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Ruling: In invalidating the 57 ballots, the COMELEC relied on several laws which basically said that the
signatures of the particular authorities are needed to validate the ballots. However, the Court ruled that “It is
correct to postulate that administrative findings of facts are accorded great respect, and even finality when
supported by substantial evidence. Nevertheless, when it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly
misappreciated evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, this Court has not hesitated to
reverse their factual findings. Factual findings of administrative agencies are not infallible and will be set
aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness.”
The COMELEC has already promulgated a new set of rules which states that the failure to authenticate the
ballots shall not invalidate them. Rather, the Board of Election Inspectors shall merely note such failure in the
minutes and declare the failure to authenticate the ballots as an election offense. “Consequently, the absence
of the Chairmen's signature at the back of the ballot should not be a reason to invalidate the 57 ballots which
are genuine. Hence, all votes indicated in these ballots must be counted in favor of the petitioner because the
intent of the voters to vote for him is crystal.”
Issue: Whether the Board has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petitions for legalization and awarding
special permits to the private respondents
Ruling: Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue provisional permits as
a step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the alleged time limitation. There is
nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months after
promulgation of the Decree. There is no impediment to the Board's exercise of jurisdiction under its broad
powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the avowed purpose
of PD 101.
As a rule, where the jurisdiction of the BOT to take cognizance of an application for legalization is settled,
the Court enjoins the exercise thereof only when there is fraud, abuse of discretion or error of law.
Furthermore, the court does not interfere, as a rule, with administrative action prior to its completion or finality
. It is only after judicial review is no longer premature that we ascertain in proper cases whether the
administrative findings are not in violation of law, whether they are free from fraud or imposition and whether
they find substantial support from the evidence.
SAPHIE Macailing v Andrada
Facts: A dispute over 4 parcels of land in Cotabato arose between plaintiffs, settlers thereon occupying four
hectares each, and Andrada (later substituted by his heirs), sales applicant of a bigger parcel which includes
the lands occupied by plaintiffs. The District Land Officer of Cotabato decided in plaintiffs' favor, excluded
the four parcels of land claimed by plaintiffs. The Director of Lands, however, reversed, declared that the
portions adjudged to the four plaintiffs "shall be restored to the heirs of Andrada."
Appeal was taken to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (SANR), reversing the decision by
awarding to plaintiffs the lands they claimed. Defendants sought reconsideration to which the Secretary
denied. Defendants moved once more to reconsider but the Secretary rejected the reconsideration, and ruled
that his judgment in the case "had long become final and executory." Consequently, the said Office has no
more jurisdiction to entertain the said motion.
Defendants appealed to the Office of the President. In a letter-decision, Assistant Executive Secretary Quema,
by authority of the President, reversed the decision of the Secretary and declared that the lands involved
"should be restored to the heirs of Andrada to be included in their individual applications."
Plaintiffs filed a suit before the CFI in Cotabato raising the issue of finality of the decision of the Secretary.
Issue: Whether the decision of SANR is final and executory; whether the CFI has jurisdiction over the case
Ruling: The decision has become final and executory. Rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a
matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts
of administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having
general judicial powers. The Court held that the decision of the Assistant Executive Secretary reversing the
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is null and void and of no effect.
Mere silence of a statute on availability of judicial review does not necessarily imply that it is unavailable
The pertinent statutory provision, Section 44 (h) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, reads: "Courts of First Instance
shall have original jurisdiction ... (h) Said court and their judges, or any of them, shall have the power to issue
writ of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in their respective
provinces and district in the manner provided in the Rules of Court." Complementary thereto is Section 4,
Rule 65, Rules of Court, 4 providing that: "The petition may be filed ... if it relates to the acts or omissions of
an inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in a Court of First instance having jurisdiction
thereof."
Hence, even if the action done is not within the jurisdiction of the CFI, "The Preliminary injunction that may
be granted by a court of first instance under said Section 2 [Rule 58] is, in its application, co-extensive with
the territorial boundaries of the province or district in which the said court sits. Therefore, CFI has jurisdiction
over the said case.
Doctrines
PRIMARY JURISDICTION
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
With the MR still unresolved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for
preliminary injunction in the SC contending that the Minister acted with GADALEJ. It was remanded to the
CA for determination, which denied the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. While pending
litigation in the SC, Brett wrote a letter to the new Minister, Ernesto Maceda praying for the reinstatement of
the original decision made by his predecessor. Maceda granted petitioner's prayer. Upon notification to the
Guilles of said decision, they filed before the SC to declare such decision null and void, being without
jurisdiction. They also filed the same with the CA. They likewise made an appeal to the Office of the President.
The CA reconsidered its decision dismissing the petition holding that petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies and for which the petition and the writ for PI must be dismissed invoking PD 605*.
Hence, Brett filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to annul the decision of CA contending
that the case at bar is an instance where resort to administrative remedies was no longer necessary and
advisable since it is one where the recognized exceptions to the doctrine come into play. She manifestly refers
to, among the other exceptions; Minister Peña’s alleged patent lack of jurisdiction in reversing his previous
decision which she claims had already become final and executory. Concerning respondent court’s invocation
of PD No. 605, she submits that the same does not authorize the courts to shed or abdicate their inherent
judicial authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent court erred in dismissing petitioner’s original action for certiorari on the
ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
RULING: Yes, while it is true that in our jurisdiction, unless otherwise provided by law or required by public
interest, before bringing an action in or resorting to the courts of justice, all remedies of administrative
character affecting or determinative of the controversy at that level should first be exhausted by the aggrieved
party. However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. Among the
exceptions is when the assailed act, order or decision is patently illegal or was performed or issued without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, Minister Peña gravely abused his discretion in reversing his original decision which
precisely prompted petitioner to forthwith invoke the jurisdiction of the courts. It constituted as an exceptions
which would justify his’ resort to the special civil action for certiorari in lieu of the appeal to the OP.
