Europe and the New Balance of Global Order

Author(s): Hanns W. Maull

Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 81, No. 4,
Britain and Europe: Continuity and Change (Jul., 2005), pp. 775-799
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569674 .
Accessed: 13/10/2011 13:44

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Blackwell Publishing and Royal Institute of International Affairs are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,
preserve and extend access to International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-).

http://www.jstor.org
 Europeandthenewbalance
ofglobalorder

HANNS W. MAULL*

Since the end of the I98os the global orderhas been in decay. 'Global order'
here means two things. First, it means any system of governance for
international relations.In thissense,itsprincipaldimensionsare (a) thewaysin
which, and the frequencywithwhich,actorsresortto organizedviolence to try
to realizetheirobjectivesvis-a-visothers,and the relationshipbetween violent
and non-violentformsof conflictmanagement;(b) the distribution of power
and authorityin the system;(c) the degree to which checksand balancesexist
againstoverwhelmingpower, and the formsthose checks take; and (d) the
levels of legitimacyenjoyed by actorswho exercise power. Second, 'global
order' is used in the normativesense of 'good order'. We may call thissense,
characterizedby normssuch as non-violentconflictmanagement,participation
and social justice, 'thick', as opposed to the 'thin' order provided by any
arrangement of governance.I
That global ordershould have become 'thinner'since I990 is perhapsnot
verysurprising. With all itshorrors,the Cold War maybe seen as a remarkable
artefactof politics.Albeit at the riskof annihilatingcivilization,and at enor-
mous coststo the societiessucked into it, the bipolarframeworkof the East-
West conflictrestrainedviolence and channelled it into a highly choreo-
graphed arms race, imposed checks and balances on power, and helped to
underpinthe politicallegitimacyof regimesand allianceswithineach bloc.2
Almost as a side-effect,it also created the global institutionaland political
* Manythanks go to mycolleaguesSebastian Harnisch, MarcoOverhaus, JoachimSchildandSiegfried
Schiederfortheirveryhelpful comments atshortnotice.I alsowantto expressmysenseofappreciation
andgratitude to theorganizersofandparticipants in theTransatlantic
Workshopsetup bytheMortara
CenterforInternational
Studies,EdwardA. WalshSchoolofForeignService,Georgetown University,
at theArrabidaMonastery in Portugalon 5-8 May 2005 fortheirinputandourinspiring discussions.
The usualattributionofeventualculpabilities
neverthelessapplies.
Fora subtlerecentdiscussion oftheconceptofglobalorderin an important politicalcontext,
namely
thatofweaponsofmassdestruction, see WilliamWalker,Weapons ofmassdestruction
andinternational
order, AdelphiPaper370 (London:OxfordUniversity Press/International
Institute
forStrategic Studies,
2004).
2 This becameevermorethreadbare in theSovietbloc,ofcourse,in partbecauseitsmodel-
legitimacy
unlikethatofthewestern industrialized
democracies-failed to deliverbothmilitarypowerandpublic
welfare simultaneously.

International 81, 4 (2005) 775-799

Affairs
Hanns W. Maull

frameworkfornurturingand channellingthe emergingdynamicsof globali-

zation.
During the Cold War, therole oftheEuropean Community(to become the
European Union) was twofold.3First,as America'sjunior partnerin theEuro-
Atlanticalliance,it providedvitaleconomic and military supportforthe US in
its efforts
to containSoviet power and thusconstituteda key partof the Cold
War global order. Second, within this contextit launched a powerfulnew
method of regionalgovernance,based on (supranational)integration,which
turnedout to be a greatsuccessand over time developed considerableattrac-
tion to others,both as a club worthjoining and as an alternativemodel for
orderingregionaland perhapseven worldwide internationalrelations.4This
European way of ordering(regional)interstate relationseventuallycame to be
associatedwith the term'civilianpower'.5
With the Cold War over,Europe's futurerole in international relationshas
been throwninto doubt.Will it continueto supportAmericanhegemonyas its
junior partner?Can it become an alternative source of power and attractionin
an increasinglymultipolarworld, and perhaps even eventuallychallenge
America as a 'civilian power'? Or will Europe itselfbecome a superpower?
What, in short,will be itsrole in the new balance of global order?
In fact,none of thesethreeoutcomesseemsverylikely.The first, essentially
a continuationof the old divisionof labouracrosstheAtlanticduringthe Cold
War, seemsimplausiblefortwo main reasons:the clear erosionin the sense of
sharedinterestsand values acrossthe Atlanticcommunity,and a fundamental
change in Americanforeignpolicy which arguablywas underway before I I
September2001, but certainlyhas fullyunfoldedsince then,while European
foreignpolicieshave not undergonesuchfundamental change.This has already
made it difficult to revivethe old qualityof transatlanticcooperation,and will
probablymake it more difficult still.6Nor would it necessarilybe desirable-
fromthe perspectiveof a 'thick',robustglobal order-to revivethatcoopera-
tion if the United States insistedon an approach which restedon its own
supremacy,unrestricted autonomyand discretionary use of force.The second
scenario,involvingEurope as an alternative,'civilian' source of global order,
mayseem the mostdesirablebut also seemsunlikely.The mostobvious reason
forthisis thatit would put Europe at odds with America,which would not
tolerateitas a coequal partnerin a stronglymultilateralized
globalorder;a further
reason lies with Europe's unique sources of influenceand its deficienciesin

3 The twotermsreflect stagesin thehistorical

thedifferent evolutionofEuropeanintegration;theyare
usedherein linewiththeirrespectivehistoricalcontexts, butinterchangeably.
4 FrancoisDuchene,'Die Rolle EuropasimWeltsystem: Von derregionalen zurplanetarischen
Interdependenz', in Max Kohnstamm andWolfgang Hager,eds,ZivilmachtEuropa:Supermachtoder
Partner?(Frankfurtam Main:Suhrkamp, 1973), pp. I -35.
5 Duch&ne,'Die Rolle EuropasimWeltsystem'.
6 David P. Calleo,'The brokenWest',Survival 46: 3, Fall2004,pp. 29-38.See alsoGustavLindstrom,
orrift:
ed., Shift US-EU relations
assessing afterIraq(Brussels:EU InstituteforSecurityStudies,2003),pp.
21-42.

