#2 CASE

G.R. No. L-25246 September 12, 1974

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION and
ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC., defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION,
defendant-appellant.
ZALDIVAR, J.:

FACTS:
Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect known
as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as Company) since 1958.
As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred
to as Union) which had with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed
shop provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent
employees workers covered by this Agreement.
The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following
day, March 4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic
Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act
No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4
of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor
organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action
was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union
wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in
view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member.
The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the
Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service.
This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing
Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective
bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and contended
that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24
and 9 (d) and (e).

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

* CFI - Manila: enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff
from his present employment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay
the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this action
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law.
ISSUE:
WON RA 3350 introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of
Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization" is
constitutional

SUB-ISSUES & RULING:

a. WON RA 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations when it
"prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect
prohibits affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives said members of
their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution

NO.
What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be
compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements
with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects
cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not
members of the collective bargaining union.
If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up
with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse
to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit
them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic
Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.

b. WON RA 3350 unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while the
Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining agreement containing a "closed shop
provision," the Act relieves the employer from its reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the
maintenance of union membership as a condition of employment; and that said Act, furthermore,
impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues from members who, under the Act, are
relieved from the obligation to continue as such members

NO.
The contract clause of the Constitution must, therefore, be not only in harmony with, but also in
subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power of the state to safeguard the vital
interests of the people. It follows that not all legislations, which
have the effect of impairing a contract, are obnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to
impairment, and a statute passed in the legitimate exercise of police power, although it
incidentally destroys existing contract rights, must be upheld by the courts. This has special
application to contracts regulating relations between capital and labor which are not merely
contractual, and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public interest, must yield to the
common good.
Legislation impairing the obligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the
promotion of the general good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end are
reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope
of the reserved power of the state construed in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that
power.
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its purpose was to
insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing
discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit their members from
joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to work,
the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own life and
the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate.
free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the
latter must, therefore, yield to the former.
It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security
and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only
to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger.

c. WON Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their
members from joining labor unions, in violation of Article Ill, Section 1 (7) of the 1935
Constitution or Section 8 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution; and while said Act unduly
protects certain religious sects, it leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations
Section 8 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination and preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.

NO, the government should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular in character
even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or sect. It has likewise been held that
the statute, in order to withstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Assessed by
these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to violate the constitutional inhibition of the
"no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the Constitution.
the exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly advance, or
diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who
are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit
upon the religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of
religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide
or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.

d. WON Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the constitutional provision that
"no religious test shall be required for the exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise
of his civil right to join associations for purposes not contrary to law has to be determined under
the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that conversely, if a worker has to sever his
religious connection with a sect that prohibits membership in a labor organization in order to be
able to join a labor organization, said Act would violate religious freedom

NO. The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association
membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require
affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a
condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a
labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such
religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious
objector is not required to do a positive act — to exercise the right to join or to resign from the
union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part.

e. WON Republic Act No. 3350, violates the "equal protection of laws" clause of the
Constitution, it being a discriminately legislation, inasmuch as by exempting from the operation
of closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni Cristo", it has granted said members
undue advantages over their fellow workers, for while the Act exempts them from union
obligation and liability, it nevertheless entitles them at the same time to the enjoyment of all
concessions, benefits and other emoluments that the union might secure from the employer

NO. The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application
of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.

f. WON Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional provision regarding the promotion of
social justice

NO.
Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. Republic Act No. 3350
promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who, because of their religious
belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents their being deprived of work and of the means
of livelihood. In determining whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not
necessary that the entire state be directly benefited — it is sufficient that a portion of the state be
benefited thereby.
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper
economic and social equilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the community.
Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the members of a religious sect, like the
Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for it insures security in their
employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union having a closed shop agreement
with the employer. The Act also advances the proper economic and social equilibrium between
labor unions and employees who cannot join labor unions, for it exempts the latter from the
compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed shop agreements and equalizes, in
so far as opportunity to work is concerned, those whose religion prohibits membership in labor
unions with those whose religion does not prohibit said membership.
Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity, and this is precisely what Republic Act No.
3350 proposes to accomplish — it gives laborers, irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal
opportunity for work.

#11 CASE

G.R. No. 158075. June 30, 2006.*

PHILIPPINE DIAMOND HOTEL AND RESORT, INC. (MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL), petitioner, vs. MANILA
DIAMOND HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION, respondent.

Labor Law; Unions; Collective Bargaining; Only the labor organization designated or selected by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.—Article 255 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 255. EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATION AND WORKERS’ PARTICIPATION IN POLICY AND
DECISION-MAKING. The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in
an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such
unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees
shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer. Any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right, subject to such rules and regulations as the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate, to participate in policy and decision-making
process of the establishment where they are employed insofar as said processes will directly affect their
rights, benefits and welfare. For this purpose, workers and employers may form labor-management
councils: Provided, That the representatives of the workers in such labor management councils shall be
elected by at least the majority of all employees in said establishment. (Emphasis and italics supplied) As
the immediately quoted provision declares, only the labor organization designated or selected by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of
the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. The union (hereafter referred to as
respondent) is admittedly not the exclusive representative of the majority of the employees of
petitioner, hence, it could not demand from petitioner the right to bargain collectively in their behalf.

Same; Not every legitimate labor organization possesses the rights mentioned in Article 242 of the Labor
Code—Article 242 (a) must be read in relation to Article 255.—Respondent insists, however, that it could
validly bargain in behalf of “its members,” relying on Article 242 of the Labor Code. Respondent’s
reliance on said article, a general provision on the rights of legitimate labor organizations, is misplaced,
for not every legitimate labor organization possesses the rights mentioned therein. Article 242 (a) must
be read in relation to above-quoted Article 255.

Strikes; It is doctrinal that the exercise of the right of private sector employees to strike is not
absolute; Even if the purpose of the strike is valid, the strike may still be held illegal where the means
employed are illegal.—It is doctrinal that the exercise of the right of private sector employees to strike is
not absolute. Thus Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution, provides: SECTION 3. x x x It shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled
to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy
and decisionmaking processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. (Emphasis
and italics supplied) Even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be held illegal where the
means employed are illegal. Thus, the employment of violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion in
carrying out concerted activities which are injurious to the rights to property renders a strike illegal. And
so is picketing or the obstruction to the free use of property or the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property, when accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and coercion as to constitute nuisance.

Same; Union officers who stage and participate in an illegal strike are subject to dismissal while ordinary
striking workers cannot be dismissed for mere participation in an illegal strike—there must be proof that
they committed illegal acts during the strike.—As the appellate court correctly held, the union officers
should be dismissed for staging and participating in the illegal strike, following paragraph 3, Article
264(a) of the Labor Code which provides that “. . . [a]ny union officer who knowingly participates in an
illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during strike may be declared to have lost his employment status . . .” An ordinary striking worker
cannot, thus be dismissed for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he
committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union officer who may be dismissed by mere knowingly
participating in an illegal strike and/or committing an illegal act during a strike.

Same; Blocking the free ingress to and egress from the workplace, holding noise barrage, threatening
guests, and the like, constitute illegal acts during a strike.—As reflected above, the photographs show
that some of the workers-strikers who joined the strike indeed committed illegal acts—blocking the free
ingress to and egress from the Hotel, holding noise barrage, threatening guests, and the like. The
strikers were, in a list attached to petitioner’s Position Paper filed with the NLRC, named. The list failed
to specifically identify the ones who actually committed illegal acts, however. Such being the case, a
remand of the case to the Labor Arbiter, through the NLRC, is in order for the purpose only of
determining the respective liabilities of the strikers listed by petitioner. Those proven to have committed
illegal acts during the course of the strike are deemed to have lost their employment, unless they have
been readmitted by the Hotel, whereas those not clearly shown to have committed illegal acts should be
reinstated.

Same; Backwages; The general rule is that backwages shall not be awarded in an economic strike on the
principle that “a fair day’s wage” accrues only for a “fair day’s labor”; Even in cases of Unfair Labor
Practice (ULP) strikes, award of backwages rests on the court’s discretion and only in exceptional cases—
the Supreme Court must thus hearken to its policy that “when employees voluntarily go on strike, even if
in protest against unfair labor practices,” no backwages during the strike is awarded.—The general rule
is that backwages shall not be awarded in an economic strike on the principle that “a fair day’s wage”
accrues only for a “fair day’s labor.” Even in cases of ULP strikes, award of backwages rests on the
court’s discretion and only in exceptional instances. Thus, J.P. Heilbronn Co. v. National Labor Union, 92
Phil. 575, 577-578 (1953), instructs: When in case of strikes, and according to the C[ourt of] I[ndustrial]
R[elations] even if the strike is legal, strikers may not collect their wages during the days they did not go
to work, for the same reasons if not more, laborers who voluntarily absent themselves from work to
attend the hearing of a case in which they seek to prove and establish their demands against the
company, the legality and propriety of which demands is not yet known, should lose their pay during the
period of such absence from work. The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital or
management and employee is that of a “fair day’s wage for a fair day’s labor.” If there is no work
performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay, unless of course, the laborer was able, willing
and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed or suspended. It is hardly fair or just for an
employee or laborer to fight or litigate against his employer on the employer’s time. (Emphasis and
italics supplied) This Court must thus hearken to its policy that “when employees voluntarily go on
strike, even if in protest against unfair labor practices,” no backwages during the strike is awarded.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles for petitioner.

Marlon J. Manuel for respondent.

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

The Court of Appeals, by the assailed decision of November 21, 2002,1 declared the strike staged by
respondent, Manila Diamond Hotel Employee’s Union (the union), illegal and its officers to have lost
their employment status. It ordered, however, among other things, the reinstatement and payment of
backwages to its members.

On November 11, 1996, the union, which was registered on August 19, 1996 before the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE),2 filed a Petition for Certification Election3 before the DOLE-National
Capital Region (NCR) seeking certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of its members.4

The DOLE-NCR denied the union’s petition as it failed to comply with legal requirements, specifically
Section 2, Rule V, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, and was seen to
fragment the employees of petitioner.5

On June 2, 1997, Francis Mendoza (Mendoza), one of the Hotel’s outlet cashiers, was discovered to have
failed to remit to the Hotel the amount of P71,692.50 at the end of his May 31, 1997 duty.6 On being
directed to explain such failure, Mendoza claimed that after accomplishing his daily cash remittance
report, the union president Jose Leonardo B. Kimpo (Kimpo) also an outlet cashier, who signed the same
and dropped his remittances.7

Kimpo, who was thus directed to explain why no administrative sanction should be imposed on him for
violating the standard procedure for remitting cash collections, informed that he was not aware of any
such procedure.

Mendoza was subsequently suspended for one week, it being “the responsibility of the cashier
to personally drop-off his remittances in the presence of a witness.”8In the meantime or on July 14,
1997,9 he was re-assigned to the Hotel’s Cost Control Department.10

Through its president Kimpo, the union later notified petitioner of its intention to negotiate, by Notice to
Bargain,11 a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for its members.

Acting on the notice, the Hotel, through its Human Resource Development Manager Mary Anne
Mangalindan, advised the union that since it was not certified by the DOLE as the exclusive bargaining
agent, it could not be recognized as such.12
The union clarified that it sought to bargain “for its members only,” and declared that “[the
Hotel’s] refusal to bargain [would prompt] the union to engage in concerted activities to protect and
assert its rights under the Labor Code.”13

In the meantime, or on or about November 7, 1997, Kimpo filed before the Arbitration Branch a
complaint for ULP against petitioner.19

More conferences took place between petitioner and the union before the NCMB.

In the conference held on November 20, 1997, the union demanded the holding of a consent election to
which the Hotel interposed no objection, provided the union followed the procedure under the law.
Petitioner then requested that the election be held in January 1998.20

The parties agreed to meet again on December 1, 1997.21

In the early morning of November 29, 1997, however, the union suddenly went on strike. The following
day, the National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) joined
the strike and openly extended its support to the union.22 At about this time, Hotel supervisors Vicente
T. Agustin (Agustin) and Rowena Junio (Rowena) failed to report for work and were, along with another
supervisor, Mary Grace U. de Leon (Mary Grace), seen participating in and supporting the strike.23

Mary Grace, who was directed to explain her participation in the strike, alleged that she was merely
trying “to pacify the group.”25 Petitioner, finding her explanation “arrogant” and unsatisfactory as her
active participation in the strike was confirmed by an eye witness, terminated her services, by
communication sent on December 9, 1997, drawing her to file a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioner.26 Agustin, who was also terminated, filed a similar complaint against the Hotel.27

On January 14, 1998, Rowena, whose services were terminated, also filed a complaint against petitioner
for illegal dismissal.

For its part, petitioner filed on January 28, 1998 a petition to declare the strike illegal.

By Resolution of November 19, 1999, the NLRC declared that the strike was illegal and that the
union officers and members who were reinstated to the Hotel’s payroll were deemed to have lost their
employment status. And it dismissed the complaints filed by Mary Grace, Agustin, and Rowena as well as
the union’s complaint for ULP.33
On appeal by the union, the Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC Resolution dismissing the complaints of
Mary Grace, Agustin and Rowena and of the union. It modified the NLRC Resolution, however, by
ordering the reinstatement with back wages of union members. In so ruling, the appellate court noted
that petitioner failed to establish by convincing and substantial evidence that the union members who
participated in the illegal strike committed illegal acts, and although petitioner presented photographs
of the striking employees, the strikers who allegedly committed illegal acts were not named or
identified.35

Hence, the present appeal by petitioner faulting the appellate court.

Issue:

Whether or not the srike is illegal.

Held:

Yes.

As did the NLRC and the Court of Appeals, this Court finds the strike illegal.

NOTE:(PLS REFER TO THE DOCTRINES FOR THE COURTS RULING, IT IS JUST THE SAME. THANKS)

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 21, 2002 of the Court of Appeals is, in light of the foregoing
ratiocinations, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that only those members of the union who did not
commit illegal acts during the course of the illegal strike should be reinstated but without backwages.
The case is, therefore, REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter, through the NLRC, which is hereby directed to,
with dispatch, identify said members and to thereafter order petitioner to reinstate them, without
backwages or, in the alternative, if reinstatement is no longer feasible, that they be given separation pay
at the rate of One (1) Month pay for every year of service.

Judgment affirmed with modification, case remanded to Labor Arbiter.