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ValueInvestor

February 28, 2006

The Leading Authority on Value Investing


INSIGHT
Hating to Lose Inside this Issue
F E AT U R E S
To successfully buck the consensus you first have to fully understand what the
consensus is. That’s how Jon Jacobson and Highfields Capital excel. Investor Insight: Jon Jacobson
Challenging conventional wisdom

A
fter a successful run trading options
I NVE STOR I N S IG HT on Penn West Energy, Saks Inc.,
on Wall Street, Jon Jacobson got his Vinci and Lagardere. PAGE 1 »
first portfolio to manage at Harvard
University’s investment company in 1990. Investor Insight: Ken Shubin Stein
“Back then you couldn't raise money with- Looking beyond the clouds at Foot
out a track record,” he says. “But they were Locker, Tyco, Resource America and
willing to give me $100 million to manage Newkirk Realty Trust. PAGE 1 »

the day I walked in the door.”


Uncovering Value: SuperInvestors
An excellent decision. When he left
Recent superstar-investor trades show
Harvard in 1998 to start Highfields Capital, that finding value in brand-name
Jacobson had turned that initial stake and stocks is catching on. PAGE 18 »
an added $200 million into $1.6 billion.
Since starting Highfields, which now man- Behind the Numbers: Hedging II
ages $8 billion, he and partner Richard Jon Jacobson Why a one-time short-selling star
Highfields Capital Management thinks the deck is overly stacked
Grubman have earned a compounded
15.4% annually, vs. 4.4% for the S&P 500. Investment Focus: Seeks companies against the practice today. PAGE 20 »
trading at very low historical or competitive
Valuation “dislocations” remain plenti- valuations – for reasons that are both fully Of Sound Mind: Traits of the Great
ful, says Jacobson, who’s finding opportuni- understood and changeable. What truly sets the great investors
ty in Europe, energy and media. See page 2 apart from the crowd? PAGE 22 »

Surgical Precision Editors’ Letter


The battle lines are drawn over
Making smart subjective judgments first requires objective analysis of the infor- shareholder activism. PAGE 23 »
mation at hand – a particular strength of Spencer Capital’s Ken Shubin Stein.
INVESTMENT HIGHLIGHTS

A
I NVE STOR I N S IG HT fter several years pursuing in paral-
INVESTMENT SNAPSHOTS PAGE
lel his dual interests of medicine
Foot Locker 12
and investing, Ken Shubin Stein
Lagardere 8
hung up his stethoscope for good in 2000 to
Newkirk Realty 15
manage money full-time. “I enjoyed medi-
Penn West Energy 5
cine very much,” he says. “But I just
Resource America 14
enjoyed investing too much not to make a
Saks 6
career out of it.”
Tyco 13
Investors in Shubin Stein’s Spencer
Vinci 7
Capital Management have reaped the
rewards of that career decision. Since
Other companies in this issue:
November 2000, they’ve earned a net
Altria, Apollo Real Estate, Circuit City, CKE
24.1% compounded annually, vs. an annual
Ken Shubin Stein Restaurants, Comcast, ConocoPhillips,
Spencer Capital Management 2.1% loss for the S&P 500.
Corning, Covanta, Davita, DirecTV, General
Investment Focus: Seeks companies for Shubin Stein’s rigorous research process
Electric, International Coal, Knight-Ridder,
which temporary events obscure near-term is unearthing many opportunities today,
McDonald’s, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley,
prospects but do not materially affect long- including those in big-name corporate
term earnings power. Pfizer, Reliant Energy, Time Warner,
underachievers as well as in companies he
Vornado Realty, Wal-Mart, Winthrop Realty
sees as potential hidden gems. See page 10

www.valueinvestorinsight.com
B E H I N D T H E N U M B E R S : Hedging II

Coming Up Short
Short selling shares two key traits with the airline industry: New players keep coming into the
business … and net industry profits over time are below zero. By Joseph Feshbach