Consequently, Brett’s failure to appeal to the OP from the decision of Minister Peña cannot also be considered
a violation of the rule as the latter is the alter ego of the President and, under the doctrine of qualified political
agency, his action is deemed to be that of the President.
"SECTION 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval
or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative official or
body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition,
exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines."
(1) The billing statements shall be received by the subscriber of the telephone service not later than 30 days
from the end of each billing cycle. In case the statement is received beyond this period, the subscriber shall
have a specified grace period within which to pay the bill and the public telecommunications entity (PTEs)
shall not be allowed to disconnect the service within the grace period.
(2) There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a voice mailbox, voice prompt, recorded message or
similar facility excluding the customers own equipment.
(3) PTEs shall verify the identification and address of each purchaser of prepaid SIM cards. Prepaid call cards
and SIM cards shall be valid for at least 2 years from the date of first use. Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall
be given 45 days from the date the prepaid SIM card is fully consumed but not beyond 2 years and 45 days
from date of first use to replenish the SIM card, otherwise the SIM card shall be rendered invalid. The validity
of an invalid SIM card, however, shall be installed upon request of the customer at no additional charge except
the presentation of a valid prepaid call card.
Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and
Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and
violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law.
Issue: Whether the NTC has jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as prepaid cards.
Ruling: The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a
delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should
be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is
required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to,
but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated
by an administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not
make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute,
particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the
purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.
Honasan’s contention: Ombudsman and not DOJ has the jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation
over all public officials, including him as he is a senator. Since, Honasan is charged with coup d’etat in relation
to his office. As according the Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it confers to the Ombudsman the power to
investigate moto proprio, or by complaint of any person, any act or omission that appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient. Petitioner rationalizes that the 1987 Administrative Code and the Ombudsman Act
of 1989 cannot prevail over the Constitution.
DOJ’s contention: DOJ has the jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation pursuant to the Revised
Administrative Code. And Coup d’etat is not directly related to his public office as a senator. Thus, the
jurisdiction of the DOJ is a statutory grant and is not derived from provisions of the joint circular.
Ombudsman’s contention: DOJ has the jurisdiction because coup d’etat falls under the Sandiganbayan only if
it’s committed in relation to office. Thus, Joint Circulat need not be published because it is merely an internal
arrangement between DOJ and Ombudsman and it neither regulates nor penalizes conduct of persons.
ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction precludes the DOJ to conduct preliminary
investigation.
RULING: No. While it may be true that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute any
illegal act or omission of any public official, the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate is merely a
primary and not an exclusive authority, thus:
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of RA 6770 to investigate and
prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official. However as we held only two years ago in the case
of Aguinaldo vs. Domagas, this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent
authority in respect of the offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case needed the
approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended information here did not
have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval was necessary at all. In
Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 (1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate
charges of illegal acts or omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public
official. It must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act
or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement
of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the
authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended information.
In other words the provision of the law has opened up the authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to all investigatory agencies of the government
duly authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation under Section 2, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the only qualification that the Ombudsman may take over at any stage of such investigation
in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction.
Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss. They alleged that the complaint states no cause of action. BCC,
in its motion, added that: the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court; that
the complaint was premature; and that the RTC has no jurisdiction on the matter. Respondent Serrano of the
DENR also filed a motion to dismiss stating that there was no cause of action insofar as he is concerned since
there was nothing in the complaint that shows any dereliction of duty on his part.
RTC issued an order denying respondents motions to dismiss and granting the prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. Defendants’ motion for reconsiderations was also denied. They went to the CA.
CA reversed the decision of RTC and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration of the petitioners due
to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. CA ruled that DENR and not the RTC has the jurisdiction over
the case.
Issue: Whether petitioner’s claim is correct when they alleged that their case is an exception to the “non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies” rule
Ruling: SC denied the petition. They affirmed the CA’s ruling. While the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is flexible and may be disregarded in certain instances, such as:
(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,
(5) when there is irreparable injury,
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bears [sic] the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,
(12) when no administrative review is provided by law,
(13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and
(14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptional circumstances. The Court of Appeals
correctly found that the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies before going to court which
renders their complaint dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.
The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint for
injunction with damages against the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City.
The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over the
complaint; 2) the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was
expressly prohibited by section 1 of PD 605.
Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration. The petitioner then
elevated the matter to the respondent Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial court in a and in its resolution
the motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without
exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with. The
respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial
intervention.
The petitioner is now before the Court, contending that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
was not correctly applied and that the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was
improper.
RULING: No; Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to
administrative remedies, the reasons for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require
its observance. Even if such reasons were disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pertinent
laws vesting in the DENR the power and function "to regulate the development, disposition, extraction,
exploration and use of the country's forests" and "to exercise exclusive jurisdiction" in the "management and
disposition of all lands of the public domain," and in the Forest Management Bureau (formerly the Bureau of
Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws aid regulations here claimed
to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment clearly implies at the very least that the DENR should
be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy coming under its express powers before the courts
of justice may intervene.
NOTE: The Court enumerate a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial
action may validly resorted immediately. These exceptional cases are: