Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I.
The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the decision and the resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated 26 October 2006 and 26 June 2007, respectively, in C.A.
G.R. CEB-SP No. 00855.[1]
The petition traces its origins to a complaint filed by Jandeleon Juezan (respondent)
against Peoples Broadcasting Service, Inc. (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc) (petitioner) for
illegal deduction, non-payment of service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay
for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages
and non-coverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth before the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City.[2] On the basis of the
complaint, the DOLE conducted a plant level inspection on 23 September 2003. In
the Inspection Report Form,[3] the Labor Inspector wrote under the heading
Findings/Recommendations non-diminution of benefits and Note: Respondent deny
employer-employee relationship with the complainant- see Notice of Inspection
results. In the Notice of Inspection Results[4] also bearing the date 23 September
2003, the Labor Inspector made the following notations:
Petitioner was required to rectify/restitute the violations within five (5) days from receipt.
No rectification was effected by petitioner; thus, summary investigations were
conducted, with the parties eventually ordered to submit their respective position
papers.[6]
In his Order dated 27 February 2004,[7] DOLE Regional Director Atty. Rodolfo M.
Sabulao (Regional Director) ruled that respondent is an employee of petitioner, and that
the former is entitled to his money claims amounting to P203,726.30. Petitioner sought
reconsideration of the Order, claiming that the Regional Director gave credence to the
documents offered by respondent without examining the originals, but at the same time
he missed or failed to consider petitioners evidence. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied.[8] On appeal to the DOLE Secretary, petitioner denied once
more the existence of employer-employee relationship. In its Order dated 27 January
2005, the Acting DOLE Secretary dismissed the appeal on the ground that petitioner did
not post a cash or surety bond and instead submitted a Deed of Assignment of Bank
Deposit.[9]
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, claiming that it was denied due
process when the DOLE Secretary disregarded the evidence it presented and failed to
give it the opportunity to refute the claims of respondent. Petitioner maintained that
there is no employer-employee relationship had ever existed between it and respondent
because it was the drama directors and producers who paid, supervised and disciplined
respondent. It also added that the case was beyond the jurisdiction of the DOLE and
should have been considered by the labor arbiter because respondents claim
exceeded P5,000.00.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not deprived of due process as the
essence thereof is only an opportunity to be heard, which petitioner had when it filed a
motion for reconsideration with the DOLE Secretary. It further ruled that the latter had
the power to order and enforce compliance with labor standard laws irrespective of the
amount of individual claims because the limitation imposed by Article 29 of the Labor
Code had been repealed by Republic Act No. 7730. [10] Petitioner sought reconsideration
of the decision but its motion was denied.[11]
Before this Court, petitioner argues that the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), and not the DOLE Secretary, has jurisdiction over respondents claim, in view
of Articles 217 and 128 of the Labor Code. [12] It adds that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed petitioners appeal without
delving on the issues raised therein, particularly the claim that no employer-employee
relationship had ever existed between petitioner and respondent. Finally, petitioner
avers that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law available to it.
On the other hand, respondent posits that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its
discretion. He invokes Republic Act No. 7730, which removes the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives, from the
effects of the restrictive provisions of Article 129 and 217 of the Labor Code, regarding
the confinement of jurisdiction based on the amount of claims.[13] Respondent also
claims that petitioner was not denied due process since even when the case was with
the Regional Director, a hearing was conducted and pieces of evidence were
presented. Respondent stands by the propriety of the Court of Appeals ruling that there
exists an employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner. Finally,
respondent argues that the instant petition for certiorari is a wrong mode of appeal
considering that petitioner had earlier filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and
Prohibition with the Court of Appeals; petitioner, instead, should have filed a Petition for
Review.[14]
II.
The significance of this case may be reduced to one simple questiondoes the Secretary
of Labor have the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship?
