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Abstract
Some results of the implementation of a new support tool for automated hazard
analysis are presented in this paper.
We describe in detail the further progresses on the application of intelligent systems to
the hazard analysis and especially to the HAZOP and FMEA analysis.
A previously developed program, that allows the automatic generation of the report of
the HAZOP analysis as regards the determination of causes and consequences of
variable deviations, has been enriched with the knowledge useful to perform a part of
the FMEA analysis for the components of the control and the interlock systems of the
plant.
The advantages and limits of the use of the support tool for the HAZOP and FMEA
analyses and of the qualitative modelling adopted for the knowledge representation are
critically discussed.
Introduction
HAZOP studies have become a significant part of the design of new process plants
and of the revision of existing plants in the process industry.
The HAZOP analysis systematically identifies all the possible causes and consequences
within the system for each hypothesised deviation of one of the variables of the
process: the research is carried out applying a set of “guide words” to the process
variables of the plant and determining all process variable deviations.
A HAZOP analysis is normally executed by a multidisciplinary team of experts in
process plant design, operation and maintenance, who analyse the process P&ID to find
out the causes and consequences of every abnormal deviation of the process variables.
The analysis is time consuming and requires a large amount of work by the group of
experts.
In order to reduce the analysis work and increase its reliability, computerised support
systems have been considered. Some of these, commercially available, consist of
simple spreadsheet applications and can be useful in producing a standardised final
report.
The FMEA analysis is similar to HAZOP analysis: both of them subdivide a plant in
elementary parts for the scope of the analysis, hypothesize a deviation from a normal
condition of operation and evaluate the consequences, have a similar final report in form
of table in which causes and consequences of the deviations has been indicated.
Whereas the HAZOP analysis hypothesizes process parameters deviations in a node in
which the plants has been subdivided and investigates cause and consequences, during
the FMEA analysis the experts focus the attention to particular equipment units,
hypothesizes typical malfunctions of components, list the failure modes, investigate the
failure case and estimates the failure effect on other system components.
FMEA involves the investigation and assessment of the effects of the possible failure
modes on a system. This analysis must be carried out during the design stage as it is
important that designs are analysed for all hazardous critical situations. This is an
extremely tedious process because it demands detailed and systematic examination of a
part of the design. However this work requires professional engineers and extensive
experience.
These two elements indicate the great benefit of automation analysis: producing a
support system capable of providing a help to reproduce a part of the safety analysis and
significantly reducing the procedure application time.
The hypothesis of a complete automated hazard analysis, both HAZOP and FMEA,
appears unrealistic at it least for the moment, in so far as would be necessary to supply
the support system with an extensive knowledge base that is not a priori definable. On
this account it is realistic to think of an interactive support system which automates just
one part of the safety analysis, i.e. the part linked to the elements which may be
generalised and are therefore less dependent on specific information relative to the
particular plant. These elements are those more closely linked to the functional aspects
of the equipment.
2. Qualitative models for hazard analysis automation
A key part of the HAZOP methodology is the analysis of the causes and consequences
of the possible deviations of the variables associated with the nodes in which the plant is
subdivided.
This analysis is usually made on the basis of the knowledge of the input-output and/or
cause-consequence relations among the variables associated with the different
equipment units and the typical failures mode of a single equipment unit.
For this objective the analysts use a modelling of the different components in qualitative
terms. The research of the causes or consequences of a particular deviation is carried out
using a procedure of backward or forward logic propagation.
The qualitative models of the equipment unit are similar to those developed by Lees and
Kelly (1986) to analyse and simulate the propagation of faults in chemical process plants
and they contain the reasoning mechanisms and the knowledge used by the process
technicians and by the other experts during the analysis, in the research of the causes and
the consequences of a deviation.
It seemed evident than the main characteristics of the knowledge base should be therefore a
representation of the single units of the plant by models allowing the propagation of
variable deviations. The model is formed of a certain number of elements, linked to each
other, each of which is destined for a particular application of the model. More details
about the models used can be found in Bartolozzi et al. (2000).
The heart of the qualitative models of equipment units is the “cause” and the
“consequence” model. These models contain the necessary information to the search for
the causes and consequences of deviations of the main variables of the plant units and to
propagate variable deviations from one unit to previous one or next one.
