1

Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976. September 18, 1995.
Kapunan, J:

Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ran for the Congress representing the First District of Leyte. Her opponent,
Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a petition to disqualify her candidacy on the ground that she has not satisfied the one-
year residency requirement mandated by Section 6 of Article VI of the Constitution. Montejo avers that in the
Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner, it is evident that she resided in the constituent where she sought to be
elected for only seven months.

Subsequently, petitioner claimed it to be an honest mistake, averring that Tacloban, Leyte is, as a matter of fact,
her domicile since birth. Petitioner aver that as early as eight years old, she has established her domicile in his
father’s hometown Tacloban, Leyte. She completed her studies in the said locale, and subsequently worked
therein. She later on married late President Ferdinand Marcos, then Congressman of Ilocos Norte, and
registered there as a voter. When President Marcos won the presidency, she resided in Manila and registered
there as a voter.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First
District of Leyte. If a person retains her domicile of origin for purposes of the residence requirement, the one-
year period is irrelevant because wherever she is, she is a resident of her domicile of origin. Petitioner’s domicile
of origin in indeed Tacloban, Leyte, for a minor follows the domicile of her parents. Her subsequent change of
residence does not entail that she has lost her domicile. Domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual
removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new
one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue. Petitioner evidently has animus manendi, or intention to stay and animus
revertendi, or intention to return, to her domicile of origin, Tacloban, Leyte.
2
Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 221697. March 8, 2016.
Perez, J:

Facts:
Herein petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares desires to run as the President of the Republic of
the Philippines on the May 9, 2016 elections. She is a foundling in Iloilo in 1968. She was then adopted by Filipino
parents. In 1991 she went to the United States and later became a citizen thereof. She went back to the
Philippines on May 24, 2005 to permanently reside therein. She disposed of her property in the US and
established a residence in the Philippines. She then reacquired Filipin citizenship on July 18, 2006.

Respondents assail qualifications of petitioner. They aver that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen on the
account of the fact that she is a foundling. Moreover, they aver that she has not satisfied the 10-year residency
requirement for the position as she only reacquired citizenship on July 18, 2006 which makes her a resident of
the country for only 9 years and 6 moths.

Issue:
Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad Poe-Llamanzares is a natural born Filipino.
Whether or not she has satisfied the residency requirement of 10 years.

Ruling:
The Court held that petitioner is a natural born Filipino. First, by circumstantial evidence, statistical data show
that children born from 1965 to 1975 are most likely Filipino. Furthermore, Poe manifests typical Filipino
features. Second, by legislation, Foundlings are considered as natural born citizens. Domestic laws on adoption
supports that foundlings are Filipinos for an adoptee, to be adopted, must be “Filipino children” in the first place.
Lastly, international law also recognizes that foundlings are natural born citizens.

On the second issue, the Court held that petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as she will have been
a resident for 10 years and 11 months on the day of the election. The contention of respondents that residency
be counted when she reacquired Filipino citizenship cannot be appreciated. There are three requisites to acquire
a new domicile: one, bodily presence in a new locality; two, intention to remain or animus manendi; and three,
intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi. In the instant case, Poe has satisfied all three
requisites. Petitioner decided to permanently abandon her US residence as early as May 24, 2005 when she
moved back to the Philippines with her family and in her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship.
3
Osmeña v. Pendatun
G.R. No. L-17144. October 28, 1960.
Bengzon, J:

Facts:
Petitioner Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in a privileged speech, criticized then President Carlos Garcia and
his administration. In order to investigate the charges made by the petitioner during his speech, House
Resolution No. 59 was passed by the House of Representatives (HoR). Said resolution asserts that if his
allegations were found to unwarranted, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the HoR.

Petitioner questioned the validity of the said resolution. He avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Respondent Congressman Salipada Pendatun sunsequently filed
an answer where he averred that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the
power to discipline its members.

Issue:
Whether or not the House Resolution No. 59 infringes the parliamentary immunity of petitioner.

Whether or not the Congress can punish its members for disorderly behavior.