To resolve this pivotal issue, one must look into the extent of the visitorial and
enforcement power of the DOLE found in Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7730. It reads:
Article 128 (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of
this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of
employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue
compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of
this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor
employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made
in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized
representative shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for
the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer
contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and
raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered
in the course of inspection. (emphasis supplied)
xxx
The provision is quite explicit that the visitorial and enforcement power of the
DOLE comes into play only in cases when the relationship of employer-employee still
exists. It also underscores the avowed objective underlying the grant of power to the
DOLE which is to give effect to the labor standard provision of this Code and other labor
legislation. Of course, a persons entitlement to labor standard benefits under the labor
laws presupposes the existence of employer-employee relationship in the first place.
The first situation is categorically covered by Sec. 3, Rule 11 of the Rules on the
Disposition of Labor Standards Cases[15] issued by the DOLE Secretary. It reads:
In the first situation, the claim has to be referred to the NLRC because it is the
NLRC which has jurisdiction in view of the termination of the employer-employee
relationship. The same procedure has to be followed in the second situation since it is
the NLRC that has jurisdiction in view of the absence of employer-employee relationship
between the evidentiary parties from the start.
Clearly the law accords a prerogative to the NLRC over the claim when the
employer-employee relationship has terminated or such relationship has not arisen at
all. The reason is obvious. In the second situation especially, the existence of an
employer-employee relationship is a matter which is not easily determinable from an
ordinary inspection, necessarily so, because the elements of such a relationship are not
verifiable from a mere ocular examination. The intricacies and implications of an
employer-employee relationship demand that the level of scrutiny should be far above
the cursory and the
mechanical. While documents, particularly documents found in the employers
office are the primary source materials, what may prove decisive are factors related to
the history of the employers business operations, its current state as well as accepted
contemporary practices in the industry. More often than not, the question of employer-
employee relationship becomes a battle of evidence, the determination of which should
becomprehensive and intensive and therefore best left to the specialized quasi-judicial
body that is the NLRC.
It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and
enforcement power somehow has to make a determination of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship. Such prerogatival determination, however,
cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement power itself. Indeed,
such determination is merely preliminary, incidental and collateral to the DOLEs
primary function of enforcing labor standards provisions. The determination of
the existence of employer-employee relationship is still primarily lodged with the
NLRC. This is the meaning of the clause in cases where the relationship of
employer-employee still exists in Art. 128 (b).
Thus, before the DOLE may exercise its powers under Article 128, two important
questions must be resolved: (1) Does the employer-employee relationship still exist, or
alternatively, was there ever an employer-employee relationship to speak of; and (2)
Are there violations of the Labor Code or of any labor law?
The approach suggested by the dissent is frowned upon by common law. To wit:
A more liberal interpretative mode, pragmatic or functional analysis, has also emerged
in ascertaining the jurisdictional boundaries of administrative agencies whose
jurisdiction is established by statute. Under this approach, the Court examines the
intended function of the tribunal and decides whether a particular provision falls within
or outside that function, rather than making the provision itself the determining
centerpiece of the analysis.[19] Yet even under this more expansive approach, the
dissent fails.
A reading of Art. 128 of the Labor Code reveals that the Secretary of Labor or his
authorized representatives was granted visitorial and enforcement powers for the
purpose of determining violations of, and enforcing, the Labor Code and any labor law,
wage order, or rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto. Necessarily, the actual
existence of an employer-employee relationship affects the complexion of the putative
findings that the Secretary of Labor may determine, since employees are entitled to a
different set of rights under the Labor Code from the employer as opposed to non-
employees. Among these differentiated rights are those accorded by the labor
standards provisions of the Labor Code, which the Secretary of Labor is mandated to
enforce. If there is no employer-employee relationship in the first place, the duty of the
employer to adhere to those labor standards with respect to the non-employees is
questionable.
This decision should not be considered as placing an undue burden on the
Secretary of Labor in the exercise of visitorial and enforcement powers, nor seen as an
unprecedented diminution of the same, but rather a recognition of the statutory
limitations thereon. A mere assertion of absence of employer-employee relationship
does not deprive the DOLE of jurisdiction over the claim under Article 128 of the Labor
Code. At least a prima facie showing of such absence of relationship, as in this case, is
needed to preclude the DOLE from the exercise of its power. The Secretary of Labor
would not have been precluded from exercising the powers under Article 128 (b) over
petitioner if another person with better-grounded claim of employment than that which
respondent had. Respondent, especially if he were an employee, could have very well
enjoined other employees to complain with the DOLE, and, at the same time, petitioner
could ill-afford to disclaim an employment relationship with all of the people under its
aegis.
