Ancient Indian jurisprudence is available in various Dharmaśāstra texts starting from the

Dharmasutra of Bhodhayana.[6] Jurisprudence already had this meaning[citation needed] in Ancient

Rome even if at its origins the discipline was a (periti) in the jus of mos maiorum (traditional law), a
body of oral laws and customs verbally transmitted "by father to son". Praetors established a
workable body of laws by judging whether or not singular cases were capable of being prosecuted
either by the edicta, the annual pronunciation of prosecutable offense, or in extraordinary situations,
additions made to the edicta. An iudex then would judge a remedy according to the facts of the case.
Their sentences were supposed to be simple interpretations of the traditional customs, but effectively
it was an activity that, apart from formally reconsidering for each case what precisely was
traditionally in the legal habits, soon turned also to a more equitable interpretation, coherently
adapting the law to the newer social instances. The law was then implemented with new
evolutive Institutiones (legal concepts), while remaining in the traditional scheme. Praetors were
replaced in the 3rd century BC by a laical body of prudentes. Admission to this body was conditional
upon proof of competence or experience.
Under the Roman Empire, schools of law were created, and the activity constantly became more
academic. In the age from the early Roman Empire to the 3rd century, a relevant literature was
produced by some notable groups including the Proculians and Sabinians. The scientific depth of the
studies was unprecedented in ancient times.
After the 3rd century, Juris prudentia became a more bureaucratic activity, with few notable authors.
It was during the Eastern Roman Empire (5th century) that legal studies were once again
undertaken in depth, and it is from this cultural movement that Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis was
born.

Natural law[edit]
In its general context, natural law theory may be compared to both state-of-nature law and general
law understood on the basis of an analogy to the physical laws of science. Natural law is often
contrasted to positive law which asserts law as the product of human activity and human volition.
Another approach to natural law jurisprudence generally asserts that human law may be supported
by decisive reasons for action. In other words, there must be a compelling rationale behind following
human law. There are two readings of the natural law jurisprudential stance.

1. The Strong Natural Law Thesis holds that if a human law fails to be backed-up by decisive
reasons, then it is not properly called a "law" at all. This is captured, imperfectly, in the
famous maxim: lex iniusta non est lex' (an unjust law is no law at all).
2. The Weak Natural Law Thesis holds that if a human law fails to be backed-up by decisive
reasons, then it can still be called a "law", but it must be recognised as a defective law.
Notions of an objective moral order, external to human legal systems, underlie natural law. What is
right or wrong can vary according to the interests one is focused upon. Natural law is sometimes
identified with the maxim that "an unjust law is no law at all", but as John Finnis, the most important
of modern natural barristers[citation needed] has argued, this maxim is a poor guide to the
classical Thomist position. Strongly related to theories of natural law are classical theories o