Ruling:
The House Resolution No. 59 does not infringe the parliamentary immunity of the petitioner. Such immunity,
embodied in Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative shall not be questioned in any other place. Although
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. The parliamentary immunity does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof. Hence, the Congress can punish its members for disorderly
behavior.
4
Senate v. Ermita
G.R. No. 169777. July 14, 2006.
Carpio Morales, J:

Facts:
The Senate Committees issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department to be the resource
speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail Project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
likewise invited Armed Forces of The Philippines officials to appear on its own hearing on various issues.

Subsequently, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order 464 which Section 1 thereof prohibits
officials of the Executive Department from appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation without the
consent of the President. At which point, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita informed the Senate that said
officials cannot to attend the hearing due to lack of consent from the President as provided by EO 464.

The Senate filed a petition averring that EO 464 is unconstitutional on the ground that it is violative of Sections
21 and 22 of Article VI, encroaching the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation
and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order 464 is unconstitutional on the ground that it contravenes the power of
inquiry vested by the Constitution in the Congress.

Ruling:
Executive Order 464 is partially unconstitutional on the ground that it contravenes the power of inquiry vested
by the Constitution in the Congress. The legislative’s power of inquiry during question hour is different from its
power of inquiry in aid of legislation. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Hence, Section 1 of EO 464 is valid but it can only be invoked during
question hour. The President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise executive privilege. Congress is
not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a
valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
5
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
G.R. No. 180643. September 4, 2008.
Leonardo-De Castro, J:

Facts:
The Senate committees were conducting an investigation on the controversial deal of Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) to supply the National Broadband Network Project (NBN). Whereupon,
herein petitioner Romulo Neri, former Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA), was invited to testify on the matter to which he obliged. He revealed pertinent information, but refused
to answer three questions in which he invoked executive privilege. The questions were: 1) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project; 2) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it; and 3) whether
or not she directed him to approve.

Issue:
Whether or not the three questions petitioner refused to answer are covered by executive privilege.

Ruling:
Yes, the communications elicited by the three questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege. The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others provided that:
one, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the president; two, that the
communications are received by a close advisor of the President; and three, that there is no adequate showing
of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an apt investigating authority.

Applying the mentioned requisites in the case, first, the communications relate to those under correspondence
between the President and public officials necessary for executive and policy decision-making process. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized.

Second, under the operational proximity test, petitioner is considered as such because he is a member of the
cabinet of the President.

Lastly, the respondent failed to pinpoint the specific need for the information sought or how the withholding of
the information sought will hinder the accomplishment of their legislative purpose.

6
Araullo v. Aquino III
G.R. No. 209287. July 1, 2014.
Bersamin, J:

Facts:
The Disbursement Acceleration Program enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to
priority projects. In the DAP, when a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain
executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. These funds will then be
declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be transferred to other priority projects.

Issue:
Whether or not the Disbursement Acceleration Program transfers are unconstitutional.
Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

Ruling:
The DAP transfers are unconstitutional. The Constitution allows the President to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made within the respective office. Hence, no cross-border
transfers/ or augmentations are allowed. Under the DAP, funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were
being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies, hence, unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being
declared as unconstitutional, is applicable. This is so because if the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions
under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. Moreover, the beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be
asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP.
7
Belgica v. Ochoa
G.R. No. 208566. November 19, 2013.
Perlas-Bernabe, J:

Facts:
The Congressional Pork Barrel system is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members
of the Congress. The provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for the
realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred
by the legislator concerned.

The Presidential Pork Barrel system, on the other hand, include the Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social
Fund which is a special funding facility wherein the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and
projects not funded under the regular budget.

Petitioners assail the validity of the Pork Barrel System on the ground that it violates several principles of the
Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not the Congressional Pork Barrel system is unconstitutional.
Whether or not the Presidential Pork Barrel system is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
The Court held that the Congressional Pork Barrel system is unconstitutional because: First, it violates the
principle of separation of powers as the legislators have intruded into the proper phases of budget execution.
Second, it violates the non-delegability of legislative power as legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation which is lodged in Congress. Third, it violates the principle of checks and
balances as legislators make intermediate appropriations only after the General Appropriation Act is passed,
which impairs the President’s power of item veto. Fourth, it violates the principle of accountability as the
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which
they themselves participate. Lastly, it violates the principle of local autonomy as that it is in conflict with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils whose functions are essentially geared towards managing
local affairs.
On the Presidential Pork Barrel system, the Court held that it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to determine the limits of the President’s authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude
to use the funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to appropriate public funds
beyond the purview of the law.
8
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
G.R. No. 115455. October 30, 1995.
Mendoza, J:

Facts:
Republic Act 7716 of the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law evolved from House Bill 11197 passed by the House
of Representatives and transmitted to the Senate. In the Senate, Senate Bill 1630 was submitted in substitution
of Senate Bill 1129, taking into consideration HB 11197. Subsequently, the President certified SB 1630 as urgent
for the reason of a growing budget deficit hence, it was approved on the 2nd and 3rd reading on the same day.
Both SB 1630 and HB 11197 was then referred to a conference committee which recommended that HB 11197,
in consolidation with SB 1630, be approved as reconciled and approved by the conferees. It was then approved
as RA 7716.

Petitioners are challenging the constitutionality of the EVAT Law. First, among others, they aver that the EVAT
Law was a result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, hence, it did not originate exclusively in the HoR as
required by the Constitution. Second, they contend that SB 1630 did not undergo the required three readings
on separate days.

Issue:
Whether or not the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law should be declared unconstitutional based on the grounds
of the petitioners.

Ruling:
No, the law in question is not unconstitutional based on the grounds of the petitioner. First, the Constitution
means that the initiative be from the HoR in matter concerning revenue bills and the like. It does not prohibit
the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill. Hence, the consolidation of the bills was consistent with the power
of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the bill originated in the HoR.

Lastly, petitioners’ assailment that the three readings on separate days mandated by the Constitution was not
complied with is without merit. The certification of the President of the necessity for immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity emergency, dispenses the need for, not only of printing, but also that of reading the bill
on separate days. Hence, upon the certification of a bill by the President as urgent, the approval of the Senate
bill in question in the 2nd and 3rd reading of the same day does not infringe the validity of the EVAT Laws.
9
Marcos v. Mangalapus
G.R. No. 88211. September 15, 1989.
Cortes, J:
G.R. No. 88211. October 27, 1989.
Per Curiam:

Facts:
Ferdinand E. Marcos was forced into exile in Hawaii with his family. Corazon Aquino’s ascension into presidency
was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as by plots of Marcos loyalists. Ferdinand E. Marcos, in his
deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.

Issue:
Whether or not the President is granted power in the Constitution to prohibit the Marcoses from returning to
the Philippines.

Ruling:
Yes, the President is granted power in the Constitution to prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines. The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it cannot be said to be limited only to the
specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither
legislative nor judicial has to be executive. The return of the Marcoses may be deemed as a serious threat to
the national interest and welfare. Such demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines must
be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which
are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect the general
welfare.
10
Sarmiento III v. Mison
G.R. No. L-79974. December 17, 1987.
Padilla, J:

Facts:
Petitioners seek to prohibit Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs. Petitioners aver that Mison’s appointment was not confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments and therefore, unconstitutional.

Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs requires
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Ruling:
No, the appointment of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs does not require
confirmation from the Commission on Appointments. Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, which
contemplates the appointing power of the President, provides that only appointments of heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution are to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The 1987 Constitution excluded the position of “heads of
bureaus” from appointments that need the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Hence, the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is not one of those within the scope of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required.
11
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
G.R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.
Bersamin, J:

Facts:
Chief Justice Reynato Puno’s compulsory retirement was due seven days after the presidential election. In view
thereof, the Judicial and Bar Council agreed that the vacant position must be filled. Hence, there were five
nominees for the position and one of them is Associate Justice Renato C. Corona who was subsequently
appointed for the position of Chief Justice by the President.

The petitioners assail Justice Corona’s appointment as Chief Justice. They aver that the appointment violated
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution, which prohibits the President from making midnight appointments
which are appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term.

Issue:
Whether or not the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice.

Ruling:
Yes, the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice. The prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of
the Constitution does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments
to the judiciary. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so.
12
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J:

Facts:
President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and General
Order No. 5 implementing the former. This law intended to defeat disorder and suppress extremists’ threat to
the government.

Respondent assails the validity of PP 1017 on the grounds that, among others, it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argued that the issue has become moot and
academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021.

Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of PP 1021 rendered the present petitions moot and academic.
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.
Whether or not PP 1017 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
The issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. All the exceptions to such
principle are present: one, said law is alleged to have violated the Constitution; two, the issues raised affects
the public as it involves the basic rights of the people such as freedom of expression; three, it requires the
formulation of a guiding principle, like in the case, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection
given by constitutional guarantees; and four, the assailed actions are capable of repetition. Henceforth, on the
second issue, all the petitioners have legal standing in view of the transcendental importance of the issue
involved.

PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees.
Legislative power is within the province of the Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a
state of emergency can justify the President’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that
these decrees are void and, therefore, cannot be enforced.
13
Lagman v. Medialdea
G.R. No. 231658. July 4, 2017.
Del Castillo, J:

Facts:
On May 23, 2017, in lieu of the rebellion and lawless violence in the vital part of Mindanao, Marawi City,
President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for a period not exceeding 60 days.

On May 25, 2017, the President submitted to Congress a report on the factual basis of the proclamation.
Subsequently, the Senate and the House of Representatives issued a resolution which expressed its support to
the martial law proclamation, finding it adequate and constitutional.

Petitioners assail the validity of Proclamation No. 216. They invoke the Supreme Court’s specific and special
jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation. Furthermore, they also aver that
said proclamation should be nullify for being unconstitutional because it lacks sufficient factual basis.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation.
Whether or not the declaration of Martial Law in Mindanao is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
On the first issue, the Court held that it may indeed review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation. However, such review is limited on the information available to the President prior to or at the
time of the proclamation.

On the second issue, the Court held that the proclamation of martial law in the whole of Mindanao is
constitutional. This is so because it satisfies the requirement mandated by the Constitution. On the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation, the Court ruled that it is the discretion of the President to determine
the territorial scope of martial law. There is no constitutional edict that mandates martial law to be confined
only to the area where there is actual public uprising. This is so because rebellion and public safety does not
have fixed physical parameters. Hence, the proclamation is intended not only to prevent the escape of the rebels
from Marawi City but also to avoid enemy reinforcements and cut their supplies from the other parts of
Mindanao. To rule otherwise would thwart the purpose of martial law and make the exercise thereof ineffective
and impractical.
14
Brillantes v. Yorac
G.R. No. 93867. December 18, 1990.
Cruz, J:

Facts:
President Corazon Aquino designated Associate Commissioner Haydee Yorac as Acting Chairman of Commission
on Elections in place of Chairman Hilario Davide’s vacation of his chairmanship.

Petitioner assails the validity of the appointment. He avers that the act of the President violates the
constitutional provision that ensures the independence of the COMELEC, which provides that “In no case shall
a Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity”. He contends that such appointment
is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members of the COMELEC as the interference of the
President violates the COMELEC’s independence.

Issue:
Whether or not the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the absence of the
regular Chairman?

Ruling:
No, the President may not designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the absence of the regular
Chairman. Even if all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature, they are not under the
control of the president in the discharge of their functions. Hence, it is the members of the COMELEC who should
choose whom to sit temporarily as acting chairman. Therefore the appointment of Yorac is void. However, the
members of COMELEC can choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting chairman. It is important that the members
are the one who should elect their acting chairman pursuant to the principle that constitutional commissions
are independent bodies.
15
Francisco v. House of Representatives
G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.
Carpio-Morales, J:

Facts:
An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court was filed on June 2, 2003 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. The House Committee on Justice
dismissed the same for being insufficient in substance. A second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. on October
23, 2006.

Various petitions were filed with the Supreme Court most of which petitions contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the
Constitution that “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.”

Respondents on the other hand, aver, among others, that the Court does not have jurisdiction over the case as
the present case is a political question.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Whether or not the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is valid.

Ruling:
On the first issue, the Supreme Court held that only questions that are truly political questions are beyond
judicial review. As the case at bar pose alleged violation of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has the exclusive
power to resolve with definitiveness the issues of constitutionality. It is duty bound to take cognizance of the
petitions to exercise the power of judicial review as the guardian of the Constitution.

On the second issue, the Court held that initiation takes place by the act of the filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of
Section 3(5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one-year period.

Henceforth, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and the second
impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.