THE ROLE OF BRITAIN IN GREEK POLITICS AND MILITARY

OPERATIONS: 1947-1952

ELEFTHERIA DELAPORTA

PhD THESIS SUBMISSION

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
FACULTY OF ARTS
UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
FEBRUARY 2003
 i

Abstract

This thesis examinesAnglo-Greek relations during 1947-1952;the era of the

Greek civil war from the British announcementto withdraw aid from Greeceuntil the

end of the civil war and Greece'sentry into NATO. A comprehensivetreatmentof the

crisis of the civil war focuseson British imperial defence, the politics and society of

Greeceand bilateral relations as formulatedby Cold War needs.During the rift between

the Rigbt and the Left in Greece, the main issue addressedby this work is the

continuation of British influence in Greek affairs and the extensionof British interestin

bolsteringthe anti-Communist fight of the Greek government.In 1947 Britain, being

itself on the verge of economic collapse, opted to discontinue financial support to the

Greekright-wing government,which boostedthe enunciationof the Truman Doctrine in

March 1947. In t he w ake ofA mericani nterferenceinG reece,A nglo-Greekr elations

remainedclose and intense,as the Greek governmentsmaintainedtheir trust in the

British. For the British, Greeceremained a destitute country, in need of assistanceto

defeatthe communists.

This study emphasisesthe diplomatic and military co-operation between the

British, the Americanand the Greekgovernmentsin trying to defeatthe communist

forces, while attention is given to the policy and aims of the Greek Communist Party.

The communistattemptsto take over power along with the policies of the Greek

governmentsand their allies are examined, with particular emphasis on the

counterinsurgencyoperationsof the Greek government developed from 1947 until the

final defeat of the communist forces in 1949. The British role in these operationsis

consideredto be important and influential in training and equipping the Greek armed

forces.
 11

In the first post-civil war period of 1950-1952,the main issuesexaminedare the

attemptsmadeby the Greek governmentsand the allies to establisha strongdemocratic

cabinetand to strengthenthe securityof Greecewithin the context of internationalCold

War policies. Due to anti-Communist perceptions,precipitated by the Korean War,

Greece became a quasi NATO member in 1950 and full member in 1952, which

brought the withdrawal of the British Military Mission from Greece.

 iii

Contents

ABSTRACT I

CONTENTS III

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS Vil

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION x

I SETTING THE STAGE: 1941-1946 19

From Resistanceto Civil War 19

The DecemberEvents 32

The Development of a Full ScaleCivil War 36

11IN SEARCH OF SECURITY: 1947 43

The Maximos Government: The Test of the Centre 43

The Truman Doctrine 50

The War in Greece 54

The Sofoulis Government: A New Centre Experiment 63

Counter-insurgency Operations in Greece 66

III THE DENOUEMENT: 1948-1949 78

Military Preparations 78

The Battles of 1948 81

Stalematein Late 1948 88

The End of the Civil War 94

IV POST-CIVIL WAR POLITICS, THE KOREAN WAR AND NATO

SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS: 1950 108

The Periodof UnstableCoalitions 108

The VenizelosGovernments:A Marginal Stability 119

 iv

GreeceJoins NATO 124

V STABILISATION ERA: 1951-1952 130

PapagosEntersPolitics 130

ThePlastirasGovernment 144

TheRally Wins the Election 149

VI GREECE'S ACCESSION TO NATO: 1952 154

GreeceandNATO's SouthernFlank 154

TheDefenceBurdenDebare 161

TheBritish Military Missionand the NATO Framework 165

UNSCOBand BalkanCold War Policy 171

CONCLUSION 174

APPENDICES 180

BIBLIOGRAPHY 196
 V

Acknowledgments

This study has been made possibleby the kindness of many. The official debts

go tomys upervisor,DrS imon B all. His suggestionshave enlarged the scopeof my

researchand broadenedthe limits of the thesis.He unwaveringly offered me much of his

time during and off term to comment upon the chapters and the thesis as a whole.

Specialthanks are due to Dr Richard Aldous, University College Dublin, and Dr Phil

O'Brien, Glasgow University, for their discerning comments, apt remarks as well as

constructivecriticism during my viva. They both offered me insight on their particular

area of interest and made the exam a particularly fruitful experience.I am warmly

appreciative of the professionalism of the staff at the PRO, Liddell Hart Archives,

Churchill Archive and National Library of Scotland; without their competenceand

wholehearted assistance the research of this work would have been extremely

frustrating.I shall alwaysbe indebtedto the staff of the DDS of the GlasgowUniversity

Library for makingeverypossibleeffort to offer me accessto all booksneeded.I also

owe particular dept of gratitude to the staff of King's College Library for their

exceptional professionalism, which firmly was offered to me, even in the form of

personalcontactwheneverneeded.Lastbut not least,my specialthanksareextendedto

Ms Alison Peden, the Secretaryof the Department of History, for her personal and

secretarialsupport, for finding solution to practical problems and sorting out all kinds of

administrativedifficulties.

The pleasantduty of unfolding the roll of personaldebts begins with my family

without whose supportthe completionof this work would have been much more

comp icated and difficult. They all have alwaysbeengenerousand reassuringduring the

very many trying moments involved in the lonely adventureof developing this thesis.

Their belief in me has given me strength to go on. Their understanding and

 vi

has
encouragement made the burden of this study much easier. Thus, it has been my

greatpleasureto dedicatethe thesisto them. My grateful thanks go also to my friends in

Athens and Glasgow for their support along the way and especially to Eleftheria

Daleziou,who hasbeensharingpart of the difficulties.

I owe special thanks to my friends and colleaguesat the Glasgow University

Library for their support and understandingduring all these years. Being a memberof

in
staff my self, working such a friendly environmenthas often madework an enjoyable

break from study and academiccommitments.I thank them for their kindnessand above

all for making me feel at home in Glasgow. For warm hospitality as well as unfailing

care, special thanks are due to Sir Roddy and Lady Ma&rie MacSween. Their

acquaintancehasbeengreathonour to me. Their generosityexceededmy expectations.

For his solid advice and personalinterest in my work, my specialthanks also go

to Dr Alex Zervoudakisfor suggestinglines of enquiry, which have greatly enrichedthe

scopeof my research.I am indebtedto Dr Fotini Konstantopoulou,Serviceof Historical

Archive- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who gave me accessto the archive and Ms Efi

Pashalidou,who allowed me to consultthe documentsof the Greek GeneralStaff

FEVAIE-GES/DIS. Although this work has been made possible by the assistanceof

thosementionedabove,its weaknessesaremy own.

 vii

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AMAG American Mission for Aid to Greece

AMFOGE American Mission for ObservingGreekElections

ASEA SupremeNational DefenceCouncil-AvCOTaro

luýtpol)kto EOvwýqA[wva;

BLO British Liaison Officer

BLU British Liaison Units

BMM British Military Mission

CAB CabinetPapers

CIGS Commanderof Imperial GeneralStaff

Cos Chiefsof Staff

DA Democratic Army- AijýtoKpawc6q Erp=6;

EAM National Liberation Front-EOvtlcoAnckcuftpamO MF. T(JD7[0

EDA United DemocraticLeft-Evcop-',

vjj AijgoicpwrtKý
APICTEP6

EDES National RepublicanGreekLeague-EMO; Ail[toicpaTtic6;Milwco;

E-Mwgo;

ELAS National Popular Liberation Army-

EOvtic6qA(xtic6qAnc%ci)OcpcoTtYOq ETpar6q

EPE National Political Union-Rvwý flo%tmý Email

EPEK National ProgressiveUnion of the Centre-EOvtxýI-Ipooku=i Evcoaq

K&rpou

FO Foreign Office

FRUS Foreign Relationsof the United States

GES General Staff-FFviK6 E7nTF,?

£io 7,TpctTolý

GES/DIS General Staff /Directorate of History of the Army- ]Fmico EmTEW'o

ITP(ITOi)/At601. wail IGTOPiaqETPaTOI)(GES/DIS in the text stands for the
published sources of the General Staff/Directorate of History of the Army.
]FEE/AlE is used in the text to illustrate the primary sources of
 viii

the GeneralStaff/ Directorateof History of the Army)

HCDeb House of Commons Debates

HQ Headquarters

ics Joint Chiefs of Staff

JUSMAG Joint United StatesMilitary Advisory Group

JUSMAPG Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group Greece

IDEA Sacred Bond of Greek Officers-Icp6q Acaýt6; EXXývcovAýtcogaTtic&

is Internal Security

KKE Greek CommunistParty-Koggowtowco Kogga EXX68a;

LEK Populist Unity Party- Aatk6 EvarvK6Kogga

LOK CommandosUnits OpFtv(bv

KaT(x8po[L(bv
-A6Xot
MAD Units of Pursuit Detachments- Mova8eq Anoanaaýtkcov &64ccoq

MAY Units of Rural Defence-Movd5c; Acyakciag YnaiOpoi)

MEA Units of National Guard Defence-Movd8c; EOvixýq Apwaq

MEDO Middle East DefenceOrganisation

NA National Army-EOvtic6qITpar6q

NEA Office of the Near East andAfrican Affairs

NSC National Security Council

PDG Provisional DemocraticGovernment-llpo(YcoptvýAiToicpauldl Kuptpilan

PEEA Political Committeeof National Liberation-

llo%utký E7nTpo7M'Uvwýq AnckcuOE' pcoaTI;

PRO Public RecordOffice

SACME SupremeAllied CommanderMiddle East

SACEUR SupremeAllied CommanderEurope

SHAPE SupremeHeadquartersAllied PowersEurope

SHDM Headquartersof Epirus and WesternMacedonia-E-rpaTilysioHacipoi) Kat

Alnwýq Malcc8oviaq
 ix

UNGA United Nations GeneralAssembly

UNSC United Nations SecurityCouncil

UNSCOB United Nations SpecialCommitteeon the Balkans

USAGG United StatesAnny Group Greece

wo War Office

YIA Serviceof Historical Archive (GreekMinistry of Foreign Affairs)

a!
-Y7njpF, (xIc;
ToptKoUApXdou (Ynoupyct'Ou
E4(OTCPIIC6)V)
 x

Note on Transliteration

The transliteration of Greek charactersis based on an attempt to balance the

literal and spelling elements as well as please the eye. Greek names have been rendered

in the simplestor most familiar manner,often following the modem and commonly seen

orthographyin contemporaryEnglish texts. It is assumed,however,that this modem

versionof namesand regionalplace nameswould servethe articulation and aestheticsof

the Greek languageas well. Conventionssuch asph or kh have been simplified tof and

h for reasonsof convenienceto the non-Greekreader. So Sophoulesand Zakhariades

havebeengiven as Sofoulis and Zahariadis.

 xi

Chronological Table

1940

Italy declareswar on Greece(28 October).

1941

Prime Minister 1. Metaxas dies (26 January).Germansinvade Greece(6 April). British

troops land in Greecebut too weak to opposeGerman invasion (21 April). Armistice
between the Greek forces and the Germanssigned by Gen.Gcorge Tsolakoglou (23
April). Athens falls to the Germans(27 April). King George and cabinet headedby
PremierTsouderoswent from Creteto Cairo (May). Germanairborne invasion of Crete
(20 May). Allied evacuationof Crete(1 June).KKE forms EAM (21 September).

1942

KKE forms ELAS (10 April). Col Eddie Myers and British SOE team arrives in Greece.
BMM established (September). Zervas forms EDES (September). Konstantine
Logothetopoulosreplaces Gen. George Tsolakoglou as PM of Greek collaborationist
government(December).

1943

Ioannis Rallis becomesPM of Greek collaborationist government (April). Operation

Animals-supportof Allied invasion of Sicily (July). Cairo Conference(9 August). Italy
surrendersto Allies. Italian army in Greecebegins surrenderto Germansand strengthen
ELAS and EDES (September). Clashes between the resistant movements start (12
October) 'first round'.

1944

ELAS, EDES, BMM meet at Plaka Bridge in Epirus to settle peacebetweenthemselves

(12 February). 'Plaka Agreement' ends 'first round' (29 February). EAM forms PEEA
(10 March). Mutiny in the Greek forces in the Middle East begins (31 March). Army
insurgent in M. East suppressed(23 April). Lebanon Conference(17-20 May). George
Papandreoubecomes PM of the Government of National Unity. Soviet mission to
guerrillas under Col. Popov (28 July). EAM agrees to join government in exile
(August). Greek government moved to Italy (September). 'Caserta Agreement' (26
September).Churchill-Stalin 'PercentageAgreement' (9 October). Germansevacuate
Athens (12 October). Greek Governmentand British return to Greece(17 October).The
'secondround' b egins (November). E AM ministers resign from the governmentover
the issue of demobilisation of ELAS (2 December).Bloody KKE-EAM demonstration
in Athens, 'December Events' (3 December). Outbreak
of civil war, British army
support Papandreou(December).Churchill flies to Athens (25 December). Archbishop
DamaskinosappointedRegent(31 December).
 x1i

1945

Plastiras becomes Prime Minister (11 January). Yalta Conference (4-11 February).
Warkiza Agreement', end of 'second round', 'third round' begins (12 February).
Plastiras resignes (April). Voulgaris takes over to resign in October. Zahariadis returns
from Dachaou and reassumes leadership of the KKE (May). Velouhiotis murdered (16
June). Regent Premier for a few days, succeeded by Kanellopoulos (November) and
Sofoulis (November 1945- March 1946). Preparation for elections.

1946

SecondPlenum of Central Committee of the KKE, secondphase of the 'third round'

begins (12 February). General Election-KKE, EAM and Left abstained (31 March).
Tsaldaris becomes PM. 'White Terror' intensifies. Marcos Vafeiadis organises the
Communist military forces in the mountains(July). Plebiscite results in return of King
George11to Greecefrom London (I September).KKE forms the 'Democratic Army of
Greece' under Marcos (28 October). Allied Mission for the Observation of the Greek
Elections(AMFOGE) arrived in Athens (27 November).

1947

Fall of Tsaldarisgovernment,Maximos forms cabinet(2 January).KKE decidesto form

a conventional military force (February). British government notifies the Truman
administration that its aid to Greecewould ceaseon 31 March 1947 (24 February).
Greek government formally requests United States support (3 March). 'Truman
Doctrine' (12 March). King GeorgeH dies (I April), succeededby his brother Paul (22
April). Operation Terminus to clear Roumeli south and north (9 April). USAAG
established(14 April). UN Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier
Incidents rendersits report to the UN Security Council (27 June). Third Plenum of the
KKE (12-15 September). Sofoulis forms new cabinet (7 September). Creation of
Cominform (5 October). UNSCOB establishes its headquarters at Salonika (I
December).KKE forms Provisional Democratic Government(24 December).Battle of
Konitsa begins (25 December).KKE outlawed (28 December).JUSMAPG established
(31 December).

1948

Battle of Konitsa ends(I January).Stalin expressesdesireto Yugoslavs to end rebellion

in Greece(9-10 February).Re-organisationof the NA and the DA (February).Lt. Gen.
JamesVan Fleet arrives in Greeceas Commanderof the Joint US Military Advisory and
Planning Group (24 February). Operation Dawn (15 April May). Tito-Stalin break
-3
and expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform (28 June). Strasbourg Congress of
French Communist Party (June).Increaseof American assistanceto the national forces.
Enlargementof the NA. BMM operations.OperationCrown to clear Grammos(20 June
- 21 August). Operation Vitsi (August - October).DA reorganisationalong conventional
lines intensifies (15 November).PapagosbecomesField Marshal (October).
 xiii

1949

GeneralPapagosreassumescommandof the national forces (21 January).Fifth Plenum

of KKE Central Committee (30 January). DA mop-up in Peloponnese (April-June).
Further enlargementof the NA. Allied equipmentagainstthe DA. OperationRocket in
south-centralGreece (25 April July). PM Sofoulis dies (24 June), succeeded by
-31
Diomidis. KKE sides with Moscow against Tito. Yugoslavia closes its border with
Greece (11 September).Operation Torch A in Grammos (5-10 August). Torch B in
Vitsi (10-16 August). Torch C in Grammos (24-31 August). Hoxha announces
disarmamentand detention of DA defendersin Albania (26 August). End of civil war
(16 October).

1950

Alexandros Diomidis caretaker government dissolves. John Theotokis caretaker

government (6 January).Nicolaos Plastirasand Emmanuel Tsouderos createEPEK (14
January).Elections (5 March). Coalition governmentof the Centre (12 March). Sofocles
Venizelos government(22 M arch).P lastirasg overnment( 15 A pril). K oreanW ar (26
June).Plastirasgovernmentresigns(19 September).Venizelos-Papandreougovernment
(21- 23 September).Venizelos-Tsaldaris-Papandreou takes the oath (13 September).
New cabinetVenizelos-Papandreou (3 November).

1951

Creationof Populist Unity Party -LEK (6 January).Papagosresigns from the position of

the C-in-C (29 May). Papagos sets up Greek Rally (6 July). General election (9
September).EPEK-Liberals form government(18 September).NATO admits Greece
and Turkey (20 September). Anglo-Iranian Oil conflict (October). New Plastiras-
Venizelos g overnment(27 0 ctober).C hurchill g overnment(27 0 ctober). New Greek
constitution (21 December).

1952

Accession of Greece and Turkey into NATO as full members (18.2). American
intervention towards simple majority electoralsystem(14 March). The Parliamentvotes
for simple majority (12 September).The Parliament dissolves, new elections (10
October).CaretakergovernmentDimitris Kiousopoulos (I I October). Eisenhowerwins
the elections(2 November). Generalelections-GreekRally wins (16 November).
 I

Introduction

This work is a study of Anglo-Greekrelations during the period 1947-1952.The

thesis surveys British policy during the resistance years and the immediate post-war

period. Its main focus, however, is the climax of the civil war and the post-civil war

years. The post-civil war period endedwhen Greecejoined NATO in 1952; the thesis

too terminatesat that pivotal moment.

The aims of this study are threefold. Firstly, to examine British policy towards

Greece during the crucial years of 1947-1952. Secondly, to understand the Greek

domestic developmentswhich influenced policy-making. Thirdly, to analyse Greek

foreign policy and the demandsGreecemadeon Britain. The purposeof this thesisis to

to
contribute a better understandingof both British and Greek foreign policies. The

study also aims at providing a framework for the understanding of diplomatic and

military developmentsin civil war andpost-civil war Greece.

Most works on Anglo-Greek relations have suggestedthat the relationship

disintegratedafter 1947.1This thesisdemonstratesthat bilateral relations remainedclose

throughout the whole period under examination. A combination of Greek and British

sourcesare deployedto supportthis argument.One of the most important aspectsof this

thesisis the varietyof sourcesuponwhich it is built. On the Greekside,the recordsof

the Service of Historical Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ynilpecia

IuTopucol)ApXeiou, YIA) and the General Staff/ Directorate of History of the Anny

1According to the traditionalist historians Greece,

of after 1947the United Statestook over the fight
againstthe SovietUnion's plan for global domination.See:St. Xydis, Greeceand the Great Powers
1944-1947(Thessalokini,1963).Revisionisthistoriansof Greeceemphasisethe financial limitations of
Britain, which led to British withdrawal andAmericaninvolvementin Greece.D. Eudes,TheKapetanios
(London, 1972).Other historiansof Greecestressthat 1947signified 'the changingof the guardfrom
Britain to the United States'in Greece.Th. Veremis, TheMilitary in GreekPolitics (London, 1997),p.
151. Vlavianosarguesthat Britain decided'to end its own military and financial supportto Greece'in
February1947.H. Vlavianos, Greece,1941-1949(Oxford, 1992),p. 236.
 2

(I'mm E7rtTF, ]FEVAIE) are used for the

4io Zrparof)/Atcf)Oi)vaijI(;TOpia; ETPaTOf),

first time. Theserecordswere releasedunder Greece'sfifty-year rule just asresearchfor

this thesis began. When combined with the more familiar British primary sources these

records furnish insights into both diplomatic and military relations. Thus, the thesis

contains the first detailed analytical coverage of the battles of 1947-1949 and the

operations of the British Military Mission in Greece. In particular, new light is shed on

Greek counter-insurgencyoperations carried out with British and American support.

The interrelation of diplomatic and military componentsis an important element in

determiningrelations,which is underplayedby the existing literature.

In addition to the newly available Greek government archives, memoirs,

monographsand Greek newspapersfrom various political backgroundshave also been

consulted. The analysis of British policy is based upon official British papers and

documentsregarding Greece. Researchhas been conducted on documents from the

Foreign Office, the War Office, the Ministry of Air, the Admiralty, the Ministry of

Defence, the Treasury and the Cabinet. The papers of Anthony Eden, Winston

Churchill, Brigadier Godfrey Pennington Hobbs, General Harold English Pyrnan,

Admiral RobertKirk Dickson and Admiral William Halford.Selby regardingGreece

have also been consulted, the last four for the first time in this context. British

parliamentarydebatesandpressrecordshavealsobeenused.Oneof the mostdifficult

challengesin studyingboth the public and official documentsof the period is the critical

evaluation of their unspoken assumptions.An attempt has been made to examine and

evaluate sources from all sides of the polarised political debate in and on Greecein

order to cut through the prejudices and propagandawhich bedevils the proper study of

this subject.

The chronological definition of the subject is straightforward: February 1947

marked the British note to the Americans announcingBritish intention to withdraw aid
 3

from Greece. In March 1947 the American governmentannouncedthat it intendedto

keep Greecewithin the western sphere.In February 1952 Greecejoined NATO and

began its integration into the system of western collective security. In the same year the

acutepolitical instability that had hauntedGreecesince 1944 was brought to an end by

the election of a strong conservativegovernment.It was in 1952that the British Military

Mission concludedits activities in Greece.

The evolution of the Greek civil war and the impact it had in both Britain and

Greeceis examined. Special attention is paid to conflicting interests and attitudes.At

various times, on the British side, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Office, the Treasury

and the War Office had differing policies towards Greece.

The issue of the timing of the

withdrawal of British troops from Greece constituted a typical example of friction.

Within American circles, there was often a considerablevariancebetweenthe views of

the Presidentand the StateDepartment;as the casewas over the dispatch of American

army toG reece.T he Greek Communist Party (KKE) followed a series of conflicting

policies. Whilst membersof the KKE were servingin governmentsof national unity, the

KKE Politburo was planning military operationsto topple those governments.On the

Greek governmentside, personal ambitions, party friction, power politics and

international Cold War developmentseach played ar ole inap rocessof rn aking and

dissolvinggoverranents. of theseinternaldifferencesis essentialto an

An understanding

explanationof how policy was developedand of the difficulties in its implementation.

In theseyearsintervention was the central issuein Greek history. Both the Greek

governmentand the Greek communistscalled for foreign intervention. The former was

privileged in that its allies were readyto fight communism.The latter was lessfortunate.

Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria provided limited source of assistance.The Kremlin

 4
2
was not interestedin the fight of the Greek Communist Party (KKE). Intervention was

also the constant theme of Anglo-Greek 3

relations. What the Greek Communist Party

denounced as 'monarcho-fascist interventionA was also the central pillar of both

Churchill and Labour's Cold War policy. Intervention was instrumental in furthering

Britain's two main objectives in Greece:the security of routes to and from the Middle

5 Yet intervention has all too often been

East and the contaimnent of CommuniSM.

interpretedas the sole determinantin developmentsin Greece.6 The form and degreeof

British intervention in 7
oscillated the post-war. It was constant neither in form nor in

intensity. Interventionwas a complexphenomenon.

Not only do many accountsof Anglo-Greek relations fail to take the complexity

of intervention into accountbut also they fail to note that foreign intervention was far

from being the sole determinant of developments in Greece. The very fact that

intervention occurredunevenlyin time, location and form gave Greekparticipantsin the

2 Chiclet claims that Stalin usedthe KKE his Cold War

as strategy.Ch. Chiclet, Les CommunistesGrecs
dansla Guerre-Histoiredu Parti Communistede GrOcede 19410 1949 (Paris, 1987).Iatrides,on the
contraryalthougha left-wing sympathiser,puts the blameon the KKE itself for the way it hasinterpreted
Sovietpolicy. latrides, 'Perceptionsof SovietInvolvementin the Greek Civil War 1945-1949',in L.
Baerentzen,J. 0. Iatrides, 0. L. Smith (eds.), Studiesin the History of the GreekCivil War (Copenhagen,
1987),pp. 225-248;Similarly, in 0. Smith, 'The GreekCommunistParty, 1945-1949',in D. Close(ed),
The GreekCivil War, pp. 129-155. A detailedaccountof the KKE's policy is of P. J. Stavrakis,Moscow
and Communists,1944-1949(London, 1989).
3For a left-wing
accounton foreign interventionin Greecesee:H. Richter, British Intervention in Greece:
From Varkizato Civil War.February 1945 to August 1946 (London, 1985);B. Kontis, Anglo-American
Policy and the Greekproblem 1945-1949-HAy7Ao-Aycpwaviký HoAmK4Kai ToEUqVIK6ffp6fl2qya-
(Thessaloniki,1984);J. 0. Iatrides, 'Britain, the United States,and Greece,1945-1949',in D. H. Close,
(ed.), TheGreekCivil War, 1943-1950(London, 1993);J. 0. Iatrides, 'Civil War, 1945-1949:National
andInternationalAspects', in J. 0. Iatrides(ed), Greecein 1940s,pp. 195-219;J. Iatrides, 'Britain, the
United Statesand Greece',in D. Close(ed), TheGreekCivil War,pp. 190-213.For non pro-KKE
accounts:L. Stavrianos,Greece:AmericanDilemma and Opportunity (Chicago, 1952);L. S. Wittner,
AmericanIntervention in Greece1943-1949(New York, 1982).Hereaftercited asAmericanIntervention.
A. Nachmani,'Civil War and ForeignInterventionin Greece:1946-1949',Journal of Contemporary
History 25 (1990), pp. 489-522;R. Ovendale,'Britain, the United Statesand the EuropeanCold War,
1945-19481, History 67 (1987), pp. 217-236.
4 KKE Official Documents KE[pcvavol. 6 (Athens, 1987).
aqua
-E7r!
5F. Northedge,British Foreign Policy (London, 1962);E. Bullock,
TheLife and TimesofErnest Bevin,
vol. II (London, 1967);T. Howarth,Prospectsand Reality. Great Britain 1945-1955(London, 1985).
6 For a right-wing
view seeXydis, Greeceand the GreatPowers.For the left-wing orthodoxy,History of
the KKE 1918-1949-, 40KIUIOIaroplaq TovKKE- (Athens, 1996).
' On the contrary,historian Eudesinterprets
the civil war as a monolithic political and social conflict with
no changeof characterthroughout. Eudes,LesKapetanios.La guerre civile grecquede 1943-1949
(Paris, 1970).
 5

post-warevents a wide d egreeof latitude. This study is based on the perceptionthat

Greek political forces were responsible for developments in Greece. Quite often,

however, accountsof Greek relations with a foreign power are basedon a seriesof a

priori, over-simplified valuejudgements,whosepurposeis to condemnor exoneratethe

policy of a great power or one of the Greekpolitical parties. Although the literature on

the period of the occupation and the civil war is extensive, the great majority of these

studies are violently prejudiced and disappointingly unwilling to comprehend the

interestsor rationale of the 'other' side.8 Theseconspiracyor one-sidedaccountsascribe

primary responsibility for developmentsin Greeceto the foreign factor - thus turning

Greekinternal forcesinto powerlesspuppets.Developmentsin Greece,to a large extent,

shouldbe explainedon the basis of power relations within Greeceitself. In other words,

at various points, such as the outbreak of the civil war or the prolonged political

instability of 1950-1952,the conflicting Greek forces are to be blamed. Consequently,

internal politics must also be taken into account whenever foreign intervention is

judged.

The i nterpretationoft he G reek c ivil w ar and f oreign i nvolvement h asb een a

matterof disputebetweenthe schoolsof thoughtfrom 1950sonwards.The excesses

of
the Cold War led both right-wing and left-wing traditionalist historians of Greeceto

argue that Stalin instigated the KKE insurgency as part of his plan for global

domination. The role of the foreign powers has been emphasised,as well as American

predominanceafter March 1947.Traditionalist historians of the Right of Greecetended

to focus on the KKE and the 'bandit' war and soughtto blame the civil war on the threat

8For a right-wing
view seeAveroff, By Fire and Axe; Xydis, Greeceand the Great Powers.In these
accountsit is claimedthat the KKE waspreparinga revolution by the occupationyears.From the opposite
perspectiveis Psyroukiswho puts the blameof the Greekcivil war on Britain and the United States.N.
Psyroukis,History of ContemporaryGreece,1940-1967- Iaropia
TqqEv7XpovqqEU66aq, 1940-1967
(Athens, 1970);Richter writes that 'the
civil war did not comeas a result of the decisionor the actsof the
KKE, it was rather the outcomeof a
processset in motion by the terrorist actsof the extremeright'. H.
 6

'EAM-Bulgarians'. The Left denouncedthe 'white terror' measuresapplied by the

of

Greekgovernmentto defeatthe Communistsor British and American 'monarch-fascist'

9 A serious drawback of this school of thought is the lack of academic

policy-makers.

proof in their British

accounts. back to the 'white terror' was also the main of
argument

10
the revisionist historiansof Greecedevelopedduring the 1970s.

By the 1980s,however, somehistorians of Greecehad reacheda more critical

Greek the the allies and the Left. John latrides

analysis of the govenunent, role of

underlined both the KKE's commitment to revolution as well as the provocative effect

of the 'white terror'. David Close stressedthe responsibility of the Right, which gave

rise to an apparatusof terror and repression,whilst praising the decisive role of British

American " According to thesehistorians, the civil war resultedfrom a

and intervention.

domesticstrugglefor power aggravatedby Cold War conflict.

These accounts were based upon American and British primary sources.

h
Unavoidably, owever,t hey suffered from aI ack ofp rimary s ourcesd rawn from the

Greek governmentor the Greek Communist Party. For instance,

archivesof either the

the British determinationto maintain Greecewithin its sphereof influence is very well

examined by Procopis The

Papastratis. author provides a scholarly account of British

policy in Greeceand British to

strategies contain the Communist threat. However, the

Richter, 'Varkiza Agreementand the Origins of the GreekCivil War', in J. 0. Iatrides (ed.), Greecein the
1940s(London, 1981), p. 179.
9Among the right-wing historianssee:E. Averoff, By Fire and Axe-ocoTldKai TacKo6pi(Athens,1974);
D. Kousoulas,Revolutionand Defeat (London, 1956). For an accountof left-wing historianssee:the
publicationsof the Greek Communist Party; J. Meynaud,Les Forces Politiques En GrOce(Etudes De
SciencePolitique, 1965).White terror is the term usedby the Left to deflinethe governmentmeasuresto
defeatthe communists.
10Eudes,TheKapetanios(London, 1972);0. L. Smith, 'Self Defenceand CommunistPolicy 1945-1947',
in L. Baerentzen,J. 0. Iatrides,0. L. Smith (eds.), Studiesin the History of the GreekCivil War
(Copenhagen,1987),pp. 159-179;N. Alivizatos, 'The "EmergencyRegime" and Civil Liberties, 1946-
1949', in Iatrides (ed.), Greecein the 1940s,pp. 220-228;latrides, 'Civil War 1945-1949',in H. 0. L.
Smith, 'Self Defenceand CommunistPolicy 1945-1947, in L. Baerentzen,J. 0. latrides, 0. L. Smith
(eds.), Studiesin the History of the GreekCivil War (Copenhagen,1987),pp. 159-179.H. Fleischer,
Crown and Swastika:Greeceunder Occupationand Resistance-ETtypa Kai EP60TIKa:H F-UMa KaTic
Tjv Karqý Kai &TIoTao-q,vols. 1- 2, (Athens,1988,1995).
 7

Foreign Office documentsto British Greekpolicy.12

authorrelies mainly on analyse and

The 'December Events' and the Warkiza Agreement' are analysedin great detail by

Heinz Richter. The author's interpretation is based on Foreign Office files, Greek

newspapersand KKE official publications.The author condemnsBritish policy makers

'Tories as well as Labourites' for the prolongation of the civil war becausethey did not

the Greek from 'white terror' 13George Alexander's study

prevent government practises.

of British policy in Greece takes the opposite view. Alexander provides a thorough

analysisof British its

policy and struggleto contain communists' attemptsto take over

power. Like Richter, however, Alexander's primary sources on decision-making are

almost exclusively Foreign Office documents.

As a result, his analysisis limited mainly

14
to the British point of view. Lawrence Wittner's important study, American

Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949 (New York, 1982), is based mainly on American

governmental sources and British Foreign Office documents. Wittner thoroughly

examined American policy regarding Greece on the eve of the Cold. He himself

acknowledges,however, the limitations imposed on him by lack of work in Greek

Robert
archives. Frazier his
casts net wide to write his seminalstudyAnglo-American

Relations with Greece.Frazier's book was basedon sourcesfrom the Foreign Office,

the Ministry of Defence, the Treasury, the office of the Prime Minister and private

papersof Hugh Dalton,MyersandWoodhouse.

The authoralsoreadswidely in the US

National Archives and a variety of American private papers.Perhapsas a result of this

wide coverageFrazier becameconvincedof the pivotal importanceof the British role in

11Iatrides, 'Perceptions Soviet Involvementin the GreekCivil War 1945-1949',in Baerentzen,

of
Iatrides,Smith (eds.), Studiesin the History of the GreekCivil War 1945-1949,pp. 225-249;D. Close
(ed.), TheGreekCivil War,pp. 156-185.
12p. Papastratis,British Foreign Policy towardsGreeceduring the SecondWorld War 1941-1944
(London, 1984).
13H. Richter, British Intervention in Greece:From Varkiza Civil War,February 1945to August 1946
to
(London, 1986);H. Richter, 'The Varkiza Agreementandthe Origins of the Civil War', in Iatrides(ed.),
Greecein the 1940s,pp. 176-177.
14G. M. Alexander, ThePrelude to
the TrumanDoctrine: British Policy in Greece1944-1947(Oxford,
1982).
 S

the Cold War and developmentsin Greece.He arguesthat 'the only motivation for the

British withdrawal from Greecewas Bevin's fervent desireto bring the United Statesto

the defenceof Europein the face of a Soviet threat'. Frazier stressesthat mutual Anglo-

American perception of a Soviet threat to world peace 'gave a new basis for joint
15
Anglo-American policies'. The book was once again based solely on British and

American documents.

In drawing attention to the shortcomings of previous studies, one acknowledges

how much historianshavebeenimpededby the lack of Greek sources.Even though this

thesis marks a step forward in integrating Greek and British sources, archival

impedimentsare s till e xtant. A Ithought he I ong I astingp roblem.oft he f ifty-year rule

restriction regarding documentson the Greek civil war was solved in 1999 it is, even

now, still applied to the post-civil war era and documents referring to NATO. An

additional obstacleis the underdevelopedstate of the Service of Historical Archive of

the GreekMinistry of Foreign Affairs (Ynqpcciu la'ropticoi)ApXct'Oi),YIA) that renders

researchextremely slow. As a result of cataloguing and filing there are still many

restrictionson viewing eventhosedocumentsthat shouldbe madeavailable.Similar

difficulties hamperresearchin the GreekGeneralStaff/ Directorateof History of the

Army (]Fcvtic6Earrekdo l'rpaTol)/AtF,-60i)vaTjlaropia; Drpam-6, ]FEE/AIE) archive. The

lack of an organised archival service results in serious restrictions on documents

available to research.The problem is slightly easedin the caseof the military archive

due to the availability the official publications of the Greek General Staff, cited as

GES/DIS to underline the distinction betweenthe military primary documentscited as

FEVAIE. Accessto the archive of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) is still forbidden

to researchersrendering the assessmentof the policy of the KKE during the civil war

yearsboth dangerousand difficult. Although there are published official collections of

15R. Frazier,Anglo-AmericanRelations
with Greece(London, 1991),p. 180.
 9

documentsof the Party that presentthe official party line, aswell as memoirswritten by

be 16
Partymembers,theseshould treatedwith greatcaution.

The literature on the Cold War and power relations between the actors is a

matter of debatefor years.An interpretationthat dominatedfor the last twenty years-the

height of the Cold War animosities-broadlyacceptedthe positions taken by western

literature. An orthodox or traditional point of view developed the basic argument of the

influential Soviet expansionism.The orthodox westerninterpretationputs the blame for

the Cold War on the USSR whereasthe Cold War remained only betweenthe United

Statesand the Soviet Union. The revisionist critique of this interpretation led into a

reassessmentof the United States involvement in the making of the Cold War.

American economic imperialism is brought the ccntrc stage. A post-rcvisionist

interpretationwas developedin the 1970sto avoid polarities of the above debate.Both

previous views were criticised for being too simplistic in their adherenceto one

particular side of the "

argument. Thus a typical post-revisionistconclusionstatesthat

The Cold War grew out of a complicatedinteraction of external and

internal developmentsinside both the United Statesand the Soviet
Union. The external situation-circumstancesbeyond the control of

either power- left the Americans and Russiansfacing one another

acrossa prostrateEurope."

However,this post-revisionistconclusionfrom Gaddis sharesbi-polar assumptions

along with both the orthodoxand revisionistwriters. Thus, the Cold War literature

either o rthodox, r evisionist orp ost-revisionistb lamesore xoneratese ither the United

Statesor the USSR for any contest.Both the origins and the first Cold War yearsseem

to be a matter of interaction between only the two superpowerswhere there is no

16One example
of secondaryliteraturebasedon researchin the KKE's primary sourcesis the work
written by Gr. Farakos.Farakoshad beenarchivistof the KKE for more than thirty yearsand an active
KKE memberfor more than forty. Gr. Farakos,December1944-JcKtyflp? 7q1944 (Athens, 1996);Gr.
Farakos,ELAS and Power Kai Eýovuia (Athens,2000).
-EAAE
 10

mention of smaller powers involved and especially Britain. The initial stimulus to re-

evaluate Britain's role came from Deighton who argues that all such writing is

profoundly 'unhistorical' and that 'Britain carried out the responsibility for the Cold

War as much as Russia and America'. ` Deighton's argument is based on the premise

that three main victors emergedfrom the SecondWorld War and that the 'Big Three'

constitutedof three The

superpowers: United States,Soviet Union and Britain. Hence,

in this period Britain was as active and war victor as the other two partnersin tying to

reconstructworld order and geopoliticalbalanceof power.

This latest deconstructionrequires a critical re-evaluation of the whole bipolar

nature of the Cold War. If follows that all bi-polar accountsof the origins of the Cold

War are 'fundamentally deficient"' and from this perspectivethis is indeedtrue. Sucha

complex reality as the Cold War is not a matter of interaction betweenonly two powers

but a multi-dimensional issuewith more actorsinvolved. In an evenmore 'Anglocentric

view of the early Cold War"' Frazier suggeststhat Britain played an important role in

dragging the United States to the international affairs." Ryan also assertsthat the

preoccupationof the Foreign Office was to 'maintaining Great Britain in the first rank

of power' and this made the Cold War its 'secondary objective'." Smith has

summarisedthis new tendencyin historiography as a significant response,which 'has

overtumedthe bi-polarity of the Cold War' and seesthe Cold War as the result of post-

17W. Loth, TheDivision of the World (London, 1988), 9.

p.
" J. L. Gaddis,The United States
and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947(New York, 1972),p. 361.
19A. Deighton, 'The "frozen fronf': The Labour
government,the division of Germanyandthe origins of
the cold war, 1945-17',International Affairs 63 (1987),449-465.On the role of smallerpowersin the
formationof the Cold War consideralso: S. Ball, The Cold War. An International History, 1947-1991
(London, 1998).
20R. H. Hathaway,AmbiguousPartnership: Britain
and America, 1944-1947(New York, 1981),p. 1; T.
H. Anderson,The United States,Great Britain and the Cold War 1944-1947(Columbia, 1981),p. viii.
21D. Reynolds,'Rethinking Anglo-American
relations', International Affairs 65 (1989), 89-111.
22Frazier,Anglo-AmericanPolicy
towards Greece.Thecoming of the Cold War, 1942-1947(London,
1991); R. Frazier, 'Did Britain Startthe Cold War? Bevin and the Truman Doctrine, TheHistorical
Journal 27,3 (1984), 715-727.
23H. B. Ryan, The Vision
ofAnglo-America (Cambridge,1982),p. 9.
 11

interaction between all three power-actors of the wartime Grand Alliance."

war

Although Britain did not remain a greatpower throughout the Cold War era it played a

significant role in the making and formation of the early period and this makes the

British argumentvalid.

This new assumption of British significance in the first Cold War period

enriches British Cold War policy. The argument is that British first priority was to

secure British sphere of influence with American backing. Both Anderson and

Hathaway focus on a 1944 Foreign Office Memorandum,which reads that 'it must be

our purpose not to balance our power against that of America, but to make use of

American power for the purposewhich we regard as good."' As the argumentgoes,if

Britain wantedto maintain its role as a world power, it should securepolitical, financial

and military American For

assistance. British historian Ryan British power crisis could

be overcomeby a close associationwith the United States." Hence Churchill's Anglo-

American 'special relationship' was followed by a co-ordinated foreign policy. On the

sameprinciple the Labour foreign policy continued after Churchill's defeat in the 1945

Bevin's
election. role in the originsof the Cold War is that of another'Cold Warrior'.

Bevin followed the policy of having the US as the means to shore up the British

Empire." Deighton also writes that the overriding aim of the British governmentwas to

ssecurea continuing American commitment to harmony and a balance of power in

Europethat would not favour Communism."'

24R. Smith, 'A climate of opinion: British

officials andthe developmentof British Sovietpolicy, 1943-
1947', International Affairs 65 (1989), 631-47.
25Anderson,The United States,Great Britain
and the Cold War 1944-1947,pp. 12-13;Hathaway,
AmbiguousPartnership: Britain andAmerica, 1944-1947,p. 52. This is also the main themein A.
Bullock, ErnestBevin: Foreign Secretary(London, 1983).Although the argumentgoesback to the First
World War years,it acquiresspecialimportanceduring the early Cold War yearswithin the contextof
British decline.
26Ryan, ne Vision
ofAnglo-America, p. 2.
27Bullock, ErnestBevin: Foreign Secretary(London, 1983);Frazier,Anglo-AmericanRelations
with
Greece,TheComingof the Cold War, 1942-1947.
28Deighton, 'The "frozen fronf': The Labour
government,the division of Germanyand the origins of the
Cold War, 1945-17',International Affairs 63 (1987), 449-465.
 12

Regarding British role in the Cold War origins, Frazier assumesthat British

policy of manoeuvringthe Americanseventuallyproducedthe Cold War and Ryan that

the confrontation of the Cold War was the result of hard work by the British and

especially Churchill. " Rothwell also notes the importance of British post-war policy and

arguesthat the Foreign Office did not point towards an east-west "
confrontation. This

work doesnot considerthat British policy of manoeuvringthe US eventuallyproduced

the Cold War, but that Britain was powerful enough to influence policy-making and

Cold
subsequently War developments.
Hence,British role as 'Cold Warrior', the role of

smaller powers and a multi polar assumptionto understandthe Cold War is a more

balancedinterpretationto the traditional Cold War perceptions.

Although both the Truman Doctrine and NATO creation committed the US to

the defence of Western Europe against Soviet aggression,Britain did not succeedto

remain ag reat p ower f or long. However, in the processof the power struggle of the

early Cold War years it had contributed to the making of the Cold War geopolitical

order. As Reynolds put it, the British argument 'offers a healthy antidote to an

American
excessively dominatedaccountof westernpolicy in the Cold War'.` This

thesis is built on the promise that Britain played a formative role in the early Cold War

years.

The detailed analysesof British and American policy written sincethe I 980s

form the startingpoint for the presentthesis.By using new Greek sourcesand delving in

archivesof British agenciesother than the Foreign Office, it is able to go beyondthem

and suggestthat relations betweenBritain and Greecewere close throughout the whole

period under examination, despite the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine and the

29Frazier,Anglo-American
policy towardsGreece.Thecomingof the Cold War, 1942-1947;Ryan, The
VisionofAnglo-America, p. 2.
30V. Rothwell, Britain
and the Cold War 1941-1947(London, 1982).
31Reynolds,'Rethinking Anglo-American
relations',International Affairs 65 (1989), 108.
 13

interventionist taken by the United States 32

government. In particular, it
more stance

arguesthat the post-1947 situation was dynamic and fluid. It by

was marked constant

military and political manoeuvreas the British, the Greek government and the KKE

constantly reassessedtheir interests and their tactics. British military influence remained

a vital elementin Greek politics not only in the final yearsof the civil war but also until

Greece'sentry into NATO in 1952.

The structure of this study is both chronological and thematic. The work is

divided into six chapterspresentedin chronological order. Chapter one gives a general

picture of the driving forces that influenced the course of events and the key

participants.It considersthe reasonsfor the dramatic rise in communist strengthduring

the occupation and the aims of EAM/ELAS; the communist political and military

resistanceorganisation. The significance of British involvement in Greece and its

policies to securea broadly basedpost-war goverranentare also assessed.The chapter

refutes the traditionalist argumentof historians of Greecethat the civil war broke out as

a result of a monolithic c ommunistp Ian tos eize p ower.33Similarly, it dismissesthe

view thatthe British provokedthe Left into 34

hostilitiesandcausedthe civil war. It also

softens the leftist argumentthat the Warkiza Agreement' became,in the hands of the
35
government,an instrumentof revenge.

32In the presentwork there is discussion

no abouteconomicrelationsbetweenGreece,Britain and the
United States,which is an issueexploredby the unpublishedthesisof J. Stefanidis,The UnitedStates,
Great Britain and Greece,1949-1952(University of London, 1992).Stefanidisfocuseson American-
backedrecoveryprogrammesin Greecebetweenthe end of the civil war and the inaugurationof Papagos'
premiership.From this perspectivehe arguesthat after 1947America was undoubtedlythe dominant
foreign power in Greece.Stefanidis,The UnitedStates,GreatBritain and Greece,1949-1952,p. 58. This
work howeveris still basedon AmericanandBritish documents.On the Americanpolicy consult:L.
Wittner, 'American Policy toward Greece,1946-1949',in J. Iatrides (ed), Greecein the 1940s,pp. 229-
238.
33This is the
main themein A. Averoff, By Fire and Axe-OCOTid Kai TacKobpi(Athens, 1974);K.
Tsoukalas,TheGreek Tragedy(London, 1969).
34See:Th. Mosxatos,TheKapetaniosMeeting in Lamia-HE6myll Karcravalow Aapla
raw M
(Athens,1985).
35H. Richter, 'The Varkiza Agreement
andthe Origins of the Civil War', in J. 0. Iatrides (ed.), Greecein
the 1940s,pp. 167-181.
 14

Chapter two examinesBritish policy towards Greecein 1947 and assesses

the

British role in the American policy that turned into the Tnmian Doctrine. The

significanceof the British note of February 1947 on Greeceis its

analysedand effects

within the Cold War context are evaluated.The chapter traces the evolution of Greek

expectationsof Britain during the period of the escalationof the civil war and outlines

the importance the Greek government attributed to British aid and assistance.The

chapter examines in detail Greek counter-insurgencyoperations (COIN) in 1947 and

outlines the gradualchangein the practisesof the National Anny (NA). The role of the

British Military Mission (BMM) in the re-organisationof the national forcesis analysed.

American missions also had as hareint he r e-organisationoft he n ational f orcesand

thereforean evaluation of British and American co-operationis attempted.Thirdly, the

policies of the KKE and EAM are examinedand the responsibility of the party for the

is Zahariadis
civil war assessed. and the KKE Politburo's policy in the spring 1947 is

analysed.The aims of the DemocraticArmy (DA) and the subsequenttransformationof

the civil war from guerrilla fighting to conventional warfare are also outlined. The

chapterrefutesthe view of the right-wing traditionalisthistoriansof Greecethat the

36
British supportedright-wing governmentsappointedby the Palace. It is demonstrated

that British policy supportedmoderategovernmentsof the Centrein an attemptto soften

the political extremes. It also refutes the orthodox left-wing view that British

imperialism had turned Greek politicians into puppets.37The Greek government,it is

suggested,was mainly responsiblefor its own weaknessesand disabilities. Moreover,

the orthodox view that the Soviet Union and its communist satellites fomentedthe civil

war in Greece 38
and that the KKE was acting as their agent is also refuted. The

36S. Markezinis, Contemporary Political History

of Greece-E67Xpov?l IZoAiTxý JoTopla TqqEUM a,q
2, (Athens, 1994). ,
Hereafter cited as Markezinis, Political History- ffob=4 IoTopla
vol.
37This is the
argument put forward in the official history of the KKE. History of the KKE-, JOKfuiO
Iaropfaq Tot) KKE (Athens, 1996).
38G. Kousoulas, Revolution
and Defeat: The Story of the Greek Communist Party (Oxford, 1965).
 15

revisionist view that the communistswere fighting only in responseto the aggressionof

the Greek is
government also dismissed39Like the government,the KKE was pursuing
.
its own aims with considerablesuccess.

The chapterdissentsfrom the view that British involvement in Greekaffair came

40
to a deliberateend in February 1947 as a result of British financial problems. Instead,

it offers an accountof how Greeceremainedwithin the strategicsphereof Britain after

February 1947. The American presenceis explained in terms of supporting British

policy. Regardlessof the Truman Doctrine, the Greek governmentcontinuedto expect

support and assistancefrom Britain, especiallyin the form of British Military Mission

training the Greek National Army. British assistancein the organisation of Greek

counterinsurgencyoperationafter spring 1947 further demonstratesthe British intention

to continuesupportfor the governmentalfight againstthe DemocraticArmy.

Chapter three examinesin depth the developmentof Greek counter-insurgency

operations and the evolution of the Greek national forces into an effective and self-

sufficient machine. Although the Democratic Army evolved into a sophisticatedand

complex force, capable of challenging the National Army the governmentalmilitary

machine gradually managedto defeat the Communist forces. The chapter refutes the

contention of the orthodox view that the KKE lost the war becauseof lack of support

from the Soviet Union and the closureof the Yugoslav borders.41The left-wing claim of

the historiansof Greecethat the westernallies defeatedthe communistarmy is also

dismissed.42 Instead, the chapter demonstratesthat a combination of factors brought

bout the victory of the National Army over the Democratic Army. The fighting

39Alivizatos, 'The "EmergencyRegime"

and Civil Liberties, 1946-1949',in Iatrides (ed.), Greecein the
1940s,pp. 221-228.
40Vlavianos, Greece,1941-1949, 236; Eudes,TheKapetanios, 279.
p. p.
41See:Averoff, By Fire
and Axe; S. Vukmanovic,How and Whythe People's Liberation Struggleof
GreeceMet With Defeat (London, 1985).
 16

efficiency of the National Army, the western allies' the

assistance, KKE's inability to

cope with conventional warfare and the lack of communist foreign support all finally

brought the defeat of the Democratic Army. The British role in this process is examined,

with the aim of defining the true extent of British involvement in the civil war and the

British shareof responsibility for the defeatof the KKE. In particular, the evolution of

is
air power analysedin detail, becauseit was a decisive factor in the defeat of the

communist forces. The Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) supported, trained and

equipped by the Royal Air Force (RAF) added a new dimension to governmental

The
supremacy. co-operationbetweenthe British Military Mission and the Joint United

StatesMilitary Aid Planning Greece(JUSMAPG) is analysed,with the aim of offering a

realistic account of the allies' relationship. The chapter deconstructsthe view that

British and American policies were identical and their co-operationstraightforwardand

43The revisionist view that completeAmerican domination prevailed on the

undisrupted.

is
Greek sceneof operation,following the British withdrawal, also 44
dismissed. Instead,

the chapteroffers a more complex andbalancedinterpretationof the situation in Greece.

Chapterfour revolvesaroundthe issuesof thepost-civilwar searchfor domestic

reconciliation and stability. The characterof the Greek politicians within the processof

cabinetmaking and dissolution is examined.The failure of the Greek governmentto

forrn a long-lasting administration is analysed.The failure of the Greek political world

to embracenational reconciliationmeasuresdue to the pressureof the Cold War

exaggerationis described.The that

chaptersuggests instability and extremismoccurred

not becauseof but despite British intervention. Although British support for King Paul

and moderatecabinetsplayed a role in Greece'spolitical development,Britain exercised

42See:N. Psyroukis,History ContemporaryGreece,1940-1967-IoTopla rbyxpovq,;E'u6zaq, 1940-

of Tjq
1967(Athens, 1975).S. Grigoriadis,History of ContemporaryGreece,1941-1974-Io-roplainq E6yxPovlq
E,U6&aq1941-1974(Athens, 1978).
43Averoff, By Fire
and Axe-Owud Kai TucKo6pi,p. 267.
44O'Ballance, The GreekCivil War,
pp. 173-175.
 17

a light touch with regard to Greek domestic affairs. Partly as a result of this relation,

Anglo-Greek amity in the foreign policy field was maintained.The relative importance

of the Cyprusissuein the early 1950sbearstestamentto thesegood relations.

Chapterfive analysesthe failure of the Centreexperimentin Greekpolitics. The

role of the Palace and the royal solution to the parliamentary deadlock is examinedas

well as the nature of royal politics. Foreign intervention in Greek affairs is also

examined.The responseof the Greek political world to the Papagossolution put into

questionthe kind of governmentthe Greekswanted for themselves.Both the palaceand

the governmentlooked to Britain for support and the British thus becamean integral

part of Greek political The

machinations. chapter discussesalso the American shareof

responsibility and the United States' objectives in the new system. This discussion

reveals the essentialunity of aims maintained by Britain and America. Both chapters

four and five examine in detail the domestic aspectof Greek politics. These chapters

refute the traditional claim of historians of Greecethat the Palace enjoyed the Foreign

Office's full support and that Britain was obsessedwith imposing a right-wing

45
monarchicalgovernment. British
Instead, aims are analysedin the light of British

pursuit ofas trong and d emocraticallye lected g overnmentoft he Centre to moderate

polarisation. The failure of the Greek governmentto fonn a strong and self-sufficient

cabinetis explained,therefore,in terms of Greekinternal developments.

Chapter six examines the evolution of Greece's entry into NATO as a full

member.The chapterattemptsto moderateover-exaggeratedclaims regardingGreece's

importanceto NATO. 46Instead,the chaptersuggeststhat there were variety of reasons

that convinced NATO's membersto accept Greeceinto the North Atlantic Alliance.

None was decisive in itself, rather it was the accumulationof perceivedadvantagesthat

45Markezinis,Political History-ffobriký Icropla,

pp. 295-300.
46A. Siapkaras,'The Importance Greeceto NATO', Military Review(August 1961),90-97.
of
 18

led to the decision.The chapteralso challengesthe view that Greece'sentry into NATO

Instead, it interpretation by
was solely an American objective. gives a more rounded

he int his d C tot he of left-

analysingt B ritish r ole ecision-making. ontrary c ontention

wing historians,who portray Greeceas capitulating to 'imperial interests', Anglo-Greek

relationsare explainedin the light of mutual interests.

 19

I Setting the Stage: 1941-1946

From Resistance to Civil War

In May 1941 the GennansdefeatedGreek forces and their British allies. King

GeorgeH accompaniedby Prime Minister Emmanuel Tsouderos,the cabinet, and the

bulk British Greek forces to to '

Egypt. The
great of the and were obliged withdraw

government-in-exile establisheditself in Cairo, while the King removed himself to

London. In occupied Greecea seriesof collaborationist cabinets -quisling- functioned

under the Axis authorities, however the de jure Greek government recognisedby the

2
Allies was King George'sH government-in-exile.

Within a short time resistancebeganin occupiedGreece.The Greek Communist

Party - the KKE - was the first group to organiseresistance.The Sixth Plenum of the

Central Committee of the KKE in July 1941 endorseda national front policy and called

upon 'the Greeks,the parties and their organisations'tofonn a national liberation front

to fight imperialistic 3 As a result of its resistanceactivities the KKE

againstany power'.

gained considerable political influence among the Greeks. The National Liberation

Front (EAM) was founded by the KKE on 27 September1941. The declaredaims of

EAM included the I iberation of the nation from foreign elements;the formation of a

provisional government by EAM after the liberation; and the safeguardingof 'the

fundamental right' of the Greek people to decide upon the forin of their future

4
governmentthemselves. Resistanceto the Germans,however, was the priority that

1For an accountof Greek-British

relationsduring the pre-warperiod see,J. Koliopoulos, Greeceand the
British Connection1935-1941(Oxford, 1977).
2The Greekgovernment,together
with an army of 58,000British, who had assistedthe GreekArmy
againstthe Axis, were transferredto Cairo. Prime Minister was E. Tsouderos,a former Governorof the
Bank of Greeceand liberal by conviction,who also enjoyedthe confidenceof the conservativeparty.
3KKE Official Documents1940-1945-KKEEximlya KElyeva,
vol. 5 (Athens, 1981), p. 39. For a map of
Greecesee:D. 1 p. 187.
4KKE Official Documents1940-1945-KKEExim7yaKelyeva,
vol. 5 (Athens, 1981), p. 39.
 20

swelled the numbers of EAM, appealing to members from diverse political

5
backgrounds.

Other resistancemovements followed. Yet none managed to mobilise large

segmentsof the urban and rural population as effectively as had EAM. General

Napoleon Zervas created the National Republican Greek League (EDES) on 9

6
September 1941. Although the republican General Nicolaos Plastiras nominally headed

EDES the right-winger Zervas was its true leader. EDES was second only to EAM in

members,although far less popular. Colonel Psarrosfounded the National and Social
7
Liberation (EKKA). This was a third and even weaker organisation.To someextent a

resistancemovementrepresentedeachmajor political party. Yet despitethe number of

resistancegroups, EAM was the most popular and powerful. Although exact numbers

are lacking, it has been claimed that EAM had up to some two million members-
8
almostthirty per cent of the population.

EAM's mass appeal was the result of its nation-wide operations. The other

groupswere purely regional in their activities. EDES operatedin Epirus and EKKA in

Rourneli. EAM developed a full political programme and established numerous

subsidiaryorganisations,designedto enlist the support of all sectionsof the population,

5L. S. Stavrianos,'The GreekNational Liberation Front (EAM): A

study in ResistanceOrganisationand
Administration', Journal of Modern History 24 (1952), 42-54; History of the KKE-JOKI'pwIaroplacrOv
KKE, pp. 387-89.
6GeneralNicolaos Plastirashad distinguishedhimself in the 1909
and 1922military coupsfor his
republicanisrn.He was in self-exile in Parisfollowing a failed putschin 1933.After the end of the civil
war he createdNational ProgressiveCentreUnion Party (EPEK). In the period 1950-52he headed
coalition governmentsof the Centreand advocatedmeasuresof leniencytowardsthe communists.Zervas
wasa soldier andpolitician aswell. In 1941he foundedEDES and in 1945he resignedfrom the army to
becomea politician. He servedasMinister of Public Order in 1947,in which he wasnoted for his harsh
anti-Communistmeasures.In 1950hejoined the Liberal Party and servedas Minister of Public Works in
1950-51.
7 K. Pyromaglou, National Resistance. EAM-EL4S-EDES-EKKA-E6vixý AvTlo-rauq.
EAM-ELAS-EDES-
EKKA (Athens, 1975); For an account of EKKA, K. Pyromaglou, George Kartalis
and his Period 1934-
195 7-0 r KapTaqq Kai H ExqX4 I (Athens, 1965).
TOV,Vol.
8 Stavrianos,'The GreekNational Liberation Front (EAM): A Study in ResistanceOrganisation
and
Administration', Journal ofModern History 24 (1952),44.
 21

the in 9
character. EAM's appeal was
whilst other groups were primarily military

by
strengthened the fon-nation of the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), in

March 1942.10The KKE, therefore, through EAM/ELAS established itself as a

dominant resistance power. A military Commander, or Kapetanios, was in charge.

ThanassisKlaras, under the nameof Aris Velouhiotis, becamethe political and military

to the first band to to the to fight! 1 Thus the KKE by

adviser guerrilla go mountains

1942had takenthe lead as the most sophisticatedforce operatingin Greece.

Greeceremainedwithin the British zone of interest during the war years.British

policy inG reecefocused u pon m aintaining i ts i nfluence int he c ountry soastoh elp

securethe 'traditionally British area' of the Mediterraneanand the Middle East in the

long-term. In the short-term the presenceof King George in London and the Greek

governmentin exile under British protection also servedto keep interest alive. One of

the principle supply lines from Germanyto Field Marshal Rommel in North Africa ran

through Greece.As a result the British were keen to becomeinvolved in the direction of

resistanceactivities in Greece.The SpecialOperationExecutive (SOE) war organisation

devotedits attentionto thepossibilitiespost-occupation 12

andsabotage.
resistance

British contacts with the resistance organisations became more intense in

October 1942,when SOE-Cairo decidedto launch OperationHarling. Its objective was

9 G. M. Alexander, ThePrelude to the TmmanDoctrine (Oxford, 1982), 13. For a scholaraccountOf

p.
Greekoccupationyears:J. Hondros,Occupationand Resistance.The Greek,4gony 1941-1944(New
York, 1983).
10EAM claimedthat its members October 1944rose to 1,500,000 the number is over
up until members;
exaggerated,however,thereis no doubt that EAM was the most widespreadOrganisationin termsof
membersand sympathisers.N. Svoronos,'The Main Problemsof the Period 1940-1950in Greek
History', in Iatrides (ed.), Greecein the 1940s,pp. 1-16.The dramaticrise of communiststrengthis dual
to its doublepolitical and military nature.
11From March 1943,StefanosSarafis ELAS together Velouhiotis an EAM's
was an commander, with and
political conu-nissar. S. Sarafis,ELAS (London, 1980),pp. 50,100,272. EAM representatives were taking
part in ELAS's commanddealingexclusivelywith political affairs. The position of the EAM
representativewas abolishedin March 1944whenEAM and the KKE foundedPEEA-its provincial
governmentin the mountains.
12For an account SOE
of activities in Greecesee:R. Clogg, 'The SpecialOperationExecutivein Greece',
in latrides (ed.), Greecein the 1940s,pp. 109-111;B. Sweet-Escott,'SOE in the Balkans', in Ph. Auty
andR. Clogg (eds.), British Policy towards WartimeResistancein Yugoslaviaand Greece(London,
1975)p.7. Thereaftercited asBritish Policy; R. Clogg, 'Pearlsfrom Swine', in British Policy, p. 192.
 22

to blow up the Athens-Salonikarailway and thus prevent the dispatch of Axis re-

inforcementsto North Africa. Three British commandoteams- nine officers and three

non-commissionedofficers - led by Colonel Edward C. W. 'Eddie' Myers, with Major

Christopher M. Woodhouse,as second-in-command,parachutedinto central Greece.

The operation was to be accomplishedby Colonel Myers, ELAS guerrillas under

13
Velouhiotis, EDES guerrillas under Zervas and other minor resistancegroups. On the

night of 25-26 November 1942,they blew up the Gorgopotamosviaduct. This operation

was SOE's in
greatestsuccess 1942.Initially, the intention had been for Myers' team to

evacuateGreecethereafter.However, Myers received orders to remain in Greeceto co-

ordinate the activities of the various resistancemovements.Keeping a generaleye on

political forces in Greece was also one of Myers' assignedtasks. Subsequentlythe

British resistance and intelligence group became the British Military Mission in

14The missioncontrolledthe distributionof money,arms,and othersupplies.

Greece.

Managementof the British Military Mission was entrusted to the British SOE-Cairo.

Although resistanceactivities continued,however, there was to be no other spectacular

by
act of resistanceorganised British and Greekforces.The amountof suppliesand

that
assistance was provided by the British to ELAS to fight the Gennanswas actually

very limited. The reason for this was that the British did not intend to boost the
15
communistforces.

13For early resistanceactivitiesbetweenthe British and EAM see,E. W. Myers, GreekEntanglement

(London, 1955);C. M. Woodhouse,'Early British Contactswith the GreekResistancein 1942', Balkan
Studies12, no. 2, (1971), 347-354;R. Clogg, 'Pearlsfrom Swine': the Foreign Office Papers,SOEand
the GreekResistance',in Ph. Auty and R. Clogg (eds),British Policy, pp. 167-208.C. Woodhouse,'The
National Liberation Front and the British Connection',in J. Iatrides (ed), Greecein the 1940s,pp. 81-101.
14E. W. C. Myers, GreekEntanglement(London, 1955),pp. 13-96;C. M. Woodhouse,'Early British
Contactswith the GreekResistancein 1942', Balkan Studies12, no.2 (1971), 347-354.
15O'Ballance, TheGreekCivil War,
pp. 56-57.E. Barker arguesthat British policy towardsthe various
resistancemovementsin Greece'seemeda matterof conflict' provoking civil war, in Barker,British
Policy, p. 148; Sfikasalso emphasises the negativeeffect of British assistancetowardsELAS, for
simultaneouslychallengingthe Greekestablishedorder.Th. Sfikas, TheBritish Labour Governmentand
the GreekCivil War-01 A7yAoiEpyaTIK01 Kai 0 EUt7viK6q Eu(pbAioq, (Athens, 1996),p. 47. On this line,
Vlavianosnotesthat the British assistanceto ELAS hasits sharein the civil war that followed in that it
cabled'contradictory' ordersafter 1943.Vlavianos,Greece1941-1949,p. 30. Sarafisrefutesenormous
British assistanceto the KKE. Sarafis,ELAS,p. 278. KKE's future political strategywould prove that,
 23

Despite British efforts to limit EAM's powersby mid-1943 the communistshad

managedto fill the power vacuum left by the absenceof the government-in-exileand

the distrust felt by most Greeksof the quisling cabinets.EAM dominatedthe resistance

sceneby combining both political and military power. Myers wanted the guerrillas and

the governmentin Cairo to co-operatewith eachother. On 10 August 1943,Myers, now

promoted to Brigadier, and his political adviser Major D. Wallace flew to Cairo with a

guerrilla delegation to meet with the government-in-exile.The delegation consistedof

six Greeks, the

representing main resistance EAM
organisations. securedfour out of the

six places.The aim of the delegationwas to obtain recognition of their statusas part of

the armedforces of Greecefrom the Greek govemment-in-exile.The delegateshad two

main demands.
Firstly, that King GeorgeH should declare that he would not return to

Greecebefore the conductof a plebiscite.16Secondly,that the Greek governmentshould

be broadenedto includeEAM's members,who shouldhold threeportfolioswithin the

new government:Interior, War, and Justice.Thesemembersshould be able to exercise

their powers from within Greece.

The Foreign Office 17Rex Leeper, the British Ambassadorto the

was appalled.

Greek governmentbasedin Cairo, accusedMyers of encouragingand empoweringthe

communists.As a result, Myers was replacedby Chris Woodhouse as Commanderof

the British Military Mission in Greece.Republicanclaims also alarmedthe GreekKing.

On 18 August 1943, King Georgecabled Roosevelt and Churchill, appealingfor their

supportagainstthe demandof the delegationto postponehis return to Greeceuntil after

regardlessthe British, the Party was inclined to claim for power. Of the sameopinion are: O'Ballance,
TheGreekCivil War,pp. 75-76,85-86; C. Shrader,The WitheredVine(London, 1999),p. 52; C.
Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece(London, 1976),pp. 27,3 6,64. In this senseboth Sarafisand
Woodhouseproved right
16The position of the King
was alwaysin debatein Greece.Royalistsand republicanshad beencompeting
since 1920s.E. C. Myers, 'The AndarteDelegationto Cairo: August 1943', in Auty, Clogg (eds.), British
Policy, p. 166; C. Woodhouse,'Summer 1943:The Critical Months', in Auty, Clogg (eds.), British
Policy, p. 137.
17Churchill supportedthe GreekKing
andmonarchyin Greece,as a sign of political stability and
proximity to the West.
 24

a plebiscite. Four days later, the American President and the British Prime Minister

replied to the King's telegram after their meeting in Quebec. Both supported 'his

he 18
contentionthat was preparedto return to Greeceas soonas possible'. Churchill and

Eden believed that Britain's post-war supremacyin G reece,c ould b est bes ecuredby

working through monarchy, an institution to which they also felt a strong attachment.

Rooseveltdid not object Churchill's sympathyfor the old order of Greece,althoughhe

remained determined to involvement in Greek 19Greece and the Balkans in

avoid affairs.

general,were consideredby the Americans to be outside their area of interest in late

1943.

The Cairo meeting was a failure. Churchill, Eden, and British Ambassador

Leeper, together with the Greek cabinet, refused the demands of the KKE. The

delegationdepartedfrom Cairo within daysof its arrival. Richard Clogg haswritten that

'the total failure of the mission [ ] coupled with the evidence that the Greek
...

government-in-exilehad receivedof the strong commitment of the British government

to the support of the King, was certainly a factor contributing to the outbreak of civil

war between 20
the rival groups'. The agendaof the Cairo delegation,therefore,was

crucial in establishing the course of future events. Churchill in particular was

detenninedto re-establishthe pre-war order in Greece.21

In October 1943, anned clashesbroke out between ELAS and EDES. What is

known as the 'first round' of the civil war hadbegun.Throughoutthe autumnof 1943

8FRUS (1943): 4,14243,932-34: The Conferences Washington

at and Quebec.
9PU13LICRECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/37203R6555,A. Edento Leeper, 16 July 1943;
FRUS(1943): 4,131-32: Aide Memoir, British Embassyto the StateDepartment,24 April 1943;R.
Leeper,"en GreekMeets Greek(London, 1950),pp. 10,27-28; Wittner writes that Rooseveltshared
Churchill's attachmentto the old order in Greeceand this is illustrated in that the AmericanPresidentdid
not object the return of the King in Greece.Wittner,,4mericanIntervention,pp. 10-11.The clashbetween
royalismand republicanismwas an old issuein Greekaffairs including coupsandplebiscitesto demolish
andrestorekingship sincethe inter-warperiod.
20R. Clogg, "'Pearls from Swine":
the ForeignOffice Papers,SOE and the GreekResistance',in Auty,
Clogg (eds.), British Policy, pp. 192-194.
21The Times,I September1943.PUBLIC RECORDOFFICE,KEW (PRO), PREM 3,211/4, Churchill
to the King of the HellenesGeorge11,20August 1943.
 25

and the winter of 1944 the two main resistanceorganisationsbegan a seriesof attacks

againsteach other. Neither to

managed score a victory - although EDES managedto

ELAS that had EDES territory in 22

Epirus. In an attemptto reach
repel units penetrated

a political compromisePremierTsouderosand Leeper

Ambassador in
proposed, January

1944,that Damaskinos,Archbishop of Athens, should act as Regenton the liberation of

Athens from the Germans. Damaskinos would try to bring about a political

understandingamong all parties in Athens, before elections and a plebiscite on the

held. Tsouderos' to EAM's to form

return of the King were aim was pre-empt attempt

23
its own government. On 6 March 1944, the formal agreementof the political parties,

excluding the KKE, over Damaskinos' Regencywas achieved. Sofoulis, leader of the

24
Liberal Party,was nominatedasprime minister in the first post-war government.

By that time the military hostilities betweenEAM and EDES had also come to

A
an end. conferencestartedon 15 February 1944, at the Plaka Bridge, over Arachthos

River inE pirus. E AM/ELAS, E DES and E KKA m embers all took part. Woodhouse,

who as senior BMM officer, had in

a major role arrangingthe Plaka He
conference. had

that 'a solutionmustbe foundnow, or Greecewill

to Cairoandemphasised
telegraphed

the Yugoslavia'.25On 29 February 1944, all parties concurredin the 'Plaka

go way of

Agreement', which put an end to the first round of the civil war. The agreementdefined

22Fraziernotesthat EAM beganthe 'first round' of the Greekcivil war. Frazier,Anglo-American

Relationswith Greece,p. 3 1. On the contrary,Vlavianosstatesthat EDES turned its army againstELAS,
after arranginga cease-firewith the Germans.Vlavianos,Greece1941-1949,p. 34.
23E. Tsouderos,GreekIrregularities in Middle East-Avc0paUeg M Mý0-j AvaroA4 (Athens, 1945), pp.
78,85; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,KEW (PRO),FO 371/43676R1440,Leeper'stelegram,27 January
1944.King Georgehad prornisedto acceptthe Regentto softentensionuntil the plebiscite.Archbishop
Damaskinosheld republicanviews, andhad avoidedthe internecinestrugglesduring the occupationby
focusinghis interestson his flock. He thereforewas a candidateacceptableto all sides.
24ThernistoclesSofoulis leaderof the Liberal Party, Premier 1945-46,
wasrepublicanpolitician and
1947-49.GeorgePapandreoualso consented.He was a republican,anti-Communistcentristpolitician,
prot6g6of the liberal E. Venizelos during the 1920s.
PM in 1944. Leader of the National Political Union
in 1946.In 1950he foundedthe small SocialDemocraticParty, an offshoot of the old Venizelist party; he
servedin shortlived Centrecoalition cabinetsin 1950-1951.
25PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/43681R3430,Woodhouseto Cairo, 27 February
1944.
 26

the areaof operationsof EAM and EDES with

organisations, EDES being confined to

26
its heutland o Epirus.

Nonetheless,on 10 March 1944,EAM announcedthe formation of the Political

Committeeof National Liberation (PEEA). The formation of PEEA cameas a shockto

in Cairo. 27 The Chairman of the PEEA was Professor Svolos, an

most politicians

authority on constitutional law. On 9 April 1944, PEEA organised free elections by

secret ballot throughout 'free Greece' (areas under EAM-ELAS control) to create a

'National Council' of 202 delegates.The KKE, through the election of its National

Council, took anotherstep in underminingthe legality and authority of the non-elected

28
govemment-in-exile.

The British governmentwas alarmedby the creationof PEEA. In order to disann

EAM and weakenthe communistplans for taking over power, the Foreign Office asked

Tsouderosto invite EAM and other parties to Cairo for discussionsover a post-war

government. Leeper's diplomacy, aimed at rendering EAM impotent by enmeshing

them in a non-communist government, which they would have no opportunity to

dominate,was too subtle for some.It was derailed by King George's suddenrefusal to

appoint Damaskinosas Regent.The King fearedthat the regencywould be the first step

towards his loss 29

of the throne.

26Woodhouse,Apple ofDiscord,
pp. 303-304;Sarafis,ELAS,pp. 244-60. Subsequentlyit wasan
indefinite and short-termagreement,foreshadowingfuture escalation.
27EAM during the Plaka
negotiations demanded the formation of a Provisional Committee to form a post-
war representative cabinet, which at that point had been rejected by both the representatives of the
government and the representatives of the BMM on the grounds that the government-in-exile was the legal
authority they all recognised. On PEEA see: Archive ofPolitical Committee offational Liberation
(PEEA)- ApXcio TqqHolirw4s EmTpon4s EOviK4qA 7raXcv0hpcoaqc (PEEA), (Athens, 1990). The KKE
seemedto follow the steps of Tito, who in November 1943 turned his Antifascist Council of National
Liberation into a 'provisional government'.
28Papastratis
notesthat the creationof PEEA reinforcedTsouderos'plan to force all political parties
exceptEAM to join him openly in Cairo, andthenblameEAM for not acceptinga solution to which all
the otherpartieshad agreed.Papastratis,British Foreign Policy, p. 164.
29PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/43682R3988, Leepertelegram,14 March; PREM
3/211/11,Churchill to Eden, 10 March 1944;FO 371/43683R4476, Leepertelegram,13 March 1944.
 27

The chargedpolitical situation in Cairo was worsenedwhen a crisis broke out

amongstthe 20,000 Greek armed forces stationed in the Middle East. On 31 March

1944,thirteen officers of the Committee of National Union of the Greek armed forces
30
demandedthat Prime Minister Tsouderosforms a governmentbasedon PEEA. On 7

April 1944the Greek army mutinied. A soldierscommitteeassumedcontrol of the First

Brigade,just before it joined the allies in the Italian theatre of operations.Greek naval

units, stationedin the port of Alexandria, the

supported mutinies. The SecondBrigade

also declared its loyalty to PEEA. Many other units of the Greek army and navy

declared themselvesin favour of PEEA. The only notable exception was the Sacred

Battalion, which remained loyal to the King and his government throughout the

The force backed 31

side. As a of the crisis, Tsouderos
upheaval. air neither result

tenderedhis resignation.On 13 April 1944,the King appointedthe liberal Thernistocles

Venizelosprime minister."

The British wanted to restore order. Churchill declared that 'rebellious

manifestationsin forces will not be tolerated' and that the British governmentwould
33
support'the lawfully constitutedGreek headed
Government by the King'. Leeper,

reinforced by Churchill's solid backing, telegraphedthe Commanders-in-Chief

that the

Greek governmentshould 'win a complete and bloodless victory and teach the Greek

armedforces a 34
lesson'. The units with which the British dealt first were the First

GreekBrigade,stationedin Egypt, and the Greekships in Alexandria.On 16 April,

30j. Iatrides,AmbassadorMacVeaghReports(Princeton,1980), 482; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,

p.
KEW (PRO), FO 371/43728R5316,Leepertelegram-198,3April 1944;PREM 3/211/11,Leeper
telegrams-208,209,5April 1944.The King had appointedEmmanouelTsouderosPremierin 1941and
left with him for Cairo after the Germanoccupation.Georgewas in chargeof the Greekarmedforces.
Venizelos' leftist backgroundwashopedto be a factor in reconciling the republicans.
31Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece, 78-79.ThernistoclesVenizelos is one the main republican
pp. of
politicians to influencethe developmentsof the period.
32ThemistoclesVenizelosis
one of the main republicanpoliticians to influencethe developmentsof the
period. Prominentin the National Political Union alliancetogetherwith Papandreouand Kanellopoulos,
leaderof the Liberal Party, Prime Minister for a while in 1950and acting premier in 1951.
33W. Churchill, TheSecondWorld War,
vol.5 (London, 1952),p. 481.
34PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/43701R6035, Leeper'stelegram,15 April 1944.
 28

Admiral Sir A ndrew C unningharnt hreatenedt hat t he R oyal N avy w ould sink a11t he

ships of the Greek fleet 'within five minutes', unless they the
abandoned mutiny. Six

days later Admiral Voulgaris, Venizelos' new Commander-in-Chief, took over the

ships. On 25 April, the fleet surrenderedand following the British intervention, all the

Greek troops laid down their 35

arms. As a result of the mutiny, the Greekarmy
mutinous

was thoroughly Approximately

reorganised. half it
of was put into internment camps.It

is probablethat had the British not intervenedor supportedthe old establishedorder,the

Greek politicians, under the pressureof the mutineers,would have formed a new pro-

36
Communist cabinet. The mutiny underlinedthe inefficiency of the Greek government

and the weaknessof its mainstay:the army.

While the army was purged, the political task of controlling EAM remained

unsolved. Papandreou,a prominent ex-member of the Liberal Party, provided the

solution. The KKE regarded him as a sympathiser. On the other hand Papandreou

convinced British officials that he could wrest the political initiative from EAM. With

37
their supporthe was appointedthe new prime minister of the government-in-exile.

A new attempt to rebuff EAM was organised. Papandreou summoned a

conferencein Lebanon on 17-20 May 1944,to which twenty-five representativesof all

seventeenpolitical p arties and groups were invited in order to seek a way out of the

35K. Alexandris, Our Navy During the WarPeriod 1941-1945-To NavTiK6Maq T? Ilcplobo Tov
jv
17611yov(Athens, 1952),pp. 148-150.Adn-dralAlexandriswasthe Commander-in-Chiefto be replaced
by Voulgaris.
36Col. ThrasyvoulosTsakalotoscommandedthe Third Brigade.Tsakalotosfought in the mutiny aswell
asunderthe British Eighth Army in Italy, earningthe title of 'Rimini Brigade'. Later on he playeda
prominentrole in the civil war of 1945-49as a seniorofficer of the Greeknational army. In 1952,he
becameChief of Staff of the GreekArmy. The right-wing streamclaims that the mutiny in April was
'plannedby the Communists'in order to monopolisepower. Kousoulas,Revolutionand Defeat,p. 187.
However,asWoodhousenotedPEEA wasthe occasionnot the cause.Woodhouse,Strugglefor Greece,
p-78.Vlavianos statesthat the mutiny was only the result of rise of republicanism.Vlavianos, Greece
1941-1949,p. 38.
37Venizelos forced to the that he KKE P. Kanellopoulos, Diary
was resignon grounds was a sympathiser.
31 March 1942- 4 January1945-HpEpoMpo31 MapTiou1942-4Iavovaplov 1945(Athens, 1977),pp.
553-554;Iatrides (ed.), AmbassadorMacVeaghReports:Greece1933-1947,pp. 505-508;Papastratis,
British Foreign Policy, pp. 175-76.
 29

impasse that had 38

arisen. Papandreou's plan was to disarm ELAS and
political

incorporateEAM into the government.As one result of this, the National Anny coupled

ELAS's forces be 39 Papandreou

with would much stronger and more co-operative.

announcedthat, in the case of civil war breaking out, the Greek governmentwould

for
appeal allied support and call on the Allies to intervene openly. Within this context

he proposed the formation of both a Government of National Unity and a National

40
Amy.

All representativesfinally signed the resolution of what is called the 'Lebanon

Agreement' or 'Lebanon Charter' on 20 May. The most important provision of the

argument called for all guerrilla fonnations to be placed under the command of a

governmentof national unity, in which five out of twenty relatively unimportant posts
41
were reservedfor EAM representatives. Papandreoudid not make a clear statementon

the Communistdemandthat the King's returnshouldbe prevented.He notedthat 'the

is
Governmentof National Unity to clarify the 42
issue'. Britain's supportfor Papandreou

proved a successful gambit. Meanwhile the KKE disapproved of PEEA's 'cheap'

the 43 Churchill announced in the House of

capitulation and repudiated agreement.

Commons, 'a hopeful turn in Greek affairs'.44 The course of events served British

interests.On 28 May, the Foreign Office instructed Leeper that Papandreouwas to be

38G. Papandreou,TheLiberation of Greece-HA7rcAcvffp(oo-1 rqq FU6&oq (Athens, 1948),pp. 54-56.

39PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/43731R7608, SpearsTelegram-278,13May 1944.
40Papandreou,TheLiberation of Greece-HA7rcAcv0tpcoo-1 Tqq UMog,
E. pp. 67-70; P. Papastratis, 'The
PapandreouGovernmentand the LebanonConference',in J. Iatrides (ed), Greecein the 1940s,pp. 119-
130.
41L. Woodward,British Foreign Policy, vol. 3 (London, 1971),pp. 408409; Sarafis,ELAS,pp. 308-33;
Papandreou,TheLiberation of Greece-H A7rcAcv0ýpr, 0", r1qEU6.boq,pp. 73-80.
42Papandreou,TheLiberation Greece-H A7rc2zv0tpc00-17EAWoq, 76.
of Ti7q p.
43Sarafis,ELAS,p. 334. KKE's demands were almost to those in Cairo in
power claim equal made
August 1943,alsorepeatedon 4 July 1944andrejectedby Papandreou.KKE Official Documents-
Exiaqya Kelyeva- 1940-1945,pp. 406-407.The KKE demandedinter alia the retentionof four ELAS
divisionsunder the commandof ELAS. This divergencebetweenthe KKE's agenda,PEEA andthe actual
agreementunderlinedthe stability of the Governmentof National Unity. This is one of the incidentsthat
prove the complexitiesof the KKE's policy and smoothensthe argumentof right-wing orthodoxhistorians
of Greecethat the GreekCommunistParty hadplannedits attemptto take over power right after EAM's
creation.For this argumentsee:Averoff, By Fire and Axe.
 30

given 'the fullest support, and at all costs prevented from yielding to the insidious

atmosphereprevalent in Cairo'. Leeper was also directed to keep in touch with his

Americanand Soviet colleaguesand ask them to back British actions.45

The LebanonCharter and EAM's agreementto join the governmentof national

unity facilitated the principal British objective regarding Greece:to prevent the KKE

from seizingpower after the Germanwithdrawal and then to createa Greekgovernment

broadly acceptable to the Greeks to take over after the liberation. British policy

regarding Greecein 1944 was basedupon the principle of eliminating the communist

threat and establishinga pro-British governmentalschemeso as to secure'our strategic

position in the EasternMediterranean'.Eden's report on 8 August to the Foreign Office

reads:

If we are to maintain any political influence in SE Europe and,

above all, our strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean
after the war, it is essentialthat Greece should be ruled by a
Government friendly to us. [ ]I regard it as essential that
...
British influence in Greece and the traditional connection
between the two countries should be preserved, but unless
British f orcesc an bes ent in there isa serious danger that the
Greek people, who still look to us for assistance,will lose faith
in Great Britain and that a Governmentwill c ome i nto p ower
which would bring the countryunder Soviet 46
domination.

The next day the War Cabinetdecidedto despatcha 6,000 strong British force to Greece

to securepeace after the German withdrawal from the country. Rooseveltand Stalin

were informedof the British decisionon 17 and21 Augustrespectivelyandraisedno

47
objection.

In order to prevent a communist attempt to seize power, the new Greek

governmentorganised a Conferenceat Caserta,near Naples, on 26 September1944,

44House CommonsDebates,1943-1944,
of vol. 400, col. 772, Churchill, 24 May 1944,Thereaftercited
asHCDeb.
45PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/43731R8331, Churchill
minute, 28 May 1944.
46PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),371/43715,R12457, Eden
memorandum,8 August 1944.
47H. Macmillan, TheBlast War: 1939-1945(London, 1967), 575.
of p.
 31

Papandreou British 48 General H. Wilson, C-in-C

under the aegis of and a committee.

Middle East,called both ELAS and EDES representativesto Italy to receiveinstructions

the
concerning operationsfor the final phaseof the liberation of Greece.Sarafis,Zervas,

Papandreou,Harold Macmillan, Minister Residentat Allied HQ in North West Africa,

Leeperand Lt. Gen. Scobie,newly appointedas GeneralOfficer CommandingGreece,

all took part in the CasertaConference.It was agreed that all Greek guerrilla forces

would be put under the orders of General Spiliotopoulos, Military Governor of Athens

and Attica, of
acting as representative the Greek govenunent.Spiliotopoulos would then

serveunder the command of Lt. Gen. Scobie. The decreed

agreement that no military

action regarding Athens was to be taken, except on direct orders from General Scobie.

In this way EAM was put under British command. General Othonaios, a figure

respectedby ELAS, was nominated as the future Commander in Chief of the Greek
49
aMY.

On the eve of the German withdrawal from the Balkans, Churchill and Eden
a
were still concernedabout communist activities in Greeceand Soviet intentions in the

Balkans.On 9 October1944,Churchill flew to Moscowto concludethe 'Percentages

Agreement' with Stalin. He suggestedthat the Russiansmight have ninety per cent

dominancein Romaniawhile the British ninety per cent in Greece;Yugoslavia would be

sharedon a fifty-fifty basis.The spirit, if not the details, of this Anglo-Soviet agreement

hadanimportantimpact,for it servedto definepost-warterritorialareasof control.50

The last German units left Athens on 12 October 1944, and on 18 October the

Greek govenunent, backed by Lt. -Col. Sheppard,the British liaison officer with the

48The GreekGovernment National Unity

of movedfrom Cairo to Italy on 8 September1944,to prepare
itself for its return to Greece.
49Sarafis,ELAS,pp. 382-389.The text the 'CasertaAgreement'is
of reproducedin Iatrides,Revolt in
Athens,pp. 311-313.OthonaiosreplacedVentiris, the latter a stronganti-Communist.
50For an account the Anglo-Soviet Churchill, The Second War World, 6, 197-
of agreement see, vol. pp.
99; S. Xydis, 'The SecretAnglo-Soviet Agreementon the Balkansof October 9,1944', Journal of
CentralEuropeanAffairs 15, (October 1955),248-71.
 32

Greek government,was establishedin Athens.51The first British troops under Lt. Gen.

Scobie arrived on 14 October, and were augmentedat the end of October by two

brigades of the 4th Indian Division from Italy. The basic objective of British policy had

proved successful:the communistshad joined a government friendly to Britain. The

most seriousproblem facing the new governmentwas how to bring about the peaceful

disarmamentof the guerrilla formations and their replacement by a national army,

without whosebacking the governmentcould not long hope to remain in place.

The DecemberEvents

In mid-October there were no seriousclashesbetweenELAS and EDES. Small

British units guardedprincipal ports such as Athens-Piraeus,Salonika, Patra, Preveza,

Volos, and Kavalla. The rest of the mainland was under the control of the guerrillas.

Zervas with his headquartersat Ioannina held most of Epirus. ELAS with its

headquartersat Lamia held Macedonia,Thessaly,Roumeli, and the Peloponnese.The

islands were controlled by both ELAS and the Greek authorities, except Crete, which

remainedunder Germancontrol until after their final surrenderin May 1945.Therefore,

EAM/ELAS had three quartersof the liberatedterritory under its control.52

The peacedid not last long. DisagreementbetweenELAS and Papandreouarose

over military issues. The Greek forces in the Middle East, ELAS and EDES

organisationswould have to be disannedin order to form the new National Army. But it

soon becameclear that Papandreoudid not intend to disband the brigade most loYal to

the King, the Third Brigade.53ELAS regardedthe retention of the Third Brigade as a

51PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/43694R 16803,

The Situation in Athens, 15
October 1944.
52Leeper,Nen GreeksMeet Greeks, 85.
p.
53The Third Brigade Rimini Brigade formed bulk
or the of the re-organisedME forcesafter the April
1944mutiny and consequentlywas formulatedto be
anti-Communist.It arrived in Athenson 9 November
1944from the Italian front to Athensto supportPapandreou'scabinet.Its
strengthwas nearly 2,800men
 33

breachof trust. On 7 November,Papandreoudeclaredthat he was planning to dissolve

EAM before the Third Brigade, which would arrive in Athens from Italy on 9

November.54The KKE was convinced of Papandreou'santi-Communist feelingsand

thereforecalled for massdemonstrationsagainstthe government.

Leeperwrote in his diary on 7 November 1944 that he did not expectthe facade

of unity to last and that 'ever growing lawlessness by EAM in Athens' was about to

55
explode. The British governmentprepared itself to face a communist insurgency.

Churchill wrote to Eden,that 'we shouldnot hesitateto useBritish troops to supportthe

Royal Hellenic Government under Papandreou'.56 Indeed General Sarafis, military

commanderof ELAS, noted that he had beenwarnedby Lieutenant GeneralScobie,'to

bear in mind that a guerrilla army is not able to face a modem army with heavy arms,
57
tanks,aircraft and a fleet at its disposal'. British reinforcementswere despatchedfrom

Italy to Greece.There were, however, few heavy weaponsand no tanks in Greece.The

Greek air force was weak. On 17 Novembertwo RAF squadronsand a Greek squadron

flew i nto t he m ain a irfield at Athens, to be greetedby the Prime Minister in person.

AnotherthreeRAF squadrons
arrivedby the endof the month.At the endof November

Scobiehadnearlytwenty-threethousandtroopsunderhis command,thoughnot all were

58
combatants.

The refusal of the KKE to disarm ELAS led to the military confrontation

betweenELAS and the Anglo-Greek governmentforces in December1944.As the dates

includingjust over 200 officers, coupledwith a British force of about 8,000 men. GeneralTsakalotos,
Forty YearsSoldier of Greece-Eýp&TaXp6via ETpa-rxý, vol. I (Athens, 1960),p. 587; Woodhouse,
TheStrugglefor Greece,p. 114;H. Macmillan, WarDiaries, vol. 1 (London, 1984),p. 595. ELAS armed
strengthat the time of the liberation in mid-October1944was 5,240 officers and 43,700 otherranks.
Sarafis,ELAS,p. 276. Therefore,the non-communistpart of the army enjoyeda distinct superiorityof
force.
54G. Papandreou,The Third War-0 Tpi-roq176)xpoq(Athens, 1949),
pp. 202-03, Leeper, Hen Greek
MeetsGreek,p. 92.
55Leeper,Hen GreekMeets Greek, 92.
p.
56Churchill, TheSecondWorld War,
vol. 6, p. 250.
57Sarafis,EL4S,
pp. 291-92. Scobiewas the British officer designatedto representthe Allied Commander
in liberatedGreece.
 34

drew near for the dernobilisation of ELAS, EDES and the Third Brigade, tension

increased.Siantos- from PEEA - and Sarafis- from ELAS - assertedthat they would

not disbandELAS unlessthe Third Brigade was also disbanded.On 18 November,the

KKE Political Bureaudecidedthat 'if a political solution was not found, the ELAS must

be prepared for a clash'. 59In a show of force the six EAM ministers in the Government

of National Unity resigned on 2 December.

The direct causeof the fighting was EAM's demonstrationon 3 Decemberin

Syntagma(Constitution) Square,Athens. The demonstrationturned violent when police

panickedand beganfiring at the demonstratorsas they advancedacrossthe squarein the

direction of the police headquarters.The 'second round' of the civil war, or the

'December Events', h ad b egun.'Maintain o rder in Athens', C hurchill c abled Scobie,

'defeat EAM. The ending of the fighting is subsidiary to this. I am ordering large

to cometo
reinforcements 60
Athens'.

Britain was determinedto put down the insurgency.General Scobie orderedall

ELAS units to leave Athens within seventy-two hours and on the following day he

declaredmartial law. On 5 DecemberScobiecommittedhis British troopsto the fray.

Scobie commanded the 4h Indian Division, the Greek Third Brigade, a parachute

brigade and an armoured brigade, a total of nearly 20,000 combat troops. In the first

threeweeksof the fighting in the Athens-Piraeus

area,ELAS held the upperhand,
however.The Tatoi airfield and some800 RAF headquartersand ground staff personnel

were cut off in the northern suburbof Kifissia. The Kalamaki airfield was insecureand

the ground routes from and into the city centre were under ELAS's control.

58Ibid, pp. 291-293.

59Y. Ioannidis,Memoirs-Avqqv4aeiq(Athens, 1979),
pp. 329-33. J. Loulis, The GreekCommunistParty
(London, 1982), pp. 170-171; Vlavianos, Greece1941-1949,p. 48; Shrader
claims that Scobieshouldbe
blamedfor polarisationover the demobilisationof ELAS,
which brought the armedconflict. Shrader,The
WitheredVine,p. 39.
 35

Consequently,the port facilities were limited and there was, in Macmillan's words, no

csecureplace' of operation for 61

the British . Between 13 and 16 December,however,

two British divisions, a tank regiment, two brigades and other supporting units landed in

Piraeus.Meanwhile, the ELAS forces of GeneralSarafis continued fighting their usual

enemy:the EDES forcesof General 62

Zervas.

Operationalcontrol of the Anglo-Greek forceswere entrustedto Maj. Gen. John

L. I. Hawkesworth. By 20 DecemberGeneral Hawkesworth had securedhis base at

Faliron and beganattackingELAS supportedby artillery and aircraft. On 27 December,

Hawkesworth's forces took control of the southernhalf of the city, except the Athens-

Piraeusroad. The tide had turned againstELAS although fighting continued.The role of

the British forces during the Decembereventswas decisive even if they did not do the

bulk of the fighting. British troops usedtanks to securemain communicationlines such

as Sygrou and Kifissias Avenue and to defend the city centre and governmental

buildings. In terms of offensive operations,British troops were limited to cutting ELAS

off from Athens-PiraeusAvenue, so as to free Piraeus harbour and allow supplies to

reach 63
Athens. The Greek the
units conducted restof the fighting. British intervention
64
to key points, however, radically changedthe courseof the eventsagainstEAM
.
On ChristmasEve, Churchill and Eden flew to Athens for a first hand look at the

emergency.This was a definite proof of Churchill's determination to oppose the

insurgency.
communists' On 26-28December,Churchill,Eden,Macmillan,the leaders

of K KE, E AM/ELAS, the American and French Ambassadors,Colonel Popov of the

60Churchill, TheSecondWorld War,

vol. 6, pp. 252,254. According to Farakos:17,000men of ELAS
took action in the DecemberEvents; 11,000of Papandreou'sforces; 8,000 of British Army. Farakos,
ELASand Power-O EAAE kai H Eýovala,vol.2, p. 117.
61Shrader,The WitheredVine, 40; Iatrides,Revolt in Athens, 227. SeeMap D.2,
p. p. p. 188.
62O'Ballance, The GreekCivil War 1944-1949, 104-105.
pp.
63In Decemberthe Greek
governmentforcesconstitutedof. 4,000 men (Rimini Brigade), 500 (The
SacredBattalion), 3,000 (Athens City Police), 1,000(X Organisation);9,000 men (4h Indian Division-3
infantry brigades),2,000 (Airborne Brigade), 1,000(ArmouredBrigade), 1,000(Battalion, Leicestershire
Infantry Regiment);50,000 (ELAS), 10,000(EDES).Iatrides,Revolt in Athens,p. 176.
64G. Margaritis, History the GreekCivil War-OEUIVIK6q Ey(pbAiog,
of vol. 1, p. 72.
 36

Soviet Military Mission and Greek national governraentofficials agree to appoint as

RegentArchbishop Damaskinos,to take office, on 31 December 1944. On 3 January

1945,a well-known republicanGeneralNicolaos Plastiras,recently returnedto Greece

from self-imposed exile in PaTis,was appointed as prime minister. 65

The 'second round' of the civil war effectively came to an end on 15 January.

Although ELAS troops had defeated EDES and occupied most of the country they had

been forced to abandon Athens.66 The formal end of the December Events was a

political settlementbetweenthe new govenunentand EAM, signed at a seasidevilla in

Varkiza, a small resort on the outskirts of Athens, on 12 February 1945.Under the terms

of the Tarkiza Agreement', ELAS agreedto disarm. In return the Plastirasgovernment

promisedamnestyfor political crimes.Martial law was lifted, civil liberties guaranteed

and the K KE w as r ecognisedasaI egalp olitical p arty. E AM w as tobep ennitted to

continue as a political organisation.A plebiscite on constitutional issuesand elections

67
would be held in one year, followed by elections. As a result of the 'Varkiza

Agreement',ELAS surrenderedits arms,althougha few 'hard core' party members,like

Aris Velouhiotis,refusedto comply and fled to the mountains.Other EAM-ELAS

membersleft for Yugoslavia, Albania and 68

Bulgaria. ELAS officially ceasedto exist.

The Developmentof a Full Scale Civil War

From the Warkiza Agreement' onwards the Greek governmentmoved steadily

to the Right. On 17 February 1945, the right-wing Populist Party led by the prominent

conservativepolitician KonstantineTsaldaris,which had been totally dismantledunder

65W. McNeill, The GreekDilemma (London, 1947),

pp. 103,192-93.
66Churchill, TheSecondWorld War,
vol. 6, p. 252.
67The termsof the Tarkiza Agreement'
are includedin Iatrides,Revolt in Athens,pp. 320-24.
68O'Ballanceputs the
numberof ELAS fighterswho crossedover into Albania, YugoslaviaandBulgaria
at about4,000. O'Ballance, The GreekCivil War,p. 113;The right-wing historian Kousoulasestimates
 37

the Metaxas dictatorship, was re-establishedin Athens. The Populists presentedthe

King and themselvesas the bulwark against communism. The moderate republican

Venizelist Liberal Party, represented by Thernistocles Sofoulis, began to switch its

allegianceto the right-wing group. 'White terror' governmental.measuresagainstthe

communistsgrew. Theseincluded arrestsof communist suspects,the strengtheningof

rightist organisationssuch as Grivas' 'X' to control the Army and Gendarmerieand

reduction of the leftist 69

press. The right-wing shift of the government was also

consolidated by the appointment of Admiral Petros Voulgaris as a new caretaker

premier to conduct the first post-war elections, following Plastiras' resignation on 7

April 1945. Voulgaris had proved his anti-Communist bent during the army purge of
70
April 1944.

On 26 July 1945,the victory of the Labour Party over Churchill's Conservatives

in Britain cameas a shockto the Greekpolitical world. The Labour governmentseemed

to representthe British 'socialism in one country'.71Greek conservativesfearedthat the

British Labour governmentwould distance itself from them.72These fears, however,

were not realised. Bevin was an aggressiveand anti-communist Foreign Seretary

following Churchill's path. Prime Minister Attlee was not charismaticbut strengthened

Bevin's anti-communiststrategiesand backed every effort to weaken the Soviet threat.

Attleeand B evin c ontrolledt he c abinet,w hich p revailedt he d ecisionsof the Labour

Party. The Left had only four representativesin the government of minor political

importanceand consequentlypossible debateswithin the cabinet were easily dissolved.

The foreign policy of the Labour governmentcontinued Churchill's pursuit to maintain

23,000communistsin Albania, 20,000Yugoslavia,5,000 Bulgaria. Kousoulas,ThePrice

offreedom, p.
149.
69GeneralVentiris,
whom PlastirasappointedDeputy Chief of the GeneralStaff, had promotedthe
penetrationof extremeright-wing organisationswithin the army. Ventiris, in fact, was one of the leaders
of IDEA a right-wing organisation,which prevailedover the GreekArmy and in May 1951, wasto play a
role in Papagos'resignationfrom the post of Cornmanderin Chief.
70Leeper,WhenGreekMeets Greek,
pp. 161-62.
 39
73
British imperial interestsin the Middle East againstthe Soviet Union. On 11 August

1945,Bevin submitteda memorandumon British policy towards Greeceto the Cabinet,

stressingthe continuity with Churchill's line. He also spoke of the need to contain .

74B
communism. cvin n oted int he H ouseofC ommonst hat t he L abour government's

foreign policy regarding Greecewould remain almost entirely the same as that of his

75
predecessor.

The situation in Greecewas exacerbatedby the continuing conflict betweenthe

Right and the Left. Right-wing groups, such as Lt. Col. George Grivas' X soughtto

root out the former supporters of EAM/ELAS. In the KKE too militants were

increasingly in the ascendant.In May 1945 Zahariadis returned from the German

Dachau the leadership the KKE from 76

Siandos.
concentrationcamp at and resumed of

Zahariadisat the SeventhParty Congresson 4 October 1945 noted that 'if this mess

continues,everyGreekwill haveto taketo the hills'. 77In orderto avoid a new crisis

Leeper suggestedVoulgaris to resign in October 1945. After a month of uncertainty

71K. Morgan, TheBritish Labour Governments1945-1951(Oxford, 1985),p. 93.

72Vlavianos,Greece1941-1949,p. 120.Alexander,YhePrelude to the Thiman Doctrine, pp. 125-26.
73Morgan, TheBritish Labour Governments1945-1951,pp. 56-81.
74PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/48277R13856,Memorandumby Bevin, II August
1945;FRUS (1945): 8,136-137: British Embassyto Departmentof State,II August 1945.
75HCDeb, 194546, vol. 413, cols. 289-91,16 August 1945.
76Following the decision the KKE to remainofficially committedto the establishmentof a more
of
equitablesocial order in Greeceby peacefulmeans,the CentralCommitteeof the KKE proceededwith
the organisationof Self Defence(Aftoamyna);an intelligenceandpropagandaorganisationcreatedto co-
ordinatedefensiveactionsto protect the KKE from 'monarcho-fascistterrorism.Woodhouse,The
Strugglefor Greece,p. 163;History of the KKE-A0K1, U10Io-roplaqTov KKE, pp. 526-535.0. Smith, 'Self-
Defenceand CommunistPolicy 1945-1947',in L. Baerentzen,J. 0. Iatrides and 0. Smith (eds),Studies
in the History of the GreekCivil War 1945-1949,pp. 159-178.EAM threatenedto abstainfrom the
electiongiven the governmentalmeasure,the 'white terror', againstthe KKE sympathisersandthe
consequentfalsification of the electoralresultsandpolls. Sofoulis and his Liberal Party alsoconsented
with EAM, characterisingthe election day 'pitiful electoralcomedy'. FRUS (1945): 8,170: MacVeaghto
the Secretaryof State,7 October 1945;Sarafis,After Varkiza-MericTj B6PKi(a,pp. 127-134.McNeill,
TheGreekDilemma,p. 180.
77History of the KKE-Aoq,, IoTopics
uio rou KKE, pp. 526-535.The KKE establishedin cities andtowns
throughoutthe country an intelligencenetworkbasedon Communist'cells' with the purposeof collecting
information,supplies,money,recruiting andterrifying non-Communistsympathisers.Thesecells were
known asyiajka. O'Balance, TheGreekCivil War,p. 142.0. Smith, 'CommunistPerceptions,Strategy
andTactics, 1945-1949',in J. Iatrides and W. Linda (eds), Greeceat the Crossroads.TheCivil War and
Its Legacy(Pensilvania,1995),pp. 87-120.
 39

over the a
new prime minister, new stopgap government was formed under Liberal

Sofoulisin November 1945to conductelectionson 31 March 1946.

Greek political instability had becomean international issue. On 27 November

1945,the respectiveAmerican, British and French Chiefs of the Allied Mission for the

Observationof the Greek Elections(AMFOGE) arrived in Athens, headedby the future

AmericanAmbassadorto GreeceHenry Grady.78The mission signified the beginningof

Americaninvolvement in Greekaffairs. This did not, however, threatenBritish interests

in the area; on the contrary, it added another power to act as an anti-communist

watchdog.

In the meantime,the SecondPlenum of the KKE Central Committee,which met

on 12 February 1946, initiated the 'third round' of the civil war. It agreedupon a dual

strategyof continuedpolitical action and build-up of military force. This was signalised

by KKE's decision to abstainfrom the election of 31 March 1946, as announcedon 22

February,and the birth of the 'Democratic Army of Greece' (DAG), the successorof

ELAS, in the autumnof the sameyear.79According to Zahariadis' speechat the Seventh

Plenumof the CentralCommitteein May 1950,the SecondPlenum'in effectdecided

that the new armedstruggleshouldbegin'.80

The elections called for by the 'Varkiza Agreement' were finally held on 31

March 1946, under the proportional system. The result was in accordancewith the

intentions and manipulations of the majority of the Greek political world. The KKE

boycotted the election. It had already decided that 'the new anned struggle should

78FRUS(1945): 8,185: MacVeaghto the Secretary State,4 December1945.AMFOGE

of wascomposed
of morethan 1,200British, FrenchandAmericanobservers,under the American chief observerHenry F.
Grady.
79KKE's radical decisionto
abstainwasbasedon political groundsand suppressionof the communist
votersand sympathisers.On the KKE's decisionto abstainsee,G. Mavrogordatos,'The 1946Election
andPlebiscite:Preludeto Civil War', in J. 0. latrides (ed.), Greecein the 1940s,pp. 181-195;Vlavianos,
Greece1941-1949,pp. 189-224.DAG or DA is usedin the text as DA for
8'N. Zahariadis,Ten Years reasonsof convenience.
qfFight-JtKa Xp&ia 176AIq(Athens, 1978),p. 28.
 40

begin'.81The right-wing Populist Party, headedby Tsaldaris, won a majority of 206

seatsout of 354.82The election of March 1946was a critical developmentmarking the

evolution from occupation and civil strife. The right-wing party, even before the

election,had driven former ELAS partisansback to the mountains.This processgained

momentumint he e lection a Ithought he g overnmentexacerbatedan already polarised

political situation. The plebiscite to decidethe future of the monarchyprescribedby the

Warkiza Agreement' was held on 1 September1946.It too confirmed the re-emergence

of the pre-1941political order. Many who had no love for the monarch voted in favour

of his return merely becausethey regardedthe monarchy as the best guaranteeagainsta

communist accessionto power. On 27 September1946, King George H set foot on

Greek soil for the first time since he had fled in April 1941. He would remain on the

throneuntil his deathin April 1947.

The elections signified a new era for Anglo-Greek relations. On one hand,

British policy was basedon a determinationto retain British military presenceuntil the

Greekgovernmentw as able to restore law and order. The ForeignOfficehoped that

Greece'spolitical leaderswould join togetherin the face of the Communist threat and

establisha governmentof national unity or, at least, a two-party governmentin which

the moderateRight would join forces with the Centre and moderateLeft. On the other

hand, however,the Labour governmentdeclaredits intention to be releasedfrom

interferingin Greekpolitics. This new directionwas to be implementedby Clifford

Norton, who replaced Rex Leeper as Ambassadoron 7 March 1946. Bevin instructed

Norton to support the Populist governmentof Tsaldaris but to coax the Greekstowards

81Zahariadis,Ten Years
ofFight-&KaXp6vial761jq (Athens, 1978),p. 28.
92The main political factions
were: the PopulistsunderTsaldaris,the Liberal Party of Sofoulis,National
Union underKanellopoulos,Papandreou,Venizelos,the National Liberal Gonatas-Zervas the
of and
KKE-EAM. AMFOGE estimatedthat out of a total populationof 7,500,000
people only 70 per centof the
nameson the lists belongedto valid registrants,13per centbeing invalid and 17 per cent of doubtful
validity. Cmd. 6812 Report of the AlliedMission to Observethe GreekElections (London, 1946)pp. 18-
29; R. Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece(London, 1987), 18. On I September1946the
p. plebiscite
 41

a policy of peace, constitutional freedom, parliamentary institutions and financial

83
stability.

British ambitions for limiting interventionin Greecewere, however,undermined

by a renewedescalationof violence by the communists.On 26 October 1946 Marcos

Vafeiadis(Marcos) announcedthe creationof the DemocraticArmy of Greeceunderhis

command.The guerrillas numberedno more than 13,000men, yet fighters experienced

in resistingthe Germansmore than balancedthe advantagesthat governmentforceshad

in numbersand material. The squattercampsof neighbouringYugoslavia, Albania and

Bulgariawere lacedwith mountaintrails suitablefor moving men and supplies.84

Within this context of communist aggression,it was obvious to the Greek

govenunent and its British allies that the Greek National Army (NA) needed vast

improvements before it could defeat the guerrillas. In December 1946, the NA

manpowerceiling was 100,000men, along with almost 35,000 gendarmerie.Units of

Rural Defence(MAY) and Units of Pursuit Detachments(MAD) were set by the Greek

85
GeneralStaff to act as local home guardsin October 1945. None of theseformations,

however, was well equipped.Few were properly trained for their duties. Many lacked

combat motivation. The Greek Navy too was in poor shape.The outlook of the Royal

Hellenic Air Force was also dismal. It consisted of fifty-four British-made obsolete

aircraft and fewer than 300 battle-trainedpilots. Greek financesprecluded the purchase

of more aeroplanes,and the Germanshad confiscated the only state aircraft factory.

Greecehad no petroleumrefineries,no munitionsmanufacturers,

and no facilities for

washeld, 68,4 per centbrought King Georgeback. AMFOGE did not supervisethe plebiscite,but did
control the electoralregisters.
83PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/58679 3748,
R Foreign Office to Norton, 13 March
1946.
84H. Jones,'A New Kind War'(Oxford,
of 1989),pp. 19-21; Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece,pp.
179-80,187-88.
85Averoff, By Fire
andAxe, p. 191; Eudes,TheKapetanios, pp. 274,278. One of the main tasksof both
orgamsationswas to counterbalancethe conununistAftamyna
 42

for 86 The Greek government, for all its

overhauling aircraft or making spare parts.

in
posturing,was poor shapeto fight the communists.

86Averoff,By Fire
and Axe, pp. 190-191; M. A. Campbell,E. W. Downs, and L. V. Schuetta,The
EmploymentofAirpower in the GreekGuerrilla War, 1947-1949(Maxwell Air Base, 1964),p. 8.
 43

11 In Search of Security: 1947

The Maximos Government: The Test of the Centre

As a result of the escalationof the civil war a new round of political negotiations

started in Athens. On 8 January 1947, the Foreign Office instructed Norton to press

Prime Minister Tsaldaris to form a centrist coalition. ' British diplomats wanted power-

sharing between the parties of the Right and the Left. Despite the assertionofs ome

historians that Britain favoured a right-wing govenunent in Greece, the consistent

British aim was the establishmentof a moderategovernmentof the 2

Centre. MacVeagh,

the United States Ambassadorto Greece,also urged Tsaldaris to form a right-wing

coalition of the 3
Centre. Tsaldaris,however,was unwilling to surrenderthe position of

his right-wing party. He proposed instead that elections should be held. Both

ambassadorsrejected the Greek premier's proposition. They argued that there was no

constitutionalreason for new elections.Moreover, such an act would undermine

institutions 4
stability of the of governmentand encouragefurther unrest.

The Anglo-American determinationto createa moderateand stable government

forced Tsaldaris' hand. On 10 January, he consented to the broadening of the

A
government. new cabinet would be formed under a compromiseprime minister with

the PopulistsandLiberalsservingasjoint vice-premiers.Negotiationsstartedbetween

the Populistsand the Liberalsover seatsin the cabinet.Sofoulis,however,demanded

the premiership. In order to enhance his claims to leadership he championed a

1PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/66994R113, Norton Foreign Office, 8 January
to
1947.
2Margaritis,History the GreekCivil War-Iaropla
of TovEUqVIK06EpqvAlovHompov, vol. 1, pp. 174-
176.
3PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/66994R78, MacVeagh StateDepartment,8
to
January1947;FRUS (1947): 5,4: MacVeaghto the Secretaryof State, 11 January1947.It wasbelieved
that suchan act would satisfy the claims for power of the insurgentsand bring the warfareinto an end.
 44
5
programmeof amnesty,re-organisationof the army and a new election. Tsaldaris,had

no intention of offering Sofoulis the He

premiership. was unwilling to his
weaken party

by co-operating with moderate politicians of the Centre such as Papandreou,

Kanellopoulos and Venizelos from the National Political Union (EPE). Moreover the

hard-corePopulists Gonatasand Zervas,refusedto serveunder the Liberals. Three days

after the talks had begun they endedin failure with eachparticipant accusingthe other

intransigence 6
of over the distribution of power. On 23 January, disagreement over the

balanceof power betweenthe Liberals and the right-wing Populists causedthe collapse

of Tsaldaris' 7
premiership.

Dimitrios Maximos, an elderly Populist and ex-govemor of the National Bank,

was drafted in a stop-gap prime minister. He took the oath as Premier, leading a

coalition cabinet of the Centre,on 24 January 1947. Maximos enjoyed the approval of

the Palace. He was a neutral figure, acceptableto the parliamentary parties, and, as

Norton put it, 'no one imagined that at the age of seventy-threeand after [a) long
8
absencefrom politics he wanted the job'. The coalition cabinet consistedmainly of

Populists,LiberalsandtheNationalPoliticalUnion (EPE).Tsaldarisremainedpowerful

becausehe became Vice Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The EPE were

allotted important posts. Zervas becamea Minister but without portfolio as a result of

Norton's refusal to countenancea more important post for him. The British Ambassador

pointedout that Zervaswasknown to advocateextrememeasuresagainstthe Left; his

4 Seefootnote 1. Tsaldaris,
a purely Populist andright-wing politician, would havepreferrednew
electionswith the aim to form againa purely right-wing cabinetand avoid negotiationswith the Liberals
andthe powersof the Centreand Left.
5PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/66995R 460, Norton Foreign Office, 10 January
to
1947.
6 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/66996 R 578,
Lascelles to Foreign Office, 14
January1947.
7FRUS (1947): 5,9-11: Marshall to Athens,21 January1947.
8PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/66998R 1515,Norton Foreign Office, 3
to
February1947.
 45

d t he g overnment'sc hancesofp roj ecting am oderatei mage

appointmentc ould estroy
9
both at home and abroad.

In the short-term British and American objectives were realised through the

formation of the Maximos government.A cabinet of the Centre had been created.

Although some centre-right politicians had joined the cabinet (Kanellopoulos,

Papandreou,Venizelos) there was no changein policy: the military campaignagainst

the guerrillas would still be pursued.Yet, the Maximos coalition was extremely fragile.

The Left, which would have preferred a more friendly governmentunder Sofoulis and

the Liberals denouncedthe new cabinetas a 'fraudulent product of British intrigue' bent

Tsaldaris' 'reign terror'. 10King GeorgeH predicted that it would be

on perpetuating of

very difficult for the new cabinet to function. Norton, although he liked the 'clever and

moderate' Maximos, agreed.Paul Porter, Head of the American Economic Mission,

who arrived in Greece in mid-January, reported that Maximos was 'the most non-

partisan,moderateand co-operativepersonalityin Government' but that his government

little than 'loose hierarchy individualistic "

was more a of politicians'.

The Maximos cabinet had to cope with a series of problems. First, and most

important, of these were the continuouscommunist attacks and the inadequacyof the

National Army. By early 1947 the Democratic Army had managed to build an

impressive force, operating as bands or 'groups', each consisting of seventy to one

hundred men and called 'Military Formations'. In February 1947, Marcos had about

13,000 fighting men organised in seven commands under his authority. These

in
commandswere turn headedby political commissarsor 'kapetanios'. The DA had

9Markezinisbelievesthat the Maximos

governmentwas a Greektest to find the most acceptable
combinationto the Americans.He notesthat it servedthe transitionalperiod until the 'real' applicationof
the TrumanDoctrine. Markezinis, Political History-HoAmK4Icropla, vol. 2, p. 307. However,the
declarationof the Truman Doctrine in just two monthstime, weakensthis theory.
10History of the KKE-J0K1, Iaroplaq
U10 TovKKE, pp. 564-67.
11PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/66998R1524,Norton to Foreign Office, 3
February1947.
 46

in
headquarters the north-west comer of the country, close to
establishedpennanent

Lake Prespaon the Greek side of the Albanian and Yugoslav borders. The Grammos

and Vitsi mountain rangesprovided a natural fortress that protected the Democratic

Army againstthe National Army. This location was also near to the Democratic Army's

12 An important factor that strengthenedthe

supply centres outside the country.

DemocraticArmy was the organisationof 'hit and run' attacksby bands of communist

fightersa gainst i solatedp olice and army stations. The advantageof the 'hit and run'

that it weakenedthe strengthand unity of the National Army by spreading

strategywas

its units into 13

different micro-operations. Thus, the Democratic Army challengedthe

National Army with guerrilla warfare.

On paper the National Army should have had little difficulty in crushing the

opposition. The nominal strengthof the National Army at the beginning of 1947 was

100,000men, organisedin five divisions and seven brigades;

independent an increaseof

almost 15,000men had been authorisedas a result of Spiliotopoulos' (Chief of General

in
Stafo visit London in November The
1946.14 National Army, however, trained by the

ion
British Military Miss. for regular warfare, was inexperienced and ill equipped for

15 During 1947, the Greek National Army

counter-guerrilla mountain operations.

attempted to apply a strategy of 'encirclement' supported by the British Military

16
Mission CommanderRawlins and American officers. This strategy involved attacks

on particular communist headquarters

or isolated communist hubs. The drawbackof this

'2 Averoff, By Fire and Axe, pp. 203-4.This eventuallywould prove a decisivefortressto support
Communistinsurgencyoperations.
13GES/DIS,The GreekArmy during the Bandit War: TheFirst Yearof the Bandit War 1946-0 EUIVIK6;
Xro=6; K=6 'rovAvTiavppopiaK6v Aycbva,(Athens, 1971), pp. 65-66; Th. Tsakalotos,Forty Years
Soldier of Greece-EapdvraXp6via ETparicbrqýTq(;EUMoc, vol. 2, (Athens, 1960),p. 5 1.
14The British governmenthad agreedto financethe improvementand increaseof the National Army. On
the Greek-Britisheconomicagreementin: Margaritis,History of the Greek Civil War-Icropla Tov
E,Ujv1K06EyýpvAlov HoAtluov,vol. 1, pp. 120-123,237-239.
13The National Army, as alreadymentioned, to Egypt after the Germans occupiedGreeceto
moved
continuetheir serninormal activities in training campsunderthe aegisof the allies.
16PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/893,Rawlins, Review of the Anti-Bandit
Campaign,22 October 1947.
 47

strategy was that it left many areas unprotected against the depredations of the

insurgents.This favouredthe DemocraticArmy, in that it could counter-attackafter the

National Army had withdrawn. Another implication of this strategy was that the

National Army neededhigh manpowerlevels to extend control over the clearedtargets.

17
Thus 'hit andrun' warfare offerednumerousadvantagesto the guerrillas.

Severalother factors offset the DA's numerical disadvantages.An unknown but

significant number of Greekcivilians were assistingthe communist fight. " The 'hit and

run') missions terrorised settlementsthroughout Epirus, Macedonia and Thrace and

yieldedconscriptsfor the DemocraticArmy.

The country's inadequate road system severely limited army pursuit. The

National Army had no armouredforce, exceptfor a few British-made Centaurtanks.But

these 18-ton tanks armed with small 50-millimetre cannons were virtually useless

becausethey were unable to climb mountainousterrain under their own p ower. F ew

in the Greek countrysidewere paved and once motor vehicles left the main
passageways

arteries,they had to reducespeedstoI esst han f ifteen m iles p er h our. As ingle r oad

connectedAthensin the southto Salonikain the north-east.Along the west coastthe

only north-southhighway was the Yannina-Arta-Agrinion road. Across the northernpart

of the country, a single west-east link ran from Yannina to Trikala and Larissa.

Moreover, the Yannina road wound through a low-lying coastal stretchbetweenseaand

mountainsand provided an excellentopportunity for 19

guerrilla sabotageand ambush.

On 18 February, King GeorgeH askedNorton and MacVeagh to authorise an

increasein the National Anny's strengthto revive morale otherwise, he feared,'serious

and widespreadbreakdown of discipline'. 20The Maximos governmentwould be tested

on its ability to put an end to the warfare and bring peace and stability to the country.

17Kousoulas,Revolution
and Defeat,pp. 241-242;Shrader,The Withered Vine,pp. 216-18.
18O'Ballance, The GreekCivil War, 146.
p.
19Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece1941-1949,
p. 205.
 49

Changingthe highest echelonof commandwould show its determinationto defeatthe

enemy.Consequently,
on 19 February1947 GeorgeStratos,Maximos' Minister of War,

conveneda meeting of the SupremeNational DefenceCouncil (ASEA) with the aim of

boosting military organisation and morale. Lt. Gen.Ventiris replaced Lt. General

Spiliotopoulosas Chief of GeneralStaff althoughSpiliotopouloswas retainedasDeputy

21
Chief of the GeneralStaff Plans to improve the equipmentof the army, the Units of
.
Pursuit Detachments(MAD), the Units of Rural Defence(MAY) and Commandounits

22
were announced. In February 1947 the generalplan of the governmentalforces was

war on all fronts. The army,gendarmerie,MAD and MAY would all be used.The army

thereafterwould concentratein spring 1947 and start continuous military attacks of

largescaleand duration in order to pressthe enemyto the defeat.23The rest of the forces

would focus on the civil control of the Communists.

Yet the bellicose rhetoric emanatingfrom the Greek governmentdid little to hide

its parlous state. It could not afford to pay for serious military operations. On 17

FebruaryPaul Porter cabled to Washingtonthat the Greek statewas virtually bankrupt,

it
since spent more than fifty per cent of the national income on non-productive

purposes.The budget deficit was vast, inflation was rampant and the Greeks were

20FRUS(1947): 5,27-28: MacVeaghto Marshall, 19 February1947.

21GES/DIS,Archivesof the GreekCivil War 1944-1949-ApXcia EUqVIK06EuýpvAlov HoMpov 1944-
TOv
1949-(thereaftercited as GESIDISArchives-ApXcla)Av(bTaTovEuppof)),tov Uvwfj; ARI)va;, 11paKTucd
q; I I" cmvc5ptdac(o; TouAIEA, 19 Ocppouapiou1947'(Minutesof the I la'Meeting of HighestBoard
of National Defence-ASEA, 19 February 194T), vol.3, iceim.(text) 58, p. 333. ASEA was composed
afterthe 'Varkiza Agreement' in February1945to co-ordinatethe armedforces;headedby the Prime
Minister, GreekMinisters of War, Navy, Air andthe threeChiefs of General,Navy, Air Staff,
representatives of the British and Americanmilitary missionswere also included.After the end of the civil
war it becameGeneralStaff of National Defence(rEEGA).
22Lack of discipline
and organisationwere amongthe main drawbacksof the NA. Tsakalotos,Forty
YearsSoldier of Greece- Eap6vTaXp6via EipaTioýýqrj,;, EUd6oq,pp. 52-55.
23GES/DIS,Archives-ApXcia,Avagopd ITpaTof)4 Ocppovapiou1947(Army Report,4 February1947),
vol 3, kcim. 42b, p. 259.The war preparationshad alreadystartedsincethe daysof Lt. Gen.
Spiliotopoulosto be accomplishedand further enlargedunder Lt. Gen. Ventiris. The new plan differed to
the old one in that the DA would be fought all over the country, as opposedto the local nuclei throughout
1946.
 49

overcomeby a senseof national in

manifested the conviction that the
helplessness

be
countryshould taken careof by its 24
rich allies.

On the sameday the Foreign Office also concludedthat there were threeways in

which the situation in Greececould evolve. First, if Britain and the United Statesagreed

to aid the countryjointly after 31 March, or, if the Americansundertook to shoulderthe

entireburdenthe Greek governmentwould fight it out with the communiststo the bitter

end. Second,if Britain and the United Statesdecidedto abandonthe country, the Greek

National Army might still manageto crush the guerrillas during the campaignplanned

for the spring. This seemeda doubtful prospect,however, as, accordingto Norton, the

DemocraticArmy was now operatingthroughoutThrace,Macedonia,Thessaly,and the

Peloponnesewith a high standard of organisation, discipline, and morale. Third, if

Westernaid ceasedon 31 March, and the guerrillas survived the spring campaign,the

moraleof the N ational Army w ould p robably c ollapse and its units would panic and

dissolve.Maximos' cabinetwould then be compelledto negotiateterms with the

from disadvantageous
if hopeless 25
communists a not position. Norton stressedthe need

to continue assisting Greece using familiar geopolitical arguments. The threat of a

political breakdown in Athens, in the light of the communist uprising, would render

Greecehighly vulnerable to Soviet imperialism.26This would damagethe security of

Europeand the Westernworld. It would affect areasof particular importancefor

Britain: the searoutesof the Mediterranean

and the Middle East.The Sovietthreatto

Turkey and Iran, coupled with the civil war in Greecewere interpreted as threatening

Europe and the Northern Tier. The threat of Soviet imperialism in the Eastern

Mediterranean
gavethe impetus,therefore,for keepingGreecewithin the British sphere

24FRUS (1947): 5,20: Paul Porter to Clayton, 17 February1947.

25PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67000R2359,Norton Foreign Office, 14
to
February1947.
26PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67032R1900,Norton Foreign Office, 5
to
February1947.
 50

of influence. The Greeks were told of the 'permanent' and 'unchangeable' nature of

27
British interestsin the areaandin the political developmentsof the country.

The Truman Doctrine

Geopolitical argumentswere not, however,the whole story. The bleak prospects

of the Greek goverriment were matched by the bleak prospects of the British

government. British financial problems preoccupied Whitehall. The issue of whether or

to
not extend financial to
assistance Greece,an obligation that expired in March 1947,

dominatedthe ministers' agenda.On 29 January,Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the

Exchequersent a note to Prime Minister Attlee arguing that in light of the weak British

economyaid to Greeceshould be reduced.The Chancellor warned the Prime Minister

that the British cabinet shouldjudge national defence'not only againstthe more distant

possibility of armed aggression,but also against the far more immediate risk of

economic and financial 28

overstrain and collapse'. Ranged against Dalton were the

Minister of Defence,Albert Alexander and, more importantly, the Foreign Secretary,

Ernest Bevin. Bevin argued that Britain should finance an expansion of the Greek

NationalArmy. To balanceincreasedaid to Greece,British forcesin Greecewould be

reducedto onebrigadeof four battalions,which would itself withdraw after the retreat

of the Red Army from Bulgaria. Bevin's plan garneredsupport from the Chiefs of Staff

The British govemmenthad a clear choice setbefore it. 29

On II FebruaryHugh Dalton askedfor a final decision on ending aid to Greece

which, in his view, 'from the endof the war onwardshad receivedthirty nine million

11YrIHPEEIA IETOPIKOY APXEIOY-SERVICE OF HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, ATHENS (YIA),

1947,86.1,16740,AvayopdtTounpcapmý Ayvi8q (yTqvEkkqvucýrIpcapeta A01jv6)v,23 Iavouaptou
1947(AmbassadorAgnidis' Report to the GreekEmbassyin Athens,23 January1947).This note
confutesthe revisionist argumentthat the Greekgovernmenthad nothing to expectfrom London after
March 1947.Vlavianos, Greece1941-1949,p. 236.
28PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),T 236/1037,11 January1947; Dalton, High Tide
H. and
After: Memoirs 1945-1960(London, 1962),pp. 193,197.
29PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 129/16C.P. (47) 34, Policy
towardsGreeceand
Turkey, 25 January1947.
 51

pounds,almost without result'. If the British cabinet desiredto save money, he argued,

it would have to 'start immediately, by cutting the expensestowards Greece'. Greek

instability and the inability of its politicians to work together to improve their country

reinforced Dalton's scepticismabout the value of further aid. He complained to Bevin

that 'the Greekswere not helping 30

themselves.

Bevin himself was in a quandary.On one hand,he believed that the KKE should

be contained.On the other hand, he recognisedthat the Greeksremainedincapableof

defending themselves and the burden on Britain was heavy. The British Foreign

31
Secretarytherefore turned to the United Statesto seek assistance. The two British

ministers agreed that the United Stateswould be asked to subsidise the Greek fight

againstcommunismand westerninterestsin the area.Bevin cabled 'a strongtelegramto

the United Statesfor the sole purposeof bringing mattersto a head'. Attlee consentedto

32
an attemptto make 'the Americansfaceup to the facts in the easternMediterranean'.

On 21 February,Lord Inverchapel,the British Ambassadorin Washington,was

instructed to deliver a note to George Marshall, the American Secretary of State,

announcingthat, given British financial woes, Britain its

could not sustain assistanceto

Greeceafter the end of March 1947.33

Anglo-American negotiations followed the British note. The Truman

wasin little doubtthat if theBritish couldnot containthe communistsin

administration

30PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/67032R2440,Dalton to Bevin, 13 February1947.

31PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/67032R2443,Dalton Attlee, II February1947.
to
32PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 800/468/GRE/37/2,MemorandumBcvin, 18 February
1947.
33YrIHPEZIA IETOPIKOY APXEIOY-SERVICE OF HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, ATHENS
(YIA), 1947,46.1,21503, Avagop6rrou Tac0,86pl aro I`cvuc6Ent'rexcioT.Tp=6,21 Mapriol) 1947
(Tsaldaris'Report to GES, 21 March 1947);FRUS (1947): 5,32-37: British Embassyto State
Department21 February1947;PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67032R 1900,
ForeignOffice to Washington,21 February1947.There are various interpretationsof the British decision
to withdraw aid from Greece:savingmanpower,political pressurefrom the leftist part of the Labour
governmentandpublic opinion, financial necessity,apply pressureon America, changeof strategic
priorities, deliberateplot of the British governmentto force the Americansto enterthe internationalarena.
In R. Frazier,Anglo-AmericanRelationswith Greece,pp. 132-156.The most convincingpossiblereason
focuseson creatinga joint Anglo-Americanallianceto containcommunismin the
area.Jones,A New
Kind of War,p. 33.
 52

the EasternMediterraneanalone, the Americanswould have to join in. 34This did not

mean, however, that they were necessarilywilling to accept a British timetable or a

British prescription for action., As a necessary prelude to any Anglo-American

the
agreement Americans demandedthe continuation of the British presencein Greece

and co-operation in coping with the civil war. Greece would be included in the

35
Americansphereof interestsbut the British had also to supportthe undertaking.

London welcomed the American response.If the Americans agreedto sharethe

burden then London would agree to loan the Greeks two million pounds for the

maintenanceof their army until June 1947.The British would also retain five thousand

men in Greece,as well as non-combatantforces, and would assistthe Greek army and

the Americansin organisingthe anti-Communistcampaign.On 3 March, Ernest Bevin

that
announced British troops would remain in Greece.
However, their numberwould be

reducedin April to five thousand 36

men. Contraryto t he v iew oft he h istorians
w ho

claim that the British note signified the end of a significant British role in Greece,

Anglo-American negotiationsyielded a condominium of the United Statesand Britain

in Greek affairs.37On 12 March, the Truman doctrine, expoundedto Congressby the

Presidentaf ew d ays a fter t he conclusion of Anglo-American negotiations on Greece

by
was greetedwith enthusiasm the British.38

34H. Truman,Memoirs: 1946-1952,

vol. 2, (London, 1956),pp. 124-25;M. P. Leffler, A Preponderance
ofPower (Stanford, 1992),pp. 144-146.
35FRUS(1947): 5,72,79-8 1: StateDepartmentto British Embassyin London, I March 1947;PUBLIC
RECORDOFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 131/5,DO (47) 6, CabinetDefenceCommittee,3 March 1947;
FO 371/67034R 3190, British Embassyto the StateDepartment,4 March 1947.
36PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),T 236/1038,OF 48/39/1,3 March 1947;FRUS (1947): 5,
87: The Secretaryof State(Marshall) the Embassyin Greece,4 March 1947;PUBLIC RECORD
OFFICE,KEW (PRO), CAB 131/5,DO (47) 6,3 March 1947;FO 371/67034R3190,British Embassyto
the StateDepartment,4 March 1947;CAB 128/9,CM 30 (47) 2, Cabinetdecisionto confirm maintenance
of BMM in Greece,18 March 1947.
37Margaritis,History the GreekCivil War-Io-ropla EUjviKo6 Ey(pvAlov, 1, 429. Vlavianos,
of Tov vol. p.
Greece1941-1949,p. 151; Jones, A New Kind of War,pp. 17-35. This argumentis approachedmainly by
revisionisthistorians.
38Declaration the Truman Doctrine,
of www.whistlestop.org, 12 March 1947;The Truman Doctrine has
beenconsideredas a revolution, which madethe United Statesabandonisolation. For those
writers who
perceivea revolution, see:Harry S. Truman,Memoirs (New York, 1956),p. 106; F. F. Lincoln, United
States'Aid to Greece,1947-1962(Germantown,1975),p. 166; W. H. McNeill, Greece:AmericanAid on
 53

The Greek governmenttoo was pleased with this double alliance. President

Truman received grateful reports from Prime Minister Maximos and Liberal leader

Sofoulis, who declaredthat the American help would serve 'the aim of reconstructing

and rehabilitating peace and freedom' and that all Greek requests for help from the

39
United States'have becometrue'. On 18 March, Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign

Affairs Tsaldaris cabled the Chiefs of Staff, War and Finance Offices that, to his great

relief, the British governmentwould offer the NA two million pounds for military

equipmentand another one million pounds for economic assistanceuntil the Congress

ratified the financial assistanceto 40

Greece. The right-wing world, according to the

newspaperKathimerini declared that salvation now had two fronts: America and

England41Tsaldaris declaredthat he 'continued to remain faithful primarily to Great

.

Action, 1947-1956(New York, 1957),p. 35. More balancedinterpretationsagainsta revolution include:

J. L. Gaddis,The United Statesand the Origins of Cold War (New York, 1972),p. 318; B. R. Kuniholm,
Origins of the Cold War in Near East (New York, 1980),p. 427. MacVeaghinsistedthat the northerntier
wasthe 'front line' betweenthe 'two partsof the world' and that the Greekswere in the 'front-line
trenches'.Leffler writes that the TrumanDoctrine wasthe US policy to counterbalanceSoviet influencein
the Middle Eastand the EasternMediterraneanscheduledsince 1946.Leffler, A Preponderanceof
Power,p. 121. Critics of the TrumanDoctrine include:W. A. Williams, The Tragedyof. 4merican
Diplomacy(New York, 1959);Wittrier, AmericanIntervention; Sfikaswrites that 'the policy of supportto
authoritarianand repressiveright-wing regimesin the nameof freedom' havebeenapplied,in Sfikas, The
British Labour Governmentand the GreekCivil War,p. 143.Among defendersof the TrumanDoctrine:
H. Feis,From Trust to Terror (New York, 1966);J. L. Gaddis,Strategiesof Containment(New York,
1982);B. R. Kuniholm, TheOrigins of the Cold War in the Near East (New York, 1980);D. R. McCoy,
ThePresidencyofHarry S. Truman(U. Pressof Kansas,1984).The Truman Doctrine was significant in
that it wasthe first stepin containingcommunism;it nonethelessleft a numberof unresolvedquestions
regardingthe durationof American aid, not solvedbeforeNATO creation.A. Bullock, TheLife and
TimesofErnest Bevin (London, 1983),pp. 470-471. Bullock, as opposedto the historianswho believe
that the TrumanDoctrine was the Americanresponseto the British note to abandonGreece,deemsthat it
wasa diplomatic successon Bevin's part to divert the American approachesover Greeceso as to gain
Americanprotectionof the Middle East,accordingly,British presencein Greecewas the price the British
hadto pay to keepthe Americansin the Mediterranean.
39YrIHPEZIA IETOPIKOY APXEIOY-SERVICE OF HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, ATHENS (YIA),
1947,129.1,1614, Ava(popd Tou I'l. Otxov6gou-rKoýpa aito qv Mjvucý r1peapcia GqV O1UdLGtyKT0V
aTov r1peAvicoupy6 M64týto, II Mapriou 1947 (Report by P.Economou-Gouras from Greek Embassy in
Washington to Prertiier Maximos, II March 1947).
"' YnHPEEIA IETOPIKOY APXEIOY-SERVICE OF HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, ATHENS (YIA),
1947,46.1,21502,Avagopdrou TaaX86pij7rpo;,coI-EE, 18 Mapriou 1947 (Tsaidaris' Reportto GES,
18 March 1947).
41Kathimerini, 16 March 1947.On the
contraryliberal newspaperTo Vima stressedthat America would
undermineGreekindependencewhereasRizospastisdeclaredthat the Left would continuefighting. In To
Vima,14 March 1947;Rizospastis,14 March 1947.
 54

Britain.942To the westernworld and the pro-westernersthe Truman Doctrine signified

the strengtheningof western ties and security under an Anglo-American front. It

signified neither the end of British commitment in Greecenor the end of Britain as a
43
world power.

The War in Greece

One of the major reasonswhy the Greekscontinued to look to Britain was the

reality of military operations.The rhetoric of the Truman doctrine was vital for the long-

tenn future of Greece. Yet the Greek state could, all too easily, have collapsed in

military defeatin 1947beforeAmerican aid madeitself felt.

In February 1947 the KKE Politburo had decidedto give priority to the military

struggle. Nicos Zahariadis, the General Secretaryof the KKE, informed his mentor,

Stalin, in a memorandumdated 13 May 1947, that 'the Political Bureau of the Central

Committee of the KKE [ ] considerthe armed struggle as the most important'.44By

...
the spring of 1947 the Communists had committed themselvesto an all out armed

confrontation with the government. Indeed, contrary to the claims of pro-leftist

historians,who claim that it was the 'white terror' that had causedthe KKE to act in

the
self-defence, Party had a clear intention of seizingpower through military victory.45

On 6 April 1947, Nicos Zahariadis crossed the border to visit Moscow and

Belgade to discussthe military option with his c omrades.0n 17 April, hew roteto

Marcos that 'the problem of re-provisioning had alreadybeen solved'. The Democratic

Anny would have as its main objective 'the capture of Salonika' and should createa

42PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67003R6476,Norton

to Foreign Office, 8 May
1947.
43Markezinis,Political History-HoAITIK4 IOTopfa,,vol. 2, p. 291; Vlavianos, History of Greece,p.236;
Veremis,TheMilitary in GreekPolitics, p. 151; Stavrianos,Greece:American Opportunity, 184-185.
" Quotedfrom the 14 December1947 pp.
edition of A ygi by 0. L. Smith, 'Self-Defenceand Communist
Policy', in Baerentzen,Iatrides, Smith (eds.), Studiesin the History the GreekCivil War, 1945-1949,
of p.
175.The decisionwas subsequentlytaken
with the understandingthat both the Sovietsand the Yugoslavs
would provide the necessarymaterial help.
 55
16
'free domain' in Macedonia,Thrace and probably Epirus. in May Zahariadisassured

Stalin that the Party was capableof beatingthe Maximos governmentand coul raisean

army of 50,000 men to liberate northern Greece with the 'assistance of all our foreign

friends'. 47 On 27 June, Miltiadis Porfyroyennis, representing the KKE Central

Committee,told Eleventh Congressof the French Communist Party in Strasbourgthat

henceforth 'all of the political, military and international conditions existed for the

creationof a Free Governmentin Greece'.He demandedthe support of all Communist

in for final 48
parties the struggle victory.

The military i mPlicationsoft his c all emergedo ver t he surnmer of 1947. T he

Communistsdecidedto abandontheir guerrilla strategy,createa conventionalarmy and

fight a positional war againstthe National Army.49On 11 September,the Third Plenum

proceededto formulate the strategicdimension of the KKE's plan to seize power. The

newstrategywasbaseduponthe 'LakesPlan' the creationof a freeareain Macedonia

-

and Thrace with Salonika its

as centre.This areawould be held by a Democratic Army

50
triple in size to around60,000men by the spring of 1948.

45History of the KKE-JOKIP10 Iaroplaq TOvKKE, pp. 564-569;0. Smith, 'Self-Defence, in Baerentzen,
Iatrides,Smith (eds.), Studiesin the History of the GreekCivil War, 1945-1949,p. 160.
46Vlavianos,Greece1941-1949,pp. 238-240.
47Vlavianos,Greece1941-1949,p. 240. It hasbeensuggestedthat after Zahariadis' discussionwith
Zhdanov,Stalin promisedthe KKE full support.Moreover,that Zahariadis,after being re-assuredof
Stalin's support,askedTito and Dimitrov their supplementarymilitary assistance.J. Baev (ed.), The
GreekCivil War in Greece-OEyýp6Aioq 176)xpoqainv EW&a (Athens, 1997),pp. 143-146.
48Woodhouse,Strugglefor Greece,p. 212; Eudes,TheKapetanios,p. 296. The CentralCommitteeof the
KKE met in Belgradein September1947with only six out of the twenty-five regularmembersof the CC
in attendance.The resolutionsof this plenum,one of the most controversialin the history of the KKE,
presentedMarcos and the other advocatesof guerrilla warfarewith afait accompli. The ad hoc CC
changedthe military, political and strategicdimensionof the Party. KKE Official Documents1945-1949-
KKE Er! 677pa Kelpeva1945-1949,vol. 6, pp. 245-247.
49Shrader,The WitheredVine, 261. The
p. authorbelievesthat the decision for transition was 'ill-timed'
and 'ill-advised' and led the KKE to defeatbecauseits recruitmentand military problemshad not been
solved.For a leftist critic of the decisionto convertto conventionalwarfare see:S. Vukmanovic,How and
Ry ThePeoples'Liberation StruggleMet with Defeat (London, 1950).
so0. L. Smith, 'CommunistPerceptions,Strategy Tactics, 1945-1949', in J. latrides, W. Linda ),
(eds.
and
Greeceat the Crossroads.The Civil War and its Legacy(Pennsylvania,1995),p. 107. In that article,
materialfrom the newspaperAvgi publishedin 1979-1980is examined;accordingly the official versionof
the KKE that the Third Plenumtook place in the mountainson 12-15 September1947is refuted.KKE,
Qfficial Documents1945-1949-Em677ya KciyEva1945-1949,vol. 6, p. 245. The Umnes Plan' wasbound
to fail, as it requiredtripling of its strengthin a shorttime and the necessaryassistancefrom abroadhad
 56

The aggressionand confidenceof the KKE causeduproar in Greece.The Right

accusedthe KKE of threateningto undermine the territorial integrity of Greece.The

leaderof the oppositionparty, Sofoulis, accusedthe Maximos governmentand the Right

of not having put down the Communist claims for power. The Left greeted

Porfyroyennis' announcementswith concern. Some members of the EAM tried to

interpret his statement a merely a political gambit. 51Indeed the Central Commission of

EAM proposedto the governmentits own plan to lessentension. They suggestedthat

EAM should t akep art int he c abinet,t hat ag eneral.a mnesty should be declaredthat

Parliamentshould be dissolved,and that the anti-Communistintelligence organisations

shouldbe disanned.

The Greek governmentwas far from sanguine,however. Maximos interpreted

Zahariadis'visit to Moscow as constituting a formal authorisationfrom Stalin to create

a communist 'Free' 52
government. This raised the danger that any territory lost in

northern Greece might never be won back. Governmental Greece would shrink and

'Free' Greecewould grow until the latter choked the fonner. In the light of this new

danger,the leaders of the opposition,the liberal Sofoulis and the conservative

Tsouderosmadean attemptto reacha political compromisebetweenthe communists

and the government.Prime Minister Maximos made it clear, however, that the only way

for reconciliation with the KKE to occur was if the Communists laid down their arms.

In p racticenop arty f elt itw as sow eak that it had to capitulate and the negotiations

carneto a fruitless end. Their aftermathwas ferocious govenunentcampaignagainstthe

Left. On 9 July, three thousandKKE sympathiserswere arrestedon the pretext that a

not beensecured.The plan of the KKE to take over beforethe Americanscould penetratemilitarily into
Greecewasnot viable, as the KKE had no military meansto supportits plans.
51History of the GreekNation-Icropla
TOvEUqviKobEOvovq,vol. 16 (Athens, 2000), p. 143.
52Averoff, By Fire
and Axe-Oom6 Kai TacKo6pi,p. 224. Unfortunately,there are no recordsavailableto
verify the agendaof the meeting.
 57

53
imminent. Even the American Ambassador MacVeagh had
communist revolt was
54
doubtsat to the wisdom of thesedraconianmeasures.

By the spring of 1947 the Democratic Army had occupied wide expansesof

territory to which the governmentalforces had no access.The one advantagethat

National Army that to be by

accentuated the
accruedto the Greek - an advantage was

Communists' evolving strategy- was that for the first time they had a tangible target.

The National Army planned, given the victories of the Democratic Army in the

Greece,
to the rebels from the south to the north. The focal
mountainsof northern clear

be Greece.Here forces hoped

point of operationswould, therefore, central government

to achievetwo objectives. First, to cut the route for supplies and reservesto the south

line to The area in which the

and, second,to cut the of retreat neighbouring countries.

included the regions north of Karpenisi, and Mount Agrafa,

counter-attackwould start

to the cities of Karditsa and Trikala. The whole operation was given the code-name

'Terminus', symbolising the aim of the National Army to put an end not only to the
55
military power of the rebels but the political and social upheaval in Greeceas well.

Four.operationswould form the main Operation Terminus. First, was OperationAetos

(Mount Agrafa, Aheloos river, Nevropoli, Koziakas, Metsovo) starting on 5 April with

estimatedduration of fifteen 56
days. Second,was Operation Ierax (Hasia, Antihasia,

53Averoff, By Fire and Axe-ft-rid Kai T=06pl, p. 244. Partsalidis,Passalidis,Loulis, Gavriilidis from
the Political Bureauof the KKE included.Arrestswere followed by exile without trial to campsof
concentration in Makronisosfor the Trikeri
conscripts, for the detainees,
Yaros for the convicted.
54FRUS(1947): 5,23 1: MacVeaghto the Secretaryof State,13 July 1947.
55FENIKO EIIITEAEIO ZTPATOY /AIEYE)YNI; H ILTOPIAM ETPATOY, ATHENS (FgZ/AlZ), 1947,
1067/A/44, Avagop6t Atot", roý)ITpmrid; AvTtcrrpdLTijyoi)A. FtavTt;ý, 3 MapTioi) 1947 (Lt. Gen.
D. Giantzis' Report, 3 March 1947); GES/DIS, Archives-ApXcla, rEI 7[pogA icat B ld)g= ITpaTob,
'EittXcipqaq N6Tta kai AI)TU(dTou MadxRwva, 8 (Deppouapiou 1947'(GES to A and B Army Corps,
'Operations in the South and West of Alialanona' 8 February 1947), vol. 3, keimeno 45, p. 285. The south
to north modus operandi had been perceived before the replacement of Spiliotopoulos; to be perfected
during the spring under Ventiris. GES/DIS, Archives- ApXcla, 1,1 i: TpaT,d -rcvuc6 ZXt8jo I: TpaTtd; Sta TqV
8tc4aymýv T(ovcmxetpýac(ov TEPMINOYZ, 10 MapTioi) 1947'(1 st Army Group, General Plan of the
Terminus Operation, 10 March 1947), vol. 3, keim. 73, p. 398.; GES/DIS, Archives- Apvcla, " ZTPaTid,
,rcvtK6 IXt8to Irp=t4 Staqv &4aycoyýv T(avcnqctpýac(ovTEPMINOYI, 10 MapTtoi) 1947'(1 Army
Group,GeneralPlan of the TerminusOperation,10 March 1947),vol. 3, keirrL73,p. 402.
56GES/DIS,Archives-Apvela,B 16ga F. 'AtaTayý Eicqctpý=ov- Yuv0qgcrrtK6 6voRa'AcT6;', 23
Tporrob,
MapTiOl)1947' (B Army Corps, 'Operation Command,Codename'Eagle', 23 March 1947),vol.4, keim.
 58

Kambounia) planned to last for ten days starting on 11 May. Third, was Operations

Korax (north of Metsovo to the Albanian border, Kastoria) and Kuknos (Mount

Olympos, Pieria). Finally Operation Pelargos (Mount Ossa, Pylio) was due for launch in

July dependingon the successof its predecessors.

The British lay at the centreof 'Terminus'. The commandof the National Army

was a joint Anglo-Greek effort. The decisions of the Supreme Council of National

Defencewere taken by the Greek Prime Minister, the Ministers of Air and Navy, the

Chiefs of the General Staff, Navy and Air sitting alongside the commandersof the

British Military Mission, the British Naval Mission and British Air Mission." Yet

'Terminus' did not meet its target. Although the Democratic Army under the command

of Marcos Vafeiadis lacked both men and munitions, they were able to mount a number

of successful'hit and run' missions against the attackerswhilst themselvesavoiding

58
being pinned down in protractedbattles. The Communistshad a wholly superior

intelligence operation to the government.The command of the Democratic Army was

very often informed about the plans of the National Army before the attacksthemselves

took place.Many units of the NA by

demoralised
became their lack of effectiveness.

Moreover the mountains and inaccessiblelandscapeprotected the Democratic Army

59 Although the
defenders. force eventually cleared the ground, its
government

cumbersome lack-lustre
operationsseemed to daring.
whencompared communist

4, p.56; D. Zafeiropoulos,Anti-Bandit War,1945-1949-OAvriavupopiaK6qAyo5v, 1945-1949(Athens,

1956),p. 224; GES/DIS,Archives-ApXE! a, 8il McpaXFiarpaycto rl), T1poqopt6)vA2, 'AO-Tio
IIXýpoyoptd)v,28 MapTiou 1947'(8d'division, Information Office A2,28 March 1947),vol.4, keim. 8b,
pp. 79-80.According to the estimationsof the Information Office of the 8"' division the numberof the
insurgentsin the OperationAetos arearoseto approximately2,000 men. The GreekhistorianD. Botsikas
writesthat the guerrilla forcesin the OperationAetos areadid not exceedthe 1,200-1,500men.
Zafeiropoulosagreeswith the estimationsof the Information Office of the 86'division. Zafeiropoulos,
Anti-Bandit War-0 Av-rtavpqqpiaK6q Ayd5v,1945-1949,p. 224.
57GES/DIS,Archives-ApXcla,AV6)TaTov ZuRpobktovEOvtKfl;AR-6vil;23 (Deppovaplou1947(Supreme
Councilof National Defence,23 February1947),vol. 3, keirn. 58, p. 333.
5'T. Psimenos,Rebelin Agrafa 1946-1950-Avr4Mq 1946-1950 (Athens, 1985), pp. 78-79.
ar'Aypaýpa
59History of the GreekNation- IcTopla EUqV1K06 EOvovq, 16, 145. According to Woodhouse
Tov vol. p.
the weaknesses of the NA consistedof. low morale,shortageof manpower, Marcos's tactical astutenessin
launchinga major diversionaryattack.Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece,pp. 205-207.
 59

An additional reasonfor the failure of the National Anny to decisively defeatthe

communistswas the 'Epirus Manoeuvre' executedby the DA by the beginning of July

1947.The 8h division of the National Army, having turned its attention towardsMount

Grammos,had lcft unguardedthe exits to Konitsa and Ioannina. The commandof the

DemocraticArmy graspedthe opportunity to launch attacks in the Epirus area from 7

July. On that day the 8th and 15'h divisions of the National Army were about to attack

the forces of the Democratic Army in the area of Eptahorion. Two of the commands of

the Democratic Army attackedthe forces of the National An-ny at the point were the

latter were scheduledto meet and co-ordinatetheir forces. That was the weak point of

the National Army. The Democratic Army attackedwith approximately one thousand

five hundred men (three battalions and one party of two companies from the Hasia

commandand anotherthree battalions from the Epirus command).The tactic aimed at

breaking the pincer movementof the NA at first and then beating the enemy from the

rear.The first successof the DemocraticArmy cameon the night of 6 to 7 July. Partsof

the 8h division of the NA in Zouzouli areawere forced to retreat. The advanceof the

governmental forces 60
was stopped. Simultaneously, however, successful counter-

attacksoccurredagainstthe 15thdivision.61

Epirus, the Democratic Army's hub, becamethe focal point of the warfare. On

12 July, the National Army was overcomein Derveni. This developmentcausedpanic to

the nationalforces,which startedevacuatingthe Grammosareato coverthe interior of

Epirus. The 8th division turned to Konitsa and a great part of the 9thdivision, scheduled

to attackGrammos,was sentto Ioanninaby track.The next day,the DemocraticArmy

troops occupied the Bourazani bridge threateningthe road to Ioannina. Eventually the

situation was stabilised in favour of the NA. New government air and land forces

60Zafeiropoulos, Anti-Bandit War-0 AVTIUVUUOplaK6q

Ayd5v, 1945-1949, vol. 2, p. 243.
61GESIDIS, Archives-ApXcia, 1"'I:
TpaTt6tq'Eic0cat; rlenpayRtvo)vElliXetpýc; F(t)v'K6pa4', 15
Y.CnTE[tPPt0U1947' (1" Army, 'Report on Operation Korax', 15 September 1947),
vol. 5, keim. 20, p. 178.
 60

to
managed stop the However,
communistadvance. the fact that the key route of Pindos

remainedunder the DemocraticArmy was a sign of failure for the National Army. The

communists still controlled the areas across the Albanian, Yugoslavian and Bulgarian

borders,which provided themwith supplies,equipmentand havensin which to hide and

organisetheir battles.Hence'Terminus' was only a relative successfor the NA.

That some successeswere salvaged from 'Terminus' was to a large extent due to

the British contribution. This contribution was felt, most decisively, in the realm of air

62
power. One of the National Army's trump cardswas the co-operationof air and land

forces,for the Democratic Army completely lacked an air force. Whereasthe National

Army enjoyed combat air support, especially when defending strongholds, and the

advantagesof aerial reconnaissance,the Communist benefited from neither. Yet the

Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) was a weak force. Its main body consistedof two

British SupermarineSpitfire IX rocket-armedground attack squadrons- with sixteen

aeroplaneseach. Some C-47s (Dakotas) were also used in a makeshift bombing role.

The rest of the air force was made up of obsolete communications aircraft such as

AirspeedOxfords and Avro Ansons.

During the summerof 1947,however,the British worked hard to strengthenthe

RHAF. The British dispatched250 aeroplanesto Greece.By October 1947 the RHAF

wasequippedwith included113Spitfires,eightC-47 (Dakota)transports,nine Vickers

Wellington bombersand 108 liaison aircraft (Ansons,Harvards,Austers, Oxfords, Tiger

Moths, L-5s). The single-engineAT-6s (Harvards)were useful reconnaissanceaircraft,

the Spitfires and Wellingtons carried out strafing and bombing operationsand the twin-

enginedC-47 transportsprotectedground troops and dropped supplies.By late 1947the

GreekAir Force had three fighter-bombersquadrons,each comprising twenty Spitfires,

62Among the historians

who claim that British involvementcameto an end by beginningof 1947is
Markezinis,Political History-HoAjrIK4JoTopla,p. 312.
 61

and
equippedwith rockets, cannons, bombs, and three reconnaissanceunits, eachmade

up of four Harvards armed with a single machine gun and fragmentationbornbs. One

unit were
squadronand one reconnaissance located at each of the three bases:Salonika

for the north-castcm operations,Larissa for central Greece, Elevsina for 63

the south.

Theseunits were hamperedby poor maintenanceand inadequatepilot reserves.Their

obsolescentaircraft would havebeenincapableof effective air superiority In

operations.

a situation where the governmentenjoyedtotal air superiority they were of inestimable

64
advantage. To a large it
extent was air power that proved decisive in stabilising the

situation at the height of the Epirus crisis. Despite the Communist victory, the massive

interventionof the RHAF, the arrival of the new govenunentforces and the vacillation

of the DemocraticArmy helpedthe National Army in its final though relative victory. In

the secondweek of July the DemocraticArmy was forced to retreat to Mount 65

Pindos.

Thefightsunderthe 'Terminus'continueduntil mid October1947but without decisive

results for the civil war in Epirus area. The Democratic Army was far from totally

63The Wellington was the principal bomber

usedby RAF in the initial stagesof the SecondWorld War,
this twin-engineaeroplanewas effective only againstspecific targetsand not for bombing large areas.The
RHAF found the Wellington uselessin the civil war and orderedit grounded.For monthsthe RHAF was
only minimally successful,for it had inadequateequipmentand facilities and an insufficient numberof
trainedpilots andmaintenancemen.When the enemywas spotted,the pilots failed to co-ordinatewith
groundunits or establisheffective communication.The Spitfires were vulnerableto groundfire and could
not retaliateeffectively becauseof their limited spacefor ammunitionand their short-rangeflying
capacity.The RHAF later usedthe Dakotas(C-47) for bombing expeditions,but with no particular
accuracy.On onehandthe air force provided valuablereconnaissance information, protectionof ground
troops,provision of supplies,drop of propagandaleaflets; on the other handthough,the planescould not
identify guerrilla strongholdshidden in the mountainsand that preventedthe air and groundforcesfrom
defeatingthe DA. Later on the stricter co-ordinationof air and ground forces,the useof tanksandnapalm
bombsor liquid fire, transformedthe RHAF into a more effective force in winning the war. Campbell(et.
al.), TheEmploymentofAirpower, pp. 34-41,55-56,66-69.
64FRUS(1947): 5,367-368: Memorandumby the Deputy Co-ordinator(Wilds) for Aid to Greece
and
Turkey, 15 October 1947;Recordsof the JCS,Part 2: 1946-1953,StrategicIssues:SectionI (thereafter
cited as JCS),US Military Assistance,1798/1,'US Assistanceto Greece', 15 October 1947,Reel I,
Frame0662.
65GES/DIS,Archives-ApXeia,fil 1TaTt6t'EK0cat;TIc7rpaygtvo)v EmXctpýacwv'K6pa4%15 ZenTegPP101)
1947' (0 Army, Reportson OperationKorax, 15 September1947),vol. 5, keim. 20, pp. 179-180.The
decisionof the DA not to attackthe city of Ioanninais beencharacterised'lost opportunity' by the KKE
andis a controversyamongthe left-wing historiographers.Zafeiropoulos,Anti-Bandit War-O
Avrzuvp,uopiaK6qAY05V, 1945-1949,p. 247. It signified, however,the guerrilla characterof the communist
warfare.
 62

defeated,despite Zafeiropoulos' estimationsthat 'the operations of 1947 assuredthe

66 67
salvationof Greece'. Rather'Tenninus' brought relative success.

The operationsof the NA againstthe DA from April onwardsdemonstratedthat

the Greek government was determined to escalate anti-communist warfare while

Zahariadiswas leading the KKE towards a full scale civil war. The escalationof the

civil war had turned the focus of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the KKE on

Soviet military assistance. Zahariadis while preparing for full scale operations was

hoping that Stalin would assistmilitarily, strategicallyand financially the struggleof the

KKE. From April onwardshe persistentlybrought pressureupon his Soviet comradesto

supportthe KKE's struggleto win the war in Greece."

Such a development would fit Stalin's strategic interests in the area and

strengthenthe Soviet's international status.Even in a less ambitious plan, a powerful

KKE within the Greek political sceneseemedattractive to the Soviets and their foreign

policy. However, the Soviet leaderwas well awareof the British involvement in Greece

as well as the increasing American interest to prevent the Greek communists from

taking over power. By 1947 it was clear to him that there were no possibilitiesof

preventingwesterninvolvementin the EasternMediterranean.

ThereforeStalinwould

neither support an open or total confrontation with the West, which would jeopardise

Soviet foreign interestsin the EasternEurope, nor back the war in Greece.Had Stalin

decided to support the KKE and its fight, he would have equipped the KKE and

suppliedits anny before or during 1947.

66Zafeiropoulos,Anti-Bandit War-OAvriavuuqpiaK6qAycbv,1945-1949, 262.

67
p.
rENIKO EriITEAEIO ETPATOY /AIEY(3YNEH IETOPIAE ZTPATOY, ATHENS (rEE/AIE),
1067/B/6 0 P(boi)ktvq oTov Bmýpij, 27 OKTo)ppto'u1947 (Rawlins to Ventiris, 27 October 1947). On the
samereport Rawlins noted to the Chief of the Greek General Staff Lt. Gen. Ventiris the complains made
by Col. Davies, Commander of the British Liaison Units
on C Army Corps, on the bad organisation and
lack of discipline of the training officers of the
non-commissioned C Army Corps training school in
Salonika. Woodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece,
pp. 205-207. Margaritis, History of the Greek Civil War-
IoTopla rov Ey(pvAlovHoAtluov, vol. 1, p. 327.
6' For an analysisof the KKE
policy and the USSRsee:Vlavianos, Greece1941-1949;P. J. Stavrakis,
Moscowand the GreekCommunism1944-1949(London, 1989).
 63

Stalin did not really support the KKE's struggle. The lack of reliable Soviet

is
assistance also consolidatedin Zahariadis' letters dated 6 October and 10 November

1947. These letters to 'comrade Baranov' in Moscow revealed that Soviet aid was

in
exceptionallyslow arriving and the amountsthat did arrive were 'still' unsatisfactory.

Zahariadis also confirmed that his Balkan comrades 'do what they can' with their

" This was the picture of the communist assistancefrom abroad

limited resources.

during the civil war. Stalin provided a minimum assistanceto the KKE which would not

turn to a sufficient back up to counterbalancet hat oft he o ther s ide. T he Y ugoslavs,

Bulgarians and Albanians offered their land for shelter and training and minimum

assistancegiven their own financial restrictions.The communist fight thus suffered from

limited international assistance, government measures and increasing western

assistance.

TheSofoulis Government:A New CentreExperiment

Mi itary ambiguity translated into new political instability. The Maximos

governmenthad failed to provide Greece with peace and indeed the civil war had

becomea war on all fronts. Maximos, agreedwith Dwight Griswold, Chief of American

Aid Mission to Greece,that structural and tactical changesat governmentallevel were

needed.Griswold suggestedthat Zervasshouldbe dismissedas his anti-Communist

campaignunited the Left than it. 70Konstantine Tsaldaris, leaderof the

rather weakening

powerful Populist Party, Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, gasped the

opportunity to demand the formation of a new, purely Populist government. On 18

August, Tsaldaris flew to London for discussionswith Sir Onne Sargent,the Pennanent

Under-Secretary
at the ForeignOffice. Tsaldaristurnedto the ForeignOffice to which

69Avgi, no. 32,12 January1980.Quotedin Stavrakis,Moscow

and the Greek Communism1944-1949,p.
162.Stavrakischaracterisesthe Soviet policy towardsthe KKE as 'prudent
expansionism'or 'policy of
dualism'. Stavrakis,Moscow and the GreekCommunism1944-1949,pp. 6,14 1.
70FRUS(1947): 5,299-301: MacVeagh Marshall, 19 July
to 1947.
 64

'he remained dedicated first' becausethe State Department had told him to form a

Tsaldaris
coalition government. failed, however, in his attempt to convince Sargent
that

he was the most suitableman to take over power. What struck Sargentmost from these

talks was T saldaris' overweening ambition, which Sargentwas sure would be placed

beforethe national interestof Greece.71

A new governmentalcrisis eruptedover the Liberals' attempt to eliminate right-

wing elements of the cabinet. On 21 August, Papandreou, Kanellopoulos and Venizelos

askedthe Populist Ministers of Public Order and of War, Napoleon Zervas and George

Stratosrespectively,to resign on the groundsthat they were unpopular both in Greece

and with the British and the Americans. Their aim was to form a Liberal government

headedby Sofoulis. Both Tsaldarisand the two ministers rejected the demandsand on

23 August the three National Political Union (EPE) ministers resigned. The coalition

As a result,on the sameday,PrimeMinisterMaximosresignedaswell.72

collapsed.

A new element in politics was the fact that Greecehad a new king. Paul had

succeededhis brother at a good moment, in the spring of 1947, when the start of the

governmentoffensive, continued British support and the promise of American aid had

engenderedan air of optimism. He was fortunate to have a few months grace to ease

into the successionbefore the political and military crisesbroke out. Not that Paul was a

passiveobserver.He wasdeterminedto be moreof an interventionistin politicsthanhis

brotherhadbeen,whoseinfluencehadusuallybeenexercisedasblockeranda wrecker.

As the constitution required, Paul askedthe leaderof the secondbiggest party to fonn a

government.Tsaldaris, in an attempt to strengthenthe governmenthe was planning to

fonn, asked Sofoulis and t he L iberal P arty toj oin t he c abinet. S ofoulis t umed d own

71FRUS(1947): 5,287-288: Memorandum Villard to Marshall, 8 August 1947;PUBLIC RECORD

of
OFFICE,KEW (PRO), FO 371/67145R 11654,Reportof DiscussionsbetweenSargentandTsaldaris,18
August 1947.
 65

Tsaldaris'proposal,ashe demanded
more power for the Liberal Party. Dwight Griswold

Tsaldaris that if he formed a purely conservativecabinet American aid would

warned

slow 73
down. Griswold's intervention, however, had no impact upon Tsaldaris' plans.

h
As Orme Sargent ad p redictedt he I eaderoft he P opulists announcedt hat hew ould

form a 'pure' right-wing government. Tsaldaris formed a cabinet, which was not

Gonatas
Stefanopoulos, 74
Alexandris.
acceptableevento other conservativessuchas or

In responseto Tsaldaris' bid for power the American governmentused its most

to the Greekpoliticians on their best behaviour. On 30 August Loy

effectiveweapon put

Henderson,Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs at the State Department,

arrived in Athens. He warned Tsaldaris and Sofoulis that if they refused to co-operate

with a coalition governmentthen American aid to Greecewould be stopped and they

would be blamed for it. 75Hendersonproposedthe formation of a Sofoulis-Markezinis

coalition government.Tsaldaris, alarmedat the prospect of losing power entirely, was

forced to compromise. Once Washington and London had stood together in

more

refusing to support Tsaldaris. Instead, they preferred a coalition of the Centre under

liberalSofoulis.

The rest of the Greek political world agreed. EPE now agreed to the new

coalition, after the exclusion of hard-core right-wing members. Tsaldaris, however,

remainedas Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs. On 7 September,

the new

72PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371n2240 R2576,Norton to Bevin, IS February

1948:Annual Report for 1947;FRUS (1947): 5,299-301: MacVeaghto Marshall, 19 August 1947;
Markezinis,Political History-HoAITM4IO-ropla,vol.2, pp. 307-309.
73FRUS(1947): 5,311-313: MacVeaghto Marshall, 25 August 1947;PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,
KEW (PRO),F0371/67007 R11718,Reilly to Foreign Office, 26 August 1947;History of the Greek
Nation-IoToplaTOvEU11VIK06 EOvovq,vol. 16,p. 146.King Paul was crowned in April 1947following
George'sdeath.
74All threeimportantallies of the conservativeworld (Ministry of Co-ordination,Public Work, Finance
and Justice) under Tsaldaris cabinet in 1946 and Maximos in 1947. FRUS (1947): 5,318-319: MacVeagh
to Marshall 27 August 1947;PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67007R 11798,Reilly
to ForeignOffice, 27 August 1947.
75On that eventis basedthe view that American turned the Greek government into a viable
pressure
coalition of the centre-right.In Iatrides (ed.), Greecein the 1940s,pp. 209-10. A view sharedandpursued
by the British aswell as alreadynoted.
 66

cabinet of ten Liberals and fourteen Populists took the oath. The new government

committeditself to an amnestyfor insurgentswho agreedto surrenderand to the release

76 On hand, it the British American to further

of detainees. the other pressed and

77
forces. The implications of 'Terminus' made this the first
strengthennational armed

National Defence Council (ASEA) in

priority. On 14 October 1947, the Supreme met

Athens.C hairing the in eetingKing P aul c alled f or war on all fronts: 'the aim of the

'
operations, he declared,'is to defeatthe bandits to
not repulse them from one place to

another'. The main proposal of the meeting was the direct increaseof the size of the

army and the creation of Territorial Army battalions, which would assumethe duties of

static defenceand thus set the regular army free of this responsibility to concentrateon

the actual fighting.78

Counter-insurgencyOperationsin Greece

The outcome of Operation 'Ten-ninus' had made clear that a new type of

if
warfarewas needed the GreekNational Army was to defeat the Democratic Army. By

the end of 1947 the British and Americans were working hard on the problem of

in
counter-insurgency an effort to help their Greek allies. Counter-insurgencywarfare

intelligence 79The British role was important in

combined with civil and military efforts.

76PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/72240R2576,Norton to Bevin, 18 February1948:

AnnualReport for 1947;FRUS (1947): 5,299-301: MacVeaghto Marshall, 19 September1947;
Markezinis,Political History-HoAITIKýIo-ropla,pp. 309-311.
77Winner, AmericanIntervention,pp. 227-228.
7' GES/DIS,Archives-Apxcla,Av(oraTovZuRpob%tov EOvwý; Agb"; (AMEA), 'llpaKTtKd3 I'll
luve8pidac(o;, 14 OKTcoppiou 1947'(HighestCommitteeof National Defence(ASEA) 31" Meeting, 14
October1947),vol. 6, keim. 33, p. 219. ASEA co-ordinatedall national forces. Seealsop. 48, f. 21. By
the endof October 1947,the National Army increasedfrom 100,000to nearly 132,000men.Jones,'A
NewKind of War') p. 106.
79The Greekundertakinghasbeen typical foreign COIN objectives,as formulatedlater in the
a caseof
1950sand 1960s,combiningmilitary, political and civil control. The uniquenessof the Greekcase,
though,is that the KKE itself changedits warfare from guerrilla to conventionalcombatfrom 1947,
complicatingthe natureof operationsand that the insurgencydied out for various reasons,someof them
relatedto the KKE itself. The Anglo-Americanco-operationwas anotherfactor that madethe Greekcase
important.For the rhetoric of the British Army andBritish COIN operationsseeH. Strachan,ThePolitics
of the British Army, (Oxford, 1997);Th. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgencyin the Post-imperialEra
(New York, 1995);Th. Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency,1919-1960(London, 1990);C. McInnes,
Hot War, Cold War (London, 1996),pp. 122-123;T. L. Jones,TheDevelopmentof British COIN Policies
 67

its development.British post-war counterinsurgencyactivities world-wide have been

well however,
documented; the effort in Greecehas been neglected.It is the role of the

United Statesin shapingGreekcounter-insurgencyoperationsthat has been emphasised

by most historians.It would be fruitless to deny the importanceof the American effort.

Yet the history of Greek counter-insurgencyquite clearly demonstratesthe continuing

importance of Britain in the final years of the civil war. 80

At the end of the SecondWorld War the role of the British Military Mission had

been defined as the training of the National Army. 81 It also provided small arms,

82
artillery, clothing and miscellaneoussupplies. As a modem guerrilla conflict gathered

momentum in the Greek mountains by the end of 1946, the Chiefs of Staff

recommendedthat the British Military Mission should be allowed to unfettered advice

on counter-insurgencyoperations. The British set about organising more specialist

teamsto train the National Army in ground and air operations,commandotactics and
83
'Irregular Warfare' techniques. The Royal Hellenic Air Force, the national forces,the

Greek Royal Navy and the Police were all encompassedby the British reconstruction

programme.

In 1946 General Rawlins, Commanderof the British Military Mission between

1945-1948,GeneralSpiliotopoulos,the Chief of Greek GeneralStaff, and Field Marshal

Montgomery,Chief of the ImperialGeneralStaff,had agreedto transformtheNational

and Doctrine, 1945-52(PhD, Univ. of London, 1992),pp. 169-218;T. L. Jones,'The British Army and
Greece,1945-49',Small Warsand Insurgencies8, no 1 (Spring 1997),88-106.
80D. S. Blaufarb, The CounterinsurgencyEra: USDoctrine
and Performance(London, 1977);Th. K.
Adams,USSpecial OperationForces in Action (London, 1998);J. J. McCuen, TheArt of Counter-
RevolutionaryWar (London, 1966).
81BMM and Military establishments
operatedin Ethiopia with the aim of training the Imperial Army, in
SaudiArabia with a small BMM at Taif to give infantry training in Greeceand a small numberof British
Navy, Army, Air and Police personnelandTurkey instructing in certain specialisedfields. FRUS (1947):
5,523: StateDepartmentMemorandumon Military Missions,undated.JUSMAPG on the contrarywas
appliedfor the first time by December1947in Greece.For allies' co-operationsee:Map D.3, p. 189.
82PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/908,BMM(G) Official History; WO 32/15547,
History of BMM in Greece1945-1952;King's CollegeLondon Archives, Liddell Hart Centrefor Military
Archives,Papersof GeneralSir Harold E. Pyrnan,7/l/2,17 January1947.
83PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 79/54, COS (46), 11 December1946;WO 202/946,
31 December1946;WO 202/908,BMM(G) Official History.
 68

Army so that it could 'fight an irregular enemyin mountainouscountry'. To this endthe

British proposedinnovations such as the greateruse of air support, light infantry and

84
commandoS. The effect of theseinnovations would emerge gradually over the next

two years.Ine arly January 1947 t he C hief oft he I mperial G eneralStaff p ressedt he

Cabinet Defence Committee for a greater British counter-insurgencyinvolvement in

Greece. On 14 January 1947, General Rawlins received a new directive which

authorisedthe British Military Mission to 'give the greatestpossible assistance'to the

enlarged Greek security forces. On 21 January, following another Internal Security

conferenceheld at the War Office, Rawlins was instructed to send his men to Greek

'field units' and to ensurethat the GreekGeneralStaff actedupon British advice.85

In 1947 the escalationof the communist attacksgave the British an opportunity

to test their counter-insurgencytechniques on the battlefield. At the start of 1947

86
organisednew commandotraining courses. A three-stageplan was approvedby the

Chiefs of Staff on 27 January 1947.The first phasewas to comprise the retraining and

reorganisationof the security forces, assistedby British Liaison Units, and various

specialteamsincluding Mountain Warfare Instruction Teams, British Instruction Team

Intelligence officers, and an 'Arrny-Air Co-operation Training Team' under Major

Walker-Brush. The secondphasewould feature 'counter-organisation' actions against

the KKE underground network (viajka). These actions would consist of population

relocation combined with large-scale'encirclement clearance' operationsincorporating

the armouredand artillery assaults.The third and final phase,after an areawas cleared,

84Agreementsto
organiseat least3,000 men in Commandocolurnnswere also takenon 28 November
1946by the British Chiefs of Staff. Xydis, Greeceand the Great Powers,
pp. 361,432-33,53 1. The years
to comein the following chapterwould prove the gradualstrengtheningof the forces.
85King's CollegeLondon Archives, Liddell Hart Centrefor national
Military Archives, Papersof GeneralSir H.
PymanPapers,6/l/2, New Directive to Rawlins, 14 January1947;PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW
(PRO),DEFE 4/2, COS (47) 30,21 February1947;WO 261/637Increase the BMM, 30 January1947.
86PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB of
134/4,DO (47) 1, COIN Tasks, I January1947;WO
261/637,BMM report, 30 January1947.
 69

be to return it to 87In pursuit of these objectives the

would civil goverranentcontrol.

British Military Mission urged the National Army to enhance its mobility and

intelligence-gathering capacity.88

In March 1947 the posture of the British Military Mission was modified to

Bevin's
encompass plan to involve the United States in an allied counter-insurgency

effort in Greece.Despite the assertionsof many historians that the Truman Doctrine

signified the passagefrom a Pax Britannica to a Pax Americana the Americans did not
89
take on the burden of counter-insurgencyoperationaladvising alone after March 1947.

Indeedthe Americans themselvesinsisted that the British should remain fully involved

in the effort. On 2 September 1947, the top American official in Greece, Dwight

Griswold, invited the British to join twenty-five American Army officers in advisingthe

National Army on future operations.On 19 September1947,the War Office and Chiefs

of Staff approvedthis 90
idea. On 11 October 1947, Bevin, by
encouraged the American

desire to co-operate with the British, proposed that the British Military Mission's

operationaladvisory role in Greece be He

should strengthened. wanted to send Indian

Army and other 'officers with guerrilla experienceto the [British] Mission [in Greece]'

91
to review the strategy of the National Army. The British Military Mission further

suggestedthe creation of 'Commando deep patrolling' as well as the retraining the

92
intelligencenetwork.

87PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),DEFE 4/1, COS (47) 15,27January1947;WO 261/637,
BMM(G), 30 January1947.At that time, Britain had not developedcounterinsurgencyrhetoric. As
observedin Greeceand later on in other test casessuchasMalaya, counterinsurgencymeasuresincluded:
the useof minimum force, the useof a good intelligencenetwork, cutting off the insurgentsfrom their
the
supplies, useof the army for static defencedutiesand emergency laws to apply civilian control in
McInnes,Hot War Cold War (London, 1996),pp. 118-124.
88PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),AIR 24/760,COIN plans, RAF Report, 30 April 1947.
89C. Tsoukalas,The Greek Tragedy(Harmondsworth,1969), 109.Vlavianos, Greece1941-1949,P.
p.
236; Close(ed.), TheGreek Civil War,pp. 203-207.On the contrary,British assistancehad playeda
significantpart in the NA's struggleagainstthe DA.
90Winner, AmericanIntervention,
pp. 232-6; Jones,'A New Kind of War', pp. 91-98; PUBLIC RECORD
OFFICE,KEW (PRO), DEFE 4/7, COS (47) 121,19 September1947.
91PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), PREM 8/527,
note from Bevin, II October 1947.
92PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/893,AIR 46/62, Rawlins, 'Review the Anti-
of
Bandit Campaign',22 October 1947.Vlavianos, Greece1941-1949,p.236. Iatrides, 'Britain, the US and
 70

By spring 1947, however, the Americanshad started to expand their political,

financial and military role in Greece. The first American Mission to Aid Greece

(AMAG) was establishedin Athens in May 1947.93The head of the American Mission

to Aid Greece,Dwight Griswold, would superviseall expendituresand administerboth

civilian and military assistanceprogrammes.The mission in Greecebeganwith a staff

of forty members (exclusive of military and naval personnel) but that figure soon grew

to about 175. The military branch of the mission consistedof the United StatesArmy

Group Greece(USAGG) headedby GeneralWilliam Livesay, who arrived in Greeceon

19 June,and a small naval section.United StatesAid Group Greecehad a staff of fifty-

four, including officers, enlistedmen, and civilians. The naval mission had no more than

thirty men, whose duty was to train the Greeksin using American minesweepers,tank

landing ships,personnelboats,tugs, and other craft up to the size of a destroyer.United

StatesAid GroupGreece'smissionwasto securesuppliesandequipmentfor the Greek

anny. It would function in co-ordination with the British Military Mission in advising

the National Amy. 94

Livesay's first challenge was the Greek government's insistence on the

expansionof the gendarmerie.The gendarmerieplayed a vital role in maintaining civil

order after the army had clearedan areaof the communist forces. However, its pay and

benefits was four times than that of an averagesoldier, so there was no advantagein

replacing soldiers with gendannes.George Marshall opposed any expansion of the

Greekgendarmerie.Accordingly, Livesay approvedthe improvement of Army Security

Greece,1945-29',in Close (ed.), TheGreekCivil War,pp. 203,207. Insteadin January1948A. V.

Alexandersuggestedsendingreinforcementsfrom Palestineto bolster the allied COIN effort in Greece.In
R. Frazier,'The Bevin-MarshallDispute of August-November1947Concerningthe Withdrawal of
British troops form Greece',in Studiesin the History of the GreekCivil War 1945-1949,pp. 249-262;
Sfikas,Oi, 4yyAoiEpyaTwol,p. 207; T. L. Jones,'The British Army, and Counter-GuerrillaWarfarein
Greece,194549', Small War and Insurgencies8, no. 1 (1997), 88-106.
93The Greekhistorian Veremis
writes that AMAG in 1947signified 'the changingof guardfrom Britain
to the US'. Th. Veremis, TheMilitary in GreekPolitics (London, 1997),p. 151. Nevertheless,in 1947
theUnited Stateswas taking its first gradualsteptowardsintervention in Greece.
94Jones,',4 New Kind War',
of pp. 61,101-103.
 71

Units rather than the gendarmerieto conduct 'mopping-up operations' after the army

hadclearedan areapreviouslyheld by communists.Of coursethe Greekscaredmore for

American aid rather than quibblesover its actual implementation.Napoleon Zervas,the

Minister of Public Order, acceptedthe American preference for military over para-
95
military forces. The switch from the gendarmerie to Army Security Units was the first

substantiveAmerican impact on Greek planning. The Americans agreedto a National

Army increasedin size from 100,000to 132,000men.96

By early November 1947 the Truman administration was moving toward the

establishmentof another advisory and planning group in Greece (Joint United States

Military Advisory and Planning Group) under Livesay's direction. This would be a

group of ninety officers and eighty enlistedmen divided among the army, navy, and air

force, as part of the military section of the aid mission. They would have direct

communicationswith the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The group, with its headquartersin

Athens, would aid the Greek GeneralStaff through four advisersspecialisingin anned

forces personnel,intelligence, planning and logistics. In co-operation with the British

Military Mission,the Joint United StatesMilitary Advisory andPlanningGroupwould

provideadviceto the Greekcommanders

and staff. The British would continuetheir

current training duties whilst the Americans concentratedon raising the standardof
97
infantry units. On 31 December 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) appointed

Livesayto commandJUSMAPG.

A new Anglo-American concordat covering the presenceof British forces had

98
also to be worked out in the summerof 1947. In January 1947 the British government

haddecidedthatthe 14,000British troopsstationedin Greecewould haveto be reduced

95Ibid, pp. 71-73.

96Jones, 'A New Kind
of War, p. 106.
97FRUS (1947): 5,399:
anonymous note, 6 November 1947; Kenneth Matthews, Memories ofa
Mountain War Greece (London, 1972), p. 177; Wooodhouse, The Strugglefor Greece,
pp. 221-222;
Kousoulas, Revolution and Defeat, p. 249.
 72

to one brigade of four battalions. By July 1947 only 5,000 combatantsremained in

Greece.The British regardedtheir presenceas a symbolic gestureof British interestand

military power in the country. They were formally committed to the defence of the

integrity Greece foreign 99

territorial of against any encroachment. Yet Bevin proposed to

the Chiefs of Staff that this mission shouldbe reviewed.He suggestedthat all the troops

might be withdrawn in September1947.The Foreign Office arguedthat the retention of

a small force of 5,000 men would be inadequateto meet a possible Soviet attack, that

the British presencemerely provoked the Greek left, and that the troops were thus not

good value for 100

money. On 30 July 1947 Sir Jock Balfour, the British Chargi in

Washington,was instructedto inform the StateDepartmentthat Whitehall had decided

upon the 'immediate' withdrawal of its army from Greece for 'financial' and

cmanpower'reasons.Athens was not informed of the British decision.101

In reply to the British dimarche Marshall cabled Bevin one of the strongest

notes recorded in Anglo-American relations concerning Greece. The American

Secretaryof State stated that the British note rendered co-operation 'unnecessarily

difficult' and expresseddoubts as to whether there would be any significant financial

savingto Britain. Marshall threatenedthat if London persistedwith its coursethe United

States might reconsider all economic commitments in Europe and re-examine the

strategicposition of Greece,'becauseUnited Statesforeign policy had been [I

predicated upon British willingness to contribute to the maintenance of stability in

102
Europe'.

98FRUS(1947): 5,268: British ChargtJohnBalfour to Secretary State,30 July 1947.

of
99PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 128/9,CM 14(47) 4,30 January1947;CAB 128/9,
CM 30(47) 2,18 March 1947.
100PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/67043R 10641, Report by the COS, 28 July 1947.
101FRUS(1947): 5,268: Balfour to Marshall, 30 July 1947;PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),
FO 371/67043R 10494,Foreign Office to WashingtonandAthens, 30 July 1947.
102FRUS(1947): 5,273-274: Marshall to Bevin, 1 August 1947.
 73

Bevin replied that therehad beenno changein British policy and inquired as to

how long the Americans wished the British troops to remain in 103
Greece. On 9

September 1947, the Chiefs of Staff noted that 'it is strategically important that we must

have the closest military collaboration with the United States [ ] to supportBritish
...

policy in the Middle East and EasternMediterranean'.Any decision about withdrawal

of British troops must be determined 104The following day Bevin

on political grounds.

decided'to take no definite decision' until further discussionshad taken place with the

Americans about the Near and Middle East.105The British troops would remain in

Greecewillingly until 1950.Bevin's manoeuvrehad never been indicative of a desireto

abandon Greece. His main purpose was to make the United States send troops to

Greece.This would increasethe American interest in Greeceand in Britain's main area

of interest:the Middle 106

East. Yet the Truman administrationwas unwilling to face the

' 07
difficulties in Congressthat the dispatchof combattroops would have entailed.

Politically, it suited the Americans that the British should remain fully engagedin
108
Greece.

Conditionson the groundremainedconduciveto a continuingAnglo-American

condominium.There was neither the time nor the opportunity for an orderly transfer of

power evenif either party had wanted it. On ChristmasEve 1947 the KKE took the step

most fearedby American and British observers:it announcedthe establishmentof the

ProvisionalDemocraticGovernmentin the mountainsof north-westemGreece(at Pyli,

103FRUS(1947): 5,275-278: Douglas(Ambassadorin the UK) to Marshall, 3 August 1947.

104PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),PREM 8/797,Note to Prime Minister, 9 September1947.
105PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 800/468/GRE/47/33,34,35,Withdrawal of British
Troopsfrom Greece,10,12,15 September1947.
106PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), PREM 8/841, Policy in the Middle East and Eastern
Mediterranean,21 November 1947.In thesetalks, Bevin had madeit clear that Greece'sindependence
wasvital to the securityof the EasternMediterranean,which togetherwith the Middle Eastforms a
strategicwhole. The United Statesaimedat securingan anti-Communist'barrier' in Italy-Greece-Turkey-
Iran.
107On the issueof the withdrawal of the British Army see,Frazier, 'The Bevin-Marshall Dispute', in
Baerentzen,Iatrides (eds.), Studiesin the History of the GreekCivil War,
pp. 249-262.
 74

in the vicinity of Lake Prespa, near the intersection of the Greek, Albanian and

Yugoslav borders). In an atmosphereof 'celebration' the rebel radio station, Free

Greece,announcedthe settingup of this shadowgovernmentheadedby Prime Minister

and Minister of War 'General Marcos'. Zahariadis,following Stalin's model, assumed

but the KKE's General 109

Secretary.
no cabinetpost remained

The announcementof the formation of the Provisional Democratic Government

by
was accompanied a deten-nined
major attack by the Democratic Army designedto

its Fourteen Democratic Army

seize the north-west town of Konitsa as capital.

battalions(over 2,500 men), led by Marcos, moved south from Mount Grammoson the

24-25 Decemberand, aided by diversionary attacks elsewherein Thessalyand

night of

Epirus, seizedcontrol of the approachesto Konitsa, which was defendedby a national

forces garrison of some 900 men. Konitsa was the last of the unoccupied fronts of

Epirus. Amply supplied with men, rations and ammunition from a provisions supply

basein the village of Argyrokastro,over the border in Albania, Marcos employedall of

his available artillery (two batteries of 75mm mountain guns, three or four 105min

howitzers, and a variety of mortars) to support a number of attacks on the town from

different directions.

Delayedby heavy rains the NA relief forcesmoving from Grevenaand Ioannina

did not appearuntil 30 December.Abandoningthe usual guerrilla tactic of withdrawing

before the arrival of superiorrelief forcesthe DA choseto stand and fight. However, the

108FRUS (1947): 5,458-461: Memorandumby Henderson,22 December1947;Leffler, A

Preponderance,p. 194.
109Marcos' ProvisionalGovernmentwas,despiteZahariadis' assurances, not recognisedby anyone,even
by the SovietUnion or Yugoslavia.It soonbecameclear that Stalin, alarmedby the growing American
involvementin an areaso closeto his satellites,wantedthe Greek civil war to be brought to an end.
Marcoslater criticised Zahariadisfor the decisionto proceedto the formation of the PDG without having
fulfilled the necessarypreconditionfor internationalrecognition:to capturea major city in which a
governmentalauthority could be established.In Vlavianos, Greece1941-1949,p. 245. The
announcement of the Provisional Government had long-term political effects. On 27 December 1947,the
Sofoulisgovernmentrespondedto the communists'initiatives by passingthe EmergencyLaw 509, which
outlawed the Greek Communist Party and penalisedall communistactivities with incomparablyharsh
penalties;the deathpenalty included.
 75

National Army, newly equippedwith American weapons and supported by both air

power and artillery, soon drove the Communisttroops from the high ground aroundthe

town. After suffering heavy casualtiesthe Democratic Army began to Withdraw on the

night of 31 December-1January.By 7 January1948,the National Army had clearedthe

immediateareaalthough fighting continueduntil 15 Januaryin the surroundingregion.

The GreekGeneralStaff later estimatedthat the DemocraticArmy had committed about

5,000 men to the battle and suffered 1,169 casualties(400 killed, 746 wounded, 23

captured),while the National Army had suffered363 casualties(71 killed, 237 wounded

55 '
and missing). lo

The battle of Konitsa was the largest and most sustainedCommunist offensive

up to that time. It was the first conventionalbattle the Democratic Army had attempted.

It was the Communists' first seriousdefeat.The attempt to seize Konitsa demonstrated

that a guerrilla force, acting prematurelyas a conventionalarmy, lost most of its tactical

advantageswhen it exposeditself to the superior firepower of its opponents-"' The

dangers of Zahariadis' concept, of confronting the National Army in conventional

operations,were made manifest. Marcos' determinationnot to abandonguerrilla tactics

was shownto have a basis in reality. Zahariadis,however, refusedto learn the lessonsof

the Communists'first major military blunder.At a meetingheld at Vitsi on 15 January

1948Zahariadisannounced
that the strategyandtacticsof the DemocraticArmy would

continueto evolve from guerrilla operationstowards more conventionaltechniques.The

Democratic Army would transform itself into a structured military organisation,

employing units of battalion size (500-600 men) and higher. Marcos opposed

110
GESIDIS,Archives-ApXcia,ApXcioITparof) (Army Report), vol.7, pp. 52-101; Zafeiropoulos,Anti-
Bandit War-OAv-riavpqqpiaK6q Ayd5v,1945-1949,p. 306; O'Ballance, The GreekCivil War.,pp. 160-
162;Eudes,TheKapetanios,pp. 308-309;Margaritis, History of the Greek Civil War-Io-ropla
Tov
E,UqVIK06EpýpWov,vol. 1, pp. 373-388.The KKE officially characterisesthe Konitsa
operationa power
showandKKE's attemptto provide the DemocraticGovernmentwith credentials.History of the KKE-
dOKf,
UIOIoTopiaq TovKKE, vol. 1, p. 581. For KKE suppliesfrom the north see:Map DA, p. 190.
,111
History of the KKE-,dOKIUIO Iaroplaq TovKKE, p. 581.
 76

Zahariadis' plans but the will of the GeneralSecretaryof the Politburo prevailed. The

Provisional Democratic Governmentproceededto the creation of a hierarchy of the

DemocraticArmy officers' ranks similar to that of a regular army: theseproposalswere

by
signed the Presidentand War Minister General 112
Marcos.

The processof the 'militarisation' of the Democratic Army had to take place in

secret sustained by a minority of the population and quite frequently in areas and

circumstanceswhere its prospectswere uncertain and unstable.The areasin which the

Democratic Army was operating oflen lacked sufficient communication between each

other. Even if communicationwas possibleenormousprecautionshad to be taken so to

hide war cabinetsfrom governmentforces.

The 1947 operationsdemonstratedthe willpower of the Democratic Army to

pursuit its aims and challengethe statusand strengthof the National Army. In April the

National Army launched,its first massive campaign against the DA to eliminate its

powers and free the occupied by the Communists areas.Hence 'Terminus' begun in

April with the aim to cut the DA's communicationline from the north and clear central

and northernGreecefrom the communistinfluence.The undertakingwas relatively

for the governmentforces.Theoperationdemonstrated

successful theweaknesses
of the
NA: functional inefficiency and lack of organisationand discipline. The fights turned in

112I. General(Marcos Vafeiadis),2. Lieutenant-General(SarantisProtopappas),3. Major-General

(G.Boditsios,Th. Genios,V. Ganatsios,N. Theoharopoulos,N. Kanakaridis,G. Blanas),4. Colonel:
Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry,Air force, andPolitical Delegates,5. Lieutenant-Colonel:Infantry, Artillery,
Air force, Political Delegates,Medical Committee,6. Major: Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, Engineer,
Political Delegate,Medical Committee,Military Justice,7. Captain:Infantry, Engineer,8. Lieutenant:
Artillery, Engineer,9. SecondLieutenant:Artillery, Engineer,Medical Committee,Political Delegates;
History of the GreekNation-1aropiarov Wqv=6 EOvovq,vol. 16, p. 150. Shrader,The WitheredVine,
pp. 48048 1. On the DA's transformationsee:D. Close,Th. Veremis (eds.), 'The Military Struggle,1945-
1949', in Close(ed.), The GreekCivil War,pp. 109-112.YrIHPEZIA IZTOPIKOY APXEIOY-
SERVICEOF HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, ATHENS (YIA), 1948,126.2,16204, Ynoupyciov
Eýmrcptic(bv, An6ppqrov, -ralpoyopic; EnuccigewovEvcpyctd)v',23 Iavouaptou 1948(Ministry of
ForeignAffairs, Top Secret,Information on FutureActions, 23 January1948).Unfortunately,thereis no
way to doublecheckthe validity of the public intelligenceinformation office in termsof numbersand
specificlists, but propagandaof the KKE itself reinforcethe idea that DA fighters were expectingSoviet
assistance. M. Djilas, Conversationswith Stalin (London, 1962),pp. 181-82;V. Dedijer, Battle Stalin
Lost (New York, 1971), pp. 68-68.
 77

favour of the governmentforcesin the battlefield though the communist forceswere not

totally defeatedin the area.The key factor that brought the supremacyof the national

forceswas the useof air power to spot andbombardthe DA. The 'Epirus Manoeuvre' in

July proved the power and determinationof the DemocraticArmy to pursueits goals.It

brought a seriousblow to the prestigeand morale of the National Army, and despitethe

fact that the communist defenders were finally beaten, it was another relative

government success.The line of communication between the DA and the Balkan

communistcountrieswas not cut. Thus from a strategicpoint of view 'Terminus' failed

to meet its two main objectives.The Democratic Army lost the battles but not the war.

Konitsa battle was the first communist conventional attempt against the NA. The tide,

however, had started turning towards the national forces due to allied support and

equipment.

Overall the 1947 c ampaignsproved the determination of the DA to take over

power and the need to re-organiseand supply the NA. The role of the British and

Americans in this process obviously was of great importance. These operations,

nonetheless,
wereof differentandchangingnaturefor both The
sides. year 1947marks

a changing type of warfare for the communist defenders. Typical guerrilla warfare

turnedto an almost conventionalone from the battle of Konitsa in Decemberonwards.

The successfuldefence of Konitsa encouragedthe National Army and British

andAmericanMissionsto believethat an offensivein 1948might give the Democratic

Army a decisive victory. The prospect of victory by the summer of 1948 seemeda

realistic one. Underpinning this optimism was a perception that all units had beenmore

effective whilst co-operation between ground and air forces had improved. The

continuousassistance,advice and equipmentprovided by the foreign allies had

improved the quality of the national forces. At the same time the Communists were

beginningto conduct operationsin a way that suited the British and the Americans.
 78

III The Denouement: 1948-1949

Military Preparations

At beginning of 1948the GreekGeneralStaff beganwork on the transformation

of the national forces. This transformation was made possible by the enhanced

assistanceof both the United Statesand Britain! In January1948 the National Defence

Corps (commonly known as the Ethnofroura) was strengthenedto counter-balancethe

communist Aftoamyna. Ethnofroura would accommodate the local 'home guard'

functions of the Units of Pursuit Detaclunents(MAD), Units of Rural Defence(MAY).

Its initial establishmentof 20,000would soon increaseto more than 50,000 men. These

units, coupled with the Gendarmerie, would perforrn the civil part of clearance

operationsby arresting,detaining,and persecutingcommunist suspects.The manpower

ceiling for the National Army itself rose in stagesfrom 132,000in early 1948to 147,000

in May 1948.2

The British had a share in these new arrangements.On 19 January1948, the

British Military Attacht, Colonel Shortt, complainedto the War Office that there were

not yet enough officers with the counter-insurgencyexperience required in Greece.

Neverthelessin March 1948 the Training Commando Units Centre was created.The

Greek'RaidingForces'werereconstitutedas commandosat the VouliagmeniTraining

Centre near Athens. 3

The British advisers were, however, already by 1948 shifting their main

emphasisto conventional rather than counter-guerrilla war as they sought to meet the

' This moderatesthe

view of orthodox and revisionisthistoriansthat the defeatof the insurgentswasthe
result of the two foreign powers' intervention.Seealso in this chapterfootnotes88-92.
2By the end of the
civil war the total of all serviceswas 265,000including 13,500in the Royal Navy and
7,500in the Royal Hellenic Air Force.Zafeiropoulos,TheAnti-Bandit War-O AvriovupqpiaK6,;Ay6v,
p.
20. Gendannerieas trained and advisedby the British Police Mission
would pursuit the communists
outsidethe battlefield.
 79
4
Communists' shift to the conventionalstrategy. Major GeneralErnest Down replaced

StuartRawlins as British Military Mission Commanderon 27 March 1948. As a result

British advice on operationaldoctrinewas modified. The strategyof 'encirclement' had

beenfound wanting in 1947.Down favouredthe replacementof encirclementin villages

5
and towns with the 'relentlesschasingsmall bands in the hills'. He adheredto the

strategyof 'clear and hold' but insistedthat it had to be basedon the continuousconduct

of o ffensive o perationssupportedbym 6 To match Down's

aximum u se of air power.

aggressivemilitary strategyClifford Norton re-thoughthis political strategy.Norton was

so deten-nined
that the National Army should crack the 'bandits' in 1948 that he told the

Americans that no political compromise was possible 'until their final defeat. He

adjudgedthat to
attempts reach a compromisewith some elementsat least of the Left,

which heh imself h ad u rged ont he G reek govenunent during 1947, were 'absolutely
7
wrong'.

On 14 February 1947, the Greek government agreed to effective Anglo-

American control o ver t he N ational A rmy.8 T he arrival ofav igorous and a ggressive

American field commander,Lt. Gen. Van Fleet on 24 February 1948 to assume

commandof theJointUnitedStatesMilitary AdvisoryandPlanningGroupsignalledthe

American determinationto bring the civil war to an end. As Van Fleet told the press,the

3PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),WO 202/908,History BMM(G); WO 33/2641,War

of
Office ParamilitaryEstablishments,19 January1948.
4 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/950,BMM(G), 31 March 1948;WO 261/548,
BLO in GHQMELF, 20 March 1948;DEFE, 4/11, COS (48) 24,18 February 1948;Jones,'The British
Army, and Counter-GuerrillaWarfare in Transition, 1944-1952',Small War and Insurgencies7, no-3
(winter 1996),278.
5PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 5110,COS (48) 64(0), 24 March 1948;King's
CollegeLondon Archives, Liddell Hart Centrefor Military Archives, Gen. H. PymanPapers,6/1/14,3,4
March 1948;Woodhousestatesthat training effort of the BMM had beeninefficient for long and that
'criticism of British training methodsby Americanofficers wasjustified'. Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor
Greece,p. 238.
6PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/72248R12202, Gen. Down's 'Appreciation the
of
Bandit War in Greece',October 1948.Field MarshalPapagos,'Guerrilla Warfare', in F. M. Osanka(ed.),
Modern Guerrilla Warfare,p. 236.
7PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/72242R 6174, Norton Sargent,12 May 1948;
to
FO 371n2242 R 7475, Norton to Bevin, 21 June1948.
8Wittner, American Intervention, 242; Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece, 238.
p. p.
 80

JUSMAPG, 'appearsto be in 9 Van Fleet's aim was to keep the

chargeof operations.

DemocraticArmy continuouslyengaged.JUSMAPG, Down and the Greek commanders

framedthe plan for governmentoperationsin 1948.The national forces, it was agreed,

would undertake a 'staggeredoffence' designedto extend control progressively over

selectedareason the country, moving from the south to the north in four First,
phases.

the Roumeli region would be in to

cleared order ensurethat the national forces had a

line of communicationbetweenAthens and Salonika.Second,the National Army would

attack Democratic Army bases in the Grammos area in June 1948. Third, it would

to
conduct commando operations clear the Peloponnese.Fourth the National Army

in the Vitsi to the Democratic Anny. 10

would conducta winter campaign area eliminate

During this planning the distribution of power between the allied military

missions became a delicate issue. Averoff has claimed that the collaboration between

the British Military Mission and the Joint United StatesMilitary Advisory and Planning

Group was 'excellent'. O'Ballance assumedthat JUSMAPG was in completecontrol by

the summer of 1948. In fact functions remained shared between the British and the

"
Americans and conflicting interests brought clashes between the two missions. In

January 1948 Britain had assignedan additional one hundred seventy-five advisersto

the Greek army units in the field; this meantthat there were three times as many British

as American advisers fulfilling this role. The January 1948 agreementbetween the

American and the British missions assignedoperational and logistical duties to the

former mission and training to the latter. General Down suggestedthat co-operation

be further improved by the the American B 12V an

could merger of and ritish groups.

Fleet, however, rejectedthis proposal.He wanted America's officers to have aswide an

9 Wittner, American Intervention

p. 244.
10Shrader, The Withered Vine, 225. The drawback the 1947 'encirclement' that it
p. main of strategy was
required enormous manpower to cover the various targets and left other nearby areas unprotected and
vulnerable to the 'hit and run' tactics of the DA.
11Averoff, By Fire and Axe, 267; O'Ballance, The Greek Civil War,
p. p. 175.
 81

authority as possible. The two missions continued to offer separate advice to the

National Army. Membersof both missionscould enterthe combat zonesbut they could

take 'no in the campaigns.13The Greek Commander-in-Chief had to give

executive part'

for field deployment 14

battalions.
orders any operations, of units or releaseof

The Battles of 1948

From the spring of 1948 the Greeks confronted each other in conventional

warfare. The Greek national forces, under the guidance and assistanceof the British

Military Mission and Joint United StatesMilitary Advisory and Planning Group, started

a seriesof attacks againstthe DemocraticArmy. The National Army had a strengthof

132,000men, with artillery, armour and aircraft, and were supportedby a further 50,000

National Guards. On the other side were approximately I esst han 2 4,000 D emocratic

Anny troops, who had little artillery, no armour, and no aircraft. Despite the

overwhelmingsuperiorityof the forces,

government however,encounterswere hard

fought and the outcomes uncertain. The National Army continued to display poor

organisationand fighting ability. The inferior Democratic Army hamperedeven further

by its faulty strategy fought bravely and with a will to win that the goverranentforces

foundhardto match.

Operationsbeganwith an attempt by the National Army to occupy the DA hub

in Roumeli. The Mounts of Parnassos,Giona and Agrafa remained important

DemocraticAnny basesandjeopardisedthe rear of any National Anny operationsin the

north. The aim of the OperationDawn was to clear an areaof about 2,000 squaremiles

in the 'waist' of Greece and eliminate the K KE's m ilitary c entresi nside G reeceand

12PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/908,BMM (G), History.

13Recordsof the JCS,Part 2, StrategicIssues,Section:1, US Military Assistance,1798/7,16 March
1948,Reel 1,Frame0815; Recordsof the JCS,Part 2, StrategicIssues,Section: 1, US Military
Assistance,1798/10,7 May 1948,Reel I, Frame0894.
14PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/895,15 January1948;WO 202/950,BMM(G) 31
March 1948;Jones,'A New Kind of War, pp. 158-159.Seealso Map D.3, 189.
p.
 82

On 13-14 April 1948 the National Army establishedthe tactical initiative by a

abroad.

diversionaryraid into the Mount Agrafa areaby a commandobattalion. The commandos

successfully neutralised important communist headquarters at the village of

15
Mastrogianni. Spurred on by General Van Fleet's call to 'get out and fight! ' the

National Army initiated its first major campaignunder the new strategyof 'staggered

offence' on 15 April Army

1948.16 units blockadedthe north, east and west of the area

of operation,whereasto the south the Gulf of Corinth, patrolled by the Royal Hellenic

Navy (RHN), preventedthe DemocraticArmy's 17The Royal Hellenic Air Force,

escape.

by
strengthened RAF's aircraft, flew in There
supportoverhead. was hard fighting in the

Mornos Valley and aroundthe town of Artotina but the hard-pressedDemocratic Army

units, abandoningmules and hostages,

took guerrilla-like avoiding action and escaped

Agrafa. By 17 May insurgentshad been forced Mount Roumeli.18For

towards the out of

the time being Roumeli was cleared of organised Democratic Army units and

governmentcommunicationsbetweenAthens and Salonika were re-established.

Forty dayswere required for the completion of OperationDawn, which endedon

26 May 1948. Many of the Communist troops had been able to escapeto the north or

hide in Roumeli itself but the Democratic Army's underground organisationhad been

broken up. Large quantities of its supplieshad been captured,and the communist army

had suffered over 2,000 casualties(6 10 killed, 3 10 wounded, 995 Aftoamyna personnel

15Insteadof a sweepfrom southto north, asplannedin 1947,which had the effect of driving the rebels
backto their securebases,OperationDawn aimedto concentrateand crushthe forcesof the DA in central
Roumeli. Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece,pp. 237-9. The numbersof the National Army are
estimatedtotals of the different units as thereare no statisticsin the official documentsof GES/DIS.As a
resultthereare variationsin the strengthof the National Army. For instanceMargaritis gives a total of
90,000men in a combatbattalion that consistedof 500-600men.Margaritis, History of the GreekCivil
War-IoToplaTooEUIIVIK06Ep(pvAiov,vol.2, p. 34.
16GES/DIS,Archives-Apx6a, 13'UqLctDrpa-rob"EmXFtpýmj'Xapauyý', 25 MapTiou 1948" (B' Army
Corps,OperationDawn, 25 March 1948%vol. 7, keim.59, p. 311.
17Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece, 240. SeeMap D. 5, p. 192.
p.
18GES/DIS,Archives-ApXcia,051yeta I Mcpap&; II Maýo'u 1948(Directive for I Division, II May
1948),vol. 8, pp. 166-67.OperationDawn is describedby Kousoulas,Revolution and Defeat,p. 255,
257; Averoff, By Fire and Axe, pp. 239-240,258-260.
 83
19
captured) and there had been mass arrests of communist civilian supporters.

Dominique Eudes has noted that Operation Dawn was the product of British

gempiricism'. 20British intervention was apparent in the course of this operation. British

advisers had pushed the importance of intelligence-led counter-organisationmass

arrests.Yet the British themselvesdid not regardDawn as a great success.They pointed

out that the National Army had not managed to inflict decisive losses on the
21
CommuniStS.

The next major National Army operation,Operation Crown, was launchedon 20

June 1948 and continued until 22 August. Theo bjective of Operation Crown was to

clear out the main DemocraticArmy strongholdin the Mount Grammosand cut the line

of communicationto the north and south. Grammoswas a complex of mountains and

extremely rugged terrain. In the centre of the range lay Aetomilitsa the seat of the

Provisional Democratic Governmentwhere Vafeiadis had his generalheadquarters.The

Democratic Army defencesin Grammos consistedof two lines of fortifications, each

severalkilometres in depth, and were strong and well manned. The outer defencering

blockedthe passesleadingthroughdeepravinesto the interior of the region;the inner

ring, protecting the core area, included numerouswcll-camouflagedmachine gun

bunkersconstructedof logs. Within the Grammosstrongholdapproximately24,000

DemocraticArmy troops led by Vafeiadis faced some 70,000 govemmenttroops

in
organised two formations, 22
A and B Corps.

19Averoff, By Fire and,4xe, 260; Tsakalotos,Forty YearsSoldier- Eapdvra Xp6via Eipario5Tqq, 2,

p. vol.
%120.
Eudes,TheKapetanios,p. 320.
21PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),DEFE 4/10, OperationalWar
Office plan BMM(G), COS
(48)22,13 February1948;AIR 46/30, RAF to BLU, 19 March 1948;DEFE 5110,COS(48)38(0), 17
February1948,COS(48)64(0),24 March 1948;WO 202/893,BMM(G) Operations,20 August 1948.
22D. Katsis, Diary
ofA DA G Rebel 1947-1948-ToHucpoA6yioEv6qAvr6pTj rov JEE 1947-1948,vol. 2
(Athens, 1998),p. 150. According to intelligencereport the GeneralStaff
estimatedthe DemocraticArmy
combatantforcesat about six-and-a-halfthousandmen.Although the governmentintelligenceinformation
was wrong, the National Army held a clear numerical supremacy.GES/DIS, Archives-ApXcia,GES/Al,
EXtStov Enqctpýacwv Kop(ový;, 10 Maýou 1948,
nap6tpqgct npwTo, l7paycio A2, &%Ttov
 84

The initial National Army deployment comprisedfive divisions (40,000 men)

by artillery, together with an additional 7,500 National Corps and

supported air and

4,500 Ethnofroura troops to protect the government lines of communications. The

National Army plan called for a three-phaseoperation.First, it aimed to clear areasnear

the main Democratic Army base.Second,governmenttroops would attack and occupy

positions along the Democratic Army outer defence belt. Third, communications

betweenthe Grammos and Democratic Army support in Albania would be cut and a

from directions would be launched against the Democratic Army

general assault all

inner defences. Tsakalotos' A Corps was assigned the mission of protecting the lines of

dealing with the Democratic Army units in Epirus while

communication and

Kalogeropoulos' B Corps was assigned the main attack itself. 23

The National Army would enjoy much better air support from the RHAF during

the operation.One of the most important contributionswas to be made by two

24
squadrons
of British-made
Spitfire based
fighter-bombers at IoanninaandKozani. The

Royal Hellenic Air Force aircraft, employing strafing attacks, rockets, fragmentation

bombs, and, for the first time on 20 June,napalm supplied by the Americans, wreaked

serious damageon Democratic Army installations and troops. The Royal Hellenic Air

Force flew 3,474 sorties during Operation Crown reaching a peak during August, when
25
1,570sortieswereflown.

nX1po(popt6)v (GES/Al, OperationPlan Crown, 10 May 1948, annex 1, Bureau A Information form),
vol.8, pp. 263-68; Zafeiropoulos,TheAnti-Bandit War- 0 AvrtcvyqopiaK6qAycbv,pp-363-64.
23O'Ballance, The GreekCivil War,pp. 170-173.The official archivesdo not provide the exactnumber
of the forcesthat took part in the Grarnmosfights and thus the approximatenumbervariesbasedon the
additionsof the paramilitary troops. A combat battalion consistsof 500-600 men,whereas the LOK units
areconsidered to be weaker than regularunits. Margaritis estimates that the numberof the National Army
to takepart roseto 90,000 men. In Margaritis, History of the GreekCivil War-IoToplaTOD WIVIK06
EyýpvllovHoAtyov, vol. 2, p. 34.
24Air supporthad become
an establishedCOIN conceptin the RAF, RHAF and British and Greekarmy
groups.The Air Ministry thus mirrored the practiceof other British institutions in dispatchingspecially
selectedpersonnelto advisethe Greekson COIN matters.In that senseT. L Jonesis justified in noting
that the RHAF approvedRAF 'anti-bandit doctrine. Jones,TheDevelopmentofBritish
CounterinsurgencyPolicies and Doctrine, 1945-1952,p. 208.
25Campbell,Down, Schuetta TheEmployment irpower, 42-45,52. Implications the Operation
, ofA pp. of
Crownwere that the British-madeCentaurs,armedwith small 50 millimetre cannons,were obsolete,
 85

Operation Crown officially endedon 21 August 1948. By 22 then some 1,500

Democratic Army defendershad slipped over the border into Albania fully equipped.

26
Another 8,000 Democratic Army combatantsmoved off to the Vitsi region. Averoff

characterisedOperation Crown as 'the largest, the most difficult, the longest, and the

most deadly battle 27

of the entire war'. Nonetheless,it achievedonly moderatesuccess,

for it did not bring about any fundamentalchangein the situation. The ability of the

Democratic Army to take refuge in nearly Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was

particularly galling. Several National Army commanderswere accusedof a lack of

aggressiveleadership.After the end of the V

o peration an F leet c haracteriseditas 'a

bitter disappointment' and the 'guerrilla's' leadership, training and morale as

'excellent'. He stated that 'everything that has been accomplishedup there has been

doneby air and artillery'. 29

Technically OperationCrown was an American operation.Yet British continued

to have a say in Greek warfare. The American mission gave advice in the allied joint

planning group where it retainedfour permanentmemberscomparedto the BMM's two.

The situationwas,however,differentat the technicallevel. Joint United StatesMilitary

Advisory and Planning Group had fewer than 300 men. It maintained 20 officers at the

National Army unit level whereasthe British Military Mission had over four times as

many men overall and seventimes the American number in Liaison Units. Lieutenant

GeneralTsakalotospressedhis generalsto adoptBritish thinking andthereforeto place

underpoweredandunableto climb. As a result,the army was unableto defeatthe DemocraticArmy and

closethe guerrillas' main avenueof escape.Wittner, American Intervention, p. 243; O'Ballance, The
GreekCivil War,pp. 170-173.An additional drawbackwas that the Spitfires could carry only a limited
numberof napalmbombsfor they were too heavy.Jones, 'A New Kind of War, p. 293.
26PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 476/2 R9148/11/19,Consul-GeneralKnight to Reilly
(Athens)6 August 1948;GES/DIS,Archives-ApXcla,rEYJ rpayciov A I, '130c(K eniXelpý0CWq BtTafou-
Ano 23 Auyo-GaTou [tcWt 3 Aciccgppiou1948'(GES/BureauA 1, 'Operation Vitsi Report,23 August to 3
December1948),vol. 11, p.35; O'Ballance givesthe DemocraticArmy casualtiesas 3,128 killed, 589
captured,and 603 surrendered,O'Ballance, TheGreekCivil War,p. 173.
27Averoff, By Fire andAxe, 280.
p.
28FRUS (1948): 4,196,206: Van Fleet, 24 November
and 30 November 1948;Woodhouse,TheStruggle
for Greece,pp. 242-245.
 86

29The Greek headquarters

noted that during
a greateremphasison small unit patrolling.

the summeroperations,GeneralDown 'acted as Advisor-in-Chief on tactical matters'

and British liaison units advisedon the executionof operationsdown to brigade level.

Furthermore,Royal Air Force officers on the ground cast a 'critical eye' on the Royal

30
Hellenic Air Force.

Mount Vitsi was the next important hub of the Democratic Army. The

Provisional Democratic Governmentand the Democratic Army GeneralCommandhad

been re-establishedat Vitsi after having been forced to leave their headquartersin

Grammos.The Vitsi operationlasted from 29 August to 20 September1948. The plan

of the Vitsi campaignwas much the same as that undertakenat Grammos albeit on a

smaller scale. The National Army used three (1", 2nd 15"') divisions from B Army
,
Corps. After reconnaissanceaeroplaneslocated the enemy, Spitfires began strafing

operations. The initial results were successful. Nonetheless, as in the Grammos

operation the National Army's weaknessbecame apparent as the drive broke down

becauseof confusion in command, complicated by bad weather. On 29 August, the

National Army launched a strong attack againstthe Vitsi position but the government

31
troopsw ere t ired and t he D emocraticA nny t roops defendedtheir base tenaciously.

29GeneralDown, Commander1948-1950,distinguishedhimself in supporting'clear and hold' operation

by air supportand small army units.
30PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/983,BMM(G) Operations,20 August 1948;
DEFE, 4/14, COS (48)92,5 July 1948;AIR 23/6395,RAF to BLU, I June 1948;Jones,'A New Kind of
War', pp. 158-59;Abbott, TheGreekCivil War,p. 13.After the Czechcrisis the United Statesincreased
defencebudgetfor Universal Military Training (UMT) in Westernunion within the contextof European
RecoveryProgram.Greece,Italy, Germany,Palestine,France,Philippines were a few countriesmilitary
assistancewasrecommendedto supportgovernmentsfriendly to the United Statesto preserveinternal
order.M. Leffler, A PreponderanceofPower (Stanford, 1992),pp. 148,194-197,239. British advisers,
however,continuedto be involved in National Army training during 1949.PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,
KEW (PRO), WO 202/899,Commanderin Chief Middle EastLand Forces(CINCMELF) notesto War
Office, 16 October 1948.SeeMap D. 6, p. 193.
31FENIKO EriITEAEIO ETPATOY/ AIEYGYN1H IETOPIAZ ETPATOY-GENERAL
STAFF/DIRECTORATEOF HISTORY OF THE ARMY, ATHENS (FEE/All), 1948,1012/ A/57,
AvayopdtAvTtaTp&Tqyou A. rtavTl;ý 7Ecpt rou BtTato%3 OK=Ppiou 1948(Lieutenant-
cjcKa0apAaco);,
GeneralD. Yiantzis' Report on Vitsi clearance,3 October 1948).
 87

The resultswere moderatelysuccessful.Both sidesneededa rest and were thus forcedto

32
pause.

The stalemateof Grammos and Vitsi led the Greek government to renew its

pleas for an expansionof the armed forces funded by the Americans. Tsaldaris argued

that the army should be enlarged from 132,000 to 250,000 soldiers by the spring of

1949. The army, Tsaldaris and Sofoulis insisted, must wage offensive war at the same

time as it conducteddefensiveoperationsto protect people and property in the wake of

33
the advance. On 29 September1948,the stalematein Grammosand Vitsi forced Van

Fleet's hand. He advised the Department of the Army that the Greek armed forces

should not be reducedto a level which the Greek economycould support. He informed

Colonel Walker from the United StatesArmy, who arrived in Athens to discuss the

issueof reduction, that such an act was out of the question. Given the 'guerrilla' move

from oneareato another,Van Fleetinsistedthat 'overall thepicturehadworsenedrather

than improved since the Grammosvictory'. 34 General Down, for his part, emphasised

the importanceof air cover while performing counter-insurgencyoperations.35General

William A. M atheny,C hief oft he Air Sectionof the JUSMAPG,too arguedthat an

expandedair supportsystemwasneededto give the armythe mobility it required.The

soldierscould not by themselves in 36

pursuesmall guerrilla groups suchrough terrain.

Both the British Military MissionandJoint United StatesMilitary Advisoryand

PlanningGroupin Athensmovedtowardsthe Greekposition of further enlargingthe

32Margaritis characterisedthe September

resultsas 'failures'. In Margaritis, History of the GreekCivil
War-loTopiaTovEU?jviKo6Ep(pt)Afov HoAtyov, vol.2, pp. 195-131; Rentis,Minister of Interior,
overreactedby askingSofoulis whetherthis 'would be anotherAsia Minor disaster'.In Th. Tsakalotos,
Grammos-rpdppoq(Athens, 1970),p. 32.
33FRUS(1948): 4,154-155: Memorandumby G. Marshall,
30 September1948;FRUS (1948): 4,156-
157:The Chargtin Greece(Minor) to the Secretary State,I October 1948.
of
34FRUS(1948): 4152-153:Grady Secretary State,
to of 29 September1948.
35PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),
DEFE 5111,COS's views, COS (48) 127(0), 10 June 1948;
AIR 8/1258,COS (48) 155,19 July 1948;FO 371/722498R12202, Gen. Down, Appreciation the Anti-
of
Bandit War in Greece,22 October 1948.
36FRUS(1948): 4,160: Grady Marshall,
to 16 October 1948;Wittner, American Intervention,p. 245;
Jones,'A New Kind of War, pp. 184-85.
 88

forces in responseto the Grammos-Vitsi stalematein autumn 1948. The key to

armed

success,accordingto the JUSMAPG, was 'more men, more money, more equipment'.

b f he
Van Fleet submitted a military udget or t c orning f iscal y ear. Aso pposedtot he

$150 million allocated by the governmentfor fiscal year 1949 Van Fleet requesteda

budget $200 Greek 147,000 37

new ceiling of million and a new army ceiling of men.

Van Fleet's belligerent attitude had consequencesfor the British. The more the

JUSMAPG became involved in the National Army affairs, the more the BMM was

demoted into a secondaryrole in Greece.On 2 July 1948, the War Office had even

recommendedthat in order to retain American co-operation, the BMM should be

subordinatedto the JUSMAPG. By 1 October 1948, the British had agreed that the

JUSMAPG should assumefull responsibility for 'all operationalmatters [ ... ] [Ofl policy

or higher direction [and] tactical training', and henceforththe Americans should

in
predominate this regard.38Nevertheless,
the British Military Mission would still be

for
responsible organisationand training of the Greek, air, army, navy and police and in

is 39
thiswaytheBritish sharein Greekaffairs consolidated.

Stalematein Late 1948

The Grammos-Vitsistalematereawakenedthe issue of Army restructuring.

Prime Minister Sofoulis tried to solve the army's leadershipproblem by putting forward

a well-known military figure, General Alexander Papagos,for the position of

37FRUS(1948): 4,193 McGhee to the Under-Secretary State(Lovett), 24 November 1948; FRUS

-94: of
(1948): 4,18 3: Grady to Marchall, 13November 1948.
38PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 4/14, War Office view in COS (48) 91,2 July 1948;
WO 261/549,GHQMELF Report, 20 September1948;WO 202/895,AgreementRegardingBritish
Advice, 1 October 1948;Jones,TheDevelopmentofBritish counterinsurgencypolicies and doctrine,pp.
225-26.
39PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),DEFE 5/8, COS/WO
views, COS (48) 129,22 October
1948;IFENIKOErIITEAEI0 ZTPATOY/ AIEYGYNEH ILTOPIAL YTPATOY-GENERAL
STAFF/DIRECTORATEOF HISTORY OF THE ARMY, ATHENS (17EVAIZ), 1948,1012/A/6,
Avayopdtano TovAvTtaTPdT1j7o r. rianayecapy[o-u,
27 OKTcoppiou 1948(Report by Lieutenant-General
G. Papageorgiou,27 October 1948).In July 1948,Mac Veaghwas replacedby Henry Grady as
Ambassadorand Chief of the USAGG to smoothtensionbetweenMac Veagh and Griswold over
 89

Commander-in-Chiefof the Greek 40

forces. King Paul also supportedPapagos'
armed
41
Commander-in-Chief. Papagoshimself laid down his conditions of
accession as

in
acceptance a letter to Sofoulis on 11 November. He demandedcomplete control of

planning, order of battle, appointmentsand operations.Martial law was to be imposed

throughout the Papagos

country, with strict censorship. would command the Navy, Air

Force and Gendarmerie as well as the Army. Papagos was unwilling to brook

interferenceby the allied missions.42These demandsw ere soe xtensive that S ofoulis

hesitatedto meet them. Neverthelessmartial law was extendedto the entire country on

29 October1948.

Despite his touchinesson the issue of foreign interferenceboth Van Fleet and

Down supported Papagosas Commander-in-Chief.Van Fleet's bullish demands for

more money and equipment ran parallel to Papagos' similar demands. To many in

Greece, therefore, it seemedthat the Americans were willing to endorse not only

Papagosbut also his methods43Any hopesthat Papagos'appointmentin the near f uture

.

wouldg ive t he G however,

reekg overmnentab oostsoonevaporated, because
a new

command issues. Grady, head of the Allies' March 1946 observation of Greek elections,would be
responsible for supplies,logisticsandoperations in Greece.
40Alexandros Papagos hadbeenvictoriousin Albanianwar againsttheItaliansin 1940andwas
imprisoned in a Nazi concentration camp fromJune 1943 to May 1945. After the War he heldno military
command but in July 1947hewasofferedthetitle of Generalexofficio.Papagos wasLord Chamberlain
of King Paul'sHousehold until January1949.He witnessed OperationDawnasanobserverwith Van
FleetandDown.In January1949hebecameCommander-in Chiefof thearmedforcesaswell asField
Marshal.Papagos wasthefirst non-bluebloodedGreekto becomeFieldMarshal,a title hitherto
exclusively preserved for themembers of theroyal family.Lt. Gen.Giantzisbecame Chief of theGeneral
Staff.
41ThePalaceplayeda vital role in Greekdecisionmaking,standingat thetop of politicalhierarchy.It
represented a combinationof bothpoliticalandmilitarypowersandwithin this contexttheCourtcould
playa decisiverole in politicisingtheArmy or militarisingthecabinet.Norton,Van Fleet,Downand
Grady,however,hadproposedPapagos'appointment asCommander-in-Chief by 23 October1948
because thenationalforcesneededa 'strongpersonality'anda 'strongleader'.PUBLICRECORD
OFFICE,KEW (PRO),FO 371n2248R 12095,Nortonto ForeignOffice,23 October1948.Papagos'
strongpersonality wouldcreatein early1950sa clashbetweenthetwo importantinstitutionsof Greek
politics:theArmy andtheCourt.
42PUBLICRECORDOFFICE,KEW (PRO),FO371/72249RI 3203,Papagos to PrimeMinister,II
November1948;Woodhouse, TheStruggleforGreece,p. 247.
43FRUS(1948):4,176-77:GradyConfidentialTelegram,26 October1948;Wittner,American
Intervention, pp.247-248;Jones,'A NewKind of War, p. 186.
 90

broke 44On 6 November,Venizelos, who had withdrawn from EPE

political crisis out.

to rejoin the Liberal Party as its Vice-Chairman,informed King Paul that the majority of

his Membersof Parliamenthad withdrawn their support from the coalition government

Sofoulis 12 45
November.
in order to form a new Liberal As
cabinet. a result, resignedon

Tsaldaris and his Populist Party to

tried styrnie the Liberals by forming a new

the right-wingers Napoleon Zervas and General Stylianos Gonatas as

cabinet with

Norton
Ministers of Public Order and War respectively. and Grady, however, intervened

46
to prevent this 'provocative' move. They reasonedthat a purely right-wing formation

would antagonisethe Liberals and the other parties of the Centre,who would constantly

try to overthrow it. Four days after Sofoulis' resignationNorton proposedto Grady that

he should intervene in favour of the formation of a neutral cabinet excluding the

As
Gonatas.
General of this Anglo-
provocativeextremistsGeneralZervasand a result

American pressurethe coalition re-assembledon 18 November under Sofoulis'

47
premiership. Norton and Gradyhad beenforcedto intervenemore overtly that they

have The furtherdiscredited Greek

democratic politiciansin their
would wished. crisis

Greek
eyes. politicianswould indulgein their own petty at
squabbles the of
moments

gravestdanger.

in Athensthe Greekgovernmenthadto facea wave

As thepoliticianssquabbled

of DemocraticArmy Despite
counter-attacks. the lossessustainedin holding off the

44The military inefficiency was attributedto the political weakness.The main characteristicof this was
the 'conventional'policy and a lack of determinationto beat the enemy.GeneralDown hasreportedthat
the Greeknationalforceslackedcombatspirit andthe Greekpoliticians and governmentwere exclusively
responsible for this. Close, 'The Reconstruction of a Right-Wing State', in Close ),
(ed. The Greek Civil
War,1943-1950,pp. 172-73.
45PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 37ln2201 R 13356,Norton to Foreign Office, 23
November1948.YrIHPEEIA IETOPIKOY APXEIOY- SERVICE OF HISTORICAL ARCHIVE,
ATHENS (YIA), 1948,57.1,56786, YPEX-Av6)vuRqAva(popd Ilept Eaonpmý; rlo%MKý;, 16NOCPP
plou 1947-Report On GreekInternal Politics, 16November 1947.
46PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/72248R12357, Norton to Foreign Office, I
November1948;PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,KEW (PRO), FO 371n2248 R12579,Norton to Foreign
Office, 6 November 1948.
47 PUBLIC p
OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/72202 R13356, Norton to Foreign Office, 23
'ECORD
November1948.
 91

Grammosand Vitsi, Zahariadis convinced the KKE that the

governmentilsattacks on

fault did not lie with the strategyof using the DemocraticArmy in a conventionalarmy

Zahariadisblamed insteadMarcos' emphasison guerrilla tactics for dividing the

role.

Party and obstructingvictory. The DemocraticArmy, accordingto the GeneralSecretary

Politburo, be more thoroughly reorganisedalong regular army lines to

of the should

enableit to take the offensive. Zahariadis' will prevailed. The General Secretaryordered

as eriesofa ssaultsont he t owns ofK arditsa,E dessaand Naoussa, and establisheda

in Grammos Vitsi that was intended to beat the National

concentrationof troops and

Army into 48
submission.

By the end of 1948 the Democratic Army had its

accomplished reorganisation

into divisions, brigades, battalions similar those of the national forces. After the

Grammosbattle the total DemocraticArmy forces, accordingto the intelligence sources

of the GES, rose to 21,400 Of

combatants. these2,700 were acting in the Peloponnese,

1,700 in mainland Greece, 2,500 in Epirus, almost 6,500 in Vitsi and Agrafa and

anotheralmost 7,700 in Thrace.49Having re-occupiedthe Grammosduring the last

monthsof 1948the Army

Democratic its
increased attackson major towns throughout

Greece.

The most seriousof theseattackswas carriedout bys ome6,000 D emocratic

Anny troops againstthe town of Karditsa, on the plain of Thessaly.Karditsa was a town

of 50,000citizens,plus refugeesfrom defended

other areas, by a reinforcedNational

Army battalion of approximately 860 men. On the night of 11-12 December 1948 the

48Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece,pp. 253-57; Iatrides, 'Civil War 1945-1949',in Greecein the

1940s,pp. 210-11;Averoff, By Fire and Axe, pp. 276-77;Matthews,Memories of a Mountain War,pp.
252,267; O'Ballance, The GreekCivil War,pp. 181-183;Kousoulas,Revolution and Defeat,pp. 252-
53;Eudes,TheGreekCivil War,pp. 335-338;Jones,'A New Kind of War', p. 190.
49rENIKO EriITEAEIO ETPATOY/ AIEYE)YNIH 11TOPIAZ ETPATOY-GENERAL
STAFF/DIRECTORATEOF HISTORY OF THE ARMY, ATHENS (17EVA11),1948,1015/A/57,
Amý)OvvlqrIXqpoyopt(bv,15 FenTegPpiou1948(Information Office, 15 September1948);GES/DM
Archives-ApXcla.Atc0uv" nXijpoyopt6)v-FEE, 'Ac),Tio I'I%ijpoqopt6)v10 1CnTERPptou
1948'(InformationOffice, GES, 10 September1948),vol. 11, p. 318. According to Shraderthe DA
 92

forces the National Army the town.50The

communist eliminated outpostsand struck at

DemocraticArmy combatantsput out road-blocks,set ambusheson approachroadsand

destroyeda bridge on the Trikkala to Larissaroad, all of which delayed the arrival of

reinforcements. The telephone network connecting the government's defence was

damaged.By the dawn of 12 Decemberthe city was entirely under the control of the

Democratic Army force. The Royal Hellenic Air Force was unable to damage

51
Democratic Army posts becausethey had been establishedin the city centre. At this

stagethe Karditsa battle appearedto be a greatvictory for the Democratic Army, which

proved quicker andmore efficient than the National Army.

However, by the night of 12 December Greek national forces reinforcements

startedarriving in the areafrom aroundThessaly.Theseforces included armouredunits

equipped with British-made Centaur tanks. Once the National Army had been

strengthenedthe Royal Hellenic Air Force attackedthe Democratic Army forces.The I"

and 2nddivisions of the B Arrny Corps pushedthe Democratic Army forces outside the

52
city centre into the open country. In the battle the National Army lost 23 men killed,

76 wounded and 35 missing a total of 134 men or 18 per cent of its initial force. The

gendarmerielost four men and had six wounded.The Units of National Guard Defence

(MEA) lost 15 dead,15 woundedand 13 missingmen.The lossesof the garrisonwere

about200 killed, wounded and missing. Most seriousof all were the civilian casualties:

150were killed and wounded and over 1,000were abducted,of whom about 35 per cent

strengthwasabout23,000 combatsduring the height of the civil war in 1948-1949.Shrader,The Withered

Vine,p. I 10.
50GES/DIS,Archives-ApXcla,'EXtStovKa'r6lilyIq
704o); Kap8tral; '(Capture plan of Karditsacity),
vol. 11,pp. 378-79.
51rENIKO EIIITEAEIO ETPATOY/,&IEYE)YNEHIETOPIAF.ZTPATOY-GENERAL
STAFF/DIRECTORATEOF HISTORY OF THE ARMY, ATHENS (I-EVAIZ), 1948,1513/ B/ 23,
Y-XtStovAlau6mog 17164(o;KapSfra% Ava(popdAvTtaTPdqy0UrtavTýý, 12 AcKeppplov1948( Report
on SafeguardKarditsa city, LieutenatnGeneralYiantzis, 12 December1948); GES/DIS,Archives-
Apxcla,Eicftact; nenpay[ttwov Opoupd; KapSiTua;(Report by Karditsa Guard),
vol. 11,p. 387; T.
Psimmenos,Rebelin Agrafa- Avr6prqq oT'Aypaýpa,1946-1950(Athens, 1983), 209.
p.
 93
53
were women. The DemocraticArmy troops sufferedsome800 casualties. The battle of

Karditsa ended up as something of a success for the National Army. Eventually the

battle would turn in favour of the governmentforces.

On 21-22 December,some2,500 DemocraticArmy combatantsattackedthe key

towns of Edessaand Naousaon the road from Salonikato Florina, using both machine-

guns and mortars. The assaulton Edessafailed. The Democratic Army attacksfailed to

catch the National Army by surprise.The communist forces were weakenedby their

lossesin material and troops, the physical exhaustionof its combatantsand bad winter

weather.Under the constantthreat of the air strikes it was becoming harder and harder

for the DemocraticArmy to hide andmove from one areato another.54

Despite the unsuccessfulattacks,the Democratic Army did not waste any time

beforestartingthe next operation.The troopsof the DemocraticArmy departedon 26

December1948 from Vitsi with sixty new recruits, food and a large quantity of medical

supplieslooted from a hospital. On II and 12 January1949,the sameDemocraticArmy

troops, which had attackedEdessaon 21 December,took Naousa from its 900 strong

National Army garrison.On 12 January,however,further National Army reinforcements

of some2,5000 men arrived from Salonika and Veroia to assistthe National Army. On

15January,the NationalArmy managedto re-capturethe city of Naousa.Nevertheless,

the D emocraticA rmy a ttackerse scapedo nce a gain ing ood o rder ont he night of 15

January1949with large quantitiesof suppliesand over 600 recruits. The National Anny

52GES/DIS,Archives-ApXcla,EKOccrt;r1c7cpayýLtva)v
Opoupd; KapSiToa; kaTa qv TptýgcpovI&Xýv 11,
12,13, Acice[tPpiou1948'(Reportby Karditsa Guard
over the battle on 11,12,13 December1948),vol.
11,p. 389; Psimenos,Rebel in Agrqfa-Avr6ipTjq 1946-1950 pp. 290-210.
53Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece, ar'Aypa(pa,
p. 257; Shrader,The Withered Vine,p. 230.
54GES/DIS, Archives- ApXcAx Atofictaý EOvoypoi)pd; E)EaaaXia;, 'EKOeall
Ent -r(OvyCYov6TCOV
TCOV
EO(PdS(OV OTt; 19,20,23 Aciccgppfou 1948' (Report on events in Sofades on 19,20,23 December 1948),
vol. 11, pp. 398404.
 94

lost only 8 men, whereas the Democratic Army lost 58 killed and 70 captured or

during
surrendered the battle for the town.55

Despitethe growing size of the National Anny, its material advantages,its better

allied equipmentand the steadyimprovementsin leadershipand training introducedby

the British and the Americans, it continued to find that superior numbers and firepower

did not bring the hoped-for final successagainstthe Democratic Army. The ability of

the DemocraticArmy to escape,endurelong-lastingoperationsand counter-attackwere

all threatening signs for the National Army. The Democratic Army had conducted

unsuccessfulp ositional d efence,I ike t he b attlesofK arditsaand Naousa and suffered

serious defeats, like Operation Crown. It was, in truth, losing the war. Yet the

atmospherein governmentalGreeceat the turn of the year was hardly triumphant. The

continued uneven performance of national forces further strengthenedthe voices of

thosecalling for change.

The End of tit e Civil War

On 19 January1949Papagos Commander-in-Chief
wasappointed of the Greek

armed forces. He was equipped with new powers enabling him to replace corps

commanders,implement martial law and bypassthe nation's civilian leadership.Three

daysafter his appointment, P apagosenlarged the SupremeNational Defence Council

into the War Council,which consistedof thepremier,the deputypremier,the leadersof

the four partiesparticipating in the government,Grady, Van Fleet and Down.56Papagos

informed the War Council that 'the size of [the] Greek Armed Forces inadequate'
was

and that he had acceptedthe position of Commander-in-Chief only upon allied and

55GESIDIS, Archives-ApXcia, GES/Al,

'EKOcat; cntq; cntOtac(o; kaT6tNaoýýg, 11 lavowplou
1949' (Report on Naousa battle, 11-16 January 1949), -16
vol. 12, keim. 8, p. 94; GESIDIS, Archives-ApXcia,
'EkOeat; -tta q V&Xj q; Ndouaa; kat yta
Tov E%tyg6,28 lavouapiau 1949'(Report on Naousa battle and
manoeuvre, 28 January 1949), vol. 12, keirn. 8, p. 91.
56ASEA
was the body to co-ordinate the Greek armed forces. For ASEA see also pp. 48,66.
 95

the forces be increasedto 250,000 57

that
governmentalassurances armed would men.

Indeedthe national forcesincluding the Units of Pursuit Detachments(MAD), the Units

of Rural Defence (MAY) and Units of National Guard Defence (MEA) increased

throughout 1949 and reachedan eventualtotal of 265,000men. The tide of battle in the

Greek civil war shifted dramatically in 1949 as a result of the enlargementof the

National Army, modem and abundantequipment,new tactics and most notably the use

of the air power. Papagosproved to bean efficient Commander-in-Chief but he was

fortunate in having such supportive allies. The communists still committed to an

aggressivestrategy.Yet that strategywas one which the British and the Americanswere

well-equippedto meet.

At the Fifth Plenum of the KKE on 30 and 31 January 1949, Z ahariadish ad

the
engineered ousting of Marcos from his positions as Premier, Minister of War, and

Commanderof the Democratic Anny. 58Vice Premier Ioannidis took over as Premier of

the Provisional Government. Zahariadis himself took over the direct command of

in to
military operations, order completethe conversionof the Democratic Army from a

guerrilla army to a conventionalforce. By the spring of 1949 the Democratic Army had

reacheda strength of 100,000men and women fighters, reservesand auxiliaries from

,11,
. broad.Between30 March and 5 April 1949, Zahariadisradically the
re-organised

Provisional Government to constitute a cabinet under his full control.59 Zahariadis'

strategic policy of sustainedattacks against well-defended urban areas, along with a

'static defence' of the Grammos and Vitsi, concentratedthe lightly armed Democratic

57FRUS(1949): 6,24649: Satterthwaiteto Secretary State,8 February 1949;Wittner, American

of
Intervention,p. 248; Jones,'A New Kind of War, p. 196.
58Marcos,
after being expelledfrom the party took refugein the Soviet Union and did not return to
Greecebefore 1982.
5' Now that Marcos
was put asideZahariadishad no opposition in decisionmaking in the Politburo. In
January1949,the KKE officially announcedthat it had sidedwith Moscow regardingTito's quarrelwith
Stalin sinceJune 1948,when Yugoslaviawas expelledfrom Cominform. Averoff, By Fire
and Axe, pp.
334-35;Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece,p. 263.
 96

Army and exposed it to the devastating effects of the National Army's superior

numbers, artillery, and most of all aerial firepower.

In March 1949 the 8h DemocraticArmy division in Grammos managedto join

up with the Democratic Army forces, which had escapedinto the mountains after the

Grammosbattle (on 20 August 1948).During the winter of 1949this force had createda

new areaof Communistcontrol in the highestareasof the Mount Grammos.Its aim was

to "re-captureGrammosarea'. This areawas Democratic Army's political and military

basewith natural barriers to protect the DemocraticArmy from the National Army. The

bases in Mounts Grarnmos and Vitsi were also adjacent to the Albanian and

Yugoslavian borders and housed reception and distribution points for supplies and

equipmentfrom the neighbouringCommunistcountries.The Yugoslav-Soviet split had

decreasedthe amount of aid the Democratic Army received from Yugoslavia. On the

other hand the DA had receiveda large quantity of Czechoslovakianand Germanspoils

of the SecondWorld War. Albania and Bulgaria continued to provide the Democratic

Army with a wide range of support, including free transit acrosstheir borders,

pennission to manoeuvreon their territory, training bases,hospitals, recruiting areas,

food, money, clothing, arms, ammunition and refuge for the families of the Democratic

60 It
Army combatants. was from Albania that a Democratic Army division, newly

equippedwith modem Soviet-type automaticweapons,enteredthe Mount Grammosin

the first daysof April 1949seizing and occupyingpeaksand passes.61

In late March 1949 GeneralVan Fleet developeda campaignplan for 1949.Van

Fleet's plan was to use some 50,000National Defence Corps (Ethnofroura) men to free

the National Army from its static defenceobligations, to contain the Democratic Army

in northernGreece,to conductmobile operationswith the bulk the 147,000

of men of

60Margaritis,History
ofthe GreekCivil WarImpla TovEUjvIK06 EppAfov 17oAtpov,vol. 2, p. 481.
 97

the National Army to attackthe DemocraticArmy strongholdsin Mounts Grammosand

Vitsi and then to mop up the remaining communisttroops throughout Greece.62The

British Military Mission opposedVan Fleet's south to north plan, citing the urgent

necessityto first cut off the Democratic Army's supply lines with the neighbouring

Communist states. Van Fleet, however, persuadedGeneral Papagos and the Greek

GeneralStaff to follow his own plan.63

In March 1949 the BMM re-assessed

its role in Greece.General Down ordered

that henceforththe British should not take on any operationalrole becausethe 'United

Statesview tends to predominate'. Indeed Van Fleet preferred that the British should

take 'take no active part in operations'.Neverthelessthe BMM continuedto offer advice

to the Commandosat the Vouliagmeni Training Centre. There it stressedthe need 'to

patrol constantlyin order to obtain information and security'. The British retainedsome

influence in tactical training and planning. The advisersattachedto the Greek Raiding

Forces, which were incorporated into the Commandos, operated throughout 1949.64

GeneralDown notedthat the RaidingForceswere'the besttroopsfor eliminatingsmall

groupsof bandits[ ] [by] continuous

andrelentless'
pursuit 65
operations.
...
Most of the aid that would enablethe Greekarmedforcesto be expandedcame

from the United States.Yet Britain remainedactive in specific areas.Field Marshal Sir

William Slim, who had succeeded

Montgomeryas Chief of the ImperialGeneralStaff,

pointed out after a visit to Greecethat the 'bandit' problem was still a seriousone and

demandeda major commitment of air power. He proposed a further increaseof the

61GES/DIS,Archives-ApXelu.81j 'IcrToptjc6V
jt&papXe[a, T(oVTEXnralow RaX6)VTourpdpgo%' (8th
division, 'the last battlesof Grammos')vol. 13, keirn. 16, 127; Zafeiropoulos, TheAnti-Bandit War-O
p.
AvriovppqpzaK6qAy(Lv, pp. 575-76.
62Campbell,(et.all), TheEmployment 30.
ofAirpower,p.
63Abbott,TheGreekCivil War, 34; Shrader,TheWitheredVine,
p. p. 235.
64PUBLICRECORDOFFICE,KEW (PRO),WO 202/895,British
andAmericanviews,10February
1949;FO371/78481R2657,Downin PeakForeignOfficenote,3 March 1949.
65PUBLICRECORDOFFICE,KEW (PRO),WO 216nO2,Field-Marshal
Slim report,18March1949;
Jones,TheDevelopment ofBritish Counter-Insurgency
PoliciesandDoctrine,pp. 205-248;Jones,'The
 98

Royal Hellenic Air Force by two bomber and one reconnaissance squadron. On 24

March 1949 Slim told Bevin that if Greek air power was enhanced the Democratic

66
Army would be defeated within the next 12 months. Subsequently Norton was

'pleased to a nnounce' tot he G reek g overnment t hat B ritain w ould furnish t he R oyal

Hellenic Air Force with 22 Spitfires which would arrive in Greece in June-July 1949 to

67Yet in this field American influence was

cover the summeroperations. even specialist

growing. United StatesNavy Helldiver bombersand large storesof napalm bombs were
68
madeavailable for the operationscarriedout in the summerof 1949
.
One of the first successesenjoyedby the Papagosregime was the final operation

to mop up Democratic Army forces in the Peloponnese.These were wiped out by

OperationPigeon. The National Army under Lieutenant General Tsakalotoshad great

superiority in numbers: a division, a brigade and thirteen battalions of light infantry:

nearly 20,000 men, against the approximately 4,000 Democratic Army troops which

remainedin the region after the Aftoamyna (KKE self defence organisation) had been

purged. Operation Pigeon began on 19 December 1948, before Papagostook over. It

consistedof 11,000 men and several LOK units under Tsalakotos. The operation was

divided into two phases.The first phasewas to clear the northern part of the peninsula

by to
supported a secondaryeffort neutralisethe DemocraticArmy troops from the

69
south.Thesecondphasewasthoroughsweepfrom northto south.

The Greek Navy securedthe coasts of the Peloponnese,particularly along the

Gulf of Corinth in the north, to prevent re-supply and escapeby seaof the Democratic

British Army and Counter-GueffillaWarfare in Transition, 1944-52, Small Warsand Insurgencies7,

no.3 (Winter 1996),265-307.
66PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371n8348 R3285, Slim-Report the Situationin
on
Greece,18 March 1949.PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 800/468/GRE/49/5,Greece,
Bevin's report on meetingwith Slirn-CIGSon 24 March 1949.
67PUBLIC RECOp OFFICE, 800/468/GRE/49/7, 13 May 1949;FO
'D KEW (PRO), FO Bevin to Attlee,
371n8339 R5579,Norton to Foreign Office, 2 June 1949.
68GESIDIS,,4rchives-ApXcia, A Z(bgaZTpamb/Al, 'EkOcar, c7nXctpýac(0;'rlUpa6; ', 2-30 AuY6aT0'U
1949,(A'Army Corps,Report on OperationTorch, 2-30 August 1949),vol. 14, keim.35, pp. 414-15.
 99

70
Army forces. At the end of January1949the 2Vd brigade of the Democratic Army and

other units in the Ahaia and Hleia areas tried to counterattack the National Army.

Gradually,however,the National Army proved strongerand more effective, causingthe

collapseof the enemy's activities. The Democratic Army was denied supplies,nursing

care for the woundedand an intelligencenetwork. At the sametime the battles createda

wave of unarmed communist migrants who tended to stick to the Democratic Army

combat units for protection. The Democratic Army's flexibility and military

71
performancewas consequentlyundermined.

In the sevenweeks of OperationPigeon, the Democratic Army combatantshad

679 killed, 1,601 taken prisoner and 628 voluntarily surrendered,in addition to the

completedestructionof Aftoamyna The

apparatus. National Army reported 26 killed and

72 wounded from A Army Corps. Having attained his objectives Lieutenant General

Tsakalotosleft the mopping-up to mobile Gendarmerie,DetachmentUnits and groups

72
of armedpeasantsunderregulararmyofficers. The communistswere both
defeated

politically and militarily in the Peloponnese.

Having cleared the Peloponnese Lieutenant General Tsakalotos went to

Roumeli to implement the 'south to north' plan. The campaign was to begin with

in
mopping up operations central Greece.Operation Rocket was launched on 25 April

69GES/DIS,Archives-ApXcla,A' 2:6)ga1TPaTWAl, '1Xt8tov EntXctpýac(ov,nFptartpa,, 14AciccýPptou

1948'(A' Army Corps,OperationPigeon, 14 December1948), vol. 11, p. 291.
70The role of the Royal Hellenic Navy (RHN) dramatic for there actualbattle at
wasnot a one, was no
sea.On an averageof four times a week, shipswere called upon to deliver gunfire ashoreto assistin the
defenceof a beleagueredcoastalvillage or supportwith their presencean army unit operatingnearthe
coast.Its taskwas limited to patrolling the seaand the providing of seatransportfor the movementof
troopsand supplies.Thus the navy deniedthe watersto DA defenders.The aim of seapatrolling wasto
preventthe communistsfrom seaescape,reinforcementor re-occupationof seasideclearedareasand to
securethe islandsfrom potential attack.J. C. Murray, 'The Anti-Bandit War', in T. N. Greene(ed.), The
Guerrilla And How To Fight Him (London, 1962),pp. 65-111.
71The GreekNavy
consistedof about 115 ships,three-quartersof which were on loan from Britain. There
were I cruiser, 10 destroyersand 2 submarines.The GreekNavy lifted a completeinfantry division,
togetherwith four LOK (Commando)units, from the mainlandto the Peloponnese.
72GES/DIS, Archives-ApXE!a, A 16ga 1TpaT6, ' EicOcai; MtXqpýacw; AXF-), 6)ol), 21-30 MapTiOU
1949'(A Army Corps Report on Aheloos operations, 21-30 March 1949), vol. 13, p. 465; Tsakalotos,
Forty Years Soldier of Greece- Eo;p6vra Xp6via ETpaTi&rtjq rjq EUd&oq, vol. 2, 2 10; Woodhouse, The
p.
Strugglefor Greece, p. 261.
 100

1949.50,000 troops of the National Army descendedupon Rourneli and Thessaly

determined to drive the 12,000-strong Democratic Army northwards. Their tactics were

to round up all suspectedAftoamynapersonneland other communist sympathisersin the

area of operations.The governmentforces were formed into small groups in order to

carry o ut a relentless p ursuit of the communist army. Three months after the start of

OperationRocket Tsakalotos' forces had driven the Democratic Army troops north of

the Aliakmon River. Central Greece,Thessalyand the southern area of Mount Pindus
73
were all clear.

In mid-1949 Epirus becamethe main focus of the governmentforces.The major

task of the National Army was to drive the Democratic Army from its bases in the

Mounts Grammos and Vitsi. On 12 May 1949, Papagosinitiated a new temporary

command:the Headquartersof Epirus and WesternMacedonia (SHDM) under direction

of t he G A I
eneral rrny nspector,L ieutenant 74
G eneralV entiris. T he s chemeu nited a 11

governmentforces in an area dominatedby the communists. SHDM, once reinforced

from southernGreece,would havenearly200,000menunderits control.Thecreationof

the Headquartersof Epirus and Western Macedonia demonstratedthe army's

determination to improve its reputation after the lacklustre perfon-nanceof previous

years. The Headquartersof Epirus and Western Macedonia included B Army Corps,

which w as inc hargeoft he M ount V itsi area. Inp articular t he heavily reinforced 8'ý

division was responsible for Epirus. Political, military and intelligence units were

incorporatedto raise the strengthof the division to some 30,000 men.75

73Averoff, By Fire
and Axe, p. 338; E. Wainhouse,'Guerrilla War in Greeece,1946-1949. A Case
Study', in F. M. Osanka,(ed), Modern Guerrilla Warfare:fighting
communistguerrilla movements
(London, 1962),pp. 217-227.
74LieutenantGeneralVentiris from Chief
of the GreekGeneralStaff since February 1947,became
GeneralArmy Inspectorin February 1948and Commander SHDM in May 1949.During 1948
of
LieutenantGeneralGiantzisbecameChief of the GreekGeneralStaff.
75 GES/DIS, Archives-ApX6aAPX1aTPdTqY0qrIandyoq, Atarayý, I-Ipoa(opwý YUyKp6TIaqAtowý=);, 12
Maýou 1949 (Field Marshal Papagos, Command, Provisional Command Composition, 12 May 1949),
vol-13, keim. 5 1, p. 358. The force of the National Army was so enlarged that a
regular National Army
infantry division had nine battalions
and the 8h of the B Army Corps had twenty-one. On 24 June 1949,
 101

In August 1949 the National Army launchedOperation Torch. The plan of this

operationwas to drive the DemocraticArmy from its strongholdsin GrammosandVitsi

on the Albanian-Yugoslav border. Torch A would attack the Democratic Army on

Mount Grammos.Torch B would clear Mount Vitsi and finally Torch C would clear out

the Grammos 76
region. By the beginning of August 1949 the Royal Hellenic Air Force

had concentratedalmost all of its effective units around the Grammos and Vitsi areas.

The plan was first to bombard the Democratic Army's areasof control. The National

Army would then follow up to pursuit the communist troops. The power of the Royal

Hellenic Air Force consistedof threesquadronsof 54 English-madeSpitfires XVI, three

reconnaissanceflights of twelve American Harvards, one transport squadron which

comprisedof eleven Dakotas, one flight assignedto artillery observation composedof

77
ten old-fashionedaircraft and a bombardmentflight which constituted three Dakotas.

The real advantagewas the proximity of the airports to the battlefields. Most of the

PrimeMinister Sofoulis died at the ageof eighty-eight.AlexanderDiomidis, ex-Governorof the Bank of

Greece,formedanothercoalition governmentuntil new electionsbe held in early spring after the four year
term of the currentparliamentwas due to expire.This transition,however,did not affect the Army's
operations.
76On II July 1949Tito
announcedthe closureof Yugoslavfrontiers with Greeceowing to the numerous
violationsand the many Yugoslavswho werebeing killed. However this was the result of Tito-Stalin
breakandYugoslavia'sexpulsionfrom the Cominformby June 1948.On the role of Yugoslavia'scut of
assistingthe DAG, it hasbeensupportedthat Tito had decidedto reduceaid to the guerrillas as a result of
Westerndiplomaticpressureand the possibility of Westerneconomicaid. In N. Pappas,'The Soviet-
YugoslavConflict and the GreekCivil War', in W. S. Vucinich (ed.), At the Brink of War and Peace: The
Tito-StalinSplit in a Historic Perspective(New York, 1982),pp. 224-225. E. Barker explainsit as a result
of thepro-Staliniststanceof the structureof the KKE. In Barker, 'The Yugoslavsand the GreekCivil War
of 194649', in Baerentzen,latrides, Smith (eds),Studiesin the History of the Greek Civil War,pp. 300-
05. Anotherview suggeststhat Tito wasunableto stophis country's aid to the Greek
communistsas soon
ashe wantedto becauseof protestsfrom his Slavo-Macedoniancommunistsupporters.In J. Pidevec,
'The Tito-Stalin Split and the End of the Civil War in Greece',in Baerentzen(et ), Studiesin the
all.
History of the GreekCivil War,p. 316. The CommunistsnamedTito 'traitor' for having his
withdrawn
supportto the communiststruggle.Zahariadis,Ten YearsofStruggle-, dtKa Xp6via 17611q,p. 4 1. From
the view point of the Right Zafeiropoulosagreeswith the communistargumentthat the DA wastotally
'dependent'on Yugoslavia.Zafeiropoulos,Anti-Bandit War AVTiCVppopiaK6q AyO5v, 657.
-0 p.
O'Ballancenotesthat the closing of the Yugoslav-Grcckfrontier
was a 'deadly' blow to the DA. In
O'Ballance,TheGreekCivil War,p. 195.M. Mazower
notesthat it was the 'last straw'. In Mazower
(ed.), After the War WasOver, p. 7. Indeedthe Yugoslavianhelp had
affectedthe final outcome,but not
to a significantextent.By June 1949the DAG had alreadybeendecisively defeatedin the Peloponnese,
an areawith no direct connectionand effect to Yugoslavia.On top of that the DA forceswere better
equippedthan ever during the GrammosandVitsi battlesin August 1949. SeeMap D.6, p. 187.
77SpitfiresXVI
graduallyreplacedthe IX model. This type of aircraft was totally upgradedsincetheir
1940ancestorsand the Battle of England.They
were equippedwith strong enginesof 1,700horsepower,
 102

aircraft were operatedfrom Kozani, which was equi-distantto Vitsi and Grammos.The

arrival of the American Helldivers improved bombing performanceeven further. During

78
the first week of August the air force madewidespreaduse of napalm. The centrality

in
of air support counter-insurgencyoperationshad becomean establishedconcept.The

full realisation of this conceptwas made possible by American material support. The

concept itself, however, was the fulfilment of the advice the British had given the

Greeksaboutthe useof air power since 1947.79

Several key positions were taken and the Democratic Army's lines of

communicationsinto Albania were threatenedas a result of the Torch A attack. The

Torch B offensive startedon 10 August 1949.The National Army managedto force the

Provisional Government to abandonits capital at Pyxos (Epirus) and take refuge in

Albania. Some 4,000 Democratic Army troops also crossed the border into Albania.

Another thousandfled to Yugoslavia where they were disarmed and interned. For the

National Army the battle w asm ost successful:M ount V itsi w as c leared.D emocratic

Army casualtiesduring Operation Torch B included 997 killed, 509 captured,and 133

surrendered,as well as twenty Albanian soldiers killed and seven captured. B Army

Corps of the National Army lost 265 killed, 1377wounded and 9 missing.80Even more

availability to transferwar-cargo,rockets,bombs,and after specialalterations,under the aegisof

JUSMAPG,to carry Napalm bombs.Zafeiropoulos,Anti-Bandit War-OAvriavppopiaK6qAycbv,p. 595.
78The first two of a large instalment AmericanHelldivers had
of arrived that month at Larissa,the newly
establishedHQ CentralGreece.The remainderof the aircraft-39 Helldivers and 10 additional surplus-
werescheduledto arrive by carrier on 15 August 1949.T. Papathanasiadcs, 'The Bandits' Last Standin
Greece',Milita?y Review30,11 (February1951),22-31.
79Campbell(et ), TheEmployment
all. ofAirpower, pp. 31,51-52; O'Ballance, The GreekCivil War,pp.
196-99;Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece,pp. 278-93; Jones,'A New Kind of War', p. 218; Jones,
ThedevelopmentofBritish counterinsurgencypolicies and doctrine, p. 242; GESMIS, Archives-ApXcfa,
IHAM, 'EKOeat;ent q; acponopwýq8pdaccoq KaT&qv cmXcipilail '11upa6;', 18 AuyObmu 1949'
(SHDM, Report on air force activities during Operation'Torch', 18 August 1949) vol. 14,keirn.27, pp.
312-13.
80GES/DIS,Archives-ApXsla,B Mga Y.
TpaTobAi rpa(peto,'EKOCat;cnqctpýacw; Irlupcr6;'. Apo 10-
15MyobaTou 1949'(B Army CorpsAl Bureau Report on Operation 'Torch, 10-15August 1949),vol.
,
14,keim. 33, pp. 389-390;GESIDIS,Archives-ApXcia,Avo)TtpaAtOlKtail; Aeponopelaq,'EKOCCIV,
Mupa6; ', 10 lenTclipplou 1949' (Highest Air Command,Report on OperationTorch, 10 September
1949),vol. 15, keim. 5, p. 147; Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece,p. 280; Jones, 'A New Kind of War',
p. 218; Shrader,The WitheredVine,p. 239.
 103

damagingthan the casualtiesand the loss of territory for the Democratic Army was the

loss of its equipment.

Torch C was the final offensive on Mount Grammosand startedon 19 August.

By the start of operations the Royal Hellenic Air Force had been reinforced by fifty-one

Helldivers. The Democratic Army defenders numbered 7,000-8,000 combatants plus the

remnants of those who had escaped from Vitsi. The National Army outnumbered the

81
Democratic Army forces, however, by ten to one On the night of 24-25 August the
.

final assault on the Grammos area began with an artillery bombardment and attacks

from rocket-firing Spitfires. The government army moved forward shielded by the

Helldivers, which in the first twenty-four hours, dropped forty-eight tons of incendiary

bombs on the Democratic Army's defences.Between 24 and 29 August the Royal

Hellenic Air Force flew 826 sorties and delivered 250 tons of bombs, rockets and

napalm. The accuracy of the bombing was more impressive than in any previous

by
operation the National Amy. 82

TheDemocraticArmy positionon Mount Grammositself fell on 27 August.On

the following daytheNationalArmy sealedoff the two mainpassesinto Albania,Stairs

and Brooks. The Democratic Army defendersfinally abandonedGrarnmos entirely on

31 August. Their remnantsretreatedinto Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia

where they were subsequentlydisarmedand detained.The civil war was over. Contrary

81Woodhouseclaims forty-nine Helldivers. Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece,pp. 281-83;Margaritis,

History of the GreekCivil War-Icropla TOD EWIVIK06Epqvllov HoAtpov vol. 2, pp. 535-36.
82The air force mobilised OperationTorch C included: Kosani airport-ahnost50 Spitfire XVI model
at a.
combatantair craft (two squadrons),one flight pursuit of Spitfires IX model, one flight Dakotabombards
(4 air craft), one flight Harvard,b. Larissaairport- one squadronbombardHelldivers (24 air craft), flight
Dakotatransport(4 air craft), c. Ioanninaairport- one flight combatantSpitfire (6 air craft), d. Argos,
Elefsina,Sedes,Orestiko,Airports variousair support.GES/DIS,Archives-Apxcia,Av(oTtpctAtot"an
Atponoplq, 'EicOcat;cntXctpýcrcw;1TIupa6;', 10 E=TCPPPt0U 1949'(High Air Command,Reporton
OperationTorch, 10 Sept. 1949),vol. 15, keim. 5, p. 152. On Tsamo attack: GES/DIS,Archives-Apxcla,
Iý Mepap&, 'EKO&atq ncnpayýttvwvent Tn; c7itxcipýace);-ni)pa6; r' MI TcT(bacca;,rov rpdRýo% iý
MepapXeia'(I Division 'Report on OperationTorch C', Grammoscollapse,I Division'), vol. 15,p. 48.
GESMIS,Archives-Apx,-Ia, EKOcat;Tq; aeponopik-fl;8pdcrco)q kcrrd Tqv Cn1Xc[p1jG1jv
IrII)pa6q F', 2
EVETE[tPP[01) 1949', (Report of air force during OperationTorch C, 2 September1949),vol. 15,keim.
(text) 36, pp. 473-74.
 104

to the boastmadeby the KKE Politburo that 'Grammoswill be the tomb of monarcho-

fascism' the Torch C operationproved to be the epitaphof the Democratic Amy. 83

On 16 October 1949Radio FreeGreeceannounced:

The Greek Provisional Government is ceasing hostilities to

preventthe total destruction of Greece.The Democratic Army
has not laid its weaponsaside,but has suspendedits operations
for the time being. This should not bet akento rn eanthat the
Greeksare g iving upt he struggle for t he r ights of the people.
The Anglo-American Imperialists and their monarcho-fascist
agentswould be mistaken if they assumedthat the struggle was
over and that the DemocraticArmy had ceasedto exist. 84

Notwithstanding this empty Communist bluster, on 27 October 1949, the Labour

governmentannouncedthat the British army would withdraw from Greecebecausethe

85
civil war had come to an end. On 7 November, the Intelligence Division of the

American Army General Staff issued an estimate of the situation in Greecedeclaring

that the Greek governmentwas 'able to control' any 'guerrilla' threat.86In the same

month PresidentTruman announcedto Congressvictory in Greece.All sidesagreedthat

theGreekcivil war wasover.

TheNationalArmy hadsufferedabout13,000casualties,eitherdeador missing,

and over 26,000wounded.Approximately 38,000 communistswere deadand over twice

that manywounded.In additiona mixture of minesandmassacres,

by both sides,had

killed some80,000civilians.Almost 40,000leftistswere in detention.Over 5,000had

receiveddeathor life sentences.

On top of that, large numbersof Greekshad been

displacedand were homeless.Almost 10 per cent of the population had taken refuge in

Yugoslavia,Bulgaria, Albania and the Soviet Union. If one considersthat the National

Army had lost 37,000 men in the Asia Minor Expedition, 8,000 in the Balkan Wars and

83Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece, 283. Cold

p. War exaggerationdid not ceaseto exist for the
AmericanAmbassadorin Moscow, Alan G. Kirk insistedthat the
cease-firewas 'a Soviet tactical lull' and
thusthe Americansshouldpush the rehabilitationof Greece.Jones,'A New Kind War', 220.
84Eudes,TheKapetanios, 354. of p.
p.
85PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB
128/16/CM 62(49), 27 October 1949.
16Shrader,The WitheredVine, 241.
p.
 105

15,000during the SecondWorld War then the civil war was the most costly struggleof

twentieth centuryGreece.There is little wonder that it cast a long shadowover Greece's

87
development.
post-warpolitical

The mannerand natureof this victory was pregnantwith future importance.The

explanation for the successof the National Army forces has long been the subject of

debate. Some observers tied the victory to the Stalin-Tito split. According to this

the ingredient the in Balkan alignmentsthat ultimately forced

argument crucial was shift

Army 88There can be

Yugoslavia to withdraw supportfrom the Democratic combatants.

little doubt that this createdproblems to the KKE troops. Yet the remainder of the

The
Communists' Balkan allies remainedsteadfast. Democratic Army was able to fight

tough the closing of the Yugoslav border. The KKE's changein tactics
a very war after
89
from guerrilla to conventionalwarfare hasbeen emphasisedby numerouswriters. The

in N t he K KE T he
conventional tactics used Konitsa and aousac ost p opular support.

most important single factor in the defeat of the Democratic Army, however, was the

improvement in the morale, discipline, combat-worthiness and equipment of the

National Army. In the final Grammosand Vitsi operationsthe government forces fully

exploited their America's

material and manpower advantages. Cold War strategy and

Greece in
massiveAmerican economicand military aid to all played an outstandingrole

this transformation. Victory without American support is almost impossible to

imagine.90 However, the presenceof British troops, training personnel and advisers

97Clogg,A Short History Greece, p. 164; A. Laiou, 'Population Transition during the Civil
ofModern
War', in Baerentzenet all (eds.), Studiesin the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949,pp. 55-105.
Logisticsandnumbersare usually an unreliablesource.The history of the KKE notesthat the NA had
15,969killed, 37,557 wounded,2,001 missing;in total 55,527 men. The DemocraticArmy lost
approximately 30,000 lives. The civilians were: 154,000 killed, 800,000 homeless, 24,626 totally
destroyed houses. History of the YXE-JOKIP10Iaroplaqrot) KKE, p. 619.
8' O'Ballance, The GreekCivil War,
pp. 195;McNeill, Greece,p. 42.
89KousoulasdefinesZahariadis' decisionfor 'most basic in
conventionalwarfare the error' made the war,
in Kousoulas,Revolutionand Defeat,p. 271; Wittner, American Intervention, p. 253.
90Indeed,by the end 1949,the American
of military programmehad channelled$353,6million worth of
military aid, including hundredsof war equipment,warplanesand ships,4,130 mortar and artillery pieces,
 106

played a vital role as well. Some commentatorshave, rightly, drawn attention to the

contribution made by the RHAF, an organisationtied particularly closely to its British

91 Without the British and the Americans the Greek forces would have been
patrons.

to the
quite unable encompass 'continuous, relentless' pursuit of the Communistsso as

to 'exhaustthem and to force them to disintegrate'that Papagosidentified at lying at the

head of victory.92

Although the Communistshad beendefeatedthe Greek statehad beenhollowed

out. The British and the Americanshad repeatedlycommitted themselvesand attempted

to aid moderategovernmentsof the Centre.Yet this commitment had beenjust as often

by
undermined the egregiousbehaviour of centrist politicians. They had squabbledand

intrigued in Athens whilst the war was won by their American-supplied and Anglo-

Americantrainedarmyin the restof the country.The British andthe Americansdid all

to
they could retain civil control and democratic It
norms. was inevitable, however, that

the prestige of the army should rise, both in its own eyes and those of others, as the

reputationof politicians waned. The British governmenthoped to disengagegently from

Greece offering encouragementfrom the sidelines as the Greek body politic

89,438bombsand rockets, 159,922small weapons,7,7 million artillery and mortar rounds,and 344
million small armsrounds. Wittner, American Intervention,p. 253; Jones,'A New Kind of War%p. 197.
91See:Campbell(et.
all), TheEmploymentofAirpower.
92The importanceof Papagosas the centralconstantin the defeatof the KKE is emphasisedat Papagos,
'Guerrilla Warfare', in Osanka,(ed), Modern Guerrilla Warfare,pp. 228-242. Matthewsalso stresses
Papagos'Commandin Matthews,Memoriesofa Mountain War,pp. 261-63; Woodhouseis not
enthusiasticaboutPapagos'contribution.He notesthat the Greeks'had won the war' beforehe took
commandandbefore the deploymentof Napalmbombs,which arrived in Greecetoo late. Woodhouse,
TheStrugglefor Greece,p. 276.
 107

reconstructeditself Yet the morbidity of Greek politics drew the British in once more

as,having won the war for the Greeks,they attemptedto win the peaceas well.
 108

IV Post-Civil War Politics, the Korean War and NATO Security

Considerations: 1950

The Period of Unstable Coalitions

The end of the Greek civil war did not bring stability to Greece.As Sir Clifford

Norton, the British Ambassadorin Athens, put it at the end of 1950: 'if 1949 was the

year of victory over the communist rebels, 1950 may well be labelled the year of hope

deferred, so far as political stability and economic progress are concemed.'I Te

strugglebetweenthe communistsand the non-communistswas replacedby competition

betweenliberals and conservativesand rivalry amongstpoliticians of the Centre. The

result was the collapseof successivegovemments.The failure of the political parties to

create stable alliances meant that six different coalition governments were formed

during 1950 alone. Historians have placed the blame for this instability in various

places.Somehighlight the role of the Palacein political intrigues. Others seeGreeceas

a penetratedpolitical society. Constantmeddling by foreign powers lie, for them, at the

root of the problem. The aftermathof the civil war is also seenas important: for the Left

the harshtreatmentof the defeatedCommunists- who still commandedconsiderable

popularsupport- poisonedthe body politic by encouragingthe growth of an anti-

democratic police state. Historians of the Right regard the leniency shown to the

Communistsas a destabilising influence on politics. A close study of Greek politics in

the immediate post-civil war period confirms that all these factors had a part to play.

More immediately,however,sucha studyrevealsthat the Greeksituationcanbe 'over

ideologised'. One is struck by the fact that the most obvious

and recurrent problem was

the overweeningambition of the leading Greekpoliticians. It was not ideology but a lust

for place and power that constantly destabilisedthe political

situation. There were no

1PU13LICRECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),

FO 371/ 95106,Annual Review for 1950,Norton to Bcvin,
 109

Greekpolitical leaderswho might be describedas statesmen.None had a vision that

stretchedbeyondthe next deal or cabinetreshuffle. The Greek electoral systemhad been

2
designedto allow thesepygmiesto ply their trade.

On 6 January 1950, John Theotokis, a former leading Populist, ex-Speakerof

the House and King Paul's confidant, was appointed Prime Minister of a caretaker

3A debate arose over the electoral system under which the elections would
government.

be held. King Paul proposed a 'photographic system' based on the majority principle.

There would be a separate ballot for each candidate with his photograph printed on it.

This system would strengthenpersonalities,weaken parties and enable the King to

dominatethe cabinet. For that reason,of course,the parties rejected this system.They

threatenedto boycott the election unlessit was held accordingto the existing systemof

4
proportionalrepresentation.

Norton would not support King Paul's plans. He reported to the Foreign Office

his belief that King Paul was trying to impose a political system based around

thatthe
personalities King could Norton
dominate. foresawfurther if
political upheavals

the King continuedto demandthe creationof a new electoralsystem.Norton did not

merely report his views to London; he told Paul quite bluntly that the foreign a ies

13January1951.
2 Respectivelyin Markezinis,Political Hlsto? IoTopla;E. Nikolakopoulos, Parties and
Y-17021TIKý
ParliamentaryElections-K6, uyara Kai Bov)xvriKtq;P. Paraskevopoulos,Liberal openings-01WE60cpa
Avoiypara(Athens, 1987);S. Linardatos,From Civil War to Hounta -A;rorov EpýpUioarl Xo6vra
(Athens,1977).Thereaftercited asFrom Civil War-A;ro TovEp(p6Aio.Seealso Appendix C, p. 185.
3Following Sofoulis' death 24 June 1949,AlexandrosDiomidis, Vice-President Sofoulis
on of
government,ex-Governorof Bank of Greece,formed a coalition governmentwith conservative
KonstantineTsaldarisand liberal SofoclesVenizelosas Deputy Premiers.The coalition increasingly
sufferedfrom the rivalries betweenthesedominantpartnersfrom opposingparties.The four yearsafter
the last electionsof March 1946were aboutto cometo an end and electionswould be held in spring 1950.
On 5 January1950,Venizelosand his liberal ministersresignedfrom the coalition to push for early
electionsbefore republicanGeneralPlastirasreturnedfrom Paris and organisedhis own political party of
the Centre,which would threatenthe Liberals' unity and strength.Consequently,the coalition dissolved
andDiomidis on 5 January1950also submittedthe King his own resignation.On 14 January1950,
PlastirasandTsouderosfoundedEPEK (National ProgressiveUnion of the Centre).Papandreourenamed
his 'DemocraticSocialist' into 'Party G. Papandreou'.
4PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/87660,R 10110/12,Norton Foreign Office, 9
to
January1950;History of the GreekNation-Io-roplaTovEUIVIK06 EOvovq,vol. 16, p. 173.
 110

would not support his 5

political gambit. Without t he support ofB ritain a nd A merica

King Paul had little chanceof imposing a new electoralsystemin the face of the furious

opposition of the political parties.He had little choicebut to withdraw his constitutional

reforms. The existing systemof proportional representationwould, therefore,be applied

in any future election.6

The organisationof the state was still dominated by the system that had been

createdduring the civil war. The anti-CommunistResolution 'C' of 1946- underwhich

any political activity endangeringthe 'security of the state' was penalised was still

active.The EmergencyLaw 509 of 1947bannedany Communist activity. Specialcourt-

martials existed with the jurisdiction to deal with crimes against the state. Directives

introduced since 1947 restricted basic civil rights such as freedom of the press. The

creation of a truly democraticstate faced,therefore,major obstacles.The Gendarmerie

and the various units of anned civilians created during the civil war for counter-

insurgencyoperationsstill dominatedthe countryside.There were also severalthousand

held
political prisoners in 7
without trial concentrationcamps. Most of the countrywas

still governedunder the martial law, which had beenintroduced in November 1948.8

British and American officials stationedin Greeceregardedpolitical repression

in Greeceto be excessive.Given that the civil war was over, they believedthat the

continuationof thesepunitive anti-Communistpolicies undermineddemocracyand

preventednonnalisation. The allies' representativescontinuously expressedthe view

that the Theotokis governmentand the Greekmilitary leadershipconstitutedan obstacle

5PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/ 87660RIO 110/4,

Norton to Foreign Office, 6
January1950.This is one of the casesthat illustratedthat the Foreign Office did
not follow a particular
policy to back the Palaceunconditionally,asoften supported.On that see:Markezinis, Political History-
HoAmKýIoTopla,p. 298. The broaderspectrumof the casesof Iraq
and Egypt as well as the microworld
of Greekpolitics demonstratedthat therewasnot consolidatedBritish policy to supportkingship. W.R.
Louis, TheBritish Empire in the Middle East 1945-1951(London, 1988),
pp. 263,694-699. Occasionally,
the ForeignOffice put asidethe power of the King if this did not promote British
6On Greekinternal policy.
situationand electionsLinardatos,From Civil War-AX0TovEPý0611o, pp. 72,87.
7Alivizatos, 'The EmergencyRegime
and Civil Liberties' in Iatrides (ed.), Greecein the 1940s,pp. 223-
8.
 III

Greece's life. 9 As a result of Anglo-

to return to a nonnal, stable and unified political

American pressuremartial law was lifted on II February 1950. Restrictions on travel

were removed in most parts of the country. Resolution 'C' was also abolished.

However, EmergencyLaw 509 remainedintact. The military tribunals also remainedin

10
operation.

New political forces emergedfor the forthcoming election. On the Right the

Populist Party faced a challenge from a new right-wing formation, the Independent

Political Camp (PAP), which was led by former collaboratorsof the dictator Metaxas.

The National Unity Party of Kanellopoulosalso challengedmoderateconservatives.The

Liberal Party of Venizelos in the Centrewas reinforcedby the adherenceof the National

Liberals of General Stylianos Gonatas,who, in the 1946 electoral campaign had co-

operated with the Populists. Tsouderos' Democratic Progressive Party and George

Papandreou'sParty also competedfor the traditional Liberal vote. Another new political

force was EPEK - the National Progressive Union of the Centre led by General

Plastiras.Plastiras'republicanism him to the greaterpart of the republican

hadendeared

and left-wing supportersof Eleftherios Venizelos, particularly the refugees from Asia

Minor. " EPEK would form a join coalition of the Centre together with the parties of

TsouderosandPapandreou. in the electionby an allianceof

The Left was represented

the various leftist groups: the Union of Democratic Leftists, the Socialist Party, the

Leftist Liberals and the Politically Independent Camp. All favoured amnesty for

8 To Vima,28 January1950.
9FRUS(1949): 6,465: Minor (Chargi the Embassyin Greece) Acheson, 16 December1949.
at to
10Nikolakopoulos,Parties
and ParliamentaryElections-K6pp= Kai Bov)xurmtq Woyts, pp. 157-8.
Resolution'C' of June 1946introduceda seriesof new crimes and reinforced the powersof the executive
for the persecutionof the Left. EmergencyLaw 509 of December1947, outlawedthe KKE and the
organisationsthat were under its influenceandpenalisedany type of communistactivity.
11PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/ 87668R 10113/15,Norton Rumbold, 12 May
to
1950.EPEK's drawbackwas that it sufferedthe enmity of the Palace,becausePlastirashad been
instrumentalin the oustingof two kings, Paul's father,KonstantineI in 1922
and Konstantine'sI son
GeorgeII in 1924.
 112

12
communistsand abolition of restrictive measures.

Although this plenitude of parties created an apparently divergent political

in
spectrum, reality there were no substantialdifferenceson either domestic or foreign

policy issues.
All the partiessupportedGreece'sdetenninationto side with the West and

contain Communism with British and American backing. In terms of political

t
programmes, hey 11
a supportedaf airer d istribution ofw ealth and c laimed to have a

interest in the the 13 As Norton noted wearily these

special welfare of rural class.
14
political forcesafforded little hope for change.

The electionswere held on 5 March 1950.No less than twenty-nine parties and

250 ' 5 The

alliances contested seats under a system of proportional representation.

election left the Populists with 62 the

seats, Liberals with 56 seats,EPEK with 45 seats

and Papandreou 35 the 16No party was powerful to fonn

with seats,as strongestparties.

even a minority government strong enough to resist probable post-election alliances.

Thus a one-party governmentcould not be formed. The formation of a coalition was,

therefore,inevitable. The combinedvote of the three Centreparties of Venizelos,

Plastirasand Papandreoutaken togethergavethem the majority of the seats- 136 out of

250. As a result the three men agreedto set aside their differences and form a centrist

coalition.Plastiraswould take over premiershipas the 'newest' and most appealing

liberal politician in the Parliament.The aim of Plastiras coalition would be to displace

the Populists.As a result Norton concludedthat GeneralPlastiras was 'the moral victor

in the election'.17

King Paul, however, was reluctant to offer Plastiras the Prime Minister's chair

" Linardatos,
From Civil War-AwTovEuqRio,pp. 83-84;Charises, Elections-EkAoyts, 230.
p.
13TheTimes,4 March1950.
14PUBLICRECORDOFFICE,KEW (PRO),FO 371/87661R 10110125,Norton ForeignOffice,16
to
February1950.
15Clogg,Parties Electionsin Greece, 22-24.
and pp.
16Foranaccountof the
electionresultssee:Nikolakopoulos,
PartiesandParliamentaryElections-
K6,q,qaTaKaiBovAcvTiKtq
EKAoyts, pp. 394-5;Clogg,PartiesandElections,pp. 22-26.
 113

due to his anti-royalist past.18It was not just Plastiras' past that worried the King. As

premier Plastiraswould threatenthe rule of the Army. Not only the Palacebut its main

ally, the national forcesandField Marshal Papagos,would be put under the commandof

the goverment, turning the royal order upside down. Inevitably King Paul disliked the

idea of risking his own status and power by swearing in Plastiras as Prime Minister. As

a result of the King's disapproval,therewas a delay in forming a cabinet.

Clifford Norton 'did not entirely trust Plastiras' entourage' because it was

dominated by leftists. Nevertheless,he believed that a Plastiras-Venizeloscoalition

governmentwould correspondto the 'will of the people'. A government aligned with

popular sentiment as expressedthrough the ballot box offered the best chance of

cnduring pcace and stability. T hc F orcign 0 ffice i nstructedN orton tot ry toi mprove

King Paul's poor relations with GeneralPlastiras.The British Ambassadorin his turn

advised King Paul that Plastiras' coalition govenunent would constitute the 'best

19
solution'. The British embassycalculatedthat EPEK's leniency programmedirected at

the Communistsmight help to bring the stabilitynecessary

to normalisethe situationin

Greece.Britain was still interested in securing a democratic government politically

acceptableto the Greek people as well as in keeping Greece under the western
20
umbrella.

Attempts to coax King Paul to acceptthe 'moral' outcome of the election were,

however,derailedalmost as soon as they had begun. Venizelosbetrayedhis allies

Plastirasand Papandreouby conniving with the Palace.He acceptedthe King's mandate

to form a governmenthimself. He was hastily sworn in as prime minister before he had

17PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO

371/87661R 10110/33,Norton to Bevin, 10 March
1950.
18Linardatos,From Civil War-krowv EpV6bo,
pp. 97-8. Seefootnote 11.
19PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),
FO 371/87661RIOI 10/ 33, Norton to Bevin, 10 March
1950;FO 371/ 87661RIO 110/40,Norton to Rumbold,9 March 1950.
20PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),
FO 371/ 87662 R 10110/46,Norton to Foreign Office, 16
March 1950.Grady replacedMac Veagh in July 1948.
 114

had the to a full list of ministers. The public justification of this

even chance produce

'cabinet of the King's mandate' was that the Liberal Party was
manoeuvre of creating a

the The turn to Venizýlos was, however, ar isky o ne.

the strongest party at election.

Without EPEKs and Papandreou's support the cabinet would have little chance of

21
survival.

Not only did the British and Americansdeprecatethe formation of the Venizelos

hoc but it was assailedfrom all comers of the Greek political

ad minority government

C inG To Vima Ta Nea

world. T he p apersoft he C entreand entre-left reece- and -

denouncedit for frustrating the freely expressedwill of the people. They found it

troubling that the Premier would have to rely upon the The
support of conservatives.

Populist leader, Tsaldaris, announcedthe 'unconditional' support of his party for any

that Plastiras Papandreoufrom taking over. EPEK had

cabinet would prevent and

Tsaldaris' during the 22 Papandreou

emerged as main political rival elections.

Venizelos.
condemned Prominent membersof the Liberal Party declined to acceptposts

in the new cabineton the groundsthat this governmentwas an attemptby the Palaceand

the Right to weakenand divide the Liberal world.23

The British and American Ambassadorswere as one in their aim of establishing

a stablecabinet. The British Ambassadorstressedthe danger that the new government

would provoke the 'bitter enmity of the Right' as well as dividing the Centre.

Nevertheless,he made clear to King Paul and Queen Frederica that, despite his

objections,he did not intend to interfere in the Greek internal political affairs, let alone

21FRUS(1950): 5,351-52: Minor to Acheson,23 March 1950.In this light, the theory that the Palace
actedarbitrarily wasjustified. For suchviews see Linadratos, From Civil War-AZOTovEpýpQo,pp. 84-
87,146-147.AmericanAmbassadorGradywas absentto the United States.
22FRUS(1950): 5,346: Grady to Acheson,15 March 1950.This is one of the few casesthat the whole
political world agreedupon an issue,as a result of personal,political ambitions.
.3PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87662 R10110/62, CommonwealthRelations
Office, 29 March 1950.
 115

prevent the government from taking 24

over. The British thought that the Venizelos

experimentwas misconceivedbut did not think it in their interest to constantlyinterfere

in Greekpolitics. The Americanswere, however,much less diplomatic. They startedto

mutter darkly that instability and autocracywould put at risk the chancesof future
25
American aid.

Indeedboth the British and the Americanshad every intention of drawing down

their aid, whatever the twists and turns of Greek politics. The end of the civil war and

the consequentsurrenderof the Democratic Army forces confirmed the supremacyof

the National Army and its allies. The national forces had not only proved themselves

competent in defeating the insurgents but had also emerged as an effective and

technologically advancedarmy. Both the British and the Americans believed that a

smaller National Army was desirable once the emergencywas over. As early as 23

October 1949, when the tide of the combat shifted in favour of the National Army, the

Joint United StatesMilitary Advisory and Planning Group proposed a reduction of the

Greekmilitary and security forces from 250,000to 123,000by the end of 1950.26

At the sametime JUSMAPGalso proposedthat its own size should also be

27
reduced. On 6 March 1950,the Under-Secretary
of State,JamesWebb,proposedto

the ExecutiveSecretaryof National Security Council, JamesLay, the reductionof

Americanaid to Greece.JUSMAPGwould be reducedfrom 274 advisersin August

1949 to 128 by the end of 1950. Indicative of American perceptions was that in June

1950the Joint United StatesMilitary Advisory and Planning Group in Greecebecame

Joint United StatesMilitary Aid Group in Greece,eliminating the

advisory and planning

24PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/

87662 R 10110/46,Norton to Rumbold,23
March 1950.This is one of the casesthat illustratedthat the Foreign Office did
not supportthe Greek
Palaceunconditionally.Similarly therewasno to assistthe policies of the Crown.
25PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), particular policy
FO 371/87663RIO 110/72,Chanceryto the Southern
Department-Foreign Office, 3 April 1950.
26FRUS(1950): 6,440442: Grady
to Diomidis, 23 October 1949.
27Records the JCS,Part 2, Strategic
of Issues,Section 1, US Military Assistance,Reel II, Frame0321,
 116

nature of the mission. The lower ranking Major General Reuben Jenkins replaced

LieutenantGeneralJamesVan Fleet on 30 June 1950.28

This policy was mirrored by Britain. In November 1949 the Chiefs of Staff

the
approved withdrawal of the last British brigade from Greece.The last battalion was

departed from Salonika in February 1950.29The four British Military Missions remained

in Greece,however. On 20 January 1950, the Chiefs of Staff noted that the British

Naval, Military, Air Force and Police Missions in Greecewere still engagedin training

the Greek Police 30

forces. On 24 January 1950, a common
and organising armed and

d
proposal rawn upbyt he Chiefs of Staff in London and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in

31
Washingtonsuggestedthat the British Military Mission should be reducedin parallel.

As a result, on 3 March 1950, the strengthof the British Military Mission was reduced

from 200 to 60 relatively high-ranking officers.32

The newly-formed Venizelos government's most immediate problem was not,

however,the chilly attitudeof Greece'sallies.Ratherit wasthe split of the Centrethatit

itself had created.PrimeMinister Venizelosaskedthe prominentleadersof the Centre

parties of Papandreouand of Plastirasto join his cabinet. Papandreourefused and told

Venizelostor esign.P lastirasw asu nwilling too ffer s uccour to his treacherousrival,

Venizelos. On the other hand Kanellopoulos, the Deputy Premier and Minister of

Defence,himself resignedbecausehe was offendedthat a deal of any kind had been

1801/27,Memo by the COS,US Army for JCS,3 February1950.

28FRUS(1950): 5,410-411: NSC 42/1 Paper,19 September1950;PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW
(PRO),FO 371/101818RI 192/23,History of the British Military Mission to Greece.
29Recordsof the JCS,Part 2, StrategicIssues:Section1, Reel II, Frame0267,1801/27, Memo by the
COS,US Army for JCS, 16 November 1949;Recordsof the JCS,Part 2, StrategicIssues:Section1, Reel
II, Frame0321,3 February 1950.Vlavianos, Greece,1941-1949,p. 236. Stefanidis,Britain, the United
Statesand Greece,p. 58.
30PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO/37187755R 1202,from the Ministry Defenceto the
of
Chiefsof Staff, 20 January1950.
31PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 21/1966,Telegramfrom Washingtonto Ministry
of
Defencein London, 24 January1950;Recordsof the JCS,Part 2, StrategicIssues:Section 1, Reel 11,
Frame0321,1801/27,Memorandumby the COS to the JCS,3 February 1950.
32PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),WO 202/908,Report by Major GeneralPackardC. D.,
BMM Athens,3 March 1950.
 117

offered to the republican Plastiras. On 14 April 1950, having failed to garner any

the Venizelos 33
resigned. Contrary to the view
worthwhile support, government

by
expressed some historians it was not the Americans who were to blame for the

collapse of the Venizelos cabinet. It was other domestic political leaderswho crushed

Venizelos. As AmbassadorGrady noted the resignationof Venizelos' governmentwas

due to 'its innate weaknessprimarily and to likelihood that it would not get from

34
parliament a vote of confidence'. King Paul was left with no alternative but to offer

the loathedrepublican Plastirasthe mandate.A new coalition of the Centre was sworn

in on 15 April 1950.

The Plastiras administration was basedon anotherbroad coalition. Despite his

treacheryVenizelos was offered the posts of Deputy Prime Minister and M inister of

Foreign Affairs in an attempt to appeasethe Palace. He declined Plastiras' offer,

however,and the posts remainedvacant for the rest of Plastiras' short premiership.The

Populists too were excluded from this formation. Field Marshal Papagostold both

Norton andGradythat he would acceptthe Plastirasgovenunentas a 'necessarystage'

in Greece'spolitical evolution. However, he would immediately resign from the

positionof the Commander-in-Chief

if the Plastirasadministrationattemptedto curtail

his powersandput the armyunderthe authorityof the government.Papagoswasstill in

control of the armed forces, which had been entrustedto him at the climax of
aubsolute
35
the civil war.

33Stefanidis
notedthat Venizelos' resignationcameas a result of American intervention,discontentover
his economicpolicy and determinationto imposea governmentof the Centre. Stefanidis,The United
States,GreatBritain and Greece,p. 139.Linardatosaswell, believesthat the governmentwasbrought
downbecauseof Grady's interventionagainstthe Venizelos' political
measures.Linardatos,From Civil
War-Azo-rovEy(p6Aio,pp. 104-107.The foreign factor was decisive.However, the Greekpoliticians
themselvesproved unableto sustaintheir government.It was not foreign pressurethat brought down the
Venizelosgovernment,becauseVenizeloswould form anotherthree different cabinetsin the monthsto
come.
34FRUS(1950): 5,364-365: Grady Acheson,17 April 1950.Grady had State
to anywaynot exceeded the
Department'spolicy of technical 'non-interference'in Greek internal
political affairs, thoughdid not go to
the limit of this direction either.
35PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/87663 R101
10/93,Norton to Rumbold,28 April
 118

Plastirashimself had no intention of deviating from a pro-Western line. Contrary

to popular belief Plastiras was not a left-wing politician: he devoted to maintaining the

In
alliance with the westernpowers. the caseof Britain this was best illustrated by his

attitude to the Cyprus By

question. spring 1950 agitation among the Greek public over

the question of Enosis with Cyprus was strong enough to seriously concern British

36Yet Plastiras declined to endorse the Greek-Cypriot demands for support of

observers.

their struggleon the groundsthat the time was inopportune for raising the question.His

to
governmentwas anxious not strain Anglo-Greek relations and the British would not

depart from the view that the question of sovereigntyover Cyprus was closed for the

foreseeablefuture.37

Despite its pragmatic approachto international relations the Plastiras coalition

enjoyedneither unity nor stability. Very soon disputesaroseover programmesin favour

of the communists. Plastiras I

w asn ot ah ard-core eft-wing p olitician. Hew as t rying,
38
however, to bring society into a balance. In June 1950 Plastiras' governmentpassed

39
five 'leniency' bills and was aboutto closethe concentrationcamps. With the outbreak

1950.
36On 15 January1950,an the Greek-Cypriot population of the island was held
unofficial plebisciteamong
in Cyprusandresultedin a 96 per cent vote in favour of Enosis.This further alarmedthe British about
Greekforeign policy.
37pLTBLICRECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/ 87722R1081/169,Report in'Activitics of the
Cypriot Delegationto Greece',8 August 1950.Plastiras'pro-westemforeign policy contradictshistorians
who supportthat the Generalwas a left-wing politician as consideredin: Markezinis, Political History-
NoAirwý Iaropla. In practisetherewasno differencebetweenconservativesand liberals in Greece
towardsforeign policy issues.Field MarshalPapagoswho supportedagitation strengthenedEnosis
sentiments.According to GeneralGrivas, leaderof EOKA pro-Enosisand anti-British organisation,
GeneralGeorgeKosmas,the Chief of GeneralStaff in Cypruswas in the confidenceof Marshal Papagos
andhopedto win official backing for the Enosisplans.However for the time being Papagosnotedthat the
Cypriot liberation campaignwas 'premature' and at this momenthe would do nothing to risk exposureas
a revolutionaryplotting againstGreatBritain. Ch. Foley (ed.), TheMemoirs of General Grivas (London,
1964),p.13.
38Around 13,000detainees
were in exile (Makronisosisland), around 17,000sentencedand 2,289
sentencedto deathfor political reasons,and 5,500pendingtrial. Histor of the Greek Nation-loTopla Tot)
E,UqVIK06EOvovq,vol. 16, p. 173. .y
31In July 1950the initiatives the PremierPlastirasto
of releaseailing detaineescausedgreatoppositionto
the government.Vice-PrcsidentPapandreouand someliberals accusedPlastirasof being too tolerantwith
the communists.The Premierannouncedthat he was obsessedwith reconciliation. Failing to succeedhe
would resign.Venizelosaswell turned againstPlastiraswith the aim to overthrow the government.
Linardatossuggestedthat Plastirasgovernmentwasbrought down becausethe Palaceand the Americans
disliked 'communist' Plastiras.Linardatos,From Civil War-A7roTovEyqblio,
pp. 140-141.
 119

of the hostilities in Korea at the end of June, however, anti-Communist hysteria grew

it
and became more difficult to make a case for national reconciliation measures.

Pressureon the Greek cabinet by the Greek moderateparties to abandonmeasuresof

40In August the Liberal Party ministers resigned from the Plastiras
leniency increased.

coalition supposedlyover the issue of leniency measures.This, however, was only the

official excuse.The real reasonwas that Venizelos' in

party was offered more posts a

new Liberal governmentby the King. Anti-Communist rhetoric was merely a cover for

the personal ambition of Venizelos and the Liberals. General Plastiras submitted his

resignationon 18 August 1950 after 125 days as prime minister. The withdrawal of the

Liberal Party's support from the coalition brought the third governmentalcollapsein the

first eight months of 1950.41The Foreign Office was under no illusions as to the real

driving force - personalambition that dominatedGreek politics. The new royal plans
-
did not enjoy the approval,let alonethe consent,of the British government.Norton once

again tried to discourage King Paul and the royal establishment from undermining
42
stabilityin Greece.

The VenizelosGovernments:A Marginal Stability

King Paul entrusted the mandate for the formation of a new government of

cnationalunity' to SofoclesVenizeloswho was sworn in on 21 August 1950.A new

coalition basedon the Liberals, the secondstrongestparty, was fonned. The King

wantedthis coalition to include the Populists.Venizelos, however, proposedan alliance

with the moderatepoliticians Papandreouand Tsouderos,hoping that they would both

supporthim and form a purely Centre coalition. Tsouderos,however, refusedto betray

40PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/87664

RIOIIO/101, Norton to Younger,7 July
1950.
41PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/87664
RIO 110/125,Norton to Atllee, 22 August
1950;Linardatos,From Civil War-kro TovEp(pbAto, 143-147.
42PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO pp.
371/87701R1054/3, ConversationsbetweenErnest
DaviesandKing and Queenof GreeceandField Marshal Papagos,14,17 July 1950.Dafnis, TheGreek
 120

his electoral ally Plastiras. The Democratic Progressive Party and EPEK deputies

decided not to give a vote of confidenceto the Venizelos govenunent. The Populists

refused to tolerate an administration in which they themselves were not strongly

represented.On its own Papandreou'ssupportwas not enough to give the government

the necessarymajority in Parliament.Consequently,Venizelos failed to receive his vote

of confidence.He was forced to submit his resignation. His suggestedsolution to the

43
impassewas the holding of fresh electionsunder the majority system. The failure of

the Venizelos governmentto receive a vote of confidence signified a new period of

political unrest and re-ignited calls to set up a single strong party that could commanda

stablemajority in Parliament.

King Paul, in particular, had a preferredsolution to the power vacuum createdby

party infighting. He wanted his confidant Papagos

to assumepower. The combination of

royal and military power would, in the King's opinion, not only guaranteepolitical

stability but also the safety of the monarchy.Yet Papagos,

royalist though he was, was

far from being a royal poodle. In August 1950 Papagos and King Paul seriously

the creationof a royal-militarygovernment.Their negotiations,however,did

discussed

not, at this stage,reach fruition. Indeed they ended in deadlock. Papagosdemandedan

Premiership
unconditional control
untrammelled wielded in the royal but
interest not
-
by the Palace. Naturally enough King Paul shield away from the possibility that he

would become a powerless figurehead in a regime in which the real leader was a

military dictator. His thoughts startedto turn insteadto the creation of a governmentthat

wasdevotedto the Court.The Anny wasto be the bulwark of royal powerratherthana

Political Parties-TaE.UlviKit HoAnKdK6pyaTa,p. 470.

43Vcnizclos' Liberal Party
received 106votesfor and 124 against.PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW
(PRO),FO 371/87664 R 10110115,Norton to Rumbold, 6 August 1950;History the GreekNation-
of
Iaropia TovEU11VIK06 EOvovq,vol. 16,p. 175; Markczinis, Political History-IMAITIKýIaropla, p. 360.
The majority systemwould restrict participation in parliamentto the
parties with the largestshareof votes
andoffer the first party massiveparliamentarymajority.
 121

44
threat to it.

Neither the Papagos solution nor a royal puppet government attracted much

support from Britain. As usual the British wanted an efficient and sustainable

government to take over. The Head of the Southern Department, Sir Anthony Rumbold,

described Papagos' entry into politics as the last card to be played. Papagos acted as a

the recrudescenceof Communist power. His intervention in politics at

guarantor against

however likely to further increase

a time of anything other than acute crisis was, more

long-term instability. British interest in the developments in Greece

rather than suppress

was expressed in discussions between the Foreign Office and State Department officials

in September 1950. Ernest Davies and the American Assistant Secretary of State for the

Near East, South Asia and Africa, George McGhee, discussed a closer co-ordination of

British and American efforts to support political stability in Greece. Both decided that a

joint Anglo-American front was needed to prevent King Paul from arbitrary attempts to

impose his own ideas and solutions to the political instability. 45

With spectre of the 'Papagos solution' hanging over him Venizelos renewed his

The Populists would be included 46 On 13 September

efforts to form a new coalition. .

1950, the fifth cabinet of 1950, a tripartite coalition administration, was sworn in,

headed again by Venizelos. Papandreou and Tsaldaris were appointed Deputy

Premiers. 47 This tripartite coalition proved a difficult test of the cohesion of not only the

44PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/ 87663 RIO 110/93,Norton to Rumbold,28 April
1950;Linardatos,From Civil War-A7rorov EpýpQo,pp. 147-150.Papagos'detern-dnation to form the
cabinethe would have liked is alsojustified in Dafnis, The GreekPolitical Parties-Ta WIvwd I70AITIK4
K6ypaTa,pp. 474475.
45PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87664 RIO1 10/118, Norton to Rumbold, 8
September 1950; FO 371/87665, R 10110/ 125, Rumbold to Norton, 9 October 1950. Giannoulopoulos
supports that the Americans supports Papagos' solution on the grounds that he would form a strong
government; in Giannoulopoulos, Post- War World-O McrazoAzyw& K6apoq, p. 289. Dafnis, The Greek
Political Parties-Ta EUqviK6tl7oAiTiK6 K6ppara, pp. 474-475.
46Linardatossuggeststhat Papagos
solution was a King's trick to avoid new electionsandprobable
victory of Plastiras.Linardatos,From Civil War-AxoTovEpýpQo, pp. 147-155.However, this conspiracy
theoryshouldbe treatedwith cautionfor it was the Centre'spower clashesand desireto excludethe
Populiststhat had mainly causedgoverrunentalmaking and dissolving.
47The Liberals
were given ten ministries,the Populistsand Papandreou'sparty nine. History of the Greek
Nation-IoToplarovEUqviKob EOvovq,vol. 16,p. 175.Linardatos,From Civil War-Airo
TovEpqQo, pp.
 122

cabinetbut also the Liberal Party itself. The co-operationwith Tsaldaris and the Populist

Party was bitterly opposedfrom within the Liberal Party. Twenty out of fifty-seven

Liberal deputiesvoted in favour of immediate elections.Two prominent leadersof the

Liberal Party, the former ministers,KonstantineRendis and Ioannis Zigdis, left its ranks

to join Plastiras. In mid-October the liberal newspaper To Vima began a strong

campaignagainstTsaldaris' son over chargesof misuse of public money. In reality this

was an attack againstthe leaderof the Populist Party himself and an attempt to exclude

the Populists from the government.Papandreoudeclaredthat the dealings in which the

name of the Populist leader was involved were 'too strong to be ignored'. With the

consentof Venizelos he tried to convince Tsaldaris to withdraw from the government

until the had

scandal passedoff 48Tsaldaris,however, refused to resign. Therefore, on 2

November 1950, the Prime Minister submitted his own resignation to the King. He

claimed that his resignationwas a sign of 'political responsibility and In

sensitiveness'.

reality d issent inh is o wn p arty had forced him to try and exclude the Populist Party

49The
from the cabinet. tripartite governmentwas dissolvedafterjust fifty-one 50
days.

Venizelosand Papandreouintendedto continuethe governmentwith a reshuffled

bipartite cabinet.

On 3 November1950,Venizelostook over Premiershipfor fourth time in the

same year. Papandreou became Deputy Premier and Minister of Co-ordination.

Portfolios were distributed amongst the Liberals and Papandreou'sParty members.51

156-157.
48PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/87665 R 10110/139,Norton to Bevin, 29
November1950.
49PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87665RI01 10/138,Norton Rumbold, 15
to
November1950.Clogg supportedthe view that the Populistswithdrew their backing to provoke new
elections.In Clogg, A Short History ofModern Greece,pp. 166-7;Markezinis noted that the Liberals
withdrew asa result of the scandals.Markezinis,Political History-HoAITIKýIcTopla,p. 360.
50PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/876651110110/139,Norton Bevin, 29
to
November1950.
51On 16November,the Populist Ministers,
who had beenleft out of Venizelos cabinet,twenty-sevenof
sixty-twoof the Populist deputies(Stefanopoulos,Karamanlisand Rallis included)joined forceswith
Kanellopoulos'National Unity Party and formed the Populist Unity Party (LEK) headedby both
 123

The bipartite cabinet could, in fact, commanda workable parliamentarymajority. Thus,

on 16 November 1950,SofoclesVenizelosand GeorgePapandreoumanagedto securea

vote of confidencein Parliamentof 164 for to 54 against.Simultaneously, strong anti-

Communist measureswere revived. Resolution 'C' was re-imposed and left-wing

52
newspaperswere suppressed.

As theseeventsunfolded Clifford Norton and the new American Ambassadorin

Athens,John P eurifoy a greedt hat itw as d angerousfor the government of Greeceto

continuewith its hand-to-mouthparliamentaryexistence.This existence dependedon

the whims of a group of political power brokers. These political leaders disliked and

distrustedeachother. They were happyto betray one anotherin order to gain a marginal

political or personaladvantage.The British and Americans thought that this circus had

to end. One group of politicians had to triumph whilst other faded from the scene.It was

not particularly important in the grand schemeof things, which group turned out to be

winner or loser. Each was anti-communistenough for Anglo-American purposes.The

tendencyof somecentriststo flirt with the left-wingwasoffsetby the tendencyof some

politicians of the right to engagein capriciousand destabilising persecutions.Thus, the

Foreign Office could supportPlastiras' governmentwhilst rejecting Papagos'entry into

politics or Tsaldaris' premiershipdespitethe fact that Plastiraswas considereda

communist sympathiser whereas Papagos and Tsaldaris were out-and-out anti-

Communists.Norton and Peurifoy had little confidence that the Venizelos-Papandreou

coalition would last much longer than its predecessors.They believed the best thing that

could happeno nce itc ollapsedw as for e arly e lections tobeh eld u nder t he m ajoritY

system.The result should empowerthe big parties and make possible a stable

Kanellopoulosand Stefanopoulos,on 6 January1951. History the GreekNation-IoTopla

of TovEUIVIK06
EOvovq,vol. 16,p. 176.
52PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 87665
R10110/139,Norton to Rumbold,29
November1950;History of the GreekNation-IoTopiarov EUIVIK06 EOvovq, 16, 179; Linardatos,
vol. p.
From Civil War-A 7roTovEpýp6Aio,
pp. 179,181-3.
 124

53
government. The probablealternativeto a new electoral systemwas the of
emergence

an authoritarian regime under Field Marshal Papagos.Such a regime, they believed,

be
would at oddswith the needsof post-civil war Greek society. On 27 November 1950,

the Greekswere warned that only the formation of a strong government would make

Greece'sassociationwith NATO possible.54The very fact that this warning was issued,

however, suggested that the Western allies were moving back towards a more

interventionistapproachin Greekaffairs.

GreeceJoins NA TO

In October 1949the GreekForeign Minister, PanayisTsaldaris, had preparedan

aide-memoireto Achesonrequestinghim to considersomekind of security arrangement

55
for the countriesimmediatelyto the eastof the NATO area. In April 1950Greeceand

Turkey made fon-nal applications to join NATO. Many existing members did not,

however,welcome the application.Denrnark,Norway, and the Benelux statesexpressed

apprehension
about assumingresponsibilityfor the defenceof a region distant both

geographicallyand culturally from WesternEurope. Britain preferred the establishment

53FRUS(1950): 5,433435: Achesonto Peurifoy, 9 November 1950;PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW

(PRO),FO 371/87665R10110/138,Norton to Rumbold, 15 November 1950.The Foreign Office
disagreement with royal tactics further historians
weakens who believe that the Court was fully backedby
the ForeignOffice. In Markezinis,Political Hlstory-HoAirwý laropla, pp. 295-300.
54PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/87665R10110/138,Minute to Norton, 27
November1950.The Foreign Office had an additionalreasonto discouragePapagosfrom entering
politics andtaking over power, asField Marshalwas in favour of Enosis of Cyprus with Greece.From the
ForeignOffice's point of view D6tentein Greek-Turkishrelationswould reinforce stability in the areaand
keepCyprus' issuedormant;that excludedthe take over of a military government,in PUBLIC RECORD
OFFICE,KEW (PRO), FO 371/95106,Annual Report for 1950,Norton to Rumbold, 13 January1951.
53FRUS(1949): 6,447449: Tsaldaristo Acheson,28 October 1949.Greece's
entry into NATO wasa
dividing issueamongGreekhistorians.For an accountof both the right and left-wing argumentssee:Th.
Couloumbis,GreekPolitical Reactionto Americanand NA TO Influences(London, 1966),pp. 40-41. An
official sourceis that by Major GeneralA. Siapkaras,'The Importanceof Greeceto NATO' Military
Review,August (1961), 90-97. The authorstatesthat Greece'sinclusion into NATO was the result of its
affluentmaterialresources(minerals,agriculture,trade,industry), land-seaand air space,'moral strength'
of the Greeksand 'outstandingplace amongEurope'smodem armies' and finally the convincing
argumentof its strategicimportance.He totally neglectsthe impact of the Korean War in pointing
Greece'simportanceto the westernsecurity.Despiteboth right and left-wing views that the West wasby
definition interestedin Greece'sentry into NATO, the process its incorporation
of was longwindedand
precipitatedby the Korean War.
 125

Middle East 56
Command.
of a separate

In the spring of 1950,however, more auspicioussigns for the Greek petition to

57
join NATO emerged. In May 1950 at the tripartite discussions held in London

betweenthe United States,Britain and Francethe situation in Greeceand its strategic

importance was discussed.Acheson and Bevin reaffirmed the determination of the

United States and Britain to safeguardthe independenceand territorial integrity of

58
Greece. The volatile situationsin Egypt and Iran the
suggested need for action to firm

up the westernposition in the EasternMediterraneanand the Middle East. The British

American however 59Both allies were still undecided

and approachwas, one of caution.

regarding the necessityof including Greecein NATO. The limited American defence

budgetand limited British resourceswere devotedto making good NATO commitments

to secureWesternEurope. Moreover, opposingAnglo-American interestsin the Middle

East complicatedmatters.The British plan for a Middle East CommandfacedAmerican

scepticism.Endlessconversationsseemedlikely to produce stalematerather than action

60
in this area.

This rather sluggish approachto Mediterraneansecurity was, however,

galvanisedby the outbreak of the Korean War. Within this context the need to broaden

61Greece and Turkey were included in

NATO's geographicalborders was re-assessed.

56S. Papacosma,'Greece
andNATO', in L. S. Kaplan, R. W. Clawson,R. Luraghi (eds),NATO and the
Mediterranean(SR, 1985),p. 191. The containmentof Soviet power in the Middle Eastwas agreedasa
sharedAnglo-Americanobjective in as seriesof talks held in 1950. See:Leffler, A Preponderanceof
Power,pp. 192-197.In thesetalks British goal focusedon securingAmerican supportin the Middle East.
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 131/9,DO (50) 40,19 May 1950; CAB 131/8,DO (50)
5 Meeting,23 March 1950;CAB 131/9,DO 45, Reportby the Chiefs of Staff on Defenceand Global
Strategy,7 June 1950;Documentson British Policy Overseas(DBPO) SeriesII, vol. 4, (London, 1991),
pp. 411-434.On the British attemptto establisha MEC consult: D. Devereux, TheFormulation ofBritish
DefencePolicy Towardsthe Middle East, 1948-56(London, 1990),pp. 43-75.
57Gaddis,Strategies Containment, 91-9,109-110
of pp.
58FRUS(1950): 5,414: Memorandumby the Acting Secretary State(J. E. Webb) to the Executive
of
Secretaryof the NSC (Lay), extract 19 September1950;FRUS (1950): 3,1076: Report of the Tripartite
PreliminaryMeeting, 6 May 1950.
59Leffler, A Prependerance
ofPower, p. 348.
60McGhee,The US-Turkish-NATO, 65.
p.
61L. Kaplan, The UnitedStates
and NATO (Kentucky, 1984),pp. 9-10. The Berlincrisis, Prague'scoup,
the conununistinvasion of SouthKorea, the explosionof the first Soviet atom bomb and the victory of the
 126

this re-assessment.On 6 July 1950, Premier Attlee intimated to President Truman his

fearsof a possible Soviet initiative to 're-light the fire' in 62

Greece. On 26 July, Reuben

Jenkins, the new Chief of the Joint United States Military Aid Group to Greece,

reportedto the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he and AmbassadorJohn Peurifoy had revised

their estimateof the amountof aid requiredby They

Greece. proposedthat Joint United

StatesMilitary Aid Group should be authorisedto programme for a 200,000 men force

the the forces to 400,000 63

men. Even at the peak
with possibility of expanding national

of the civil war the governmenthad not had a

such strong national defenceforce. In the

summer of 1950 the policy of demilitarising Greece was thrown into reverse by the

Americans.

Although the American and British diplomats were reluctant to encouragea

military autocracythis in
change military policy inevitably increasedthe importanceand

power of Field Marshal Papagos. had

Papagos beenpolitically weakenedby the decision

to reduce the size of the armed forces and the military missions. He could no longer

poseas the sole conduit or arbiter of Anglo-Americanaid to In

Greece. July 1950,

however, he was able to suspenddernobilisation. The whole Greek political world

agreedthatbecauseof the deterioratinginternationalsituationthe NationalAnny should

be increased.
In September1950the Joint Chiefsof Staff agreedwith Papagosthat the

GreekNationalArmy shouldbe increasedto a strengthof 147,000men by the endof

the year - as comparedto the 122,000 serving in July 1950.64On 1 September1950,

Venizeloshad announcedto the SecretaryGeneralof the United Nations that the Greek

communistforcesin China had all increasedthe Soviet threat.

62FRUS(1950): 5,314: Attlee to Tnunan, 6 July 1950.PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO
371/ 87710R1078/2,Foreign Office to Crossely,UK Delegationto UNSCOB, 19 July 1950;FRUS
(1950): 5,408-409: Memo of informal discussionspreparedin the embassyin London, 19 September
1950.Woodhouse,TheStrugglefor Greece,p. 286.
63FRUS(1950): 5,387: ReubenJenkinsto Joint Chief Staff, 26 July 1950.
of
64FRUS(1950): 3,240-241: Minor to Acheson,24 August 1950.According Jenkins
to the national forces
would consistof a force of: 147,000NA, 10,000for RHN and 60 ships,7,400 for RHAF. AMAG would
remainin Greece.JUSMAG would have266 personnelby 30 June 1950.FRUS (1950): 5,406: JCSto
Jenkins,15 September1950;FRUS (1950): 5,410-411: NSC 42/1 policy on'US Objectives
with Respect
 127

had decided to send a unit of brigade strength to join the

government unanimously

United Nations Forcesin 65

Korea.

A further boost to the power of the military and its allies was provided by the

associationof Greecewith NATO. On 4 September1950, during a tripartite meeting of

Foreign Ministers in New York between the United States, Britain and France, it was

decided that the security of Europe a nd t he M iddle E ast w ould bee ndangered ift he

Soviet Union obtained control of either Greece or Turkey. Bevin and Acheson agreed to

NATO 66 On 4
announce the admission of Greece and Turkey to associate status with .

October 1950, Greecewas invited to co-operatewith the Atlantic Treaty countries in

military planning for the Mediterraneanarea.

In the winter of 1950-51there was a tension in British policy towards Greece.

British analysesof Greek politics acknowledgedits very personal nature. They

concludedthat the frangibility of politics causedby its personalisationcould probably be

fixed by changesin the structureof the political system.Political turmoil in Greecehad

little to do with the Cold War. Yet onceinstability in Greecewas set in the contextof

international 'instability' it took on a much more ideological Cold War aspect. Co-

operationwith the Americans was desirablefor Cold War reasonsbut inhibited British

to Greeceand Turkey', 19 September1950.

65PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/87710 R1078/9, Norton to Foreign Office, 4
September1950. Turkey a Iso followed the s amep ath. The Menderes governmentgatheredover 5,000
troops to embark for Korea on 18 October 1950. This battalion eventually departed for Korea on
Christmasday 1950. F. Ahmad, The Turkish Experimentin Democracy 1950-1975(London, 1977),pp.
390-392.PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95106,Annual Report for 1950,Norton to
Bevin, 13 January1951.
66PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/87466R1074/8,Tripartite Meeting Foreign
of
Ministersin New York, 4 September1950.There arevarious explanationsto explain the entry of Greece
andTurkey into NATO in the beginningwith associatestatusand finally as a full member.It hasbeen
notedthat the Korean War was the turning point, creatingthe needfor massiveincreasein military
assistance,expandedgeographicalterritoriesunderNATO, defenceof Europe and the creationof a
Mediterraneancommand.In Kaplan, Clawson,Luraghi, NA TO and the Mediterranean, pp. 9-19;
Rearmamentefforts, political and economicinterestsin the Middle East.In Leffler, A Preponderanceof
Power,pp. 419-425;For an accounton the Middle EastCommandnegotiationsseeDevereux,The
Formulation ofBritish DefencePolicy. Leffler, A PreponderanceofPower, p. 420. American isolationists
fearedthat the openingwedgefor a vast programof assistancewould destroythe American economy
beforeit damagedthe Russians.In Kaplan, Clawson,Luraghi (eds.), NATO and the Mediterranean,p. 35.
The creationof SupremeHeadquartersAllied Powersof Europe and American
of military air basesin
Turkey overcameobjectionsto their membershipbecauseEurope's southernflank defencehad been
 128

freedomof manoeuvrein regional affairs. Whilst the British wished to discourageField

Marshal Papagosfrom emerginginto politics the strengtheningof the army, to which

they acquiesced,was likely to make this a possibility. The Greek problem could not be

placed on the back burner becauseinternal criseswere likely to continually reoccuruntil

somekind of solution had beenfound.

These dilemmas were soon brought to a head. The Venizelos administration

faced a decisive crisis in late February 1951. The leadersof the Populist Unity Party

(LEK), Panayiotis Kanellopoulos and Stefanos Stefanopoulos, announced that their

party was withdrawing its support from the 67 This meant that the
government.

Venizelos-Papandreoucoalition could no longer muster a parliamentary majority. The

motives of Kanellopoulos and Stefanopouloswere difficult to comprehend.There were

allegationsthat Field Marshal Papagoswas behind the defection. The prospect of the

LEK and Papagosforming a new right-wing cabinet was rumoured. A political power

play by both leaderswas anotherpossibility. They may have wished to force the LEK's

way into the governmentfrom a position of strengthafter it had demonstratedthe

dependency its 68
government's on support. Whatever LEK's motives their manoeuvre

simply confirmed British scepticismthat under the political systemas it existed in 1950

anycoalition,evenonewith a largemajority,couldhold on to power for any lengthof

time.

The National ProgressiveUnion of the Centre (EPEK) skilfully exploited the

crisis. As the governmentwas draggedinto a test of confidencein the Chamber,General

Plastiras,offered the support of his party on two conditions: that an all-party committee

Kaplan,Clawson,Luraghi(eds.), NATOandtheMediterranean,
strengthened. p. 9.
67LEK hadwondeputiesfromthePopulistParty
andturnedpowerfulconservative party.PUBLIC
RECORDOFFICE,KEW (PRO),FO 371/95116R10114/5,Chanceryto SouthernDepartment, 21
February1951.Linardatossuggests
thattheaimof LEK seemed to be theformationof a newcabinetwith
thenewforcesharingpower.Linardatos,
From Civil War-AX0TovEqV6A1o, pp. 196,199.
61PUBLICRECORDOFFICE,KEW (PRO),FO 371/95116
R10114/3,Nortonto ForeignOffice,8
February1951.
 129

be set up in order to draft a new electorallaw and that the goverranentshould proposeto

the King that generalelectionsbe held. Prime Minister Venizelos acceptedtheseterms

and his goverranentreceiveda 133-to-91vote of confidenceon 22 February 1951.69The

issue of the conduct of general election came to the foreground once again. Efforts

would concentrateon the reconstructionof the traditional 'big parties'.

69PU13LICRECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),

FO 371/95116 R10114/5, Chanceryto Southern
Department,21 February 1951; Linardatos,From Civil War-A
7roTovEpVbAio,p. 199.
 130

V Stabilisation Era: 1951-1952

Papagos Enters Politics

As a result of the announcementof the elections the political temperaturerose

once again. Papagos' steps to enter politics stoked up the heat even further. On 10

January1951, Papagosmade his first attemptto presenthimself as the best solution to

the p olitical c risis. Inani nterview w ith C harlesY ost -t he USC harge dAffaires in

Athens - the Field Marshal denouncedthe Venizelos government. He stated that a

'strong administration' was neededto securea parliamentarymajority. The statementin

itself was of no p articular i mportance.W hat w as s ignificant, h owever, w as P apagos'

portrayal of himself as potential saviour. The Field Marshal told Yost of his intention to

becomeprime minister. He intendedto enterthe election at the headof a slatecomposed

of candidatesof his own choosing. His ticket would be drawn from 'all groups and

'
classes'.
Someconservativeandliberalpoliticiansfavouredthe Papagossolution.Indeed

Markezinis, head of the conservativeNew Party, Papagos' friend and main counsellor

proposed his own version of the Papagos solution. Markezinis favoured Papagos'

participationin the next electionsas the head of a wider right-wing coalition of

individual politicians. Markezinis wanted to renovatethe traditional Right and securea

2
conservativecabinet to replacethe failing coalitions of the Centre. At the other end of

the political spectrumthe liberal newspaperTo Vima spoke of 'the need' for Papagos'

entry into politics. For the liberals Papagos'appealto all groups and classesappearedto

guaranteeliberal participation in the government. If Papagos appearedto be able to

attract substantialsupport from within the traditional parties he had also gained a new

1FRUS(1951):5,445: Yost
to the StateDepartment,4 January1951; In Papagiannopoulos,Field Marshal
A-Papagos-.
rrpa*Xqq A.U&vJpoq 1767r6yoq, p. 372.
 131

important By the beginning 1951 the Palacehad swung from its initial
and opponent. of

for the Field Marshal to 3 The falling out had its origins
enthusiasm outright opposition.

in the rift betweenPapagosand the Palaceover the issue of the distribution of power,

which had arisenin 1950.The clashbecamemore intensein the months that followed.

If the King's enthusiasm for Papagos had waned then that of Greece's allies

low. The British and American believed

embassies that the international and
remained

domestic situation in Greece called for a 'strong government'. However, they

'overriding' the Field Marshal. They

consideredthat there were still argumentsagainst

feared that his entry into politics would foreshadow the creation of a dictatorship.

Peurifoy announced that Papagos' entry into politics should not be encouraged.

According to Norton Papagosmight be 'acceptable' only if he headed a broad and

4
moderatecoalition and formed a 'right of centre' party.

On 28 May 1951, Papagossubmittedh is r esignationfrom t he p osition oft he

Commander-in-Chiefof the National Army. Two d ays;I ater, a fter a fruitless m eeting

with King Paul, the Field Marshal submittedhis formal resignationletter to Prime

Minister Venizelosciting 'ill health' ashis reasonfor dernittingoffice. King Paulwas

appointedCommander-in-Chiefin Papagos'place according to the protocol set out in

The Field Marshalhimself told Peurifoythat is

the constitutionfor suchemergencies.

the the the '

Palace. Papagos'resignation from the post
resignationwas result of rift with

of Commander-in-Chief,
however, was dictated by his personal ambitions. By resigning

2FRUS(1951): 5,445: Yost to the StateDepartment,4 January1951.

3 To Vima,22 February1951.
4PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/95116RIO 114/2,Norton to Noble, 31 January
1951; FRUS (1951): 5,470: Peurifoy to the StateDepartment,9 March 1951.
5FRUS(1951): 5,477: Peurifoy to the Department State,5 June 1951. This is also supportedby
of reason
somehistorians.According to this argumentPapagosaccusedPaul of trying to limit his army powersby
re-organisingthe GeneralStaff officers. Verernis,'The Military' in Featherston,Katsoudas(eds.),
Political Changein Greece,p. 218; Stefanidis,The United States,Great Britain and Greece,p. 172.This
wasnot the casethough,because,despitethe changeof officers, no policy was scheduledto limit the
Field Marshal'sauthorities.Papagoshad underhis control all three armed forces and the police up until
he resigned.On Papagosresignationseenext footnote.
 132

He that
from the Army, the road to enterpolitics was opened. eliminated accusations he

6
dictatorship.
was trying to createa military

The Greek governmentwas alarmedby this new development.The resignation

of the Field Marshal causeda variety of reactionsacrossthe Greek political world. No

one doubtedits importance,however. All political parts stressedthe appointmentof the

7
King as C-in-C and the effect of the subordination of the army to the government.

Venizelos askedPapagosto reconsiderhis decision. He was particularly fearful of the

responseof IDEA to the resignation. The Holy Bond of Greek Officers, Iep0q Awyk

(IDEA), was a powerful group of right-wing officers in the

E,Uývcov AýtcqpaTIK05V

armedforces.The organisationhad been createdin October 1944 as a result of the anny

in
mutiny the Middle 8
East.

In the early hours of 31 May 1951 high-rankingofficers and members oft he

Higher Military Committee met unofficially to discuss the issue of the resignation.

Many were prominent membersof IDEA. As a result of the meeting most major military

in
garrisons the A
countrywereput on alert. numberof military units movedinto the

city of Athens. The main routes into Athens were put under military control. Brigadier

Christeas'occupied' the General Staff building situated at the Old Palacein the centre

of 9
Athens. According to Lieutenant General Karayannis, an IDEA member, Papagos'

attemptsto
resignationwas seenas a reactionagainstthe Venizelos goverru-nent's

6 Linardatos,in a rather form, that Field Marshal's sudden in the

exaggerated suggests resignationwas
hopeof catchingby surprisethe Greekpoliticians and consolidatinghis strength.Linardatos,From Civil
War-A7rorovEy(pQo, p. 227. On the contrary,Papagiannopouloswrites that Papagoshad madeclear to
the public his entry to politics in order to 'bring the real changethe Nation's needs' and so the government
waspreparedfor Papagos'resignation.In Papagiannopoulos, Field Marshal A.Pqpagos-ETpaT6PxjC
AWavbpo,; 17a7rdyo,;, pp. 443-444. Stefanidiswrites that the reasonwas over the control of the armed
forces.Stefanidis,The United States,Great Britain and Greece,p. 177. Veremis notesthat Papagos
resigned'following a disagreementwith the royal court' due to King's interferencein army affairs. Th.
Veremis,'The Military', in K. Featherstone,D. Katsoudas(eds.), Political Changein Greece (London,
1987),p. 218. Haralampeswrites that the disagreementof the Palaceand Papagosover army command
broughtPapagos'resignation.Haralampes,Army and Power-E=T6,;Kai 17011TIK4 Eýovala, pp. 3941.
This argument,however,doesnot explain Papagos'entry into politics later on in August.
7PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/95143RI 1951/1, Norton Foreign Office, 31 May
to
1951. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95143RI 195/5,News Review, I June 1951.
' Grigoropoulos,From the Top the Hill-Aro
of Tjv KopWP4TOvA6Vov, pp. 446-448.
 133

reduce the anny's powers. This triggered a coup to secure the independenceof the

army.10The plotters establishedthemselvesin the Ministry of Defence (located in the

Parliament building). In the confusion that followed Papagos' resignation it was the

in for "
IDEA organisationthat was able to act most quickly speaking the army. Within

hours, however, the Chief of the GeneralStaff, Lt. Gen. Grigoropoulos, askedfrom the

to to
putschists return order. The rebelsmade clear that they would only obey the Field

Marshal's orders. Grigoropoulos asked for Papagos' intervention. The Field Marshal

visited the Ministry of Defence and askedthe officers there to return to their normal

duties. By noon of 31 May 1951 order had been restoredin Athens, after the putschists

had been reassuredby Papagosthat there would be no sanctions against them. The

Prime Minister and Minister of DefenceVenizelos attributed the settlementof the coup

to Papagos' decisive intervention. 12

The existing literature on the coup of 31 May has gaps despite the credible but

biasedaccountsof the officials involved in the incident. There is no clear evidenceas to

the
who organised coup,why andwhen.Accordingto the official findingsof Zozonakis,

the Counsellorof the Military Defence,who carried out an investigationin January

1952,the plotters were mobilised by IDEA. It is not clear at what stagePapagoshimself

becameawareof the initiative of theplotters.However,no matterwhat the extentof his

supportmight have been, the truth is that the coup endedonly after the Field Marshal's

intervention. His willingness to stand down his admirers suggeststhat he was not

aimingat military dictatorship.Ratherhe was confidentthat he could obtainpowerby

9 Linardatos, From Civil War- Aro

Tov EyVUio, p. 229.
10On the
military coup there is a detailed account in Karayiannis, The Greek Drama- To.Jp6'Ua'rqc
E,Ud&oc (Athens, 1964), p. 265.
11It has been
estimated that in winter 1945-1946 seventy-five per cent of the army officers were IDEA
members. Karayannis, The Greek Drama-ToJp6pa TqcERMoc, pp. 210-211.
12After the
end of the rebellion Lt. Gen. Grigoropoulos was appointed C-in-C of the General Staff
National Defence (rEEE)A), Tsakalotos Chief of the Greek General Staff, Kitrilakis General Inspector
of
the Army. Grigoropoulos, From the Top of the Hill-Ax6 T?jv Kqpv(p4
rov A6(pov, pp. 451-3; Lieutenant-
General and member of IDEA- Karayannis, The Greek Drama-Todp6ya
rqc EU6c&o,;,pp. 266-267.
 134

13He was evenwilling to acquiesceto moves that the govermnenttook

political means.

against the plotters. The Field Marshal had asked Venizelos not to impose sanctions

against the insurgents as he himself had promised them. He even proposed that the

events should be described as an alarm drill. Venizelos, however, expressed his

government's intention to gradually remove the most important of the IDEA officers

from key positions. LieutenantGeneralGrigoropoulosput the participants of the putsch

under detention and ordered a preliminary examination, while the ringleaders of the

coup were placedunder house 14

arrest.

Papagos'resignation and the ensuing events of 31 May came as a blow to the

British andAmericans.Norton and the British embassybelieved that the deteriorationin

the relations betweenKing Paul and Papagoswas a seriouscausefor alarm. Insteadof

acting as guarantors of Greece against Communism, their personal ambition was

pressingthem forward into the front-line of politics thus removing the safety net that

had underlain the unpredictable political situation. Norton believed that the most

importantact was to try to reconcilethe Palace,the Field Marshaland the Venizelos

15
government. The American Ambassadoragreedwith his British colleague. Peurifoy

reportedthat the resignation of the Field Marshal was a great blow to Greeceat time

when some formal security arrangementsfor the country with NATO were being

13Basedon the available

sourcesit is not clear whetherPapagosdirected the coup or if so the extentof his
influence.He might have causedit as a direct attemptto demonstratehis power to the public, militia and
governmentor as an indirect way to underlinehis power without being accusedof having plannedit. Lt.
Gen.Grigoropoulos,Chief of GeneralStaff, writes in his memoirsthat the Field Marshal knew in advance
the intentionsof the plotters. For an accountof the coup, seeGrigoropoulos,From the Topof the Hill-
Aro TqvKopvýp4TovA6ýpov,pp. 445-64,468-72. Veremis supportsthat IDEA membersdid not only want
to supportPapagosbut attemptedto overthrowthe governmentafter the Field Marshal resignedas
Commanderin Chief. Veremis, 'The Military', in Featherstone,Katsoudas(eds.), Political Changein
Greece,p.218. A hard-coreright-wing versionclaims that Papagoshad no relation in any way with IDEA,
which had anywaydissolveditself after the end of the civil war. In Papagiannopoulos,Field Marshal A
Pqpagos-ETpaT6pXj; AMýav6poq17a7r6yo;, p. 448.
14FRUS(1951): 5,475-6: Yost to the Department State,I June 1951; Brigadiers Kontopoulos,
of
Christeas,Tavoularis,Colonel Papadopoulos,Anagnostopouloswere amongthosewho had been
demobilised.Linardatos,From Civil War-A7roTovEyVQo, p. 238; Grigoropoulos,From the Top of the
Hill- A;ro T?
jv Kopv94 rov A6Vov,pp. 460-1; FRUS (1951): 5,48 1: Peurifoy to the Departmentof State,
II June1951.
 135

discussed.GeneralJenkinsand Peurifoy believedthat Papagos'resignation involved the

forces 16
morale and efficiency of armed and hencethe security of Greeceand the West.

The British agreed.17Upon his return to Greeceon 2 June 1951 Peurifoy undertook a

sustainedeffort to mend fences.In a discussionbetweenhimself, the Prime Minister, the

King, and Papagos, the American Ambassador proposed to them to bury past grievances

and try to bring the Field Marshal back to his post. From the allies' point of view, the

Field Marshal as Commander-in-Chiefwould guaranteethe military stability required

for Greece's entry into NATO. 18 Regardlessof Ambassadors' negative responses,

however,P apagoswas determinedto stay away from his military duties. There is no

evidencethat the British and the Americans had any direct influence on the events of

May 1951.19The Field Marshal was content to have demonstratedhis power whilst

Venizelosbelieved that he had skilfully outmanoeuvredIDEA.

In the aftermathof the coup the next bone of political contention was the system

that would govern the elections. The fon-naldiscussionsabout the electoral law lasted

from 10 to 26 July 1951.VenizelosandPlastiraswerein favour of a kind of modified

whichwould favourthe two or threepartiesheadingthe list.

proportionalrepresentation,

Both Plastiras and Venizelos expectedt hat s uch as ystem w ould b enefit t heir p arties

whilst opening up reasonableprospectsfor creating working majorities in Parliament.

Tsaldarisadvocatedthe introductionof the majority systemas a meansof achievinga

stronggovernment.Papandreou,on the other hand, wished to seethe existing systemof

15PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/95143RI

1951/1, Norton to Foreign Office, 31
May 1951.
16FRUS(1951):5,4 82: Peurifoy
to the Departmentof State,II June 1951.
17PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO
371/95143RI 195n, Norton to Morrison, 7 June 1951.
18FRUS(1951): 5,482-483: Peurifoy
to the Departmentof State, II June 1951.
19PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),
FO 371/95143RI 195/8,Norton to Morrison, 20 June
1951.
 136

maintained.
simple proportional representation The systemfavoured his own small party

increased that he be included in 20

and the probability would any coalition cabinet.

Knowing that the electoral systemproposedby Venizelos and Plastiras would

his
weaken party Papandreou
tried to its He
scupper chances. decided to resign from the

cabinetwith immediate effect. Papandreou

calculatedthat his resignation would trigger

immediate the 21
old system. In order to cover his tracks he
an election under

manufactureda dispute with the Americans o ver t he p rice ofw heat a nd t he s cale of

to
governmentsubsidies wheatproducers.On I July 1951, Papandreouand the ministers

politically close to him such as Lagakos, Minister of Justice, Makkas, Minister of

Industry, Yiannopoulos, Minister of Transportation, Labropoulos, Minister of

Agriculture as well as their junior ministers handed in their resignations. The

governmentwas left with insufficient parliamentarysupport and collapsed. On 28 July,

Venizelos was forced to offer his resignation as well. 22

The King, however, objected to the prospect of early elections. He was still

aversetot he i dea ofa ccepting P lastirasb ack i nto p ower. Hea Iso w antedtop revent

Papagosfrom enteringpolitics. He graspedthe opportunity of Papandreou'sresignation,

therefore,to form anotherstop-gapcabinet.He askedVenizelos to form a broader

coalition and thus forestall rushedelections.Venizelosagreedto take over until the

plannedelections.Venizelospromisedthathe would safeguardthe rights andpowersof

the Crown in the coming revision of the constitution. He was able to form such a

governmentbecauseTsouderoswas willing to betray his ally Plastiras. The Populist

20PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/95117RIO 114/14,Norton to Morrison, 9 May

1951;FRUS(1951): 5,473: Yost to Departmentof State,12 May 1951.Modified proportional
representationwould grant to threepartiesreceiving largestpopular vote all parliamentaryseatsnot
allottedin first distribution.
21PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/95117RIO 114/16,Norton to the Foreign Office, 4
July 1951; FRUS (1951): 5,473: Yost to the Departmentof State, 17 May 1951; FRUS (1951):5,48 1-
483:Peurifoy to Departmentof State,II June1951; A. Raikou, Lectureson Constitutional Law-
1TqpaJd5aciq EvvraypaTIK06 A walov, vol. 5 (Athens, 1978),pp. 148-158.
22Linardatos,From Civil War-A7ro Ep(p6Aio, 253.
Tov p.
 137

23
Liberals. TsouderosbecameDeputy
Unity Party (LEK) left EPEK andwent over to the

Premier and Minister of Co-ordination of the Venizelos' caretaker government on 3

AuguSt. 24

On 27 Ju ly 195 1, t he G P i t he lectoral
n ew e, I aw t hat
reek arliament ntroduced

would create a system of modified proportional representation. Its main stipulation was

a threshold of votes that would allow a party to take part in Parliament. Under the new

law a party would need seventeenper cent and a coalition of parties twenty in order to

participate in Parliament. Smaller parties would have to be wound up to combine

25
togetherin bigger organisationsin order to survive.

On 3 August, the King signed the decree dissolving the Parliament and

proclaiming the elections.Three days later Papagosofficially announcedthe creation of

he to
his party: The GreekRally. Its aim, claimed,was provide the country with 'the real

changethe Nation needs'. He advocatedboth 'change' and 'stability', catchwordsthat

in the 26 Papagos decreed that the

would prove effective party's electoral campaign.

It
GreekRally would acceptpoliticians of all persuasions. would only do so, however, if

they agreedto serveunder his He

banner. to both
wanted attract and accommodate

conservativeand liberal in
adherents a right-wing party. The Rally was avowedly hostile

to co-operationwith other parties.

23In July EPEK split. On 13 July EnimanouelTsouderosand his friends and MPs St. Merkouris, K.
Maris, G. Tsouderos,amongothers,left the party. The official excusegiven by Tsouderosfor the
resignationfrom the party was the disagreementwith N. Plastirasover the organisationof the party and
particularlythe combinationsin the electoraldistricts. Plastirasattributed Tsouderos'resignationto his
own 'hidden ambitions'. Linardatos,From Civil War-A7rorov Epýpblio,p. 258. In fact, Tsouderosshifted
to the conservativeparty eventuallyto takepart to the government.
24PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/95117RIO 114/16,Norton to the Foreign Office, 4
July 1951; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95117RIO1 14/21, Norton to Foreign
Office, 3 August 1951; FRUS (1951): 5,489-490: Peurifoy to Departmentof State,28 July 1951. Dafnis,
TheGreekPolitical Parties-TaEUjviK6cHoArrmi K6,qpara, pp. 486488.
25History
ofthe Greek Nation4aropla Tov EUlviKob EOvovc, vol. 16, pp. 176-177; Nikolakopoulos,
Parties and Parliamentary Elections-K6pyaTa Kai B0V)XVT1Ktq,
pp. 149-19 1.
26PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/95117RIO 114/21, Norton to Foreign Office, 3
August 1951;FRUS (1951): 5,490491: Peurifoy to Departmentof State,31 July 1951.
 138

Papagos'candidaturecaused,as might be furore. 27 The King was

expected,a

outraged and threatenedto 'take steps' against the Field Marshal. According to an

by
accountgiven the Chief of the Greek GeneralStaff, Tsakalotos,King Paul askedhim

to arrestPapagos.The Palacemaintainedthat accordingto military law any officer who

resigned remained an army official for six months thereafter. Papagos was thus

committing a breach of military discipline by defying his commander-in-chief.Papagos

was debarredfrom politics unless he had the explicit consent of the King. King Paul

believed he had the right to arrestthe Field Marshal if Papagosdefied him. Tsakalotos,

however, had no intention of moving againstPapagos.Tsakalotos refused to obey the

King's order on the grounds that it was an extreme and unwarranted act. Paul's

in
impotencemerely servedto reinforce Papagos'power theArmy. 28

The Populist leader, Tsaldaris, perceivedPapagosas a formidable threat to the

political existenceof his conservativeparty. He describedPapagos'entry into politics as

an 'intrigue'. Papagos'purpose,Tsaldaris charged,was the disorientation of the Greeks.

He w asp avingt he p athtoam ilitary d ictatorship.T saldarisw asr ight to be worried,

Papagos far from 29

dictatorship. The Populists had failed to
although was preparing a

win a workable majority at the last two elections. The emergenceof Papagosinto

politicsofferedthe hopeof new impetusfor the Right. Many Populists by

wereattracted

the prospectof a strong charismaticleaderwhose appealstretchedbeyond their existing

The
constituency. samecalculationswere made further to the left. LEK dissolved itself

27The Greekhistorian S. Linardatos

writes that Papagos'entry into politics had fallen 'as a bomb', that
manyhadbeencaughtby surpriseand alsothat it had beena 'shock' to the King. Linardatos,From Civil
War-A= rov EpV6Aio,pp. 262-263;Stefanidis,The United States,Great Britain and Greece,p. 187.
However,Papagossearnsto havebeenpreparingthe ground for his entry into politics graduallysince
1950.Firstly with his careful plan to presenthimself as an independentand self-sufficientpolitician and
eventuallywith his resignationin May 1951from the Army. J. P. Carey,A. G. Carey give an over-
idealisedversionof Papagossupportingthat his entry into politics cameas a result of 'his nationalpride,
with the main aim to give an end to instability. In J. P. Carey,A. G Carey, The WebofModern Greek
Politics (New York, 1968),p. 149.
2' History the GreekNation-IcTopia
of TovEAA? IviKo6EOvovq,vol. 16, p. 177; Linardatos,From Civil
War-A7rorovEpýpbAto, pp. 263-265.
 139

as party andjoined banner.

Papagos Papandreou
too rapidly found himself in difficulties

his followers seemed to be preparing to join Papagos' bandwagon. The left

as some of

of Centre pressjoined with their enemy Tsaldaris and embarked upon a campaign to

prove that Papagos'ultimate aim was to impose a dictatorship. Papagosfrightened and

galvanisedthe hard Left aswell.

Simultaneously,the Left was given a new boost. A new left-wing formation

appearedon 3 August 1951: the United Democratic Left (EDA). It was originated by

former EAM members,membersof the outlawed KKE and minor left-wing parties.Led

30
by loannis Pasalidis EDA was intended to be the Rally of the Left. This polarised

schemeof the Greek Rally and EDA reflected the impact of the Cold War in Greece.It

alsoproved the polarised characterof the forthcoming election. The only leader who

was confident enoughto believe that he would not be entirely occluded by Papagos
was
31
Plastiras.He publicly welcomedthe Field Marshal's candidature.

As ever British diplomats feared for the stability of the Greek political system.

AccordinglyNorton's first priority w asto preventopen conflict braking out b etween

Papagos and King Paul. Along with his American colleague, Peurifoy, Norton

persuadedKing Paul to relinquish the office of Commander-in-Chief. Lieutenant

GeneralGrigoropouloswasraisedto the office in his stead.The King, however,would

not leave the matter alone. He believed that Papagoswas potentially a threat to the

29Conservativenewspapers 31 July 1951, in Linardatos,From Civil War- Ano

on TovEp(pQo, p. 266;
Papagiannopoulos,
Field Marshal A. Pqpagos-ETpaT6PXr7qAM&v6poq 17a7r6cyoq, p. 4 84.
30Linardatos, From Civil War- A7ro
rov EpVblio, pp. 270-27 1; History of the Greek Nation-loTopid Tov
E,U)7VIK06EOvovq,vol. 16, p. 178; Nikolakopoulos, Parties and Parliamentary Elections-K6pp= Kai
BoV1CVT1K9S, P. 179. EDA was a coalition of the Left and the only communist voice in the political scene
until 1956. It represented a coherent effort of the Left to give itself a new blow, similar to the right-wing
parties. After failing to co-operate with General Plastiras, EDA took a hard-core stance and incorporated
in its list a number of deportees and imprisoned KKE members.
31PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/95117RIO 114/21,Norton
to the Foreign Office, 3
August 1951; FRUS (1951): 5,490-491: Peurifoy to the StateDepartment,31 July 1951.
 140
32
monarchy itself becauseof his relationship with the Army. On 4 August 1951, King

Paul respondedto this threat. He orderedthe Chief of the General Staff, Tsakalotos,to

sound out army commandersabout the desirability of the armed forces being permitted

to vote in the forthcoming elections.The issuewas of greatimportancesince in the 1950

elections the military had represented more than ten per cent of the electorate. King Paul

was afraid that the great majority of the army officers led by IDEA would vote for

Papagos.Tsakalotosconcededthat Papagos'entry into politics was 'a grave test' for the

armed forces. He was particularly concernedabout 'the deleterious influence of IDEA'

and warned that the organisation 'should not be underrated'. Tsakalotos admitted that

officers would not hesitateto guide their men towards voting in Papagos' favour. Once

again, however, Tsakalotosdefied the King's wishes. He refused to exclude the Army

from voting in the forthcoming elections. He feared that such a move would merely

precipitateanotherIDEA 'reaction'.33

Once again the allies backed Tsakolotos in his attempts to prevent the King

stirring up the Anny. Norton told King Paul to practice restraint. Peurifoy was even

more active on this issue. The American Ambassador obtained an assurancefrom

Venizelos that the soldiers would be allowed to vote. Peurifoy asked GeneralFrederick

(Head of JUSMAG) to ensurethat all legal stepswere taken to permit the soldiers to

exerciset eir ght to vote. He went on to tell the King to stop interferingwith the
34
electoral campaign. On the other hand Peurifoy visited Papagos and urged him to

avoid any action that might make the King's position 'difficult' in casehe was elected.35

32PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95118R10114/39,Norton

to Morrison, 5
September1951; Nikolakopoulos,Parties and Parliamentary Elections-K6,
uyara Kai Bovlcmwtc, p. 178;
Karayiannis,TheGreekDrama-Tojp6pa TICE.Wboc, pp. 262-264.
33Linardatos,From Civil War-A7ro EyqQo,
Tov pp. 280-281.
34PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/95118/10114/36,
Norton to Foreign Office, 29
August 1951.
35FRUS(1951): 5,501-506: Peurifoy
to the Chief of the JUSMAG G (Frederick), 22 August 1951. The
leftist historianssuggestthat Papagosformeda semi-dictatorship
supportedby the United States.In N.
Psyroukis,History of ContemporaryGreece-Iaropla
TqCNc6TcpqqE.U66aq 1940-1967,vol. 2, (Athens,
1975),pp. 50-55.Giannoulopoulossuggestsa more balanced
account:that the Americanssupported
 141

These Anglo-American manoeuvresavoided the prospect of the King and the Field

Marshal fighting for the soul of the Ariny in the event of Papagos' election. 36

Although the attemptsto head off a Paul-Papagosclash by restraining the King

suggestthat the Western powers favoured Papagosthis was not entirely the case.The

British were reluctant to support Papagos. Sir Clifford Norton felt uneasy about the

connectionsofP apagos' entouragewith IDEA. He felt even uneasier about Papagos'

support for Enosis. The combination of Papagos' influence over the military and his

revanchistgoals concerningCyprus threatenedto shift the axis of Greek foreign policy.

The pro-Western aspect of the military might be replaced by its anti-British aspect.

Anglo-Greek conflict would 'neutralise' t he v alue ofG reeceasap rospectiveN ATO

ally. Peurifoy sharedNorton's reservationsabout Papagos.

Not only did he warn of the

consequences of a Palace-Amy split he also feared the polarisation of Greek politics

into two camps: one led by Papagos the other by Plastiras. Although the American

Ambassadorconcededthat Papagos' initiative might form a possible answer to the

problem of political instability, he expressedconcern about the 'artificial and probably

temporary crystallisation of political forces' which might create a 'meaningless'

37
reconstructionof the traditional conservativeparty. Papagos'connection to IDEA was

a furthercomplicationin his mind.Both the British andAmericanembassies

fearedthat

the Field Marshal's entry into politics might lead to the establishment of a military

regime.Neither, however, planned any seriousintervention in Greek politics except for

emollient and ameliorative measuressuch as the changein Commanderin Chief. This

in
was, part, an admission of impotence. Diplomats recognised that Papagoswas a

popular figure. Any attempt to stranglehis movement at birth was likely to provoke a

Papagosbecausehe could provide strongpolitical governmentbackedby the army. Giannoulopoulos,

Post War World-OMeTa;ro2,cuiK6qK6apoq,p. 289.
36ThusKing Paul failed to
strengthenhis power in 17EEGA,which was headedby the Gin-C.
37PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95117
RIO 114/24,Norton to Mason, I August
1951; FRUS (1951): 5,492493: Peurifoy to the Department State, I August 1951.
of
 142

dangerousbacklash. Furthermore British and American officials in Greece admired

Papagos as an energetic and competent figure. He was neither weak enough nor

dangerousenoughto move against.38

Indeed the new electoral law transformed the Greek political scene in the

elections held on 9 September 1951. As a result of the modified proportional

representationonly nine parties contestedthe election. The main contestantswere The

Greek Rally headedby Papagos,the Populistsheadedby Tsaldaris, the Liberals headed

by Venizelos, National ProgressiveCentre Union (EPEK) headedby Plastiras and the

United Democratic Left (EDA) headedby Pasalidis. The poll was declared seventeen

dayslater. It returnedthe GreekRally asthe strongestparty. The Rally did not, however,

gain an absoluteparliamentarymajority. The Rally received 36.53 per cent of the vote

and 114 seats out of 258. EPEK came second with 23.49 per cent and 74 seats.

Venizelospolled 19.04per cent and secured57 seats,EDA received 10.57 per cent and

elected ten deputies. Tsaldaris managed only 6.66 per cent and two deputies.

Papandreou'sparty failed to crossthe thresholdand neither he nor any of his supporters

were re-elected.The borderlandpolling districts and the military polling stationsin

particular favoured the Field Marshal. Papagosreceived 53.43 per cent of the army

39
votes. The modifiedproportionalrepresentation
systemas well as the creationof the

new bipolar systemof the Right and the Left had obviously favoured the big parties.The

electionsof 9 September1951 were a landmark for the future political developmentof

Greece.The political alliances that had been formed dominated Greek for the
politics

38FRUS(1951): 5,491: Peurifoy

to the Departmentof State,31 July 1951.
39FRUS(1951): 5,508: Peurifoy
to the Departmentof State,15 September1951; Meynauld, The
Political Powersin Greece-Oi17oAmKtqdvv6#ciq
oTqvEUd&a, p. 92; Nikolakopoulos, Parties and
ParliamentaryElections-K6, upara Kai BoOzmwts, pp. 422-423. Clogg, Parties and Elections,p. 27. The
PopulistParty,which was all-powerful during the civil
war, althoughit had lost its strength,reducedthe
strengthof the GreekRally. In this light, one canjustify thosewho believed that Papagos'entry into
politics was 'premature'. To Vima,the Centrenewspapernoted that the electionsafter would be Papagos'
success,whereastheseoneswere 'untimely'. To Vima, I August 1951. Nevertheless,Papagos
neededtime
to establishhimself on the political sceneand in this light his
entry into politics in 1951offered him the
time to win the absolutemajority in the electionsof November 1952.
 143

following two decades.Moreover, the electionsshowedthat, contrary to the usualbelief

that the King headedthe Right, the majority of the conservativesvoted againstthe will

of the Crown.

Yet despitethis momentousre-alignmentthere was a limit to change.As before

it was impossible to forin a single-party government. Papagos' key goal had not been

achieved.Indeed although the emergenceof his Rally as the single largest in

party this

its first election was a major achievementthe results demonstratedthat there were limits

to the Field Marshal's appeal. In fact the parties of the Centre had won an overall

majority. Their problem was that these seatswere still divided between two separate

fonnations: EPEK and the Liberals. As a result there was a serious possibility that

politics would return to 'business as usual'. Indeed King Paul proposed a tripartite

coalitioncomposedof the threemajor parties.Norton and Peurifoy,perhapsrelieved

that Papagoshad not achieved an unalloyed triumph, also favoured the three party

in 40
solution order to createa 'strong andbroadly acceptablegovernment'.

Papagos,however, in a typically uncompromising stand, excluded any

possibility of taking part in a coalition cabinet. Insteadhe called for the formation of a

caretakergovernmentandthe proclamationof new electionsunderthe majority system.

Naturally, King Paul and the Palace strongly opposed this prospect.41 Instead, on 29

September1951, Plastirasand Venizelos formed a governmentenjoying a parliamentary

majority. Plastiras was Premier whilst Venizelos took on the posts of Deputy Prime

40PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95118RIO 114/43,Norton to Foreign Office, 19

September1951;FRUS (1951): 5,508-509: Peurifoy to the Departmentof State, 15 September1951.
41On the rift betweenPapagos the Palacethere
and are different views. Papagiannopouloswrites that,
despitethe well known and well provenpro-royalist Papagos'beliefs, the clashbetweenPapagosand the
Palaceoriginatedfrom the end of 1950whenthe former refusedto be appointedthe King's Premier.
Papagiannopoulos, Field Marshal A. Papagos-Zrpar6pX? 1cAAt&v&poq I7a7rdyoq,pp. 469470. There is
alsothe view that the relationshipof Papagosand the Palacedeterioratedbecauseof disagreements with
King Paul over the powersof the Army, which accordingto the King could 'awake' EthnikosDichasmos
(NationalSchism)and this in turn would challengeagainthe position of kingship in the caseof
as
EleftheriosVenizelosand King KonstantineI, father of King Paul, in 1920.Linardatos,From Civil War-
A2rorovEpýpbAio, pp. 296,299. Indeed,both casesarejustified. However, the uncompromisingcharacter
of Papagosand mainly his political ambitionshad brought the clashbetweenthe two men.
 144

Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The cabinet consisted of EPEK and Liberal

in the two 42
ministers proportion to the parliamentary strength of parties.

The Plastiras Government

The Plastiras government managed to remain in power for almost a year.

Although Plastirashad always been consideredto be a left-wing sympathiserpolitician

he turned out to be a typical Cold War pro-westemerprime minister. He followed an

anglophile foreign policy on the Cyprus issue. He confirmed the rights of the King by

the introduction of a new constitution. The eventualfall of his cabinet was the result of

the usual falling out between coalition partnersover issues of personality and power

rather than 'the contradictory policies towards the communists' as suggestedby some
43
historians.

An important issue for Plastiraspremiershipwas the constitution, which had not

been reformed since 1911. On 27 July 1951, at an ad hoc meeting at the Tatoi Palace

betweenall party leaders,exceptfor Papagosandthe Lefl, it had beenagreedthat the

new chamberwould vote for a new The

constitution. prime mover in maintainingthe

for
momentum constitutional reform was the King himself. Paul was still smarting from

his repeatedhumiliations during the rift betweenPapagosand the Palace.He was

desperateto consolidatehis status.44The role of the King and his authority to appoint

ministersanddissolve in 31
wereratified article of
governments the At
constitution. one

42pLMLIC RECOp OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95118 RIO 114/54, Norton Foreign Office, I
'D to
October1951; FRUS (1951): 5,511: Peurifoy to Departmentof State, 16 October 1951.
Papagiannopoulos arguesthat the King proposedthe formation of the tripartite coalition to undermine
Papagos'strength.Papagiannopoulos, Field Marshal Ale-xandrosPapagos-ZTpo: r6pXjqAAt&v6poC
17=6yoq,p. 445. From anotherperspective,Linardatosnotesthat King Paul aimed at sustainingthe
Liberalsin power as much aspossibleto pleasethe Liberals and put down any liberal claims for
republicanism.Linardatos,From Civil War-A7ro,TovEp(pbAio,p. 301. Both historians arepartly right.
Papagoshad strengthenedhis powersduring Plastiraspremiershipthrough the new electorallaw.
Similarly, the new constitutionunder Plastirascabinetwould favour the King's rights. Claims for
republicanism,however,were not a threatat that point for the King.
43History of the GreekNation4aropla
TovEU?IvIK06EOvovq,vol. 16, p. 180.
 145

stagePapagoshad threatenedto break the power of the Palace.Insteadthe result of the

election led to the confinnation ofr oyal p ower inG reek p olitics. T his w ast he m ost

important achievementfrom the point of view of the Palace.The new constitution was

also framed to appealto the Army. It prescribedinter alia: restrictions on the pressand

freedomof speechand that civilians shouldbe court-martialled if they acted 'againstthe

security of the armed forces'. The application of emergencylaws in the caseof a threat

to national security even without parliamentaryapproval was ratified. The constitution

bannedthe right of strike to civil servants.The constitution was a thoroughgoing Cold

War document. It reflected the balance of power thrown up by the September 1951

elections. There could be considerable dispute as to which political grouping had

emergedbest from this election. One thing was certain, however: the left was weak. All

other parties could agreeto measuresthat infringed civil liberties but helped guarantee

their own political 45

futures.

The strengtheningof the centre-right in Greek politics was entirely satisfactory

to Britain. The Cold War politics of Greece could be seen as a triumph for British

diplomacy.Theyhadmanagedto achievetheir objectivesandstayfriendlywith both the

Greeks and the Americans. Sir Charles Peake, Norton's successor as British

Ambassador, that
considered the allieswerestill 'on 46
closeandcordial terms'. It was

not just the embassythat provided a conduit for this cordiality. The British Military

Mission was still in operation training Greek forces. British diplomats and soldiers

attendedpolitical and military meetingsand took part in decision-making.

44PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/101799

R1017/5, Peaketo Eden,5 February1952;
History ofthe GreekNation4aropia TooEUqviKo6EOvovq, 16, p. 179.
45History the GreekNation-IoTopla F-UlviKob EOvovc-, vol.
of Too vol. 16, p. 179. For an accountof the new
constitutionsee,A. Svolos, Vie GreekConstitution-ToEaUqVIK6 Ebvrayua, vol. I (Athens, 1954),pp. 3-8.
SvolosandVlahos write that this new constitution'was
not new but just a deteriorationof the old ones'.
Linardatos,From Civil War-A 7rOTovEyýpQo, p. 362. That
constitution was applied until 1967,to be
renewedin 1975.
46PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),
FO 371/ 101899 R1017/3, Peaketo Harrison, 6 February
1952.
 146

Even the most difficult issuein Anglo-Greek relations - Cyprus had beenkept
-

off the boil. Archbishop Makarios' demandthat the question of self-determination for

Cyprus should be institutionalised by the Greek government taking the issue to the

United Nations alarmed the Foreign Office. William Strang, the Permanent Under-

Secretary,had made clear to'Venizelos and Leon Melas, the Greek Ambassador in

London, that 'there were no disposition on the p art ofH is M ajesty's G overnmentto

discussthe Greek 47 On 14 May 1951, Venizelos had met with Norton and
proposals'.

the British Ambassadorand had stressedto the Greek Prime Minister that 'there is no

Cyprus issue'. Five days later the Greek Prime Minister stated that the official Greek

position towards the Cyprus issuewas that 'the issue of Cyprus is always open' but 'the

does to to 48 Plastiras, in his

contemporarysituation not allow us proceed a solution' .

turn, continuedthe sameAnglophile foreign policy. In his pre-election programmethere

was no agendafor 49
Cyprus. On 22 November 1951, Averoff, the Under-Secretaryof

Foreign Affairs, cabled the Greek delegation to the United Nations led by George

Mavros instructing 50
them 'not to raise the Cyprus question'. The Foreign Office in

return recognised the efforts of the Greek government 'to minimise Enosis

51
propaganda'.

47PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 101793,Annual Report of 1951,24 January1952.
48To Vima,20 May 1951; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101793,Annual Report for
1951,24 January1952.
49PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/ 101793,Annual Report for 1951; On the
contrary,
Valinakis supportsthat the Cyprusissuewas one of the main pillars of Greek foreign policy, togetherwith
NATO and containmentof communism.G. G. Valinakis, Introduction to the GreekForeign Policy-
Eioraya)y4 oTqvEýU? jvzK4E&rcpwý 1`7olmK4(Thessaloniki,1989),p. 45.
50Linardatos,From Civil War-A7ro Ey(p6lio, 350. On 12 November 1951, Politis, the former
Tov p.
Minister of ForeignAffairs, the Archbishopof Athens,Spyridon,as well as the Greek delegation
indirectly brought the questionof Cyprusto the attentionof the UN GeneralAssemblyin a speechabout
the interpretationof Article 73 of the Charterand self-determinationrights. Simultaneouslypro-Enosis
studentdemonstrationswere organisedin AthensUniversity on 22 November. PUBLIC RECORD
OFFICE,KEW (PRO), FO 371/101793,Annual Report for 1951. All developmentsremainedsmall-scale
reactionseasilycontrolled by the governmentitself.
51PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/101807R.1051/2,D.F. Murray Minute, 14 May
1952.PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/951181110114/65,Peaketo Mason, 10
November1951; Linardatossuggeststhat the Americanswere in favour of the British deteriorationas a
powerandprefer to 'forward their statuson the ruins of the British Empire'. Linardatos,From Civil War-
Aro TovEp(p6Aio, p. 351. However,it seemsthat the Americansrelied on British supportstill at that time.
 147

The Plastiras government,however, faced serious practical drawbacks. On 10

March 1952,Plastirassuffereda stroke,which incapacitatedhim for many months. Four

days later TheodorosHavinis, the Minister of Public Works, resigned in protest against

American pressureon the issue of the renewal of the contract between the Greek state

and the American owned Athens Water Authority. At the same time, Kartalis, the

Minister of Co-operationand Sakellariou,Minister of Defence, also resignedin protest

A deputies
of the reactions at the continuing executions of communists. number of

from both EPEK and the Liberals: as a result the Plastiras governmentlost its
resigned

majority of the seatsin Parliament.Plastirasannouncedthat elections would take place

in September1952.52Once againthe Greekpolitical systemrevealedits fissile nature.A

potentially strong governmentof the Centre had been created.The hard Left had been

reduced to a negligible political force. The militaristic Right had been contained.

Political reform had reduced the number of parties to manageablenumbers. Yet the

leading politicians were simply unwilling to make the system operate. Instead of

its
recognising virtues their disagreements
on a myriad of issues destabilised it once

more.

As a result the electoral systemcameto the fore once again. The majority system

to
seemed be as the only solution. Since Greek politicians were unable to get along with

eachother only the enforceddominanceof one figure of party would provide the ballast

the system needed. The electoral law, however, divided the Greek leaders. General

Alternatively, Stefanidisbelievesthat the Americanspressedthe British to 'support' Greekleaders.In

Stefanidis,The United States,Great Britain and Greece,p. 207.
52FRUS(1952-54):5,271-272: Peurifoy to the Secretaryof State,25 February 1952;PUBLIC RECORD
OFFICE,KEW (PRO), FO 371/101794R1013/6,Peaketo Foreign Office, 12 March 1952;History of the
GreekNation-Idropla TovEUIVIK06 EOvovq,vol. 16, p. 180.At the sametime, anti-Communistmeasures
andexecutionsof communistshad causedstrongreactionsin Greeceand abroad.Telegramsfrom
politicians,clergy and commonpeople from acrossthe world had been sentto King Paul to cancelthe
executionsof eight communists.The casehadbecomeinternationally known. Picassohad drawn the
sketchof Belogiannis,one of the most famousconvicts.However, Cold War rhetoric prevailed.
Linardatossuggeststhat Minister of DefenceSakellariou hasbeen forced to resign in order to smooththe
upheavalof the executions.Linardatos,From Civil War-A7roTovEpýpQo, p. 395. This, up to a certain
 148

Plastiras,re-affirmed his preferencefor the majority system.Papagostoo favoured the

majority system. King Paul and Venizelos, however, favoured the re-introduction of the

simple proportional representationsystem,which would allow small parties the strength

to gain seatsin the Parliament.

The risk of anotherprolonged and destabilisingargumentalarmedthe allies. On

14 March 1952, Peurifoy warned that a return to simple proportional representation

would have 'disastrous effects' on the supply of American aid. He described the

initiative for the re-introduction of simple proportional representation as 'palace

intrigue' aiming at pen-nitting King Paul to rule through unstable coalitions. Peake

agreedwith his with

colleague'sexasperation the Greek political situation. According to

his own reportsto the Foreign Office he had sided with the American as 'for good or ill

the United States have

Government now committed to
themselves a definite andovert
53
interference in the internal affairs of the country'. The Americans supported the

majority system becausethe Centre experiments had failed to provide parliamentary

54
strongc abinets. In an undisguisedintervention in domestic politics Peurifoy openly
55
advocateda changein the electoralsystemto a simple majority one.

extent,broughtthe downfall of the government,but this downfall coupled with the instability of all
coalitionsdemonstratesthat the electoralsystemallowed the dissolution of the cabinets.
53PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/101799R1017/12,Peaketo Eden, 19 March 1952.
Linardatosbelievesthat the Palacetogetherwith the 'English' did not favour the majority systembecause
theypreferredcoalition cabinets,which offered them more spacefor intervention. Both the Palaceand the
British were afraid of Papagos'Premiershipand the total American 'guardianship' in Greece.Linardatos,
From Civil War-A7rorov EpqbAzo,p. 371. W. H. McNeill gives a more realistic accountand writes that
the Americanembassyand Missions continuedto pay for Greeceprovided the establishmentof 'stable
government',which the majority systemwould provide. In W. H. McNeill, TheMetamorphosisof Greece
since WWII(Oxford, 1978),p. 48. Orthodoxhistoriansof Greek history tend to believe that the Foreign
Office supporteda priori the Palaceand the Americanspreferredany right-wing formations.Markezinis,
Political History-HoAmK4Iaropia, pp. 295-300.This incident, however, is one of the casesthat
discreditedthesebeliefs.
54Clogg,A Short History
qfModern Greece,p. 167.
55J. CareyandA. Carey, The Web
qfModern GreekPolitics, p. 153.
 149

The Rally Wins the Election

for
Plastirastabled a proposal a new electoralsystem.On 12 September1952, it

gained the approval of Parliament by a narrow majority. The American intervention

decisive in
role creatingthis new system.Without this it
stick would have been
played a

unlikely that the necessaryvotes in favour of changecould have been found. It was

obvious to all that the majority systemwould favour Papagos

who had been the victor of

56Those Papagos lose out.57The biggest

the previous elections. not aligned with would

loser, of course,was the King. In September1951 he had been threatenedby political

impotence. Instead the Papagosthreat had been averted and a new constitution had

reiteratedhis position at the heart of political life. Now the Americans had forced the

Greekpolitical elite to reversethat decision.Paul wildly declaredthat he split the Rally

by appealingto royalists and rule through a new seriesof royal minority governments.

Peakequite understoodwhy Peurifoy had finally lost patienceand effectively committed

the United Statesto a Papagosgovernment.Yet becauseBritain had not had the power

to engineerthis crisis themselvesthey were at least able to wield a calming influence at

a time that anti-Americah sentimentran high. It was left to the British to remind the

King how unrealistic he was being.58

56PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/101800/1017/31, J. Galsworthy to ForeignOff"ice,

27 August 1952;History of the GreekNation4aropla rov E.UtIVIK06EOvovq,vol. 16, p. 181.
57The Americansupport Papagos the
of and majority electoralsystemin the electionsof November 1952
is a matterof controversyin Greekhistoriography.Linardatos,ftorn a rather 'conspiracy' point of view,
notesthat Plastirasvoted for the new systemsolely as a result of American 'blackmail' over reducing
Americanfinancial support.In Linardatos,From Civil War-A;ro TovEp(pQo, pp. 495-496.Valinakes
givesa more roundedaccountandjustifies the American 'intervention' in order to supportPapagosand
stabilitybetweengovernmentand army. In Valinakes,Introduction to the GreekForeign Policy-Ewaycoy4
oTqvEUqvixý E&rcpxý HoAnipý, p. 44. Giannoulopoulos,emphasisingthe domesticfactor, notesthat
the changeof the electoralsystemcameas a result of a Greekneedto form a strongparliamentary
majority. In Giannoulopoulos,Post-War World-0 M6Ta7r0ACU1K6q K6apog,p. 294. Papagiannopoulos, in a
totally pro-Papagosinterpretation,notesno relation betweenthe new electoral law and Papagos'
Premiership,which would have occurredregardlessthe system.Papagiannopoulos,Field Marshal A.
Papagos-Erpar6px? 1,;AMýavbpoql7a7rdyoq,pp. 480-484.This systemwould subsequentlyback a strong
single-partycabinet.
58PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/101800RIO 17/37,Peake Harrison, 2 September
to
1952;FO 371/101800RIO 17/40,Peaketo Strang,17 September1952.
 150

On the basis of a deal between the government and the Rally, the majority

finally into a new electoral law on 4 October 1952. The deal also
systemwas enacted

further for the Right. Voters would need to return to their home
promised advantages

in order to vote. The placewhere a man could vote was determinedby

town andvillages

the 1940 census rather than by the incomplete 1951 census. Voting based on this

traditional basis was easier for the anti-communist local police forces to monitor and

In theory to be to vote and to stand as candidates.In

control. women were allowed

however, few to 59The Army was, of course, encouraged

practice, were registered vote.

to vote.

On 10 0 ctober 1952, t he P lastirasg ovenunentr esignedtobes ucceededbya

caretakergovernmentheadedby the Public Prosecutorin the SupremeCourt of Justice

Dimitrios Kiousopoulos. Kiousopoulos proceeded to dissolve the Parliament and

60
proclaim electionsfor the 16 November 1952
.
Even more so than in September1951the appealof Papagos- now being made

under an electoralsystemfavourableto him - forced the other parties to reorganise

A
themselves. numberof prominent Centrepoliticians, including GeorgePapandreou

and Emmanouel had

Tsouderos, alreadyaligned themselveswith In
Papagos. an attempt

to withstandthe impact of the bandwagon

Papagos' the National Centre
Progressive

Union (EPEK) headedby Plastiras, the Liberals headed by Venizelos and the small

SocialistParty headedby Svolos decidedto enter the elections on a joint slate. This so-

called Union of the Parties also included a small number of left-wing personalities.The

59PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101803RIOI 14/4, Galsworthyto Barnes,8

October1952;Nikolopoulos, Parties and Parliamentary Elections-K6ppara Kai BovIEDTIKkpp. 194-
195.
60PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/101800R1017/42, Lambert to Southern
Department,'The Recordof the PlastirasGovernment',22 October 1952;History of the GreekNation-
IoToplarov EUIVIK06 EOvovq,vol. 16,p. 182.The Greekleft-wing historian Linardatos attributedthe fall
of Plastirasgovernmentto the American intervention.Linardatos,From Civil War- A;rOTovEUV6110, P.
414.The executionof the communists,Plastiras'bad health and the re-organisationof the political world
coupledwith the westernpreferenceto Papagos,also contributedto Plastiras' fall. The main drawback,
 151

two-fold. They wished to point to the

campaignstrategyof the centre-leftistworld was

during its in
year office. Even more, however, they tried to
government'sachievements

by Papagos' a front
whip up fearsof a 'white terror' arguingthat movement was merely

for right-wing authoritariansbackedby the Army. Yet, in truth, Plastiras had very little

to to the electorate. His attempts to extend leniency to former

with which appeal

been half-hearted. They had into his

communists had, of necessity, called question

in any real way the bitternessleft over from the civil war.
reliability without addressing

Neither had his much vauntedsocial reform programmesamountedto much. Legislation

land its to landless peasantshad been

allowing the expropriation of and redistribution
61
enactedbut no land transfershad yet takenplace.

The elections of 16 November 1952 returned the Rally with a majority of

in Greek electoral history. The Union of the Parties failed in

unprecedentedproportions

its last ditch attempt to deny Papagosa majority. Reaping the benefits of the maj ority

system Papagos' party won a crushing parliamentary majority. Out of the 300 seats

being contestedthe Rally won 247. This landslide was basedon winning 49.22 per cent

of the vote. Support for Papagos had increased by one-third over a year.

Notwithstanding this, however, the effects of the new system are clear. Papagoshad

received less than half of the total vote but over four-fifth of the seats.The obverseof

this was that the Union of the Parties securedonly 51 seatswith 34.22 per cent of the

votes. The vote for Union was less than that garnered by its individual partners the

previousyear. Yet an alliance commanding over one-third of the votes had been left

with less than one sixth of the seats.EDA polled 9.55 per cent of the vote but failed to

securethe election of any of its candidates.The Populist Party won only 1.05per cent of

however,was that the existenceof the governmentwasbasedon coalitions of the centrepowersand that
left the cabinetexposedto making andunmakingof alliances.Seealso f. 52.
61PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO/101803R10114/9, Peaketo Eden, 2 December1952;
Nikolakopoulos,Parties and Parliamentary Elections-K61.
ipara Kai BovAcvTiKtq, pp. 108-109.
 152

the votes and no seats.The Parliament was rounded out by two deputies from minor
62
parties.

The new electoral law had achieved its stated purpose. It had produced a

governmentwith clear parliamentarymajority. Papagos'

triumph paved the way towards

the formation of the first post-war stable, single-party, government. Papagos had

to f
managedto appeal all n on-communist orces.T he R ally w as i ndeedw orthy ofi ts

It to
name. was go on to enjoy eleven uninterrupted years of rule. Greek politics after

November 1952was quite different in

to that the post-war years. Papagoswould stay in

power until his death in 1955. Yet even the passingof the Rally's charismatic founder

did not dent its electoral prospects. Renamed the National Radical Union (ERE) it

Papagos' Konstantine 63
KaramanliS.
the
remained party of governmentunder successor,

Papagos' victory came about because of changes in Greek politics. The

communistsand their surrogateshad lost all but a hard core of support. The politicians

of the Right, Centre and soft Left had discreditedthemselvesby their behaviour during

and after the civil war. The King had been to

unable rally a royal party. Papagos,

however,wasa royalistwhateverhis disagreements

with Paul.At leastthe victory of the

Rally canbe saidto havesecuredrespectanda degreeof influencefor the Palace.The

62PUBLICRECORDOFFICE,KEW (PRO),FO/101800 R1017/49,Galsworthyto Bames,26 November

1952.
Nikolakopoulos,PartiesandParliamentaryElections-K6,
uparaKai Bov)xvTiKtq,
pp. 108-109;
Clogg,PartiesandElectionsin Greece,p. 31.
63The establishmentof the Rally's majority becamea matter of controversy. Papagiamopoulos,notes
that it wasthe result of Papagoshimself andhis strongadministrativecapacities.Papagiannopoulos, Field
Marshal A. Papagos-XTpaT6pvqq AU&v6poq Hardyoc, pp. 480-486; Left-wing historian Dafnis, writes
that Papagosbrought totalitarianismby supportingexclusivelythe new post-warbourgeois.Dafnis quoted
in Linardatos,From Civil War-A7roTovEyýp6Ato, p. 524. Another pro left-wing Greek historian
Linardatoswrites that Papagosenjoyedthe supportof the Americans,who brought him to power.
Linardatos,From Civil War-A7rOTOvEp(p0io, p. 524. Stefanidisalso supportsthat Papagoswas the result
of American'overt intervention'. In Stefanidis,The United States,Great Britain and Greece,p. 229.
Giannoulopoulossuggeststhat Papagossucceededbecausehe managedto changethe political sceneryof
the Right sincethe electionsof September1951. In Giannoulopoulos,Post-War World-0 Mera7ro)xu1K6q
K6apoq,p. 300. It hasbeensupportedthat the Rally's successlay in supportingthe agrarianpopulation.
History of the GreekNation-Io-ropidTovWqv=6 EOvovq,vol. 16, p. 183. In fact, one can not ignore
that the prominentcharacteristicof the majority systemis the security of strong governmentin termsof
parliamentarymajority and stablesingleparty formations.In this light, the caseof the Rally was the
typical consequence following the new law. The Rally's administrationfitted the allies' policy in that it
secureda strong,right-wing cabinetto governa four-yearterm and make Greecepart of the systemof
Westernsecurityand integratedmemberof NATO.
 153

one institution of state that had its

enhanced reputation was the Anny. It had provided

Papagos' springboard into power. It benefited greatly from his elevation. The IDEA

officers who had been demobilised as a result of the coup of 30 May 1951 were

reinstated in their offices. Some were appointed to key positions in the Greek

government.A. Natsinas, a prominent IDEA officer, for instance, becamethe head of

64
the newly createdGreek GovernmentInformation Service (KYP). The final piece in

the p olitical j igsaw, itis true, had been put in place by the United States.Peurifoy's

decisive intervention had undermined resistanceto the electoral law. Even under the

previous electoral law, however, the Rally would have emergedas overwhelmingly the

strongestparty. The new systemthat the Americans had insisted on neverthelesswas a

key elementin the system's enduring stability. This is a long way from saying that the

Rally was the creation or even the puppet of the western allies. After the elections Sir

CharlesPeakewrote that he andPeurifoywere 'delighted'by the result.Yet both they

had attemptedto usetheir influenceto obviatethe needfor the

andtheir predecessors

Papagossolution. Their preferredsolution had been always been a stable coalition

goverranentof the Centre. But the Centre would not hold; things repeatedly fell apart.

The Anglo-American influence on Papagos'victory was of decisive importance. They

hadmerelymadeit clearthat theywould no longerhelp eitherpoliticiansor the Palace

in their attemptsto thwart the clear will of the Greek people. Eventually, it was the new

electorallaw, which madethe allies' expectationstrue.

"History
ofthe Greek Nation-IoTopid Tov WIIVIK06 EOvovq, vol. 16, p. 184; Th. Veremis, ' The
Military', Featherston, Katsoudas (eds), Political Change in Greece,
pp. 218-219.
 154

VI Greece's Accession to NATO: 1952

Greeceand NATO's Southern Flank

One result of the Korean War was that measuresto secure Europe and the

Middle East against Communism became even more important to the westernallies.

According to a NSC paper dated 6 February 1951 Greececonstituted 'a symbol of the

ability of the United States to effectively assist nations threatened with communist

domination'.' George McGhee, Assistant Secretaryof State for the Near East, South

Asia and Africa wrote to Acheson that if the West was to make wartime use of the

Middle East oil, bases and manpower, further political and military action was

2
required. In thoughts
consequence, turned to in
ways which both Greece and Turkey,

with whom it had beentwinnedin suchdeliberations

sincethe Trumandoctrine,
might
3 In the American conception Greececonstituted the linchpin between
be strengthened.

Europe and the Middle East. These two areas the Americans regarded as being

1FRUS(1951): 5,451-461: NSC 103, 'The Position the US

of with Respectto Greece', 6 February 1951;
Documentsof the NSC 1947-1977,NSC 103, 'The Position of the US with Respectto Greece',6
February1951, Reel 3, Frame0055. This also coupledwith the American Foreign policy for raising
military expendituresby January1950andNSC 68 later on in September.In December1950as a result of
the KoreanWar, the rearmamentefforts and the US reinforcementsto Europe,D. Eisenhowerwas
appointedas the first SupremeAllied CommanderEurope(SACEUR). On 2 April 1951 Supreme
HeadquartersAllied PowersEurope(SHAPE) was createdin Paris,under Eisenhowerwithin the context
of the employmentof Americantroops in Europe.
2McGhee,The US-Turkish-NATO, 79. McGhee
p. was American AssistantSecretaryof Statefor the Near
East,SouthAsia andAfrica since8 June 1949and AmericanAmbassadorto Turkey and Chief of the
United StatesAim Mission (T) from December1951to 19 June 1953.
' Accordingto
somehistoriansTurkey wasthe key issuein bringing the Americanscloserto the south-
easternMediterraneanarea.McGheesuggeststhat the Americanswantedto expandAmerican control to
the Straits.McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection,pp. 74-76; M. P. Leffler, 'Strategy,
Diplomacyand the Cold War: the United States,Turkey and NATO, 1945-1952',Journal ofAmerican
History, vol. 7 1, no 4 (1985), 823. Leffler emphasises the American interestin including Turkey and
Greeceinto NATO as a result of the rise of nationalismin the Middle East and Turkey's fear of neutrality
in caseof generalSoviet attack.Leffler, A Preponderance,p. 425. Couloumbisattributesthe inclusion
into NATO to the rapid American global ascendancy.Coulournbis,GreekPolitical Reactionto Americans
and NATO,p. 19. Kuniholm.estimatesthat the invitation to Turkey and Greeceto join NATO wasnot the
effectof the KoreanWar, but the strugglefor power in the Near Eastpolicies againstSoviet ventures,as
outlinedby 1946.Kunihohn, TheOrigins of the Cold War in the Near East, p. 425. Nevertheless,despite
the fear of Turkish neutrality, the actualtreaty of Turkish and Greek admissioninto NATO was vagueon
thatpoint. So the useof Turkey's land andmanpowerseemedto be more realistic motivation.
 155

interdependentin both peacetimeand war.4 Greek governmentshad long wanted Greece

to become fully-fledged member of NATO. The prime objective of the Greek

governments' foreign policy had always been the securing of western military

In
assistance. spring 1951, the Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos, made a petition for

extending Greece's role to a full NATO member. The reason for this call was the

protection of Greeceagainst a probable Soviet attack. The experienceof the civil war

the the Cold War had the threat 5

danger. In
and escalationof made communist a vivid

1951 their requestsbegan to be taken seriously. Neverthelessthe internal politics of

NATO meantthat the road to Greekmembershipwas not entirely straightforward.

In February 1951 the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff began lobbying for

enhancedGreek military strength. They suggestedthat the manpower ceiling for the

Greek armed forces should be raisedby one-third to 164,000men. These increasesand

for
more generalsupport the Greek army would be financed by increasedAmerican aid.6

On 8 March 1951, Admiral Carney,the Commander-in-Chiefof Allied Forces in

SouthernEurope,suggested
that all the countriesof the NorthernMediterranean
should

be consideredas parts of the SupremeAllied CommanderEurope's right flank. Dwight

Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) also favoured the

of his EuropeanCommand.As a result, on 30A pril 1951, T rumanand

enlargement

Achesonagreedthat the accession

of GreeceandTurkeyinto NATO shouldbecomethe

policy of the
openly-expressed American 7
administration.

4 FRUS(1951): 5,451-461: S. Everett Gleason(Acting ExecutiveSecretary

of the NSQNCS report, 6
February1951; Documentsof the NSC 1947-1977,NSC ION 1, 'The Position of the US With Respectto
Greece',14 February1951, Reel 3, Frame0070.
5FRUS(1951): 3,508-510: Peurifoy to Acheson,13 April 1951.
6FRUS(1951): 5,50-60,70: Conference Middle EasternChiefs Mission, Istanbul, 14-21February,
of of
1951; Documentsof the Joint Chief of Staff (thereafterJCS),JCS 1798/58,Additional Military Aid to
Greece,15 February1951,Reel 4, Frame0015; McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATOMiddle East
Connection,pp. 78-85.
7FRUS(1951): 3,479485: Carney Eisenhower,8 March 1951; FRUS (1951):
to 3,501-505: Achesonto
Marshall,24 March 1951. Eisenhowerin early 1950 had becomeSupremeAllied CommanderEurope
(SACEUR).The SupremeHeadquartersAllied PowersEurope(SHAPE) had its headquartersin
political
Paris.The regional southernEuropeancommandheadquartersin Naples
was directly subordinateto the
 156

The British were also interestedin incorporating Greeceand Turkey into NATO.

On 17 May 1951 British policy, as outlined by the Foreign Secretary,Herbert Morrison,

Turkey the defence Middle 8

East. This association
was targetedat associating with of

American into the Eastern

would, it was hoped, extend military commitments

Mediterranean.Britain saw NATO's enlargementto include Greece and Turkey as a

deal with the Anglo-Egyptian impasse of British rights over Suez.

possiblemeans to

The Middle East Commandthat the British had long wanted to form might prove more

if it linked NATO. ConsequentlyMorrison inclined

palatableto the British was to was

Greece's for NATO 9 The British Minister of

to support application membership.

Defence,EmmanuelShinwell, to
came much the sameconclusion. Shinwell emphasised

the strategic importance of Greece against 'enemy forces' and the importance of the

Americancommitmentto defendthe The

area. of
military presence NATO, he argued,

deter Soviet from the Eastern '

Mediterranean. 0
would the threat entering

When the Cabinet discussedthe proposalspresentedby Morrison and Shinwell

their major concernwasno longerthe principleof Greek into

membership NATO - its

desirabilitywas conceded.What really concernedthe British was the questionof

command arrangementsin the Mediterranean.The Chiefs of Staff argued that Greece

and Turkey shouldnot be a part of Eisenhower's

commandbut insteadshouldjoin a

British SupremeAllied CommanderMiddle East (SACME). Ideally the putative Middle

East Commandwould be linked to NATO and the American Sixth Fleet Commander

SACEUR.The expansionof the regionalplanning groupswith supremeallied commandsshowedthe

massivedefence structureundertaken by the American military aid by early 1950.
8FRUS(1951): 5,104-106: informal United States-UnitedKingdom discussions,2 April 1951; PUBLIC
RECORDOFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 129/45,CP (51) 130, memorandumby the Secretaryof Statefor
ForeignAffairs, Admission of GreeceandTurkey to NATO, 17 May 1951.
9PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 129/45,CP (51) 132,'Strategic Importanceof Greece
andTurkey', 17 May 1951; HC Deb, 1951, vol. 488, col. 198,30 May 1951; E. Athanassopoulou,
Turkey-Anglo-American SecurityInterests1945-1952(London, 2000), pp. 207-211.
10PU13LICRECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 21/1967,CP (51) 132,
note by the Minister of
Defence,'Turkey and Greeceand NATO', 17 May 1951; CAB 129/45,CP (51) 132, 'Strategic
Importanceof Greeceand Turkey', 17 May 1951.
 157

11
would be under SACME.

This plan faced obvious difficulties. Neither Greecenor Turkey was willing to

place their forces under British command either in the Mediterranean or the Middle

East. Both countrieswanted their forces to report to a United Statesgeneraland be part

the NATO European army.12Their primary thought was of American beneficence.

of

Political leaderswere convinced that in order to support their general in Europe the

United Stateswould loosen the purse strings. Although Marshall Aid was drawing to a

close Greece could expect new ports and airports as the first stage of an American

their infrastructure! 3 The Greek military too were keen to prioritise

reconstructionof

the American A
connection. round of military talks was held in Athens and Ankara

under General Bradley (Joint Chiefs of Stafo, Field Marshal Slim (Commanderof the

hnperialGeneralStafo and their colleagueFrenchGeneralLicheresin October1951.

According to Bradley's report the Greek Chiefs of General Staff wanted to place their

forcesunder Eisenhower'scommand.They believed that the inclusion of Greek ground

forcesin SACEUR's southerncommandwould turn Greeceinto the masterin the

Balkantheatrein termsof military power andprestige.The Royal Hellenic Navy, the

14
Greeks argued, should be under the command of the Sixth Fleet. They opposedthe

favoured
alternatives by the British the inclusionof the Aegeanandthe islandswithin
-
the Middle East Command, the Greek Navy under the control of the British Supreme

Commanderfor the Middle East and a separatecommand for the Greek and Turkish

" PU13LICRECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 4/43, COS (51) 84, COS Committee
meeting,21
May 1951;DEFE 5/31, COS (51) 309, COS Committeemeeting,28 May 1951.For an accountof the
culminationand failure of MEC seeDevereux,TheFormulation ofBritish Defence,pp. 55-64.
12Harris, TroubledAlliance,
pp. 42-46. On theselines it also supportedthat Turkey was willing to play
the Middle Easternrole askedby the West as soon as Turkey becamea NATO member.In, F. Ahmad,
The TurkishExperimentin Democracy,1950-1975(London, 1977), p. 392. Nevertheless,neither Turkey
nor Greecedid join such an organisationof collective security as Middle East Defence Organisationor
Middle EastCommand,which anywaywas shelvedby 1953 in the light of NATO and the BaghdadPact,
ratified two yearslater.
13PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 128 23/19, CC 5(51), 8 November 1951. G. McGhee,
Envoyto the Middle World (New York, 1983),p. 218.
14FRUS(1951): 3,594-595: Peurifoy to Acheson,12 October 1951; Grigoropoulos,Field Marshal A.
 158

forces under a British general.15

Neither would the Americans acceptBritish predominancein an areawhere the

main naval and air strength was provided by the USAF and the USN. Carney was

appointed Commander-in-Chief of the United States Naval Forces in the Eastern

Atlantic and the Mediterraneanto supportEisenhowernot to divide American power in

16
the Mediterraneanand Europe. The most that the Americans were willing to concede

was a suggestion,never acted on, that Turkey might co-operate in the defence of the

Middle E ast Supreme Command under a British Supreme Commander whilst Greece

would come under SACEUR's command but be linked with Middle East Command

17
headquafters.

In reality the manoeuvres surrounding Greece and Turkey's relationship to

NATO increasinglytendedtowards the extrusion of British interests.The British might

applaudthe overall concept but when they expressedconcerns about details they were

18
overruled. The decision to acceptGreeceand Turkey into NATO was finally taken at

Papagos-Erpar6pXIq AM&v6poq ffax6yoq, pp. 475-477.

15FRUS(1951): 3,713-714: Middle EastCommandand Placeof Turkey and Greecein the NATO
CommandSet-up,23 November 1951; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95129
RI 051/3,Edento Peake,14 December1951.
15FRUS(1951): 3,613-616: Peurifoy to Acheson,28 December1951.PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,
KEW (PRO),DEFE 5/33, COS (51) 567, Field Marshal W. Slim, 4 October 1951;FRUS (1951): 3,594-
595: Peurifoy to Acheson,12 October 1951; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 128,
23/19,CC (51) 5, Conclusionsof Cabinetmeeting,8 November 1951; From n-dd-October,the Egyptian
Parliamentvoted bills to evacuatethe British troops from Egypt and abolish the British rule in Sudan,
which acknowledgedits unity with Egypt. Cypruswas the site of the British Middle Eastcommand
headquarters in Middle East.Devereuxgivesa detail analysisof the MEC plans, however,he omits the
Europeandimensionof British securityconsiderations.
16PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 129, CP (51) 130, Memorandum by Morrison,
'Admissionof GreeceandTurkey to the NAT', 17 May 1951. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),
CAB 131/10,DO (51) 18, CabinetDefenceCommittee,2 July 1951; FRUS (1951): 3,475-486: 8 March
1951;FRUS (1951): 3,551-552: Draft MemorandumPreparedby John Fergusonof the Policy Planning
Staff, 6 July 1951.
17PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 131/10, DO (51) 18, Minutes the CabinetDefence
of
Committee,2 July 1951;FRUS (1951): 3,551-554: Commandin the EasternMediterraneanand Middle
East,6 July 1951.
18PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/11923R262, Wright, British Embassyin London,
to G.W. Harrison,Northern Department-ForeignOffice, Admission of Greeceand Turkey, 3 September
1951; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), CAB 128,29/54, CM60 (5 1), of Cabinet
minutes
meeting,27 September1951.
 159

the Ottawa conferenceon 22 October 1951.19

The Greek liberal and conservativeworld

welcomed the news. Advantagesof Greece'sinclusion into NATO revolved around the

military and economic benefits. It was also estimatedthat public expensesfor defence

would be by
decreased approximately fifty per cent whereas financial assistancewould

increase by $ 100-200 million per year. There were drawbacks involved as well

including fear from all perspectives of political circles of high expenditure on

armamentsto be imposed to Greece.Naturally, however, advantagescompensatedfor

all 20
disadvantages.

Despite agreements,the new Conservative government of Winston Churchill

kept plugging away at the command 21

issue. They enjoyed little more successthan their

Labour predecessors.The formal inclusion of Greece in NATO was ratified at the

Lisbon meeting in February 1952. On 15 February 1952, the Military Committee of the

19Norway, Denmarkand the Netherlandsexpressedreservationson NATO's enlargementto non-

Northerncountrieson conditionsof geographicalproximity, political organisation,culture and religion in
the caseof Turkey. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/11923R262, Wright, British
Embassyin London, to G.W. Harrison,Northern Department-ForeignOffice, Admission of Greeceand
Turkey, 3 September1951
20Grigoropoulos,From the Top of the Hill- A7ror1v KopvV4TovA6rov, pp. 514,521-522; The Left, as
expected,cameout against NATO alliance for the latter deliberatelydissuadedGreece from smoothingor
enlargingits relationswith Bulgaria and Albania, which led to maintainingtension in the Balkans.
Couloumbis,GreekPolitical Reactionsto Americanand NATO Influences,pp. 34-41; Valinakis,
Introduction to the GreekForeign Policy-Eiaaycoy4oTIv EUqviký E&rcplKý 17011TIKýp. 50. Major
,
GeneralAndrew Siapkaras,GreekArmy, 'The Importanceof Greeceto NATO', Military Review,August
(1961), 90-97.The authornotesthat Greecewas acceptedinto NATO becauseit suitedwesternstandards.
Siapkaras'argumentshouldbe treatedwith cautionbecausehe overestimatesGreece'simportanceon a
nationaland internationallevel, especiallyvis a vis Turkey. Siapkaras'report, however,is important
becauseit is one of the few documentsof Greekofficials on Greece'sperceptionstowardsNATO. The
archivesof the GreekMinistry of ForeignAffairs on NATO are still restricted for research.From another
point of view, Lt. Col. EdwardR. Wainhouse,writes that the only valuable elementGreecepossessedfor
a foreignpower was its geographicposition. Wainhouse,'Guerrilla War in Greece', in Osanka(ed.),
Modern Guerrilla Warfare,pp. 217-227.Both authors,however,have presentedthe two oppositesidesof
the matter.In practice,a seriesof bilateral policies and necessitieshad brought all parts together.
21FRUS(1952-1954):9,168-170: 'Middle East Command',4 January 1952; FRUS (1952-1954):6,774-
777: Third formal meeting of PresidentTruman and Prime Minister Churchill, 8 January 1952;PUBLIC
RECORDOFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 5/36, COS (52) 11,3 January 1952. FRUS (1951): 5,257-264:
NSC r eport, 27D ecernber1951; The Greek historians tend to acquire an American point of view and
supportthat 'Churchill's governmentmarked the disintegrationoft he e rnpire', L inardatos,From Civil
War- A7rorov Ep(pQo, p. 353. Accordingly, 1947 and thereafter signified the 'change of guard' from
Britain to the US in sustainingthe lifeline of pro-WesternGreece,whereasthe formation of NATO was
the vivid proof of American predominance.Th. Veremis, 'The Military', in Featherestoneand Katsoudas
(eds.), Political Change in Greece, p. 217; Tsoucalas, The Greek Tragedy (London, 1969), p. 109.
However, Britain deservesto be given credits for putting the foundations of American assistance.
Moreover,Britain had a secondarybut importantrole in NATO commandarrangements.
 160

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Standing Group agreed to include Greek and

Turkish ground armed forces in Eisenhower's general command and specifically under

Admiral Carney's (CINCSOUTH) command. A Greek and a Turkish general would

control their countries' respectiveland forces.Eachwould report directly to Carney.The

air forces of both Greeceand Turkey would be placed under an American commander,

who w ould bea ppointed byA dmiral C 22

amey. The British could do little other than

consentto this arrangement.The only concessionthey won was a promise to link the

Greek and Turkish navies to the British naval commanderin the Mediterraneanin his

Middle East Command role. Yet even this promise was fairly meaningless.The exact

natureof this linkage was not clarified. It most certainly did not mean direct command.

In any caseMiddle East Commanddid not yet exist and no one could accuratelypredict

when it would. NATO was the real game.In the end a compromisewas devisedto

create a separateEastern MediterraneanCommand under Admiral Carney. This new

Commander-in-Chieffor the Mediterranean(CINCMED) would have his headquarters

in Malta. On 18 December 1952, the naval forces of Greece and Turkey were placed

under the authority of Admiral Louis Mountbatten, who was serving under Carney's

commandandthe Sixth 23
Fleet.

The British did not fare much better when it came to the details of Greek

military affairs.Greece'sinclusionin NATO madea rethink of the size,shapeandrole

of its anned forces inevitable. During the fiscal year 1952-1953 the Greeks tate was

estimatedto be devoting forty-nine per cent of its budget to defence,as opposedto the

22 FRUS (1952-1954): 5,178-179: North Atlantic Committee

session, Lisbon, 26 February 1952;
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101818 R1192/12,
communiqut by HMG to the
Royal Hellenic Government,29 February 1952; Cmd. 8489 Protocol Regarding the Accession Greece
of
and Turkey into NATO (London, 1952); McGhee, The US-Turkey,p. 102; Harris, Troubled Alliance, p.
44.
23FRUS(1952-1954):5,352: Acheson Truman, 17
to December1952; McGhee, The VS-Turkish-NATO,
p. 102.CommandArrangementsaswell asnaval British presencein the Mediterraneanare also discussed
in E. J. Grove, Vanguardto Trident (London, 1987),
pp. 104,153-164. G. Tsitsopoulos,'Oi
EUjvoTovPKtKtqAgi)vTuctqI: Xtact; 1945-1987'(The Greek-TurkishDefenceRelations 1945-1987)in
A. Alexandris,Th. Veremis,P. Kasakos,V. Koufoudalds,Ch. Rasakis,G. Tsitsopoulos(eds.) Greek-
 161

thirty per cent spentby Britain. Moreover in March 1952 Greecewas estimatedto have

in its 24
numerically the largest army relation to population of all NATO member-states.

As a result a debateabout the so-called 'defenceburden' arosebetween the Greeks,the

British and the Americans. Like the discussions over command arrangementsthe

defenceburden issue suggestedthat the Greeks were looking to the Americans rather

than the British to shapethe future. Yet the efforts the British made to influence these

discussionshighlights the fact that they had not lost an interest in Greek affairs.25

The DefenceBurden Debate

Kartalis, the Greek Minister of Co-ordination was detennined to extract further

allocations of cash from the Americans to cover the disproportionate amount of

governmentexpenditurededicatedto defence.During the civil war military expenditure

had doubled from its pre-war levels. By 1952, however, the civil war had been over for

three years and there was little danger of a recrudescenceof a Communist military

threat. Officials in Washingtonbegan to suggestthat the bloated Greek defence

eitherGreece'sstability or its role

couldbe reducedwithout endangering
establishment
in the Westernalliance. Theseproposalswere met with fierce resistancein Greeceitself.

Not only did the Greekgovernmentobjectto its lossof subsidiesbut so too did the US

26
embassyand the economicmission.

In May 1952formaldiscussions
on the defenceburdenwerelaunchedin Athens.
GeorgeMavros, the Greek Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs met with Admiral Carney

andthe American CommandingOfficers in Greece.The Americans proposedcuts in the

Turkish Relations 1923-1987- Oi EUjV0T0VPK1Kýq EX&SIq 1923-1987, (Athens, 1988), p. 182.

" Linardatos, From Civil War- A7ro
rov Eyrblzo, pp. 455-457.
25For an
accountof the left-wing historiographyof Greecein N. Koulouris, GreekBibliography of the
Civil War-EUqvwý BiflAioyparia TovEuVvAiovHoAtpov;D. Haralampes,Army
and Political Power-
F-rpaT6qKai HoAiriq Eýovaia (Athens, 1985).
26B. Sweet-Escott,Greece:A Political
and EconomicSurvey(Oxford, 1954),p. 158; FRUS (1952-1954):
1,546-547:On Military Assistanceand DefenceSupportto Greece,18 August 1952;McNeill, The
Metamorphosisof Greecesince WWII,p. 232; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO
 162

Greek defence budget. The Greek negotiators responded with the warning that any

reduction in the size of the armed forces would undermine morale. A discontentedarmy

would threatenthe new-found domestic and international stability that the two countries

had beenworking to achieve.LieutenantGeneralGrigoropoulos, the Chief of the Greek

General Staff, persistently resisted every attempt of the government to curtail the

military budget, let alone the size of the Greek national forces. Carney was not

impressed.He thought that the Greeks' insistence on maintaining all their military

programmeswas tantamount to graft. The Greeks were gold-plating every military

requestfor their own glorification. Little military or political damagewould be done, in

Carney's view, if the Greek military was reduced to a realistic establishment.

AmbassadorPeurifoy, however, sided with the Greek point of view. He was not as

sanguineas the NATO commanderabout the underlying stability in Greece.Carney saw

an oversized and inefficient military. Peurifoy with his intimate knowledge of recent

eventsknew how important it was to keep the Greek generalssweet- even at the cost of

some expensive military toys. Faced with Peurifoy's opposition Carney proposed a

the
compromise: tablesof establishment
of the Greekforcesshouldbe kept the but
same

units shouldbe reducedto smallerregularcadresthat could be reinforcedat times of

27
criSiS.

The Americans, however, were not the only ones interested in the defence

burden issue. There were Anglo-Greek talks on the same issue. As a result of the

Mediterraneancommand arrangementdiscussions a number of high-ranking British

delegationsvisited Athens during the courseof 1952.Each discussedexpenditureas

well ascommand.In May 1952Admiral Carneywasnot the only NATO commanderin

Athens. The Deputy Supreme Commander, Lord Montgomery, arrived also.

371/101816RI 102/5,Peaketo Eden,2 September1952.

27Linardatos,From Civil War-A7ro EyrUio,
Tov pp. 456-457.
 163

Montgomery was typically outspoken. He thought it ridiculous that Greece was

spending forty-five per cent of its national budget on defence and said so, openly. His

solution was the same as Camey's: the Greeks should aim to create small but well-

equippedarmed forces with a well-trained reserveready for emergencies.Montgomery,

of course,went further in his criticisms than his NATO colleague.He said directly what

many British, American and NATO officials thought: Greece was playing on a now

non-existent Communist threat to justify over-expenditure and an unnecessary

repressivepolitical system. He argued that Plastiras was on the right lines: leniency

rather than repressionwas the'route to long-term stability. As Montgomery put it 'the

true bulwark against Communism was an affluent citizen who trusted their leaders

ratherthan prison bars'.29

Lord Mountbatten,operatingas a dual-hattedNATO and British Commander,

visited Athens in July 1952. He too supported Carney and Montgomery's call for

smaller armed forces. Mountbatten arguedthat since war was not imminent the NATO

countriesshould concentrateon safeguardingtheir economicand political stability.

Montgomery himself returned to the chargein September1952 in a memorandumthat

suggestedpresent levels of expenditureon Greek armed forces were wasteful of both

29
NATO and Greece'slimited resources.

The fact is that it was a British Field Marshal, albeit one operating in a NATO

role, who was the least diplomatic critic of Greek policy, antagonisedthe Greek

governmentand createdafroideur in relations. The right-wing press were particularly

outraged that Montgomery had gone out of his way to praise Plastiras rather than

Papagos. Grigoropoulos, the Chief of the Greek General Staff, complained that

Montgomery'ssuggestionscausedconfusionand underminedthe efforts of the Greek

28PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101794

RIO 13/11,Peaketo Foreign Office, 21
May 1952;Grigiropoulos,From the Top of the Hill- A= Kopv(p4rov A6ýpov,pp. 517-518.
29Grigoropoulos,From the Top Tjv
of the Hill- A= vIv Kopv(p4TouA6(pov,pp. 518-519.
 164

General Staff to improve its performance.The American embassywas worried enough

to persuadeMontgomery to 'clarify' his in

remarks a fashion that was less offensive to

30
Greek sensibilities.

Montgomery and the other British, American and NATO commanderswere only

speaking the truth, however. The financial situation of Greece i

w as ndccd p oor. T he

nation remained an underdevelopedcountry with limited productive capacity. Despite

infusions of American aid the unstable and weak Greek governmentsof the post-civil

war period had shown little aptitude for economic management.On 4 April 1952, for

instance,Kartalis drew a gloomy picture of the Greek economy.Inflation was a constant

problem in the financial sphere. Yet this was merely the symptom of underlying

structural weaknesses. Industrial investment was dangerously low. Even more

fundamentallyagricultural productivity was very poor. Wages remained at roughly the

same levels as in 1951, national income increasedby only 1.5 percent and counter-

inflationary measuresin 1951 had brought a marginal monetary stabilisation.31 The

Greekswerenot very goodat their coreeconomicactivities.

Plastirasmade a limited attemptto deal with thesecriticisms. In September1952

he announcedthat compulsorymilitary servicewould be reducedin length by one-third,

from thirty-six to twenty-fourmonths.This changewould bring Greeceinto line with

the other Europeanmembers of NATO most of whom maintained a two-year term of

military conscription.The reduction of the length of military service was - supposedly-

designedto alleviate the problems of the government's financesby saving an estimated

500 million drachmae. In fact this was a sleight of hand. The expected military

expenditurefor the fiscal year 1952-1953remained at the samelevels of approximately

two anda half billion drachmaeasthepreviousyear.32The Greekgovernmentwantedto.

30Linardatos, From Civil War- A=

Tov Ep(p6Aio,p. 455.
31Ibid., p. 448; B. SweetEscott, Greece:A Political
and EconomicSurvey,p. 48.
32PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101816 R1102/5, Peakc
to Eden, 2 September
 165

impression that they were respondingto allied demands.In reality they were
give the

to to spendbeyond their meansin the expectation that the Americans

planning continue

finance their spendthriftplans under the cover of NATO solidarity. Plastirasalso

would

had a more pressingpolitical rationale for this announcement- he hoped it would boost

in
his popularity the forthcoming generalelections.His gambit failed utterly. It remains

true, however, that there was now a consensusamongstthe Greek political and military

Greece's into NATO triumph. It was a victory that

elite. They regarded entry as a

obviated structural reforms in the economyor indeed rational economic of

management

any kind. NATO for the Greekswas a valuable constant.

The British Military Mission and the NA TO Framework

At the highest levels of command the British were losing out. Once the

Communistthreat had recededpolitico-military relations were reducedmuch more to a

simple financial transaction.This was the kind of transaction in which the British could

not hope to competewith the Americans.At a lower level, however, there was a period

of transition. British military personnelwere still embeddedwithin the Greek system.

Following the end of the civil war both the British Military Mission and the Joint

United States Aid to Greece (JUSMAG) had decided to reduce their presence in Greece.

The official task of both missions was to advise and assist the Greek General Staff in

forces 33Both the British

maintaining the national as an effective westernisedarmy. and

1952.
33PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/904,Report by Brigadier G. D Browne, BMM in
Athens,November 1950-June1951.Within this context,the JCS decidedto provide additional military
aid to Greece.In fact, as a result of the KoreanWar and the American policy of containingthe
the
communists, ceiling strength for the Greekmilitary establishmentwas set to 94,700 to be attainedby
31 December1950;with the distribution of personnel:80,000Army, 8,500 Navy, 6,200 Air Force.On 15
September1950,the JCS approveda fiu-therceiling increasefor the Greek armedforce of 164,400:
147,000for the Army, 10,000Navy, 7,400 for the GreekAir Force. Similarly, on 15 February 1951the
NSC approvedthat the United Statesshouldundertaketo maintain internal security in Greece,repelling
anyattemptof communistattackand finally bear an increasingpercentageof the Greek economicburden.
Recordsof the JCS,Part 2, StrategicIssues:Section 1, US Military Assistance,JCS 1798/58,29
 166

the Americans engaged, however, in more direct aid. They continued to lead

'intelligence gathering' patrols in the border areas.

The post-civil war objectivesof the British Military Missions in Greecehad been

set out on 13 June 1950. Their first task of 'clearing the ground" was all but

accomplishedwith the end of the civil war. The emphasisshifted thereforeto the second

task - 'building the house' as it was called. This involved the creation of self-sufficient

armed forces,which in future, would be able to operatewithout constantguidancefrom

British and American military advisers.For the British this transformation was to come

it 34
about asmuch through professionalisationas was through re-equipment. The British

set up Basic Training Centres all over the country, Training Establishmentsin Staff

College, Specialist Training Centres, Army Schools, Corps Schools. These centres

functionedunderjoint British and Greekcommand.The training centresreplacedthe

old method of training whereby conscripts were called up directly into units. In the

aftermathof the civil war, therefore,the averageGreek soldier was much more likely to

comeinto direct contactwith British soldiersandBritish training methods.The British

also introduceda more formal system for officer selection and promotion. This

'scientific' method was to replace the haphazard'patronage' system that had operated

up until then.It is remarkablyimportantthat from the 1950sonwardsthe majority of

35
officers were academygraduates.

At the apex of the new systemwere two institutions. The War College prepared

a small cadre of the most effective officers for future high military command. War

September1951, Reel IV, Frame0038.

34PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),WO 32/15547,Report
on The Work of the BMM (Greece),
by Major GeneralC. D. Packard,13 June 1950;PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/908,
A History of the BMM 1945-1952;PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101818
RI 192/23,A History of the BMM(G) 1945-1952.
35PU13LICRECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),WO 32/15547,History
of the BMM(G) 1945-1952,13
June1950;GreekAmy Headquarters,IoTopiaOpyavcbmm; EUIVIK06 ETparo6 the
rov -History of
Organisationof the GreekAmy (Athens,Dept. of Army History Publication, 1957)
cited from
Kourvetaris,'The GreekArmy Officer CorpsIts Professionalism Political Interventionism', in
and
Janowitz,Van Doom (eds.), On Military Intervention,
pp. 170-190.
 167

College graduates were eligible to attend the National Defence School, which brought

them together with civil servants and politicians. Here a future nexus for civil-military

relations and national leadershipwas to be created. The products of these institutions

came to dominate military affairs in the post-civil war period. British officers were

involved in setting up this higher training system.The Americans were also influential

at this level. Selective officers were also trained at training coursesin the United States

within the JUSMAPG context. Neverthelessit can be seen that British proceduresand

thought had been inculcated in the Greek levels.36By the very

patternsof military at all

nature of a hierarchical these

military establishment influences, once implanted, would

last for a generation.

The successof the joint British and American undertaking to re-organise the

Greek Army consisted not only in the final defeat of the insurgents but also in the

introduction of military professionaleducationand training of the national forces. This

was reflected in the acceptanceof the statusof Greek officers arnongtheir fellow NATO

37
members. After 1949 the Greek armedforcesbecame,
relative to their past, a less

38This transformation should

politicised organisationmodelled on other western armies.

36PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),WO 202/ 895, Major GeneralE.E. Down report, June
1947-November1949;WO 32/15547,History of the BMM 1945-1952.Table of the Army GeneralStaff,
3rdOffice of Educationof the Officers, Athens,cited in Kourvetaris, 'The Greek Army Officer Corps', in
Janowitz,Van Doom (eds.), On Military Intervention,p. 171. The training of the local national armies
with the aim to makethem capableof defendingtheir nation was a typical task undertakenby both the
BMM andJUSMAG. Training centresandtraining officers operatedin particular areasof interestsworld
wide aswell as one of the most critical aspectsof foreign involvementin a country. An American mission
operatedin Vietnam from the beginningof 1954to supportUnited Statesinvolvement in SoutheastAsia.
See:J. L. Collins (ed.), TheDevelopmentand Training of the South VietnameseAmy 1950-1972
(Washington,1986).
37GreekArmy Headquarters,IoToplaOMavcbacco; E.UlvIK06 ZTparo6 the Organisation
Tov -History of
of the GreekAmy (Athens,Dept. of Army History Publication, 1957) cited from Kourvetaris, 'The Greek
Army Officer CorpsIts Professionalismand Political Interventionism', in Janowitz,Van Doom (eds.), On
Military Intervention,pp. 155-201.
3' The Greek
army was a highly politicised corps,which from the inter-war yearshad attempteda number
of coupsand counter-coups:1922,1926,1933,1935 and 1943.After the end of the civil war, not only did
it developprofessionalself-image,but alsoa coherentideological identity: keep itself out of politics,
defendstability and peacein Greeceandpreventcommunistsfrom seizingpower again.There is alsothe
view that the Greekofficers beganto stageautonomouscoup d'itats betweenthe two greatwars-aperiod
of a generalparliamentarycrisis in Greece.Most inter-war coups,however, soughtto replaceone civilian
orderwith anotherratherthan permanentlyhandover the governmentto the army. In this light, only the
coupof April 1967constituteda direct interventionof the army into politics, when the military flite
 168

be As the American historian William McNeill observed 'a

not overstated,of course.

corps of officers', approximately 15,000 strong, had become, in their own

professional

'special 39
Greece. A certain metastasis(transformation) did occur.
eyes,the guardian' of

Yet this is not to say that the Greek forcesbecamea depersonalisedand non-politicised

corps. Western norms were present in the dominant value system but they were often

level 40Nevertheless,the British Military Mission

relegatedto a secondor subsidiary .

and Joint United StatesMilitary Advisory Group did give the Greek national forces a

more professionalself-image.

British influence was far from negligible during the transitional period between

the end of the civil war and Greece'sentry into NATO. Nevertheless,Greece'sinclusion

into NATO resulted in the British decision to withdraw its Air, Army and Police

missions.41D. F. Murray of the Department

Southern of the Foreign Office, explained

that if Greecejoined NATO under Admiral Carney's command, 'there would seemto be

42
little purposein retainingdwindlingBritish Missions' Greece. Accordingto the Air
in

British Military Mission to Greece,the RAF Mission 'will be negligible

Commander,

and barely worth considering'. He concludedthat the mission should be run down and

its duties handedover to the Americans.43The Americans themselveswere happy with

The
this arrangement. Chief of the JUSMAGto Greece
Major General
Frederick(who

manageda dominantstateapparatus.For a generalaccountof the role of the military in Greekpolitics,

seeTh. Veremis, TheMilitary in GreekPolitics (London, 1997).The author suggeststhat the changeof
military attitudeoccurredin the 1980swith the prevalenceof populism under the socialist government.
39McNeill, TheMetamorphosisof Greecesince WWII,pp. 97-98.
40Accordingto the eminentstatesman,PanayiotisKanellopoulos,who servedas Minister of Defencein
severalpost-warcabinets,IDEA memberssucceededpromotions and vital appointmentsthroughthe
1950sand 1960s.The most important of theseappointmentswas the choice of GeneralKardamakisas
Headof the GeneralStaff. P. Kanellopoulos,Historical Essays-IaropiKj&,d0K1Pia(Athens, 1975),pp. 26-
44.
41PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/95157RI 641,
minute by Murray, 8 November
1951,21December1951; PUBLIC RECORDOFFICE, KEW (PRO), PREM 11/914,Report on'Future
of British ServiceMissions in Greece',21 November 1951; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),
WO 216/473,Notes from GeneralPerowne,25 March 1952;PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),
WO 216/473,W. S. Slim report, 18 April 1952.
42PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/95141RI 192/15,D.F Murray, 15 August 1951.
43PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 371/95141RI 192/15,
memorandumby R. Barnes,23
August 1951; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), AIR 20/8439, D. G Lewis- CommandingRAF
 169

had succeededJenkins in May 1951) believed that the British Military Mission in

Greecehad outlived its usefulnessand should be dissolved by mutual agreement.The

American Ambassadorin Greece,Peurifoy, saw no advantagesin retaining the British

Military Mission. He noted that the British should 'withdraw voluntarily at the time of

final adjustmentof commandrelationship in EasternMediterranean'. The Joint Chiefs

of Staff concluded that the withdrawal of the! British military mission would have no

adverse impact on the efficiency of the Greek armed forces. They noted that those

functions not taken over by the Americans would be filled by a small number British

liaison-advisorofficers left 44
behind. In early January1952, thirteen British police

officers, for instance,would remain at Gendarmerie 45

training schools. The strength of

the RAF Mission was reducedto 3 junior officers: one Air Attacht and two assistants,

oneof ývhomw ould bec oncernedsolely w ith q uestions

ofs upply f or t he G reekA ir

Force and detachedpermanentlyto work with the American Mission. The other would

be appointedto the British embassyin Athens.46Army officerswould remainaffiliated

to JUSMAG(G) that remainedin Greeceunder Major General Charles Hart. The

executiveresponsibility for the remaining British officers would also be transferredto

the Chief 47
of JUSMAG. On 29 February1952,GeneralPerowneannouncedformally

that the missionswould ceaseto exist on 30 April 1952 'having accomplished'their

dutiesandbeing replacedby NATO's services.48

Mission in Greece,7 September1951.

44Recordsof the JCS,Part 2, StrategicIssues:Section 1, US Military Assistance,JCS 1798/59,23 August
1951, Reel IV, Frame0038; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/96551Wul 1923/272,
OttawaMeeting, 17 September1951.
45PUBLIC p OFFICE,
'ECORD KEW (PRO), FO 371/101830 WG 1643/1, Report by J. C. A Roper,
British Embassy to Athens, 5 January 1952.
46PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/101818 WG 1192/2, D. F. Murray, 10 January
1952.
47PUBLIC RECOp OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/906, Major General Commander LECM Perowne,
'D
29 February 1952; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 216/473, S. Venizelos to General
Perowne, 26 April 1952. Churchill College Archives, Cambridge, Noel Baker Papers, 4/350,12 May
1952, press cutting without title.
48Brigadier G. P. Hobbs is
a typical intelligence officer, who worked in Greece as Chief Staff Officer,
BMM(G) 1942-1947, Colonel of Liaison 1947-1949, Military Attacht in Athens 1954-1957. Major
General H. L. Boatner, JUSMAG (G) on 18 January 1955
noted Hobbs as 'leading figure' in the British
 170

The British Naval Mission, however, proved an exception. Britain intended to

remain a significant naval power in the Mediterranean. 'Showing the Rag' in the

Mediterraneanwas the symbol of British naval power. In the purely Greek context they

took a close and continuing interest in naval conununications between Cyprus and the
49The
Greekmainland. British Naval Mission was to continue to 'assist in the defenceof

the Middle East and fight alongside the British Mediterranean Fleet' despite the
50
presenceof the United StatesSixth Fleet in the Aegean and the Mediterraneanbasin.

The British Naval Mission only came to end on 15 October 1955, when it was decided

that its head Admiral Selby would not be replaced.According to the official statement

the reason for the withdrawal of the Mission was financial 51 Admiral Selbyhimself
.

noted, however, that other considerations lay behind the decision to 'wind up' the

missionand turn its functionsto a lower ranking British Naval Attacht. By 1955the

Greek governmentwas no longer subordinating the question of Cyprus to the need to

integratein the western alliance. Insteadthey were consciouslywhipping up anti-British

feeling over Cyprus.In addition a new AmericanCommanderin the Mediterranean,

EspionageServicewith the aim to maintainGreeceunderthe British influence. King's College London

Archives,Liddell Hart Centrefor Military Archives, Brig. G. P. Hobbs Papers,16/1-13NID.
49PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),ADM 1/23715, Report of Head of British Naval Mission,
1-5/1952;FO 371/95141RI 192/15,memorandumby D. F Murray, 28 August 1951.
50PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95141RI 192/15,minute by Cheetman-Foreign
Office, 20 September1951; FO 371/95141RI 192/21, minute by Morrison, 22 November 1951. PUBLIC
RECORDOFFICE, KEW (PRO), ADM 1/23538,M0193/52,22 January1952;FO 371/95141RI 192/15,
meetingin ForeignOffice on ServiceMissions,28 August 1952;ADM 116/6330,24 October 1955.
National Library of Scotland,RearAdmiral Robert Kirk Dickson Papers,Head of the BNM in Athens
1949-1951,MS 13587(207-214),30 September1949,13 October 1951.Accordingly, it was claimedthat
the GreekNavy had 90 British vessels,including 6 submarines,but only 42 American vesselsand a high
proportionof the largestshipswere British. PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), FO 371/95141
RI 192/15,Cheetrnan-Foreign Office to ParkerH.-Ministry of Defence,20 September1951. There is also
the reasonthat the British withdrew their Air, Army and Police Missions for economicreasonswhile they
kept their Naval Mission in Greecewith the aim of linking the Greek and Turkish naval forcesto MEC
througha British Allied Naval Commanderfor the Mediterranean.In Stefanidis, The United States,Great
Britain and Greece,p. 101. This latter version,however,doesnot explain the timing the Mission
withdrewin October 1955whenboth GreeceandTurkey were alreadyunder NATO's command.
Moreoverthe missionswere not so numerousto be an unbearablecost.
51PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),ADM 1/23538,M0193/52, Report Head BNM(G)
of of
RearAdmiral Smith (1951-1953),22 January1952; The Times,15 October 1955; PUBLIC RECORD
OFFICE,KEW (PRO), PREM 11/914,Ward-Headof SouthernDepartment1955- to H. Caccia-Private
Secretary,24 October 1955;PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), ADM 116/6330,M370/18/55,
Reporton Futureof BNM (G), 25 October 1955.
 171

s 52
According to the between
Admiral Fechteler'did not want us [the British] agreement
.

the Foreign Office, the Admiralty and the Greek authorities the Mission would remain

'dormant basis' to 'keep an eye" on the Mediterranean area and provide Britain
on a

listening 53
with a naval post.

UNSCOB and Balkan Cold War Policy

in
It should be noted passingthat a further symbol of residual British influence

in 1952. As far back January 1947 hoc United Nations

was disbanded as an ad

Committee had arrived in Greece to investigate the accusations of the Greek

its northern neighbourswere assisting the Communists, by providing

governmentthat
54 The Committee
shelter, supplies, military equipment and economic assistance.

consistedof eleven membersof whom Britain was one. The Committee was succeeded

by UNSCOB (United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans) whose formation was
55
mandated Assembly
by the General on 21 October1947. Its basewas Salonikaandits

to
mission was mediating and reconciling between the four neighbouring countries of

Greece;Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and Romania that directly supported the Greek

56
communiss.

52King's CollegeLondonArchives,LiddellHartCentrefor Military Archives,RearAdmiralSelby

Papers,GB 99 KCLMA Selby.RearAdmiralSelbywasHeadof BNM(G) 1953-1955. Of all the
themostconvincingseem
alternatives to be the of
strengthening thepresence of NATO and Americas'
wedominance.
3PUBLICRECORDOFFICE,KEW (PRO),ADM 116/6330, RearAdmiralW. H. Selby,18October
1955,24October1955,30December1955;PUBLICRECORDOFFICE,KEW (PRO),PREM11/914,
24 October1955.
54ThedrivingforcebehindAmerica'smotivationto sendtheUN committeewasthetypicalColdWar
suspicionof Sovietexpansionism. TheBritishhadhopedby 1945thattheUN wouldreinforcetheirrole
in thearea.DBPO:1,102,Sargent,II July 1945.
55FRUS(1947):5,865-889:Marshallto Austin(USRepresentative at theUnitedNations),June-
September 1947;A. Nachmani,InternationalInterventionin the GreekCivil War: TheUnitedNations
SpecialCommittee on the Balkans.1947-1952 (New York, 1990);The conunittee
consistedof Britain,
US,SovietUnion,France,China,Belgium,Syria,Poland,Colombia,AustraliaandBrazil.UNSCOBwas
a westernproduct.An unarmedobserveroperationratherthana peacekeeping forceof thetype
subsequentlydeployedby theUnitedNationsin theSinai,GazaStrip,Congo,Cyprus,GolanHeights,
Lebanon andelsewhere to servewesternintelligenceneeds.H. N. Howard,'Greeceandits Balkan
Neighbours (1948-1949): TheUnitedNationsAttemptsat Conciliation',BalkanStudies7 (1966),3.
56UnitedNationsResolution,SecurityCouncil,Series11,1946-1947, Reportson Communist Activities,p.
38. UnitedNationsResolution,GeneralAssembly,SeriesI, Reportson 30 September, 21 October,3
 172

Greece'sinclusion into NATO called the necessityof the United Nations Special

Committee on the Balkans into question.UNSCOB's mandatehad been renewed since

the end of the civil war because it had some marginal usefulness in intelligence

gathering. During 1951 it was called on to counter Cominform in

propaganda the

Balkans. On many occasionsthe committee had undertaken to repudiate Cominfonn

propagandain the Balkans.The governmentsof Albania and Yugoslavia accommodated

the large number of Greek armed communist refugees, who had escaped to these

countries in 1949. The Greek Communist 'Free Greece' radio station continued to

operate from Romanian territory, transmitting instructions to the so-called 'fighters' of

the movement. The Special Committee assembled evidence to demonstrate that

Communiststateswere continuing to aid the KKE. The committee's annual report to the

sixth United Nations general assembly claimed that tension persisted in the Balkans

fermentedby former 'guerrillas' who threatened'the political and territorial integrity of

57 However, UNSCOB's Cold War functions changed with NATO's

Greece'.

Although
enlargement. the WesternAllies were still concernedabout Soviet intentions

the Americansreckonedthat the admissionof Greeceinto NATO provided a deterrent

much strongerthan any body of observers.As a result, in October 1951 they proposed

the dissolution of UNSCOB. The intelligence part of its mission would be performed by

an ad hoc sub-commission of the Peace Observation Committee (POC) under the

United Nations auspices.A small observergroup of 10-15 personswould be located in

58
Greeceto keepa watchon the Greekborderswith Albania andBulgaria. The British

supportedthe PeaceObservationCommittee proposal. The Greek governmentaccepted

November1947,pp. 203-205; YearBookof the United Nations, 1947-1948,21 October 1947,pp. 298-
302; YearBookof the United Nations, 1948-1949,October 1948-July 1949,pp. 245-256; Howard,
'Greeceand its Balkan Neighbours1948-1949:The United Nations Attempts at Conciliation', Balkan
Studies7 (1966), 1-26.
57FRUS(1951): 5,453: Staff Studyby the NSC 'The Position
of the US With Respectto Greece',6
February1951; FRUS (1951): 5,493-498: Report of the UNSCOB, 'Conclusions', 15 August 1951.
58FRUS(1951): 5,515-516: Memorandumby the director
of the office of Greek,Turkish and Iranian
 173
59
it in November 1951. UNSCOB was dissolvedin February 1952.

It was Greece's entry into NATO in 1952 rather than the Truman Doctrine of

1947 that marked a turning point in Anglo-Greek relations. In the period between 1947

and 1952 Britain remained an important player in Greek political and military affairs.

The British provided ag reat d eal ofp ractical h elp tot he G reeks inm ilitary m atters.

Even in politics the British retained some influence, not least because of their

relationshipwith the monarchy.In theory it benefited the Greek governmentto have two

rather than one friendly power working with it. Yet, since the British almost always

sided with the Americans, this advantageseemedby 1952 to be a wasting practical

asset.It made little sensefor the Greeksto align themselveswith the British in debates

aboutNATO commandarrangements.
As the Communistmenacefadedso too did fears

of American hegemony.
The Greekswanted American money rather than British brains.

Affairs (Rountree)to the AssistantSecretaryof Statefor Near Eastern,South Asian and African Affairs
(McGhee),19 October 1951; FRUS (1951): 2,514: Achesonto Truman, 21 November 1951.
59FRUS(1951): 5,516:
note 2 without name,20 November 1951. Kousoulas,Revolution and Defeat,pp.
184-187;Details on the negotiationson the Balkan alliance are to be found in John Iatrides, Balkan
Triangle:Birth and Decline of an Alliance AcrossIdeological Boundaries (The Hague, 1968).
 174

Conclusion

This study has attempted to deconstruct a number of myths connected with

Anglo-Greek relations in the 1940sand early 1950s.Both the traditional and revisionist

historiography on Greek history tends to assume that 1947 brought about a British

withdrawal from Greecethat resulted from Britain's post-war financial difficulties. In

fact both countries sought to maintain close bilateral relations for five years after the

British note of February 1947signalled the end of military aid. The British army did not

withdraw from Greeceuntil 1951.The British Military Mission remained involved with

the National Army until 1952. In the short-term the American take-over of the Greek

financial burden did not undermine British policy towards Greece. On the contrary,

Britain's position was strengthenedby America's backing.

The subject of Anglo-Greek relations in the late 1940s is a complex one. It was

deeplyaffectedby the SecondWorld War, the Greekcivil war andthe Cold War. Each

tendedto push the British and the Greekstogetherrather than apart. The relationship of

the two countrieswas basedon common interestsand bilateral security concerns.It was

the relationship of a great power and a small and relatively poor country. The Greek

looked
governments to Britain the
as powerwith the long-termtraditionalpolicy in the

region and a well-establishedobjective to keep Greecewithin a British sphereof

influence.The British governmentssoughtto maintain Greeceas a buffer stateto secure

their routes to the Middle East, and later on, to secureEurope's borders from possible

Soviet expansion.

The KKE thought of the British 'monarcho-fascists' as its main enemiesand the

main obstacleto its seizure of power. The Party accusedthe British of provoking the

civil war in Greeceby supporting undemocratic Greek governments and theirwhite

terror'. In their turn the British were convincedthat the KKE intended to use EAM as a
 175

springboard for seizing power and subjugating Greece to Stalinism. British policy on

Greecewas strongly influencedby the mounting evidence of Soviet expansionismin the

Balkans and the Middle East.

British policy towards Greece was formulated on the premise that it was

necessaryto have in
a regime power that would accommodateBritish interests in the

area. The first prerequisite for the establishmentof such regime was the defeat of the

insurgency.The secondobjective was the establishmentof a broad-basedgovernment

that would be acceptableto the majority of the Greek population. British aims during

the yearsunder examinationremainedrelatively constant.

The implementation of British policy, however, revolved around a complicated

policy of intervention. Bevin blended intervention and non-intervention throughout the

yearsunder examination.The Labour foreign policy enjoyed a high degreeof bipartisan

support. Professionaldiplomats too understoodthat the Labour Foreign Secretarywas

pursuing traditional British interests. The Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign

Office, Sir Orme Sargent,assertedin November 1945, for instance,that the new

governmentwould maintain the Greek but

commitment by 'other and more discreet

methods'.The Labourcabinetwascommittedto the idealsof 'anti-imperial' policy and

' They had to modulatethe rhetoric surroundingtheir policy rather
'non-intervention'.

than its reality, however. The most spectacularBritish intervention in the civil war had

occurredunder the wartime coalition when, during the 'December Events', Churchill

had ordered that British troops treat Athens as a 'conquered city'. 2 As a result of

Churchill'sdecisiveactionhis successors
could afford to be more discreet.The British
Army guaranteed Greece's territorial integrity rather than engaging in combat

operations.The British troops who did go into combat were involved in directing and

1PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO),FO 800/276/GRE/45/10:SargentPapers,Sargent Leepcr,

to
9 November1945.
2 Churchill, TheSecondWorld War,
vol. 6, p. 252.
 176

assisting Greek counter-insurgencyoperations. These operations by their very nature

tendedto cloud the degreeof British involvement not least becausethey took place in

remote areaswhere few journalists could be found. The Labour government followed

the pattern of intervention as 'oscillating' intervention. If at all possible Britain would

standat one remove from the civil struggle.It would, however, intervene both militarily

and politically at times to

of crisis only withdraw once more once the crisis had passed.

The trust that the Greek governmentput in the guaranteeof its survival, provided by

Britain, was underlinedby the right-wing Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Tsaldaris,evenas the Truman Doctrine was promulgated.

It would be correct to characteriseBritish and American policy towards Greece

as moving along parallel paths. Even before the crisis of February and March 1947 the

United Stateshad decidedthat it neededto becomemore militarily involved in the

Mediterraneanregion. The British did not lure the Americans in. Rather they provided a

good opportunity for the Truman administration to launch their new policy in public.

This parallel developmentof policy explains why, on the whole, Anglo-American co-

operationin Greecewas so amicable.Neither side felt it was being 'used'.

During the courseof 1948,however,with the appointmentof GeneralJames

Van Fleet,the United Statesconsolidatedtheir supremacyover the British in Greece.

This doesnot imply that the British presencewas not important, but that the Americans

becamethe leading power in this collaboration.Each power maintained its own military

missionsacting in Greecewith separateroles. In 1949the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged the

White House to maintain its 'predominant position' and to be nothing less than the

4seniorpartner'in a 4senior-junior'arrangement
with Britain. The Americanswantedto

maintain control over military assistanceand 'hold in predominant position on all

3 YrIHPEY.IA Il: TOPIKOY APXEIOY-SERVICE OF HISTORICAL ARCHIVE, ATHENS (YIA), 1947,

46.1,21502,Avagopdrou TcyakSdpq iipo; TorEY,, 18 MaPTIOU1947 (Tsaldaris' Report to GES, 18
March 1947).
 177

4
fronts'. This, however, does not suggestthat there were serious clashes between the

two allies in Greece.Whatever the surface disagreementsmight be, the correlation of

interests between Britain and the United States ran deep, and, in the end, the two

countries were alwayspreparedto supporteachother.

The Greek civil war was a complex military struggle. During its final two years

the nature of the armed struggle itself was transformed from guerrilla to semi-

conventional warfare. Guerrilla activities in the mountains were combined with

conventional operations aimed at capturing cities. It was never a purely military

struggle. Both sideswere fighting for the 'hearts and minds' of the civilian population.

The KKE used its yiajka network to organise the Party's activities whilst the Greek

governmentcreateda number of civil guard organisationsto fight the Democratic Army

defenders.This type of warfare demandedsophisticatedcounter-insurgencyoperations

from the National Army. They were not well preparedto carry out such operations.They

lacked strategic imagination, tactical savvy and the willingness to engagethe enemy

moreclosely.Eachof the had

missingcomponents to be inculcatedby foreign military

In
advisers. the end, however,
the war was one betweenGreeks.The British and the

Americanscould teachthe National Army how to win the war but the government

forcesthemselveshad to win the victory. It saysmuch for the skill and diplomacyof

theseadvisersthattheywereableto motivatethe Greekarmedforcesto the point where

they could fight the war so competently.It is pointless to characterisethe government

forcesas 'puppets' of foreign powers, whether Britain or America. If they had deserved

this epithetthen the war would never have been won.5

The British Military Mission comprised of army, air, navy and police divisions

to train forces in its respectiveareasof interests.The British counter-insurgencyrole in

4 FRUS(1949): 6,453,455: Van Fleet to Departmentof Army, 7 November 1949.

5PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 202/892,WO
Instructionsfor the formation of the National Army, June1945;McNeill, The GreekDilemma, p. 189.
 178

Greeceremainedactive throughoutthe civil war until the final defeat of the Democratic

Army in October 1949.After 1947 American formations further reinforced the National

Army's fight againstthe insurgents.JUSMAPG too was divided into three divisions -

Tasks were divided betweenthe BMM and JUSMAPG. The British

army, air, and navy.

Military Mission continued its training duties; JUSMAPG provided operational advice

and supplies.Naturally the relationship betweenthe two allied missions was not always

Yet the Anglo-American partnershipnot only trained the National Army to a state
easy.

in which it could defeatthe Communists,but made it a full and effective part of NATO.

The Greek counter-insurgencyoperations symbolised the determination of the

West to contain communism.Britain's counter-insurgencyeffort in Greecewas crucial.

It was the British Chiefs of Staff who first introduced the three-stagestrategy of 'clear-

and-hold' in January 1947. This strategy called for and established a framework for

intelligence that lay the future 6

successeS.
military, political and co-operation at root of

The strategy necessitatedthe retraining and re-organisation of the security forces by

British units, instruction teams, and intelligence officers. The American 'staggered

offence' strategy applied after Van Fleet's arrival involved these political and military

Moreover
practises. the British role was crucial in terms of air power. Air supplies and

equipment, RAF personnel and RHAF training improved the RHAF's levels of

performance. Air raids were of decisive importance against the Democratic Army

7
defenders,who lacked any air cover. Many of the techniquesdevelopedby the British

in Greecewere applied elsewhereby both the British themselvesand by the Americans!

' The fist stagewas the reorganisationof securityforces.The secondwas propagandaorganisationto

counterbalanceyiaika and the third militarily 'clear' areas.Papagos,'Guerrilla warfare' in Osank-a(ed.),
Modern Guerrilla Warfare,p. 236; PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, KEW (PRO), WO 261/637, BMM (G),
On New Training Team, 30 January1947.
7 PUBLIC RECORDOFFICE, KEW (PRO), DEFE 5/8, COS (48) 129,22 October 1948; rENIK0
EnITEAEIO ETPATOY/AIEYGYNEH ILTOPIAL XTPATOY-GENERAL STAFF/ DIRECTORATE
OF HISTORY OF THE ARMY, ATHENS ( rEVAII), 1012/A/6, Avaqopdrou AvTtaTpdqyou
rc(opyiounanaycwpytou,27 Oicrwpptou1948(Reportby Lt. Gen. G. Papageorgiou,27 October 1948).
aJones,'A New Kind of War, p. 235.
 179

The British role in Greek politics was equally creative. British diplomats

consistentlyaimed at the creation of a stable coalition of the Centre. In politics Britain

backed a coalition of the Centre with the aim of creating a stable government. In one

sensethe British were as successfulin politics as they were in war. They managedto

keep the whole democraticshow on the road. The KKE and its front organisationscould

never gain enoughpurchaseon the political systemto fatally undermine the governance

of Greece.
In the end, however, British policy was undennined by unreliability of all the

anti-communistp oliticians a nd p arties. T he d ream ofas table c oalition o,f the Centre

was underminedby their inability to co-operate.

For Greeceitself, the negative effects of the civil war were evident for years to

follow. Political rivalry between the Right and the Left, between monarchists and

to
republicanscontinued divide the Concentration
people. carnpsandpolitical seclusion

followed the communist identity during the decadesthat followed. The KKE remained

illegal for almost thirty-five years.

The King and the royal Court were a constantdestabilising factor in politics. The

Palace exploited, for its own political interests, the fragmentation of Greek political

forcesandthe willingnessof certainpoliticians- suchas SofoclesVenizelos to bow

-
to royal demandsfor parliamentarysupport.By 1950,IDEA had graduallyestablishcd

its loyalty to Papagosand had becomethe rallying point of officers whose professional

ambitions were frustrated by the clients of the Court. The British tried to steer and

restrainKing Paul. British representativestreatedthe emergenceof Papagosinto politics

with s ome s cepticism.Itw as o nly w hen itb ecamec lear t hat Papagosdid not plan a

dictatorshipthat they swung their supportbehind him. The triumph of Papagossuggests

thatjust asin military affairsGreekpoliticianswent their own way. They too wereto a

greatextendindependent
of the Allied powers.
 180

Appendices

Appendix A: Principal Characters

A. I Main Participants

AchesonDean,US Secretaryof State, 1949-1953.

Agnidis Th. GreekAmbassadorin London, acting in 1947-1949.
AlexanderA. V., S ecretaryofS tate for D efenceint he B ritish L abour Cabinet, 1946-
1950.
Attlee Clement,Prime Minister of the British Labour government 1945-1951.
BernesJ. F, US Secretaryof Stateuntil 1947.
Bevin Ernest,Secretaryof Statefor Foreign Affairs in the British Labour administration,
1945-1950.
Browne G. D., Brigadier, CommanderBMM(G) November 195O-June1951.
Churchill Winston Spencer,British Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, 1940-
1945;Prime Minister October 1951-April 1955.

Crawford, GeneralKenneth, Commander,British Land Forces, Greece, 1946-1947.

Cripps Stafford, Chancellorof the Exchequerin the British Labour cabinet, 1947-1950.
Dalton Hugh, Chancellorof the Exchequerin the British Labour cabinet, 1945-1947.
DendrournisVassilis, GreekAmbassadorto Washington from 1950.
Dickson R.K., Rear Admiral, Head of the BNM(G), 1949-1951.
Down ErnestE., Major General,CommanderBMM(G) 1948-1949.
Eden Anthony, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the British National
Government,1940-1945;Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Conservative cabinet, 1951.
1955.

EisenhowerDwight D., General Secretaryof the Army, Supreme Commander, Allicd

Powers,Europe(SACEUR).

ForrestalJames,Secretaryof Defence, 1947-1949.

Frederick,Major GeneralRobert, Chief of the JUSMAG (G) from May 1951.
GeorgeII, King of the Hellenes, Succeededto throne, 1922; Abdicated, 1924; Recalled
by plebiscite, 1935; Fled from Greece after German invasion, 1941; Recalled by
plebiscite, 1946.Died in I April 1947.Succeededby his brother Paul.

GonatasStylianos, General, Member of the Revolutionary Committee and Premier,

1922; Founded National Liberal Party, 1945; Minister of Public Works
and
Reconstructionin Cabinet of Tsaldaris,Apr. 1946-Jan.1947.
Grady Henry, US Ambassadorto Greece,July 1948- March 1951; Chief US Mission
 181

(G).
Grigoropoulos, Lieutenant, General Theodoros, Chief of the Greek General Staff,
March-May 1951; Head of GreekNational Defence Council from June 1951.

Griswold Dwight, Chief of US Mission in Greece1947-1948.

Hobbs Godfrey, Lieutenant-Colonel,October 1944-February 1945 served in Greece in
the BMM. March 1947-December1949, as Colonel, served as associatebetween Greek
General Staff and the BMM. During 1954-1957, Brigadier, was appointed military
attachtduring negotiationsover Cyprus.

Ioannidis Ioannis,Member of the KKE Politburo.

Jenkins,Major GeneralReubenE., Chief of the JUSMAG (G), 1950.
Kanellopoulos Panayiotis, Professor of Sociology, Prime Minister November 1945;
Leader of the National Radical Union, acting Minister in all cabinets,joined Papagos's
GreekRally on 6 August 1951.

Kiousopoulos Dimitris, Public Prosecutor, PM of the caretaker government October

1952-November 1952.

Kirk Alexander,US Ambassadorto Greece,1941-1943.

Kopr616Fuad,Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs
LascellesDaniel, Counsellorof the British Embassyin Athens, 1945-1947.
LeeperRex, British Ambassadorto Greece,1941-1946.
Lovett Robert A., Deputy secretaryof Defenceuntil Sept. 1951; Secretaryof Defence.
Livesay William, General,Director of USAGG June 1947; JUSMAPG late 1947.
Macmillan Harold, British Resident Minister at Allied Headquarters in North-Wcst
Africa, accompaniedthe Allied Headquartersto Italy as Acting President of the Allied
Commissionin Italy, mediator betweenparties in Greecein the Greek civil war.

to Greece,1933-1941,1943-1948.
MacVeaghLincoln,US Ambassador
Marshall George,US Secretaryof State,1947-1949.
Maximos Dimitrios, Governor of National Bank of Greece; Prime Minister, January
August 1947.

Melas Leo, GreekAmbassadorin London 1951.

McGhee George, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, S. Asian, and African
Affairs from October 1949; Ambassadorto Turkey from December 1951.

MontgomeryB ernard,F ield M arshal, Chief of the Imperial General Staff 1946-1948,
Chairman of Western European Committee 1948-1951, Deputy Supreme Allied
CommanderEurope 1951-1958.

Morrison Herbert, British Minister of Foreign Affairs 1951

Mountbatten Louis, Admiral (British Navy), Commander-in-Chief for Eastcm
 182

Mediterranean.

Myers Edward C.W., 'Eddie', Colonel, Brigadier, CommanderBMM (G) 1942-1943.

Norton Sir Clifford, SucceededLeeper as British Ambassador in Athens, March 1946-
October 1951.

PapagosField Marshal Alexandros, Greek C-in-C of the armed forces, 1941,1949.

PremierNovember 1952-1955.

PapandreouGeorge, Joined Venizelist movement in Thessaloniki (Salonika), 1916;

Prime Minister, Apr. -Dec. 1944; Minister of the Interior in Cabinet of Maximos,
January 1947; Deputy PM, Minister of Co-ordination and Minister of Religion and
National Education,until July 1951.

Packard,Major General Sir Charles Douglas, Commander BMM 1949-1951; Chief of

Staff, GeneralHeadquarters,Middle East Land Forces, 1951-1953.

PattersonJefferson,US Representativeon the UN Special Committee on the Balkans.

PartsalidisDimitrios, Member of the KKE Politburo.
PeakeCharles,British Ambassadorin Athens from 1951.
PerowneLECM, Major GeneralCommanderBMM(G) June 1951-April 1952.
Peurifoy John E., US Ambassadorto Greeceand Chief of American Mission for Aid to
Greecefrom March 1951

Plastiras Nicolaos, General, President of the Revolutionary Committee, 1922-1923;

Launchedabortive coup d' itat, 1933; Premier, Jan- Apr 1945, April 1950-August 1950,
Sept. 1951-October 1952.

Politis AthanasiosG., GreekAmbassadorto the US.

PorterWilliam J., Office of Greek,Turkish, Iranian Affairs, Department of State.
Rawlins, Major GeneralSteward,Head of the BMM in Athens, 1945-1948.
Sakellariou, Vice Admiral Alexander, Greek Minister of National Defencc from
Oct.1951.

SargentSir Orme, Under-Secretaryof the Southern Department of the British Foreign

Office until 1946;PermanentUnder-Secretaryof Statefor Foreign Affairs, 1946-1949.

ScobieRonald, Lieutenant-General,CommanderBMM (G) 1944-1945.

SiantosGeorgios,Member of the KKE Politburo.
SofoulisThemistocles,Leaderof the Liberal Party-,PM November 1945-March1946,
September1947-June1949.

SelbyW.H., Admiral,Headof theBNM(G), 1951-1955.

TrumanHarry, SucceededRooseveltas Presidentof the US, 1945-1952.
Tsaldaris Konstantine, co-leader of the Populist Party, 1945-1946; Leader
of the
 183

Populist Party, 1946; Premier and Foreign Minister 1946-1947; Deputy Premier and
Foreign Minister 1947-1949;Vice-Presidentin Venizelos's cabinet Sept. 1950.

TsakalotosThrasyvoulos,Lieutenant General, Chief of the Greek General Staff, from

June 1951.

Tsouderos Emmanuel, Governor of the Bank of Greece, 1931-1939; Premier of

governmentin exile, Minister
1941-1944; of Co-ordination in Cabinet of Sofoulis.

Vafeiadis Marcos, Member of the KKE Central Committee, 1942; Chief ELAS
CommanderinM acedoniad uring t he S econdW orld W ar; 0 rganised t he D emocratic
Army 1947;Commanderof the Democratic Army December 1947 to January 1949.

VanFleet, Lieutenant General James A., USA former Director, Joint US Military
Advisory andPlanning Group in Greece,1948-1950.

Venizelos Sofocles, Son of Eleflierios Venizelos; Premier, Apr 1944; Founded Liberal
Party, 1946; Vice-Premier in Cabinet of Maximos, January 1947; Greek Minister of
ForeignAffairs October 1951- October 1952.

Ventiris, LieutenantGeneralKonstantine,Chief of the Greek GeneralStaff February

1947;InspectorGeneralof theNA February1948;Commanderof SHDM May 1949.

Woodhouse Chris, Major, Commander BMM(G) 1943-1944; Second Secretary in

in
embassy Athens, 1945.

Yost CharlesW., Minister at the American embassyin Athens. 1951-1954.

ZahariadisNicolaos,Installedby Cominternas Secretaryof the Central Committeeof
the KKE, 1931;GeneralSecretary,1935;Leaderof KKE after 1945;Expelled from the
Party,1956.
 184

Appendix B: GreekGovernments1944-1952

B. I ChronologicalTable of Goverrunents

October1944-January1945:GeorgePapandreou.

January1945-April 1945:Nicolaos Plastiras.

April 1945-Octobcr1945:PetrosVoulgaris.

November 1945-Novcmbcr1945: PanayiotisKanellopoulos.

November 1945-March1946:ThemistoclesSofoulis.

Elections31 March 1946(proportional representation)

March 1946-January1947:PanayisTsaldaris.

January1947- September1947:Dimitrios Maximos.

September1947-June1949:ThemistoclesSofoulis. (Sofoulis died.)

June1949-January1950:Alexander Diomidis caretakergovernment.

January1950-March1950:John Theotokis caretakergovernment.

Elections5 March 1950(proportional representation)

March 1950-April 1950: SofoclesVenizelos.

April 1950-August1950:Nicolaos Plastiras.

August 1950-September1951: SofoclesVenizelos.

Elections9 September1951(reinforcedproportional representation)

September1951-October1952:Nicolaos Plastiras.

October 1952-November1952:caretakerDimitrios Kiousopoulos.

Elections 16 November 1952 (majority system)

November 1952:Alexander Papagos

 185

Appendix C: The Electoral Systems

C.1 The Electoral Systems

The first two post-war elections in Greeceon 31 March 1946 and 5 March 1950

were held under the system of proportional representation similarly to the electoral

system of 1936. The 1946 election, due to the decision of the KKE to abstain, had

producedthe closestcorrelation between the number of votes cast for a given party and

its proportion of seats in Parliament and a relatively stable and strong majority to

govem. The systemwas tested in 1950, with greater number of parties to participate. It

in between
resulted weak correspondence the share of votes cast and the share of scats

received.No party managedto receive a strong majority to govern and coalitions of the

Centrewereformed.

As a resultof the unstablecoalitionsduring 1950and 1951new electionwould

be conductedunder a new electoral systemof reinforced proportional representationon

9 September1951. The aim was to limit the number of parties elected in Parliament and

form strongercoalitionsor alliances.Participationin Parliamentwas restrictedto the

threepartieswith the largestshareof votes, subject to a seventeenper cent minimum for

single parties and a twenty per cent minimum for parties in alliance. Only nine partics

contestedthe 1951 election. Yet, no single party managedto win a workable majority of

seats.Therefore,still weakcoalitionsof the Centrewere formed,which wcre vulncrable

to making and dissolving alliances.

The lesson to draw so far was that a further change in the electoral systcm was

neededif a strongcabinetwas at last to be formed.This was a debatebetweenthe right

andleft-wingparties.The right-wingpartiessupportedthe new simplemajority system,

which coupledwith the Americanwill; whereasPrimeMinister Plastiraspublicly sidcd

against.Nonetheless,the majority systemwas adoptedon 12 September1952 to be

 186

appliedto the election on 16 November 1952. Only two parties were now representedin

Parliament,the Greek Rally and the Union of the Parties, which was a coalition of the

three Centreparties.The majority systemgave a strong majority to Papagos' Party. The

GreekRally with 49 per cent shareof votes resulted in and 82 per cent shareof seatsin

the Houseand thus a single party formed a government.

 197

Appendix D: Maps

D. 1 Map of Greece

Source:O'Ballance, Yhe Greek Civil War, 1944-1949,London: Faber and Faber, 1966.
 188

D.2 The Map of Athens during the DecemberEvents

TOTatoC.t
From3fe3am

TLR .....

K-
c US

IIA

.**.---*- tiadw., qu
rit, asu
;Ue e

AT
C.vm
m XT
US

Plu*ron
-IF

Conv=nist
Airfieht Territag

Source:H. Macmillan,TheBlast of War,1939-1945,Londow.

Macmillan,,1967,p.565.
 189

MissionsCommandSetUp in Greece.
D.3 British andAmericanMilitary
I CrnRn t3FFiCh I ".. .II-I
......
2 _MS
cms

u" da my be Subjed tO
am comviava and UM V"
P, Ro=ds! klaft displaybd &I OW Ovbd@bls
PW.. . 10 mw tNa COPY is supp- --I- Ccfýdhw% Of Vý** of Pubk
is 91"
Furum i nf orMdo"
copyrQM resuwborka. pw Odo*, g "a"",

NIMMMaa-

Z) Md 0
P:
q-f--- i9+
-- .-. M 9i 14 C13 A
0 0 91 a

Cd ri ý4 co 0 0
R: $4
0N
P4 P,
-ri
N 0

(D 4)
4;
0. -1
11 .14
+3 -0
+
E-1 4) -H 43 to C.)
> Id r,
0 9 0 t :,
ý
Fl
W
0
-. 8o C)s
4; 1w0
I to
14
0
0p
:;9
FA ýq 0 H,
,
ý2 '1 0 C3 cs to 0 (d
co od M'd g AM
j, " (a V. -H 4-3 0
(a V4 g:a I "
tz; : 4- C) 4) qA +3
4-1 0 cd
It
P
A Pq + A0
1 to cl 0Q
14
,10 ýd Vo 4) W)
1.1
1
co

.a
/I-. P. -H ý0 to
4) 04
+3
0
94 r.
0
00
-H
CQ$4
fq ý4
+
+3
ýW
4J
;4 4-1 q-4 0
43 00 0 zi

CM
$4
Cd -4 -H +3 0 43
0 00 -00
.0
4)
rq IL, 0 r: ýf vi ýl -H r-I
"0 ;4 94 V, 0 94 93.0
F-4 4J 0 / Cd -H (13 1.1 If V-1
,

0aZ --------------
0 02
Ps
0
% ri
Co
14 cd
% r-I > 14
cd cd r.
ýl . -H
%% % 14 0
Cb

Id

O'd
43
0 V
vi 00
co c0
-# ý- Cd r-,
U 4-3
co
0 r-I
9
00 1 0
0.2 -
4-1 to 00
(D 4)
43
ca
rq 4.
as 03 A
41

rq 0 ;4 q)
ýq 4.3 0 43
ýf ca
to
0[ 0) ý4 Id
..
gco
0 9 S
11 +3
0 -4
r-I
4J
ý e- $4
Cd 0
-H
to
co

4) 0

.. -4 -- r4
S.
ý
ý-gl
 190

DA Map of CommunistSuppliesfrom Albania, YugoslaviaandBulgaria.

cd
00 1, N
r. u 00
IV040
. 8; 2 ; Gpuýý ýIw0
--*",,, 4)
44 A
. 00C! a-
10

0
E-A
cd
ta 000
.0
too
cz
t CIO
0 cd 0
cl
to
D 0
>> 0
00

d
0 01,914n cd
L. 4)
114
cd
.00N
L4 :ý ; go 0 S3
'tý @§
A, -
- cl
ed
to
93 "0
0 ba
4. j
cd
>
0 4) CS
0t

cl td
.4 .I cN
0 fe
0
cd
0. cis
$4
cd
.6
CL. cd
w0 0.4) Wý go
9
U
cd
-bi
cl
e.
OU
A *Z; 0. cd

01
0c5
tg ca Co
0
(n 0

>
0
(1 0 Ngý
.W0
0 >% 0 -%
cd .'
cl 140 Oc' . "e
cl
WO
0
a z
U
,V..
-

cl
ca
cq .0 0
14 >
. "0 W.
0

0
4) a c
0 >U
te! 'Oý. 0
0a0 ! cý t
cd po
ý4. a
54. .ý

r"19r., .0
4ý
Mot 0
40
0 IA
*--,

>. O Q,

0
0V0

00
U'V., S.Po
*IV VVV
W.

0>
64

10
> !0- .0 cd
W
'U
cn
0 L. . "iU.ýý
V. CL, 0

0
> mv
'40Od C3
to 1.
0
V :ý
-11ý' '-c
cd 0 -ý. V
S, =1 :> '01 c'
04

. ýO 0 F,
i4
w ed 0
e
cl - OU 'Q
lu cd
>>00a
0> cd cc
En V c 4- 'Itrýý
V 4) 0 4n cd r io a
E- ba 0
4! 0A 00
4c"
*c "Ov ,,
P-4 -0 0
: ý-
00 .6 *%4%
0

:4
'6 cl cd

-00 P

WO :9

pwo/

0
0
 191

main passageof DA defendersentrance.

->

itinerary from and to Greece.

.... ->

main allied cities

hospitalsabroad.

DA supply centresand training camps in Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria.

Source:YIA, 1948,126.5, DIPWTaTtic6qX6prl; EvtcrX6(ycco; -rcovZI)PPopjT6)v

wco Akpavw, riouyKouXapia Kat Bov%yapta-Mapof Bandits Supplies from
Albania, Yugoslavia,Bulgaria.
D. 5 OperationDawn

Rource:
Averoff, By Fire andAxe,London:CaratzasBrothers,
1978,p. 420.
D.6 TheMountain Forts of the Democratic Army at Mounts Gr,

f it gý
ýOchrid t
-;z YUGOSLAVIAj /fill, L,
4
.... .....
71
........
.....
Alf,

LakePrespor

forina E essa
-I
2",

vil I
Naoussa

oillow

Z, -
Z,

'1Z W,
r. I
%%%

..............T
fit

Ioannina jo /V
1ý
0Sw ;r
C.
z mp$ ;,. .: ELVý-
"nt#

Trikk la
rllilisýs
fv, -s /, ý&0-
-ý=&I
-=s. =. z;: I? -
III k;
zz-
W. Z; 'iý- it

/11of

[_.THE TWO MOUNTAIN FORTS OF Dý

I r. 1- Axe,London:Caratzas
Brothers,1978,
.Fire and
 194

AppendixE: Table

E.1DemocraticArmy CombatantStrengthin Greece,1946-1949

Central Epirus Eastern

Greece, Western Macedonia
Date Total Peloponnes Crete, Macedonia Western
e Islands Thrace
March 1946 2,500
June1946 3,000
July 1946 4,000
August 5,500
1946
October 6,000
1946
December 9,285
1946
Early 1947 11,390 400 8,140 1,700 1,150
March 1947 13,000
April 1947 14,250
Summer 18,000
1947
September
1947 13,610
October 17,000 3,000 8,500 5,000
1947
November
1947 19,420
December
1947 20,350
January 22,250
1948
February 24,140
1948
March 1948 25,000 1,000 9,450 9,450 5,100
April 1948 26,210 3,000 8,800 10,400 4,010
May 1948 25,610
June 1948 23,300
July 1948 24,180 2,500 4,940 10,490 6,250
August 21,100
1948
September
1948 23,720
October 25,480
1948
November
1948 25,000 3,300 1,720 13,080 6,900
December
 195

1948 24,000 3,300 1,620 11,080 8,000

January 23,210 3,000 2,020 10,390 7,800
1949
February 24,090 1,600 5,370 11,120 6,000
1949
March1949 21,810 1,000 7,780 7,250 5,780
April 1949 19,820 100 4,830 9,750 5,140
May 1949 20,240 50 5,650 9,880 4,660
June1949 18,270 130 2,840 11,280 4,660
July 1949 17,635 80 1,270 12,855 3,430
August 10,105 0 1,735 5,610 2,760
1949
September
1949 3,580 0 1,490 590 1,500
October 1,910
1949

Source:Basedon JUSMAPG,GreekGeneralStaff, andUS Military Attacht-Greece

Cited
reportsandothersources. in Shrader,
The WitheredVine,p. 111.
 196

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Unpublished Documents

ATHENS

FEVAIE, rcvtico ExtTOxio 6/

ETpaTo, IcyTopi(x;
At&-60i)v(yil Y-TpaTof).

yLA,, y7Mpc(jja lmopticol) Apxciol).

LONDON

PRO: Public RecordOffice, Kew.

ADM 1: AdmiraltyandSecretariatPapers.
116:AdmiraltyandSecretariatCases.

AIR 8: Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence:Department of Chief of the Air Staff.
20: Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence:Air Historical Branch.
23: Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence:RAF Overseas Commands.
24: Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Operations Record Books, Commands.
46: Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence:RAF Liaison Missions.

CAB 21: Cabinet Office and predecessors:RegisteredFiles.

79: War Cabinet and Cabinet: Chief of Staff Committee.
122: War Cabinet and Cabinet Office: British Joint Staff Mission and
British Joint Service Mission.
128: CabinetMinutes (CM and C Series).
129: Cabinet Memoranda(CP and C Series).
130: Cabinet Committees(MiscellaneousCommittees: Minutes
and Papers.
131: Cabinet Defence Committee:Minutes and Papers.
134: Cabinet MiscellaneousCommittees:Minutes and Papers.

DEFE 4: Chiefsof Staff CommitteeMinutes.

5: Chiefsof Staff CommitteeMemoranda.
6: JointPlanningCommitteeReports.

FO 371: GeneralPolitical Correspondence.

476: ConfidentialPrint Greece1947-1957.
 197

800: Private Papersof Ernest Bevin, 1945-1950

(460: Europe, 468: Greece,475-477: Middle East).
PrivatePapersof Anthony Eden, 1950-1955
(796: Greece).

PREM 3: Prime Minister's Office: Operational Correspondenceand Papers(Winston

Churchill).
8: Prime Minister's Office: OperationalCorrespondenceand Papers(Clement
Attlee).
11:Prime Minister's Office: OperationalCorrespondenceand Papers(Winston
Churchill).

T 236: Treasury:OverseasFinanceDivision.

WO 32: War Office and successors:RegisteredFiles.

33: War Office: Reportsand Memorandaand Papers.
44: OrdnanceOffice and War Office: Correspondence.
202: War Office: British Military Mission in Liaison with Allied Forces.
216: War Office: Office of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
261: War Office: Middle East Land Forces.

King's College,Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives.

Papersof BrigadierG. P. Hobbs,KCLMA, 16/1-13NID.

Papersof Major GeneralH.E. Pyrnan,KCLMA, 6/1/14,6/l/2,7/1/2-3,7/1/13.

Papersof Admiral W.H. Selby, KCLMA, GB 99.

EDINBURGH

National Library of Scotland.

Rear Admiral Robert Kirk Dickson Papers,MS 13587 (207-214), Various Personal
and
Naval Papers.

CAMBRIDGE

Churchill ArchivesCentre.

Philip Noel-BakerPapers,NBKR, 4/348:Cuttings

andCorrespondence
in Greece.
Winston Churchill Papers,CHUR2:Public
andPolitical PapersGeneral,1945-1965.
 198

PublishedDocuments

BRITAIN

CommandPapers. Cited as Cmd.6812 Report of the Allied Mission to Observe the

GreekElections.London: HMSO, 1946.

Cmd.8489 Protocol Regarding the Accession of Greece and Turkey into NATO.
London:HMSO, 1952.

Documentson British Policy Overseas (cited as DBPO). Series I, vols. 1-2,11, vol. 4.
Eds.R. Butler, M. E. Pelly, and H. J. Yasamee.London: HMSO, 1984.

Debates
Houseof Commons (flMeb). 5hSeries.London:HMSO, 1944-1953.

GREECE

GreekGovemment

GES/DIS.History of the Organisation of the Greek Army 1821-1954-Io-ropla

Tov
E,UqviKob,
ETpaTob1821-1954.Athens:GES/DIS,1957.

GES/DIS.The Greek Army during the Bandit War, 1946-1949: 77je Clearanceof
Roumeli and the First Fight in Grammos 1948-0 EUqvzK6g Erpar6q KaTd TOV
EKKaOdpzaiqTqg P0bU9Aqq Jzpo5Tq MdXq
Aycbva,1946-1949:H
AvriavppopiaKOv Kai H
TovFpapuov 1948.Athens:GES/DIS, 1970.

GES/DIS. The Greek Army during the Bandit War, 1946-1949: The First Year of the
Bandit War 1946-0 EUjVIKOqETpaTO9KaTaTov AvvoVUqopzaK6 Ayo5va, 1946-1949: To
Hp&ro EToqTov AvvuvppopiaKO6 Ayo5va 1946. Athens: GES/DIS, 197 1.

GES/DIS. The Greek Army during the Bandit War, 1946-1949: Tile Operations
of the C
Army Corps, 1947-1949-0 EUqvIK6q XTpaTd9KaTa
Tov AVTIO-VPUOPIaKd Ay6va, 1946-
1949: Ot EmXcipýcvq Tov rEcbpaToq. ETpaTo6,1947-1949. Athens: GES/DIS, 1976.

GES/DIS.Archivesof the Civil War 1944-1949-ApXcia

Ep(pvAiov
HoAtpov1944-1949,
Vol-1-16.Athens:GES/DIS,1998.

History of the GreekNation-lo-roplaToo EUqVIK06 EOVOVq,

VOL16. Athens:Ekdotiki
Athinon, 2000.
 199

KKE(GreekCommunistParty)

IoToplaq rov KKE, v ol. 1,1918-1949. A thens: S unchroni

Historyof the KKE-JOKi,1110
Epochi,1996.

KKE, Official Documents-E;dm7pa Kcipeva, vol. 6,1945-1949. Athens: Synchroni

Epochi,1987.

PEEA Archive-17EEA Apxcio rqq 17oArrIVIg Emrpo ýq EOvwýs A; rcAcv09pC0Uqs.

flpaycrwd Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 1990.
Evv65pidarecov.

UNITEDNATIONS

UnitedNations Resolutions, Series I, General Assembly: Resolutions Adapted by the

GeneralAssembly,vol. 1,1946-1948. New York: Oceana Publication Inc., 1972.

UnitedNations Resolutions, Series II, Security Council: Resolutions and Decisions of

theSecurityCouncil, vol. 1,1946-1947. New York: Oceana Publication Inc., 1988.

YearBookof the United Nations, 1947-1948. New York- Department of Public

Information,1949.

YearBook of the United Nations, 1948-1949. New York: Department of Public

Information,1950.

UNITED STATES

Documents
of the NationalSecurityCouncil1947-1977(cited asDocumentsof the NSC
Washington:UniversityPublicationsof America,Inc., 1980.
1947-1977).

Foreign Relations of the United Statescited as FRUS

FRUS (1943): 4. The Near East and Africa. Washington: Government Printing Office
(GPO), 1964.
FRUS (1945): 1. General: The United Nations. Washington: GPO, 1967.
FRUS (1945): 8. TheNear East and Africa. Washington: GPO, 1969.
FRUS (1947): 3. TheBritish Commonwealth.Washington: (GPO), 1972
FRUS (1947): 5. TheNear East and Africa. Washington: GPO, 1971.
FRUS (1948): 4. Eastern Europe; TheSoviet Union. Washington: GPO, 1974.
FRUS (1948): 5. YheNear East SouthAsia
and Africa. Washington: GPO, 1975.
FRUS (1949): 4. WesternEurope. Washington: GPO, 1975.
FRUS (1949): 5. Eastern Europe; TheSoviet Union. Washington: GPO, 1976.
FRUS (1949): 6. TheNear East, SouthAsia
and Africa. Washington: GPO, 1977.
FRUS (1950): 3. WesternEurope. Washington: GPO, 1977.
FRUS (1950): 5. YheNear East, SouthAsia Washington: GPO, 1978.
andAfrica.
FRUS (1950): 7. Korea. Washington: GPO, 1976.
FRUS (195 1):1. National SecurityAffairs. Washington: GPO, 1979.
FRUS (1951): 2. The United Nations: The WesternHemisphere.Washington:
GPO, 1979.
 200

FRUS(1951):3. European Security and German Question. Washington: GPO, 1981.

FRUS(1951):5. YheNear East andAfrica. Washington: GPO, 1982.
FRUS(1952-1954):5. WesternEuropean Security. Washington: GPO, 1983.
FRUS(1952-1954):6. WesternEurope and Canada. Washington: GPO, 1986.
FRUS(1952-1954):9. TheNear East and Middle East. Washington: GPO, 1986.

Recordsof the Joint Chief of Staff (cited as Records of the JCS). Part 2: 1946-1952.The
MiddleEast.Washington:University Publications of America, Inc., 1979.

Recordsof the Joint Chief of Staff (cited as Records of the JCS). Part 2: 1946-1953.
StrategicIssues:Section 1. Washington: University Publications of America, 1981.

Newspapers

BRITAIN

TheTimes

GREECE

Eleftheria (EAcvOcpfa)
Kathimerini (KaOI7,
UEPV0
Ta Nea (Ta Ma)
To Vima (To Bý,ua)
Rizospastis (Pi(oo7rdo'rl9)

Memoirs, Diaries, Autobiographies, Biographies

Acheson,D. Presentat the Creation:My Yearsin the StateDepartment.New York:

Norton,1969.

Attlee, C. 4s It Happened.London: Heinemann, 1954.

.
Blanas, G. Civil War, 1945-1949-Euý96Aioq
H6)xuoq, 1945-1949. Athens: Kastaniods,
1976.

Bullock, A. TheLife and TimesofErnest Bevin, vol. H. London: Heinernann, 1967.

ErnestBevin: Foreign Secretary1945-1951.London: Oxford UniversityPress,

1983,1985.

Churchill, W. S. TheSecondWorld War,vol.5. London:Cassell,1952;

vol. 6. London:
Cassell,1954.

Dalton,E. High TideandAfter: Memoirs1945-1960.London:FrederichMuller, 1962.

Djilas, M. Conversations
with Stalin.London:Penguin,1962.
Eden,A. TheEdenMemoirs, 3, TheReckoning.London:Cassell,1965.
 201

Foley, Ch., ed. YheMemoirs of General Grivas. London: Longrnans, 1964.

Ioannidis G. Memoirs: Problems of the KKE Politics during Resistance, 1940-1945 -

Avapv4acig: HpoflA4para rov KKE Mv EOviK4 AvrioTaaq, 1940-1945. Athens:
Themelio, 1979.

Kanellopoulos,P. Diary 31 March 1942-4January 1945-HqcpoA6yzo31 Mapriou 1942-

4 lavovaplov 1945.Athens: x. ekd, 1977.

Katsis, D. Diary of A DAG Guerrilla 1946-1949 -To HpcpoA6yio Ev6q Avr6prq rov
JEE, 1-3 vols. Athens: Glaros, 1990.

Leeper,R. WhenGreekMeets Greek.London: Chatto & Windus, 1950.

MacMillan, H. YheBlast of War: 1939-1945.London: Macmillan, 1967.

Mar Diaries. London: Macmillan, 1984.

Matthews, K. Memories of a Mountain War. Greece: 1944-1949. London: Longmans

Green,1972.

Montgomery, B.L. 77ie Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of

Alamein. London: Collins, 1958.

Myers, E.W. C. The GreekEntanglement.London: Hart-Davis, 1955.

T. E. Marshal Alexandros Papagos.Legend and Glory -ETpardpXqq

Papagiannopoulos,
AM&v6po,; 17a7rayoq.
epbAoqkai J6&. Athens:[sm], 1987.

Papandreou, G. The Liberation of Greece-H A7rcAcvNpcOaq

r?lq EUdboq. Athens:
Elliniki Ekdotiki, 1945.

Psimenos,
T. Rebelin Agrafa-Avr6pTqq
ar'Aypaga. Athens:Synchroni
Epochi, 1985.

Sarafis,St. After Varkiza-Merdrq B6PKI(a.Athens: Epikairotita, 1979.

Truman,H. TheMemoirs ofHarry S. Truman, vol. 2, Years of Trial and Hope. London:
Hodderand Stoughton,1956.

Tsakalotos,E. Forty Years Soldier of Greece.How We Won Our Fights 1940-1949

-
-rapavra Xp6via ETpavoýTqq Tqq EUdbog. I165qEKEp6q'aqus
Tovq Ayo5vegMaq 1940-
1949.Athens: Typogafeion 'Akropoleos', 1960.

Vafeiades, M. Memoirs-Axouvquovcbuara,vol. 3. Athens: Nea Sunora, 1985, vol 5,

Athens:Papazisis,1992.
 202

Secondary Sources

Books

Abbot, F. J. The Greek Civil War, 1947-1949. School of Advanced Military Studies
Thesis.Fort Leavenworth,KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, USACGSC, May
1994.55 pages.Casestudy of United Statesgovernmentefforts to help Greece defeat its
Communistinsurgency,1946-1949.

Adams,Th. K. US Special OperationsForces in Action. London: Frank Cass, 1998.

Ahmad, F. The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975. London: Hurst for the
Royal Institute of InternationalAffairs, 1977.

Alexander,G. M. The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine: British Policy in Greece, 1944-
1947.Oxford: ClarendonPress,1982.

Alexandris, A., Veremis, Th., Kasakos, P., Koufoudakis, V., Rasakis Ch. and
G.,
Tsitsopoulos, eds. Greek-TurkishRelations 1923-1987- Oz EUqvoroVPKIKtqEXtaclq
1923-1987,Athens: Gnosi, 1988.

Alexandris, K Our Navy During the War Period, 1941-1945-To NavrtKb paq r?lv
17epioborov HoMpov, 1941-1945.Athens: Aetos, 1952.

T.
Anderson, The United Great
States, Britain and the Cold War, 1944-1947.
London:
Macmillan,1981.

Athanassopoulou,E. Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests 1945-1952. London:

Frank Cass,1999.

Auty, Ph. and Clogg, R., eds.British Policy towards Wartime Resistancein Yugoslavia
and Greece. London: Macmillan, 1975.

Averoff-Tositsa, E. By Fire and Axe. London: CaratzasBrothers, 1978.Greek edition:

OUrld Kai TaCK06pl. Athens: Estia, 1974.

Baerentzen,L., Iatrides,J. 0. andSmith,0. L., eds.Studiesin the History of the Greek

Civil War,1945-1949.Copenhagen: MuseumTusculanurnPress,1987.

Baev,B. YheGreek Civil War-A Yiewfrom Outside.Athens: Fifistor, 1997.

Ball, S. J. The Cold War: An International History, 1947-1991.London: Arnold, 1998.

Ballance,E. 0. The Greek Civil War, 1944-1949.London: Faber and Faber, 1966.

Balta, N. The Greek Civil War (1946-1949) through the French Press EUlviKbq
-0
Ey(pRiog 176,lxpoi; (1946-1949) Mgaa a7roro rU. UIKo T67ro.Athens: Odysseas, 1993.
 203

Barker, E. British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War. London:
Macmillan, 1976.

Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics. London: Royal Institute of

InternationalAffairs, 1950.

Blanas, G. Civil Mar, 1945-1949-, Ep(pbbog 176lepog 1945-1949. Athens: Kissavos,

1977.

Blaufarb, D. S. 71e CounterinsurgencyEra: US Doctrine and Performance. London:

Macmillan, 1977.

Campbell,M. A., Downs, E. W. and Schuetta,L. V. The Employment of, 4irpower in the
Greek Guerrilla Mar, 1947-1949. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Concepts Division,
AerospaceStudiesInstitute, US Air University, December 1964.

Carey, J. and Carey A. The Web of Modern Greek Politics. New York: Columbia
University Press,1968.

Charises,A. Elections 1946-1996: what the Greeks voted during the last 50 years -
Ekbyýq 1946-1996: Ti VIVicave oi EUnveg ra mlEmada 50 Xpovia.Athens:
Demiourgia,6996.

Chiclet, C. Les CommunistesGrecs Dans La Guerre: Histoire du Part! Communist de

GrOcede 1941 C 1949.Paris: L' Harinattan, 1987.

Clayton, A. The British Empire as a Superpower: 1919-1939. London: Macmillan,

1986.

Clogg,R. A. Short History ofModern Greece.London: C arnbridgeUniversity Prcss,

1986.

PartiesandElectionsin Greece.London:C. Hurst andCo., 1987.

Anglo-GreekAttitudes: Studiesin History. London, Macmillan, 2000.

Close,D. H., e d. The Greek Civil War, 1943-1950: Studies of Polarisation. London:
Routhledge,1993.

The Origins of the Greek Civil War. London: Longman, 1995.

Coulournbis, T. Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences. New

Haven:Yale University Press,1966.

The United States,Greece,and Turkey: the troubled alliance. New York:

Praeger,1983.

Dafnis, G. Greece Between Two Wars-H EUdg MT46

rcov Mo HoMpcov. Athens:
IKUOS,1955.

The Greek Political Parties-Ta EUqvIKa 176ATmdK6,uuaTa. Athens: Ikaros,

 204

1961.

Dedijer, V. Tito Speaks.London: Simon and Schuster,1953.

The Battle Stalin Lost: memoirs of Yugoslavia, 1948-1953. New York: Viking
Press,1971.

Devereux, D. The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle East
1948-1956.London: Macmillan, 1990.

Eudes,D. YheKapetanios.London: New Left Books, 1972.

Farakos, G. ELAS and Power-O EAAE kat I Eýovcrla, vols. 1-2. Athens: Ellinika
Grammata,2000.

Featherstone,K. and Katsoudas,D., eds. Political Change in Greece. London: Croom

Helm, 1987.

Fleischer, H. Crown and Svastiwa-.Erýppa Kai EfldovKa, vol 1. Athens: Papazisis, 1988;
vol 2. Athens: Papazisis, 1995.

Foley, Ch., ed. YbeMemoirs of General Grivas. London: Longman, 1964.

Frazier,R. Anglo-American Relations with Greece.The Coming of the Cold Mar, 1942-
1947.London: Macmillan, 1991.

French,D. TheBritish Wayin Marfare 1688-2000.London: Unwin Hyman, 1990.

Gaddis,J. L. The United Statesand the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947.New York:

ColumbiaUniversity Press,1972.

New York: Oxford UniversityPress,1982.

Strategiesof Containment.

WeNow Know: Rethinking the Cold War History. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1998.

Giannoulopoulos, G. Post-War World: Greek and European History 1945-1963-0

MmxoýEpIK6,; EUIVIKI'
Kbapog: Kai EvpCO7raIK?
l' IoTopia 1945-1963. Athens:
Papazisis,1992.

Greene,T. N., ed. The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him. London: Frederick A. Praeger,
1962.

Grigoropoulos, Th. From the Top of the Hill-Ano viv Kopuyý rou A69o-o. Athens:
Estia, 1966.

Grove,E. J. Vanguardto Trident. London: Bodley Head, 1987.

Hammond,N. Venture into Greece: with the guerrillas, 1943-1944. London: Kimber,
1983.
 205

Hathaway,R. M. AmbiguousPartnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947. New York:

ColumbiaUniversity Press,1981.

Haralampes,D. Army and Political Power-ETpaTbqkai I70AITIK4Eýovuia. Athens:

Exadas,1985.

Harris, G. Troubled Alliance. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public

Policy Research,1972.

Hams, K. Attlee. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982.

Hondros, J. Occupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony, 1941-1944. New York:
Pella, 1983.

Howarth, T.E.B. Prospects and Reality. Great Britain 1945-1955. London: Collins,
1985.

Iatrides, J. 0. Balkan Triangle: Birth and Decline of an Alliance Across Ideological

Boundaries.The Hague:Mouton, 1968.

Revolt in Athens: The Greek Communist 'Second Round, 1944-1945.

Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press,1972.

Ambassador MacYeagh Reports. New Jersey: Princeton University Press,

1980.

ed. Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis. Hanover and London: University
Pressof New England, 1981.

and Wringley, L., eds. Greeceat the Crossroads: Yhe Civil War and Its Legacy.
University Park: PennsylvaniaStateUniversity Press,1995.

Janowitz, M. and Doom. J. V., eds. On Military Intervention. Belgium: Rotterdam

University Press,1971.

Jones,H. 'A New Kind of War': America's Global Strategy and the Truman Doctrine in
Greece.New York: Oxford University Press,1989.

Kanellopoulos,P. Historical Essqys-IOTOPKddOKi

IIUia. Athens: Papazisis,1979.

Kaplan, L. S, Clawson, R.W. and Luraghi, R., eds. NATO and the Mediterranean.
Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources,c1985.

Kaplan, L. The United Statesand NATO. Kentucky: 1984.

Karayiannis,G. The GreekDrama: 1940-1952-ToEUqviK6 Apdpa: 1940-1952.Athens:

Estia, 1964.

Kontis, B. Anglo-American Politics and the Greek Problem, 1945-1949-H AyyAo-

ApcpwaVIKý 170ATIKýkaz To EUqvzK6 17p6flA)7pa,1945-1949. Thessaloniki: Paratiritis,
 206

1984.

Koulouris, N. Greek Bibliography of the Civil War, 1945-1949-EWIVIKýBiflAtoypa(pla

Tou Eu(pvA[ovHoAtpov, 1945-1949.Athens: Filistor, 2000.
,
Kousoulas,D. Revolutionand Defeat. TheStory ofthe Greek CommunistParty. Oxford:
Oxford University Press,1965.

Kuniholm, B. R. The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict
and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey and Greece. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1980.

Laquer, W. Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Survey. London: Weidenfeld and

Nicolson, 1977.

Leffler, M. P. A Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman

Administration and the Cold War. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
c1992.

Leontarides,G. Betweenthe Two Extremes] 946-1967-Avdpcaa o-ra,46o AKpa 1946-

1967.Athens: Estia, 1992.

Linardatos,S. From the Civil War to Hounta, 1949-1952-A;rorov Ey(pQo M Xo6vTa,

1949-1952.Athens: Papazisis,1977.

Loth, W. TheDivision of the World. London: Routhledge, 1988.

Louis, W. R. TheBritish Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the
UnitedStatesand Postwar Imperialism. London: Routhledge, 1988.

Loulis, J. The Greek CommunistParty, 1940-1944.London: Groom Helm, 1982.

Margaritis, G. History of the Greek Civil War 1946-1949-Io-ropla 'rov EUIVIK06

Eppvliov RoAtpov 1946-1949,vols 1-2. Athens: Vivliorama, 2001.

Markezinis, S. Contemporary Political History of Greece 1936-1975- X67xpovq

ffobvK4 Io-roplaMg EUdbog 1936-1975,vols. 1-2. Athens: Papyros, 1994.

Mazower, M., ed. After the War Was Over: Reconstructing the Family, Nation
and
Statein Greece,1943-1960.Oxford, Princeton:Princeton University Press,2000.

McCuen,J. J. YheArt Of Counter-RevolutionaryWar. London: Faber and Faber, 1966.

c
McGhee, G. The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection. London: Macmillan,

1990.

Envoy to the Middle World. London: Harper and Row, 1983.

c
McInnes, C. J. Hot War, Cold War: t he B ritish A rmy's Way in Warfare, 1945-1995.
London:Brassey's,6996.
 207

McNeill, W. H. The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath. London: Victor Gollancz,
1947.

Greece: American Aid in Action, 1947-1956. New York: Twentieth Century

Fund, 1957.

TheMetamorphosisof GreeceSince World War H. Oxford: Oxford University

Press,1978.

Meynaud,J. Les Forces Politiques En GrOce.Paris: Etudes de SciencePolitique, 1965.

Mockaitis, T. British Counterinsurgency:1919-1960.London: Macmillan, 1990.

British Counterinsurgencyin the Post-Imperial Era. Manchester:Manchester

University Press,1995.

Morgan,K. Labour in Power, 1945-1951.Oxford: Oxford University Press,1985.

Mosxatos,Th. YheKapetanios Meeting in Lamia-H luvdvnjaqT(Ov Ka7rcravalcovcyTil

Aagia- Athens: Glaros, 1985.

Nachmani, A. International Intervention in the Greek Civil War.- The United Nations
Special Committeeon the Balkans, 1947-1952. New York: Oxford University Press,
1990.

Nikolakopoulos,E. Parties and Parliamentary Elections in Greece1946-1964-K6puara

Kai BovAcvriKtqEkAoyýqo-r?7vEUdba 1946-1964. Athens: Ethnikon Kedro Koinonikon
Erevnon,1985.

dqpoKparia. Athens: Patakis, 2001.

TheSickly Democracy-H KqXCKrIK4,

Northedge,F. S. British Foreign Policy. London: Ruskin House, 1962.

O'Ballance,E. The Greek Civil War, 1944-1949.London: Faber and Faber, 1966.

Ovendale,R., ed. The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments 1945-1951.
Leicester:LeicesterUniversity Press,1984.

Anglo-American Relation in the Twentieth Century. Basingstoke:

Macmillan, 1998.

Osanka,F. M., ed. Modern Guerrilla Warfare:fighting communistguerrilla movements.

London:Macmillan, 1962.

Papandreou,G. The Liberation of Greece-H AnclevOýpwaig Tqq EUdboq. Athens:

Ekdotiki Athinon, 1948.

Papastratis,P. British Policy Towards GreeceDuring the Second World War 1941-
1944.London: CambridgeUniversity Press,1984.
 208

Psyroukis, N. History of Contemporary Greece 1940-1967-Iaropia Tjq NEbrEpqq

E,UdJaq 1940-1967. Athens: Exantas, 1975.

Raikos,A. G. Lectureson Constitutional Law -17apaMucig EvvraypariKo6.diKa16v,vol.

1. Athens:[publishedUniversity notes] 1978.

Richter, H. British Intervention in Greece: From Yarkiza to Civil War, February 1945
to August 1946.London: Merlin Press,1986.

Rothwell, V. Britain and the Cold Mar, 1941-1947.London: Macmillan, 1982.

Ryan,H. B. Yhe Vision ofAnglo-America. Cambridge:University Press, 1982.

Sarafis,S. ELAS.- GreekResistanceArmy. London: Merlin, Press, 1980.

Shrader,C. R. The Withered Vine: Logistics and the Communist Insurgency in Greece,
1945-1949.London: Praeger,1999.

Sfikas, T. TheBritish Labour Governmentand the Greek Civil War 1945-1949. Kecle:
Keele University Press, 1994. Greek edition Ot AyyAoi EpyarIKOI kai o Ep(pQos
176)xpogoTqvE.Uaba 1945-1949.Athens: Filistor, 1996.

Sked,A. and Cook, C. Post-War Britain: A Political History. London: Penguin, 1984.

Stavrakis, P. J. Moscow and Communism, 1944-1949. Ithaca and London: Cornell

University Press,1989.

Stavrianos,L. S. Greece:American Dilemma and Opportunity. Chicago: Regnery, 1952.

Strachan,
H. ThePolitics ofBritish Army. Oxford:ClarendonPress,1997.

Svolos,A. The Greek Constitution-ToEUIVIK6 E6vrayua. Athens: Estia, 1954.

Sweet-Escott,B. Greece:A Political and Economic Survey, 1939-1953. London: Royal

Institute of InternationalAffairs, 1954.

Tsakalotos,Th. Grammos-rpduuoq. Athens: x. cK8., 1970.

Tsouderos, E. Greek Irregularities in Middle East-LUImb; AvcouaA[cqcM Aftail

AvaroA4.Athens: Aetos, 1945.

Tsoukalas,K. The Greek Tragedy.London: Penguin, 1969.

Valinakis, G. Introduction to the Greek Foreign Policy 1949-1988-Emay(op)

oviv
E,UIVIK4 E&WPIK4 I70AITIK11' 1949-1988. Thessaloniki: Paratiritis, 1989.

Veremis,T. GreekSecurity. London: InternationalInstitute of Strategic Studies, 1982.

Greek-TurkishRelations 1923-1987-OtEUqvoToVPKIKýq
EXtUCIg1923-1987.
Athens: Sakoulas,1986.
 209

77jeMilitary in GreekPolitics. London: C. Hurst, 1997.

Vlavianos, H. Greece 1941-1949: From Resistance to Civil War. London:

Macmillan/St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 1992.

Vukmanovic, S. How and JVhy The People's Liberation Struggle Met With Defeat.
London: Merlin Press,1950.

Wittner, L. S. American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949. New York: Columbia

University Press,1982.

Woodhouse,C. Apple ofDiscord. London: Hutchinson, 1948.

TheStrugglefor Greece,1941-1949.London: Hart-Davis/Mac Gibbon, 1976.

Woodward,L. British Foreign Policy in the Second World War. London: HMSO, 1970-
1976.

Xydis, S. Greece and the Great Powers, 1944-1947: Prelude to the Truman Doctrine.
Thessaloniki:Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963.

Zahariadis,N. Ten Yearsoffight -NKa Xp6via Athens: Poreia, 1978.

Zafeiropoulos, D. The Anti-bandit War-O AvvcvppopiaK6q Ayoývaq, 1945-1949.

Athens:x. ekd., 1956.

Articles

Alivizatos, N. 'The 'Emergency Regime' and Civil Liberties 1946-19491, in J. 0.

latrides, ed., Greecein the 1940s:A Nation in Crisis. Hanover and London: University
Pressof New England, 1981,220-228.

Barker, E. 'Yugoslav Policy towards Greece1947-1949', in L. Baerentzen,J. 0. Iatrides

and 0. L. Smith, eds., Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949.
Copenhagen:Museum Tusculanum.Press,1987,263-295.

Clogg, R. "'Pearls from Swine': the Foreign Office Papers, SOE and the Grcck
Resistance', in Ph. Auty and R. Clogg, eds., British Policy towards Resistance in
Yugoslaviaand Greece.London: Macmillan, 1975,167-208.

'The SpecialOperationExecutivein Greece',in J. 0. Iatrides,ed.,Greecein

the 1940s:A Nation in Crisis.HanoverandLondon:University Pressof New England,
1981,102-118.

Close, D. H. 'The Reconstruction of the Right-Wing State, in D. H. Close, ed., Yhe

GreekCivil Mar, 1943-1950.London: Routhledge,1993,156-189.

Veremis, Th. 'The Military Struggle, 1945-1949, in D. H. Close, ed., 77te

 210

GreekCivil Mar, 1943-1950.London: Routhledge, 1993,97-128.

Deighton, A. 'The "frozen front": the Labour government, the division of Germany and
the origins of the cold war, 1945-T, International Affairs 63 (1987), 449-465.

Frazier, R. 'The Bevin-Marshall Dispute of August-November 1947 Concerning the

Withdrawal of British Troops from Greece', in L. Baercntzen, J. 0. latrides and 0. L.
Smith, eds., Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949. Copenhagen:
MuseumTusculanumPress,1987,249-262.

'Did Britain Start the Cold War? Bevin and the Truman Doctrine', 71e
Historical Journal 27,3 (1984), 715-727.

Howard,H. N. 'Greece and its Balkan Neighbours(1948-1949): The United Nations

Attempts at Conciliation', Balkan Studies7 (1966), 1-26.

Jones,T. 'The British Army, and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in Transition, 1944-1952',

Small War and Insurgencies7, no. 3 (Winter 1996), 265-307.

'The British Army, and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in Greece, 1945-49', Small

Warsand Insurgencies8, no. I (Spring 1997), 88-106.

Iatrides, J. 0. 'Civil War, 1945-1949: National and International Aspects', in J. 0.

Iatrides, ed., Greecein the 1940s:A Nation in Crisis. Hanover and London: University
Pressof New England, 1981,195-219.

'Perceptionsof Soviet Involvement in the Greek Civil War 1945-1949', in L.

Baerentzen,J. 0. Iatrides and 0. L. Smith, eds.,Studiesin the History of the Greek Civil
War 1945-1949.Copenhagen:Museum TusculanurnPress, 1987,225-248.

'Britain, The United States,andGreece',in D. H. Close,ed., TheGreekCivil

War,1943-1950.London:Routhledge,1993,190-213.

Kouvertaris, V. 'The Greek Army Officer Corps Its Professionalism and Political
Interventionism', in M. Janowitz and J. V. Van Doom, eds., On Military Intervention.
Belgium: RotterdamUniversity Press,1971,155-201.

Laiou, A. 'Population Transition during the Civil War', in L. Baerentzen,J. 0. latrides

and 0. L. Smith, eds., Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945-1949.
Copenhagen:Museum Tusculanum.Press,1987,55-103.

Mavrogordatos,G. 'The 1946 Elections and Plebiscite: Prelude to the Civil War', in J.
0. Iatrides, ed, Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis. Hanover and London:
University Pressof New England, 1981,181-195.

Myers, E. C. W. 'The Andarte Delegation to Cairo: August 1943', in Ph. AutY and R,
Clogg, eds., British Policy towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece.
London: Macmillan, 1975,147-166.

Murray, J. C. 'The Anti-Bandit War', in T. N. Greene,ed., The Guerrilla and How To

Fight Him. London: Frederick A. Praeger,1962,65-111.
 211

Nachmani,A. 'Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece: 1946-1949', Journal of

ContemporaryHistory 25 (1990),489-522.

Ovendale, R. 'Britain, the United States and the European Cold War, 1945-1948'
History 67 (1987), 217-236.

Papacosma,S. 'Greece an NATO', in L. S. Kaplan, R. W. Clawson, R. Luraghi, eds.,

NATO and the Mediterranean.SR, 1985.

Papagos,A. 'Guerrilla Warfare', in F. M. Osanka, ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare:

fighting communistguerrilla movements.London: Macmillan, 1962,228-242.

Papastratis,P. 'The Papandreou Government and the Lebanon Conference', in J. 0.

latrides, ed., Greecein the 1940s:A Nation in Crisis. Hanover and London: University
Pressof New England, 1981,119-130.

Papathanasiades,T. 'The Bandits' Last Stand In Greece', Military Review 30,11

(February1951),22-31.

Pappas,N. 'The Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Greek Civil War', in W. S. Vucinich,
At
ed., the Brink of Mar and Peace: The Tito-Stalin Split in a Historical Perspective.
New York: Columbia University Press,1982,219-237.

Pidevec, J. 'The Tito-Stalin Split and the End of the Civil War in Greece, in L.
Baerentzen,J. 0. latrides and 0. L. Smith, eds.,Studies in the History of the Greek Civil
War 1945-1949.Copenhagen:Museum TusculanumPress, 1987,309-316.

Richter, H. 'The Varkiza Agreement and the Origins of the Civil War', in J. 0. latrides,
ed., Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis. Hanover and London: University Press of
New England, 1981,167-180.

Reynolds,D. 'Rethinking Anglo-American relations', International Affairs 65 (1989),

89-111.

Siapkaras,A. 'The Importance of Greeceto NATO', Military Review, (August 1961),

90-97.

Smith, 0. L. 'The Greek Communist Party, 1945-1949', in D. H. Close, ed., The Greek
Civil Mar, 1943-1950.London: Routhledge,1993,129-155.

'Self-Defence and Communist Policy 1945-1947', in L. Baercntzen, J. 0.

Iatrides and 0. L. Smith, eds.,Studiesin the History of the Greek Civil Mar 1945-1949.
Copenhagen:Museum TusculanumPress,1987,159-178.

'Communist Perceptions,Strategyand Tactics, 1945-1949', in J. 0. latrides

andW. Linda, eds., Greeceat the Crossroads.The Civil War and its Legacy. University
Park,Pa: PennsylvaniaStateUniversity Press,1995,87-120.

Smith, R. 'A climate of opinion: British officials and the developmentof British Soviet
policy 1943-1947',International Affairs 65 (1989), 631-47.
 212

Stavrianos,L. S. 'The Greek National Liberation Front (EAM): A Study in Resistance

OrganisationandAdministration', Journal ofModern History 24, (1952), 42-54.

Svoronos,N. 'The Main Problemsof the Period 1940-1950 in Greek Historiography', in

J. 0. Iatrides, ed., Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis. Hanover and London:
University Pressof New England, 1981,1-16.

Sweet-Escott,B. WE in the Balkans', in Ph. Auty, R. Clogg, eds., British Policy

in Yugoslavia Greece. London: Macmillan, 1975,3-
towards JVartimeResistance and
21.

Tsitsopoulos, G. 'The Greek-Turkish Defence Relations 1945-1987- Ot

MilvoTo-opKtict; Aývovmeq IXtaet; 1945-19871, in A. Alexandris, Th. Veremis, P.
Kasakos, V. Koufoudakis, Ch. Rasakis and G. Tsitsopoulos, eds., Greek-Turkish
Relations 1923-1987- 01 EUqVOTOVPKIKb;EX&EIg 1923-1987. Athens: Gnosi, 1988,
185-194.

Veremis, Th. 'The Military', in K. Featherstone and D. Katsoudas, eds., Political

Changein Greece.London: London: Croorn Helm, 1987,214-229.

Wainhouse, E. R. 'Guerrilla War in Greece, 1946-1949. A Case Study', in F. M.

Osanka, ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare: fighting communist guerrilla movements.
London: Macmillan, 1962,217-227.

Wittner, L. 'American Policy toward Greece, 1944-1949', in J. 0. Iatrides, ed., Greece

in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis. Hanover and London: University Press of New
England, 1981,229-238.

Woodhouse,C. M. 'Early British Contactswith the Greek Resistancein 1942, Balk-ail

Studies12,2, (1971), 347-357.

'Summer 1943: The Critical Months', in Ph. Auty and R. Clogg, cds.,
_
British Policy towards Wartime Resistancein Yugoslavia and Greece. London:
Macmillan,1975,117-146.

'The National Liberation Front and the British Connection', in J. 0.

Iatrides, ed., Greecein the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis. Hanover and London: University
Pressof New England, 1981,81-101.

Xydis, S. 'The Secret Anglo-Soviet Agreement on the Balkans of October 9,1944',

Journalof Central EuropeanAffairs 15, (October 1955), 248-271.

Unpublished PhD Theses

Economidis,S. The International Implications of the Greek Civil War 1946-1949,

LondonSchoolof Economics,1991.

Jones,T. L TheDevelopmentofBritish CounterinsurgencyPolicies and Doctrine 1945-

1952,University of London, 1992.
 213

Stefanidis,I. The United States,Great Britain and Greece 1949-1952: The Problems of
GreekSecurityand International Stability, London School of Economics, 1989.

FiT