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Introduction
Since his first work – Essay on the immediate data of consciousness (1889) –
the real, which gives rise to the opposition between space and time, the latter understood
as duration. However, this opposition is not a dualism of substances such as the radical
(Extension/Thought).
That's why when examining the relationship between the act of consciousness and
the body, Bergson tells us the point of contact between spirit and matter: our memory.
While the tradition housed the spirit in the body "as the pilot on his ship" – a metaphor
that presents a completely external relation that calls for an inner homunculus – the
Bergsonian version of the metaphor rather expresses a thesis on the brain function that
points to the functional continuity of the body in view of the action on their
environment: "the brain is something like the prow on which narrows the ship to cut the
ocean," he wrote in a letter to William James and then reshapes the argument, giving it a
temporary move that implies a certain tension, an attention effort assimilated to the
essence of life.
The concept of "psychological stress" explains the unity of the subject along
similar lines to those who dedicated the cone metaphor: "I perceive as the totalization of
my past, this last being contracted in view of the action. A 'unit of the self' that speak
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philosophers appears to me as the unity of a tip or a ridge, where I focus myself by an
Maybe in line with the distinction established by Justin Barret between system 1
(faculties) and system 2 (beliefs), this paper examines some results of the scientific
philosophy in view of the perennial need to investigate and provide answers to the
then the impact that had to be confronted with the latest scientific experiments. First,
recall that the brain, as an intermediate concentrates a set of feelings and movements
moving on the tip of mental life, when inserted into the tissue of events. More useful
than evoke memories, the brain contributes to temporarily displace the others, from
which it follows that the body has an important function to link the memory to the present
matter and denies that the first can be accommodated in the second. In addition to the
philosophical implications that this thesis may have (especially in relation to overcoming
the "dualism"), it establishes an hypothesis about the functioning of the brain that
immediately raises suspicions from the part of modern physiology. Indeed, Bergson
conviction that the spirit (pure memory) can be dissociated from the functioning of
the human brain is not shared by most scientists. But what is striking is that now
proliferate books written jointly by philosophers and neuroscientists who give the action
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a central role in philosophical theories of subjectivity.1 By stating that perception is
If all perception extends moving, the power to act of a living being is expressed
by the degree of uncertainty that accompanies the stimulus received by the senses. This
means that the brain state is already an action started and not the condition of the
perception, and the perception of a distinct object of our body is a virtual action.
(perception), but modern neuroscience goes further when considering the perception
as a simulated action and the brain as a simulator of the action. Scientific experiments
show that certain brain areas are activated in the same way when passively observe an
In addition, the science shows that the brain contains not only a set of
sensorimotor mechanisms (as Bergson thought), but also other mechanisms that allow
it to operate independently of the outside world, thanks to internal models of the body's
reality (the corporal scheme) that can simulate the action without executing it. Without
going any further, the dream is already a proof that we do not need sensory input to have
The neuroscience of movement also confirms the thesis of the unity of action, as
the experiences in the field of biomechanics show that when we make a move as draw
a picture of an "8", there are certain laws operating in that gesture that assure its unit. It
is interesting to note that the action is not produced only by the excitement of the
1
BERTHOZ, Alain. Les théories de Bergson sur la perception, la mémoire et le rire, au regard des données
des neurosciences. Annales bergsoniennes IV. Paris: PUF, 2008.
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muscles, but thanks to the intervention of certain structures whose neurons are
movements among those we can do. Acting is uninhibit and movement is produced by
disinhibition.
This is important because we use to attribute to action an active role. The free act,
for example, depends on the activity of the spirit, that is, the act we make "with the whole
soul." Usually, the action is explained as a production of movement. In this sense, to act
is to move our bodies in view of the usefulness (practical action). But there is also a
passive action that should not be overlooked, even when we think about the issue of
freedom. To be free is not to yield to all movements that solicit our attention, or produce
a greater amount of movements. Often, freedom is some kind of denial of the movement.
By inhibiting certain movements, we release others, but we are free in these two
(movement detention).
Regarding the matter, we could say that Bergson attributes to it an specific length
of time, that is, an apparent continuity of movements made by na infinitely small and
for what today is called "the body in action." It is useless to perceive the trillion of
vibrations in the effective duration of the matter, since, to act, is much more useful to
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This insistence of Bergson in the continuous character of living opens the door to
2008, p.170). They allow us to move our sight of a point in space to another and
understand how on the reading, for example, we read the globally phrases, as a whole,
We also highlight the critical from Bergson to Zeno (paradox of the running
between Achiles and the turtle) for its proximity to what today is called "kinesiology"
(science of movement) and has a central role in explaining the constitution of spatial
relations. This criticism shows the importance of action and sensitive experience in
also the muscle sensations (the action of the movement) and not only the underlying
space. Perceiving the line set by our own feets when we walk, for example, it is only
Conclusion:
there is a difference of principle regarding the relationship between body and spirit,
because, from the scientific point of view, the spirit is something that is in the proper
functioning of the brain, contrary what Bergson held. All the powers of mind, also
including memory, would be contained in the brain processes, missing the explanation of
interaction with scientific problems should be addressed with their own methods
different from those adopted by the natural sciences. The philosophical question is not
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holdover that exceeds the matter, but this does not imply an abandonment of the praxis
in favor of pure speculation (theories), since philosophy can remain in constant dialogue
with the scientific experiments, whether in the context of psychology, neuroscience and
evolutionary biology, which leads us to claim for it the status of a rigorous science (as
Husserl wanted).