Editors’ Note: In our last issue (VII, egy with the following fundamental eco- Nothing in my investing career has
January 31, 2006), Whitney Tilson and nomic characteristics: been more satisfying than identifying and
Glenn Tongue argued that bearish bets profiting from the emperor-has-no-
through short sales and put options are 1) Limited potential returns, but clothes opportunities we repeatedly
potentially viable money makers and a unlimited potential losses found in the 1980s. But I’ve come to
sound way to hedge risk. This prompted 2) Skyrocketing competition believe that the game has become so
a response from Joseph Feshbach, who 3) Tax inefficiency stacked against the short seller that it’s
sees short-selling as a loser’s game. Given 4) Aggregate net losses over its history just not worth the periodic emotional and
that Joe, along with brothers Kurt and 5) The elimination of a significant monetary high that comes from being
Matt, ran the largest short-only invest- source of income in recent years right with a bearish bet.
ment fund in the 1980s, we were eager to 6) Risk of asset repossession at The business of shorting has only got-
hear this counter argument. creditors’ whim ten tougher since my brothers and I left it
in the early 1990s. Rebates on the short
“Investing is most intelligent when it Having spent 15 years of my career credit – a share of the interest earned on
is most businesslike,” wrote Benjamin doing nothing but short selling – with the short-sale proceeds – used to be a sig-
Graham, a sentiment that Warren periods of great prosperity and other peri- nificant source of income for short sellers,
Buffett has described as containing ods of fast, painful losses – I can argue but have all but disappeared due to low
among the nine most important words with some authority that, as an invest- interest rates and even “negative rebates”
ever uttered about investing. Given that, ment strategy, shorting suffers from each on hard-to-borrow stocks. There are now
how would you judge an investing strat- of these characteristics of a bad business. a few thousand hedge funds looking at
the same short opportunities, versus a
few dozen 20 years ago. The tax ineffi-
ciency is more pronounced than ever:
short-sale profits are taxed at a short-
term capital-gains rate that is approxi-
mately 2.5 times the rate for long-term
gains. The landscape is littered with the
carcasses of short-only funds that never
made money, while long-term winners
are about as numerous as those in the air-
line industry.
Whitney Tilson and Glenn Tongue are
in good company with the poor perform-
ance of their bearish bets. According to
the investor presentation Carl Icahn used
in launching his activist hedge fund last
year, his returns from a mere 15 long
positions from 1996 to 2004 generated
$1.5 billion in profits. Conversely, his 24
short positions produced a comparatively
small $150 million in profits, 85% of
which came from a single position,
Conseco (a stock, by the way, that I
shorted about ten years too early!). Given
that this period included three years of a
gut-wrenching bear market, even Icahn
“I thought buying the boat would make him more himself must be questioning the real ben-
optimistic about the future but apparently not...” efit of shorting.

February 28, 2006 www.valueinvestorinsight.com Value Investor Insight 20


B E H I N D T H E N U M B E R S : Hedging II

Whitney and Glenn offer a key argu- the most overvalued and hyped stocks are Don’t worry about short-term swings
ment for making bearish bets: hedging. small- or mid-caps, for which puts usual- in performance. Contrary to modern
Specifically, they see such bets as “insur- ly aren’t available or are extremely expen- portfolio theory – and as legendary value
ance” against their portfolio of “80-cent sive. Second, puts require that you be investors such as Buffett and Joel
dollars,” and take comfort in the analogy right not only on the fundamentals, but Greenblatt have well articulated – portfo-
that “The fact our home didn’t burn also on timing. Payday may arrive, but lio volatility and risk are not remotely
down doesn’t mean we’re upset that we your options may already have expired. synonymous. Tweedy, Browne’s Chris
lost 100% of our ‘investment’ in home So if making bearish bets is the costly Browne studied the long-term perform-
insurance.” game I think it is, how should value ance of seven of the greatest value
But any insurance only makes sense at investors address issues of risk manage- investors in history and found that they
a given cost, which I’d argue is too high ment, preservation of capital and periods under-performed market averages
when it comes to short-selling. Great of underperformance? I like Icahn’s between 28% and 40% of the time –
short-sellers like Michael Steinhardt and description of his risk-management sometimes accompanied by hair-raising
Edward “Rusty” Rose have made signifi- approach as “fundamentally driven by asset drawdowns – while still trouncing
cant profits over the course of their the underlying value of the company the averages over long periods. My unso-
careers from shorting, but from my inter- rather than prevailing market condi- licited advice: Embrace volatility – you’ll
actions with each, it was always clear that tions.” In other words, nothing beats get- make more money in the long run.
their motives in shorting were not as ting the value proposition right on a There will, of course, be many market
“insurance,” but as a vehicle to create stock-by-stock basis as your best protec- swoons to come and short selling may
high absolute profits in every single posi- tion from permanent capital loss. I am help mitigate losses during the toughest
tion, in up markets or down. still looking for and finding 50-cent dol- times. But for my and my investors’
Are put options a better alternative lars and would argue that the 80-cent dol- money, the structural disadvantages of
than shorting for making bearish bets? lar offers both inadequate downside pro- shorting make it too un-businesslike to
They do take away the risk of unlimited tection as well as insufficient upside pursue. VII
loss and aren’t susceptible to short potential. I also insist on growth as a key Joe Feshbach runs Joe Feshbach Partners,
squeezes, but they suffer from two addi- component of the investment thesis – which invests primarily in companies facing
tional major flaws. First, other than dur- value accreting over time further some type of crisis – from accounting scandals
ing the Internet bubble, I’ve found that enhances the risk-reward equation. to government investigations.

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