121(b)(1). See also

Broaca v. Broaca, 181 Conn. 463 Ct. Sup. Ct (1980); Bartley v. Bartley, 27 Conn. App. 195,

198 (1992); Bruno v. Bruno, 132 Conn.App. 339, 350, 31 A.3d 860 (2011); Shaquanna M., 61

Conn. App. 592, 602, 767 A.2d 155 (2001); Mathews v Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976);

Valentine v. Valentine, 149 Conn. App. 789, 803-804, 90 A.3d 300 (2014); Styrcula v. Strycula,

139 Conn. App. 735, 745, 57 A.3d 822 (2012); Unkelbach v. McNary, 244 Conn. 350, 366

24
(1988); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S. Ct. 1187, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62 [1965];

Egan v. Egan, 83 Conn. App. 514, 518, 850 A.2d 251 (2004).

Standard for Review: “Appellate Court review of a deprivation of due process is a

question of law subject to plenary review." Bartley v. Bartley, supra. The trial court erred by:

1) declaring a mistrial on the Plaintiff’s October 2015 motion for modification of child support

and ordering that the motion be heard concurrent with an appellate remand; 2) holding hearing

and issuing orders absent jurisdiction, in violation of due process and procedure and manner

which did not apply least restrictive means or the Mathews v. Eldridge, supra balancing test; 3)

reopening prior judgment of the court, 4) issuing orders in violation of state and federal

support law then denying due process to correct error. Appellate review of the trial court's

calculation of child support is "limited to the question of whether the court correctly applied

the law and could reasonably have concluded as it did." Unkelbach v. McNary, supra. In

child support cases however, the trial court's discretion "is closely circumscribed by the

breadth of the law that it must apply." When a trial court incorrectly applies the law it is

subject to a review of abuse of discretion.

Discussion: Point 1) The trial court erred by ordering that the Plaintiff’s October 2015 motion

for contempt and modification of support be combined and heard along with the Defendant’s

August 2016 remand. This was improper because the Appellate Court vacated the court’s

October 2013 financial orders, rendering the Plaintiff’s October 2015 motion moot. (The

Appeals Court established precedent regarding mootness by finding that the issue of payment

of former GAL’s fees in the October 2013 financial orders (and fees deemed “in the nature of

support”) was moot and did not require appellate review in 2016. If this portion of the vacated

financial orders was deemed moot, then the entirety of the financial orders were moot.) Plaintiff

did not file a new motion after the court’s October 2013 financial orders were vacated. The

court declared a mistrial on her motion on the basis that she did not provide any financial

25
information during hearings held in December of 2016. Yet there was no valid motion before

the court for the court to respond to or act on. Therefore, the court had no basis to or statutory

authority to declare a mistrial, hold hearings or issue new orders on her stale and moot October

2015 motion. (See Valentine v. Valentine, supra and see also Styrcula v. Strycula, supra.)

Point 2 - Jurisdiction) CT. Gen. St. §46b-121(b)(1) states that orders of the family court

are stayed pending the outcome of a juvenile neglect petition, yet the court proceeded being

aware that the juvenile matter was open and pending. On May 26, 2017, the Defendant filed

a motion to stay and vacate orders, challenging jurisdiction. The court prevented the filing of

this motion by denying leave to file – which was unopposed. On June 15, 2017, Defendant

filed a Motion to Stay proceedings (#483.00) citing jurisdiction. The court waited until after

the hearing was held on June 27, 2017 to grant the leave on this motion, but did not hear or

respond to the motion prior to proceeding with the hearing. The court may claim that the

motion was not filed prior to the hearing. Such claim would be disingenuous as the court

was aware of what the motion contained well before the hearing date and aware that

request for leaves do not apply to motions challenging jurisdiction. If the court received such

motion with a request for leave, the court should have recognized that leaves do not apply

to such motions and resolved the issue of jurisdiction. In Bruno v. Bruno, supra the

Appellate Court established the importance of establishing proper jurisdiction:

“…[Our Supreme Court] has often stated that the question of subject matter
jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be
raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time. Fleet
National Bank v. Nazareth, 75 Conn. App. 791, 793, 818 A.2d 69 (2003.)
Furthermore, there is no question that [a reviewing court] has jurisdiction to
consider, on its own initiative, the jurisdiction of the trial court.” Soracco v.
Williams Scotsman, Inc., 292 Conn. 86, 91, 971 A.2d 1 (2009).”

Defendant repeatedly notified the trial court of an open juvenile neglect petition,

scheduled for hearing in mid-July. However, the court proceeded without resolving the

jurisdictional issue. When the court granted leave to file the motion to stay on June 27,

26
2017, the court should immediately heard the motion and addressed jurisdiction instead

of issuing orders on July 7, 2017. Orders issued without jurisdiction are void orders.

Point 2 – Due Process) On August 26, 2016, the Appeals Court found that the Defendant’s

due process rights were violated because the trial court did not afford the parties a hearing to

“to cross-examine each other on their financial affidavits.” On July 7, 2017, the trial court

issued default orders after hearing where the parties were again be unable to examine each on

their financial affidavits.

"A fundamental premise of due process is that a court cannot adjudicate any
matter unless the parties have been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard
on the issues involved.... It is a fundamental tenet of due process of law as
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and
article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution that persons whose ... rights will
be affected by a court's decision are entitled to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bruno v.
Bruno, supra.

“It is a fundamental tenet of due process of law as guaranteed by the

fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, §10,
of the Connecticut constitution that persons whose property rights will be
affected by a court's decision are entitled to be heard "'at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong v. Manzo, supra

“It is a fundamental tenet of due process that "no court will proceed to the
adjudication of a matter involving conflicting rights and interests, until all
persons directly concerned in the event have been actually or constructively
notified of the pendency of the proceeding, and given reasonable
opportunity to appear and be heard ... in sufficient time to prepare their
positions on the issues involved." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Styrcula v. Styrcula, supra

The Fourteenth Amendment states: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Due process and substantive due process

require more than a court simply holding a hearing. Due process requires that the parties be

afforded reasonable opportunity and time required to obtain counsel, obtain and present

27
evidence and to call witnesses to support their claims. This allows a court to hear grievances in

a meaningful and unbiased manner. When motions for continuance are requested to preserve

a due process right, the decision to grant or deny a continuance is no longer a matter of judicial

discretion, but a constitutional issue. (See Shaquanna M., 61 Conn. App. supra.) The court was

aware that a holding a hearing on June 27, 2017 would not be meaningful. It would not be

meaningful because the court granted Defendant’s counsel’s request to withdraw on June 6,

2017 and the Defendant informed the court on that day that he would need request a

continuance of the hearing which the court scheduled for June 27, 2017. 6 A hearing which was

scheduled without his knowledge, absent proper written notice and absent consideration of his

ability to appear on that day. The court was aware that the Defendant requested time to obtain

new counsel and would need the court’s assistance to obtain evidence and to call witnesses.

The court proceeded being aware that the Plaintiff did not comply with the court’s orders and

did not submit her financial affidavits to the court. The court proceeded after returning the

financial affidavit the Defendant provided to the court on June 6, 2017 back to him uncoded. As

a result, the court proceeded without having valid financial affidavits from which the court could

possibly deduce the parties’ financial status and situation in either 2013 or in 2017. The court

was aware that this prevented the parties from cross examining each other on their financial

affidavits – which is precisely what the appellate remand ordered. Instead, the court issued

orders based on the testimony of a litigant the court has repeatedly questioned the

credibility of. The Hon. J. Simon stated on June 27, 2017 that “…I need to make sure that

certain documents are in place and each other’s hands.” (see transcript, Page 24), yet

he proceeded without making sure financial documents were in place and available to the

6
In its July 7, 2017 MOD, the court claimed that the Defendant stated he was prepared to go
forward on June 27th. This is inaccurate. Defendant response was regarding going forward that
day and after his counsel withdrew – reflected by the court proceeding that day.

28
parties. The court was aware that the Defendant was unable and unprepared to go forward and

that his employment would be at significant risk if he appeared that day. The court was aware

that the only possible contribution he could make at the proceeding would be to reiterate to the

court what the court was already aware of from his filings. Yet the court proceeding with the

hearing regardless, being well aware that the hearing would be meaningless, again denying the

Defendant’s right to full and due process and a meaningful financial hearing.

"It is a fundamental premise of due process that a court cannot adjudicate a

matter until the persons directly concerned have been notified of its
pendency and have been given a reasonable opportunity to be heard in
sufficient time to prepare their positions on the issues involved."
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Egan v. Egan,supra

The court did not apply the three prongs of the Mathews v. Eldridge, supra balancing

test to avoid the risk of erroneous deprivation of a private interest or least restrictive means, by

not weighing the implications of proceeding against the harm done to the Defendant and his

family of disabilities by not granting his continuance or allowing him to appear at 4:00pm. The

court had several other far less drastic options available other than issuing what may be

deemed punitive orders against the Defendant. The court could have continued and issued an

order that he appear. The court could have issued a bench warrant and provided the

Defendant’s employer reason as to why the Defendant was not at work. This would have been

prudent given the substantial time away from work the Defendant was forced to bear as result

of near endless family court, juvenile court and DCF hearings (which did not burden the

Plaintiff as she sat home willfully unemployed receiving income from the Defendant.)

In Mathews v Eldridge, the Supreme Court held that "due process is flexible and calls

for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands" In this instant case, the

court failed to employ the three part balancing test to determine whether Defendant received

due process under the Constitution: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official

action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,

29
and probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s

interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute

procedures would entail. When analyzing the balancing test, the Defendant had a significant

private interest at stake - a finding of an arrearage that surpassed $40,000 and having his child

support more than quadrupled from the amount he was paying as ordered by the court in 2011.

The risk of erroneous deprivation of his due process rights to a fair child support hearing was

pronounced, as the result has placed the Defendant, his wife and his two children from his

second marriage at risk of losing their home after the garnishing of wages began in August

2017. Additional safeguards could have been employed by the court if it had granted

Defendant's continuance, which would have prevented the default judgement entered as the

continuance would have afforded Defendant the opportunity to retain counsel and obtain

relevant evidence. The court faced minimal, if any, burden if it had rescheduled the hearing.

On April 19, 2017 the family court held a hearing and issued new orders in violation of

due process and proper court procedure. Neither the Defendant, nor his counsel were served

prior written notice of the hearing. Defendant received notice of the hearing from the court the

day after it was held. The case file reflects that there is no motion or status conference request

form in the case file presented to the court or served on the Defendant or his counsel. The

hearing was held based on an email sent by Plaintiff’s counsel to the court’s caseflow office.

The court allowed Plaintiff’s counsel to engage the judicial machinery in violation of Practice

Book procedure by circumventing the clerk’s office and the court’s direction that no motions be

filed with the court without leave. A pattern of bias against the Defendant and his counsel who

are not even able to have their motions filed. Defendant has repeatedly raised this issue before

the trial court as well to the Office of the Chief Court Administrator regarding improper operation

of the court (See letters to the clerk incorporated into the casefile.) Neither the Defendant, nor

his counsel, received copy of the court’s April 19, 2017 orders. The court failed to conference

30
the Defendant into the hearing when his counsel made him aware that it was going forward that

morning. This is not trivial concern as by intent and design, Defendant’s counsel was not aware

of the issues around the court’s April 2011 orders which were under seal and she was unable

to represent him on those issues. Defendant was not allowed time to prepare with his counsel

prior to the hearing. The court issued orders and scheduled hearing dates for June 27-28, 2017

without the Defendant’s knowledge or consideration of his ability to attend. On June 6, 2017 the

court granted Defendant’s counsel’s request to withdraw. On June 21, 2017, Defendant

received copy of the court’s June 20, 2017 orders. These orders vacated and replaced the

court’s prior April 19, 20117 orders and substantially altered the scope of the June 27, 2017

hearing, just days prior to the hearing. Again not affording the Defendant time to respond or

prepare. The court refused to support the Defendant and his efforts to obtain Plaintiff’s

counsel’s billing records associated with counsel’s direct personal involvement with the

Defendant’s children, their educations and medical care. Preventing Defendant from being able

to obtain and present financial information related to expenditures made for the minor children.

Point 3 - Opening of Prior Judgment) The Appeals Court did not authorize the trial court to

reopen, revisit, re-examine, recategorize payments, or to in any way alter or modify the prior

financial findings, orders or judgments of the court made prior to June 2012 or after June 2013.

In Broaca v. Broaca, supra, the Connecticut Supreme Court found that a court is only allowed

to open prior judgment based on a claim of error or fraud. There was no such claim before the

court, therefore the court acted without proper subject matter jurisdiction when it made a new

finding regarding the nature of the $75,000 lump sum payment the Defendant made to the

Plaintiff in April 2011. The court erred in finding that the payment was for back child support

when this claim was unsupported (and directly contrary to) every prior finding of fact, judgment

and order of the court dating back to the dissolution of marriage in April 2008.

31
Point 4 – Plain Error) The trial court erred abused discretion by completing state and

federally support guidelines worksheets without having valid, signed and sworn financial

affidavits from the Plaintiff, improperly returning the financial information, the Defendant

provided to the court back him uncoded, ignoring the financial affidavits in the case file

which Defendant provided in 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013 and prior years, and ignoring prior

judgments, orders and findings of the court The court erred in modifying the court’s April

2011 support orders without basis as the court did not modify custody in its October 2013

orders. The court erred in finding that $75,000 lump sum payment the Defendant made to

the Plaintiff was for “back child support” when this is mathematically impossible (the

Defendant was not ordered to pay $1,973/month in support in April 2008.) The court unlawfully

ordered a recurring lump sum arrearage payment in excess what state statute allows. The court

erred and harmed the government interest in not reflecting the Defendant’s qualifying child in its

support guideline worksheets when evidence of the child is in the case file. The court erred in

ignoring prior order and finding that the Plaintiff was making $1,035/week and had $77,000 in

assets (See A-34-A35) not the $565/week figure used by Judge Simon. The court erred in

examining the period of time from June 2012 to June 2013, then applying this finding for one

year period to override all other years of this matter and ignoring payments made and

invalidating judgments entered from April 2008-June 2012 and from June 2013 to date. The

court acted contrary to Valentine v. Valentine, supra which requires proper consideration the

entire mosaic of all payments made over the course of a matter when crafting financial orders,

without altering them absent a claim of fraud or error. There was no such claim in this matter.

“An appellate court "will not disturb trial court orders unless the trial court has
abused its legal discretion or its findings have no reasonable basis in the facts....
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tanzman v. Meurer, 309 Conn. 105, 113, 70
A.3d 13 (2013). "In dissolution proceedings, the court must fashion its financial
orders in accordance with the criteria set forth in [General Statutes] § 46b-81

32
 (division of marital property), [General Statutes] § 46b-82 (alimony) and [General
Statutes] 46b-84 (child support). All three statutory provisions require
consideration of the parties' amount and sources of income in determining the
appropriate division of property and size of any child support or alimony award."
(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mensah v. Mensah, 145
Conn.App. 644, 652, 75 A.3d 92 (2013).

We next note that our review of financial orders entered by a trial court in a
dissolution matter is governed by the "mosaic doctrine." "Under the mosaic
doctrine, financial orders should not be viewed as a collection of single
disconnected occurrences, but rather as a seamless collection of interdependent
elements. Consistent with that approach, our courts have utilized the mosaic
doctrine as a remedial device that allows reviewing courts to remand cases for
reconsideration of all financial orders even though the review process might
reveal a flaw only in the alimony, property distribution or child support awards."
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marshall v. Marshall, 119 Conn.App. 120,
135-36, 988 A.2d 314, cert. granted on other grounds, 296 Conn. 908, 993 A.2d
467 (2010). Accordingly, because we conclude that at least two of the
defendant's claims challenging the court's financial orders have merit, the entire
set of them must fall, and a new hearing be held regarding them.”

In this matter, the Appeals Court did not remand for reconsideration of all financial orders.

Further, on November 7, 2017 the court openly admitted that it “didn’t know” how the

substantial $75,000 payment the Defendant made to the Plaintiff in April 2011 was categorized

(Hon. L. Prestley.) This stunning admission provided ample cause for the court to immediately

stay and open its July 7, 2017 orders. Instead the trial (and reviewing court) have prevented,

prohibited, dismissed and denied every attempt made by the Defendant’s and his counsel to

have motions to vacate, stay, open and correct, or modify to be properly heard as the

Defendant’s family of disabilities is being financially devastated. The court has again attempted

to fault the Defendant as basis to bar the doors of courthouse to him. Defendant’s wife moved

the court to intervene to represent her child’s interests because the court was preventing the

Defendant from doing so. Her motion was dismissed, leaving the child no means to her

interests advanced or represented by either of her parents. The state is treating the child as if

she does not exist, while destabilizing her and her home by seizing and garnishing the wrong

33
amount from the Defendant’s wages in violation of state and federal support law. The court is

acting in a punitive manner by punishing the Defendant for appealing the court’s October 2013

financial orders and by erasing the substantial investment in time and money the Defendant

and his appellate counsel were forced to spend to prevail on their appeal, and appeal filed to

correct elementary error by the court: not holding a hearing where the parties could

examine each other in their financial affidavits. The court has repeated and exacerbated the

same error, forcing Defendant to file another appeal to protect his children and family from the

state. In sum total, the court’s procedural error, denial of rights and violations of law have cost

the Defendant and his family of disabilities in excess of $32,000 in legal costs, over $40,000 as

a result of logically flawed claim of arrearage owed and over $10,500 in wages improperly

seized and garnished since August of 2017. Defendant’s take home income is just over $4,000

a month after taxes, retirement and paying for healthcare coverage for four minor children

impacted by this matter, two with autism, and his wife, who is expecting. The court’s actions

represent a violation of U.S. Code 18 U.S.C. §242; 18 U.S.C. §245; 42 U.S.C. §1983, denial of

rights under the color of law. The state receives matching federal dollars for every dollar of child

support collected. When the state collects federal taxpayer dollars based on false claims, the

state is defrauding the federal government. The CT State Legislature requires that the court

to adhere to the legislature's carefully constructed plan for calculating the amount and

character of a child support. The CT Supreme Court requires guidelines be followed to the

letter in order for the state to adhere to federal mandate. Favrow v. Vargas, 231 Conn. 1,

25- 30, 647 A.2d 731 (1994). Given the heavy federal overlay on the entire guideline

process, the family court is constrained to apply guidelines consistently with the clearly

stated federal mandate. The court does not enjoy discretion or authority to ignore

qualifying children, ignore financial evidence and prior judgments of the court, or to seize

property by denying full and proper due process.

34
 CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED

The Appellate Court should declare that the Superior Court erred in issuing orders on

January 6, 2017 and vacate those orders. The Appellate Court should declare that the

Superior Court erred in not declaring a mistrial on Plaintiff’s October 2015 motion for

modification of custody. The Appellate Court should declare that the Superior Court erred

by violating the Defendant’s constitutional rights, his right to due process and his ability to

enjoy proper legal representation. The Appeals Court should vacate the Request for

Leave mandate the family court imposed on his filings. The Appellate Court should

declare that the Superior Court erred issuing financial orders in July 6, 2017. The

Appellate Court should declare that the Defendant be credited for amounts garnished

from his wages since August of 2017, his qualifying child recognized by the state and that

he be properly credited for all payments made to the Plaintiff. The Appellate Court should

declare that the personal involvement of Plaintiff’s counsel with the parties’ minor children

tainted the matters before the court since the time counsel became personally involved

with the disabled child and the child’s educational and medical issues in March of 2014.

The Appellate Court should declare this as a basis to vacate the trial court’s 2017 orders

and to disqualify counsel. The Appellate Court should grant Defendant’s request that the

January 6, 2017 and July 7, 2017 orders of the Superior Court be vacated and the court’s

October 11, 2013 custody orders and April 1, 2011 financial orders be restored.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
____________/s/___________
PETER T. SZYMONIK
142 Chimney Sweep Hill Road
Glastonbury, CT 06033
Tel. (860) 614-7721
Fax. (860) 812-2092
email: szymonik@gmail.com

35
 CERTIFICATION

The undersigned Pro Se appellant hereby certifies, pursuant to

Connecticut Rule of Appellate procedure §67-2, that:

1. The electronically submitted brief and appendix was delivered electronically to

the last known e-mail address of each counsel of record for whom an e-mail
address was provided; and

2. The electronically submitted brief and appendix and the filed paper brief and
appendix have been redacted or do not contain any names or other personal
identifying information that is prohibited from disclosure by rule, statute, court
order, or case law; and

3. A copy of the brief and appendix was sent to each counsel of record and to any
trial judge who rendered a decision that is the subject matter of the appeal, in
compliance with Section §67-2; and

4. The brief and appendix filed with the appellate clerk are true copies of the brief
and appendix that were submitted electronically; and

5. The brief complies with all provisions of this rule.

6. A copy of the brief and appendix have been mailed and emailed to all counsel of
record on the 25th day of January 2018, in compliance with Practice Book §62-7:

The Honorable Jose Suarez

Middlesex Superior Court
One Court Street
Middletown, CT 06457

The Honorable Jorge Simon

Tolland Superior Court
69 Brooklyn Street
Rockville, CT 06066

The Honorable Leslie Olear

The Honorable Linda Prestley
The Honorable Robert Nastri
The Honorable Gerald Adelman
Hartford Superior Court for Family Matters
90 Washington Street
Hartford, CT 06106
Attorney David DeRosa
Law Offices of David DeRosa
42 Terrace Avenue
P.O. Box 992
Naugatuck, CT 06770
JURIS#: 416704
Tel. (203) 729-4246
Fax. (203) 729-4249
Email: dderosa@attorneyderosa.com

Attorney Keith Yagaloff

Law Offices of Keith Yagaloff & Associates
1343 Sullivan Avenue
South Windsor, CT 06074
JURISI#: 433088
Tel. (860) 432-5400
Fax. (860) 432-5402
email: keith@yagaloff.com

/s/ Peter T. Szymonik

PETER T. SZYMONIK
142 Chimney Sweep Hill Road
Glastonbury, CT 06033
Tel. (860) 614-7721
Fax. (860) 812-2092
email: szymonik@gmail.com