Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards

Liang v. People- GR 125865, March 26, 2001

MAINPOINT: The immunity granted is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official
capacity. It cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name
of official duty.

FACTS: This case has its origin in two criminal Information for grave oral defamation filed
against petitioner a Chinese national who was employed as an Economist by the Asian
Development Bank allegedly uttered defamatory words to Joyce V. Cabal, a member of the clerical
staff of ADB. The Trial Court pursuant to an advice of DFA that petitioner enjoys immunity from
legal processes, dismissed the criminal Information’s against him.

ISSUE: Should the petitioner enjoy immunity against the alleged crime?

RULING: The immunity granted is not absolute; it is limited to acts performed in an official
capacity. It cannot cover the commission of a crime such as slander or oral defamation in the name
of official duty. Immunity from legal process is only limited to with respect to acts performed by
them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.

It should be made clear that nowhere in the assailed Decision is diplomatic immunity denied, even
remotely. The issue in this case, rather, boils down to whether or not the statements allegedly made
by petitioner were uttered while in the performance of his official functions, in order for this case
to fall squarely under the provisions of Section 45 (a) of the Agreement Between the Asian
Development Bank and the Government

Effect of Unconstitutionality; Par. 2(a); Operative Fact Doctrine

Article 7, New Civil Code

De Agbayani v. PNB- 38 SCRA 429 [1971]

MAINPOINT: Counter to the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act that is suffering from
that infirmity cannot be the source of any legal right or duties, OPERATIVE FACT states that
prior to the declaration of a law as unconstitutional, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with.

FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944,
secured by real estate mortgage. On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, defendant
instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the loan
remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both alleging that the mortgage sought
to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB
on the other hand claims that the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from
March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent
legislative act 2 extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted
from the computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the
loan. The lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of
plaintiff.

ISSUE: W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium Law
before the same were declared invalid tolled the period of prescription (Effect of the declaration
of Unconstitutionality of a law)

RULING: YES. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects.

The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being
adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because of
the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the
debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive
in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and
Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.

The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944,
when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started
by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period
was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18,
1953, when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months
and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the
mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.

Philippine Coconut v. Republic, supra.

MAINPOINT:

FACTS: This is about consolidated petitions for review assailed and seek to annul certain issuances
of the Sandiganbayan that issued Partial Summary Judgments in its Civil Cases about a suit for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth commenced by the PCGG against Marcos and several individuals
occupied, at one time or another, as directorial or top management positions in either the Philippine
Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) or the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), or
both. In rendering the assailed Partial Summary Judgments, among other issues, was that the
Sandiganbayan committed gross and irreversible error, gravely abused its judicial discretion and
flagrantly exceeded its jurisdiction as it effectively sanctioned the taking of COCOFED, et al’s
property by the respondent Republic without due process of law and through retroactive
application of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the coconut levy laws, an act that is not only
illegal and violative of the settled Operative Fact Doctrine but, more importantly, inequitable to
the coconut farmers whose only possible mistake, offense or misfortune was to follow the law.

ISSUE: Was there a violation of the settled Operative Fact Doctrine?

RULING: Yes. The Sandiganbayan gravely erred if not grossly abused its discretion when it
repeatedly disregarded, and out rightly refused to recognize, the operative facts that existed as well
as the rights that vested from the time the coconut levy laws were enacted until their declaration
of unconstitutionality in the assailed PSJs. As a result, the assailed PSJs constitute a proscribed or
forbidden retroactive application of the declaration of unconstitutionality, a taking of private
property, and an impairment of vested rights of ownership, all without due process of law.
Otherwise stated, the assailed PSJs and the assailed Resolutions effectively penalized the coconut
farmers whose only possible mistake, offense or misfortune was to follow the laws that were then
legal, valid and constitutional.

Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, GR 171101, Nov. 22, 2011
(Operative Fact Doctrine applies to unconstitutional executive act)
CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, GR 187485, Oct 8, 2013 (Operative Fact Doctrine does not
apply to a mere administrative practice; there must be a law or executive issuance)

Automatic Review; Paragraph 2 (d)

Garcia, et al. v. People- 318 SCRA 434
Pearson v. IAC, GR 74454, Sept. 3, 1998
People v. Mateo- 433 SCRA 640
People v. Duavis, GR 190681, 07 December 2011

Question of Law; Paragraph 2(e)

Cebu Woman’s Club v. De la Victoria- GR 120060 [March 9, 2000]

Change of Venue; Paragraph 4

People v. Gutierrez- 36 SCRA 172 [1970]

Power to Promulgate Rules; Paragraph 5

Enforcement of Constitutional Rights, Pleading, Practice, and Procedure in All Courts
First Lepanto v. CA- 231 SCRA 30 [1994]
Lina v. Purisima- 82 SCRA 344 [1978]
Santero v. CFI- Cavite- 153 SCRA 728 [1965]
Damasco v. Laqui- 166 SCRA 214 [1988]
Carpio v. Sulu Resources- GR 148267, August 8, 2002
Baguio Market Vendors v. Hon. Cortes- GR 165922, February 26, 2010
In re Petition for Recognition- 612 SCRA 193 [2010]
In re Exemption of NPC- 615 SCRA 1 [2010]
In re: in the matter of clarification of Exemption from payment of all Court Sheriff’s Fees of
Cooperatives, A.M. 12-2-03-0,13 March 2012-668 SCRA 1 [2012]
Sto. Tomas v. Paneda- 685 SCRA 245 [2012]

Admission to the Practice of Law, the Integrated Bar, Disciplinary Powers, and Legal Assistance
to the Underprivileged
In re Cunanan- 94 PHIL. 534 [953-1954]
Javellana v. DILG 212 SCRA 475 [1992]
Velez v. De Vera- A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006
In re letter of UP Law Faculty- 644 SCRA 543 [2011]