Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
( May 1991
(
ii
Abstract
(
{
iii
Abrégé
1
Cette dissertation a pour but l'analyse de la relation entre
la guérilla britannique et les opérations d'espionnage,
ainsi que leur impact sur la résistanc~ grecque. La
Orient.
PrefacE.'
l
vi
Table of Contents
Preface: ....•........•..........................•... p. iv
Introduction: ......................................... p. 9
(
vii
Chapter 5:
1 The Occupation of Greece .......•....•............... p. 224
German Military Administration in Greece ......•..... p. 229
Organization of Southern Greece Command .......•..... p. 232
The German Iptelligence Services in Greece .......... p. 237
The Reaction to the Occupation p. 244
Chapter 6:
Cover'/: Operations 1941-1944 .•.•....••••....•........ p. 289
Chapter 7:
Guerrilla Warfûre Operations 1942-1944 •....••....... p. 359
Part IV: Conclusion and Bibliography
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 459
c Introduction
viji
1 Introduction
9
Introduction
the walls of their station and after several hours the crowd
dispersed.
Greece within one year. The guerrilla bands which had been
12
"
these forces were organized and armed they would demand
their fair share of political power in the post-war period
and that these demands would not necessarily conform to the
British policy of re-establishing the pre-war political
status quo in Europe. Ultimately, the clash of these
incompatible interests pitted the British army in December
against the "revolutionary" forces cultivated by the
intelligence services during the occupation of Greece.
(
-
30
Part I
Historical Background
31
Chapter 1
Gr.eece 1936-1940
4. In 1909 for example the army demanded that the King and
government accept a series of military and economic reforms
by threatening to march on Athens. At this critical
junction the military refrained from establishing a
dictatorship and turned to Venizelos tQ implement their
demands.
35
undermine the dictatorship and for the rnost part the y did
( not pose a serious threat to the regime. Their activities
were limited to rnaking written protests. Sorne attempted to
convince the King that they could provide equally good
government in place of the dictatorship.19 There were
exceptions, most notably, P. Kanellopoulos, but the main
non-Communist resistance effort came fI'om Venizelist
officers forcibly retired after the 1930's coups. with the
exception of a single abortive coup in 1938 the activities
of these ex-officers were confinAd to plotting future coups
and printing illegal parnphlets. 20
(
48
'.
Even before the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne in
1923, the British had in fact begun to re-consider their
policy towards Greece, Turkey and the Balkans. On 14
October 1922 the Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum to the
Foreign Office, had recommended closer ties between Britain
and Turkey and warned that an aggressive attitude could
endanger the allegiance of Britain's Muslim subjects who
regarded Turkey as the ch~mpion of their faith. The Chiefs
of Staff also suggested that friendly relations with Turkey
would allow Britain to maintain control over the Straits
with minimal forces. 31 Consequently, as far as the Balkans
and Near East were cor.cerned the British were now content to
maintain the status quo. Within this context Greeee ceased
to be the focal point of British poliey in the Eastern
Mediterranean. The British Government regarded the internaI
political situation in Greeee with indifferenee and for the
most part lost aIl interest in Greeee. Aeeording to Robert
Vansittart: "Those who helped Greeee into a mess did nothing
to help her out.".32 After the Chanak crisis in 1922
Britain had lost interest in foreign adventures and the
possible showdown with the King should the latter press for
72
Hitler at Brenner may have rclented and given his assent for
an Italian invasion of Greece. Ansel bases this on a
comment by Jodl to Warlimot that he thought: "it possible
that at the Brenner Pass conference the Fuhrer gave his
consent to the Duce for an attack on Greece without
informing his military entourage.".
79. DGFP, Series D, No. 323, Vol. XI, pp. 527-528; Vol. XI,
No. 352, pp. 598-606; Vol. XI No. 3~3, pp. 608.
80. DGFP, Series D, No. 369, Vol .. XI, pp. 639-642.
73
( 82. FO 371/24910.
83. FO 371/24982.
74
In fact the newly created SOE had very little contact with
the intelligence services, ministries or individuals close
to the Metaxas Government. The raison d' etre of its
function was to prepare for and create sabotage, resistance
and to use the often quoted phrase of winston Churchill:
"Set Europe AbIaze". Its role in Greece was to organize a
network of agents to conduct such activity in anticipation
of a possible Axis occupation. Despite the assurances given
to the Foreign Office by the SOE in London, Special
Operations Exec~tive officers in Athens began to make
contact with Venizelists, Communists and other opponents of
the Metaxas regime since, as will be illustrated below, the
SOE believed that such groups were capable of the type of
underground work required to pursue its objectives in an
occupied country. As a result, after the occupation of
Greece the SOE's contact was mainly with Venizelists and
Communists who were still opposed to the Greek monarchy
which effectively was the Greek Government-in-Exile. On the
'.'
84. FO 371/24982.
-
75
{
"
(
76
of the 40,000 British troops were what was left of the BEF
in Greece. The majority were disheartened, disorganized and
on the mainland.
and it was not until 25 April that Hitler gave his approval
targets. 108
( war.
Chapter 2
1973, p. 161), adds that the real problem was that: "To many
military minds intelligence was no profession for an officer
and a gentleman.".
2. The ancient Greek city-states up until the time of Philip
and Alexander did not maintain permanent military
establishments with a professional officers corps. Espionage
was employed but remained under the control of politicians
and diplomats. (see: Andre Gerolymatos, Espionage and
Treason: A study of the proxenia in Political and Military
Intelligence Gathering in Classical Greece, Amsterdam 1986,
passim) .
3. Alfred Vagts, The Military Attache, Princeton 1967, pp.
9-10.
4. Vagts, Princeton 1967, p. 15.
93
94
Between 1904 and 1935, two critical ideas emerge from the
development of military intelligence and, in turn,
characterized the role of British intelligence operations
against the Axis forces in Greece. First, the function of
the military Intelligence Branch was confined to that of an
advisory department without executive authority. Secondly,
it was the consensus of the Service staffs that this
function was to be strictly focused on matters which
concerned intelligence regarding the military, naval, or air
capabilities of foreign countries. 34 AlI intelligence
matters dealing with political developments were left to the
Foreign Office despite any military significance they May
have had for the Serv.Lces. Hinsley states that:
36. The same attitude was held by the Admiralty despite the
fact that its Intelligence Branch was not placed under
Operations. According to Hinsley (London 1979, Vol. 1, p.
9), it was assumed that by incorporating intelligence within
the operations directorates the Services would make regular
and effective use of specialized intelligence departments.
37. The Secret Service Committee was appointed by the
Cabinet in 1919 to advise the government on the post-war war
arrangements for the intelligence services, its findings and
recommendations were concluded in 1921. (Hinsley, London
( 1979, Vol. 1, p. 17).
105
108
Espionage
During the inter-war period, the SIS was organized into fi;e
sections designated by Roman numerals whose function was to
distribute to the appropriate departments information
collected by the SIS Stations abroad. section l was
responsible for political intelligence; section II supplied
information to the War Office; section III worked with the
AdmiraIt y; section IV dealt with air intelligence; section V
handled security and counter-espionage. The he ad of each
section was commanded by liaison officers from the Foreign
Office and the Service intelligence departments. 50
The use of the PCO system as a cover for SIS officers was to
be a temporary arrangement and one which the Foreign Office
did not regard as compatible with diplomatie activity. As a
result, many SIS officers faced difficulties because their
cover as PCO's placed them in a~ awkward position in most
British embassies. Their status remained unclear and they
were often regarded as an embarrassment by the mission
( diplomats. The Foreign Office was reluctant to grant PCO's
diplomatie credentials but in some cases they were given
consular or honorary-vice consular status. In general,
conditions varied from one embassy to another and depended
upon the attitude of the local ambassador. 56
60. West (London 1983, p. 39), adds that since the First
World War it had bE!(i;m the custom for individual Stations to
focus their activities on countries bordering their station
rather than on the country that they were located in, to
avoid getting into difficulties with the local authorities.
Thus, information about the Soviet union was obtained from
Stations in countries near Russia and fram White Russian
exiles in Paris and London.
In 1938, the War Office was again complaining that the SIS
was not meeting its urgent need for accurate and factual
information about Germany's military capability while the
Air Ministry, according to Hinsley, dismissed SIS
intelligence as 'normally 80% inaccurate'. Both Services
attributed the failure of the SIS te provide them with
information on the diversion of the limited SIS resources to
the " ... collection and distribution of political speculation
It was not until the summer of 1939 that the JIC acquired
the status and organization it required to act as an
intelligence coordinating bod~. The reorganization occurred
between June-July 1939 and came as a result of the demands
of the Chiefs of Staff for some mechanism to coordinate
military and political intelligence matters that required
immediate attention. 8S In respanse ta this, the minister
for the Coordination of Defence set up the situation Report
( Center which consisted of representatives of the Service
intelligence departments and of the Foreign Office. After
two months, the C~nter proposed its merger with the JIC and
in July 1939 received approval from the Foreign Office. 86
The mandate and terms of reference of the JIC acquired their
final form and are included by Hinsley as following:
84. The primary fear of the Foreign Office in participating
in an intelligence coordinating system was that it would
105e its monopoly over palitical intelligence (Andrew,
London 1985, p. 410; Hinsley, London 1979, Vol. 1, p. 42).
85. Another factor was the alarrnist intelligence circulated
by the Foreign Office at this time, which later proved to be
wrong, as weIl as the military implications of some of the
information collected which highlighted the lack of
intelligence coordination (Hinsley, London 1979, Vol. 1, p.
42).
As matters stood in the first year of the war, the JIC had
been given a considerable degree of administrative
responsibility for the creation and organization of new
Chapter 3
,
~
" ..• attempted at the very moment when we are fighting for
(JIS) , became the inner committee of the JIC. 21 The JIC was
one captain and two commanders from the Royal Navy, one lt.
colonel and one major from the Army, one wing commander and
one Sqdr. Leader from the Royal Air Force, one First
Secretary from the Foreign Office, one Assistant Secretary
and one Principal from the Ministry of Economie Warfare
(Ismay 1960, pp. 160-161).
22. Hinsley, London 1981, Vol. 2, p. 3.
23. Hinsley, London 1981, Vol. 2, p. 3.
24. Hinsley, London 1979, Vol. l, p. 288.
137
1
'.
At this critical junction (1939-1940), the SIS deployment
for war relied on an organization based in two parts: the Y
headquarters post~ and the YP division which looked after
the overseas Stat1ons. The Y division consisted of ten
sections which maintained liaison with the Service
intelligence departments and were responsible for counter-
espionage, communications, and finance: section l, political
intelligence; section II, military intelligence; section
III, naval intelligence; section IV, air intelligence;
Section V, counter-espionage; section VI; industrial
intelligence; Section VII, finance; section VIII,
communications, section IX, ciphersi section X, press. 36
For the most part SIS relied for information on its European
stations but after the fall of France most of these, with
the exception of those located in neutral countries, were
closed down. As a result, the iocal points of British
intelligence shifted to the Baltic, Switzerland, the United
States and the Middle East. The Balkan Stations, which had
been considerable sources of intelligence, were also
A new source on the Balkan countries for SIS and MI was the
(
149
Perhaps the greatest handicap faced by the SOE was the lack
of radio transmjtters and that it had to rely on the SIS not
only for the latter but also for its general communications.
Relations between the two organizations were poor from the
beginning and were considerably aggravated later when the
SOE began to collect intelligence, in addition to its
sabotage activities. Part of the problem arose from the
fact that the SOE took over SIS's sabotage section without
consulting Menzies and from the fear that the violent
activities of the SOE would disrupt the intelligence
gathering efforts of the MI6 networks. Early recriminations
between the two bodies eventually led to a bitter rivalry
constantly fuelled by overlapping in several areas of
intelligence work and competition for resources. 98
In the Middle East, the PWE did not direct the propaganda
effort in the Balkans and Italy until the end of 1942, and
when it did assume control of its responsibilities, it ran
into considerable conflict with the SOE. In order to
resolve the differences between the two organizations and
avoid future problems, the tasks of the SOE and PWE were
clear1y divided. The SOE was obliged to hand over to PWE
its radio stations in Cairo and Jerusalem as weIl as its
propaganda staff of four hundred specialists. The SOE,
furthermore, had to use the broadcasting facilities of the
PWE but the latter could not send agents in the field. The
after taken over by the PWE but the use of sabotage was
viewed as a complement to the bOmbing efforts of the RAF.
The role of secret drmies outlined by the Joint Planning
staff was to be confined to supporting British units in the
field. ln their report on the future efforts of the SOE,
the Joint Planning staff assumed that:
Part II
'.
c
169
Chapter 4
17. AlI the preparations maèe by MI(R) and the Greek General
Staff amounted to very little, in terms of organizing an
effective number of underground groups, as a result of the
total collapse of Greece in April 1941 (Report on SOE
Activities in Greece and the Islands of the Aegean Sea,
Appendix l, "Orig in and Constitution of SOE", p. 1).
However, the agents of MI(R) and section 0 managed to
purchase substantial quantities of small arms, ammunition,
grenades and incendiary bombs and hide them in the British
Consulate in Athens. In addition, sabotage kits were
manufactured out of four gallon petrol cans which included:
explosives, a saboteur's hand-book translated into Greek,
100 pounds in Greek currency, two pistols and ammunition,
and a few knuckle busters. At the same time, as Many as
three to four hundred potential saboteurs were trained
(Clogg, "The Special Operation:~ Executive in Greece",
Hanover and London 1981, pp. 110-111.)
18 Woodhouse, Apple of Discord, London 1948, p. 37. In his
second book, The Struggle for Greece 1941-1949 (London 1976,
p. 29), however, Woodhouse emphasizes that the SOE recruited
cashiered republican officers since: " ... such officers were
readily available ... and were perhaps thought not to be so
dangerous politically as the Communists.".
175
in Greece.
organizations as required. 34
32. It was not until the autumn of 1943, however, that the
SOE (Cairo) was brought under the direct control of the
Commander-in-Chief Middle East (Woodhouse, Apple of Discord,
London 1948, pp. 44-45; Henry Mait'and Wilson, Eight Years
Overseas, London 1948, pp. 164-165, 169).
regarding Greece. 39
organization:
53. Gubbins, "SOE and Regular and Irregular War", pp. 104-
105.
---------------------
67. Sweet-Escott, "SOE in the Balkans", p. 18.
68. Throughout this period, and for the duration of the
occupation of Greece, the island of Krete and Greece were
managed separately and the heads of both sections reported
to the Balkan Department (D.M. Candit, Case study in
Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II, washington D.C.
1961) .
69. Sweet-Escott, "SOE in the Balkans", p. 19.
70. Sw'eet-Escott, "S0E in the Balkans", p. 18.
192
193
(
" 77. Condit, Washington 1961, pp. 14-15.
196
The King and his ministers went to Egypt and then ac the end
of June to South Africa. They reached London on 22
September 1941. The Greek Cabinet which arrived in England
was small alld comprised the following ministers: 'l'souderos,
President of the council and Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Finance; General Nikolaidis, Minister for Air;
Dirnetratos, Minister of Labour. AdmiraI Sakellariou,
Minister of Marine and Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces, remained with the fleet in the Middle East. In
addition to the ministers, the Government-in-Exile included:
the Governor of the National Bank of Greece, Varvaressos;
the Depu~y Governor, Manzavinos and the Minister for
Shipping, Theophanidis. Initially, the King and his
ministers were stationed in London with only an
administrative headquarters representing the Greek Minister
for War waintained in Cairo. Greek forces in the Middle
East, however, were placed under the command of British
military authorities. 81 The Government-in-Exile contained
no outstanding personalities, with the exception of
Tsouderos, who had been Governor of the National Bank of
Greece until he was removed from his post by Metaxas, and
AdmiraI Sakellariou, who had managed to evacuate part of the
Greek fleet to Alexandria. 82
more than the problem of distance, they had to deal with the
occupation. 85
201
controlled press 94
96. The famine took a greater toll of life than the war of
1940-1941, aIl the bombings, casüalties from resistance
activity and the victims of reprisaIs exacted by the Axis
forces (Fleischer, Athens ~988, p. 194).
205
115-116) .
20R
The famine caught the attention of the world press and the
added pressure of the international community threatened to
affect adverse1y wor1d opinion against Gre~t Britain. 105
Ultimately, the War Cabinet relented and lifted the
b1ockade, but on1y after strong signs of American
disapproval. 106 In the interim period, thousands starved to
death while the British grapp1ed with moral di1emmas and the
impact of starvation on subversive warfare. While the
British Government debated whether death by starvation of a
substantial number of these people was necessary to the war
effort 107 , these same Greeks risked the death penalty from
the occupation authorities by hiding British soldiers who
had managed to escape or had avoided capture and shared with
... could not have been based on any other assumption but
such a poJicy of moderation and common sense assumed a
higher level of political education and restraint than
was the ~ase in the prÏïgminantly peasant countries of
Yugoslavla and Greece.
Chapter 5
.'
As the war in Russia grew more difficult for the Germans and
despite the increasing partisan activity in Yugoslavia, the
German High Cornmand was forced ta transfer additianal forces
fram the Balkans as weIl as from Germany ta the eastern
front. In late October, List was forced ta relinqujsh his
command because of ill health and was replaced by Lieutenant
General Walter Kuntze while in early December the XVIII
Mountain Corps was transferred from the Balkans ta Germany
for re-deployment. To make up for these losses the German
commander of South East was forced to rely more and more on
Bulgarian and Italian forces which were not as effective in
dealing with the growing partisan activity.l0
East and his forces to that of an army group (Army Group E).
Although Loehr still only commanded one army the new
designation May have been prompted by the desire to have the
German commander attain equal status with his Italian
counterpart. 11
236
237
238
240
243
within the Greek armed forces in order to use them for their
own purposes in the post-war periode These groups did not
survive very long and after they were broken up sorne of
their memLers became willing Gestapo agents. 34
244
245
43. Athenians were not perrnitted out doors after 10:00 P.M.
(Benetatos, Athens 1963 p. 28
44. Ch. Christidis, Athens 1971, p. 5-6; Fleischer, Athens
1988, p. 121.
45. Christidis, Athens 1971, p. 10; Fleischer, Athens 1988,
p. 121.
46. Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Greece: Laws of
Occupation. Analysis of Government ProposaIs for Redress,
New York 1973, p. 190.
{ 47. Benetatos, Athens 1963, p. 27
248
,
set for 10:00 P.M. other regulations followed which
\
illustrated the frustrations of the Germans and the course
of action they intended to follow:
The term officer corps in the decade before and the four
years during the occupation encompasses the professional
255
256
caire had very little to werk with and SIS had te rely on
the traditional means of espionage to collect information
about the Axis in Greece. 65 Durinq the three and one-half
years of the occupation intelligence was required on the
Axis order of battle in Greece and the Aegean islands,
information concerninq German and Italian shipping,
particularly on convoys to North Africa. By the end of
1942, however, intelligence on the Greek resistance
organizations was becominq increasinqly important and after
1943 it attained equal priority with the German armed
forces. 66
German withdrawal. 70
(
In the beginning of the occupation the Grcek Communist Party
was in disarray but quickly managed to reorganize. 74 In
268
During the seventh plenum, the central theme of the KKE was
Republicans met with failure and had the same results with
86. The first step towards forming a common front was ta ken
by the Greek labour unions who, with the support of the
Communists formed the National Workers' Liberation Front
(EEAM) on 16 July 1941. In a~dition, to its role of looking
after the needs of labour during the occupation, EEAM aiso
proposed the creation of a common front to instigate
resistance (Avgi 13 July 1960: KKE Episima Keimena 1940-
1945, Vol. 5, pp. 66-67: Fleischer, Athens 1988, p. 146).
273
was only in February of 1942 that the KKE sent agents into
the mountains to organize an arrned resistance and on 10
April the first guerrilla bands were officially approved. 91
A month latter (22 May 1942), Aris Veloukhiotis organized
the first unit of ELAS. 92 Although Veloukhiotis started
with fifteen men and his actions were originally limited to
they also had a direct link with the KKE. Before the
,
j
a
288
Part III
Chapter 6
1
Covert Operations 1941-1944
with this situation and make sorne attempt to bring those men
Allied troops.
shipping. Slnce the war in North Africa was not going weIl
Navy to choke off the Africa Corps' supply line from Piraeus
with the help of Alexander Zannas, the head of the Greck Red
---------------
1952, pp. 22-40. The sources dealing with Atkinson and his
activities at Antiparos are not in agreement concerning his
raIe in Greece, or even the period of time he spent therc.
According to the accounts listed above, Atkinson arrived in
Greeee in October 1941 and was eaptured Dy the Italians ln
January 1942. The British accounts refer ta Atkinson's
presence in Greeee and his capture but do not provide ~ny
additional details. Foot and t.angley (London 1979, p. 92)
state that Atkinson's mission was to assist British soldlcrs
to escape from Greece and almost aIl the members of the tcam
were eaptured in January 1942. In addition, the submarlnc
Triumph sent to facilitate the rescue was lost at Antiparos.
According to Roskill (The War at Sea, Vol. 3, London 1954,
p. 443), the submarine Triumph was sunk by a mine on the
14th of January 1942 in the Gulf of Athens (presumably the
Saronic Gulf), whereas Janes Fighting Shiê (New York 194~»)
lists the submarine lost on the 16th of January 1942 in th~
Aegean. Bickham Sweet-Escott (Baker street rrreg~lgr,
London 1965, p. 119), on the other hand, suggests that this
event took place in the spring of 1942 and its purpose was
1 to make contact with Greeks w~lling to work for the British.
He aiso adds that the group was brought to Antiparos by
submarine but he does not indicate that it was lost. In a
later account, Sweet Escott ("SOE in the Balkans", p. 8)
refers to a sir.gle British officer who was captured dt
Antiparos in February 1942. Woodhouse (Apple of Discor~,
London 1948) writes about the capture of a British officer
at Antiparos but does not provide any other information.
The Greek references listed above derive their facts from
~he account of Alexander Zannas, (1 Katochi: Anamniseis~
Epistoles, Athens 1964, p. 74ff.), although they provide
sorne aspects not covered by Zannas. The most reliable
source for this episode is provided by AdmiraI panagiotis E.
Konstas (1 ElIas 1940-1950: ai Polemikai, Politikai kai
Diplomatikai Anamniseis tau, tis Dekaetias 1940-1950, Athens
i955, pp. 244-246), the head of the Greek secret service in
Cajro. Konstas bases his account not only from his own
recollection of the event but on the transcripts of the
post-war trial of the collaborators on the Island of SIlOS,
where Atkinson and the rest of his team stood trial for
espionage by the Italian authorities and as sueh had the
benefit of consulting the Italian dûcuments coneerning this
event. Another reliable source, although it only provides a
brief reference to the Atkinson affair, is the Istorikon
Archeion Ethnikis Andistaseos, (ed. K. Pyromaglou, Vol. 2,
occupation forces. lO
with the help of the Zannas group and through contacts with
islands. 12
of the morning, the explosives went off and bath ships were
and five hundred pounds, hi~ nates from the meeting with
20. Many received long prison sentences but Atkinson and his
irnmediate associates were condemned to death and executed
sorne months later.
monarchy.
(EAM) •
the Italians. From this point on, relations between two the
l dissolved and the SOE in cairo was once again organized into
27. Until the arrivaI of its code book, the Prometheus group
had concentrated on minor acts of sabotage such as placing
explosives in German automobiles (IAEA, Vol. 1, pp. 56-57).
tanker and one cargo ship loaded with ammunition just before
severa! weeks. 30
Vichy government. 32
partieulaTly use fuI since they supplied her with the Italian
l date), p. 29).
308
away because she was convinced that the Germans were closing
torture, Karagiannis did not break down and thus was aLle to
1944, she along with sixty-five men and five women was
l lives. 47
list. 51
from lack of funds and frorn low morale due to the failure of
one hundred and thirty pounds and inforrned him that he will
send reports and receive supplies from the MI9 and MI6
did not have a transmitter nor would it get one until much
possible. 56
Despite the on-going link with the MI9 and MI6 stations in
.,
'Ji
resistance was quickly discouraged, and he was told to
writes that the MI9 and MI6 Stations in Izmir were not
Cairo and made liaison officer between the Greek and British
his efforts Levidis could not get any details concerning the
The main problem faced by Rigopoulos and his group was how
1 1973, p. 55.
320
British.
•
April 1941. He decided to rernain in Atnens and volunteered
to work for the British (Zaousis, Athens 1987, p. 80).
321
Service 5-165. 69
an escort to Egypt. 73
The MI6 and MI9 stations in Smyrna (Izmir) were able to get
groups working for the SOE in Greece and supply them with
un favorable light. 80
327
fr.:,.n:
for intelligence:
Aegean:
time, his wife's family had close ties with the leading
transmitters. 90
German convoy had departed Piraeus and was heading for the
96. Apollo was the name of the organization but the radio
code name was Yvonne ("Report on Organization Yvonne",
Peltekis File No. l, Benaki Museum).
one group. One important draw back, was that most of these
l, Benaki Museum.
the Foreign Office reported that the SOE had ~ent 5,000
give evidence and Peltekis was not only exonerated but was
awarded the OSO.113
in 1944.
118. Mana was the operational name for the return to Greece
of the Greek Government-in-Exile with the British army and
plans for organization of relief. Report on SOE Activities
in Greece and the Islands of the Aegean Sea, "Appendix
VIII".
345
Exile:
the Colonels. At about this time (July 1942), the SOE was
espionage. Its code name was MIDAS 614. The mission was
Allied troops that had evaded capture, while the rest of the
activities. 138
the owner of the boat dnd left behind one of the radio
resistance.
the bridge while the explosives were set. 141 However, this
warfare. 142
From this point on the plans for both the direction of the
(
)~9
Chapter 7
360
There was also the fear by SIS and the JIC that SOE's
to attack than the much older SIS which enjoyed the sympathy
and support of the Foreign Office, the JIC and the Service
in regions where the SIS ha~ lost its pre-war networks was
was indicated in the previous chapter the SOE was quite well
Greece and had shown a clear bias towards groups that were
J6J
have stated that when they parachuted into Greece the y had
rarely spoke to each other and that is why none of the Greek
Woodhouse:
Office and the SOE has demonstrated that not only both
representatives in cairo. 15
in political orientation.
British team, Woodhouse had no idea what the man was talking
while ~ search was made for the rest of their supplies which
the wrong place while the third team was forced to turn back
later but neither team was able to find Zervas or make radio
the way he heard about ELAS which had given refuge to the
and two days later they set out to join Myers and undertake
Eight days later, and after almost two months of delays, the
A week and one half later the 8th Army had pushed the
26. Over the next two years the SOE established eighty
373
develop in Greece. 27
The destruction of ESPO not only startled the Axis but also
resistance. 30
many of the key figures with whom he was to work, and who
him.
with the Socialists 34 and through them with EAM 35 and the
35. EAM and the KKE ~'ere weIl informed about Tsigantes'
activities in Athens and received copies of his reports to
Cairo from a member of the MIDAS team (Fleischer, Athens
1988, p. 302).
political leader. 44
the other left the SOE responsible for directing the Greek
opposed the monarchy or had been cashiered from the army dnd
1943 but at this time they were more concerned with the
whom Keeble assumed would come under the control of the six
Colonels. To Woodhouse: " ... this belonged to a world of
directed from the mountains. For any SOE agent, let alone
clandestine operations.
in Athens.
representat~ves in Greece.
policy. They did not succeed but had to be content with the
" ... while they don't mix in politics, they know that His
{. viaduct both EDES and ELAS began to expand their forces and
1
390
2,420, while the combined force of aIl the other bands did
strength of EDES along with the other bands was 2,970 while
headquarters. 66
the end of the summer of 1943 ELAS, had increased its forces
well and during the same period (January - May 1943) it only
68. The report was written in June 1943 by J.M. stevens who
had returned to Cairo from a fact finding mission in the
Greek rnountains trying to assess the merits of ELAS and
EDES. stevens concluded in his report (British Reports on
Greece 1943-44, "Report of Lt.-Col. J.M. stevens on Present
Conditions in Central Greece", ed. Lars Baerentzen,
Copenhagen 1982, p. 16 and p. 24), that ELAS was poorly led
since it had mounted a campaign against regular Greek
officers but by the summer of 1943 was in the process of
attempting to attract such men into its ranks.
that Zervas had made his peace with the monarchy had the
controllcd organization.
action.
that had developed between ELAS and the other groups was off
theory by the BMM and SOE Cairo, until the fall of 1944, was
J
397
concluded that:
supplies, something which the SOE could not ensure, not only
different perspective:
not becau~e they were first in the field but because the SOE
that:
Foreign Office was concerned, the British did not have any
German divisions in the region and keep them from France and
military.88
401
405
politicians and made it quite clear that the King must not
in-Exile.
100. Rex Leeper, When Greek meets Greek, London 1950, p. 31.
liberated. 103 But the Foreign Office and Lord Selborne, the
explained that:
disappointed frame of mind .... 111 The only change that they
the British were bent upon imposing the Greek King and the
Cairo. 114 The thrust of Leeper's argument was that the SOE
explaining that:
" ... has no political acumen and does not see beyond his no se
the resentment felt by the Greeks for the King. 11S After
guerrillas as:
" ... the chief man who reared by hand this cockatrice brute
between them and the bands of Marshal Tito. They are a mere
The difflculty with this analy~is is that the SOE, like any
accepted that the SOE should retain its autonomy but its
war with each other but despite this Wilson resisted the
bands.
before the end of the war but the failure cf the Cairo
Greek King.
Fighting broke out on 9 October 1943 and within one week had
from Arta, and pushe~ them back across the Arachtos river.
The civil War also renewed the conflict between the Foreign
Office and the SOE, only this time it was Middle East which
incorporated into the Greek army and the same invitation was
The end of the civil war in February 1944 and the mutiny of
the Greek armed forces in th~ Middle East 1eft the Greek
government.
into play and had surnmarily been rejected when the andarti
occupied Greece.
1944.
conference. 153
match for the KKE. The Republican forces, which the SOE had
force and an Ideal target for the Germans who in the fall of
who had been disrnissed from the arrned forces since 1927 to
437
EAM/ELAS.".174
attacks against the Rallis forces 176 but was lifted in July
EDES, and with it the Republican cause, not only within the
176. FO 371/43706
on British supplies.
180. Chapter 6.
provisions included:
Scobie), for:
diary that Greece is: " ... in grave danger of EAM seizing
power whenever the Germans are leaving .... 187 Thus, despite
Battalions. 188
of ELAS' forces and keep them away from the main cities of
\
On 12 October 1944, the Germans pulled their forces out of
For the Greek Government, the most pressing issue was the
(
establishment of a new national army to replace the
Germany. Wjth the exception of the Greek Navy and small air
force, the Greek Government had under its control the 3rd
FLAS who feared that any new arrny based on these officers
the time being, the 3rd Brigade was stationed in Italy and
that:
forced to revise the list and drop those associated with the
Rex Leeper and General Scobie did not officially condemn the
rank and file into elements of the Greek arrny and the police
and through them the KKE was deterrnined to seize power. 199
divided the Balkans into British and Soviet zones. 201 Part
admits that: "My fears that EAM would try ta take over the
they were not wanted and that: " ... incoming officers had
Athens and its presence, according to Hondros, " ... was the
"EAM's attempt to seize power would have been made just the
war.
in 1943.
The December uprising was the legacy of the civil war which
had broken out in the fall of 1943 because the Left feared
458
Part IV
Conclusion
When the Greek Government went into exile, after the fall of
Krete in May of 1941, the British Government based its
policy on the assumption that the basic constitution of the
Greek Governrnent would be unchanged during the exile and
that an Allied victory would see the return of that
Governrnent, with the King at its head, returning to Greece.
T~e British Government would continue to maintain such a
policy, despite the obvious divisions within Greek society,
about the place of the monarchy, which had manifested itself
even before the German occupation of Greece.
( At the same tirne, the British were faced wlth helping in the
organization of sorne forro of Greek resistance against the
Axis occupation. Such a task fell, in part, to the SOE,
many of whose mernbers believed that effective resistance
could only corne from radical, even revolutionary, elements
within the occupied state. So there were in fact two
British policies, one dictated by the perceived military
necessities, a policy that called for the creation and
eventually the expansion of guerrilla activities and the
other which called for the preservation of the existing
Greek Government. Such policies were bound to clash no
matter how rnuch the British Government tried to separate out
the military functions dictated by the war and the political
460
the Greek resistance has been viewed from the prism of the
guerrilla war in the mountains and little effort has been
made to understand the significant contributions of
espionage and sabotage activity during the occupation.
Indeed, the history of British intelligence organizations
and the implementation of espionage and other covert
activities has been overshadowed by the exploits of
guerrilla armies and the feats of British officers working
behind '~emy lines.
The War Office and MI6 had only considered the possibilities
of subversion, sabotage and guerrilla warfare after the
Munich trisis in 1938. In both cases, it was thanks to
efforts of a few individuals that the concept of, what was
later termed, irregular warfare, received serious
consideration. In the War Office, J.C.F. Holland set up MIR
to plan and execute guerrilla warfare and special
operations, while Laurence Grant organized Section D in SIS
ta implement sabotage and subversion. In 1940, both
departments began to recruit agents and deploy their
personnel in Europe and the Middle East.
were three but the propaganda section was handed over to the
471
aiso meant that the SOE was the only body that could attempt
the backdrop for these events, and that prior to the fall of
dealt with the Greek resistance more or less along the lines
that had been adopted by the SOE. It was far too late to
disavow EAM-ELAS and not enough time to expand EDES or
create another organization to counter the influence of the
Left. Headquarters Middle East, consequently, viewed the
Greek resistance from a narrow military perspective, leaving
it to the Foreign Office and the Greek Government-in-Exile
to work out the political ramifications.
TransliteratlQn Table
A, 0: =a
...a =
B, v O:l = al
r, =9
(hard) E l = el
y (soft) o l = 01
6, 6 = d
E, € = e
Ul =1
o:u = af or av
Z, ( = Z EU = ef or ev
H, 11 = 1 l1U = if or lV
8, e = th ou = ou
l, L =1
K, 1< =k
1\, .,.. = 1 v, = d or nd
M, IJ ::. m '-'TT = b or mb
N, v YI< = 9 or
......... , ( = x
n ng
0, 0 = 0
= YY = ng
'ra = ts
n, TT = P 1( = dz
P, p = r
L, o,s = 5
T, T = t
T, U = y
~, ct> = f
X, x = ch or kh (hard)
h (soft)
'II,
0, 'UI" = 0
= ps
488
Great Britain:
FO 371:
FO 898:
FO 989:
989/133 R74320.
Treasury (T):
PREM 3/365/7
WO 201:
1598/74206
WO 204:
Other:
United states:
National Archives:
NARS RG 226:83476.
Greece:
I!e.1aki Museum:
Great Britain:
Greece:
United states:
Germany:
Secondary Sources:
Dalton, H., The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton, ed.
B. Pirnlott, London 1986.
Articles:
GI~rolymatos, A., "The Role of the Greek Off icer Corps in the
Resistance", Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, Vol. XI, No.
3, (Fall 1984), 69-79.
Gubl.'ins, C., "SOE and Regular and Irregular War", The Fourth
Dimension of Warfare, ed. M. Elliott-Bateman, Manchester
1970-1974, pp. 83-103.
Newspapers:
Akropolis: 2.11.40
Rizospastis: 15/11/1944.
Rizospastis: 18/7/1944.
Rizospastis: 30/7/1944.
Rizospastis: 25.10.43.
Fizospastis: 28.10.45.
Books:
,
,. -
London 1978.
Benetatos, D., To Chroniko tis Katochis 1941-1944, Athens
1963.
Bennett, Ro, Ultra and the Mediterranean Strategy 1941-1945,
London 1989.
Blandas, D., Politiki Istoria K.K.E.: l Prodorneni
Epanastasie 1941-1941, Athens 1977.
Bouras, B., l Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftherosis
PEEA: Eleftheri Ellada 1944, Athens 19B3.
Cave-Brown, A., "CH The Secret Life of Sir stuart Menzies.
Spymaster to winston Churchill, N.Y. 1987.
Hadzis, Th., l Nikiphora Epanastasi pou Chathike:
Ethnikoapeleftherotikos Agonas 1941-45, 4 Vols. Athens 1982.
Chiclet, C., Les Communistes Grecs dans la Guerre, Paris
1987
Chiotakis, G., Politikes Thyelles: 2. l Dictatoria 4is
Avgoustou e oi Protagonistes tise 0 Polernos 1940-1941, Athens
1983.
Colville, J., The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street
Diaries 1939-1955, London 1985.
501
Foot, M.R.D., "The IRA and the origin of the SOE" , War and
Society: Historical Essays in Honour and Memory of J.R.
Western, 1928-1971, London 1973.
.
~