Without a doubt, petitioner, since the inception of this case had been consistent in
maintaining that respondent is not its employee. Certainly, a preliminary determination,
based on the evidence offered, and noted by the Labor Inspector during the inspection
as well as submitted during the proceedings before the Regional Director puts in
genuine doubt the existence of employer-employee relationship. From that point on, the
prudent recourse on the part of the DOLE should have been to refer respondent to the
NLRC for the proper dispensation of his claims. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, even
the evidence relied on by the Regional Director in his order are mere self-serving
declarations of respondent, and hence cannot be relied upon as proof of employer-
employee relationship.
III.
Aside from lack of jurisdiction, there is another cogent reason to to set aside the
Regional Directors 27 February 2004 Order. A careful study of the case reveals that the
said Order, which found respondent as an employee of petitioner and directed the
payment of respondents money claims, is not supported by substantial evidence, and
was even made in disregard of the evidence on record.
It is not enough that the evidence be simply considered. The standard is substantial
evidence as in all other quasi-judicial agencies. The standard employed in the last
sentence of Article 128(b) of the Labor Code that the documentary proofs be considered
in the course of inspection does not apply. It applies only to issues other than the
fundamental issue of existence of employer-employee relationship. A contrary rule
would lead to controversies on the part of labor officials in resolving the issue of
employer-employee relationship. The onset of arbitrariness is the advent of denial of
substantive due process.
As a general rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. This applies with
greater force in cases before quasi-judicial agencies whose findings of fact
are accorded great respect and even finality. To be sure, the same findings should be
supported by substantial evidence from which the said tribunals can make its own
independent evaluation of the facts. Likewise, it must not be rendered with grave abuse
of discretion; otherwise, this Court will not uphold the tribunals conclusion. [20] In the
same manner, this Court will not hesitate to set aside the labor tribunals findings of fact
when it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the
evidence on record or when there is showing of fraud or error of law.[21]
At the onset, it is the Courts considered view that the existence of employer-
employee relationship could have been easily resolved, or at least prima
facie determined by the labor inspector, during the inspection by looking at the records
of petitioner which can be found in the work premises. Nevertheless, even if the labor
inspector had noted petitioners manifestation and documents in the Notice of Inspection
Results, it is clear that he did not give much credence to said evidence, as he did not
find the need to investigate the matter further. Considering that the documents shown
by petitioner, namely: cash vouchers, checks and statements of account, summary
billings evidencing payment to the alleged real employer of respondent, letter-contracts
denominated as Employment for a Specific Undertaking, prima facie negate the
existence of employer-employee relationship, the labor inspector could have exerted a
bit more effort and looked into petitioners payroll, for example, or its roll of employees,
or interviewed other employees in the premises. After all, the labor inspector, as a labor
regulation officer is given access to employers records and premises at any time of day
or night whenever work is being undertaken therein, and the right to copy therefrom, to
question any employee and investigate any fact, condition or matter which may be
necessary to determine violations or which may aid in the enforcement of this Code and
of any labor law, wage order or rules and regulations pursuant thereto.[22] Despite these
far-reaching powers of labor regulation officers, records reveal that no additional efforts
were exerted in the course of the inspection.
The Court further examined the records and discovered to its dismay that even the
Regional Director turned a blind eye to the evidence presented by petitioner and relied
instead on the self-serving claims of respondent.
On the other hand, petitioner maintained in its position paper that respondent had
never been its employee. Attached as annexes to its position paper are photocopies of
cash vouchers it issued to drama producers, as well as letters of employment captioned
Employment for a Specific Undertaking, wherein respondent was appointed by different
drama directors as spinner/narrator for specific radio programs.[25]
In his Order, the Regional Director merely made a passing remark on petitioners
claim of lack of employer-employee relationshipa token paragraphand proceeded to a
detailed recitation of respondents allegations. The documents introduced by petitioner in
its position paper and even those presented during the inspection were not given an iota
of credibility. Instead, full recognition and acceptance was accorded to the claims of
respondentfrom the hours of work to his monthly salary, to his alleged actual duties, as
well as to his alleged evidence. In fact, the findings are anchored almost verbatim on
the self-serving allegations of respondent.
