ALIMPOOS vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-27331
July 30, 1981

The sole function of the writ is to relieve from unlawful imprisonment, and ordinarily
it cannot properly be used for any other purpose. Thus it has been held that the writ
cannot properly be used: To enforce a right to service; to determine whether a person
has committed a crime; in determine a disputed interstate boundary line; to punish
respondent or to afford the injured person redress, for the illegal detention; to recover
damages or other money award.

FACTS
Reynaldo Mosquito was detained by the Chief of Police in Agusan by virtue of a warrant
of arrest in a criminal case which was a prosecution for Robbery with Less Serious
Physical Injuries, the place which was allegedly robbed belonged to spouses Alimpoos.
The accused, then detained, contending that the warrant was issued without the
observance of the legal requirements for the issuance thereof, instituted the Habeas
Corpus case before the Trial Court. Mosquito named as defendants in this case the
Provincial Fiscal and the spouses Alimpoos. He also filed a claim for damages premised
on Article 32 (4) and the other applicable provisions of the Civil Code.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the writ of Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy for Mosquito
2. Whether or not he may be awarded damages in a Habeas Corpus case
3. Whether or not spouses Alimpoos can be a party to the case

HELD
1. Habeas corpus is not the proper remedy. When a warrant of arrest is being assailed
for improper preliminary investigation, the remedy is a petition to quash the warrant of
arrest or a petition to conduct a preliminary investigation of the case. It is the general rule
that Habeas Corpus should not be resorted to when there is another remedy available.
2. Damages cannot be awarded. The sole function fo the writ is to relieve the unlawful
imprisonment and ordinarily it cannot be properly issued for another purpose. The sole
function of the writ is to relieve from unlawful imprisonment, and ordinarily it cannot
properly be used for any other purpose. Thus it has been held that the writ cannot
properly be used: To enforce a right to service; to determine whether a person has
committed a crime; in determine a disputed interstate boundary line; to punish respondent
or to afford the injured person redress, for the illegal detention; to recover damages or
other money award.
3. As to the issue whether or not the spouses Alimpoos may take part in the case, the
court ruled that which the issuance connotes the commencement of a civil action, the
proceeding for Habeas Corpus is technically not yet a suit between private parties. A
habeas corpus proceeding is not a suit between parties. While the issuance of the writ is
to all intents and purposes the commencement of a civil action, a suit, yet technically the
proceedings by Habeas Corpus is in no sense a suit between private parties. The person
restrained is the central figure in the transaction. The proceeding is instituted solely for
his benefit. As it is not designed to obtain redress against anybody, and as no judgment
can be entered against anybody, and as there is no real plaintiff and defendant, there can
be no suit in the technical sense. The proper party is the Chief of Police or the person
having the accused in the detention and not the private offended party. It is also only the
fiscal who may appeal the order granting the writ as mandated by Section 19 of Rule 14
of the Revised Rules of Court.
 SALVAÑA vs. GAELA
G.R. No. L-234115
February 21, 1931

Habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto, except in cases expressly excepted.

FACTS
A petition habeas corpus for custody was filed by spoused Francisco Salvaña and
Modesta Saliendra in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas to recover their daugther
Felicisima Salvaña, a 15-year old single girl who is in the custody of respondent,
Leopoldo Gaela, justice of the peace of Lucban, Tayabas. The latter however claims that
he never had the slightest intention of detaining said Felicisima Salvaña and depriving her
of her liberty, that her stay in Gaela’s home being due not only to the request of the
petitioners herein, but also to that of Felicisima Salvaña, herself, who does not want to
live in her parents' house, because they maltreated her and wished for her to marry to a
person whom she does not care for.

ISSUE
Whether of not the writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to
regain the custody of a minor daughter, even though the latter be in the custody of a third
person of her own free will.

HELD
The remedy of habeas corpus is a proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the
custody of a minor daughter, even though the latter be in the custody of a third person of
her own free will. The writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto, except in
cases expressly excepted. The fact, then, that a minor daughter is in the custody of a third
person of her own free will, and without said person's having the slightest intention of
detaining her, is no hindrance to the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to enable her
parents to regain custody of her person.
 SUAREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 83251
January 23, 1991

The question as to who shall have the custody of the child can be sufficiently resolved
in the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court.

FACTS
Respondent Manese filed with the trial court a petition for writ of habeas corpus against
petitioner Renato Suarez, his mother Paz Suarez and his sister Milagros Suarez for the
custody and support of minor Rafael Carlos Suarez. The court however rendered a
decision dismissing the petition for habeas corpus. Not satisfied with the decision,
Manese filed another action for custody of minor and support before the trial court,
against petitioner.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the order of dismissal with prejudice in the action for a writ of habeas
corpus was valid;
2. Whether or not said dismissal constitutes a res judicata to for the filing of another
action for the custody of the minor and support.

HELD
1. The order of dismissal by the Regional Trial Court with the writ of habeas corpus is
null and void for having been rendered without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based. The circumstances surrounding the dismissal of
the case show that the order of the trial court was issued whimsically and capriciously
and with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to nullity of the order.
2. The dismissal does no constitute res judicata. The court ruled the order of dismissal of
the petition for the writ of habeas corpus cannot be considered as a valid adjudication on
the merits which would serve as a bar to the second action for custody of minor.
The court further held that when questions raised involve the determination of who shall
have the custody of the child, such can be sufficiently resolved in the petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to Rule 102, Revised Rules of Court. Nevertheless, it is the error
of the trial court to dismiss the first case with prejudice to the filing of the second action
without stating the reasons or basis thereof, this should not prevent the filing of the
second action for custody of minor, since no opportunity was granted by the trial court to
the plaintiff to raise this issue for the determination of the court in the habeas corpus case.