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SUMMARRY OF THE CASES FOR PERSONS:

II. Human Relations (Civil Code, Arts. 19-22)

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CASES:

1. Tañada vs. Tuvera-April 24, 1985

) As to the necessity of publication, the Supreme Court ruled that laws should be published. The clear object of
such is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by
law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned

2. Garcillano vs. The House of Representatives Committees on Public Information, etc., Dec.
23, 2008)

The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. Publication
is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days
following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines. An electronic data message, or an electronic document, as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes, in other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for
their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

3. Honasan, II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ, G.R. No. 159747, Jun.
15,2004)

In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only circulars and regulations which prescribe a
penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.
· In the case of Taňada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The Honorable Court rules that:
o Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so called
letters of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules on guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in performance of their duties.
 OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the office of the
Ombudsman, Outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the office of the
Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or the
public, in general.

4. Rep. vs. Claude A. Miller and Jumrus Miller, April 21, 1998

Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the
filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law
disqualifying him.

5. Manuel v. People, G.R. No. 165842, Nov. 29, 2005

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant.
As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by
dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because
everyone is presumed to know the law. “Ignorantia legis neminem excusat” Where a spouse is absent for the
requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring
the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse
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will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such
judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the
present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
The court rules against the petitioner.

6. Phil. Bank of Comm. V. CIR, Jan. 28, 1999.

7. Ferrer vs. Diaz, 619 SCRA 26; April 23, 2010

Is Comandante’s waiver of hereditary rights valid? Is petitioner’s adverse claim based on such waiver
likewise valid and effective?

A contract may be classified as a contract upon future inheritance, prohibited under the second paragraph of Article
1347, where the following requisites concur:
(1) That the succession has not yet been opened.
(2) That the object of the contract forms part of the inheritance; and,
(3) That the promissor has, with respect to the object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in
nature.38
In this case, there is no question that at the time of execution of Comandante’s Waiver of Hereditary Rights
and Interest Over a Real Property (Still Undivided), succession to either of her parent’s properties has not
yet been opened since both of them are still living

8. Isabelo dela Cruz vs. Lucila dela Cruz; Dec. 04, 2013

did Lucila’s affidavit of waiver ceding to Isabelo half of the subject property conveys to him a right of
ownership over that half?

The phrase "hereby waive" means that Lucila was, by executing the affidavit, already waiving her right to the
property, irreversibly divesting herself of her existing right to the same. After he and his co-owner Emelinda
accepted the donation, Isabelo became the owner of half of the subject property having the right to demand its
partition.

9. HEIRS OF CIPRIANO REYES, et al vs. JOSE CALUMPANG, et al, October 30, 2006

However, the equitable rights barred by laches still subsist and are not otherwise extinguished. Thus,
parties guilty of laches retains equitable rights albeit in an empty manner as they cannot assert their rights
judicially. However, such equitable rights may be revived or activated by the waiver of those whose right
has ripened due to laches, and can be exercised to the extent of the right waived.

The waiver is clear. The recent case of Valderama v. Macalde reiterated the three (3) essential
elements of a valid waiver,thus: “(a) existence of a right; (b) athe knowledge of the existence thereof;
and, (c) an intention to relinquish such right.” [25] These elements are all present in the case at bar.

In this factual setting, respondents could have filed an action for reconveyance to recover their shares in
Lot No. 3880. However, instead of instituting such a suit, respondents were able to convince Victorino, Luis,
and Jovito, all surnamed Reyes, to execute a Deed of Quitclaim restoring to them their shares. Therefore,
it is clear that the quitclaim is not a donation for the three (3) Reyeses

10. INING vs. VEGA; August 12, 2013

One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot become a co-
owner of the decedent’s property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of the co-ownership of the
estate that was formed among the decedent’s heirs

11. In the matter of the adoption of Stephany Nathy Astorga Garcia, March 31, 2005

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for all intents
and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it
is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

12. Rep. vs. Orbecido III, Oct. 5, 2005

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage.
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Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

13. Van Dorn vs. Romillo –Oct. 8, 1985

The policy against absolute divorce covers only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law.
From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage between them with the petitioner. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before said
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

14. Llorente vs. CA and llorente- Nov. 23, 2000

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

“However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property may be found.”

As to the validity of the foreign divorce, jurisprudence reiterates that once it is proven that an individual is no longer
a Filipino, thus an alien, when he obtains a divorce abroad; its effects shall be recognized in the Philippines.

The Supreme Court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.

Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court.

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.

The decision of the CA is set aside and that of the RTC is reversed. Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin
for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional
rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to
settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

15. Rep. vs. Orbecido III -Oct. 5, 2005

16. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera- 174 SCRA 653 (1989)

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that
private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far
as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that
he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

17. Garcia vs. Reccio, Oct. 2, 2001

The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed marriages involving
a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. A divorce obtained abroad by
two aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before
our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian
family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged foreign
laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to object properly because he
objected to the fact that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established
his legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there are two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating
the marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce the
respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Under the
Australian divorce decree “a party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits the
offense of bigamy”. This shows that the divorce obtained by the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent also
failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences
submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law.
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Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between the petitioner and respondent can not be declared null and
void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack of
such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the parties’ marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.

18. Rep. vs. Iyoy-Sept. 21, 2005

The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity. Furthermore, Article
36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.” Finally, Article 36 “is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

19. San Luis v. San Luis 6 February 2007

1. Venue was properly laid. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate should be filed in the RTC of the province “in which he resides at the time of
his death”. In the case of Garcia Fule v. CA, we laid down the rule that for determining venue, the
residence of the decedent is determining. Residence for settlement of estate purposes means his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence of place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. It is possible that a
person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

2. The divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee Corwin, which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as the surviving spouse.
However, the respondent was not able to provide sufficient documentation to prove the decree of divorce
obtained in Hawaii.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find
that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration as she may
be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties acquired during their cohabitation.
The case is therefore remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.

20. MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE,February 8, 2012

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce under
the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need
to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of
divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential
right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be
issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with
Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful
party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

21. Corpus vs. Sto. Tomas, Aug. 11, 2010

The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26, ¶2 of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the FILIPINO SPOUSE.

Art. 26, ¶2 was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by thedivorce decree. Essentially, Art. 26, ¶2 provided the Filipino spouse a substantive
right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. Without Art. 26, ¶2, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond.

An action based on Art. 26, ¶2 is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. However, no Philippine court can make a
similar declaration for the alien spouse, whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.
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22. Roehr vs. Rodriguez, 404 SCRA 495

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to
Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given
ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule
39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard
to the rights of Wolfgang to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German
court were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmen’s participation in the proceedings in the
German court, the records remain unclear.

Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was
correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the children.

23. Herald Dacasin vs. Sharon Dacasin- Feb. 5, 2010

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of
age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
Art. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) The civil status of persons;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (1814a)

Court’s Rationale:
o It is precluded from taking cognizance over suit considering the Illinois Court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce
its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent
o The divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the “nationality rule” prevailing in this jurisdiction
 Agreement is void
o The agreement is void for contravening Article 2035 paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise
agreements on jurisdiction.

Agreement is still void but the court calls for the remand of the case to settle Stephanie’s custody.(Article 213 of the
Family Code lost its coverage over Stephanie. Stephanie was already almost 15 during this time thus, she is entitled to
choose to whom she want to be)

24. Minoru Fujiki vs. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, ET. AL. June 26, 2013

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

RATIONALE/ HOLDING:

I. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of
the Rules of Court.

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity
of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction
relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted
and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
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While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign
divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen
to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad. 65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no
divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

II. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
thecivil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil
status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108
to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the
decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

III. A Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage
in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. Recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

25. Aznar v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749. Jan. 31, 1963

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator’s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile cannot
and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of
determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states,
between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine
court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the
question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no
legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should
be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by
the internal law of California..
NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only
within the state. The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted cannot,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private
law of the State of California.

26. Bellis vs. Bellis

Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot
be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be
governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas
law, which is the national law of the deceased.
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27. Miciano vs. Primo

ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimo’s estates.

HELD:

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that “it be made and disposed of in
accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island”, this condition, described as impossible
conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner
whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as
those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary
dispositions

28. Insular Govt vs. Frank

Mr. Frank being fully qualified to enter into a contract at the place and time the contract was made, he
cannot therefore plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being enforced. Although
Mr.Frank was still a minor under Philippine laws, he was nevertheless considered an adult under the laws of
the state of Illinois, the place where the contract was made. No rule is better settled in law than that
matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of
the place where the contract is made. Matters connected to its performance are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of its performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as bringing of a suit,
admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is
brought
Although generally, capacity of the parties to enter into a contract is governed by national law, this is one
case not involving real property which was decided by our Supreme Court, where instead of national law,
what should determine capacity to enter into a contract is the lex loci celebrationis. According to Conflict of
Laws writer Edgardo Paras, Frank’s capacity should be judged by his national law and not by the law of the
place where the contract was entered into. In the instant case whether it is the place where the contract
was made or Frank’s nationality, the result would be the same. However, as suggested by the mentioned
author, for the conflicts rule in capacity in general, national law of the parties is controlling

29. Carpio vs. Soledad, Sept. 9, 2004

In the sphere of our law on human relations, one of the fundamental precepts is
the principle known as " abuse of rights " under Article 19 of the Civil Code. To find
existence of an abuse of right, the following elements must be present: 1) there is legal right or duty; 2)
which is exercised in bad faith; 3) for the sole intent or prejudicing or injuring another. Thus, a person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with
prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
The Court said that petitioner's verbal reproach against respondent was certainly
uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of
jewelry inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had no right to attack respondent with her
innuendos which were not merely inquisitive but out rightly accusatory.

30. Nikko Manila Hotel vs. Reyes, Feb. 28, 2005

Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. Plaintiff
failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the necessary precautions to
ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave the party. Considering almost 20
years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how to handle such
matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code.

31. Ardiente vs. Sps. Pastofide, July 17, 2013

disconnection case- When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations
and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

32. Raul H. Sesbreno vs. CA, et. Als. , March 26, 2014 VECO CASE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE APPLIES ONLY IF THE SEARCH WAS DONE BY THE
GOVERNMENT. VECO AND ITS TEAM ARE NOT GOVERNMENT AGENTS. NOT BEING AGENTS OF
THE STATE, THEY DID NOT HAVE TO FIRST OBTAIN A SEARCH WARRANT TO DO SO.

BUT BALICHA A TEAM MEMBER WAS A POLICEMAN. DID HIS PRESENCE NOT MAKE THE SEARCH
AS A SEARCH BY GOVERNMENT AGENT?

NO. HIS ROLE THERE WAS NOT TO SEARCH BUT ONLY TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE TEAM.
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33. TITUS B. VILLANUEVA vs. EMMA M. ROSQUETA, January 19, 2010

Held/Ruling: No, the decision of the CA did not err. Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19
of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of his legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be
liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice another. Complementing this principle are
Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which grant the latter indemnity for the injury he suffers because of
such abuse of right or duty. The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such
damages may be awarded when the defendants transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiffs
anguish in the cases specified in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

34. California Clothing vs. Quinones, Oct. 23, 2013

Clearly, these statements are out rightly accusatory. Petitioners accused respondent that not only did she
fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but that she deliberately took the same without paying for it and
later hurriedly left the shop to evade payment.

Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code which read:4

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals
or good customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney's fees. Moral
damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of
the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.41 Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease
the defendant's grief and suffering. They should, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused
and the gravity of the wrong done.42 They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the
latter to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone

35. Pantaleon vs. American express intl inc-aug. 26, 2010

. Yes. The reason why Pantaleon is entitled to damages is not simply because AmEx incurred delay, but
because the delay, for which culpability lies under Article 1170, led to the particular injuries under Article
2217 of the Civil Code for which moral damages are remunerative. The somewhat unusual attending
circumstances to the purchase at Coster – that there was a deadline for the completion of that purchase by
petitioner before any delay would redound to the injury of his several traveling companions – gave rise to
the moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation sustained by
Pantaleon, as concluded by the RTC.

36. Manzanal vs. illusorio-dec 6 2010

ISSUE: whether the complaint for damages filed by Ramon K. Ilusorio (respondent) against petitioners
Dennis R. Manzanal and Baguio Country Club Corporation (BCCC) states a cause of action.

The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized
or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for
the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
No cause of Action.

37. Ravina vs. Villa Abrille, Oct. 16, 2009

38. Sps. Hing v. Choachuy-July 26, 2013

(1) whether there is a violation of petitioners’ right to privacy,

The right to privacy is the right to be let alone.

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution 44 and in our laws. It is defined as “the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities.” 45 It is the right of an individual “to be free from
unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public
is not necessarily concerned.”46 Simply put, the right to privacy is “the right to be let alone.”

Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand, protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides a
legal remedy against abuses that may be committed against him by other individuals. It states:
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Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce
a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief

(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;

xxxx

This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or
even restricted by others. It includes “any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the
residence of another without the consent of the latter.” 49 The phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s
residence,” however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil
law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:
Our Code specifically mentions “prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” This does not mean,
however, that only the residence is entitled to privacy, because the law covers also “similar acts.” A
business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded there from and only
such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)

The “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is used to determine whether there is a violation
of the right to privacy

(1) Whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
(2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.” Customs, community norms, and
practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” 53

Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case

basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The
operation by [respondents] of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the
right of privacy of [petitioners], who are the owners of the adjacent lot.

“The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person.” 55

39. Tenchavez vs. Escano, 17 SCRA 674

Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign
decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code.
Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign
countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the
legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is
the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an
invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

40. Lagon vs Ca-March 18, 2005

No, the interference of Lagon was with a legal justification (in furtherance of a personal financial interest)
and without bad faith.

RATIO:

Elements of Tortuous Interference with contractual relations (So Ping Bun v. CA):
1. Existence of a valid contract
2. Knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract
3. Interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse

To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have been
driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff.
 Even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina
Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing
the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never established. This case is one of
damnum absque injuria or damage without injury.
Injury- legal invasion of a legal right
Damage- the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury
BPI Card Corp vs CA: There can be damage without injury where the loss or harm is not the result of a
violation of a legal duty.

41. LACSON vs. SAN JOSE-LACSON

Was the assailed compromise agreement—and the judgment of the CFI grounded on said agreement—conformable to
law? YES—but only as far as the separation of property of spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, in
accordance with Article 191 of the Civil Code. The spouses did not appear to have any creditors who would have been
prejudiced by their arrangement. At the time of the decision the spouses had been separated five years and so the
propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests was manifest. (However, the Court maintained that
approving the separation of property and dissolution of conjugal partnership did not amount to recognition or
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legalization of de facto separation.) As to the custody of the children, they were all below 7 years of age at the time of
the agreement and so the CA was correct in awarding the custody to the mother. The Court was also “loath to uphold
the couple’s agreement regarding the custody of the children”, citing rights of the children to proper care not anchored
on the solely on the whims of his or her parents. Courts must decide fitness of parents for custody.

42. Illusorio vs. Illusorio-Bildner, July 19, 2001)

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is
withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of Potenciano’s liberty that would justify issuance
of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not
be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any
event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty
attached to the exercise of his right.

43. Goitia vs. Campus-rueda- November 2, 1916

This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile.

Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:

ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually assist each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second paragraph deals with the management of the wife's
property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when he charges his domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for just cause relieve her from this duty when the
husband removes his residence to a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the whole extent specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or
by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with
her husband is not one of them.

The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so
much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation,
the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own
wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home.

44. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. CA, G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993)

HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach of promise to marry
her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and fraud employed by
Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful
scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She was
a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised to
marry her. Gashem’s blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to
morals, good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and even taking
advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him
liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is
meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It
was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books – such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of
promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made and there was carnal
knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if
there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then actual
damages may be recovered.

45. Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089 , December 26, 1964)

ISSUE:
Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?
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HELD:
The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of the Civil Code
provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages.
This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally
set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
When a breach to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219(10) of
the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant
clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.

46. Hermosisima v. CA, G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960)

ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry.

HELD: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court of Appeals based its award of
damages on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which says in part that “Moral damages may be recovered from… (3)
Seduction, xxx…” However, it must be noted that the “Seduction” being contemplated in the said Civil Code provision is
the same “Seduction” being contemplated in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code. Such “seduction” is not
present in this case.
Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal seduction) Soledad given the circumstances
of this case. Soledad was 10 years older than Francisco. Soledad had a better job experience and a better job overall
than Francisco who was a mere apprentice. Further still, it was admitted by Soledad herself that she surrendered herself
to Francisco and that she wanted to bind “by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of
clergy.”

TAKE NOTE:
Under Article 388 of the Revised Penal Code,
the elements of simple seduction are as follows:

1. That the offended party is over 12 and under 18 years of age;

2. That she must be of good reputation, single or widow;
3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with her; and
4. That it is committed by means of deceit.