Respondent tried to address the discrepancy between his identification card and the
standard identification cards issued by petitioner to its employees by arguing that what
he annexed to his position paper was the old identification card issued to him by
petitioner. He then presented a photocopy of another old identification card, this time
purportedly issued to one of the employees who was issued the new identification card
presented by petitioner.[29] Respondents argument does not convince. If it were true that
he is an employee of petitioner, he would have been issued a new identification card
similar to the ones presented by petitioner, and he should have presented a copy of
such new identification card. His failure to show a new identification card merely
demonstrates that what he has is only his Media ID, which does not constitute proof of
his employment with petitioner.
In the instant case, save for respondents self-serving allegations and self-
defeating evidence, there is no substantial basis to warrant the Regional Directors
finding that respondent is an employee of petitioner. Interestingly, the Order of the
Secretary of Labor denying petitioners appeal dated 27 January 2005, as well as
the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for certiorari, are silent on
the issue of the existence of an employer-employee relationship, which further suggests
that no real and proper determination the existence of such relationship was ever made
by these tribunals. Even the dissent skirted away from the issue of the existence of
employer-employee relationship and conveniently ignored the dearth of evidence
presented by respondent.
Although substantial evidence is not a function of quantity but rather of quality, the
peculiar environmental circumstances of the instant case demand that something more
should have been proffered.[33] Had there been other proofs of employment, such as
respondents inclusion in petitioners payroll, or a clear exercise of control, the Court
would have affirmed the finding of employer-employee relationship. The Regional
Director, therefore, committed grievous error in ordering petitioner to answer for
respondents claims.Moreover, with the conclusion that no employer-employee
relationship has ever existed between petitioner and respondent, it is crystal-clear that
the DOLE Regional Director had no jurisdiction over respondents complaint. Thus, the
improvident exercise of power by the Secretary of Labor and the Regional Director
behooves the court to subject their actions for review and to invalidate all the
subsequent orders they issued.
IV.
The records show that petitioners appeal was denied because it had allegedly failed to
post a cash or surety bond. What it attached instead to its appeal was the Letter
Agreement[34] executed by petitioner and its bank, the cash voucher, [35] and the Deed of
Assignment of Bank Deposits.[36] According to the DOLE, these documents do not
constitute the cash or surety bond contemplated by law; thus, it is as if no cash or surety
bond was posted when it filed its appeal.
The provision on appeals from the DOLE Regional Offices to the DOLE Secretary is in
the last paragraph of Art. 128 (b) of the Labor Code, which reads:
While the requirements for perfecting an appeal must be strictly followed as they
are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly
discharge of judicial business, the law does admit exceptions when warranted by the
circumstances. Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. [37] Thus, in some
cases, the bond requirement on appeals involving monetary awards had been relaxed,
such as when (i) there was substantial compliance with the Rules; (ii) the surrounding
facts and circumstances constitute meritorious ground to reduce the bond; (iii) a liberal
interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve the desired objective of
resolving controversies on the merits; or (iv) the appellants, at the very least exhibited
their willingness and/or good faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary
period.[38]
It is understood that the said bank has the full control of Platinum
Savings Deposit (PSD) No. 010-8-00038-4 from and after this date and
that said sum cannot be withdrawn by the Plaintiff-Appellee/ Department
of Labor and Employment Regional Office VII until such time that a Writ
of Execution shall be ordered by the Appellate Office.
(Signed)
GREMAN B. SOLANTE
Station Manager
The purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure, during the period of appeal, against
any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees
under the judgment if subsequently affirmed.[40] The Deed of Assignment in the instant
case, like a cash or surety bond, serves the same purpose. First, the Deed of
Assignment constitutes not just a partial amount, but rather the entire award in the
appealed Order. Second, it is clear from the Deed of Assignment that the entire amount
is under the full control of the bank, and not of petitioner, and is in fact payable to the
DOLE Regional Office, to be withdrawn by the same office after it had issued a writ of
execution. For all intents and purposes, the Deed of Assignment in tandem with the
Letter Agreement and Cash Voucher is as good as cash. Third, the Court finds that the
execution of the Deed of Assignment, the Letter Agreement and the Cash Voucher were
made in good faith, and constituted clear manifestation of petitioners willingness to pay
the judgment amount.
The Deed of Assignment must be distinguished from the type of bank certification
submitted by appellants in Cordova v. Keysas Boutique,[41] wherein this Court found that
such bank certification did not come close to the cash or surety bond required by law.
The bank certification in Cordova merely stated that the employer maintains
a depository account with a balance of P23,008.19, and that the certification was issued
upon the depositors request for whatever legal purposes it may serve. There was no
indication that the said deposit was made specifically for the pending appeal, as in the
instant case. Thus, the Court ruled that the bank certification had not in any way
ensured that the award would be paid should the appeal fail. Neither was the appellee
in the case prevented from making withdrawals from the savings account. Finally, the
amount deposited was measly compared to the total monetary award in the
judgment.[42]
V.
Another question of technicality was posed against the instant petition in the hope that it
would not be given due course. Respondent asserts that petitioner pursued the wrong
mode of appeal and thus the instant petition must be dismissed. Once more, the Court
is not convinced.
A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy, and adequate remedy at law. There is
grave abuse of discretion when respondent acts in a capricious or whimsical manner in
the exercise of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[43]
Respondent may have a point in asserting that in this case a Rule 65 petition is a
wrong mode of appeal, as indeed the writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedy, and
certiorari jurisdiction is not to be equated with appellate jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it is
settled, as a general proposition, that the availability of an appeal does not foreclose
recourse to the extraordinary remedies, such as certiorari and prohibition, where appeal
is not adequate or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient, as where the orders of the
trial court were issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or there is need to promptly
relieve the aggrieved party from the injurious effects of the acts of an inferior court or
tribunal, e.g., the court has authorized execution of the judgment. [44] This Court has
even recognized that a recourse to certiorari is proper not only where there is a clear
deprivation of petitioners fundamental right to due process, but so also where other
special circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action.[45]
In one case, it was held that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie if it is
satisfactorily established that the tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically in total
disregard of evidence material to or even decisive of the controversy, [46] and if it is
shown that the refusal to allow a Rule 65 petition would result in the infliction of an
injustice on a party by a judgment that evidently was rendered whimsically and
capriciously, ignoring and disregarding uncontroverted facts and familiar legal principles
without any valid cause whatsoever.[47]
therein.[50] The rules were also relaxed by the Court after considering the public interest
involved in the case;[51] when public welfare and the advancement of public policy
dictates; when the broader interest of justice so requires; when the writs issued are null
and void; or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.[52]
The peculiar circumstances of this case warrant, as we held in Republic v. Court
of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504, 524, the exercise once more of our exclusive prerogative to
suspend our own rules or to exempt a particular case from its operation as in x
x Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., (83 SCRA 453, 478-480 [1978]),
thus: x x The Rules have been drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair trials
and expediting justice. As a corollary, if their applications and operation tend to subvert
and defeat instead of promote and enhance it, their suspension is justified. [53]
The most important consideration for the allowance of the instant petition is the
opportunity for the Court not only to set the demarcation between the NLRCs
jurisdiction and the DOLEs prerogative but also the procedure when the case
involves the fundamental challenge on the DOLEs prerogative based on lack of
employer-employee relationship. As exhaustively discussed here, the DOLEs
prerogative hinges on the existence of employer-employee relationship, the issue
is which is at the very heart of this case. And the evidence clearly indicates
private respondent has never been petitioners employee. But the DOLE did not
address, while the Court of Appeals glossed over, the issue. The peremptory
dismissal of the instant petition on a technicality would deprive the Court of the
opportunity to resolve the novel controversy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 26 October 2006 and the
Resolution dated 26 June 2007 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CEB-SP No. 00855
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of the then Acting Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment dated 27 January 2005 denying petitioners
appeal, and the Orders of the Director, DOLE Regional Office No. VII, dated 24 May
2004 and 27 February 2004, respectively, are ANNULLED. The complaint against
petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice