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Chapter 1 Section 1
(This section contemplates on those Úruti texts that have explicit reference to
Brahman)
It is well known in the world and the Vedas that Lord Bâdarâyan+a, with the aim of
securing the welfare of the worlds, has contemplated on the Upanis+ads in four chapters
2 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.1
. in
that are called ‘Brahmasûtra’ or ‘Chaturlakúnî’. The inaugural topic (jijñâsâ adhikarana)
in d
of Brahmasûtra pertains to the aspiration to inquire into Brahman. It also refers to the
.
four pre-requisites (anubandha chatus+t+aya) essential for such an enquiry, without which
st
e
no astute reader will proceed into the text. These four pre-requisites comprise the ‘eligible
u
(sambandha). t a q
person’ (adhikâri), the ‘topic’ (vis+aya), the ‘purpose’ (prayojana) and the ‘relation’
n
a of each section) has five essentials
e d
viz. ‘vis+aya’ (topic), ‘sanúaya’ (doubt), thev‘pûrva pakúa’ (first objection to the argument),
An ‘adhikarana’ (refers here to the sub-division
li@
tu
the ‘uttara pakúa’ (reply to the aforementioned objection) and ‘sangati’ (association,
relation).
d ra
r e
This scripture nnamed ‘Brahmasûtra’ comprises of four chapters namely –
n a
‘samanvaya’ (reconciliation), ‘virodha parihâra’ (rectification of incongruity), ‘sâdhana’
d
(means) andr. ‘phala’ (result). Each chapter (adhyâya) is further divided into four sections
(pâda) and each section comprises of various topics (adhikarana). All Úruti texts conclude
directly or circuitously in delineating the Supreme Non-dual Brahman, which is devoid
of all attributes and is identical to one’s inner Self, thereby establishing the association of
this scripture with the Úrutis (Úruti sangati).
aphorisms (sûtra) of the first a tu because of their conclusion in the exposition of the
ther‘adhyâya sangati’ by the way of ‘samanvaya’ (reconciliation).
chapter,
Supreme Brahman, mark d
n
remarksconsisting
The first section (pâda), of the aphorisms containing explicit reference to the
n a
d r
the ‘jijñâsâ .
Supreme Brahman, the ‘pâda sangati’. The first sub-division (adhikarana), called
adhikarana’ (desire to know), has no ‘adhikarna sangati’.
Topic 1: Jijñâsâdhikarana
(Enquiry into Brahman)
Doubt: In the face of the argument that deliberations on Vedânta are constructive
only if there exists an apposite ‘subject’ (vis+aya) and ‘purpose’ (prayojana), without which
4 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.1
.in
nd
Opponent: In response to such suspicion the opponent asserts that only a ‘doubtful’
i
st.
and ‘meaningful’ object is worthy of deliberations. The object about which there is no
ue
doubt, and which serves no purpose cannot be considered worthy of any deliberations.
aq
For instance nobody deliberates on a pot kept in bright light, since there isn’t any doubt
t
n
as regard its existence. Similarly nobody would deliberate on the number of teeth in a
a
ed
crow’s mouth, since such deliberation does not serve any purpose. Therefore only a
v
‘doubtful’ and ‘meaningful’ object is considered worthy of deliberations. No one has any
li@
qualms as regards ‘Brahman’, since the Úruti reveals ‘Brahman’ to be the Self of all. That
tu
Self, being the content of the knowledge ‘I’, is directly perceived by everyone, and hence
dra
is beyond the dominion of ‘doubt’. Nobody ever doubts as regards one’s own Self that
en
whether I exist or not. Therefore it is worthless to deliberate on ‘Brahman’, the Self of
ar
all, which is neither an object of doubt nor entails any contradiction. Moreover no
n
dr.
meaningful purpose is attained by the knowledge of Brahman - the Self of all, since it is
universally seen that even those who perceive Brahman as their own Self continue to be
tormented verily by the dualities and attributes of world of the form of happiness, sorrow,
hunger, thirst etc. Thus one cannot hope of attaining emancipation from the knowledge
of Brahman, and hence it is futile to deliberate on the Vedânta texts.
d r
Self and the. non-Self. With this ends the erroneous perception of the body as the Self, as
well as the fears and sorrows that are associated with the body. The Úruti too declares,
‘The favorable and hostile do not affect one who is devoid of ego in the body’ (Ch. Up.
8.12.1). Thus none can realize that Absolute Brahman, which is entirely different from
the physical (sthûla), mental (sûkúma) and the causal (kârana) body and is free from all
vicious alliances, without resorting to deliberations on the Vedânta texts.
This is the first aphorism of this scripture. The word ‘atha’ (subsequently, thereafter)
in this aphorism implies that such an enquiry into Brahman is to be undertaken subsequent
6 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.1
in d
annihilated with time, akin to the time bound destruction of the agricultural produce. The
st .
Úruti also declares – ‘As various pleasurable things that are achieved through varied
u e
actions get exhausted in this world, similarly the other enjoyable worlds (heavens and
t a q
all) that are attained consequent to the execution of various Vedic sacrifices also get
a n
annihilated with time’ (Ch. Up. 8.1.6). Contrary to this, one attains the ultimate fulfillment
e d
through the knowledge of Brahman, as has been declared by the text – ‘The knower of
v
li@
Brahman attains Brahman’ (Tai. Up. 2.1). Hence one should aspire to know the Brahman
after fulfilling the four essential pre-requisites.
tu
d a
The four essentialrpre-requisites are – discrimination between the eternal and
r e
non-eternal, detachmentn
worlds beyond,aexcellence
from the enjoyment of fruits of actions in this world and the
in the six types of practices viz. control of mind (úama),
r . n
control of senses (dama), firm belief in the preaching of scriptures and the Guru (úraddha),
d
tolerance of dualities like cold and warm etc. (titikúâ), renunciation of the scripturally
prescribed actions like obligatory (nitya), occasional (naimittika) etc. for the purpose of
attainment of knowledge (uparati) and the attainment of mental state consequent to the
relinquishment of indolence, sleep etc. (samâdhâna), and finally the fourth viz. the desire
to attain emancipation (mumukúutâ). Deliberation on the Vedânta is possible only after
the fulfillment of the aforementioned criteria and not otherwise.
The form and nature of Brahman, that one aspires to know, would be detailed in
the next aphorism. The word ‘Brahmajijñâsâ’, having the sixth case ending, means ‘desire
to know the Brahman’. Although, in this scripture, not only Brahman has been deliberated
upon, but others viz. the embodied soul (jîva), the world with its causal factors, the
1.1.1 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke É) 7
izèkkua czão
S A rfLeUifjx`ghrs rnisf{krk% inkFkkZ vFkkZnkf{kI;UrsA uuq KkrqfePNk ftKklsR;=k
izÑfrizR;;kFkZ;ksKkZusPN;ks% drZO;rk;k vuUo;kfnR;r% ^drZO;s* fr inkè;kgkjL;
oS;F;Zfefr psÂ_ Kkèkkrq:i;k izÑR;k¿tgYy{k.k;k czãkijks{kKkuL; yf{krRokr~]
lUizR;;su tgYy{k.k;k bPNklkè;L; fopkjL; yf{krRokPpA vrks czãkijks{kKkuL;
eks{klkèkuRoa JqfrokD;kuka p fopkjfo"k;RoeFkkZYyH;rsA czãkijks{kKkueso
means of attaining Brahman as also the fruit of such accompliúment have also been
discussed, but Brahman alone has to be attained through knowledge; hence Brahman is
the principal factor and the others are secondary. Comprehension of the principal verily
.in
includes the realization of the secondary also. For example on saying – ‘there goes the
in d
King’, the comprehension of all accessories like the army, the ministers etc. along with
.
the King occurs naturally. Hence the knowledge of Brahman, which is the primary subject,
t
es
verily leads to the acquisition of the knowledge of the secondary also. Accordingly, the
u
ta q
sixth case ending is used in the accusative sense, and not in the sense of mere relation.
a
The word ‘jijñâsâ’ is derived from the root n(dhâtu) ‘jñâ’ with ‘san’ as the suffix
(pratyaya). The root ‘jñâ’ means ‘knowledge’
v e d
and the suffix ‘san’ means ‘wish’. Hence
dr .
does not disappear.
Neither of these two, i.e. ‘knowledge’ or ‘wish’ are entities that can be created,
but these two arise robotically from their causal materials. Hence both of these cannot be
deemed to have any association with the verb ‘to be undertaken’ (kartavyâ), and
consequently it is futile to designate any sense of obligation on the part of an aspirant in
undertaking these two. Negating this assertion of the opponent, the vedântin clarifies that
the root ‘jñâ’ does not imply ordinary knowledge, but refers to the direct knowledge of
Brahman that leads to emancipation. The annihilation of the directly perceived delusion
viz. the world, manifesting as name and form, is only possible with the direct knowledge
of Brahman and not otherwise, for only the direct knowledge of Brahman can destroy the
‘Ignorance’ (avidyâ) that is the seed of all worldly sorrows. Therefore a deliberation on
8 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.1
e
previous adhikarna by
emancipation thatrcan
nresult
the way of protestation. Here the opponent negates the state of
a from deliberations on Brahman in the absence of any definitive
nthat can be ascribed to It, as It lacks any characteristics. On the contrary the
r.
configuration
d affirms the state of emancipation, as there are definitive characteristics that can
vedântin
be attributed to Brahman. These attributes establish the configuration of Brahman, and
thus makes It worthy of deliberations.
Doubt: The text from Taittirîya Upanis+ad - ‘That from which all beings take
birth, That by which they continue and That into which they dissolve; aspire to know
That only, That is Brahman’ (Tai. Up. 3.1) – forms the topic of deliberation of this
adhikarna. Here arises a doubt whether the states of birth, continuance and dissolution
characterize Brahman or not?
.in
of that species. When the origin, continuance and dissolution concerns the world and not
in d
the Brahman, then how can they be labeled as the characteristics of Brahman?
t.
Vedântin: To this we say,
u es
Janmâdyasya yatah+t(2) a q
a n
d
That (Brahman) from which occursethe birth etc. of this (Universe).
v
@
li originates, continues and into which dissolves
t
Brahman is that cause fromu which
ra
this world of unimaginable diversity,
d
manifesting as name and form, and which apparently
n
is being directly perceived. This is an ephemeral characteristic of Brahman. The attribute
ein the object permanently is called its ‘ephemeral’ characteristic.
rFor
a
that does not remain
n
.
(tat+astha lakúana). example – ‘the house with a crow perched on its top belongs to
Devdatta’;rin this instance the crow constitutes an ephemeral sign since it will not remain
d
perched on the top of the house forever, but still it serves as a characteristic that
distinguishes Devdatta’s house from others’. Similarly the characteristic of origin etc. of
the Universe does not remain in Brahman at the time of emancipation or in Its bonafide
form, but only exists during the times of manifestation of the world. Hence it is an
ephemeral characteristic of Brahman that exists in It temporarily, but nevertheless leads
to Its comprehension.
The word ‘etc.’ used along with ‘birth’ in this aphorism implies ‘continuation’
and ‘dissolution’, i.e. the birth, continuation and dissolution of the Universe. Against this
the opponent argues that the word ‘etc.’ can also be construed to imply the remaining of
the six modifications of birth, continuance, growth, transformation, decay and death, as
10 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.2
Brahmandr.has uninterrupted
words, being in their implication, conclude in single Brahman. Thus
been demonstrated to possess both – ephemeral and configurative –
characteristics, and Its direct realization leads to emancipation. Hence Brahman is proved
to be worthy of deliberations. (2)
Topic 3: Úâstrayonitvâdhikarana
(Brahman being the source of Scriptures)
Explanation 1
By attributing the causality of the universe to Brahman and thus establishing the
omniscience of the latter, one is lead to the objectionable acceptance of attribution of
1.1.3 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke É) 11
.in
the causality of the Universe to Brahman. The present adhikarana commences in response
i n d
to this objection only, and hence is related to the preceding adhikarana by the way of
.
protestation. Here, in this adhikarana, the opponent negates the omniscience of Brahman
t
es
whereas the vedântin affirms it; this alone is the difference between the results of the
u
two.
ta q
Doubt: ‘The R+gveda etc. manifest from then
Up. 2.4.10) – this Upanis+adic text forms the e
a exhalation of this Supreme Self’ (Br.
d of deliberation of this adhikarna. Here
v topic
@ text or not?
the Vedas as is declared in the aboveliÚruti
arises a doubt whether the omniscience of Brahman is proved by It being the source of
t u
Opponent: Brahmand a
r cannot be the creator of the Vedas as the latter have been
n
declared to be eternaleby the Úrutis. Hence the quality of omniscience cannot be attributed
to Brahman, andaItrcannot be the cause of Universe.
r . n
dVedântin: To this we say,
Úâstrayonitvât (3)
Brahman alone is the cause of the Vedas (R+gveda etc.) that themselves are an
ocean of knowledge bringing to light all that is past, present and the future. Though the
Úruti has proclaimed eternality of the Vedas, yet in the face of the abovementioned text
that declares the Vedas to have emerged from the exhalation of the Supreme Self, it is
concluded that the Úruti proclaiming the eternality of the Vedas is merely eulogistic. If
objected that ascribing causality to the Vedas would lead to the defect of their being
12 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.3
e n
being created by somebody. (3)
Explanation 2
That Brahman, which has been declared to be the cause of the universe in the
previous aphorism, would also become the object of other means of knowledge; the
current aphorism commences after taking into account such presumption. The
establishment of the existence of any entity requires two factors – characteristics of such
entity (lakúana) and its substantiation through means of valid knowledge (pramâna). The
previous aphorism described the characteristics of Brahman, whereas the current aphorism
focuses on the means of Its validation.
1.1.3 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke É) 13
ta
Brahman can be known only through the means of scriptures, q or there exist other means
of knowing It?
a n
v d
ejust as established objects like pot etc. can
i@
Opponent: The opponent opines that
u
be known, not only through the means
t l of speech, but also through other means like direct
raHence from the above Úruti text one cannot conclude that
perception etc., similarly Brahman can also be known through other means of knowledge,
d
apart from merely scriptures.
nthrough scriptures only.
r
Brahman can be known
e
a To this we say,
. n
dr
Vedântin:
Úâstrayonitvât (3)
The vedântin asserts that the real nature of Brahman can only be known through
the means of the Vedas, as has been declared in the aforementioned Úruti text. Though an
established entity, the Brahman cannot be known by any other means of knowledge as
one knows a pot etc., since Brahman, which sans all adjuncts and attributes, is not an
object of senses that can be perceived directly. The Brahman lacks in form and shape, as
declared by the Kat+ha Úruti, ‘The Supreme Self lacks in form, sound, smell, touch, taste
14 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.3
Topic 4: Samanvyâdhikarana
(Brahman is known from the scriptures alone because of It being the object
of their fullest import) .in
in d
Explanation 1
st.
u e
How can you (vedântin) affirm that Brahman a is q
t known through scriptures? The
great seer Jaimini has declared the Vedas to be thenpromulgators
Vedic pronouncements that do not promulgated
a of ‘action’ only. Those
e of an already established entity - ‘The
any action are considered futile. The Vedas
v
@ to the previous one by the way of protestation.
cannot be construed to be the promulgators
Brahman’. The present adhikarana islirelated
a tu for an aspirant, desirous of emancipation, to pursue
In the opponent’s view it is futile
d rthe vedântin asserts the contrary. All Vedânta texts (Upanis+ads)
Vedânta scriptures, whereas
r en of this adhikarana.
form the topic of deliberation
a
one without a second’ (Ch. Up. 6.2.1). Similarly the Aitareya Upanis+ad also asserts, ‘Before
manifestation,nthis entire creation of the nature of name and form was but the Self alone’
d r. The Br+hadâran+yaka also states, ‘The Self, which experiences everything,
(Ai. Up. 2.1.1).
is but Brahman only’ (Br. Up. 2.5.19). Thus all aforementioned texts reconcile in the
revelation of Brahman. Hence it can be indubitably acknowledged that all Vedântic texts
have, for certain, Brahman as their definitive objective. Consequently, when such
reconciliation has been attained, it becomes inappropriate to conclude that the Vedânta
texts enjoin some kind of action or form a part of an injunction about action, for admitting
such conclusion will amount to accepting ‘unheard of’ implications and rejecting the
established ones.
If asserted that Vedânta is all about the exposition of dispositions of agent, deity
etc., which are essential for the execution of any action; then such proclamation is incorrect,
for the Úruti text, ‘but wherein everything becomes the Self, then who will see whom and
16 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.4
Hence it is concluded that the Vedânta texts principally promulgate the nature of
an established entity – the Brahman. It is reprehensible to hold these texts to be primarily
delineating the nature of agent, deity etc., or forming a part of an injunction about action
by way of revealing them. Brahman is devoid of any adjunct and attribute and hence It
cannot be known through any other means of valid knowledge except the Úruti texts that
are entirely autonomous and not dependent on any other means. Thus on ascertaining the
implication through the six tests viz. the beginning-end (upakrama-upasanghâra),
distinctiveness (apûrvatâ), result (phala), reiteration (abhyâsa), reason (upapatti) and eulogy
1.1.4 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke É) 17
d .
as are presented
r in injunctions about action” – the aphorist addresses this ‘theme’ in this
agni) as factors
adhikarna, which also constitutes the basis of its relation with the previous adhikarna.The
entire Vedânta constitutes the topic under deliberation here.
Doubt: The doubt that arises is whether the Vedânta promulgates Brahman as an
independent entity, or as a contingent entity in association with the injunction about
meditation?
18 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.4
.i n
or dissuade a person from activities, which is their primary function. Scriptures are nothing
n d
but a collection of these persuasive or dissuasive pronouncements. Hence if one assumes
i
st .
Vedânta to be primarily concerned with the portrayal of a perpetually existent entity viz.
e
Brahman, then such Vedânta text would lose all scriptural relevance. Therefore Vedânta
u
a q
promulgates Brahman only as a contingent entity in association with the injunction about
t
meditation, and not independently.
a n
Vedântin: To this we say, ve d
l @
i Samanvyât (4)
t uTattu
ra
dpresented as an independent entity by the scriptures since all
That Brahman
r e n is
n a
Úruti texts are seen to reach their fullest import in the explicit delineation of the Absolute
r .
Non-dual Brahman.
dThe scriptures promulgate that Brahman as an independent entity only, since all
Úrutis unambiguously conclude in propounding the Absolute Non-dual Brahman that is
devoid of all adjuncts and attributes. Your assertion that comprehension of the power of
a word is not possible in absence of signs of persuasion or dissuasion from activity is not
correct, for such signs are not mandatory to comprehension. On informing one Chaitra,
in Sanskrit, that a son has been born to him, another man standing nearby, though oblivious
of the language, readily comprehends the same on seeing the joy on Chaitra’s face as well
as the relevant clothes etc. presented to him. Thus it is seen here that comprehension of
the word power, stating a factual incident not entailing any persuasion or dissuasion,
occurs even to one ignorant of the language.
1.1.4 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke É) 19
.in
and dissuasive injunctions is also incorrect, for Scripture is that which subscribes to
d
t. n
one’s welfare. Accordingly the Vedânta, which leads to one’s emancipation by annihilating
i
the delusion caused by Nescience and subsequent realization of the identicalness of Self
u es
and Brahman, is indubitably the crown of all scriptures. Hence it is clear that Vedânta
a q
promulgates Brahman, a perpetually existent entity, independently, and not as a contingent
t
n
entity in association with the injunction about meditation. (4)
a
v e d
Topic 5: Îkúatyadhikarana
(The primary causal
u l i@entity of the world is sentient)
Îkúaternâúabdam (5)
The Pradhâna is not the cause of the Universe, for the Upanis+ads do not mention
it; the first Cause being characterized by the act of visualization.
l i
visualization (îkúana) prior to creation,@which is only possible in a sentient (cetana) entity
t
(Brahman), and not in the insentientu (jad+a) Pradhâna. Visualization is a feature of sentience
and not insentience.
d ra
r e nthe unchangeable (kût+astha) Brahman lacks in the power of creation
a then it is not correct, for the association of Mâyâ makes all that
If asserted that
n
.
r Brahman. It is also incorrect to attribute omniscience to Pradhâna on the
and all-knowingness,
possibledfor
intensification of the quality of Sattva, for Pradhâna is a state where all the three traits
exist in equilibrium. If one attributes omniscience to Pradhâna on the intensification of
Sattva, then, on the escalation of Raja and Tama, it would robotically get endowed with
ignorance, making it impossible to act as the creator. Hence the sentient Brahman alone
is the cause of the Universe, and not the insentient Pradhâna. (5)
Since the act of primary visualization is not possible in Pradhâna due to its
insentient nature, therefore one should figuratively accredit this action to Pradhâna, as
has been done in the case of ‘water’ and ‘fire’ in the Chândogya Úruti. To dispel such
belief of the opponent is pronounced the next aphorism:
Gaun+aúcaennâtmaúabdât (6)
22 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.6
i@mokúopadeúât (7)
Tannis+t+hlasya
u
a t
d rnot refer to Pradhâna, for the attainment of liberation is
n
The word Self does
re gets established in That.
spoken of for one who
n a
r .
d construed to imply Pradhâna, for starting from the text, ‘This is the Self’ (Ch.
The word ‘na’ (not so) is carried forward from the last ahporism. The word ‘Self’
cannot be
Up. 6.7.8), and concluding with the declaration, ‘Thou art That’ (ibid.), the reposition of
oneself in the Self that is subtler than the subtle is being preached to Úvetaketu – the
aspirant desirous of emancipation. Moreover, to one who is firmly established in the
Self, the scriptures preach of the attainment of emancipation by the texts, ‘one who has a
teacher knows that Self. For such knower, liberation is but as far as the exhaustion of the
‘prârabdha karmas’ (actions responsible for the present body), after which the enlightened
verily attains emancipation (Ch. Up. 6.14.2). If the word ‘Self’ is construed to imply the
insentient Pradhâna, then establishing oneself in the latter will not lead to emancipation
of the sentient aspirant, but on the contrary, the aspirant would rather lose his sentience
too. Moreover, the scriptures too, that preach so, would lose all validity. If anyone,
following others blindly (andhalângûlanyâya; logic of the blind man holding the tail of
24 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.8
an ox), fails to comprehend the Self as distinct from Pradhâna, then such one will not
.in
only lose the chance of attaining emancipation, but will incur sin also. Hence the word
i n d
‘Self’ is indicative of a sentient entity, and not the insentient Pradhâna. (7)
.
st as regards a grosser
u e
To make one comprehend a subtle entity, one first preaches
t
entity, and then steers ingeniously to the subtle one. Thisa q
is called ‘sthûlârundhatî’ logic.
Keeping this in mind is said:
a n
v e d
i@
Heyatvâvacanâcca (8)
The Pradhâna has not tbeen ul referred to even indirectly, for the scriptures do not
d ra subsequently.
instruct as regards its desertion
r e n
n aof ‘na’
The word (not so) is carried forward from the last ahporism. If Pradhâna be
r.
d Up. 6.7.8) and ‘That thou art’ (ibid.), would be inferred as preaching that
the implication the word ‘Existence’ (sat), then in that case the Úruti texts, ‘That is the
Self’ (Ch.
(Pradhâna) only. Hearing such pronouncements an aspirant, desirous of emancipation,
may not establish himself in the insentient Pradhâna mistaking it to be the real Self, the
Úruti, seeking to reveal the primary Self, should have preached, on the basis of
‘sthûlârundhatî’ logic, the rejection of aforesaid Pradhâna. But such pronouncements by
the Úruti are nowhere to be found. On the other hand the sixth chapter of Chândogya
Upanis+ad is seen to conclude after preaching the knowledge of ‘Existence’. There is no
topic discussed ahead. Hence, due to absence of any Úruti text preaching the rejection of
Pradhâna, the word ‘Existence’ cannot be inferred to mean Pradhâna.
1.1.9 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke É) 25
Svâpyayât (9)
The Pradhâna is not the implication of the word Self, for the scriptures mention
the merger of the individual soul into its own Self.
Pradhâna cannot be the cause of Universe, for this context concerns the sentient
Self that is implied by the word ‘Existence’ (sat). As in the text – ‘O amiable one, when,
in the state of deep sleep the embodied soul gets suffused with ‘Existence’ (sat), then, at
that period of time it merges into its own Self’ (Ch. Up. 6.8.1). Here, the same Self that is
26 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.10
v
in the deep sleep (sus+upti), the soul loses all d
e attributive distinctness, then, that sentient
i@
Self, which is denoted by the word ‘Existence’,
of Universe, and not the Pradhâna.l(9)
into which all beings merge, is the cause
a tu
d r Gatisâmânyât (10)
r e n
n
Because aall Vedânta texts unanimously refer to a sentient entity (Brahman) as
dr. of the Universe.
the first Cause
The insentient Pradhâna is not the cause of Universe, for all Úruti texts are seen to
conclude unanimously in attributing the causality of the Universe to a sentient entity.
The texts like, ‘From the Self originated the space’ (Tai. Up. 2.1), ‘From the Self emerges
this vital force’ (Pr. Up. 3.3), clearly point to a sentient Self from which originated the
entire Universe. Hence the omniscient Brahman indeed is the cause of the Universe. (10)
Úrutatvâcca (11)
The insentient Pradhâna, as imagined by the Sânkhya School, cannot be the cause
of Universe because of the declaration in the Úvetâúvatara Upanis+ad, wherein, in the
.in
context of the omniscient Lord, is declared, ‘That Lord is the ordainer of even the master
d
t.i n
of organs, and He alone is the cause of Universe. He Himself is without any cause, and
es
there is no other ruler over Him’ (Úv. Up. 6.9). Hence it is proved that the omniscient
u
Lord alone is the cause of Universe, and not the Pradhâna or anything else. (11)
q
n t
Topic 6: Ânandamayâdhikarana a
e d
(The Blissful a
One)
v
@ (non-Úankar’s) viewpoint
Explanation 1: The
u liother
a t ‘That from which the birth etc. of this occurs’ (1.1.2),
drrevealed in the Upanis+ads’ (1.1.11), it has been demonstrated
Starting from the aphorism,
n
re – describing either the Qualified or the Unqualified Brahman –
and ending with, ‘Because
that all Vedântaatexts
r. n in the Unqualified Brahman only. They accomplish this either directly
ultimately rejoice
throughdthe principle of knowledge or circuitously through various meditations. The
Upanis+ads describe Brahman in Its twin forms – the Qualified and the Unqualified. The
former, being associated with Mâyâ and its effects, is possessed of the limiting adjuncts
and attributes that manifests as varied modifications of name and form, whereas the
latter is devoid of Mâyâ and all limiting adjuncts and attributes. The Úruti texts that
enlighten the Unqualified Brahman do so by the principle of direct knowledge, whereas
those texts that propound the Qualified one will also ultimately conclude in the Unqualified
Brahman only though indirectly through the principle of meditation.
Now, with a view to promulgate that these twin forms of Brahman are in reality
one only since the Vedânta texts sermonizes the path of ‘meditation’ (upâsana) for the
Qualified Brahman and the path of ‘knowledge’ (jñâna) for the Unqualified one,
28 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.12
commences the subsequent scripture. Firstly, with a view to deliberate upon those texts
that highlight the Unqualified Brahman, commences the Ânandamayâdhikarana.
. in
As in the previous adhikarana the act of ‘visualization’ .has in d
st been figuratively
accredited to ‘fire’ (Ch. Up. 6.2.3) etc., and hence it could noteconclusively
u establish the
q in the Úruti text, ‘The Self
is Blissful (âtmânandamayah+)’ (Tai. Up. 2.5), owing a
causality of Brahman as the creator of the Universe; similarly
t
n cannot be construed to be definitive
to the use of the suffix ‘mayat’
d a
e is related to the previous one by the way
denoting ‘modification’, the word ‘âtmânandamayah’
v
in its implications. Thus the current adhikarana
@
of counter-illustration.
li
a tisuTruth, Knowledge and Infinite’ (Tai. Up. 2.1) – in this
d
Doubt: ‘The Brahman r sequentially the Self as being constituted by ‘food’,
e
context the Úruti, after
r n describing
intelligence,n
a
‘vital force’, ‘mind’ and ‘intelligence’, goes on to declare, ‘within the Self constituted by
r. the ‘blissful one’ being referred to by the Úruti is the same Brahman that
a doubtdwhether
there is another inner Self constituted by ‘bliss’ (Tai. Up. 2.5.2). Here arises
Opponent: The opponent asserts that the ‘blissful one’ refers to some secondary
self other than Brahman since it occurs in the context wherein the Úruti is describing a
series of secondary Selves constituted by ‘food’ etc.
Vedântin: The vedântin, on the contrary, asserts that the ‘blissful one’ refers to
none other than the ‘Supreme Self’ only since:
Ânandamayoabhyâsât (12)
1.1.12 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke É) 29
n a
by coming in contact with Bliss. How could it ever attain happiness if this Bliss was not
dr.Up. 2.8.1), ‘The embodied soul attains this Self full of Bliss’ (Tai. Up. 2.8.5).
present in the supreme space within the heart’ (Tai. Up. 2.7), ‘This is an evaluation of
Bliss’ (Tai.
Thus the word ‘Bliss’ has been repetitively used by the Úruti to refer to ‘Brahman’. Hence
the term ‘blissful one’ refers to none other than the ‘Supreme Self’ only. Your assertion
that the ‘blissful one’ refers to some secondary self other than Brahman as it occurs in
context of sequential enumeration of secondary selves is erroneous, since the ‘Blissful
one’ exists as the innermost self of all the secondary selves enumerated here. The Úruti
has sermonized the primary Self i.e. the ‘blissful one’ in the aforementioned manner
keeping in mind the commonly prevalent logic of enumerating the grosser entity first and
then serially moving on to describe the most subtle one so that even a person of
compromised intellect can also comprehend the same. This is also called as description
by ‘arundhatî logic’, wherein one initially points to a much grosser star as the ‘arundhatî
30 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.13
star’, and then steers the observer to the real ‘arundhatî star’ which is much subtler.
Hence the ‘blissful one’ is none other than the primary Supreme Self. (12)
. i n
in d
Vikâraúabdânneti caenna; prâcuryât (13)
st .
e
ubut denotes abundance.
t
The suffix ‘mayat’ does not denote modification,a q
n
a to here is not the primary Self due to
ed
Opponent: The ‘blissful one’ being referred
v
i@
the use of a suffix (mayat) in the word ‘ânandamaya’
the Supreme Self is an entity that is lbeyond
in the ‘modification’ sense, whereas
d a
conveys the sense of modification
r of the food (anna), similarly the word ‘ânandamaya’ also
the gross body is a modification
r e
refers to the innermostncasing, in line with the casings of food, vital-air etc., that has as its
limbs ‘joy’ etc.a
n as is declared in the Úruti, ‘Of Him joy is verily the head’ (Tai. Up. 2.5).
r. This is not correct since the suffix ‘mayat’ has also been used in the
dVedântin:
sense of ‘abundance’ as per the instructions of Pân+inî’s aphorism (Pân+inî’s grammar sutra
5.4.21). For example in the phrase ‘annamayo yajñah+’ (this sacrifice has an abundance of
food) the suffix ‘mayat’ has been used in the sense of ‘plenty’, and not in the sense of
‘modification’. Similarly in the word ‘ânandamaya’ the suffix is used to indicate the
abundance of ‘bliss’, which ultimately concludes in the Supreme Brahman only. In this
world if a healthy, wealthy, wise and a young adult attains the rulership of the entire earth
with all its seven isles, then that would be counted as the supreme pleasure for the humans.
If such pleasure be multiplied hundred times, then that constitutes the supreme pleasure
of ‘gandharavas’ (a class of divine beings), hundred times that is the pleasure for ‘pitaras’
(manes), and so on till one concludes in the supreme Bliss attained by the one established
1.1.14 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke É) 31
The very Brahman that has been mentioned in the Mantra portion is spoken of
in the Brâhmana text as well.
In the Tai. Up., beginning with the text, ‘The knower of Brahman attains the
Highest’ (Tai. Up. 2.1.1), and continuing with the sermon, ‘Brahman is the Truth that is
impervious to time. It is the illuminator of all and is Itself self-illumined. It is beyond the
32 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.16
r en Netaroanupapatteh+ (16)
n a
r. other (individual soul) is not implied here, for that is illogical.
dThe
Moreover the term ‘blissful one’ means the Supreme Self only, for in the context
of this ‘Blissful one’ is heard that – ‘He desired that let me be many and let me be born as
the populace. He deliberated and then created all this that is perceived’ (Tai. Up. 2.6.1).
Here, before creation, the entire created modifications have been declared to be inseparable
from the creator. All these declarations are fulfilled in the Supreme Self only, and not in
the embodied soul. Hence the ‘Blissful one’ is none other then the Supreme Self alone.
(16)
Bhedavyapadeúâcca (17)
.in
Moreover the term ‘Blissful one’ cannot imply the embodied soul, since in the
d
in
context of the ‘Blissful one’ the Tai. Up. declares, ‘That Supreme Self is of the nature of
t .
es
Bliss indeed. Attaining Him only this embodied soul attains happiness’ (Tai. Up. 2.7.1).
u
Here the embodied soul is declared as an aspirant and the Supreme Self as the entity
q
t a
aspired for. The distinct difference amongst the two implies that the term ‘Blissful one’ is
n
e d a
used for the Supreme Self and not for the embodied soul. An aspirant is always seen to
attain something that is different from him. The attainer and the attained cannot be same.
v
@ scriptures which promulgate the attainment
u
Opponent: Then, in that case, l ivarious
of Self would stand nullified, astthere can be no attainer of one’s own Self as such, as per
your own admission above.ra
n d
a e
rThis is not correct, for all scriptures promulgate as above taking into
r.
consideration nthe superimposition that occurs between the Self and non-Self, which indeed
Vedântin:
Opponent: If the meaning of the word ‘the Blissful one’ cannot be taken as the
‘embodied soul’, then why not it be construed to imply the ‘Pradhâna’ – the entity
acknowledged by the school of Sânkhyas, since ‘Pradhâna’ can also be termed as ‘the
Blissful one’ due to the preponderance of the quality of ‘sattva’?
Vedântin: This is not correct since in the context of the ‘Blissful one’ it is heard,
‘He wished, let me manifest as many, let me be born’ (Tai. Up. 2.6.1). The attribute of
34 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.19
.in
Rosoalw=kk.kka ;kstuk cksè;kA iwokZfèkdj.ks eq[;s{k.kkuqjksèksu czãfu.kZ;s xkS.kizokg&
ikBL;kfu'pk;dRoa ;Fkk] uSofegkèkkjRoko;oRo;ks% iqPN'kCny{kdRolkE;kno;oizk;&
in d
s .
t only in a sentient
e
‘wishfulness’ that is heard in context of the ‘Blissful one’ is possible
u school. This has already
ta q
entity, and not in the insentient Pradhâna inferred by the Sânkhya
been dealt in the aphorism 1.1.5 wherein Pradhâna was
n refuted
a úâsti (19)
on similar logic. (18)
v e d
Asminnasya ca tadyogam
The various aphorisms of this adhikarana have been explained above on the basis
of other (non-Shânker’s) view-point. Now the same would be dealt in accordance with
the Shânker’s view-point.
1.1.12 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke É) 35
Topic 6: Ânandamayâdhikarana
The suffix ‘mayat’ has been used in the sense of ‘modification’ during the sequential
description of the self constituted by the essence of food (annamaya), vital force
.in
(prân+amaya), mind (manomaya) and knowledge (vijñânamaya). In the same sequence is
d
i n
described the Self constituted by the essence of bliss (ânandamaya) (Tai. Up. 2.5.2). That
t.
es
being so, one cannot abruptly and arbitrarily conclude that the suffix ‘mayat’ in the
u
‘ânandamaya’ is not used in the ‘modification’ sense but is used in the sense of ‘abundance’
q
and implies the Supreme Brahman.
n t a
Doubt: The Úruti concerning the blissful d a
eside, bliss is the trunk and Brahman is the
one says, ‘Of him joy is verily the head,
v
i@
enjoyment is the right side, hilarity is the left
u l
tail (pucha) that forms the basis’ (Tai.
t
Up. 2.5.2). Here arises a doubt that whether the
independent entity?
dr a
Úruti intends to promulgate Brahman as an accessory of the ‘blissful one’, or as an
n
reTaking into consideration the commonly prevalent meaning of the
a
n(tail), the Úruti intends to describe Brahman as a limb of the ‘blissful one’.
Opponent:
r.
word ‘pucha’
d
This being the position the vedântin says,
Ânandamayoabhyâsât (12)
.in
Even if one takes the implication of the word ‘Blissful’ to be the ‘blissful sheath’
n d
(ânandamaya koúa), then also Brahman cannot be a limb of that sheath, as It is the source
i
st .
of the reflected bliss that constitutes this sheath. Hence by the verse, ‘Brahman is the tail
u e
that stabilizes’, the absolute Brahman alone has been promulgated. (12)
a q
Opponent: When the word ‘tail’ obviouslyt means a limb, then how can one
a n
assume it to be indicative of Supreme Brahman
used in the ‘modification’, sense. To this vthe
d
evedântin clarifies,
independently, since the word ‘tail’ is
l i@
tu caenna; prâcuryât (13)
Vikâraúabdânneti
a
d rnot used in the sense of modifcation, but is used on account
en denoting parts.
The word ‘tail’
of abundance of r
is
n a terms
d r. word ‘tail’, though read in context of a limb here, is not intended to imply a
The
limb due to its usage with the word ‘pratis+tha’ (base, foundation). Such usage confers
upon the word ‘tail’ an implication as ‘basis/foundation’, and not a limb. If only the word
‘tail’ would have been used alone one could have taken it to imply a ‘limb’, but the use of
the word ‘pratis+tha’ alongside conveys a meaning in the sense of ‘foundation’ rather than
a ‘limb’. Hence in this context the Supreme Brahman has been promulgated independently,
and not as the limb of the blissful one. (13)
Taddhetuvyapadeúâcca (14)
czã.k% ^bna loZel`tr* (rSñ 2@6) bfr okD;s Lofodkjk.kka gsrqRosu O;ins'kkr~AAHkñ
14AA
br'p iqPNokD;s czã Loizèkkuija] uRokuUne;ko;oijfeR;kg & ekU=kof.kZdeso
p xh;rsA ^lR;a KkueuUra czãs* R;=k eU=kokD;s ;n~czã izfrikfnra] rnso ^czã iqPN*
fefr czkã.kokD;s Loizèkkur;k xh;rs_ eU=kczkã.k;ksjsdkFkZRokfHkèkkukfnfr Hkko%AAHkñ
15AA
uuq iqPNokD;s LoizèkkuRosukuUne;L;Soizfrik|Roa fda u LohfØ;rs bR;k'kÄïÔkg
& usrjks¿uqiirs%A brj vkuUne;ks uk=k izfrik|%A dqr%\ ^rL; fiz;eso f'kj%* bR;=k
d.in
t.in
More so, the word ‘pucha’ cannot mean a limb, but can only imply ‘basis/
es
foundation’, since the text, ‘He created all that is there to be’ (Tai. Up. 2.6), shows Brahman
u
to be the creator of all modifications. ‘Ânandamaya’ is a ‘modification’ in itself. If Brahman
q
nta
is assumed to be a limb of this ‘blissful one’, then it would not have been possible for the
Úruti to preach Brahman to be the creator of all in the aforementioned text. One does not
eda
see, in the common parlance, the creation of a whole body from its limb alone. Hence the
v
Úruti desires to promulgate Brahman as an independent entity that is the creator of all
li@
modifications, including the ‘blissful one’, and not as a limb of the ‘blissful one’. (14)
u
t
d ra ikameva ca gîyate (15)
Mântravarn+
Moreover r e nsame Brahman that has been spoken of in the Mantra portion is
n aBrâhmana text as the tail.
the
described in .
dIt isr perfectly logical to assume that the very Brahman that has been expounded in
the
the mantra portion, ‘Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, Infinite, (Tai. Up. 2.1.1), the same
has been described in the Brâhman+a section by the verse, ‘and Brahman is the tail that
forms the basis’ (Tai. Up. 2.5.2). Hence in the latter verse the absolute Brahman has been
preached independently, and not as a limb of the ‘blissful one’. (15)
Netaroanupapatteh+ (16)
The other (individual soul) is not implied here, for that is illogical.
Opponent: Why can’t it be assumed that in the verse referring to the ‘tail’, the
‘blissful one’ (individual soul) has been independently promulgated?
38 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.17
Vedântin: It cannot be so. How can that ‘blissful one’ who has limbs of joy,
.in
enjoyment, hilarity etc. become the creator of the world? Hence it cannot be assumed
in d
that the ‘blissful one’ has been independently promulgated in the aforementioned verse.
(16)
st .
u e
Bhedavyapadeúâcca (17)
ta q
n
a between the two.
And because of the mention of difference
v e d
l @
i by getting that Bliss’ (Tai. Up. 2.7.1), the ‘blissful
u
In the text, ‘For it becomes happy
t Brahman (of the nature of Bliss) as one to be attained.
Hence the verse referring to
d a
one’ is talked of as the attainer and
r the ‘tail’ cannot be assumed to be concluding in the ‘blissful
one’, but expoundingn
ar e Brahman as an independent entity. (17)
n
dr. Kâmâcca nânumânâpeks+â (18)
And owing to the use of the term ‘kâma’ (Bliss) in the sense of Brahman, the
blissful one cannot be inferred as Brahman, for the suffix ‘mayat’is used in the sense
of modification.
If asserted that as in the text, ‘Bliss is Brahman’ (Tai. Up. 3.6), Bliss has been
called as Brahman, similarly one can infer the Brahman-hood in the ‘blissful one’ also,
then it is not correct. It must be noted that one does not hear of the suffix ‘mayat’ in
relation to the ‘Bliss’ referred to in the above Úruti, and neither one hears of its various
1.1.19 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke É) 39
AA foJke%1AA
d .in
(â) (â vUrjfËkdj.ke~ A lwÒ Ñå&ÑÉ)
t .in
es
,oa iwoZ=k fufoZ'ks"ks czãf.k leUo;% fl¼LrL;kiokndRokfnnekg&
u
ta q ‘Bliss’ to be Brahman, one
n the latter has the suffix ‘mayat’
limbs of joy, enjoyment etc. Hence even on acknowledging
cannot infer Brahman-hood in the ‘blissful one’asince
v e d
attached with it. Hence one cannot infer Brahman-hood in the mutable ‘blissful one’.
(18)
u li@
a t ca tadyogam úâsti (19)
r
Asminnasya
d
n
rescriptures declare the absolute identity of the individual soul and
Moreover the
this Brahman. a
r. n
dMore so one cannot call the ‘blissful one’ as Brahman since the scriptures declare
the attainment of Brahman-hood by this ‘blissful one’ on awakening in the Brahman that
has been propounded in the verse referring to the ‘tail’. Hence one concludes that the
‘blissful one’ is not implied here, but what is independently expounded is the absolute
Brahman, of the nature of Bliss, as the basis of this ‘blissful one’. Hence Brahman is not
the limb of the ‘blissful one’. (19)
Topic 7: Antaradhikarana
(The Being Inside)
i n
Similarly on analyzing various words suggesting shape and form, the opponent suggests
.
in d
that in the current adhikarana it is the ‘transmigrating soul’ that is being referred to as the
st .
‘golden person’ (Hiranmaya Purus+a). Thus this adhikarana is related to the previous one
e
by the way of illustration. Here, in the opponent’s view, it is the meditation on the ‘Qualified
u
t a q
Brahman’ (apara Brahman) that is being preached here whereas in the vedântin’s view
n
the meditation on the ‘Unqualified Brahman’ is preached here.
aÚruti, ‘The golden Purus+a that is visible
d
Doubt: As regard the declaration byethe
v as to this ‘Purus+a’, being referred to by the
l @
i soul who has attained excellence in knowledge
in the sun’ (Ch. Up. 1.6.6-8), doubt arises
tu
Úruti, is some transmigrating embodied
and action and is hence to beameditated upon in the sun and the eye? Or it is the eternally
r
dwho is being referred to by the Úruti?
n
true Supreme Lord alone
e
n ar It is the transmigrating embodied soul that is being referred to here as
d . about its form and abode.
Opponent:
the Úrutirtalks
Antastaddharmupadeúât (20)
The Being inside is Brahman, for Its attributes having been mentioned.
The Being talked about by the Úruti, both in the Sun and the Eye, is none other
than the Supreme Lord only and not a transmigrating worldly soul since the Úruti describes
various characteristics of this Being that are consistent with God only. For instance the
1.1.21 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 2) 41
Bhedavyapadeúâccânyah+ (21)
The Being inside is different from the embodied soul owing to the mention of
the difference between the two.
The Being said to be residing in the Sun and the Eye is none other than the Supreme
Lord only, since in the Br+hdâranyaka Upaniúad also the difference between the sun and
the internal-ruler residing in the sun is clearly brought out. The Úruti there says, ‘He who
resides in the Sun, is within it, whom the sun doesn’t know, whose body is the sun, and
who controls the sun from within, is the internal Ruler, your own immortal Self’ (Br. Up.
42 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.22
u e
that the internal being referred to in the Sun and Eye is none other than the Supreme
Lord. (21)
ta q
a n
e d
Topic 8: Âkâúâdhikarana
vSpace)
l i@
(The
u
t due to the presence of special indicatory signs like
a
In the previous adhikarana,
‘devoid of all sins’ etc., itrbecame
d possible to conclude that form and abode becomes
n a Space only.
that the Úruti concerning the Space cannot be interpreted in any other way except in the
way ofd
r .
sense of material
counter illustration.
Thus this adhikarana is related to the previous one by the
Doubt: The Chândogya Upanis+ad states, ‘What is the destiny of this observable
world’? The Úruti answers, ‘Space alone is the eventual goal of all things’ (Ch. Up.
1.9.1). Here arises a doubt whether the word ‘Space’ refers to ‘material space’ or to the
‘Supreme Brahman’.
1.1.22 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 2) 43
d
‘Space’ in the meaning of Brahman also, butethat usage is in secondary sense taking into
v shared both by Brahman and the material
@
li space’ in the primary sense, and moreover when a
account similar attributes like pervasiveness
t u
space. But the word refers to ‘material
primary meaning is admissibleait is inadvisable to accept a secondary meaning. It is possible
ofrthe entire world to Space through the sequence of air, fire,
to attribute the causalityd
water and earth. re
n
n a
.
r Such being the case, we say:
dVedântin:
Âkâúastallingât (22)
Topic 9:
l @
i is Brahman)
Prânâdhikarana
t u
(Prâna
r a
dabove in connection with the ‘Space’ Úruti, here we consider
e n
As was discussed
r illustration.
n a
the Úruti concerning the Prâna (vital force). This adhikarana is related to the previous one
.
by way of counter In the context of ‘Udgita’ meditation, the question by
dr occurs, ‘Which is that Deity’? To this Uúasti replies, ‘It is Prâna. It is in
Chakrâyana
Prâna that all these things merge into, and from Prâna indeed they emerge’ (Ch. Up.
1.11.4).
Doubt: Here arises a doubt whether the word ‘prâna’ is used here to imply Brahman
or it is used in the sense of more familiar ‘vital force’?
u l i@
after Prâna, and these deities are separate from Brahman. Hence Prâna too is not Brahman
but the vital force.
a t
n dr the case, we say:
Vedântin: This being
a re
. n Ata eva prân+ah+ (23)
dForr the very same reason the word Prâna too refers to Brahman.
The word ‘Prâna’ is indicative of Brahman only due to the occurrence of the
indicatory sign of the latter, as was in the previous adhikarana. Though the mergence of
various senses in the Prâna is acknowledged as it is a matter of direct perception and is
also endorsed by the Úrutis, but still the basis of the mergence of all things is Brahman
alone. Hence in presence of this exceptional indicatory sign it is apposite only to infer the
implication of Prâna as Brahman. Moreover even in the Úruti that declares, ‘When a
sleeping man does not see any dream whatsoever, then at that moment he becomes one
with the Prâna’ (Kau. Up. 3.3), the word ‘Prâna’ is suggestive of Brahman only, as it is
the Brahman indeed which is the abode of dissolution of all. As for the assertion that
Prâna is not Brahman because of its occurrence in proximity to Sun etc., then such assertion
46 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.23
d r a
e n
r is related to the previous one by the way of counter example.
a
This adhikarana
n The Úruti text declares, ‘That ‘Jyoti’ (Light) which shines in the worlds
d r .
Doubt:
above this heaven, above all beings and above all worlds is the same as that is within a
human being’ (Ch. Up. 3.13.7). Here arises a doubt whether the word ‘Jyoti’ represents
the light of sun etc. or it implies ‘Brahman’?
Opponent: The word ‘Light’ is used for the light of sun etc. as the concerned
Úruti text refers to heaven as a limit, whereas such limit cannot apply to all pervasive
Brahman. The Brâhmana portion of the Upaniúad also declares, ‘There is Light above
this heaven’. Moreover the usage of the word ‘shine’ is more in tune with the shining of
sun etc., and not Brahman. Hence the word ‘Light’ refers to the physical light of sun etc.
for the purpose of meditation and not Brahman. In the previous adhikarana the implication
of the word ‘Prâna’ as ‘Brahman’ could only be agreed due to the presence of indicatory
1.1.24 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 2) 47
If it be asserted that even in the earlier text it is not the Brahman but the metre
(chanda) Gâyatrî that has been talked about, as the Úruti there declares, ‘All this is Gâyatrî
indeed’ (Ch. Up. 3.12.1); then it is not correct, since the metre Gâyatrî is nothing but a
collection of certain words only. How could that be the self of all? Moreover the metre
itself preaches the concentration of mind in Brahman. The Úruti, elsewhere also, sermonizes
meditation of Brahman with the help of natural mediums as in, ‘The followers of Rig-
Veda meditate on this very Supreme Self as inhering in the hymn called the great Uktha’
(Ai. Â. 3.2.3.12). Here, in this text, it is the Brahman that is instructed as the entity to be
meditated upon, and not the metre. (25)
1.1.26 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 2) 49
referreddto in the verse regarding ‘Light’. Moreover the Úruti, ‘That much is His glory’
that very Brahman, reminded of by Its relationship with heaven, is
(Ch. Up. 3.12.6), becomes absurd if Brahman is not taken up as its subject-matter. Also
the Smriti, ‘O Arjuna, I exist supporting this entire creation by a portion of Myself’ (Gita.
10.42), supports the form of Brahman that has been spoken of in the Úruti, ‘All things are
but one of His feet’ (Ch. Up. 3.12.6). Hence the word ‘Light’ is indicative of Brahman
only. (26)
If asserted that Brahman of the Gâyatrî passage is not referred to here in the
Light passage due to difference in instructions, we say, not so, for there being no
contradiction in either.
50 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.1.27
tu
it is the natural light and not Brahman
r e
or ablative case, there nis no contradiction in the recognition of Brahman in both places.
As in commonaparlance it is observed that a hawk in relation to the top of the tree is
r.asneither, ‘The hawk on the top of the tree’ or ‘The hawk above the top of the
d Brahman can also be talked of as either ‘in the heaven’ or ‘above the
referred to
tree’, similarly
heaven’. Hence the Brahman that has been detailed before is being recalled in the ‘Light’
verse and therefore the word ‘Light’ refers to Brahman alone and not anything else. (27)
Though the previous adhikarana was devoted to the context of Brahman and Its
three feet and it was proved therein that the word ‘Light’ was referring to none other than
Brahman only, but due to the absence of definitive indicatory signs of Brahman the word
1.1.28 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 2) 51
in
adhikarana is related to the previous one by the way of counter-illustration.
d .
Doubt: In the Kaus+îtaki Upanis+ad there occurs a dialogue ibetween
t . n Pratardana
and Indra wherein Indra pronounces, ‘I am the Prâna identified with
e s Consciousness. You
meditate on me who is of the nature of life and immortality’
q uwhether
(Kau. Up. 3.2). This Úruti
t a
orn
text is the point of deliberation here. Here arises a doubt the word ‘Prâna’ is
indicative of the commonly known ‘vital-force’,a
d is referring to the deity ‘Indra’, or to
the ‘jîva’ (embodied soul) or is it indicativeeof the Supreme Brahman? Though in the
v for that very reason)’ (1.1.23), it has already
@
li of Brahman only, and in the current context
aphorism, ‘Ateva prânah (Prâna is Brahman
t u
been shown that the word ‘Prâna’ is indicative
also there are indicatory signsaof Brahman, viz. ‘Bliss, ageless and immortal etc.’, but the
r of certain indicatory marks of others also. For instance
doubt has arisen due to thedpresence
the statement of Indra n
re declaring, ‘Know me alone’ is indicative of a divine being. Also
n a
r.
the statements, ‘Taking hold of this body, it raises it up’, ‘Know the speaker and not the
doubt isdnatural.
speech’, are indicative of ‘vital-force’ and the ‘embodied soul’ respectively. Hence the
Prân+astathânugamât (28)
ok;qek=keqP;rs] bUænsork] thoks] ija czã osfr la'k;%A ^vr ,o izk.k%* bR;=k
izk.k'kCnL; czãijRofu.kkZ;dfyÄ~xfeo ^vkuUnks¿tjks¿e`r%* bR;kfnczãfyÄ~xlÙos¿fi
^ekeso fotkuhfg* ^bna 'kjhja ifjx`áksÙFkki;fr* ^oDrkja fo|kr~* (dkSñ 3@1]2]8)
bR;k|usdfyÄ~xn'kZusu la'k;%A r=k ^vFk [kyq izk.k ,o* bR;kfnfyÄ~xkn~ok;qek=kfefr
iwoZ% i{k%A fl¼kUrLrq izk.k% ¾ izk.k'kfCnra czãSo foKs;e~A dqr%\ rFkkuqxekr~A rFkk
czãijRos ikSokZi;sZ.k i;kZyksP;ekus okD;s inkFkZleUo;L; czãizfriknuijRokr~A rFkkfg
^Roeso es oja o`.kh"o] ;a Roa euq";k; fgrrea eU;ls* bfr izkfFkZra fgrrea
czãfoKkueUrjs.k u lEHkofrA vrks czãSo izk.k'kCne~A ^;ks eka osn u g oS rL;
dsupu deZ.ks* fr deZ.kk¿uoysiJqfr% ^vtjks¿e`r%* bfr Jqfr% ^l u lkèkquk
i
deZ.kk Hkw;ku~ Hkorh* R;kfnJqr;'p czãifjxzgs la?kVUrsA vrks¿=k izk.k'kfCnra
. n
czãSosR;FkZ%AA28AA
in d
.
st bR;gadkjoknfyÄ~&
uuq ^ekeso fotkuhfg* bR;qiØE; ^izk.kks¿fLe izKekRek*
q u
xsusUænsorkfHkèkkuesokLrhR;k'kÄïÔkg&
n ta
a
(29) u] oDrqjkReksins'kkfnfr psendè;kRelEcUèkHkw ek áfLeu~ AA29AA
v
@ alone, since such is validly concluded after
i
The word ‘Prâna’ indicateslBrahman
a tu
d r
contemplating on all the abovementioned texts. There in the context of the dialogue
n
between Indra and Pratardana, the latter asks the former, ‘You, on your own, bless me
re is the best for humans’ (Kau. Up. 3.1). Here the most beneficial
with that boon which
thing for men a
n has been asked for, which can be nothing other than the knowledge of
Brahman.r.Hence the word ‘Prâna’ means Brahman only. Similarly the Úruti texts, ‘The
one whod knows me as such, is certainly not affected by any action. He neither loses nor
gains anything through actions (Kau. Up. 3.1)’, ‘That one is ageless and immortal’ (Kau.
Up. 3.8), etc. are properly reconciled only when the word ‘Prâna’ is interpreted as Brahman
and not otherwise. (28)
Na, vaktturâtmopadeúâditi
cedadhyâtmasambandhabhûmâ hyasmin (29)
Vedântin: This is not correct since this chapter (of Kau. Up.) contains
abundance of references to the innermost Self. The texts, ‘As long as the Prâna remains
in this body that life exists’ (Kau. Up. 3.2), ‘This Prâna is the innermost Self and is
Bliss, ageless and immortal’ (Kau. Up. 3.8), repeatedly refers the relation of the word
‘Prâna’ to the innermost Self. Hence the word ‘Prâna’ refers to Brahman, and not to
the divine being Indra. (29)
Jîvamukhyaprân+alinghânneti
cennopâsâtraividhyâdâúritatvâdiha tadyogât (31)
Opponent: The presence of the indicatory signs of the individual soul viz., ‘Know
the speaker’ (Kau. Up. 3.8) etc., and also those of the vital-force viz., ‘Taking hold of this
1.1.31 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 2) 55
bfr czãlw=k'kkÄïjHkk";koyfEcU;ka
;rhUædqyfryddSyklihBkèkh'ojLokfefo|kuUnfxfjfojfprk;ka fo|kuUno`ÙkkS
izFkekè;k;L; izFke% ikn%AA1&1AA
d .in
t. in
e sthat the passage under
body, the Prâna lifts it up’ (ibid. 3.3), one can verily conclude
consideration might as well refer to the ‘individual soul’ q u
the Supreme Brahman.
nt a and the ‘vital-force’, and not to
d a
Vedântin: This is not correct sincev itewill then involve a threefold meditation viz.
l i@tenetsandof meditation
that on the individual soul, on the vital-force
u
on the Brahman, which is
not admissible, for it goes against
consideration the beginningra
t the scriptural interpretation. Taking into
a
concluding with the e ‘I am the Prâna’ (Kau. Up. 3.2) and then
r text, ‘And that very Prâna indeed is Bliss, ageless, deathless and one
and thed r. ofnthe passage(Kau.
with the Consciousness’
end
Up. 3.8), it is clear that the coherence of the beginning
can only be maintained when Brahman is accepted as the
entity discussed about. Moreover since the word ‘Prâna’ is admitted elsewhere to imply
Brahman (BS. 1.1.23) because of the presence there of the characteristics of Brahman,
similarly, in the current context also, occur signs of such exceptional characteristics like
‘the most beneficent’ etc., that make it amply clear that the reference is to the Supreme
Brahman alone. (31)
In the first section of the present chapter it was demonstrated that certain Úruti
texts of doubtful implications, though have distinct references to Brahman but are yet
familiar for other things, meant Brahman only. Now, with a view to prove that all those
Úruti texts wherein the distinct indications of Brahman do not occur also ultimately rejoice
in the Supreme Brahman, commence the second and third sections.
This adhikarana deliberates on the Úruti text that declares, ‘All that is seen is but
Brahman only; because it originates from That, dissolves in That and is sustained by
That. Knowing thus one should, with a tranquil mind, meditate on Brahman everywhere.
One becomes what one resolves. Hence one should meditate on Him, who consists of the
mind, whose body is Prâna and who is of the nature of Space’ (Ch. Up. 3.14.1-2).
Doubt: Here arises a doubt whether the entity to be meditated upon is the embodied
soul or is it the Supreme Brahman?
Opponent: It is the embodied soul that has been sermonized here, since the relation
with mind etc. is justified only with respect to the embodied soul and not the Supreme
Brahman.
1.2.1 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 2) 57
l @
i expressed in the aforementioned Úruti text (Ch.
u
t topics of meditation are possible in the case of Brahman
Moreover the proposed attributes
Up. 3.14.1-2) to be considered
r a as
d with true-resolve (satya-sankalpa), ‘one of the form of light’
r e n
only. The qualities like ‘one
n a
etc. are possible only in Brahman and not in the embodied soul since the former is possessed
.
of absolute power in the matter of creation, sustenance and the dissolution of the universe.
dIfrasserted that the attributes like ‘mind’ and ‘prâna’ are indicators of the embodied
soul and not Brahman and hence the aforementioned Úruti cannot be applied to Brahman,
then such assertion is wrong, since these attributes can readily be related to Brahman also
for Brahman is the Self of all. The Úruti also declares about Brahman, ‘You are a woman,
You are a man, You are a youth and also that old man walking with the support of a stick’
(Úv. Up. 4.3). The Smriti also says, ‘He possesses hands and feet everywhere. Having
eyes, heads, and mouths everywhere He exists pervading everything’ (Bg. 13.13). Hence
the intended attributes are vindicated if applied to ‘conditioned Brahman’ (Qualified
Brahman), and so it is the Brahman that is spoken of here and not the individual soul. (2)
1.2.3 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 2) 59
a n
Vedântin: To this we say,
e d
v na úârîrah+ (3)
@
uli
Anupapattestu
Karmakritr+vyapadeúâcca (4)
Moreover the individual soul cannot be accepted as the principle discussed above
(Ch. Up. 3.14.1-2) since the Úruti mentions about the ‘object’ attained and the ‘subject’
60 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.2.5
li@
Because of the difference in
t u the case-endings of the two words.
r e
for an additional reasonn context in another Vedic text there occurs a
n acase-endings
difference in the of the words denoting the embodied soul and Brahman. In
r.
d soul (antarâtman)’ (Ú. Br. 10.6.3.2), wherein the Self endowed with mind
Úatapatha Brâhmana it is declared, ‘That golden Being (Hiranmaya purus+a) dwells inside
the embodied
and prâna etc., denoted by word ‘purus+a’ in the nominative case (first case-ending) is
described as dwelling inside the embodied Self denoted by the word ‘antarâtman’, which
is in the locative case i.e. seventh case-ending. (5)
Smr+teúca (6)
The Smriti too reminds of the difference between the embodied soul and the
supreme Self. The Gîta declares, ‘The Lord dwells in the hearts of all beings’ (Bg. 18.61),
1.2.7 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 2) 61
.in
^,"k es vkRek¿UrâZn;s* (Nkñ 3@14@3) bfr ifjfPNUuk;ruRokr~] ^v.kh;kUczhgsokZ
i d
nIt must be clearly
thereby negating the possibility of meditation on the embodied soul.
understood here that this difference between the embodied soul s t.
u e and the Supreme Self is
r n
the Supreme Self too. The
e than a grain of barley’ (Ch. Up. 3.14.3), wherein the limitations
a
a grain of rice, slighter
n
r.
declared, in terms of abode and size, befits the embodied soul more than the Supreme
d the Úruti too declares as regards the size of the embodied soul by saying,
Self. Moreover
‘The embodied soul of the size of the tip of the sawyer’ (Úv. Up. 5.8), thereby indicating
that it is the embodied soul that is taught to be meditated upon here and not the Supreme
Self.
If asserted that Brahman is not taught here because of the smallness of Its
abode and because of It too being referred to as minute in size, we say, not so, since
such is done for the sake of meditation, as is seen in the case of Space.
62 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.2.8
d a
assert as regards the dwelling and
r to Space, which though is all-pervasive, but still assumes
of contemplation. This is akin
r e
a diminutive size and nplace with reference to the eye of a needle. Hence the limitation
with respect to a
r. n
being imagined
size and abode do not belong to the Supreme Self in the real sense, these
merely for the purpose of meditation. Thus there is no contradiction in
d of Vedânta. (7)
the principles
Opponent: If the Supreme Self is accepted to be connected with the hearts of all
beings on account of Its omnipresence then, being conscious akin to the embodied soul,
It too would be subjected to pleasure and pain similar to the embodied soul. Moreover
the declaration by the Úruti, ‘There is no other viewer but Him’ (Br. Up. 3.7.23), indicates
that it is none other but the Supreme Self alone that becomes the embodied soul.
v e d
pain etc., we say, not so, for Its nature is different.
li@
This is incorrect, for the embodied soul alone experiences pain and pleasure, it
being an agent of action; whereasuthe Supreme Brahman, not an agent, experiences no
t
such dualities. Hence it is theadifference between the innate temperament of the two that
r
causes one (the embodieddsoul) to indulge in action and experience its result whereas the
r n
emerely remains a witness. As far for the Úruti asserting the oneness
a
other (the Brahman)
n
d r.
of the embodied soul and Brahman, we say that such pronouncement becomes valid only
after ignorance and its effects have been completely annihilated by the ‘knowledge’ (of
Brahman). It must be remembered that the embodied soul experiences pain and pleasure
due to the effect of Ignorance whereas the Supreme Self is free from it. It is akin to
concavity and dirt attributed to the Sky by the ignorant, whereas in reality the sky never
gets affected by them. Hence one cannot imagine even a whiff of experience (of pain and
pleasure) in Brahman; it, being the results of ignorance, is possible only in the embodied
soul. Hence it is the Supreme Self alone, consisting of ‘mind’ and ‘prâna’, that is taught
here as the entity to be meditated upon, and not the embodied soul. (8)
Topic 2: Attadhikarana
(Brahman is the eater)
64 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.2.9
iwosZ.kkL; n`"VkUrlaxfr%A
(40) vÙkk pjkpjxzg.kkr~ AA9AA
iwoZi{ks¿XusthZoL; oksiklua] fl¼kUrs fufoZ'ks"kczã.kks Kkufefr r;ks% iQyHksn%A
^;L; czã p {k=ka pksHks Hkor vksnu%A e`R;q;ZL;ksilspua d bRFkk osn ;=k l%AA (dñ
1@2@24) bR;=kkÙkk Jw;rsA l ,o fopkjfo"k;%A v=k df'pnksnuksilspulwfprks¿Ùkk
izrh;rsA l fdefXu%] tho%] ijekRek osfr la'k;s_ vfXujÙkk & ^vfXujUukn%* (c`ñ
As the previous adhikarana denies any experience of pleasure, pain etc. in Brahman,
similarly the current adhikarana commences with a view to refute any agent-ship in
.in
Brahman; thus this adhikarana is related to the previous one by the way of comparative
illustration.
in d
s .
twhom the knowledge-
Doubt: The Úruti says, ‘How can one know of Him, to
u e
enriched Brâhmanas and the activity-enriched Ks+atriyas are
the curry’ (Kath. Up. 1.2.25)? Here arises a doubt asta q but rice (food) and death is
regards the identity of the ‘eater’
a n
d
referred to by the Úruti. Is it the ‘Fire’ or the ‘embodied soul’ or is it the Supreme Brahman?
e Úruti declares so by the text, ‘Fire is the
vthe
Opponent: The eater is Fire @
u l i it is a matter of common experience that fire
since
t
eater of all food’ (Br. Up. 1.4.6). Moreover
a
consumes everything.
d r
Or the eatereisnthe individual soul for the Úruti supports this by the text, ‘One of
them tastes thea
r
n
r. To this we say,
sweet fruit’ (Mu. Up. 3.1.1).
dVedântin:
Attâ carâcaragrahan+ât (9)
The eater is Brahman, for it is in Him alone that all movable and immovable
things get absorbed.
The eater here is none other but the supreme Lord, since it is in Him alone that the
entire universe, comprising all movable and immovable things, gets withdrawn at the
time of dissolution. The annihilation of this entire creation, characterized by Brâhmanas
and Ks+atriyas, cannot possibly be accomplished by any other but the Supreme Lord only.
1.2.10 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 2) 65
v
that the entire creation is being referred to here as His food. Death, which consumes all,
u li@
is itself consumed by Him. Brâhmanas and Ks+atriyas have been singularly named as they
t
are the foremost of all created beings
a
d rthat the Supreme Lord is not implied here since the Úruti text
n
As for the assertion
declares, ‘The otheremerely looks on without tasting’ (Mu. Up. 3.1.1), we say that such
r This declaration merely negates the experience of fruits of action by
n a
contention is wrong.
r.
d for the latter has been unequivocally proclaimed to be the creator, sustainer
the Supreme Lord. It by no means denies the dissolution of all creation into the Supreme
Brahman,
and the destroyer of the entire universe in all scriptures. Hence the Supreme Self alone
has been referred to as the ‘eater’ in the above Úruti. (9)
Prakaranâcca (10)
Moreover, it is the Supreme Self alone that is implied by the Úruti here as the
‘eater’ since the context relates to the That only. The Úruti says, ‘That Self is neither born
nor does It die’ (Kath. Up. 1.2.18); here the Supreme Lord alone constitutes the subject
under contemplation. Also the declaration, ‘How can anyone know Him thus’ (Kath. Up.
66 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.2.11
Topic 3: Guhâdhikarana
.i n
(The cavity of the heart)
in d
s .
t ‘Ks+atriya’ have been
As in the preceding adhikarana the words ‘Brâhmana’ and
u e
word ‘death’, similarly in the current context the phrase q
construed to imply all perishable creation because of their occurrence
ta‘entering
in proximity to the
into the cavity of heart’
a
occurs in close proximity to the word ‘drink’ (pibat),n thereby indicating that it is the
ed
related to the previous one by the way of v
‘intellect’ and the ‘embodied soul’ that dwell in the cardiac cavity; thus this adhikarana is
tu
rathe reward of their works; both are mutually distinct akin to
Doubt: The Úruti declares, “In this body two beings dwell in the extremely subtle
d
re
shade and light, so has nbeen declared by the worshippers of ‘five-fires’ and the performers
cavity of the heart to enjoy
n a thrice” (Kath. Up. 1.3.1). Here arises a doubt whether these two
of ‘Nâciketa sacrifice’
d r
referred to .by the Úruti are the ‘embodied soul’ and the ‘intellect’, or are they the ‘embodied
soul’ and the ‘Supreme Self’?
Opponent: It is the ‘embodied soul’ and the ‘intellect’ that have been referred to
here in the Úruti.
The two who have entered into the cavity of the heart are the two Selves, for it
is so seen.
1.2.11 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 2) 67
iQyHksn%A ^Íra ficUrkS lqÑrL; yksds xqgka izfo"VkS ijes ijkèksZA Nk;krikS czãfonks
onfUr* (dñ 1@3@1) bR;kfn okD;e=k fopkjfo"k;%A r=k fdfeg cqf¼thokS
fufnZ"VkS] mr thoijekRekukfofr la'k;s_ cqf¼thokSA dqr%\ ^xqgka izfo"Vkfofr
fo'ks"k.kkfnfr iwoZ% i{k%A fl¼kUrLrq thokReijekRekukosok=k xzkákSA dqr%\ vkRekukS
fg & ;LeknkRekukS psrukS ^Íra ficUrkS* bfr iQyHkksxJo.ksuSdL;kReRos f}rh;&
L;kI;kReRoa U;kÕ;e~A la[;kJo.ks la[;kor% lekuLoHkkoL;So yksds n'kZukr~A vL;
xksf}Zrh;ks¿Uos"VO; bR;qDrs f}rh;L; xksjUos"k.kofngkfi Írikusu fyÄ~xsu fuf'prs
foKkukRefu f}rh;kUos"k.kk;ka lekuLoHkko'psru% ijekReSo izrh;rsA ^xqgkfgra xgojs"Ba
.in
iqjk.ke~* (dñ 1@2@12) ^;ks osn fufgra xqgk;ka ijes O;kseu~* (rSñ 2@1) bR;kfnJqfr"kq
d
t.in Self’ since both
esdisposition. It is seen in
The two referred here are the ‘individual self’ and the ‘Supreme
u
belong to the same class, both are sentient and both have similar
common parlance that during enumeration one roboticallyqassumes that the units of same
n a to find a companion for a
tdesires
‘cow’, then another cow alone is sought ford
e a not a horse etc. Similarly once the
category are being accounted for. For instance if one
and
embodied soul, endowed with intellect, has vbeen ascertained to be one of the dwellers in
@indicatory
the cardiac cavity by the presence oflithe
u mark of enjoying the fruits of work,
the search for the second dweller trobotically concludes in the ‘Supreme Self’ alone because
d rain the ‘intellect’ which is insentient.
of Its similar nature, and not
r e n
n aenjoyment
As for the assertion that on assuming the Supreme Self to be the second dweller
r .
the declaration of of fruit by both becomes erroneous, since such cannot apply
d we say that such can be figuratively asserted for both on the analogy of ‘men
to Brahman,
with umbrella’, wherein only one man has an umbrella and not the whole group. Similarly
here also though it is the individual Self alone who enjoys the fruits of action, yet both
are so spoken of.
Also the objection that the Supreme Self cannot be spoken of as dwelling in the
subtle cavity of the heart since it is inappropriate to incarcerate an all-pervading entity to
a certain location; we say that it involves no contradiction since such confinement of
Brahman is talked of only for the purpose of realization. Moreover the Úruti also declares,
‘Rarely does one know that entity which is inscrutable, ageless and is lodged in an
inaccessible place in the cavity of the heart’ (Kath. Up. 1.2.12), and ‘One who knows that
68 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.2.12
.in
Supreme Self which dwells in the supreme space within the cavity of the heart’ (Tai. Up.
2.1).
i n d
st .
Hence the embodied soul endowed with intellect andethe Supreme Self are the
u
two entities referred to in the Úruti under contemplation.q(11)
n ta
e d
Viúes+an+âccaa(12)
@ v
u li of the two are mentioned.
Moreover the distinctive attributes
a t
d r
Moreover an additional reason for accepting the individual soul and the Supreme
u l
interpreted as a shadowy being (a reflection),
and fearlessness should be seentmerely as an expression of eulogy; thus this adhikarana
d
is related to the previous oneraby the way of comparative illustration.
r en
Doubt: a
n In the context of discussions between Satyakâma Jâbâla and Upakosala
r. text occurs, ‘The One seen in the eye is the Self. This One is immortal and
the following
fearless.dThis is Brahman’ (Ch. Up. 4.15.1). Here arises a doubt whether the One referred
to in the Úruti is some shadowy being etc. reflected in the eye, or is it the Supreme Self?
The being inside the eye is Brahman, for the attributes mentioned can apply to
It alone.
70 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.2.14
which logicallya
n relates to the Supreme Lord only. Hence the being in the eye is God alone
d . (13)
and nonerother.
Sthânâdivyapadeúâcca (14)
And because the abode etc. are attributed to It for the sake of meditation.
1.2.15 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 2) 71
d
7), whereinr . the Úruti ascribes name and form to Brahman with the sole purpose of
facilitating meditation on It. Hence, akin to the placement of Vishnu in the stone ‘Úâligrâma’
for the purpose of worship, the position of Brahman in eye etc. for the purpose of meditation
does not present any contradiction. (14)
Sukhaviúis+t+âbhidhânâdeva ca (15)
Furthermore, there cannot be any incongruity as regards the One in the eye being
Brahman only because of Its occurrence in the same context. The topic commences with
the Úruti declaring, ‘Prâna is Brahman, Kam (bliss) is Brahman, Kham (space) is Brahman’
(Ch. Up. 4.10.5), wherein the words ‘bliss’ and ‘space’ mutually qualify each other and
72 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.2.16
u e
as such. And then the same Brahman, with a view to reveal the course, is further elucidated
a q
in the text, ‘The One seen in the eye is the Self. This One is immortal and fearless. This
t
is Brahman’ (Ch. Up. 4.15.1). (15)
a n
v e d
Úrutopanis+atkagatyabhidhânâcca (16)
i@
uldeclaration
And on the account of tthe of the path followed by those who have
d ra
known the Truth of the scriptures.
r e n
n aby which the knower of Brahman departs after death. This path (path of
The Path of
is the same. path
departure declared here for the one who knows the person in the eye
d r has been elucidated by the Úruti in the text, ‘One, attaining perfection by
gods, devayâna)
continence and meditation, proceeds to world of Brahman by traveling along the Northern
Course’ (Pr. Up. 1.10). This path has also been detailed in the Smriti, wherein the text
says, ‘The Path in which the deities of fire, light, day-time, the bright fortnight and the
six months of northern course of sun preside, know that as the path of no return’ (Bg.
8.24). The same path has been declared here for the one who knows the person in the eye
by the Chândogya Úruti that says, ‘He proceeds from the sun to the moon and then to the
lightning from where he is escorted to the world of Brahman by a non-human being
never to return back to the world of transmigration’ (Ch. Up. 4.25.5). Hence the person in
the eye is none other but Brahman only. (16)
1.2.17 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 2) 73
AA foJke%2AA d .in
t. in
e s
q u
Anavasthiterasambhavâcca netarah+
a (17)
nont account of impermanence and
None other can be the being in the eye a
edattributes.
impossibility of application of the mentioned v
u li@that the person in the eye could be a shadowy
being, or individual self orrsomea t divine being, we say it is not correct because of their
As for the opponent’s assertion
.i n
In the previous adhikarana while concluding that the person in the eye is Brahman,
in d
the Br+hadâranyaka Úrutis (3.7.3/18) were cited in support of such contention. There the
.
conclusion that the ‘internal ruler’ (antaryâmin) referred to in these Shrutis is none other
st
e
but Brahman only was arrived at without any debate. The current adhikarana commences
u
ta q
with a view to establish this conclusion as regards the aforementioned ‘internal ruler’ by
apposite arguments. Thus this adhikarana is related to the previous one by the way of
a n
protestation.
e d
v inhabits the earth, but is within it, whom the
@
ithe earth, who controls the earth from within; That
Doubt: The Úruti declares, ‘He who
l
u
town immortal Self’ (Br. Up. 3.7.3). Here arises a doubt
earth does not know, whose body is
r a
One is the Internal ruler, your
d
n
whether the Internal ruler spoken of in the Úruti above is the ‘Supreme Self’ or some
‘divine being’ or iseit the ‘embodied soul’ endowed with some mystic powers, or some
r
other entity? a
r. n
dOpponent: The Internal ruler could be a ‘divine being’ or an ‘embodied soul’
endowed with mystic powers, but not Brahman since It is not possessed of body and
organs.
The internal ruler heard of in the contexts of the divine and other is Brahman
on account of Its characteristics being mentioned.
1.2.19 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 3) 75
r n
finds, in the aforementioned
e (being inside everything viz. earth, sun, water, fire space,
a
Sovereignty, Omnipresence
n Selfhood etc. that befit Brahman only and none other. (18)
r.
senses etc.) and
dOpponent: The pronouncements that the Internal ruler cannot be seen, heard or
known etc. could also befit ‘Pradhâna’ (Primordial Nature), the insentient entity inferred
by the followers of the Sânkhya School of philosophy.
Vedântin: To this we say,
Na ca smârtamataddharmâbhilâpât (19)
And not the Pradhâna known from the Smriti, for the attributes described do
not apply to it.
No, since characteristics like ‘unseen but seeing’, ‘unheard but hearing’, ‘unknown
but the knower’ etc. mentioned in the context (Br. Up. 3.7.23) cannot apply to an insentient
76 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.2.20
okD;'ks"ks¿fHkykiknfHkèkkukfnR;FkZ%AA19AA
uUosoa psruRokn~æ"Vk] Jksrk] izR;DRoknkRek] èkekZèkeZiQyHkksDr`Rokne`r% 'kkjhjks
thoks ;ksxh L;knUr;kZehR;r vkgµ
(51) 'kkjhj'pksHk;s¿fi fg HksnsuSueèkh;rs AA20AA
usfr iwoZLeknuqorZrsA 'kkjhjks ukUr;kZeh HkforqegZfrA dqr%\ mHk;s¿fi ^;ks
foKkus fr"Bu~* bfr dk.o'kkf[ku%* ; vkRefu fr"Bu~* bfr ekè;fUnu'kkf[ku%
vUr;kZfe.kks HksnsuSua 'kkjhja i`fFkO;kfnonkèkkjRosu fu;E;Rosu pkèkh;rs vkeufUrA u
pSdfLeu~ nsgs }kS æ"VkjkS dFkeqii|srs bfr okP;e~_ vfo|kizR;qiLFkkfirdk;Z&
. in
dkj.kkSikfèkdHksnkH;qixesu ikjekfFkZdHksnO;ins'kkHkkokr~A ,dks fg izR;xkRek] u }kS]
i n d
entity like ‘Pradhâna’. Moreover Pradhâna can never be one’s own
s .
t and not Pradhâna, is
Self, as has been
e
declared regarding that Internal ruler in the Úruti. Hence Brahman,
u
the Internal ruler. (19)
a q
t here as the internal ruler as,
n
aa hearer, a thinker, a knower etc. It is the
Opponent: The embodied soul could be
v e d
being a sentient entity, it can become a witness,
implied
a t Hence
r
d we say,
n
Vedântin: To this
e
n arÚârîraúcobhayeapi hi bhedenainamadhîyate (20)
r.
dAnd not the embodied soul also, for it is read as different by the followers of
both the recensions.
The word ‘not’ is to be supplied from the last aphorism. The embodied soul cannot
be the internal ruler for the former is read to be distinct from the latter by the followers of
both Mâdhyandina and the Kânva recensions of Úatapatha Brâhmana. The Kânva text
says, ‘He who dwells in the intellect (vijñâna), whom the intellect does not know’ (Br.
Up. 3.7.22), wherein the word ‘intellect’ refers to the embodied soul for it identifies itself
with the intellect; and the Mâdhyandina text says, ‘He who dwells in the Self (âtmâ),
whom the Self doesn’t know’, wherein the word ‘Self’ refers to the embodied soul. Hence
1.2.20 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 3) 77
.in
Opponent: It is not possible to have two witnesses in the same body – one the
d
Supreme Self, i.e. the internal ruler and the other the embodied soul.
t. in
Vedântin: The difference between the internal rulere(Supreme s
u Self) and the
q (avidyâ) that conjures the
t a
embodied soul is not factual but is attributed to ‘Nescience’
n
of Space into ‘the pot-space’ etc., a single Selfd
e a
limiting adjuncts. It is because of these limiting attributes that, akin to apparent divisions
is treated as if It were two. The Úruti also
declares, ‘When there is duality then one v
one, everything has become the Self, l @
then
sees something, but when, to the enlightened
i what should one see and with what’ (Br. Up.
u
t possible within the domain of ignorance, but no
d a
2.4.14), wherein all behavior becomes
such activity remains after rthe dawn of knowledge. (20)
e n
r Topic 6: Adr+úyatvâdhikarana
n a
d r . (The Unseen one)
In the previous adhikarana the Supreme Self was acknowledged as the internal
ruler to the exclusion of Pradhâna, as qualities like ‘seeing’, ‘hearing’ etc. mentioned in
the Úruti texts were confirmed to be unfeasible in an insentient entity like Pradhâna. The
current adhikarana now takes up those Úruti texts that do not mention such qualities so as
to eliminate the Pradhâna. Thus this adhikarana is related to the previous one by the way
of counter-illustration.
Doubt: The Mund+akopanis+ad says, ‘That which cannot be see with the eyes;
which cannot be grasped with organs of action; which cannot be categorized into any
caste or class; which is devoid of eyes, ears, hands and feet; which is eternal, all-pervading,
extremely subtle and unshrinking; and which is the source of all creation; That can only
78 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.2.21
in
be comprehensively realized by the men of fortitude only’ (Mu. Up. 1.1.6). Here arises a
.
i n d
doubt whether the entity discussed in the Úruti above is Pradhâna, or the embodied soul
or the Supreme Self?
st .
e
Opponent: It must be the insentient Pradhâna onlyuas it alone can appositely be
ta q
the material cause of this insentient creation.
a n
v
Or if the word ‘yoni’ (cause) is taken d
e to imply the efficient (nimitta kârana) and
l i@
not the material cause (upâdana kârana), then the embodied soul can be the entity referred
tu
to in the above Úruti since all creation is brought into existence by the embodied soul
ra
through its merit and demerit.
d
Vedântin:rToe nthis we say,
n a
dr. Adr+úyatvâdigun+ako dharmokteh+ (21)
The one endowed with the attributes of invisibility etc. is Brahman, for the
attributes mentioned apply to It alone.
The entity referred to in the aforementioned Úruti must be ‘Brahman’ alone, for
the characteristics mentioned there can be possible in It only. The Úruti further declares
as regards that entity, ‘He who knows all in general, and distinctively too’ (Mu. Up.
1.1.9). Such universal and distinctive omniscience is possible in Brahman alone, and not
in the insentient Pradhâna or the embodied soul, which is confined in its knowledge by
the limiting adjuncts.
1.2.22 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 3) 79
r. n similar.
Vedântin:
must bedtotally
It is not always necessary that the illustration and the thing illustrated
If one assumes absolute similarity between the two, then one
would have to assume that the source (yoni) of all creation is ‘gross’ too akin to the gross
earth in the illustration, which is not possible even according to your principle also.
Hence Brahman alone has been referred to by the Úruti under contemplation. (21)
The other two viz. the embodied soul and the Pradhâna are not implied, for the
qualities mentioned apply to Brahma alone, and also because of Its difference from
the other two.
Moreover, the Supreme Lord only can be the source (yoni) of creation of all
things for there is the mention of such distinctive characteristics as are possible in It
80 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.2.23
d r
r e n
a Rûpopanyâsâcca (23)
nbecause of the mention of form.
d r
And
.
Moreover, the Supreme Lord only can be the source (yoni) of creation of all
things because there is an indication of Its form. (According to the Vrittikâra) After
declaring the origin of all creation from It in the text, ‘From Him originates the vital-
force, all organs and the mind’ (Mu. Up. 2.1.3), the Úruti goes on to declare the form of
that very source by the text, ‘He of whom heaven is the head, the sun and the moon Its
eyes, the directions Its ears; He is the indwelling Self of all’ (Mu. Up. 2.1.4). All these
characteristics appositely apply to the Supreme Lord alone, and not to the embodied soul
or Pradhâna.
1.2.23 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 3) 81
But according to Shankarâchârya the above text does not refer to the Supreme
.in
Lord that is the ‘yoni’ of all, because the ensuing text also speaks of creation of
d
i n
modifications. Hence the concluding text, ‘This entire world is but Purusha only’ (Mu.
t .
es
Up. 2.1.10), in fact refers to the Supreme Lord who is the source of all. The earlier text
(Mu. Up. 2.1.3/4) refers to Hiranyagarbha. (23)
q u
n ta
(Vaiúvânarâ isd
e a
Topic 7: Vaiúvânarâdhikarana
Brahman)
v
u li@characters like ‘invisibility’ etc. were construed
In the last adhikarana the general
a t of specific indicatory marks like ‘omniscience’
to imply Brahman due to the occurrence
d r
etc., similarly the word ‘Vaiúvânara’ occurring in the current adhikarana should be
n
e regular fire’ due to the occurrence of specific indicatory marks
like ‘the supportaofrsacrifice’ etc. Hence this adhikarana is related to the previous one by
interpreted here as ‘the
L;kfnfr n`"VkUrlÄ~xR;snekg µ
(55) oS'okuj% lkèkkj.k'kCnfo'ks"kkr~ AA24AA
iwoZi{ks tkBjkns#iklua] fl¼kUrs ijekReu bfr r;ks% iQyHksn%A oS'okujfo|k;ka
^dks u vkRek fda czãsfr* ^vkRekuesosea oS'okuja lEizR;è;sf"k reso uks cwzfg* (Nkñ
5@11@1&6) bfr pksiØE; |qlw;ZokÕokdk'kokfji`fFkohuka lqrstLRokfnxq.k;ksx&
esdSdksiklufuUn;k p oS'okuja izR;s"kka ewèkkZfnHkkoeqifn';kEuk;rs ^;LRosresoa
izkns'kek=kefHkfoekua oS'okujeqikLrs* (Nkñ 5@18@2) bR;kfnokD;e=k fopkjfo"k;%A
r=k fda oS'okujks tkBjkfXu_] HkwrkfXu%] vkfnR;kfnnsork] 'kkjhj%] ijekRek osfr
la'k;s_ tkBjkfnfjfr iwoZ%i{k%A fl¼kUrLrq oS'okuj% ijekReSo HkforqegZfrA dqr%\
.i n
in d
lkèkkj.k'kCnfo'ks"kkr~A lkèkkj.k'kCn;ksfoZ'ks"kkr~A tkBjkfXuHkwrkXU;kfnR;kfnnsorklq lkèkkj.kks
st .
oS'okuj'kCn%] thoijekReuks% lkèkkj.k% vkRe'kCn%A ,oa p r=k r=k lkèkkj.k&
u e
;ks#Hk;kso'ZS okujkRe'kCn;ks% lÙos¿fi ijekReijRos fo'ks"kks n`';rsA ^rL; g ok ,rL;kReuks
t a q
oS'okujL; ewèkSZo lqrstk* bR;knkS iwoksZDr|qewèkZRokfnfo'ks"k% lokZRedijekReijRos
a n
ve d
,okoxE;rsA ^dks u vkRek fda czãs* (Nkñ 5@11@1) R;qiØes vkReczã'kCnkH;kefi
l @
istomach, or the fire as an element, or the presiding
u
‘Vaiúvânara’ refers to the fire of the
t or the Supreme Self?
r a
deity of fire, or the embodied soul
d may refer to any other except the Supreme Lord.
n
Opponent:eVaiúvânara
r
n a
d r .
Vedântin: To this we say,
Vaiúvânara is Brahman, for the two words ‘Vaiúvânara’ and ‘Self’, though
symbolize many things, have been used here in a very specifically sense.
Vaiúvânara is none other but the Supreme Lord because the two words ‘Vaiúvânara’
and ‘Self’, though symbolizing many things, have been used here very specifically. The
word ‘Vaiúvânara’ is generally used to imply the element called ‘Fire’, or it is used to
imply the deity of fire, or is used to indicate the fire in the stomach. Similarly the word
‘Self’ is used to imply both the ‘embodied self’ and the ‘supreme Self’. But here, in the
1.2.25 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 3) 83
its head, the sun its eyes etc. can be validated onlyainn
Lord only. The declaration of the Úruti as regards the ‘Vaiúvânara Self’ that has heaven as
n a
dr . Smaryamân+amanumânam syâditi (25)
Moreover the Smriti also describes the form of Lord akin to the form described
by the ‘Vaiúvânara’ Úruti. The Smriti declares, ‘Salutations to Him whose mouth is fire,
whose head is heaven, who has sky as the navel, the earth as the feet, the sun as the eye
and the directions as the ears’ (Mbh. 12.47.68). This depiction of the Lord’s cosmic form
by the Smriti agrees well with that described by Úruti text under contemplation, and thus
consolidates the conclusion that the word ‘Vaiúvânara’ denotes the Lord alone. The word
‘iti’ occurring in the aphorism is used in the sense of ‘hence’, i.e. to imply that since the
form referred to in the Smriti bears witness to the Úruti text that form its basis; hence the
word Vaiúvânara refers to the Supreme Lord alone. (25)
84 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.2.26
Vedântin: This is not correct since the aforementioned Úruti texts only preach
meditation on the gastric fire as Brahman akin to that in the text, ‘Meditate on the mind
as Brahman’ (Ch. Up. 3.18.1); or Brahman is preached here to be meditated upon as
qualified by the attributes of Vaiúvânara fire in the stomach, akin to that in the text, ‘That
which is identified with the mind, which has Prâna as its body, has effulgence as its form’
(Ch. Up. 3.14.2). Moreover the contention that the word ‘Vaiúvânara’ is primarily used in
1.2.27 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 3) 85
e n
Even if a it r
n to Vaiúvânara as the gastric fire, but they can be aptly applied to
appositely .applied
r
be accepted that attributes like ‘heaven as the head’ etc. cannot be
d as the deity (of fire) or as an element (fire). This is clarified in the next aphorism:
Vaiúvânara
And for the same reason Vaiúvânara is neither the deity nor the element.
The word Vaiúvânara cannot be construed to imply either the deity or the element.
The element Fire, which is characterized by heat and light, cannot be assumed to have
heaven as its head etc. Both the Fire as well as the Heaven are modifications (effect) of
Brahman, and hence one effect cannot become the Self of another. Similarly the deity
too, though possessed of divinity, cannot be assumed to have heaven as its head etc., for
the deity is not the cause of heaven etc. Moreover the grandeur of the deities is not
86 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.2.28
r. may be directly accepted to mean the Supreme Lord (in His cosmic form)
word Vaiúvânara
d
‘Vaiúvânara’
for meditation, rather then imagining ‘fire’ as a symbol (gastric fire) or limiting adjunct.
According to Jaimini this inference regarding the implication of the word ‘Vaiúvânara’
may also be arrived at by directly analyzing the word itself in the following manner
without any contradictions. Vaiúvânara means He who is the ‘vishva’ (universe) as well
as the ‘nara’ (person); or He who is the ‘nara’ (ordainer) of the ‘vishva’ (universe); or He
to whom belong all (viúva) beings (nara); thereby implying the Supreme Lord for He is
the Self of all. The words ‘Vaiúvânara’ and ‘Viúvânara’ are same akin to the words ‘râks+asa’
and ‘raks+as’ (both mean demon) or the words ‘vâyasa’ and ‘vayas’ (both mean crow), the
suffix signifying the original word itself. Moreover the word ‘agni’ may also be construed
to mean the Supreme Lord, as ‘agni’ is the one that leads from the front or the one that
leads to the attainment of fruit of actions, both of which appositely conclude in the Supreme
1.2.29 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 3) 87
d r
direct interpretation of the word ‘Vaiúvânara’ as implying the Supreme Lord.
e n
r Abhivyakterityâúmarathyah+ (29)
a
n says that He manifests in a spatially limited way for the sake of
d r.
Âúmarathya
His revelation.
Anusmr+terbâdarih+ (30)
r e n
Sampatteriti jaiministathâ hi darúyati (31)
n a
r .
Jaimini says that the spatial limitation is spoken of from the standpoint of
d through superimposition; for the Úruti declares so.
meditation
According to Jaimini the Lord is spoken of as being spatially limited taking into
account the mediation through superimposition (sampat upâsana). In the ‘Vâjasaneya
brâhmana’ the limbs of the ‘Vaiúvânara Self’ (cosmic being) are superimposed upon the
different parts of the worshipper’s body starting from head to chin. There the head (of the
worshipper) is identified with the ‘heavens’ (Vaiúvânara’s head), the eyes of the worshipper
as the ‘sun’ (Vaiúvânara’s eye) etc.; thus superimposing various limbs of Vaiúvânara onto
the parts of the worshipper’s body giving an impression as if the Lord is spatially restricted.
(31)
1.2.32 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 3) 89
bfr czãlw=k'kkÄïjHkk";koyfEcU;ka
;rhUædqyfryddSyklihBkèkh'ojLokfefo|kuUnfxfjfojfprk;ka fo|kuUno`ÙkkS izFkekè;k;L;
f}rh;% ikn%AA1&2AA
d .in
t.in
Aamananti cainamasmin (32)ue
s
ta q
And the followers of Jâbâla speak of the n
and the chin.
ed a God in the space between the head
v
u li@branch speak of the Supreme Lord in between
Also the followers of the Jâbâla
a t Úruti declares, ‘That which is this infinite and
the head and the chin. The Jâbâla
d
imperceptible Self is seatedron this embodied one between Varanâ (eyebrows) and Nâsi
(nose)’, thus talkinge
r n
of the Supreme Lord as spatially restrained. Hence the Vaiúvânara is
n
the Supreme Self a (32)
only.
dr.
Thus ends the English translation of Chapter 1 Section 2 of
Vidyânanda Vr+tti on Brahmasûtra
¨
izFkekË;k;s r`rh;% ikn%
(v=kkLi"VczãfyÄ~xkuka izk;ks Ks;czãfo"k;k.kka fopkj%)
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czãf.k leUo;% izfrikfnr%A lEizfr rkn`'kkuka okD;kuka izk;'kks Ks;Rosu czãf.k
leUo;a izfriknf;rqa iknks¿;ekjH;rsA
(19) (1 |qHok|fËkdj.ke~ A lwÒ 1&7)
iwo± =kSyksD;kRek oS'okuj% ijekReSoRs ;qDre~] rfgZ =kSyksD;k;rueU;RL;kfnR;kf{kI;
lekèkkukRiwosZ.kkL;k{ksilaxR;k] ;FkksiØeLFkL; oS'okujlkèkkj.k'kCnL; okD;'ks"kLFk&
|qewèkZRokfnfyÄ~xsu czãijRoeqDre~] rFkk¿=kkfi miØeLFkL; lkèkkj.kk;ruRoL;
^ve`rL;S"k lsrq%* bfr okD;'ks"kLFklsrqRofyÄ~xsu ifjfPNUuizèkkukfnijRoa L;kfnfr
Chapter 1 Section 3
The second section of the current chapter deliberated upon those Úruti texts wherein
one does not come across definitive indicatory marks of Brahman. Such texts were
ultimately shown to harmoniously conclude in the exposition of the ‘Qualified Brahman’
(the entity to be meditated upon). Now, with a view to demonstrate the harmonious
conclusion of other similar texts in the elucidation of ‘Unqualified Brahman’ (the entity
to be known) commences the current section of this chapter.
Topic-1: Dyubhvâdyadhikarana
(The abode of Heaven, Earth etc.)
n`"VkUrlaxR;k ok¿fèkdj.kfenekjH;rsµ
(64) |qHok|k;rua Lo'kCnkr~ AA1AA
v=k iwoZi{ks izèkkuk|qiklua] fl¼kUrs czãizesfr r;ks% iQyHksn%A ^^;fLeU|kS%
i`fFkoh pkUrfj{keksra eu% lg izk.kS'p loSZ%A resoSda tkuFk vkRekueU;k okpks
foeq×pFkke`rL;S"k lsrqfj** (eqñ 2@2@5) R;kfnokD;e=k fopkjfo"k;%A r=k
Or, as in the preceding adhikarana the word ‘Vaiúvânara’ was construed to imply
the Supreme Lord in view of the occurrence, towards the end, of text, ‘Its head is the
heaven’ etc.; similarly the word ‘immortal’, occurring in the current adhikarana should
.in
refer to Pradhâna and not to ‘Brahman’, in view of the occurrence of the word ‘bridge’
d
i n
(setu) at the end of the text. Hence the current adhikarana is related to the previous one by
t.
es
the way of comparative illustration.
u
q all worries know that Self
t
Doubt: The Mund+aka Úruti declares, ‘Leaving aside
a
ntheUp.sky2.2.5).
alone into which are woven the heaven, the earth and
e d a
senses, since this Self is the bridge to Immortality’ (Mu.
as also the mind with all the
Here arises a doubt as
regards the repository of all worlds being v
@ talked of here; that whether that repository is
the ‘embodied soul’ or ‘Brahman’ orlithe ‘Pradhâna’?
tu
d ra must be something other than Brahman. It may be the
Opponent: The repository
re
‘Pradhâna’; for it beingnthe material cause of heaven etc., the Pradhâna can well be their
repository also. a
n Or it may be the ‘embodied soul’; for by virtue of it being the agent of
experience .of this diverse world of enjoyment, it can logically be its repository also.
dr
Vedântin: To this we say,
.
Dyubhvâdyâyatanam svaúabdât (1)
The repository of Earth etc. is Brahman, for the word Self is used there.
The repository of all such worlds, of which the heaven and the earth are foremost,
can be Brahman only, since in the aforementioned Mund+aka Úruti the word ‘Self’ is used,
which is apposite only if Brahman is being referred to and not Pradhâna or the embodied
soul. The Úruti declares, ‘Know that Self alone which is one without a second’ (Mu. Up.
2.2.5); wherein the word ‘Self’ is appropriate only if used to designate Brahman and
92 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.2
li@
i.e. the Self qualified with adjuncts and attributes,
tu
to indicate the ‘Qualified Brahman’; then this is not correct, for the Úruti specifically
d a
emphasizes on knowing the ‘Unqualified Brahman’ by the use of word ‘alone’ along
r by saying, ‘Bring the one on which Devadatta sits’,
with ‘Self’. If anyone is instructed
then the seat alone isnto be brought and not Devadatta; similarly the unqualified Self
alone, which isathe rerepository of all, is being preached by the Úruti as the object to be
known. As.far
r nas the usage of the word ‘bridge’ (setu) in the Úruti is concerned, it should
d merely as the fact of ‘holding together’, and not in its primary sense of a
be interpreted
dam with banks. Hence the repository of all worlds is the Unqualified Supreme Brahman
alone, as is indicated by the use of the word ‘Self’ in its primary sense and the word
‘bridge’ in its secondary sense. (1)
Muktopasr+pyavyapadeshât (2)
Because of the declaration regarding It being the goal of the liberated souls.
Furthermore Brahman alone can be the repository of all worlds, for that repository
has been declared to be the place attained by the liberated souls. The word ‘Muktopas+ripya’
1.3.3 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 3) 93
t q
non-Self results in attachment to the body etc. with consequent for those who
a it. This superimposition is the
adore the body and repugnance for those who disregard
n
a cycles of transmigration. On the
d
work of Nescience that binds the souls to the eternal
e
v are free from the defects of affection and
contrary as regards those liberated ones, whose ignorance has been completely annihilated
@
li this entity that has been described as the repository
by the knowledge of Self and who consequently
repugnance, it is declared that theyu
a t attain
of earth and heaven. The same
r has been declared in the Úruti also wherein it is said, ‘The
d from the web of name and form and attains the Supreme
effulgent Purus+a’ r e nUp.
knower of the Self frees himself
Nânumânamatacchabdât (3)
Not the inferred one, for no term to that effect occurs in the scriptures.
Further reasons as to why the embodied soul cannot be the repository of earth,
heaven etc. have been discussed in the subsequent three aphorisms.
Bhedavyapadeúât (5)
u li@
a t Prakaran+ât (6)
n
On account of the drcontext too.
a r e
. n‘O Lord,
Moreover
r
this is a context of the Supreme Self alone as is explicitly clear from
d
the Úruti text, knowing what does this entire world come to be known’ (Mu. Up.
1.1.3), wherein the Úruti talks of an entity knowing which one comes to know all. Such
omniscience is possible from the knowledge of Brahman alone as It is the basis of the
entire creation. Hence the context concerns Brahman and not the embodied soul; and
therefore the latter cannot be the repository of earth, heaven etc. (6)
Sthityadanâbhyâm ca (7)
Moreover the Úruti says, ‘Two birds of similar nature reside on a single tree, of
them one tastes the fruits of actions and the other merely remains a witness’ (Mu. Up.
3.1.1), wherein the tree refers to the body, the one experiencing the fruit of action is the
96 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.7
embodied soul and the other is the Brahman. Hence a clear distinction has been drawn
between the agent of experience (embodied soul) and the witness (Brahman). Therefore
Brahman alone can be the repository of earth, heaven etc. and not the embodied soul. (7)
Topic 2: Bhûmâdhikarana
(Brahman is Infinite) .i n
in d
.
In the previous section it was concluded that the repositoryt of earth, heaven etc. is
u es The current adhikarana
Brahman alone because of the usage of the word ‘Self’ in the text.
t
commences on a note of protest against the aforementioneda q conclusion by referring to
a n(Ch. Up. on7.1.3).
another Úruti text wherein, in proximity to the discussion Prâna (vital-force), it is
ed
declared, ‘The knower of Self goes beyond grief’
v Here, one may well
Opponent: The word ‘Bhûmâ’ refers to the vital-force (Prâna) and not the Supreme
Self, since after enumerating (in the ascending order) the superiority of all entities from
‘name’ onwards to ‘hope’, it is finally declared that, ‘Prâna is superior to hope’ (Ch. Up.
7.15.1), and then the discussion ends there. This clearly establishes that ‘Prâna’ is the
most superior of all. Moreover the knower of ‘Prâna’ is referred to as the ‘ativâdin’, i.e.
1.3.8 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 3) 97
vkRe'kCniz;ksxlEHkokfnR;k{ksilaxR;snekgµ
(71) Hkwek lEizlknknè;qins'kkr~ AA8AA
v=k iwoZi{ks izk.kksiklua] fl¼kUrs rq czãKkufefr iQyHksn%A ^Hkwek Roso
foftKkflrO; bfr Hkwekua Hkxoks foftKkl bfr*] ^;=k ukU;Ri';fr ukU;PN`.kksfr
ukU;f}tkukfr l Hkwek* (Nkñ 7@23]24) bR;kfnokD;e=k fopkjfo"k;%A r=k fda
izk.kks Hkwek L;kr~] ijekRek osfr la'k;s_ izk.kks HkwekA dqr%\ ukekfnH; vk'kkUrsH;%
^vfLr Hkxoks ukEuks Hkw;%* bfr ^okXoko ukEuks Hkw;lh*] izk.kks ok vk'kk;k Hkw;ku~*
bR;kfnuk Hkw;kala lizi×peqDRok Hkw;% iz'uksÙkjijEijk¿n'kZukr~] izk.knf'kZu'pkfrok&
d
fnRodFkukfnfr iwoZ%i{k%A fl¼kUrLrq Hkwek ijekReSok=k HkforqegZfrA dqr%\ .in
t.in
lEizlknknè;qins'kkr~A lE;DizlhnR;fLeu~ tho bfr lEizlkn% lq"kqfIr%] rL;ka
u es
lEizlknkoLFkk;ka izk.kks tkxrhZfr lEizlkn'kCnsu izk.kks¿fHkèkh;rs_ rLekr~ izk.kknfèk ¾
ta q
mèo± HkwEu mifn';ekuRokfnR;FkZ%A u p izk.kksins'kkRija iz'uizfropuk¿n'kZusu izk.kL;So
a n
v e d
the one whose statement surpasses all previous statements. Hence the word ‘Bhûmâ’ in
the text refers to ‘Prâna’ only.
uli@
t
Vedântin: To this weasay,
d r
r e n
Bhûmâ samprasâdâdadhyupadeshât (8)
n a
.
r is Brahman, for it is taught after the state of deep-sleep.
dBhûmâ
The word ‘Bhûmâ’ in the Úruti text refers to Brahman and not to Prâna because of
the declaration of its superiority to ‘samprasâda’. The state wherein one becomes
completely tranquil is termed as the state of ‘samprasâda’, and one experiences such
tranquility in the state of deep sleep (sus+upti). Hence ‘samprasâda’ refers to ‘deep sleep’
in the derivative sense. And since the ‘Prâna’ alone remains awake in that state of complete
tranquility, hence in the current sutra ‘Prâna’ alone has been implied by the word
‘samprasâda’. ‘Bhûmâ’ is then taught after ‘Prâna’ and then the discussion ends. Hence it
is inappropriate to accept ‘Prâna’ as the implication of the word ‘Bhûmâ’, since
Sanatkumâra spoke of ‘Bhûmâ’ separately only after apprehending the discontentment of
Nârada even after hearing the discourse on ‘Prâna’. Hence ‘Bhûmâ’ is something clearly
superior to ‘Prâna’ and not the ‘Prâna’ itself.
98 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.9
HkweRoeH;qi;s fefr okP;e~_ izk.kkUreqins'ka JqRok rw".khHkwra ukjna izfr Lo;eso luRdqekjs.k
izk.kfHkUuL; HkwEu mifn';ekuRokr~A ukfi izk.kfo"k;desokfrokfnRofefr okP;e~_
^,"k rq ok vfronfr ;% lR;sukfronfr* (Nkñ 7@16) bR;=k ^rq* 'kCnsu
izk.kL;kfrokfnRoa O;koR;Z lR;inokP;ijekReoknL;kfrokfnRodFkusu izk.kfHkUuL;SoHkwe&
Roksins'kkr~A ,oa p ^rjfr 'kksdekRefor~* bfr iz'uokD;s vkReKkus 'kksdinokP;kfo|k&
rRdk;Zll a kjlUrj.klkèkuRodFkusu oSiYq ;kfRedk Hkwe:irk ijekReU;so lwii|rs bfrAA8AA
(72) èkeksZiiÙks'p AA9AA
HkwesR;uqorZrsA Hkwek ijekReSoA dqr%\ ^;=k ukU;Ri';fr* bR;kfnuksDrkuka
n'kZukfnloZO;ogkjkHkkokuka ^;ks oS Hkwek rRlq[ka*] ^;ks oS Hkwek rne`rfe* R;kfnuksDrkuka
.in
nd is also not
lq[k:iRoke`rRoknhuka èkekZ.kka p ijekReU;soksiiÙksfjfrAA9AA
Moreover the assertion that the knower of ‘Prâna’ is ant.‘ativâdin’ i
correct, since the same Upanishad declares, ‘But ativâdin indeed
u esis the one who transcends
t
all others by realization of the Truth’ (Ch. Up. 7.16.1). The
a qword ‘Truth’ here refers to the
Supreme Brahman only since It alone is the paramount
‘Prâna’ alone cannot be an ‘ativâdin’. Henced an reality. Hence the knower of
not ‘Prâna’. Moreover the declaration ofvthe e theÚruti,word‘The‘Bhûmâ’ refers to Brahman and
i
grief’ (Ch. Up. 7.1.3), wherein thelword @ ‘grief’ signifies ignorance (avidyâ) that is the
knower of Self goes beyond
r e n
n a Dharmopapatteúca (9)
r. because the qualities mentioned are applicable to Brahman alone.
dAnd
Moreover the characteristics attributed to ‘Bhûmâ’ are appropriate when it is
construed to imply the Supreme Self and none other. The Úruti’s declaration, ‘Know that
as Bhûmâ where one does not see anything else, does not hear anything else, doesn’t
know anything else’ (Ch. Up. 7.24.1), wherein the complete absence of all behavior is
propounded by the Úruti as characterizing the ‘Bhûmâ’, can appositely be true only if
‘Bhûmâ’ is construed to imply the Supreme Self. Furthermore while describing ‘Bhûmâ’
the Úruti declares, ‘That which is Bhûmâ is indeed Bliss and is indeed immortal too’ (Ch.
Up. 7.24.1), wherein the attributes like ‘bliss’ and ‘immortality’ can only be apposite if
the Supreme Self is accepted as the implication of the word ‘Bhûmâ’. (9)
1.3.10 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 3) 99
Topic 3: Aks+arâdhikarana
d .in
(The Immutable One)
t.i n
u es to imply Brahman
taqBrahman, similarly the word
As in the previous section the word ‘Bhûmâ’ was construed
Doubt: In the discussionsu li@ Yâjñavalkya and Gârgi, on being asked by the
a t encases the Space also, the former replied, ‘O Gârgi,
amongst
r n
this Space is woven in Aks+
e3.8.7-8). Here arises a doubt whether the word ‘Aks+ara’ denotes a
a
nor subtle’ (Br. Up.
n the Supreme Self?
r.
syllable or it implies
dOpponent: The word ‘Aks+ara’ denotes a syllable, since in passages as ‘The
delineation of letters’ (Pânini’s fourteen sûtras), the term ‘Aks+ara’ is used in the proverbial
sense of a syllable. Also the Úruti’s declaration, ‘All this is indeed Om only’ (Ch. Up.
2.23.3), wherein for the purpose of meditation the syllable ‘Om’ is declared to be identical
to all, further goes on to prove that the word ‘Aks+ara’ implies a syllable only.
Aks+aramambarântadhr+teh+ (10)
Sâ ca praúâsanât (11)
And the act of supporting is possible for Brahman alone, for the rulership is
attributed to It.
Brahman alone is the sustainer of the entire world, since in the same context of
‘Aks+ara’, one hears, ‘The Sun and Moon are bound by the administration of this Aks+ara
1.3.12 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 3) 101
u es attributed to ‘Aks+ara’
alone’ (Br. Up. 3.8.9), wherein the act of administration has been
by the Úruti. This act of administration is only possibleainqa sentient entity i.e. Brahman,
n t
and not in the insentient Pradhâna of the Sânkhyas.
ed a The pot may well be the ‘effect’ of
clay, but none can assert that the clay has any administrative control over the pot. Hence
the ‘administration’ Úruti clearly declares v
i@
Brahman to be the sustainer of the world. (11)
tu l
d r aAnyabhâvavyâvr+ tteúca (12)
n
And becauseethe Úruti negates the qualities of any other than Brahman.
r
a
nsame context one also hears the exclusion of Pradhâna by the declaration of
r.
In the
d ‘O Gârgi, that same very Aks+ara though is not seen by anyone, but It is the
the Úruti,
witness of all, is never heard but is the hearer, is never thought of but is the thinker’ (Br.
Up. 3.8.11), wherein though the Pradhâna may also not be the object of eyes, ears, mind
etc., but being insentient, it can never be the witness, the hearer or the thinker etc. Hence
the word ‘Aks+ara’ refers to the Supreme Self alone. (12)
Topic 4: Îks+atikarmavyapadeúâdhikarana
(The Superior Brahman)
In the preceding topic it was shown that even though the word ‘Aks+ara’ is more
commonly used in the sense of a ‘syllable’, but due to characteristics like ‘sustenance of
102 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.13
d r
Brahman) or on the ‘Inferior Brahman’ (Qualified Brahman)?
r e n
n a the attainment of Brahmloka (a spatially limited world) by such an
Opponent: The meditation on the ‘Inferior Brahman’ has been advocated, since
dr.
the Úruti declares
aspirant.
Supreme Brahman alone is meant, for there is the mention of It being the
object of the act of seeing.
The meditation on the ‘Superior Brahman’ has been advocated there, since the
Úrutis propound that entity as the ‘object’ (karma) of the ‘act (kriyâ) of seeing (îks+ana)’.
1.3.13 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 3) 103
fde=k ija czãkfHkèks;eqr] vija ok czãfs r fo'k;s_ vija czãfs rA dqr%\ ^l lkefHk#Uuh;rs
czãyksdfe* (izñ 5@5) R;=k ns'kifjfPNUuL; iQyL;ksP;ekuRokfnfr iwoZ% i{k%A
fl¼kUrs l% è;krO;Rosuksifn';eku% ijeso czãA dqr%\ bZ{kfrdeZO;ins'kkr~A ^l
,rLekTtho?kukRijkr~ ija iqfj'k;a iq#"keh{krs* (izñ 5@5) bfr okD;'ks"ks
bZ{kfrdeZRosukL;kfHkè;s;L; iq#"kL; O;ins'kkr~A r=k è;kuL; dekZrFkkHkwrefi oLrq
Hkofr] bZ{krsLrq deZ rFkk Hkwreso oLrqA vr% ijeso czã lE;Xn'kZufo"k;&
Hkwreh{kfrdeZRosu O;ifn"Vfefr xE;rsA rPpsg ijiq#"k'kCnkH;kefHkè;krO;a izR;fHkKk;rsA
u p ns'kifjfPNUuiQyJqR;k dFke=k ija czãkfHkè;s;a ;qT;srsfr\ f=kek=kksÄïkjkyEcusu
ija czãkfHkè;k;r% czãyksdizkIR;uUrja lE;Xn'kZuksRiÙ;qiiÙks%A vr% ØeeqDR;fHk&
d .in
izk;esrnfo#¼fefrAA13AA
t .in
u es
AA foJke%3AA taq
a n
v e d
u li@who pervades everything and is higher than the
tot be separate from this overall collection of beings’ (Pr.
The Úruti declares, ‘The highest Person
higher, is seen by the aspirant
Up. 5.5). It is well-knowndthat
a
r the object of meditation could well be an unreal thing, but
n
the object of an act ofeseeing cannot be unreal but has to be a factual entity only. Since the
ract of ‘seeing’ such an entity, it can well be concluded that the entity is
n a
Úruti mentions the
none-otherr.but the Supreme Self alone. That same ‘Supreme Self’ has been designated as
d Person in the Úruti text. If asserted that due to the mention of spatially limited
the highest
fruit (Brahmaloka) that is attained by such meditation, one cannot accept the fact that the
object of such meditation can be a spatially unbound entity like the Supreme Self; we say
that this assertion is incorrect, since the one who meditates on the Supreme Brahman
with the support of the three lettered word ‘Om’ attains full realization of the Supreme
Self chronologically, after attaining Brahmaloka. Hence the idea of chronological
emancipation (krama-mukti) is intended to be conveyed by the Úruti. (13)
Topic 5: Daharâdhikarana
(The Small Space is Brahman)
104 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.14
tu
lotus-like place (heart) is the material space (bhûta Âkâúa) or is it the embodied Self or is
it the Supreme Self?
ra
dword ‘dahara Âkâúa’ (small space) refers to the ‘material space’,
Opponent:e n
r used in this sense only. Or the word may refer to the ‘embodied
The
n a
as the word is universally
r.
d smallness is propounded by the Úruti that compares it to the tip of the goading
soul’ (jîva), since the embodied soul, limited by the mind, stays put in the cavity of the
heart. Its
stick (Shvae. Up. 5.8). The identicalness of the embodied soul with Brahman, which is
pervasive like the Space, justifies the usage of the term ‘Âkâúa’ for the embodied soul
too. Hence the embodied soul is implied by the term ‘dahara Âkâúa’.
d
the subsequent Úruti text. TheaÚruti further declares, ‘The Space that is within the heart is
routside.
e n
same in extent as the Space Both heaven and earth are indeed incorporated within
it’ (Ch. Up. 8.1.3),r‘This is the Self, free from sin, old age and death, and is devoid of
sorrow’ (Ch. n
a
d
comparison
.
r with Space, its designation as the repository of heaven and earth, and attributes
Up. 8.1.5) etc., wherein the characteristics enumerated by the Úruti like
like freedom from sin, old age, death etc., are all apposite for Supreme Self alone, and
not for material space or the embodied soul. Also, referring to the Úruti (Ch. Up. 8.1.3),
it is clear that ‘Space’ (Âkâúa) cannot be compared with itself, for no comparison is
possible in a single entity, it being only possible amongst two or more entities. If asserted
that such comparison may be possible in a single entity also, taking into account its
imaginary external or internal divisions; then such assertion is incorrect, for such
comparison, which relies on an imaginative distinction, would be debilitating. Though
the word ‘Self’ (Ch. Up. 8.1.5) is also used for the embodied soul, and it may also be
justified to promulgate the all-pervasiveness of the jîva on account of its identicalness
with Brahman, but the remaining attributes like freedom from sin, old age, death, sorrow
etc. completely conclude in Brahman only. Hence the small space is Brahman only. (14)
106 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.15
.in
Further reasons are being given in favor of establishing the meaning of ‘dahara
Âkâúa’ as Brahman, in the next aphorisms,
in d
. st
.
Gatiúabdâbhyâm tathâhi dr+s+tam lingameca
.
q u (15)
n ta
a
The small space is Brahman, for there is the mention of ‘going into’ and of the
ed Upanis+ada, and an indicatory sign
word ‘Brahma-loka’; so also is declared in another
is also present.
@ v
li
a tutext regarding the ‘small space’ (dahara Âkâúa), occurs
Complimentary to the Úruti
d r populace goes to Brahma-loka (the world that is Brahman)
the following text, ‘This entire
n wherein that ‘small space’ is being designated by the word
removement
daily’ (Ch. Up. 8.3.2),
‘Brahman’, andathe
r . n
thereby establishing
of populace towards ‘Brahman’ is being promulgated
the Brahmanhood of the ‘small space’. Hence due to the mention of
d as well as the usage of the word ‘Brahman’, it has been established that
the movement
the ‘small space’ is nothing but Brahman only. Moreover the same has been declared in
the sixth chapter of the same Upanis+ad also, wherein it is said, ‘O amiable one, the
individual soul becomes identical with Brahman in deep-sleep’ (Ch. Up. 6.8.1).
If asserted that the word ‘Brahmaloka’ may also be construed to imply the world
of Brahmâ (Prajâpâti); then we say that the word may indeed be construed to imply the
‘world of Brahmâ’ if the word ‘Brahmaloka’ is accepted as ‘tatpurûs+a’ compound with
sixth case-ending. But if the word ‘Brahmaloka’ is explained in the sense of apposition
as ‘karmadhâraya’ compound, then the inference would be – the world that is Brahman.
The declaration of the Úruti as regards the daily repatriation of the populace to ‘Brahmaloka’
1.3.16 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 107
.in
goes on to confirm that the word should be accepted as ‘karmadhâraya’ compound, as it
d
t. n
is not logical otherwise to assume that the populace daily move to the world of ‘Brahmâ’
i
(satyaloka) in their deep sleep. The acceptance of the word ‘Brahmaloka’ as ‘karmadhârya’
es
compound instead of ‘tatpurûs+a’ compound with sixth case-ending is in conformity of
u
the logic of *‘nis+âdasthapati’. (15)
taq
an
ved
* The Nis+âda community has no right to the Vedas akin to the Úûdras, but a scriptural passage
occurs that reads ‘Nis+âdasthapati yâjayet’. Its interpretation may be done in three ways. Firstly the word
uli@
‘Nis+âdasthapati’ may be admitted as a ‘tatpurûs+a’ compound with sixth case-ending thereby meaning ‘the
king of Nis+âdas’. Secondly it may be admitted as a ‘bahubrîhi’ compound thereby meaning ‘the one
t
ra
whose king is Nis+âda’. Thirdly it may be admitted as ‘karmadhâraya’ compound thereby meaning ‘the
d
Nis+âda who is the king of Nis+âdas’. The opponent feels that it would only be appropriate if one accepts
n
e
the ‘tatpurûs+a’ or the ‘bahubrîhi’ implication, for by admitting so the word ‘Nis+âdasthapati’ can be assumed
ar
as refering to a ‘dvija’ (twice born) who has the right to the Vedas. The Vedântin on the other hand rules
. n
that it would be more appropriate to accept the ‘karmadhâraya’ implication, for the other two are emblematic.
In the eighth chapter of the Chândogya Upanishad, in the context of the small
space (dahara Âkâúa), the Úruti declares, ‘That which is this Self, is a dam that prevents
these worlds from getting mixed up’ (Ch. Up. 8.4.1). Like a dam that limits the vast
expanse of water, the Self holds these different worlds in position so as to avoid their mix
up. Thus it is shown that the small space within the lotus of heart has the ability to hold
the entire creation in its position; which is possible only when the small space is nothing
but Brahman. Another Úruti declares, ‘Brahman alone is the ruler of beings, It alone is
108 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.17
Opponent: If on the strength of the Úruti the meaning of the word ‘dahara Âkâúa’
has been taken as the Supreme Self, then on the basis of the complementary text, ‘This is
the Self, the serene one (samprasâda), that raises itself from the body and attains its own
real nature’ (Ch. Up. 8.3.4), wherein the embodied soul is the subject of deliberation, it
1.3.19 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 109
n a
d r. Uttarâccedâvirbhûtasvarûpastu (19)
Opponent: The small space refers to the embodied soul and not the Supreme
Brahman since after commencing with, ‘That Self which is free from sin’ (Ch. Up. 8.7.1),
the Úruti declares, ‘The person who is seen in the eye is the Self’ (Ch. Up. 8.7.4), ‘The
one who moves about in dreams is the Self’ (Ch. Up. 8.10.1) etc., wherein the individual
soul is discussed as being involved in the states of awakening, dream etc., and it is also
declared to be free from sin etc. Hence the individual soul is being referred by the term
small space.
110 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.20
.in
Vedântin: The word ‘tu’ (but) in the aphorism refutes the opponent’s view. The
in d
individual soul is being referred to here in its real nature, and not as an embodied being.
.
The individual soul, in reality, is identical with Brahman only. The Úruti explicitly declares,
st
e
‘Raising itself from the body and realizing the supreme Light, it attains its own real
u
ta q
nature. It is then the highest Purus+a’ (Ch. Up. 8.12.3). Hence attributes like immortality,
lack of sin, old age and death etc., which are not possible in the sense of individual soul
a n
ve d
as limited by adjuncts like intellect etc, become possible when the soul attain its real
form that is identical with the Supreme Brahman. (19)
l @
i is interpreted as the supreme Brahman, then the
u
t one (samprasâda) etc.’ (Ch. Up. 8.3.4), occurring in
Opponent: If the small space
r a
Úruti text ‘This is the Self, the
d
serene
n
the passage complementary to the text concerning small space, wherein the Úruti refers
re would be rendered futile.
to the embodied soul,
n a
d r
To .this the vedântin replies,
And the reference to the embodied soul in the complementary text is meant for
a different purpose.
The same Úruti declares ahead, ‘This is the Self, the serene one (samprasâda),
that raises itself from the body and attains its own real nature’ (Ch. Up. 8.3.4), wherein it
is explicitly declared that the embodied soul in the deep sleep attains Brahman, which is
its own real form. And it is for the purpose of meditation on this Brahman only, the real
form of the individual soul, which has been declared to be endowed with attributes of
1.3.21 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 111
d .in
eternality, freedom from sin, old age, death etc., that the concept of jîva has been forwarded
t .in
by the Úruti. The Úruti does not intend to propound the actual existence of the embodied
soul. (20)
u es
t a qthat is there within the heart’
Opponent: The Úruti declares, ‘The small space
(Ch. Up. 8.1.1), wherein the smallness that one a n regarding the space cannot apply
v d hears
e for the embodied soul that has indeed
appositely to the Supreme Lord, but fits perfectly
been declared to be akin to the tip of @
concerning the small space can u li theto the
goading stick (Úv. Up. 5.8). Hence the Úruti
t apply embodied soul only, and not to supreme
Brahman.
d ra
e n replies,
To this therVedântin
n a
dr . Alpaúruteriti caettaduktam (21)
This objection has already been answered in the earlier aphorism (1.2.7), wherein
it has been clarified that such spatial limitation for the supreme Brahman has been talked
about from a relative stand-point only for the purpose of meditation. The statement
concerning the spatial limitation is not in the realistic sense of propounding the Lord’s
form. (21)
Topic 6: Anukr+tyadhikarana
(The Light is Brahman)
112 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.22
Previously, on the strength of the complementary text, ‘Raising itself from the
. in
body and realizing the supreme Light, it attains its own real nature. It is then the highest
n d
Purus+a’ (Ch. Up. 8.12.3), it was established that the ‘small space’ refers to the Supreme
i
st .
Brahman. The current adhikarana now commences with a view to deliberate upon the
‘Light’ Úrutis.
u e
a q
tconcludes in the meditation on the
Here in the opponent’s view the ‘Light’ Úruti
divine light, whereas the vedântin asserts that itd
n
a in the knowledge of the Supreme
Brahman. v e concludes
l @
i ‘There the sun does not shine, nor does the moon,
tu
a
Doubt: The Úruti’s declaration,
r
dwith His light; by His light all shine diversely’ (Mu. Up. 2.2.10),
stars or lightning illuminate It; how can the fire do so. The truth indeed is that everything
e n
else shines in accordance
r deliberation here. Here arises a doubt whether the illuminator of all
a
forms the topic under
n
r .
including the sun etc. is a material entity or is it Brahman?
dOpponent: The illuminator of all including the sun etc. is some material light
only. It is well known that in front of a brighter light the less intense lights become
subdued, as the light of a lamp gets subdued in front of the sun’s light.
Vedântin: To this we say,
Anukr+testasya ca (22)
The Light is Brahman, for the mention of ‘shining in accordance’, and because
of the use of word ‘His’.
1.3.23 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 113
. in
The Smritis too declare, ‘That Brahman cannot be illumined by the sun, the moon
in d
and the fire’ (Bg. 15.6), ‘Know the light of sun that illumines the entire world, as also the
.
light of moon and fire, to be My light only’ (BG. 15.12), wherein the sentient Self alone
st
has been declared to be the illuminator of sun, moon etc. (23)
u e
Topic 7: Pramitâdhikarana
ta q
(The Measured a nOne)
v e d
li@
In the previous adhikarana it was established that the light of the sentient Brahman
one should then meditate on it as, ‘I am the Lord’. Hence, by supplying the injunction
about meditation, the ‘Thumb-size’ Úruti should be interpreted as sermonizing meditation.
Here in the opponent’s view meditation on the embodied soul is meant, whereas
the vedântin asserts that the knowledge of Supreme Brahman is implied.
Doubt: The Úruti declares, ‘The Being (Purus+a) of the size of thumb sits inside
the heart’ (Kath. Up. 2.1.12), ‘That Being is akin to a smokeless light. He is the ruler of
the past, present and the future. He exists today and He will exist tomorrow also. This is
That’ (Kath. Up. 2.1.13). Here arises a doubt whether the thumb sized being is the embodied
soul or the Supreme Brahman?
1.3.24 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 115
a t
r say,
Vedântin: To thisdwe
re n
n a Úabdâdeva pramitah+ (24)
.
dTher thumb-sized being is Brahman, for the word ‘ruler’ is used to designate It.
The thumb sized being can be the Supreme Brahman alone, since the Úruti declares
it to be the ruler of the past, present and the future, thereby endowing it with unrestrained
grandeur. If asserted that the phrase ‘thumb-size’ mentioned in the Úruti is an indicatory
sign of the embodied soul and not of supreme Brahman; we say that such assertion is
incorrect, for the Úruti is accepted to be stronger than the indicatory sign. The text, ‘This
is That’ (Kath. Up. 2.1.13), refers to the entity enquired about in the beginning by Naciketâ
by the question, ‘Tell me of that entity that is different from virtue and vice, different
from cause and effect and different from past and future’ (Kath. Up. 1.2.14). In response
to this query the description of that entity has been given in the Úruti texts (ibid. 2.1.12-
13) under contemplation. Hence the thumb-sized Being is none other but Brahman only.
(24)
116 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.25
r. n
Though the hearts
a right to scriptures,
of other creatures have varying sizes, but since only the humans have
hence the thumb size applying to the human heart has been specified.
Henced the thumb-sized being is none else but Brahman only. (25)
Topic 8: Devatâdhikarana
(The Gods)
In the previous adhikarana it was declared that only the humans have a right to
scriptures. If this be so then beings other than humans, like gods etc., should have no
right to scriptures. The current adhikarana thus commences in response to such objection.
Or, after declaring the right of humans to scriptures, the question of the right of
gods arises; and hence the current adhikarana commences as a continuation of the topic.
1.3.26 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 117
According to Bâdarâyana, the beings higher than the humans too have a right
to the knowledge of Brahman, for that is possible.
According to the teacher Bâdarâyana, the gods too have a right to the knowledge
of Brahman, since they too fulfill the eligibility criterion necessary for the pursuance of
such knowledge. (It must be understood that the gods have no competence for rites, as
they have no gods to sacrifice to.) The gods too have a hankering for emancipation since
they may also develop dispassion towards their grandeur and pleasure after appreciating
118 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.27
v e d
with the sacred thread (upanayana) that is essential
the gods to be invested
to pursue the study of Vedas, then we
@
of the impressions of their previouslibirths. Hence they have no need to study the Vedas.
say that the meaning of the Vedas robotically becomes known to the gods on the strength
u for their investiture with the sacred thread. On
tinstruction
a
racross instances of the gods living at the gurukula (teacher’s
Therefore there is no scriptural
d
the other hand one comes
r e
residence) under a vow nof continence (brahmacarya) to attain the knowledge of Brahman.
The Úruti says,a
. n ‘Indra
(Ch. Up.r8.11.3).
lived with Prajapati for hundred years under the vow of continence’
the fatedof thumb Úruti versus the gods is concerned, we say that the Úruti text remains
Hence the gods too have a right to the knowledge of Brahman. As for
If asserted that this would give rise to a contradiction in the matter of rites; we
say, not so, for from the scriptures they are seen to assume many forms.
Opponent: If we acknowledge that the gods too possess bodies, as has been
declared in the previous aphorism, we will then have to admit that gods like Indra etc.
also participate physically in rites, akin to the participation of human priests etc. But this
1.3.28 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 119
v e d same
li@concurrently,
Vedântin: To this we say that such
the capability of assuming manyu
contradiction does not arise as the gods have
d r
sacrifices simultaneously. Shâkalya asks Yâjñavalkaya, ‘How many gods are there’ (Br.
n
Up. 3.9.1). The latter replies, ‘Three hundred and three, and three thousand and three’.
e are those’. The reply comes, ‘These are but their manifestations;
When asked again,r‘Which
but factually n a
that each r
d .
god
there are only thirty three gods’ (Br. Up. 3.9.2). Thus the Úruti establishes
can have many forms simultaneously. Furthermore the Úruti also shows
that these many forms can be ultimately incorporated into one God – the Hiranyagarbha
(The Vital Force) (Br. Up. 3.9.9). Hence the gods can assume varied forms simultaneously
and can thus attend multiple sacrifices concurrently. The others are unable to see them
since they are endowed with the power of remaining invisible.
.i n
If asserted that then would arise a contradiction with the Vedic words; we say,
in d
not so, for the world together with the gods are created from these words, and this is
known from direct revelation and inference.
st .
e
u no contradiction arises in
t a
Opponent: On admitting bodies for the gods, though q
matter of their association with the rites, but stilln
a contradictions persist with respect to
the Vedic pronouncements. On assuming thedgods to be embodied, they too, like us,
ebodies, and therefore their connection with
would become associated with impermanent v
@ In other words the Vedas are eternal, and
i
eternal Vedic verses would becomelimpossible.
u the association between the Vedic verses and their
so should be their meaning, astalso
meanings. But no embodied
d a
r being can be eternal. Hence under these circumstances there
cannot be an eternaln
re relation between the gods with impermanent bodies and eternal
a admission
r . n
Vedic verses, since
eternal entity. The
there is an opposition in relation between an impermanent and an
of the authority of Vedas is subsequent to admitting eternality
d words, their meanings and their relation. Hence, on admitting bodies for the
of the Vedic
gods, there would indeed arise a contradiction with the Vedas.
Vedântin: There is no contradiction; for the entire universe including the gods
etc. arises from Vedic words only.
Opponent: The origin of Universe has already been demonstrated from Brahman
in the aphorism, ‘That from which this Universe in born etc.’ (1.1.2), then how can you
propound its origin from the Vedic words? Even if it be acknowledged that the Universe
arises from Vedic words, it will then lead to admitting the births of the gods like ‘Vasu’
etc. also, and that would entail their impermanence. This would then lead to the
1.3.28 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 121
birth etc. of a cow, as a newabody tu is assumed at the time of birth, but yet the general
d r species are not created anew every time a cow is born.
n
features that characterize the
rate birth.theSimilar
Hence the relation between cow and the cow-hood remains eternal, even though fresh
n a
.
bodies are assumed
dr everlasting
from Vedic
is the case of gods. By stating the origin of the world
words, does not mean that the Vedic words are the material cause of the
world. The relation between an eternal word and its meaning is what makes
the usage of that word empirically possible, by ascribing it to an individual taking birth.
This is what is meant by stating the origin of world from Vedic words. This is known
from the Vedas as well as the Smr+tis, the former being the source of direct revelation, as
they do not depend on any other source of knowledge, where as the latter is the source of
inferred disclosure, for the Smr+tis depend on other sources for their validity. The Vedas
declare, “The Prajâpati created the gods by reflecting on the word ‘ete’ (these); He created
humans by thinking of the word ‘asrgram’ etc.” (Rg. Veda. 9.62), wherein the word ‘ete’
reminds Him of the gods and the word ‘asrgram’ reminds Him of men, since their bodies
have blood. The Smr+ti too declares, ‘At the beginning of creation, the Prajapâti manifested
the eternal divine speech in the form of Vedas, and from that speech commenced all
activity’. The manifestation of Vedas should be comprehended in the sense of initiating
122 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.29
r e n for the gods has also been clarified in the last aphorism. Now
Vedas on assuming bodies
n a
the next aphorism reaffirms this eternality of Vedas form the perspective of the very fact
r .
of the emergence
d
of creation from the Vedic words.
And from this very reason follows the eternality of the Vedas.
From the very fact that world of gods and others, having eternal general features,
emerge from the Vedic words, it follows that the Vedic words also are eternal. Seer
Vedvyâsa also declares, ‘The Vedas that had vanished along with the anecdotes at the
time of the great dissolution (mahâ pralaya), were received by the great seers through
austerities’, thereby proving the eternality of the Vedas. (29)
1.3.30 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 123
l @
ittâvapyavirodho
Samânanâmrûpatvâccâvr+
t u darúanâtsmr+teúca (30)
and Smritis. a
r. n
dLike a person going into deep-sleep (sus+upti), where all name and form vanishes,
finds no discontinuity in existence on waking up, similarly at the time of dissolution of
the universe, the entire creation continues to exists in a potential state (as a seed) in
Nescienec (ignorance), and manifests again ‘as before’ at the time of the next cycle of
creation. Hence there is no break with respect to the varied names and forms that existed
in the previous cycle inasmuch as the same names and forms manifest again. The Vedas
declare, ‘The designer of the Universe created the sun, moon etc. just like what they were
in the previous cycle’ (Rg. Veda. 10.190.3). The Smriti too declares, ‘Just as signs of
various seasons like spring etc. are seen to revolve serially, similarly all names and things
emerge at the beginning of the cycle, exactly conforming to what they were in the previous
cycle’ (Mbh. Shânti. 231.58, 210.17). Hence no defect vis-a-vis the eternality of Vedas
arises. (30)
124 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.31
en
concerning honey). The Úruti declares, ‘Indeed this sun is madhu (honey) to the gods’
r the meditation on the sun as honey is propounded by the Úruti.
a
(Ch. Up. 3.1.1), wherein
n is impossible for the sun god. Similarly in other meditations like, ‘Meditate
r.
This meditation
on the d
sun as Brahman’ (Ch. Up. 3.19.1), ‘Air is the place of merger’ (Ch. Up. 4.3.1) etc.,
wherein mediations on the gods themselves are promulgated, it is obvious that those very
gods cannot participate in these mediations, for there has to be a difference with respect
to the meditator and the object of meditation. The subject and object of meditation cannot
be the same. Hence, akin to Madhu-vidyâ etc., the gods have no right to the Brahman-
vidyâ too, since both are analogous inasmuch as the ‘vidyâ’ part (knowledge) is concerned.
(31)
Further reason to prove the disentitlement of gods for attaining the knowledge of
Brahman is being given in the next aphorism,
a
mythology etc. that talk of the bodies of gods, in reality mean something else. Hence the
gods etc. havenno right to the knowledge of Brahman. (32)
dTher.next aphorism refutes the view-point of Jaimini presented in the above two
sutras.
.
Bhâvam tu Bâdarâyanoasti hi (33)
But Bâdarâyana says that the gods are eligible, for they possess the pre-requisites
of knowledge.
The word ‘tu’ (but) in the sutra is to refute the Jaimini’s view-point. According to
the teacher Bâdarâyana the gods, even though not having any right to Madhuvidyâ etc.,
have a right to the knowledge of Brahman, for the gods are seen and heard to possess
126 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.33
in
to attain such knowledge. It is inappropriate to deny their right at places where such right
.
in d
is possible, even though they may be ineligible for certain meditations. For instance a
st .
Brahmin may not be eligible to perform the ‘Rajasûya’ sacrifice, which might be the
e
pleasure of a Kshatriya only, but still his right to perform the ‘Br+haspati’ sacrifice cannot
u
ta q
be denied. The assertion that the gods do not have bodies is totally inappropriate, since
n
various Vedic verses etc. bear testimony to the fact that the gods do possess bodies. These
a
v e d
verses should be accepted as valid means so far as they do not come into any contradiction
with other means. Hence the gods do have bodies as also the desire for emancipation and
li @
competence to such knowledge. Thus their right to the knowledge of Brahman is
indubitably established. (33)
tu
r a
d Topic 9: Apaúûdrâdhikarana
r e n
n a (The Right of Úûdra)
d r
The
. declaration of the Úruti, ‘Of the gods, those who realized Brahman became
Brahman themselves’ (Br. Up. 1.4.10), wherein due to the occurrence of the word ‘gods’,
their right to the knowledge of Brahman was accepted. Similarly one hears of the word
‘úûdra’ too in the Úruti, and hence their right to such knowledge should also be
acknowledged. This adhikarana commences to elucidate this theme.
Here in the opponent’s view the Úûdras too have a right to the knowledge of
Brahman, whereas in the vedântin’s view they do not possess such right.
Doubt: The Úruti declares, ‘O úûdra, keep to yourself your affluence together
with your chariot and cows’ (Ch. Up. 4.2.3). Here arises a doubt whether the ‘Úûdra’ has
any right to the knowledge of Brahman or not?
1.3.34 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 127
The Úûdra has no right to the knowledge of Brahman, for though he may have the
desire and bodily competence but has no scriptural sanction. A Úûdra cannot study the
Vedas, as such study requires one to be invested with the ‘sacred thread’ beforehand.
Such investiture with the ‘sacred thread’ is only sanctioned for the three castes, and not
for the Úûdras. Moreover the Úruti declaring Úûdra as ineligible for performing sacrifices
128 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.35
a
Up. 4.1.3). Hearing this Jânaúrutit felt and was engulfed in grief. And when
And because his (Jânaúruti’s) ks+atriyahood is evident from the indicatory sign
of his being mentioned along with the descendent of Citraratha.
1.3.36 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 129
v d
ealone
Ks+atriya Caitraratha Abhipratârina in the complementary text of the ‘samvarga vidyâ’. In
a
person who is born Úûdra has no t right to the knowledge of Brahman. (35)
d r
r e n
Sanskâraparâmarúâttadabhâvâbhilâpâcca (36)
n a the purificatory rites are mentioned for the others, and their
r.
absencedis declared for the Úudra.
And because
Furthermore, the Úûdras are ineligible for ceremonies like investiture with the
‘sacred thread’ etc., which are essential pre-requisites for studying the Vedas to gain
knowledge. In the context of Vedic knowledge, it is declared, ‘He (the teacher) vested
him (the pupil) with the sacred thread’ (Sh. B. 11.5.3.13). The Chândogya Úruti declares,
‘Uttering holy (Vedic) hymns, Nârada approached Sanatkumara and said, O Sir, teach
me’ (Ch. Up. 7.1.1). Similarly the Praúnopanis+ad declares, ‘They went to venerable
Pippalâda with sacrificial faggots in hands’ (Pr. Up. 1.1). These Úrutis demonstrate the
existence of certain purification rites like investiture with ‘sacred thread’ etc., which are
prohibited for Úûdras. The Smr+tis declare, ‘The Úûdra incurs no sin, nor he undergoes
any purification rites’ (Manu. Sm. 10.126). Hence the Úûdra has no right to knowledge.
(36)
130 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.37
t
the mother of Satyakâma, tells herusonl that if the teacher at guru-kula asks him regarding
Satyakâma Jâbâla. There Jâbâla,
d r
his caste etc., then he shouldaonly reply thus, ‘My mother does not know my caste. I only
know that my name n
Satyakâma Jâbâla’ e is Satyakâma and my mother’s name is Jâbâla, and hence I am
ar(Ch.concluded
Up. 4.4.2). Hearing this truthful utterance from the pupil’s mouth,
r n
the teacher.Gautama that Satyakâma cannot be a Úûdra, and hence proceeded
d him into Vedic studies. Hence it is clear from this topic that Úûdras have no
to initiate
right to knowledge. (37)
Úravan+âdhyayanârthapratis+edhâtsmr+teúca (38)
And because the hearing, studying and understanding of the Vedas is prohibited
for the Úudra by the Smriti.
Further reason as to why a born Úûdra has no right to the knowledge of Brahman
is being cited. The Úûdra is barred from hearing and studying the Vedas as per the Smr+tis
too. The Smr+ti declares, ‘Should a Úûdra happen to hear the Vedas, his ears should be
1.3.38 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 131
.in
front of a Úûdra so that the latter does not hear them’, ‘Study, sacrifice and charity, these
in d
three are for Brâhman+a, Ks+atriya and Veúya’ (Gau. Dh. Su. 9.1). If objected that how
t.
could Úûdras like Vidhur and Dharmavyâdha attain knowledge? The reply is that they
es
attained it as a result of good impressions of the past lives, and not from hearing etc. in
u
ta q
the present birth. The fruit of the deeds of past lives cannot be denied. It should be noted
n
that only the hearing and study of the Vedas have been prohibited for the Úûdras; the right
a
ve d
to hear the Purânas and mythologies remains unaffected. The Smr+ti too declares, ‘All
four castes should hear the Purânas and mythologies keeping the Brahmins in the forefront’
(Mbh. Sh. 327.49). (38)
u li@
a t 10: Kampanâdhikarana
dr
Topic
en (Vibration)
r on the right to the knowledge of Brahman ends here. This
n a
d r .
The deliberation
contemplation was the result of the subject that incidentally cropped up during the
discussions on the ‘Thumb’ Úruti in the Sutra 25. Now commences the deliberation on
the main topic in line with the discussions in ‘Pramitâdhikarana’ (Topic 7). Thus the
current adhikarana is related, not to the previous two adhikaranas, but to Topic 7. In topic
7 it was established that the ‘thumb-sized being’ was none other but Brahman only. But
here, in the current adhikarana, the word ‘Prâna’ cannot refer to Brahman, as such identity
between the two is impossible. Hence the current adhikarana is related to the previous by
the way of counter-illustration.
Here in the opponent’s view the meditation on ‘Prâna’ is the ultimate conclusion,
whereas the vedântin asserts the knowledge of the Unqualified Brahman as the final
conclusion.
132 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.39
d r
known to be divided into five a variants functionally. The entire world vibrates in it. Also
e n
it is commonly seen that the roar of thunder, rain etc. all are associated with the movement
ar too declare, ‘Air is the ‘particular’ (vyas+ti) as well as the ‘aggregate’
of Air. Other Úrutis
n
dr. Air is the entity referred here by the Úruti.
(samas+ti); the one who knows such overcomes fortuitous death’ (Br. Up. 3.3.2). Hence
the element
Kampanât (39)
The word ‘Prâna’ refers to Brahman and not to Air, since the entire universe
along with Air vibrates at the command of Brahman only. The Úruti declares, ‘That is
pure Brahman; that alone is called immortality. In that only all the worlds are engrossed.
1.3.39 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 133
u li@
else in which both prâna and apâna are transfixed’ (Kath. Up. 2.2.5), points to Brahman
t
only, which is the sustainer of all, and not Air etc. At other places too the declaration of
na which from the fact of ‘proximity’ (to Kath. Up. 2.3.3) and the fact
desired to be attained;
of It beingra. source of fear, concludes in Brahman only. Also by the text, ‘Knowing Him
d becomes immortal’ (Kath. Up. 2.3.2), Brahman alone emerges as the designated
alone, one
entity, for immortality comes from the knowledge of Brahman only. Hence wherever one
hears of attainment of immortality by the knowledge of Air, that immortality should be
understood to be figurative only. (39)
In the last adhikarana the word ‘Prâna’ was construed to mean Brahman in
accordance with the context there, but the word ‘Light’ in the current adhikarana cannot
be interpreted as Brahman since no such context corroborates that implication. This
adhikarana commences in response to such counter-illustration.
134 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.40
a t
Opponent: Thed
r
e n word ‘Light’ refers to the material light of illumined bodies like
sun etc.
n ar
r. To this we say,
dVedântin:
Jyotirdarúanât (40)
The word ‘Light’ refers to Brahman only, for it occurs in the context of Brahman.
Starting with, ‘The Self that is free from sin’ (Ch. Up. 8.7.1), wherein characteristics like
‘freedom form sin’ etc. establish Brahman as the subject-matter, the Úruti proceeds by
declaring this Self as an entity to be explored and aspired for. The same Self has been
referred to in the ‘Light’ Úruti also. The qualifications like ‘supreme Light’ and the ‘highest
1.3.40 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 135
.in
Up. 8.9.3), reveals the exploration of that entity. (40)
in d
Topic 12: Arthântaratvâdivyapadeúâdhikarana
t.
(The Space is Brahman)
u es
t aq famous in other sense, was
n beginning with It, similarly the
As in the last adhikarana the word ‘Light’, though
a
v d
construed to imply Brahman on the strength of context
e on the strength of commencement
word ‘Brahman’ should also be interpreted otherwise,
Opponent: The word ‘Space’ refers to material space, for that is the conventional
meaning of the word. Moreover the material space is the sustainer of all name and form
inasmuch as it provides room to the entire creation. Also no indicatory sign of Brahman,
like ‘creatorship’ etc. is found in the Úruti.
In the previous adhikarana the word ‘Space’ was assumed to mean Brahman, for
it (space) was spoken of as being different from name and form. The opponent argues
that such assumption is not correct, for even the embodied soul and Brahman, though are
1.3.42 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 137
.in
Here in the opponent’s view the adhikarana concludes in explaining the nature of
d
i n
the embodied soul, whereas the vedântin asserts that it concludes in the knowledge of
t .
es
Brahman.
u
Doubt: The Úruti questions, ‘Which is that Self?’q(Br. Up. 4.3.7). Then the text
n taand is in the midst of the organs,
e d
the self-effulgent light within the heart’ (Br. Up. a4.3.7). Here arises a doubt whether the
says, ‘The Purus+a who is identified with the intellect,
@
text is concerned with elucidating the nature vof embodied soul, or it is concerned with the
Supreme Brahman?
tuli
d
Opponent: The Úruti ra refers to the embodied soul, for indicatory signs of the
r en organs etc. are mentioned throughout, from beginning to the
embodied soul like intellect,
n aself-effulgent
end. Starting with,
the organs,.the
‘The Purus+a who is identified with the intellect, and is in the midst of
r light within the heart’ (Br. Up. 4.3.7), and ending with,
d is this great birth-less Self’ (Br. Up. 4.4.22), it is certain that the transmigrating
‘That alone
embodied soul is indicated.
Sus+uptyutkrântyorbhedena (42)
Because of the declaration of being different (from the embodied soul) in the
states of deep-sleep and death, the Supreme Self is intended to be taught here.
The text speaks about the supreme Brahman; for in the state of deep sleep and at
the time of death, the individual soul is spoken of as different from the supreme Self.
138 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.3.43
re n that the indicatory signs of the embodied soul are met with in
Lord. As for the assertion
n a
the start, mid and the end of the passage, we say that those signs are meant only to
r.
reiterate the characteristics of the embodied soul; the ultimate objective being the
d of its identicalness with the Supreme Brahman, for by the text, ‘it meditates
establishment
as it were etc.’ (Br. Up. 4.3.7), the Úruti is seen to purge those very attributes of the
embodied soul. Similarly by the text, ‘That alone is this great birth-less Self’ (Br. Up.
4.4.22), the same Purus+a who was spoken of as residing amidst the organs in the start of
the passage (Br. Up. 4.3.7), is now being propounded as the great birth-less Self, i.e. the
supreme Lord. Hence the text under consideration is meant to describe the Supreme
Lord, and not the embodied soul primarily. (42)
Patyâdiúabdebhyah+ (43)
1.3.43 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 4) 139
AA foJke%4AA
bfr czãlw=k'kkÄïjHkk";koyfEcU;ka
d .in
;rhUædqyfryddSyklihBkèkh'ojLokfefo|kuUnfxfjfojfprk;ka fo|kuUno`ÙkkS izFkekè;k;L;
r`rh;% ikn% AA1&3AA
t .in
u es
t a q
Brahman is intended to be described here
a n on account of the terms like the
Ruler etc.
ved
The Úruti under considerationliis@
primarily meant to describe the Supreme Brahman
u
and not the embodied soul, for tin the concerned context, the text, ‘the ruler of all, the
a etc.’ (Br. Up. 4.4.22), points to the Supreme Lord, as an
controller of all, the lord ofrall
d
r e
entity beyond the domainn of the world. Also the text, ‘That Self neither gains by good
actions nor losesadue to bad ones’ (ibid.), negates any trace of worldliness in that entity.
r . n Lord is being spoken of here. (43)
Hence the Supreme
d
Thus ends the English translation of Chapter 1 Section 3 of
Vidyânanda Vr+tti on Brahmasûtra
¨
izFkekË;k;s prqFkZ% ikn%
(v=k izèkkufo"k;Rosu lfUnáekukukeO;Drktkfninkuka fpUrue~)
iwoZeh{kR;fèkdj.ks xfrlkekU;e'kCnRoa p izfrKkre~A r=k osnkUrkuka czãf.k
xfrlkekU;a ikn=k;s.k izfrikfnre~A lEizfr izèkkuL;k'kCnRoekf{kI; lekèkkrqekjH;ek.ksu
prqFkZiknsu lg iwoZL;k{ksilaxfr%A
(32) (1 vkuqekfudkfËkdj.ke~A lwÒ 1&7)
iwoZfLeUufèkdj.ks izfl¼thoksfDrHkÄ~xsukizfl¼czãksfDronizfl¼izèkkuijeso
^egr% ijeO;Drfe* R;kfndkBdokD;a L;kfnfr n`"VkUrlaxR;snekjH;rsµ
Chapter 1 Section 4
This section deliberates upon the inference of various terms like ‘Avyaktta’, ‘Ajâ’
etc. occurring in the Upanis+ads, as these terms are also used for ‘Pradhâna’ (Primordial
Nature). Thus being doubtful as regard their implications, a comprehensive deliberation
on these terms is necessary.
The first section of the present chapter established that all Úruti texts propound
the sentient Brahman to be the cause of the Universe, and not the insentient Pradhâna that
has been emphasized by the followers of the ‘Sânkhya’ school of philosophy. The first
three sections of this chapter also established as to how the various Úrutis attain their
eventual fulfillment by revealing that Absolute Brahman to be their unambiguous inference.
The opponent protests the assertion that Pradhâna is not mentioned in the Upanis+ads, to
clarify which is begun the present section. Hence the preceding section is related to the
current one by the way of protestation.
Topic 1: Ânumânikâdhikarana
(The surmised entity)
In the foregoing adhikarana it was declared that those Úruti texts that seem to
promulgate the well-known ‘embodied soul’ (jîva) should be inferred as being referring
to the lesser-known ‘Brahman’; similarly should be understood as regards the Kat+hopanis+ad
texts like – ‘the Unmanifest (Avyakta) is higher than the Mahat, Purus+a is higher than
1.4.1 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 141
The opponent here rejects the dictum that all Úruti texts attain their ultimate
.in
fulfillment in revealing that Brahman, whereas the vedântin accepts this unreservedly.
d
t. n
This alone is the difference between their fruit. The Kat+hopanis+ad texts like – ‘the
i
Unmanifest (Avyakta) is higher than the Mahatattva, and the Purus+a is higher than the
Unmanifest’ (1.3.11), form the topic of deliberation.
ues
a
Doubt: Here arises a doubt whether the wordt‘Avyakta’
q refers to the ‘Pradhâna’
a nof philosophy, or does it refer to the
as imagined by the followers of the Sânkhya School
‘body’? v e d
u l i@here refers to ‘Pradhâna’ only, since, when viewed
t
Opponent: The word ‘Avyakta’
a
r
together with ‘Mahatattva’ and ‘Purus+a’, it occurs here in same sequence and appellation
dscriptures.
e n
as in the texts of Sânkhya Moreover the word ‘Avyaktta’ (na vyakta) can be
r of that which is not manifest, which can be construed to be referring
to ‘Pradhâna’n–a
derived in the sense
Upanis+ads.
Aanumânikamapyekes+âmiti caenna;
úarîrarûpakavinyastagr+hîterdarúayati ca (1)
If asserted that even the inferred entity is mentioned in some recensions of the
Vedas; we say, not so, for the word there is mentioned in a simile referring to the body;
and the scripture also explains it.
142 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.4.1
u li@
a
Rather the subtle causalt state of the body is meant, for it is appropriate to
designate it so.
ndr
are(but) is to dispel the above doubt. Here, by the word ‘avyakta’, the
r. n uncompounded (apancikr+ta) state, which are causal for the materialization
The word ‘tu’
d are being referred to; for the elements in this state remain subtle (sûks+ma)
elements in
of the body,
their
and beyond the domain of sensual perception. It is indeed common to denote the ‘effect’
and the ‘cause’ by the same word. For instance the scriptures declare, ‘Mix the Soma
with the cow’ (R+g. Veda. 9.46.4), wherein the word ‘cow’ indicates ‘cow’s milk’. Similarly,
though the body is manifest, but owing to it being the ‘effect’ of the causal uncompounded
subtle elements, is referred to by the word ‘avyakta’. (2)
If by the aforesaid logic the primordial state of the body is admitted to be the
implication of the word ‘avyakta’, then, since the Sânkhyas too acknowledge the primordial
state of the universe as Pradhâna, it amounts to recognizing the Sânkhya’s theory. To
refute this assertion commences the third aphorism,
144 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.4.3
We, the vedântins, who only lookvto the Úrutis for drawing any conclusions, do
not acknowledge Pradhâna to be the li@
autonomous cause of the universe. The Primordial
uthe Lord, is not independent
Nature, being under the controltof
d a
rsuchtheassertion
asserted that on acknowledging
in creating the universe. If
Lord to be the cause of Universe, the need for Pradhâna
en
ceases to exist; we say that is wrong, for the Úruti declares, ‘Know Mâyâ
r the Lord to be the master of Mâyâ’ (Úv. Up. 4.10). Here ‘avyakta’ is
to be the nature,aand
r. n
the other name for Mâyâ, whose utility, as an aide to the Lord, cannot be refuted. Hence
d
the Lord, with the help of Mâyâ, creates this universe, and not Mâyâ independently. (3)
Jñeyatvâvachanâcca (4)
The word ‘avyakta’, in the Úruti under consideration (Kath. Up. 1.3.11), is not
Pradhâna, for the Sânkhya School declares Pradhâna as an entity to be known. They
assert that emancipation is only possible by the differential knowledge of Pradhâna
(Primordial Nature) and the Purus+a (soul). On the other hand, the Úrutis do not declare
‘avyakta’ as an entity to be known; the word being used simply as an epithet. By visualizing
1.4.5 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 145
eqiU;kl bR;uo|e~AA4AA
(111) onrhfr psUu_ izkKks fg izdj.kkr~ AA5AA
uuq Ks;Rokopukfnfr gsrqjfl¼%A dFke~\ ^v'kCne~--------vuk|uUra egr% ija
èkzqoa fupkÕ; ra e`R;qeq[kkRizeqP;rs* (dñ 1@3@15) bR;=kkfi egr% ijeO;Dr'kCnokP;a
izèkkua 'kCnkfnghua Ks;Rosu onrhfr psUu_ fg & ;Lekr~ izdj.kkRizkIr% ijekRek
fupkÕ;Rosuksifn"V%] u izèkkue~A dqr%\ ^iq#"kkUu ija fdf×pfn* R;knkS izkKL; ijekReu%
izdj.kL; fo|ekuRokr~A fda p izèkkuek=kKkukUe`R;qeq[kizeks{k.kiQya lka[;SusZ";rs]
fdUrq psrukRefoKkukr~A vrks u izèkkuL;k=k Ks;RoeO;Dr'kCnfufnZ"VRoa okH;qi;s fefrAA5AA
(112) =k;k.kkeso pSoeqiU;kl% iz'u'p AA6AAd.i
n
t. in
the body as a chariot etc., the Úruti essentially intends to revealsthe state of ‘Vis+nu’ (the
supreme state). (4)
q ue
n ta
Vadatîti caenna prâjño hiaprakaran+ât (5)
v ed
li@
If asserted that the scripture does mention it to be known; we say, not so, for
there the conscious Self is meantufrom the context.
a t
n dr that the Úruti does not promulgate ‘avyakta’ as an entity
Opponent: The assertion
Vedântin: This is not correct, for from the authority of the context it is clear that
the sentient Self is being pointed to by the Úruti, and not the insentient Pradhâna. The
Úruti further declares, ‘There is nothing beyond the Purus+a. He is the highest goal’ (Kath.
Up. 1.3.11), thereby establishing that the context relates to the sentient Self. Moreover
according to the Sânkhya School one cannot escape from the jaws of death by the
knowledge of Pradhâna alone, the liberation being attained by the knowledge of the sentient
soul (Purus+a). Hence neither the word ‘avyakta’, occurring in the Úruti text under
consideration, refers to Pradhâna, nor has Pradhâna been described as an entity to be
known. (5)
146 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.4.6
li @
from these three topics, one does not come across any other question or an answer in this
tu of Fire,
Upanis+ad. As regards the knowledge
kindly enlighten me with theaknowledge
Naciketâ asked Yama, ‘O Yama the teacher,
r fear, where there is no dread of death and senility, where
heaven that is devoid ofdany
of Fire (agni vidyâ), which is the means to that
The other question concerns the embodied soul, whereby Naciketâ asks, ‘O Yama,
the existence of the being after death remains doubtful. Some people acknowledge the
existence of the being as separate from body etc., whereas others don’t admit to such
existence. I want to know from you the truth in this matter’ (Kath. Up. 1.1.20). To this the
Yama replied, ‘The ignorant one, who has ego in the body, proceeds after death to attain
a new body according to one’s actions and desires’ (Kath. Up. 2.5.7).
In the third question Naciketâ enquires, ‘O teacher, tell me of that entity which is
beyond good and bad, beyond cause and effect, and beyond the present, past and future’
(Kath. Up. 1.2.14). To this the Yama replied, ‘That sentient Self which is neither born nor
1.4.7 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 147
izèkkufefrAA6AA
(113) eg}Pp AA7AA
JqR;qDrks¿I;O;Dr'kCnks u lka[;kfHkerizFketlÙkkek=kokpdks] oSfnd'kCnRokr~
egPNCnofnfr iz;ksx% lEHkofrA rFkkfg ;Fkk lka[;S% lÙkkek=ks izFkets iz;qT;ekuks
egPNCnks u oSfndS% iz;Tq ;rs] ^cq¼js kRek egkUij%* (dñ 1@3@10) egkUra foHkqekRekua
(dñ 1@2@22) bR;knkokRe'kCniz;ksxkr~A rFkkO;Dr'kCnks¿fi u oSfnds iz;ksxs
izèkkuefHkèkkrqegZfrA rLekUukLR;kuqekfudL; izèkkuL; 'kCnoÙofefr fl¼e~AA7AA
(33) (2 pelkfËkdj.ke~A lwÒ 8&10)
d .in
n and ageless,
dies, neither does It ever take birth nor is anything born of It; thattis.ieternal
u
and does not die with the death of the body’ (Kath. Up. 1.2.18). es
Hence no question regarding the Pradhânanhas
q asked or answered in this
tabeen
Upanis+ad. Hence the word ‘avyakta’ does not d
e a Pradhâna. (6)
imply
@ v
u li
Mahadvacca (7)
a
The SânkhyareSchool construes the meaning of the word ‘Mahat’ to be the first
r .
evolved effectnof Pradhâna (Primordial Nature). This first effect is supposed to be endowed
with thedpreponderance of the quality of ‘sattva’, with minimal presence of ‘raja’ and
‘tama’ in defusing proportions. But such implication of the word ‘Mahat’ has no Vedic
sanction, for the Úruti declares, ‘The Mahân-âtmâ (the great Self) is superior to intellect’
(Kath. Up. 1.3.10), ‘The wise do not grieve, having known that great (mahân) pervasive
Self (âtmâ), wherein the word ‘Self’ (âtmâ) is seen to be associated with ‘mahat’. Hence,
as the word ‘Mahat’, though occurring in the Vedas, cannot be construed to imply the
first evolved effect of Pradhâna, similarly the word ‘Avyakta’ too cannot be construed to
imply Pradhâna. Hence one does not come across any Vedic text that propounds ‘Pradhâna’,
an entity established by inference only (as per the Sânkhya’s theory). (7)
Topic 2: Camasâdhikarana
(The Ajâ and the Bowl)
148 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.4.8
in d
for Pradhâna. The word ‘Ajâ’, occurring in the Úvaetâshvatara text, can definitely be
st .
construed to imply Pradhâna, since the indicatory signs there unquestionably suggest so.
u e
The current adhikarana commences to examine the opponent’s illustration.
ta q
Doubt: In the Úvaetâshvatara Upanis+ad the
a n following text occurs, ‘There exists
an Ajâ (feminine of Aja) that has red, black anddwhite hues. She produces a large populace
v e
a@
akin to herself. One Aja remains tied to her indefinitely, while the other discards her after
u
enjoyment’ (Úv. Up. 4.5). Here arisesli doubt whether the word ‘Ajâ’ refers to ‘Pradhâna’,
or does it refer to the elements twater, fire and earth?
d ra
Opponent:eThe
r n word ‘Ajâ’ literally refers to one that is birthless; and as per the
Sânkhyas, the a
r . n
birthless. Hence
Primordial Nature (Pradhâna) is not the ‘effect’ of anything, and hence
the word ‘Ajâ’ refers to the Pradhâna which is of the nature of the three
d raja and tama) in equilibrium.
traits (sattva,
Camasavadaviúes+ât (8)
The word ‘Ajâ’ does not refer to Pradhâna, for no special attributes have been
stated, as in the case of the bowl.
It is not possible to establish the Sânkhya theory on the basis of the arguments put
forward by the opponent in respect of the word ‘Ajâ’ occurring in the Úruti under
1.4.9 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 149
v
consideration, for the word in its literal sense
d
eof implication, viz. ‘one that is birthless’, is
li
generally used in varied contexts. Hence,@ in the absence of any specifications, such
u
t can isbeafurther
d r
(chamasa). The Úruti declares, a
conclusion cannot be drawn. This
‘There bowl
illustrated by an example of the bowl
that has its opening at the bottom and it
e n 2.2.3);
bulges at the top’ (Br. Up.
r
whereby no definite bowl can be identified on the basis
complementary Úruti text that says, ‘This bowl is our own head that bulges at the top and
opens below’ (Br. Up. 2.2.3). But what is the implication of the word ‘Ajâ’ here? The
next aphorism answers this,
But the elements counting from fire are meant, for some read so.
The word ‘tu’ (lit. but) in the aphorism is used in the sense of emphasizing. The
emphasis being that the word ‘Ajâ’ certainly implies the three elements (fire, water and
150 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.4.10
.i n
earth), and does not refer to Primordial Nature with its three traits (sattva, raja and tama).
n d
The reason for such understanding being that the followers of a certain recension of the
i
st .
Vedas, after declaring the origin of fire, water and earth from the Supreme Lord, then
u e
read, ‘The red color visible in the gross fire (sthûla-agni, fire in its material compounded
t a q
form) is the color of the element Fire (teja) in its uncompounded form, the white color
a n
visible in the gross fire is that of the element Water and the black color seen in the gross
e d
fire is the color of the element Earth’ (Ch. Up. 6.4.1). These very elements viz. the Fire,
v
Water and Earth are being indicated here (Úv. Up. 4.5) by the three hues of the Ajâ, for the
li@
words ‘red’ etc. occur identically in both Úrutis. Moreover the primary inference of the
tu
d r a
words ‘red’ etc. is in the exposition of colors, and not in the exposition of the three
constituents of Pradhâna, to which their reference may at best be configurative only.
e n
Also, it is well accepted that any doubtful text should be interpreted with the help of
ar
something explicit. Hence the word ‘Ajâ’ refers to the three elements only. (9)
n
d r. it is difficult to comprehend that the three elements are the implication of the
Still
word ‘Ajâ’, for the elements do not conform to the meaning of the word ‘Ajâ’. The word
‘Ajâ’ literally means ‘the birthless’, whereas all the three elements are known to be created.
Also the other meaning of the word is ‘she-goat’, which also does not conform to the
elements inasmuch as the shape is concerned. This is being answered in the next aphorism,
And the instruction has been given through the simile, as in the case of honey
etc., and hence there is no contradiction.
1.4.10 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 151
a t ‘Aja’
the fire, water and earth are
r red, white and black in color respectively, and their
d transformations of similar colors. The ignorant embodied
r e n
amalgamation produces various
Topic 3: Sankhyopasangrahâdhikarana
(The Mention of Numbers)
152 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.4.11
in d
of the word. Thus this adhikarana commences in response to the aforementioned illustration
of the opponent.
st .
u e
Doubt: The Úruti declares, ‘That in which abideq
n a
t immortal’ (Br. Up. 4.4.17).
the panca-pancajanâ along with
@
as indicated in the Sânkhya theory, or doesv it refer to the vital-force (Prâna) etc. that
occur in the complementary text? li
a tu
Opponent: Since r
d the word ‘panca’ (five) has occurred twice in the Úruti, it is
nassume that it indicates the twenty-five categories of the Sânkhyas.
r e
therefore reasonable to
a
r.
modificationsn
These are - Primordial Nature (Pradhâna; it is not a modification of anything else); Seven
of Primordial Nature viz. Mahatattva (evolves from Pradhâna), ego
d evolves from Mahatattva) and the five elements (space, air, fire, water and
(ahankâra;
earth; they evolve from ego) in their subtle forms; sixteen evolved products (five elements
in their gross form and eleven organs); and the Purus+a (it is neither a source nor a
modification of anything).
Not even from the statement of numbers can Pradhâna be admitted to have
scriptural sanction, for the entities are different, and on account of excess.
1.4.11 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 153
ren
the mention of numbers, but it is inappropriate to acknowledge its implication in
na
delineation of the twenty-five categories of the Sânkhya fame and hoping for their scriptural
dr.
sanction. The word ‘panca-pancajanâ’ refers to five divisions of five each, which implies
five divisions of five similar groups; but the twenty-five categories of the Sânkhyas are
disparate. These twenty-five categories do not exhibit any similarity so as to enable them
to be placed in five groups of five similar objects. Hence the twenty-five categories of
Sankhyas are not implied here. Moreover the second ‘panca’ in the word ‘panca-pancajanâ’
cannot be separated from the word ‘janâ’ (panchajanâ being a compound word) to be
construed separately with the first ‘panca’ to make twenty-five.
If the word ‘panca-pancajanâ’ does not refer to the twenty-five categories of the
in
Sânkhyas, then what is its implication? To answer this commences the next aphorism,
.
in d
Prân+âdayo vâkyaúes+ât (12)
st .
e
u this is known from the
The vital-force and the others are meant, for
ta q
complementary text.
n
ato vital-force, eye, ear, food and mind;
The word ‘Prânâdi’ in the aphorism e
v d
refers
and these very entities are referred@
consideration (Br. Up. 4.4.17), foru licomplementary passage of the Úruti declares, ‘Those
to by the word ‘pancajanâ’ in the Úruti under
t the
who know the Vital-force ofathe vital-force, Eye of the eye, Ear of the ear, Food of the
r
d mind’ (Br. Up. Mâdhyandina recension 4.4.21), wherein the
n
food and the Mind of the
e
word ‘jana’ n ar cannot
five mentioned earlier by the word ‘pancajanâ’ are clearly revealed. If objected that the
Or the word ‘pancajanâ’ may also be construed to imply the five namely – the
gods, manes, gandharvas, devils and demons. Or the word may imply – the Brâhmins,
the Ks+atriya, Veúya, Úûdra and the Nis+âdas (sons born out of Brâhmin father and Úûdra
1.4.13 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 155
d .in
mother). These implications of the word are also acceptable as there is no contradiction,
t.in
but in no circumstance can the word refer to the twenty-five categories of Sânkhyas. (12)
s the five entities
eamongst
Though the Mâdhyandina recension mentions ‘food’ u
qEye of the eye, Ear of the ear,
ta
nMâdhyandina recension 4.4.21), but
viz. ‘Those who know the Vital-force of the vital-force,
d a
Food of the food and the Mind of the mind’ (Br. Up.
the text in the Kân+va recension contains no e
v mention of ‘food’ amongst vital-force etc.,
@ to four only. The next aphorism clarifies this
li
thereby reducing the number of the entities
u
position,
t
a aikes+âmasatyanne (13)
d rJyotis+
r e n
n a adds up to number five for the recension that does not mention food.
r.
The Light
dThough ‘food’ is not mentioned amidst vital-force etc. in the Kân+va text, still the
count of five is fulfilled by the mention of ‘Light’ (jyoti) in the verse immediately preceding
the text, ‘That in which panca-pancajanâ abide’. The Úruti there declares, ‘One who
knows the Light of lights’ (Br. Up. 4.4.16), wherein the Supreme Self is declared as the
Light of lights. If objected that since the text concerning the ‘Light’ occurs equally in
both the recensions, how can it be accepted amongst the five at one place (Kânva recension)
and left out at the other (Mâdhyandina recension); we say that in the Mâdhyandina
recension the quintuplet consisting of the vital-force and others are accepted as such
inasmuch as they occur in the same verse, and hence there is no need to turn to ‘Light’
that occurs in the different verse, but in the Kân+va Úruti such arrangement is not present.
Hence no Úruti text endorses the existence of Pradhâna of the Sânkhyas. (13)
156 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.4.14
Topic 4: Kâran+atvâdhikarana
.i n
(The cause of Creation)
i n d
s .
tof the Sânkhya School
e
In the last three adhikaranas it was shown that ‘Pradhâna’
u
demonstrated that all Úruti texts conclude harmoniously q
has no scriptural sanction inasmuch as no Úruti text concludes in this entity. It was also
ta in Brahman alone. Here the
opponent objects that due to mutual contradictionsainnthe vedântic texts, the aforementioned
v
harmonious conclusion of these texts in Brahmane d is inadmissible, and hence these texts
should be accepted as concluding in@
l i delineation of Pradhâna. The current adhikarana
tu
commences in response to such protestation.
a
r that deal with the creation etc. of the Universe are considered
Doubt: All Úrutidtexts
r e
in this adhikarana. Heren arises a doubt whether the Úrutis that propound Brahman as the
n a are valid or not?
r.
cause of the Universe
dOpponent: These Úruti texts are not admissible as proof for the causality of
Brahman due to their observable mutual contradictions.
Brahman is the cause of space and the rest, for such is declared by all Upanis+ads
just as It is declared by any one of them.
1.4.14 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 157
u l
are concerned, but still there is no contradiction
t in propounding the omniscient, omnipresent and
a
for all Úrutis unanimously conclude
omnipotent Brahman as therultimate cause of creation. The Úruti declares, ‘The Supreme
dexists’ (Tai. Up. 2.6), ‘O amiable one, before creation there was
e n
r one without a second’ (Ch. Up. 6.2.1), ‘Indeed there was nothing
Lord created all this that
a
n but the Self’ (Ait. Up. 4.1.1) etc., wherein there is no contradiction as far
but Existence alone,
r.
prior to creation
d is concerned. As far as the discrepancy amongst the Úrutis in elucidating
as the creator
the order of creation is concerned, we say that such difference in the order can well be
reconciled, as the aphorist Vyâsa would do in the coming Sûtras. Even if this discrepancy
in the order of creation be admitted, still there is no discrepancy as far as the creator
(Brahman) is concerned. Moreover the ultimate purport of the Úrutis is not to propound
the products, but the Úrutis eventually aim to demonstrate the causality of Brahman as
the first cause. The same has been declared by the teacher Gaud+apâda in his karikâs on
the Mând+ukya Upanis+ad, wherein he says, ‘The Úruti explains the process of creation in
diverse ways, with the help of illustrations of clay, iron, sparks etc., only to enable the
intellect to grasp the non-dual entity that is Brahman, but there is no diversity whatsoever.
(Ma. Ka. 3.15). Hence there is no contradiction as regards Brahman (the creator) amongst
the Úruti texts. (14)
158 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.4.15
an
Up. 6.2.1); whereby one hears of creation from ‘existence’ at some places and ‘non-
ve d
existence’ at others. Hence an obvious contradiction persists.
r
dThe.
to the text referring to Brahman.
word ‘non-existence’ refers to the unmanifested state of the name and form,
i.e. the state when the world had not yet differentiated into name and form. It does not, in
any way whatsoever, preclude the existence of Brahman in that state of unmanifested
name and form. The word ‘existence’ is commonly used to refer to any entity that has
explicit name and form. But since no such entity existed prior to creation, when Brahman
alone was present, and hence Brahman alone has been figuratively designated by the
word ‘non-existence’ in that state of non-manifestation of name and form. Hence, by the
word ‘non-existence’, none should presume the absolute absence of the cause in that
state. Hence there is no contradiction amongst Úrutis inasmuch as the first cause (Brahman)
is concerned. (15)
1.4.16 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 159
The word ‘non-existence’ in the last adhikarana was shown to imply ‘existence’
.in
due to its occurrence in similar texts, but here in the Kaus+îtaki Brâhmana, the text, ‘I will
d
t. n
speak to you of Brahman’ (Kau. Up. 4.1), the occurrence of word ‘Brahman’ in this
i
declaration by Bâlâki cannot be considered a basis for interpreting the word ‘Prân+a’ etc.
u es
as implying Brahman; the current adhikarana thus commences in response to such counter-
illustration by the opponent.
ta q
Here in the opponent’s view, on admittinga
n
meditation on Prâna etc., one cannot assertv d
ethe harmonious conclusion of all Vedântic
the Kaus+îtaki Úruti text as propounding
Opponent: The entity to be known is Prâna indeed, for the text, ‘whose work this
is’, surely implies that only, for Prâna alone is the basis of all actions (movements).
Moreover Prâna is also mentioned in the complementary passage that declares, ‘Then it
becomes one with the Prâna alone’ (Kau. Up. 4.20)
Or the entity referred by the Úruti under consideration may be the individual soul,
for elsewhere it is declared, ‘and so feeds the conscious soul on these souls’ (Kau. Up.
4.20), wherein the indicatory sign of the individual soul is present.
in. the Supreme Self; we say that such assertion is incorrect, for there is no
sort of movement
possible r
d
indicatory sign referring to the vital-force or the individual soul. The word ‘work’ in the
text is qualified by the pronoun ‘Aitat’ (This), which refers to work at hand (in proximity).
And such work is the creation of the Universe, the ability to accomplish which rests with
the Supreme Lord alone, and not with the vital-force or the individual soul. If asserted
that since the Universe has not been mentioned by name, then how can it be accepted as
the implication of the pronoun ‘aitat’; we say that since the Úruti doesn’t mention anything
specific at hand, hence the things in general are to be admitted; and the most proximate
general thing that can be construed from the context is the Universe. As far as the specific
mention of ‘purus+as’ is concerned, it has been made to demonstrate that the ‘beings’
spoken of as Brahman by Bâlâki, are not so. Hence, by both general and specific statements,
1.4.17 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 161
q u
ta
*The instruction, ‘feed the Brâhman+as and the mendicants’, wherein the word Brâhman+as denotes
n
a
all Brâhman+as who are not mendicants,even though it is acknowledged that only Brâhmans can become
v e d
mendicants. Similarly the word ‘work’ in the Úruti implies the creation of all except the ‘purus+as’, they
having been mentioned separately. This is ‘Brâhmanaparivrâjaka nyâya’, i.e. the logic of ‘Brâhmana and
the mendicant’.
u l i@
a
Jîvamukhyaprân+ t alingânneti cettadvyâkhyâtam (17)
d r
r e
If asserted thatnBrahman is not meant, for the indicatory marks of the embodied
n a are met with; then that has already been explained earlier.
soul and the vital-force
r.
dOpponent: It is not correct to state that the entity to be known is the Supreme
Self, for indicatory signs of Prâna (chief vital-force) and the Jîva (individual soul) are
explicitly met in the complementary passage. Hence either of the two should be admitted
as the entity to be known. The Úruti text, ‘Then it becomes one with the Prâna alone’
(Kau. Up. 4.20), wherein the indicatory sign of Prâna is clear; and the text, ‘and so feeds
the conscious soul on these souls’ (Kau. Up. 4.20), wherein occurs the sign of individual
soul.
Vedântin: This has already been explained in the aphorism (1.1.31). By admitting
the aforementioned complementary text there arises a situation of threefold meditation,
viz. the meditation on the Prâna, the meditation on the individual soul and the meditation
on Brahman. But such situation is not admissible, for going through the beginning and
162 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.4.18
But Jaimini thinks that the reference here to the embodied soul is for a different
purpose, for such is known from the question and answer. Moreover some recension
mention it explicitly.
The consideration of the individual soul in this context is not aimed at describing
its nature, but is intended to enable the comprehension of Brahman; so feels the teacher
1.4.18 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 163
Topic 6: Vâkyânvayâdhikarana
(Correlation of Úruti texts)
164 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.4.19
in d
wherein the individual soul is referred to, the remaining passage of Maitreyi Brâhmana
st .
should also be inferred to conclude in Brahman. The current adhikarana commences
with such comparison.
u e
a q
t is not dear for his sake, but is
n
athe Úruti declares, ‘O Maitreyi, the Self
Doubt: Beginning with ‘O Maitreyi, the husband
e d
dear for one’s own sake’ (Br. Up. 2.4.5, 4.5.6),
v and contemplating’ (ibid.). Here arises a
@
alone is worthy of seeing, hearing, thinking
doubt whether the individual soulliis taught here as the entity to be seen, heard and
a tu Self?
contemplated upon or is it the Supreme
d r
Opponent:eThe
r n entities referred to by the Úruti like husband, wife and all other
n a to the soul
products of enjoyment
appositely.refers
befit the individual soul. Moreover the word ‘dear’ (priya)
r that enjoys these experiences. Hence, on the strength of the
d text it can be concluded that the individual soul has been referred to.
introductory
Vâkyânvayât (19)
The Supreme Lord alone has been taught here, for such is gathered from the
reconcilation of the texts.
The Supreme Lord alone has been taught here as the entity to be seen, heard etc.
This conclusion is drawn on the basis of consideration of the introductory and the
1.4.19 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 165
vjs æ"VO;% JksrO;ks eUrO;ks fufnè;kflrO;* bR;kfn Jw;rsA r=k fda æ"VO;Rokfnuk
thoks¿=kksifn';rs] ijekRek osfr la'k;s_ ifrtk;kfnda HkksX;Hkwra lo± txTthokFkZr;k
fiz;a Hkorhfr fiz;lalwfprsukReuk HkksD=kksiØelkeF;kZTthokReksins'k% izfrHkkrhfr iwoZ%
i{k%A fl¼kUrLrq ijekReSok=k æ"VO;Rokfnuksifn"Vks xzká%A dqr%\ miØekfn&
i;kZykspu;k¿L; okD;L; ijekReU;sokUo;kr~A rFkkfg ^;sukga uke`rk L;ka fdega rsu
dq;k± ;nso Hkxoku~ osn rnso es czwghfr] (c`ñ 2@4@3) bfr ve`rRok'kklku;k
eS=kÕ;k izkfFkZrks ;kKoYD;% ^ukU;% iUFkk%* ^u deZ.kk* bR;kfnJqR;Urjs ^Kkuknso rq
dSoY;fe* fr Le`R;Urjs p izfl¼ee`rRolkèkuekRefoKkueqifn'kfrA vkRefoKkusu
loZfoKkua izfrKk; ^czã ra ijknk|ks¿U;=kkReuks czã osn* (c`ñ 2@4@6) bR;usu
d .in
t .i n
rnsoksiikn;frA ^nqUnqHksgUZ ;ekuL;* (c`ñ 2@4@7) bfr nqUnqH;kfnn`"VkUrSLresok¿O;frjsda
es
æ<+;frA ÍXosnkfndkj.kRoksins'ksu rL;So uke:ideZizi×pdkj.krka izfrikn;u~
u
t a q
,dk;uizfØ;k;ka pSua ijekRekueso xe;frA vr% ijekReSok=k æ"VO;Rokfnuksifn"V%
bfr xE;rsAA19AA
a n
v e d
concluding texts. Here Maitreyi says to@
u l i Yâjñavalkya, ‘What will I gain out of something
that cannot immortalize me. Hence
t you kindly teach me the means of immortality’ (Br.
ra seer‘Knowledge
Up. 2.4.3, 4.5.4). Hearing this,
Similarly other Úrutis tooddeclare,
Yâjñavalkya imparts to her the knowledge of Self.
Opponent: But by the texts, ‘Everything is loved not for everything’s sake, but is
. in
loved for one’s own sake’, ‘the Self alone is to be seen, realized etc.’, ‘by knowing this
nd
Self all is known’ (Br. Up. 2.4.5, 4.5.6); the individual soul alone emerges as the entity
i
indicated to be seen, realized etc., and not the Supreme Self.
st .
e
uteacher Âúmarathya is now
Vedântin: The Bheda-abheda viewpoint of the
t a q
presented in the next aphorism,
a n
v e d
Pratijñâsiddherlingamaúmarathyah+ (20)
l @
i declaration of the non-difference between the
u
tSelf is an indicatory mark of the fulfillment of the
r a
Âúmarathya thinks that the
promissory assertion.nd
embodied soul and supreme
a re
n Âúmarathya says that the Úruti text, ‘All becomes known on knowing
The. teacher
r
d
the Self’ (Br. Up. 2.4.5, 4.5.6), makes a promissory declaration. If one acknowledges
absolute difference between the Supreme Self and the individual soul, then by the
knowledge of one (Supreme Self) the knowledge of other (individual soul) cannot be
attained, and the promise made by the Úruti remains unfulfilled. Hence the Supreme Self
and the individual soul are not different in the absolute sense, but have a cause-effect
relationship. They are different, but yet not different, akin to fire and the sparks (Bheda-
abheda theory). Hence the knowledge of the individual soul gives rise to the knowledge
of Brahman, and accordingly the knowledge of everything. Therefore, in the Úruti under
consideration, the reference to the individual self has been made in the beginning keeping
in mind those of its aspects that are not different from the Supreme Self. (20)
1.4.21 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 167
d .in
The next aphorism presents the view-point of the teacher Aud+ulomi, of the School
of Satya-bheda,
t .in
u es(21)
Utkramis+yata evambhâvâdityaudulomih+
t a q
a n the identity of the individual soul
v
and the supreme Self refers to the state when d
Aud+ulomi says that the statement regarding
e the individual soul departs from the
body.
u li@
a t that the Úruti under consideration refers to the
dr for as long as the soul remains associated with the
The teacher Aud+ulomi opines
n
individual soul in the beginning,
rofeBrahman
n a
limiting adjuncts like the body, senses, mind, intellect etc., it is different from Brahman.
.
On the realization through the principle of knowledge, meditation etc., the
embodiedrsoul is purified and fit to be united with the Supreme Self, but only after
d
departing from the mind-body complex. Hence in the Úruti under consideration the initial
reference is to the embodied soul only, which on rising above the mind-body complex
becomes identical with Brahman. The other Úrutis too support this assertion, ‘The
embodied soul, during the state of deep sleep, rises above the body, and attaining the
Supreme Light gets established in its true nature’ (Ch. Up. 8.12.3). This School of thought
is referred to as the ‘Satya-bheda’ school, which propounds the difference between the
embodied soul and the Supreme Self as real, it being only annihilated after the former’s
departure from the assemblage of body and senses. (21)
The opinions of two different Schools of thought have been given in the last two
aphorisms. The teacher Âúmarathya propounds a cause-effect relation amongst the
168 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.4.22
.i n
Supreme Self and the Individual Self leading to the theory of Bheda-abheda, whereas the
i n d
teacher Aud+ulomi is of the opinion that the difference between the Supreme Self and the
.
Individual Self is real as long as the latter remains confined by the limiting adjuncts like
st
e
the body etc. (Satya-bheda theory). But both theories are at fault, for admitting any kind
u
ta q
of difference between the Supreme Self and the Individual Self in one state and the absence
of such disparity in another, is not justified. Hence the final conclusion is being given,
n
atsnah+ (22)
ve d
Avasthiteriti kâúakr+
l @
i of the non-difference between the embodied
u
t for the Supreme Self alone exists as the embodied
Kâúakr+tsna feels that the declaration
r a
soul and supreme Self is correct,
d
soul.
e n
n arto the teacher Kâúakr+tsna, the Supreme Self alone is delusively conjured
According
Topic 7: Prakr+tyadhikarana
(The Cause of Universe)
Brahman was discussed in the first section of this chapter as ‘That from which
this Universe is born etc.’ (1.1.2). Here arises the question whether Brahman is the ‘material
cause’ of the Universe, akin to clay being the cause of a pot, or it is the ‘efficient cause’,
1.4.23 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 169
n a
.
dr To this we say,
Vedântin:
Abhidhyopadeúâcca (24)
Moreover the fact that the Self is the material cause too becomes explicit from
the pronouncements about the will to create. The Úruti declares, “He deliberated, ‘I shall
be many, I shall be born’” (Ch. Up. 6.2.3), whereby the act of deliberation points to
1.4.25 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 171
izÑfrRofefr foospuh;fefrAA24AA
izÑfrRos gsRoUrjekgµ
(131) lk{kkPpksHk;kEukukr~ AA25AA
br'p txnqiknkua czãA dqr%\ lk{kkn~czãSo dkj.keH;qisR;ksHk;ks% izHkokI;&
;;ksjkEukukr~ ^lokZf.k g ok bekfu* HkwrkU;kdk'kknso leqRi|Urs vkdk'ka izR;Lra
;fUr** (Nkñ 1@9@1) bR;kfnJqfr"kqA ;r% izHkofr] ;=k p yh;rs rÙkL;ksiknkua
izfl¼e~A ;Fkk ;oknhuka i`fFkohR;FkZ%AA25AA
(132) vkReÑrs% ifj.kkekr~ AA26AA
d .in
brks¿fi czã txnqiknkue~A dqr%\ ^^rnkRekua Lo;edqi#n
bR;kRekufefr f}rh;;k r=k deZRoa Lo;edq#r bR;usu edr`
. r** (rSñ 2@7)
st ZRoa pkEuk;rsA rFkk
q u
n
Brahman being the ‘efficient cause’, and the consequence ta of such deliberation expressed
d a the ‘material cause’ also. (24)
as ‘I shall be many, I shall be born’ points to It being
e
@ v
li
Sâks+âccobhayâmnânât (25)
u It to be the direct cause.
t
ra
And since the Úruti declares
d
Brahman isrthee nmaterial cause of the Universe, for the Úruti declares, ‘All beings
a (Brahman), and in Space do they all merge’ (Ch. Up. 1.9.1), whereby
originate fromnSpace
the originr
d .
and the dissolution of the Universe is declared directly in Brahman only; and it
is too well known that the origin and dissolution of any entity can be in its material cause
only. For instance the earth is the material cause of paddy, barley etc., as they originate as
well as dissolve in earth only. Hence the Brahman is the material cause of Universe. (25)
Brahman is the material cause of the Universe for the Úruti declares, ‘That created
Itself by Itself’ (Tai. Up. 2.7); wherein it is clear that Brahman is acknowledged as both
the ‘subject’ as well as the ‘object’. The phrase ‘created Itself’ presents the object (karma),
whereas the text ‘created by Itself’ presents the subject (kartâ). If asserted that it is not
172 Brahmasûtra Vidyananda Vr+tti 1.4.27
pSdfLeu~ czãf.k deZRoa drZ`Roa pkfo#¼e~A uuq iwo± fl¼L; drZ`Rosu O;ofLFkrL;
fØ;ek.kRokReda deZRoa nq%lEik|fefr psÂ_ ifj.kkekr~A ifj.kkeks¿=k foorZ% rFkk p
fl¼L;kfi 'kqfDrjtrkfnon~ foorkZReuk lkè;RokRdeZRoa laxPNrs bR;FkZ%AA26AA
(133) ;ksfu'p fg xh;rs AA27AA
br'p czãtxnqiknkue~] ;fRdy & ^;n~Hkwr;ksfua ifji';fUr èkhjk%* (eqñ
1@1@6) ^dÙkkZjeh'ka iq#"ka czã ;ksfufe* (eqñ 3@1@3) R;kfnJqfr"kq izÑfrokpdsu
;ksfu'kCnsukRek fg xh;rsA i`fFkoh;ksfujks"kfèkouLirhukfefr yksdksDR;k ;ksfu'kCn%
izÑfrokpd% lefèkxE;rsA vrks czã.k% izÑfrRoa drZ`Roa p fl¼fefrAA27AA
(39) (8 loZO;k[;kukfËkdj.ke~A lwÒ 28) n
d .i
possible for both, the subject (kartâ) and the object (karma), to .be
t i npresent in a single
isu
esonly comes to exist in the
entity, for the subject is a pre-existing entity whereas the object
future through some action; we say that such assertion q
ta and forms, and presents as an
wrong, for Brahman, though
pre-existing, undergoes modification into various names
object. Hence the creation is referred to as thea
n
(material cause) undergoing modifications v e d
into
modification of Brahman, akin to clay
various forms. These modifications of
Brahman are accepted as real by various
li@Dualistic Schools of thought, but are admitted to
t u
be apparent (unreal) by the Vedântins. The phrase ‘by Itself’ rules out any dependence on
d
any other cause. Hence Brahmanra is the material cause of the creation. (26)
r e n
a Yoniúca hi gîyate (27)
nbecause It is referred to as the ‘yoni’ of all beings.
d r
And
.
Further reason as to Brahman being the material cause of the Universe is for the
Úruti declares, ‘That, which the wise consider as the source (yoni) of all beings’ (Mu. Up.
1.1.6), ‘Those who see the creator of the world, the source of all beings, and their ordainer’
(Mu. Up. 3.1.3), wherein by the word ‘source’ (yoni) implying the material cause, Brahman
alone has been indicated. For instance, earth is called the source (yoni) of all herbs,
thereby the word ‘yoni’ signifies the material cause. Hence Brahman is the efficient and
the material cause of the world. (27)
Topic 8: Sarvavyâkhyânâdhikarana
(Explanation of All)
1.4.28 fo|kuUno`fŸk;qre~ cz„lw=e~ (foJke 5) 173
.in
,rL; oS lksE;S"kks¿f.kEu ,oa egkUU;xzksèkfLr"Bfr* (Nkñ 6@12@2) ^vlnsosnexz
r. nnon-existence
creation from
that youddon’t
(shûnya, void). Similarly the text, ‘The infinitesimal seeds
perceive’ (Ch. Up. 6.12.2), point to creation from the atoms.
AA foJke%5AA
. in
in d
bfr Jhczãlw=k'kkÄïjHkk";koyfEcU;ka st .
u efo|kuUno`ÙkkS izFkekè;k;L;
;rhUædqyfryddSyklihBkèkh'ojLokfefo|kuUnfxfjfojfprk;ka
prqFkZ% ikn% AA1&4AAta
q
a n
AA bfrizFvkeks d
e Ë;k;% AA
l i@
a tu
r then it is not so, for the Self alone has been designated by
them would be rendereddfutile;
re
the word ‘an+u’ (atom)n keeping in view its subtleness. Also the term ‘non-existence’,
n a above Úruti, indicates the Self alone in Its undifferentiated form. Hence
referred to by the
the Úrutisr.conclude in propounding Brahman as the cause of Universe. (28)
d
Thus ends the English translation of Chapter 1 Section 4 of
Vidyânanda Vr+tti on Brahmasûtra