VARIABLE
DEVIATION
The “cause” model contains a certain number of mini logic trees, which are indicated as
cause tree (Figure1); these have as a “Top Event” a deviation of one of the variables
which define the specific unit and as “Basic Events” events which take place within the
unit itself or deviations of the input variables. In some cases such events are connected
with OR/AND logic gates and form a single level of events under the Top Event (it is
for this reason that mini logic trees are referred to).
The “consequence” model for an equipment unit can be set up by considering for each
input variable deviation the set of mini-trees of the “cause” model of the equipment unit in
which the considered deviation is present, and making a logical link between the deviation
and the final events of these mini-trees.
Finally the HAZOP model also contains cause trees, but only those corresponding to
deviations examined during the HAZOP analysis and that must be indicated therefore in
the final forms. For each unit a selection has been carried out of the deviations
examined in the cause models and those significant for the HAZOP analysis have been
identified. All other deviations will be used only for the propagation.
In this manner a model library has been constructed and includes the most common
chemical units.
As said, failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is a technique used to define, identify
and eliminate potential failures, problems, errors, and so on from the system, process, or
design. The analysis of the evaluation may consider historical and reliability data to
identify and define the inherent failures and to analyse the impact on the connected
equipment units and on the total process.
Generally is accepted that the FMEA involves four aspects, relative to a characteristic
analysis carried out on the system, the design, the process, or the service.
In our work a “system FMEA” has been considered, and used to analyse systems and
subsystems in the early concept and design stage. A system FMEA focuses on potential
failure modes between the functions of the systems caused by system inefficiencies. It
includes the interactions between systems and elements of the systems.
The output of the system FMEA could be:
• A list of potential failure modes
• A list of system functions that could detect potential failure modes
• A list of design actions that can eliminate failure modes or reduce their
occurrence.
The models to be used for the FMEA present some information and data more specific
than the models specialized for the HAZOP analysis, relative to the failure modes and
malfunctions of component units.
The choice of the functional data is made according to a priority order typical of FMEA
methodology. In particular, three components help to define the priority of failures:
• Occurrence (O)
• Severity (S)
• Detection (D)
where, Occurrence is the frequency of the failure, Severity is the seriousness of the
failure, Detection is the ability to detect the failure before it affects the system..
The priority of the possible failures is ranked by the Ranked Product Number (RPN),
that is the product of the occurrence, severity and detection.
More/Less/No
ycontr.
In the very common circumstance in which the final element to be tested is a valve and
therefore the manipulation variable is a flow rate, two possible cases of control loop
inefficiency can be considered.
The first case, indicated as a “failure of the control loop in closing”, is when the final
effect of the inefficiency of one of the components of the loop results in opening the
valve to a greater extent than desired. The final effects “defect of the control loop in
opening”, results in opening the control valve to a lesser extent than desired.
The causes of these inefficiencies are looked for within the same control loop and are
traceable usually to malfunctions of the components of the loop. This part of the hazard
analysis is well carried out by the MEA, reducing potential and known failure modes.
Changing the type of control loop varies the number and type of its components, as
well as the control logic. As a consequence the causes which generate the inefficiency
of the components of the control loop are different.
In the model it is also assumed that the controlled variable might “deviate” from its set
value for two other reasons besides the inefficiency of the control loop: disturbances
beyond control and the saturation of the control loop.
Disturbances beyond control determine deviations of the controlled variable from its set
point that may not be compensated by the loop since the manipulation variable has no
influence on this.
The saturation of the control loop is the case where in spite of the control loop
intervening to its maximum capacity, the disturbance is so great that the controlled
variable will feel the effects for all cases. In these cases disturbances consisting in very
large deviations of some variables intervene which influence the controlled variable.
These large disturbances require the use of additional keywords compared with those
normally considered in HAZOP i.e. MORE MORE / LESS LESS to distinguish such
deviations from the MORE / LESS deviations which the system is able to control.
To extend the hazard analysis considering the failure modes and the failure causes of the
typical components of control loops let us consider the analysis of the simple
temperature control loop shown in Fig. 3.
Fp Fs
Tp Ts
T
Air I/P D/A Thermocouple
Tsp DCS
Operator Control A/D Transmitter
Computer
Properly tuned
valve
positioner
Leakage
Rupture
Select Variable
Deviation
Data from Query 3
Propagation of causes
and consequences
Aggiornamento variable deviation
Bit board Refreshing
della bitboard delle Inference process 2
deviazioni attive (specific knowledge)
Data allocation of
Data from Query1
- mini-tree string first stage results of
- Other data the inference
(Variable, Dev. Type, Failure process
mode, etc.)
Data from
Query2
Causes and
Activation flag to String splitting up consequences
prevent propagation Filling of cause / determination
infinite loop consequence vectors Inference process 1
(General
knowledge)
4.1 A brief note about the main aspects adopted to implement the support system Wi.T.H.
The support system Wi.T.H. has been implemented using Microsoft Visual Basic, and
Microsoft Access to develop the general knowledge data-base.
In the support system the object library of Microsoft Excel has been included, in order to
have a better visualization of results or intermediate data. The system uses the tools of
high level Windows applications for the management of the interfaces as controls, i.e.
buttons and bars sliding, associated with advanced types of controls (ADO).
The formulation of the query in the database has requested the specific language SQL
(Structured Query Language).
5. Qualitative models in automatic hazard analysis
From the first unit of the plant P&I diagram all HAZOP nodes are examined. For each
node the deviations contained in the corresponding HAZOP model of the unit will be
considered. The FMEA analysis will be limited to the equipment units considered
critical for the plant safety.
A fundamental first stage of the HAZOP analysis is the choice of nodes, i.e. of the parts
in which a plant is subdivided for the scope of the analysis. The choice may be made in
various ways: often the node is intended as the collection of the equipment units, which
contribute in carrying out a single function. The requirements of automation impose a
high grade of generalisation and detail at the same time. It is for this reason that with the
aim of constructing a support system, it is preferable to define the nodes as single
functional units. This choice is indispensable owing to the necessity of making the
equipment models as general as possible and to consider the characteristic details
relative to the FMEA.
The causes of each deviation are the basic events of the corresponding cause tree and
will be indicated in the column of the causes in the HAZOP form. At this level the
causes will be the deviations of the input variables of the particular unit or an internal
failure.
Searching upstream for the causes of a deviation, the support system must be asked to
indicate the possible causes of all or of some of the causes of deviation found at this
level (basic events of the tree). These in turn are deviations of the output variables of
another unit for which a cause model has been composed, and therefore the logic trees
consent to extend the research further upstream.
The research of the consequences may be carried out in a similar way, defining
consequence models for the single equipment unit.
For a specific equipment unit - node the consequences of a determined variable
deviation could be or the output events of all cause trees of the unit, which show the
deviation as a basic event, or the output events of the cause trees of the following output
equipment unit - node which have the considered deviation as a basic event. For a
specific equipment unit a detailed FMEA allows to consider specific information about
function modes, failure modes and failure causes of its elementary components. Further
data could be introduced in the final report in an interactive way.
The considered models of the equipment units, contain the specific knowledge relative
to the normal behaviour but also that relative to anomalous operation conditions: both
these types of knowledge are necessary to carry out the HAZOP analysis. The single
model is constituted by several modules to efficiently code the various types of
knowledge used by the experts during the analysis, searching the possible causes and
consequences of variable deviations and detecting the failure modes and the failure
causes of particular equipment units to extend the hazard analysis with FMEA.
The developed model library of the equipment units that are commonly found in a
chemical plant is the general knowledge database of the prototype. The system might be
of particular interest because it could concur to obtain not only a considerable cost
reduction of the analysis but also more standardized and reproducible results.
A comparison between the output forms produced by the support system Wi.T.H. for
particular nodes and the corresponding output forms obtained as result of traditional
hazard analysis meetings makes possible the following considerations.
The choice of elementary units, among which are included components such as pumps,
tubes, etc., as nodes, made in order to allow the automatic propagation of deviations,
leads to the production of a complex and highly detailed output form.
The analysis results obtained using the support system are encouraging: the automatic
report reproduces on the whole, qualitatively and quantitatively, the same results
obtained by the traditional hazard analysis in the search of the causes and the
consequences of variable deviations. The extension of the automatic investigation to the
failure modes and causes of some components, enhances the potential of hazard analysis
in terms of depth and efficiency of the analysis. This enhancement is reached through
the continuation of the hazard and operability analysis that, although limited to a group
of components, may prevent high risks for the plant and/or surrounding environment.
The use of qualitative models is partially successful in the identification of the
significant causes of deviations; however in some cases the models are dependent on the
context. The interactive use of the system allows information to be added, when
necessary, in order to prevent the propagation of a deviation towards an unproductive
direction.
7. References
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