776
Europeand thenewbalanceofglobalorder

power and purpose,in the sense of traditionalstatecraft. The thirdscenario,in

which the EU would, perhapsas the leader of a global coalition againstUS
dominance, order internationalrelationsas a fullyfledged power, fails to
recognize what the EU reallyis, and will remainfor the foreseeablefuture,
namelya collectiveof nation-states thatare alreadycloselyintegratedand may
become even more so; in short,a post-modernactor,but neithera greatpower
nor a quasi-statein the making.
The most likelyrole forthe EU will be thatof a pole of cooperationand
stabilityin what may well be a rather'thin' global order-an order,thatis,
characterized by a pronounceddiffusion of legitimatepower and authorityand
hence an absence of effectiveinstitutionalchecks and balances, and thus by
turbulenceand growing entropy,and possiblyalso by widespread,perhaps
even endemic,violence.7 The reasoningbehind thisis thatboth the stateof
internationalrelationsand the possibilitiesforthe creation,enhancementand
maintenanceof a 'thick' global orderare dualistic,thatis characterizedby the
simultaneouspresenceof fundamentally different and even inherentlycontra-
dictoryaspects.In the presentstateof international relations,thatis underthe
conditionsof globalization,the dualismis between patternsof integrationand
differentiationaroundspecificidentities;in therealmof globalgovernance,the
dualism is between modern and post-modernformsof governance.Under
those assumptions,a 'thick' global order would require a double (dynamic)
balance between integrationand accommodation of specificidentities,and
betweenmodernand post-modernformsof governance.Since such a complex
double balance would requireremarkablepoliticalefforts by many,and on a
global scale,the likelier outcome seems to be a 'thin' ratherthan a 'thick'global
order.
The EU could at bestsupplyonlypartof thatdouble balance,and probably
only on a regionalratherthan a global scale. Thus it can be only partof the
answer to the challenges to global order-but an importantpart, for it
represents thebest,themosteffective exampleso farof a post-modemactor.In
that capacityit is best seen as a force,ratherthan a power, in international
relations.Yet theEU also possessesan importantabilityto catalyseelementsof
'thick'global orderifthe externalcircumstances are right.Those circumstances
concernthe evolutionof the dualitybetween integrationand identity;or, put
differently,the level of transformation of internationalrelationsas a resultof
globalization,as well as the rolesplayedby otherimportantactors,notablythe
modem greatpowers of America,China and India, and perhapsRussia. And,
lastbut not least,the abilityof theEU to contributeto 'thick'global orderwill
also be shaped by its skillin governingits own realmand its neighbourhood
effectively.

7 JamesN. Rosenau,Turbulence
inworld a theory
politics: andcontinuity
ofchange (New York:Harvester,
1990).

777
Hanns W. Maull

Europeas a forcein international

relations...
In the evolutionof global ordersince the Cold War, Europe's importancehas
increasinglyshiftedfromits role as a junior partnerto America to thatof a
'civilian power', a phrase coined by FrancoisDuchene to captureEurope's
alternativeway of organizing (or 'domesticating',as he put it) interstate
relations.8The European Communityhas been remarkably successfulwiththis
alternative mode of interstategovernance:not onlyhas it succeededin abolish-
ing war withinEurope, probablyforgood, it has createda way of lifemarked
by individualfreedom,prosperityand civilityfor its people, and has even
begun to project stability,liberaldemocracyand prosperitybeyond its own
realm. The very success of European integration(which, it should be said,
owed a greatdeal to Americansupportand America'scomplementary role as
protectorto the 'civilianpower'; as 'Mars' to Europe's 'Venus'9) has made the
EU a forcein internationalrelations;and in the new, uncertaininternational
environmentof globalization,the EU has even been temptedinto becominga
global player,perhapseven a global power, forexample throughits efforts to
strikeup a 'comprehensivestrategicpartnership' with China, its involvement
in theKorean PeninsulaEnergyDevelopmentOrganization,or itscooperation
agreementswithRussia. Yet while it is thusevidentthatEurope has become a
force in internationalrelationswhich-like the physicalforce of gravity-
shapes its environmentand the behaviour of other partsof the system,this
influenceis conditioned and circumscribedby its highly specificpolitical
subject and its equally specificmodusoperandi. It is striking,
forexample,that
the EU does not seem to be much concerned about ensuringits collective
security(it has traditionally
leftthatto Americaand NATO), thatit does not
care about itsautonomyvis-a-vis othermajor players(thisis apparentnot only
in thesecuritycontextvis-a-vis theUnited States,but also in theenergycontext
vis-a-visRussiaI?), and thatit is hard to envisageit pursue power-enhancing
policies. As a post-modern'force', ratherthan as a modern power, the EU
exercisesinfluenceand shapesits environmentthroughwhat it is, ratherthan
throughwhat it does."I
Being a post-modern'force',ratherthana modem 'power', in international
relationsmeanshavingboth more and lessinfluencethanthelatter,depending
on the context.'Force' will be less influentialthan 'power' in pre-modernor
modernsettings;but it will be equallyor even more influential in post-modern
contexts,not leastthatof global orderunder conditionsof globalization.The

8
Duchene, 'Die Rolle Europas im Weltsystem'.
9 Robert Kaplan, Machtund Ohnmacht:AmerikaundEuropain derneuenWeltordnung
(Berlin: Siedler,
2003).
o0FriedemannMiiller, 'German energyand securitypolicy: technicalversuspolitical modes of
intervention',in Hanns W. Maull, ed., Germany:uncertain power.GermanForeignPolicy(oftheBerlin
Republic)intothe21st Century(Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming2006).
" Gerald Segal once used the concept of 'enlitened' powers in a similarsense: see Gerald Segal,
"'Enlitening" China?', in Denny Roy, ed., The newsecurity dimension in theAsia-Pacificregion
(Basingstoke:Macmillan, 1997), pp. 121-39.

778
Europeand thenewbalanceofglobalorder

gravitationalpull which the EU exercisesin internationalrelationsis based on

the weightof itsmarkets,capitaland technologicalresources,as well as on the
attractivenessof the European way of life. While the EU certainlycan also
exercisesome influenceover othersby manipulatingincentivesand disincen-
tives(albeitagainin wayswhich are circumscribed by itsspecificresourcesand
modusoperandi), it can also effectoutcomes in differentways, forexample by
its of
simplyimposing way doing things on others by 'shapingtheirmilieu' or
by strengtheningthe ability and/or the inclination of others to conduct
themselvesin a 'civilized' way.12

TheEuropeanUnion:a 'civilianpower'?
Can theEU therefore stillbe called a 'civilianpower'? In a nutshell,the answer
is no-not because it is not 'civilian',but because it is no 'power', but a 'force'.
When Duchene coined thisnotion in the early 1970s, he did not develop it
systematically.It was built on the European Community'seconomic weight
and meant to captureits characteristic way of organizingrelationswithinits
realms, which resembled domestic politicswithina democraticpolityrather
than normalinterstate relationsbetween modern,sovereignnation-states.I3 It
containedboth descriptiveelements(observing,forexample,the importance
of interdependenceand transnationalism, and the concomitantshiftto non-
militarydimensionsof interstate relations, well as thewaysin which decision-
as
makingin theEuropean Communitytranscended traditionalinterstate
relations)
and normativeelements (the aspirationto 'domesticate'interstaterelations,
regionallyand eventuallyalso globally).
In my own work comparingtheforeignpoliciesof Germany,Japanand the
United StatesI have borrowedthe concept of'civilian power' fromDuchene,
turningit into an analyticaltool forcomparativeforeignpolicy analysis.In a
firststep, my colleagues and I developed the notion of 'civilian power' as a
Weberian ideal-typeactorin international relations.I4Accordingto thisideal-
type construct,civilian powers strive to 'civilize' (Duchene would say

I2 The conceptof'force'usedherethusresembles thatof'structural power',as developedbyJohan

GaltungandSusanStrange, amongothers.See SusanStrange, Theretreatofthestate:thediffusion
ofpower
intheworld economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,I996); StefanoGuzzini,'Structural
power:thelimitsofneorealist poweranalysis',International
Organization 47: 3, Summer1993,pp. 443-
78. It seemsmisleading, however,to callbothstructural (thatis,notnecessarily intended)andpersonal
formsofinfluence 'power',andto setasidewhatI considerfundamental differencesin theinternal logic
ofmodernv. post-modern international
relations.
Hence mypreference fordistinguishingbetween
influence basedon 'weight'or 'force'andtheability to exercise'power'in a modemsenseon a
systemically relevant scale.
13 The term'modem'is usedherein thesenseofthethreeworldsofRobertCooper,who distinguishes a
pre-modern, a modemanda post-modern realmin international The modernrealmis thatof
relations.
theWestphalian statesystem, builton theexternalandinternal sovereignty ofnation-states.See Robert
Cooper,Europe:thepost-modem stateandworldorder(London:Demos, I996).
14KnutKirsteandHannsW. Maull,'Zivilmacht undRollentheorie', Intemationale
Zeitschriftifur Beziehungen
3: 2 (I996), pp. 283-312.See alsoHannsW. Maull,'Germany andJapan:thenew civilianpowers',
Foreign Affairs69: 5, I990-I, pp. 9I-I06; SebastianHamischandHannsW. Maull,eds,Germany as a
civilianpower? Theforeign policy oftheBerlin (Manchester:
republic Manchester University Press,200I).

779
Hanns W. Maull

'domesticate')relationsbetweenstatesalong thelinesoftheirown, democratic,

domesticpolitics.This is why theyare called 'civilianpowers'-not because
military power is irrelevant to what theyare tryingto achieve. Civilianpowers
thusaim at transforming internationalrelationsfromtheirsupposedlynatural
stateof anarchyto civility,a processwhich the German sociologistNorbert
Elias has observedand systematically analysedas a long-termhistoricaltrendin
the domestic context of modernizingsocieties.15Constraintson violence
become necessaryto allow. societies to deepen and broaden the scope of
division of labour and thus to enhance their ability to overcome social
problems.While Elias analysedthisprocessas a long-termtransformation of
European societiesfrom the tenth to the twentieth centuryprimarily within
societies,he also noted thatthistransformation would work beyond national
boundaries.
The second conceptualclarification we undertookwas to use the concept,
both analyticallyand in a normativeway, as a yardstickto evaluate policy
performance.'Civilian powers' as actorsin international relationsin our view
display specific characteristics with regard to their power resources,their
foreignpolicycultures,theirdefinitions ofvaluesand interests, and their'grand
strategies'.Part of thisspecificityis thattheyexplicitlywant to change inter-
nationalrelationsforthebetter,to make them'more civilized'and lessviolent:
thatis,morelike politicswithin a democraticpolity.This introducesan element
of 'ought' and a logic of appropriateness which Elias had explicitlyavoided: he
intendedto describe,but not to evaluate,what he saw as a directed,but basic-
allyevolutionary and sociological,long-termprocessof civilization.Its 'achieve-
ments'in hisview were at bestprecarious,and oftenmarkedly worsethanthat.'6
A third step in our research design then consisted in developing and
operationalizingthe notion of 'civilizing' internationalrelations.Here, we
could drawon thework ofDieter Senghaas,who had first systematicallyturned
Elias's concept of the processof civilizationinto a normativeconcept of order
('peace'), and developed it into the 'civilizatoryhexagon', which servedboth
to illustratethe meaningof the progressof civilizationtowardspeace and as an
analyticaltool and policy guidelineto describethe transformation of intrastate
and international relationsimpliedby the processof civilization.17 The model
stipulatesthe need to make simultaneousprogressalong six interrelated major
dimensions of politics on the way to sustainablepeace, namely (i) de-
privatization of forceand the abolitionof sourcesof military power otherthan
thatof the state(or international institutions);
(2) rule of law and institutionsas
a means to control the monopoly of force; (3) the encouragementof
interdependenceand affectcontrol;(4) representative, democraticparticipation

I5 See NorbertElias,UberdenProzess derZivilisation am Main:Suhrkamp,

(Frankfurt 1976).
16 As a GermanofJewish forcedto fleeNazi Germany,Eliaswasboundto havean acute
background
oftheambivalence
appreciation of'civilizational
progress'.
17 DieterSenghaas,'FriedenalsZivilisierungsprojekt',
in Wohindriftet
dieWelt?(Frankfurt
am Main:
Suhrkamp,1994), pp. I7-49.

780
Europeand thenewbalanceofglobalorder
in decision-making;(5) protectionof theweak and thepursuitof socialjustice;
and (6) a cultureof non-violentmanagementof conflict.8 Civilianpowerswill
both organize their own political realms along those lines and strive to
transform interstaterelationscorrespondingly.This will involvethepromotion
of internationallaw, supportforinternational regimesand organizations,and a
willingnessto transferelements of national sovereigntyto supranational
institutions.
What, then, makes a civilianpower a power?The notion 'power' in this
contextcomprisesthreedistinctmeanings:first,it refersto an actor of some
staturein international relations,withsubstantialpower resourcesat itsdisposal;
second, it describesan actor with significant ambition(includingappropriate
strategies)to transform internationalrelations;and third,it denotesthe specific
means,the power resourceson which civilianpowers can and will draw.
In this conceptualizationof 'civilian power', the dimension of military
power playsa distinctive role. The widelyheld view that'civilianpowers' want
nothingto do with militaryforce,and thatan EU which is in the processof
developing its own European Securityand Defence Policy (ESDP) can no
longer be a civilian power,'9 is in that context quite misleading.In fact,
Duchene recognized explicitlythat the European Community did have
militarypower, althoughhe did not (and had no need to) conceptualize a
European securitypolicy. Nor were the civilianpowers Germanyor Japan
pacifist:the FederalRepublic of Germanyhad thelargestconventionalmilitary
forceson thewesternside of theEuropean continentduringmuch of the Cold
War, and Japan has been a formidablemilitarypower since the I98os at the
latest.Nor is thereanythingin theideal-typeconstructwhich preventscivilian
powersfromusingmilitaryforceforpurposesof individualand collectiveself-
defence,or forpurposesof collectivesecurityor humanitarian interventionsif
and when those are perceived as promotingthe civilizingof international
relations.In fact,in some instancescivilianpowersmayideallybe moreinclined
to resortto use of force than traditionalgreat powers, which will not be
concerned about the transformation of internationalrelations. They do,
however,view militaryforceand what can be achievedthroughit rathermore
scepticallythantraditionalgreatpowers.
The role concept of a civilian power thereforedoes not describe any
inabilityor unwillingnessto use militaryforce;rather,it suggeststhe specific
way in which militaryforcewill be applied-never alone and autonomously,
but only collectively,only with internationallegitimacy,and only in the
pursuit of 'civilizing' internationalrelations.Thus civilian powers accept,
indeed impose, significant constraintson themselvesin theirabilityto project
militarypower, and they will generallybe ratherscepticalabout the utilityof
militarypower in the contextof buildinga sustainable'civilized' global order.

I8 Senghaas, 'FriedenalsZivilisierungsprojekt',
pp. 20ff.
'9 See e.g. RichardWhitman, Thefall,andrise,ofcivilian
power NationalEuropeCentrePaperno.
Europe,
I6 Australian
(Canberra: NationalUniversity
NationalEuropeCentre,2002).

78I
Hanns W. Maull

Fromthisperspective,theEU muststillbe considered'civilian',and thiswill

remainits role concept or foreignpolicy identityforthe foreseeablefuture.20
In seeingthe EU not as a civilianpower, but ratheras a forcein international
relations,I focuson the second halfof the concept-that is, withpower,rather
thanwith civilian.During the Cold War and even beyond, the EU has been
criticallydependent on a non-civilianpower, namely the US, to provide
militarysecurity,leadershipand a politico-military capacityforcrisismanage-
ment.This suggestscertainstructural deficienciesof Europe as an independent
power centrein international relations.In fact,the EU has a power portfolio
that is both selectiveand incomplete. Its principalinstruments of influence
derive from its enormous weight as a market,its capital and technology
resources,and its 'softpower', all of which can be manipulateddiplomatically.
The EU's ambitionand abilityto act strategically to promotethe civilizingof
international relationsare also limitedby itsverynature.

pull: themembership
Gravitational as a primesourceof
perspective
Europeaninfluence
If the influenceof the EU in international relationsgenerallyrestson itstrack
recordin sustainingpeace and creatingwealth,and on the ideas on which its
civilizationalmodel is built,its most importantspecificsource of influenceis
the perspectiveof EU membership.In Centraland EasternEurope, the pros-
pect of enlargement has probablymade a huge contribution to regionalstability,
prosperity and the progressof liberaldemocracy. In the western Balkans,the
perspectiveof eventual membershipfor the successor states the former
of
Yugoslavia was used in the contextof the Kosovo settlementas a means to
enhanceregionalstability. Most recently,the decisionto open negotiationsfor
eventualmembershipwithTurkeyin October 2005 has been based on similar
considerations.
The basis of thisinfluencelies in the desireof those outsideto get into the
EU. This desireis built on generalhopes forpeace, security,prosperityand
democraticstability,on the wish to share in an identityas 'Europeans' or
'European democracies',and on specificexpectationsabout gains in material
welfare.But while the perspectiveof membershiphas been verypowerfulso
far,it is, forobvious reasons,also geographically(and perhapsalso culturally)

20
One reasonis thattheroleconceptofcivilianpowerseemsbestsuitedto captureandintegrate thevery
ofmemberstates.The compatibility
nationalroleconceptsor 'identities'
different ofnationalidentities
fromtheperspective ofa Europeanforeign andsecuritypolicyhasbeenanalysed thoroughlyforFrance,
Italy,Germany, Denmark,theNetherlands andGreecebya projectundertaken at TrierUniversity.
aresummarized
The results in Britta
JoeriBenandBernhard Stahl,eds,Europaische und
Auflenpolitik
nationale
Identitit,
Vergleichende undVerhaltensstudien
Diskurs- zu Danemark, Deutschland,Frankreich,
Griechenland, unddenNiederlanden
Italien LiT, 2003); theyclearly
(Miinster: showthatonlyas a civilian
powercouldtheEU plausibly containthestrongly
divergent ofthosecountries.
nationalidentities See
alsoHenningBoekle,AnnaJohannesd6ttir, JorgNadollandBernhard Stahl,'Understandingthe
dividein theCFSP: comparing
Atlanticist-Europeanist Denmark,France,Germany andthe
Review9: 3 (2004), pp. 417-41.
Netherlands',EuropeanForeignAffairs

782
Europeand thenewbalanceofglobalorder

confined.Moreover, the value of membershipforthose inside,as well as for

aspirantsoutside, is uncertain:it could well decline in the future,for the
followingreasons.First,enlargementwill reduce the benefitsand increasethe
costs of membershipfor those alreadyin the EU, while newcomers must
expect to receiveless generousentryconditionsthanthosethatjoined in pre-
vious enlargementrounds(it alreadyseemsclear,forexample,thatifTurkeyis
admittedit will be denied one of the four fundamentalfreedoms,that of
movement of people). Second, enlargementwill make it more difficultto
governtheEU. And while the relativeweightof the foundingmembersin the
new EU-25 has declined,the futureperformanceof theEU will stillbe shaped
importantly by how well or badly the 'old' core membercountries(France,
Germanyand Italy)cope withtheirrespectivedomesticstructural problems.If
theydo not manage well, thiswould affectthe attractiveness of the EU as a
civilizationalmodel and as a club, both directlyand indirectly:EU budgetary
resourcesare directlylinkedto economic performanceand could thusstagnate
or shrink,while the managementof EU decision-makingcould also become
more complicatedand less effective.Third,even ifthe EU copes well with its
enlargedmembership,with the structuralproblemsof many of its member
statesand with new externalchallengesto its securityand prosperity, it will
probablyoftendo so throughenhancedformsof integration.This could make
membershipmore onerous and costlyfor those inside while, on the other
hand,prospectivemembersmaybe lessinclinedto subscribeto suchan enlarged
acquis communautaire. In sum, it seems quite plausible to assume that the
attractionsof membershipwill diminishforthosewho insiston retainingtheir
own sovereignty and identityand/orperceivealternative strategicoptions(e.g.
Norway, Switzerland,perhapseven Turkey),while remaininghigh forthose
countrieswithmarkedlylower performance, strongmaterialincentivesand/or
a lack of strategicalternatives(e.g. Ukraine, Moldava, Belarus,the successor
statesto Yugoslavia). In otherwords, if it is not managed carefully,enlarge-
mentcould level the differences between membersand those outside.
The gravitational forcewhich theEU exercisestowardsotheractorsthrough
the perspectiveof membershipcan certainlybe instrumentalized, and thus
turnedinto specificinfluenceand to some extenteven intopower. Yet it needs
to be borne in mind thatthis source of European influencemostlyrestson
what the European Union hasand is,ratherthanwhatit cando. Thus, itsinflu-
ence will varyin accordancewithgeographicaldistance,as well as withspecific
policy realms,the most favourableconditionsexistingin those segmentsof
internationalrelationswhich are stronglyglobalized and post-modern.But it
will also depend on the performanceof the EU itself.Still,it seems likelyon
balance to remainthe strongest leverthe EU possessesto pursueitspurposein
international relations.This will make the EU mostlya regional,ratherthana
global, force.But the 'region' will include such internationaltroublespotsas
the Balkans, the southernMediterraneanand the Near East, where several
countriesare liningup to applyformembership.

783
Hanns W. Maull

Socio-economic
weight:manipulating toexerciseinfluence
incentives
The EU's otherleversof influencein international relationsinclude association
(some formof special relationshipwith the EU below the thresholdof full
membership); diplomacy, in particularmultilateraldiplomacy; materialand
and/orthe impositionof sanctions;organizational
financialincentives and human
resources(both militaryand civilian)in conflictpreventionand conflictrehabi-
litation/state-buildingmissions;and, last but not least,the EU's 'post-modern'
conceptualization which has allowed it to evolve superiorforms
ofsovereignty,21
ofgovernanceofconsiderableattraction to others,and enabledit to engageother
regionsin dialogueand cooperationand thusto catalyseregionalismelsewhere.
Again, the EU's abilityto turnthose assetsinto influenceand power needs
to be analysedcarefully. Fundamentally, theirutilitywill againdepend on what
othersreallywant fromthe EU and how badlytheywant it, and on what the
EU will be able to deliverin the future.
will undoubtedlybe applied by the EU even more
The lever of association
vigorouslyin the future,as the difficulties of enlargementbecome more pro-
nounced; indeed, the Barcelona Processand European neighbourhoodpolicy
alreadyrepresentsuch efforts. The effectiveness,let alone the efficiency,of the
BarcelonaProcessin termsof the promotionof civilized internationalrelations
is ratherdoubtful,22 however,and in the futurethefinancialand organizational
resourcesavailable for associationpolicies must be expected to decline as a
resultof both diminishingsupply(withthe expectedfiscalsqueeze of the EU
budget)and the proliferation of demand (withadditionalcandidates).
Diplomacy,especiallymultilateraldiplomacy,is a tool which, in principle,
the EU is well equipped to deploy. Consideringthe materialresourcesavail-
able, and adding up the externalservices(diplomatic,militaryand financial/
technicalassistance)of both the memberstatesand the Union, the EU holds
manycards,and it has manyskilledplayers.In post-modernareasof multilateral
diplomacy,such as international law or international environmental policy,the
EU has indeed been creditedwith some success.23But the specificnatureof
theEU as a force,ratherthana power in thesenseof a unitaryactor(an issueto
which we will returnbelow), oftenmakesit difficult to mobilize materialand
financialincentivesand sanctionseffectively. Experiencesuggeststhatthiswill
be easierwith regardto economic, financialand technicalissuesin the post-
modem globalizedworldthanwithpolitico-military issues,as authorityto deal
with the formermostlyalreadyresideswithinthe firstpillarof the European
Union, reducingproblemsof coordinationand integration.

21 See Walter in regionalintegration',

International
Studies 2: 2, 2000,
Review
Mattli,'Sovereignty bargains
pp. 149-80.
22 See
Roy H. Ginsberg, TheEuropean Unionininternational baptism
politics: byfire(Lanham,MD: Rowman
& Littlefield,
200I), esp.pp. I 52ff.;ChristopherHill andKarenE. Smith,eds,European foreign
policy:key
documents(London:Routledge,2000), pp. 348ff.
23 JohnVogler, 'In theabsenceofthehegemon:EU actomess andtheglobalclimatechangeregime', paper
presentedto conference on 'The EuropeanUnionin international affairs',
NationalEuropeCentre,
AustralianNationalUniversity, Canberra,2-4 July2003 (NationalEuropeCentrePaperno. 20).

784
Europeand thenewbalanceofglobalorder

international
'Civilizing' theEU as a 'civilianforce'inaction
relations:
From the early I970S the European Community/Unionhas triedto use its
weight in pursuitof the objective of civilizinginternationalrelationsin two
directions:transforming political interactionwithinstatesand betweenstates.
Within states,civilized politicsis generallyequated with democraticpolitics,
and althoughthisequationmayin factbe lesscompellingthanis oftenassumed,
it certainlyis true thatkey elementsof democracy,such as the rule of law,
respectforhuman rights,the existenceof channelsforpoliticalparticipation,
and the enhancementof politicallegitimacythrougheffortsto improve the
well-beingof the largestpossiblenumberof membersof society,are indispen-
sable fora contextof civilizedpolitics.The European Community/Unionhas
thereforetriedto promotedemocracy,humanrightsand 'good governance'in
itspartnercountries.24 The emphasiswas firston European communiststatesin
the contextof the Conferenceof SecurityCooperation in Europe (CSCE).25
The basic approachdeveloped here,namelyto arrangethe subjectsofinterstate
negotiationand agreementin three'baskets'(securityissues;economic cooper-
ation issues;and issuesconcerninghumanrights,freedomand democracy),has
since been followed in othercontexts,notablyin the Barcelona Process,but
also with regardto developingcountriesin general.
Most recently,promotingdemocracyand good governancehas oftenmeant
engagingin state-building in fragileor failedstates.26It is widelyheld thatthe
EU has done betterthanothers,notablythe United States,in state-building-
a judgementlargelybased on European performancein the westernBalkans.27
The capacityto rebuildfragile,compromisedor failedstatehoodis obviouslyof
greatimportancein the contextof civilizedinternationalrelations,forwhich
functioningstatehoodis probablythe singlemostcritical(albeitin itselfclearly
not sufficient) requirement.Yet the EU's recordin thisarea is not unblem-
ished. Its initialperformancein crisispreventionin the formerYugoslavia was
anythingbut impressive,and it is littleconsolationthat others(the US, the
UN) did not do anybetter.True, theEU clearlyhaslearnedlessons:forexample,
it deservescreditfor defusing,togetherwith NATO, a dangerous crisisin
Macedonia in 200I, and also for assumingoverall militaryresponsibility for
security and in
stability Macedonia and Bosnia in 2003-2004.28 Yet political
stabilityin Macedonia and Bosnia, not to mentionKosovo, remainsfragile,and

24 See RichardYoungs,TheEuropean Unionandthepromotion

ofdemocracy
(Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press,
2000);CarlosSantiso,'Sisyphus
in thecastle:improving
EuropeanUnionstrategies
fordemocracy
promo-
tion and governance conditionality',EuropeanJournalofDevelopment
Research15: I, June 2003, pp. 1-28.
25
See Hill andSmith, European
foreign pp. 255ff.;SimonJ.Nuttall,European
policy, political
cooperation
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
26
See UlrichSchneckener,
Statesat risk:Fragile
Staaten
alsSicherheits-
undEntwicklungsproblem,
SWP Studie
S 43 (Berlin: StiftungWissenschaftund Politik, 2004).
27 Thisis alsohintedatbytheEuropeanSecurity A secure
Strategy, Europeina better
world
(Brussels:
European Commission, 2003).
28
StefanLehne,'Has thehouroftheEuropeancomeatlast?The EU's strategy fortheBalkans',inJudy
Batt,ed., Thewestern
Balkans: on,ChaillotPaperno. 70 (Paris:Institute
moving forSecurity
Studies,2004).

785
Hanns W. Maull

none of the successor states or territoriesin which the EU has assumed

responsibility forstate-building has come anywherenearsustainableeconomic
and political development.29Moreover, this ratherlimited resulthas been
achievedat enormousexpense,and it seemsdoubtfulwhethersuch efforts can
be sustainedin the future,let alone repeatedelsewhere.3?State-buildingis a
taskof enormouspoliticalcomplexity,and fraught withdangers:externalstate-
builderstryingto promote sustainable,accountable statehood fromoutside
musttreada fineline between rejectionand captureby local politicalforces.
Yet it is of crucialimportancein the contextof the EU's civilizationalproject.
The EU has also tried,throughdialogue,cooperationand simplyby forceof
example,to promotethe transformation of internationalrelationsby encour-
agingregionalcooperationand integration elsewhere.Since theearlyi98os ithas
promoted intra-Asianregionalismthroughits encouragementof, and inter-
regionaldialogue with,both ASEAN and the East Asian regionas a whole.
Lastly,the EU has also promotedthe global transformation of international
relationsalong the linesof the civilizatory hexagon. Here, the firstcomponent
in itsapproachhas been to advance universalobservanceof human rightsand
the rule of law and institutions; recentsuccess storieshere include the pro-
motion of the InternationalCriminalCourt and the global campaignagainst
thedeathpenalty3 1),thedevelopmentof constraints on theuse and instruments
of force,such as armscontroland disarmament initiatives(e.g. the land mine
ban), and the promotion of universal social justice through support for
developmentand of broad politicalparticipationin addressing'global issues'.
The EU has also promotedglobal multilateralism, with a focuson the UN
system, in such contexts as North-South relations and developmentissues,
international environmental issues,non-proliferation and disarmament, and the
Israeli-Arabconflict.Only recently,however,has theEU givenclose attention
to the difficulties of organizingglobal multilateralism effectively.32 Effective
multilateralism requires not only broad international support and legitimacy,
but also the capacityto generateinitiatives,and politicalleadershipto set the
agenda,definedeadlines,mobilizeresourcesand promoteeffective implemen-
tation.33A key qualificationin thiscontextis the abilityto formand sustain
broad-basedpoliticalcoalitions.
To summarize,while the abilityof the EU to contributeto international
orderis substantial, it is also circumscribed.Like the physicalforceof gravity,
the EU's impacton international relationsis uni- ratherthanmultidirectional

29
Lehne,'Has thehouroftheEuropeancomeatlast?'See alsoMarie-Janie und
Calic,DerStabilisierungs-
aufdemPrifstand,
Assoziierungsproze3f Wissenschaft
SWP StudieS 33 (Berlin:Stiftung undPolitik,2004).
30 CARDS, thefinancial instrument andAssociation
oftheStabilisation ProcessforSouthEastEurope,has
undAssoziierungsprozefJ3,
a totalvolumeof?4.65billionfortheperiod2000-2006:Calic,DerStabilisierungs-
pp. 26ff.
31 Ian Manners,'Normative powerEurope:a contradictionin terms?',
JournalofCommon Market Studies
40: 2, 2002, pp. 235-58.
32 The codeword'effectivemultilateralism'
first in theEuropeanSecurity
appearsprominently Strategy.
33 MichaelBrenner, in MichaelBrenner,
'Introduction', ed.,NATO andcollective (London:
security
Macmillan,I998),pp. I-5.

786
Europeand thenewbalanceofglobalorder

(it pulls other actors closer towards the EU and its particularcivilizational
model) and largelynon-discretionary. Moreover, the abilityof the EU as a
collectiveof statesto mobilizeitsresourcesforspecificpurposesand objectives
varies stronglyamong different policy areas; it is most significantwhere the
EU's core assetscome into play. Even where the EU canaffectoutcomes and
prevail against resistance,it will do so in ways that differ,in both means
deployed and processes undertaken,quite fundamentally from the ways in
which 'power' is used in the 'modern' contexts of international
relations.

... butnota power

The relevanceof theEU to international orderthuslies in itsbeing a 'force'in
internationalrelations;itsrealmis the post-modern,globalizingdimensionsof
thissphere,where its specificstrengths mattermost and where its weaknesses
are of secondary importance.Yet in the dualistic world of international
relationswhere the modernis inextricably intertwinedwith the post-modern,
thoseweaknessesmatterjust as much as Europe's strengths. They are: Europe's
of
post-modernportfolio power capabilities; its limitedcapacityto act in an
effectivemanner;and itslack of a real strategy,indeed its constitutionalinabi-
lityto have one. Beforewe turnto thoseweaknesses,however,we will look at
some of the argumentsbehind an overly optimisticassessmentof Europe's
potentialin the balance of global order.

TheEU as a 'transformative
power'?
Againstthe pervasiveEuro-pessimismin Europe itself,a number of (mostly
American) observershave recentlyproduced upbeat assessmentsof the EU's
futureimportance.34Much of theiranalysisrightlyrecognizestwo important
characteristicsof present internationalrelations,namely the transformative
potentialboth of the actual global contextand of the European Union as the
actorbestequipped fora post-modernformof governance,and thelimitations
of US power and itsfailure,underthe presentadministration, to husbandand
enhance America'sabilityto shape global order. But ratherthan admittingto
the uncomfortable(but probablymore accurate)conclusion thatif the US is
not reallypowerfulenough any more,nobody is, thoseauthorsconclude from
theirscepticalassessmentof Americanpower thatthe magic power to trans-
forminternational relationsinto theglobalorderoftheirhopes and dreamsis to
be foundelsewhere.Thus theyinferthattherealsourceofpower in thefuture,
the saviourof a 'thick'global order,mustbe the EU.

34See T. R. Reid, TheUnitedStatesofEurope:thenewsuperpower

andtheendofAmericansupremacy(London:
Penguin,2004); JeremyRifkin,TheEuropean dream:howEurope's
vision isquietly
ofthefuture the
eclipsing
American dream(New York:Penguin,2004); CharlesA. Kupchan,TheendoftheAmerican era:USforeign
andthegeopolitics
policy ofthetwenty-first (New York:Knopf,2002).
century

787
Hanns W. Maull

Perhaps the most imaginativesuch assessmentis that by Mark Leonard,

directorofforeignpolicyat theCentreforEuropean Reformin London.35His
expectationthatthe EU 'will run the 2ISt century'is based on the following
arguments.
First,Leonard argues,European power, like the 'invisiblehand' of Adam
Smith,works discreetlybut effectively. It createsa common frameworkfor
actionwhich is thentakenby European institutions and thememberstates.But
this view emphasizesonly the potentialof Europe, ignoringthe enormous
potentialfor frictionsin 'uploading' nationalobjectivesto merge them into
common norms and common action at the European level, and in 'down-
loading'Europeanapproachesto membercountries.36 It also neglectsthedarker
side of politicsin Europe: forthe complex multilevelgovernanceprocessin
Europe is not only,and probablynot even primarily, about findingappropriate
solutions to shared problems, but about protectingspecific interestsand
promotingnarrowpoliticalcalculationsat home. In sum, Leonard ultimately
professeswhatseemsan amazinglynaive view both about the effectiveness and
efficiencyof European governanceand about its good intentions.One need
not be a cynicto findthisview somewhatone-sided.
By settingcommon rules, Leonard furtherargues,the EU is effectively
takingover countrieswithout (usually)even becoming a targetof hostility.
Again,thisview seemssimplistic, once more ignoringthepotentialforfriction;
the growingreluctanceof people even in the old core membercountriesto be
'takenover' byBrusselshas recentlysurfacedstrongly in severalofthefounding
members.37The assumptionof enormouspower holdsforonlyas long as what
theEU wantsthe presentand prospectivemembersto do is what theywant to
do themselves.But what is that exactly?What do presentand prospective
membersof the EU expect fromEurope? Membershipof the club? Material
prosperity? Democracy?Or is it the attraction
Peace and stability? of European
ideas, the of
possibility sharing in the European identity?Raising those
questionspointsto the possibilitythatthepastsuccessesofEurope as a forcein
internationalrelationsmayhave been due lessto what theEU has done thanto
favourableconditionsand the particularhistoryand orientationsof the new
members.In thislight,the hard cases fortestingthe propositionthatthe EU
can run countriesthe way it likes,withouteven causingresentment, are still

(London: FourthEstate,2005). A shortsummaryof

3s Mark Leonard, How Europewillrunthe21Stcentury
power', CER Bulletin40, Feb.-March
the argumentcan be found in Leonard, 'Europe's transformative
2005.
36 The terminologyof 'uploading' and 'downloading' has been adopted fromElizabeth Bomberg and John
Peterson,'Policy transfer and Europeanization: passingthe Heineken test?'Queen's Papers on
Europeanization no. 2/2000 (Queen's University,Belfast),available at http://www.qub.ac.uk/ies/
onlinepapers/poe2.html, last accessed 14 June 2005, as quoted in AlisterMiskimmon and William E.
Paterson,'German foreignpolicy, domestic constraints,and the limitationsof Europeanisationsince
unification',in Maull, ed., Germany:uncertain power.
37 The most obvious evidence forthisis, of course, provided by the outcomes of the referendumson the
constitutionaltreatyin France and the Netherlands.See Hanns W. Maull, 'The melt-down of European
politics',editorial,Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.De, weekly digest,issue no. 234 (6 Feb. 2005), available at
http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de, lastaccessed I4 June 2005.

788
Europeand thenewbalanceofglobalorder

coming up, in the Balkans,in Turkey,and in the westernpartsof the former

Soviet Union.
Third, Leonard argues,Europe representsa felicitouscombinationof the
bestqualitiesofAmericaand Asia: like America,theEU buildsitscivilizational
model on individualfreedom,individualconsumptionand prosperity; likeEast
Asia, it emphasizessocial stability.Thus, he concludes,the European 'way of
life'will become increasingly attractiveto others.This assessmentreliesprim-
arilyon the extrapolation into thefutureof pastachievements,securedin quite
different circumstances and a veryfavourableinternational environment;again
possiblerisksand changedcircumstances (suchas themassivelydifferent demo-
graphic circumstances of the 'new' Europe, parts of which will experience
levelsof populationdeclinenot seen since the timeof theplague38)are glossed
over. The European civilizationmodel may alreadyhave itsbestyearsbehind
it, or it may be about to get a second wind by changingtrack;but it cannot
repeatpast successesunder the new, verydifferent circumstances both within
and around the EU.
Finally,Leonard suggeststhatthe EU has begun to change the natureof
power in the internationalsystemby encouragingotherregionsto follow its
example,thusstartinga 'regionaldomino effect'.This certainlyrepresentsan
importantaspect of Europe as a forcein internationalrelations,but it failsto
recognizefundamentaldifferences between European integrationand region-
alismelsewhere,notablyin Asia:39no otherformof regionalismhas yetbeen
built on a thoroughredefinitionand social reconstruction of the concept of
sovereignty.Consequently,the EU remainsthe only post-modernformof
regionalism,and for thatto change its 'transformative power'-its abilityto
shiftdefinitionsof sovereigntyin otherpartsof the world-would need to be
greatlyenhanced.
In sum, Leonard and othersare rightto point out thatthe EU is oriented
towardsa transformation of international relationsin a post-moderndirection,
and thatthisorientationcorrespondsbetterto the complex realitiesof today's
international relationsthanAmerica'spresentapproach,which seems destined
to aggravate,ratherthan improve, the balance of global order. But they
overestimateEurope's abilityto achieve such a transformation, playingdown
the darker,'modem' side in the presentdual stateof internationalrelations.
What Europe can do will ultimatelydepend largelyon its own abilitiesand
efforts, but also on the transformative potentialof this presentinternational
context and, last but not least, on well-disposedand powerfulpartnersand
vibrantinternational institutions.

38NicolasEberstadt,
'Whatifit'sa worldpopulation
implosion?
Speculationaboutglobaldepopulation',
in TheGlobalReproductive
HealthForum(Boston,MA: HarvardUniversity),
availableat:http://
www.hsph.harvard.edu/Organizations/healthnet/HUpapers/implosion/depop.html.
39HannsW. Maull,'The Europeansecurityarchitecture: lessonsforAsia-Pacific
conceptual co-
security
in AmitavAcharyaandEvelynGoh,eds,Reassessing
operation', security intheAsia-Pacific:
cooperation
multilateralism
andregional
order MA: MIT Press,forthcoming
(Cambridge, 2005).

789
Hanns W. Maull

EU capabilities:lessthanmeetstheeye
The EU's influencein international relationsrestson itsability,first,
to setand
implement common rules for its own realm, and, second, to align and
coordinatenationalpolicies within and beyond its boundaries.Its extensive
resources(commercial,human,technological,organizational,diplomatic,etc.)
and its 'softpower', based on the attractiveness of the EU as a civilizational
model) can be channelledto serve the purposesof a common foreignpolicy
only to the degree theyare subjectto common rulesor to effectivenational
policy alignment.Thus, assessingEuropean capabilitieseasily runs into the
fallacyof composition:failureto recognizethatthe capabilitiesand resources
effectively available for the task of shapinginternationalrelationsand inter-
nationalorderwill oftenbe considerablyless thanthe sum of the resourcesof
Europe's parts.
Still, the fact is that European influencein internationalaffairsis more
dependenton what goes on inside the EU than on European strategiesand
policies towards the rest of world.40 The EU does not sufferfrom the
limitations and negativeside-effects whichunderpresentinternational conditions
severelylimit the scope, range and effectiveness of power projection by
traditionalgreat powers, which are well illustratedby the conundrum of
Americanpolicyin Iraq, and more broadlyin the Middle East. While America
has the power to intervenemore or less at itsdiscretion,thispower mobilizes
so much opposition,and so manycountervailing forces,thatitseffects in terms
of a 'thick'regionalorder,and also of America'sown enlightenedself-interest,
are uncertainat best; theycould well even be counterproductive.
Being a force,ratherthana greatpower, thusis not necessarilya disadvan-
tage.But theEU's abilityto influenceitsenvironmentsuccessfully will,as with
greatpowers but again in differentways,depend substantially on how well its
resourcesforinfluencingglobal orderare husbanded.What will mattermost
here are probablynot so much tangibleand intangibleresourcestocks(popu-
lation,GNP or nationalincome) as resourcesflows(demographictrends,growth
ratesin GNP).4' Thus, the EU's politicalinfluencein the futurewill probably
depend more on presentand futureperformancethan on past achievements.
Enlargementposes new challengesin thiscontext:it could, if managedwell,
enhance the attractiveness of the EU as a vibrantsocio-economic and civili-
zationalmodel. On the otherhand, problemsof socio-economic and cultural
resistanceto change could also quicklymake Europe less attractiveand thus
also impede itsabilityto exerciseinfluenceinternationally.
These subtleraspectsof Europe's capabilitiesare oftenignored.As a cons-
equence, perceptionsof European influencein international relationsare often

40See KalypsoNicolaidis,
'We, thepeoplesofEurope...', Foreign 83: 6, Nov.-Dec. 2004,pp. 97-I IO.
Affairs
41 RichardRosecrancemakesthisimportant pointin hisstudyon modemv. post-modem formsof
RichardRosecrance,Theriseofthevirtual
governance: state:wealth
andpower inthecoming (New
century
York: Basic Books, I999).

790
Europeandthenewbalance order
ofglobal
misguided.The firstsource of misunderstanding is the assessmentof European
influencein termsof traditionalpower, ratherthan of force.This missesthe
specificityof European influence.The second source of misunderstanding is
thefallacyof composition.For theEU is not an actorin the traditionalsenseof
internationalrelations,and cannot pursue its aims and interestsin the same
way. The thirdsource of misunderstanding is a tendencyto look at stocks
ratherthanflows,and thusneglectthe dynamicsof change.

'Actorness':
rhetoric
and realities
A common European policyis usuallythe resultof a complex interplayof (by
now 25) nationalgovernmentswith the 'European' institutions: the Commis-
sion, the Council of Ministers,the Parliamentand the Court. Once decided,
European externalpolicies have to be implementedthroughcoordinated
nationalpolicies and the integrationof those with European policies, which
maywell concerntwo or even all three'pillars'.In short,Europe as an actorin
internationalrelationsis oftenless than, and different from,what meets the
eye.
One implicationof thisis thatthe EU oftensimplycannotand will not act
even in circumstances where it should.But even when it does, the proclaimed
commonalityof policy is oftenmore declaratorythan real. A trulycommon
foreignand securitypolicy, for example, would require that national and
European policies (ifnecessary,in all threepillars)be effectively
alignedaround
the same objectives,and thatall available resourcesat nationaland European
levels be channelled into their realization.The realityis usually far more
modest,and thereare good reasonsto assume thatthe abilityof the EU to
conduct truly'common' foreignand securitypolicies in thisdemandingsense
will remainlimitedas long as thereare no organizationalor institutional leaps
into supranationalintegration,as was the case with the common currency.42
The reasonsare simple:first,the EU is, and will continueto be forthe fore-
seeable future,a complex political entitywhich representsboth a regional
organizationand a supranationalcommunity,both a collective of sovereign
nation-statesand an integratedassociationof peoples; and second, foreignand
securitypolicies representpowerfulbastionsof nationalsovereignty,and are
thereforeparticularly to transform
difficult into trulysupranational'common'
policies.
The coherenceand consistencyofEU approacheswill therefore continueto
be limitedby the verynatureof the EU as a politicalentitysuigeneris.True,
assumptionsof'unitaryactor'statusin international relationsare generallybold,

42 theeuro,presumably becauseofitssuccess,todayis hardly everreferred

to as the
Interestingly,
'commoncurrency': itgoeswithoutsaying!On theneedforstronger elements
supranational in the
CFSP, see AlysonJ.K. Bailes,'Die Europaische
Sicherheitsstrategie:
programmatische undpraktische
Petrspektivenfirdie GASP undESVP', Integration28: 2, 2005,pp. 107-I8.

79I
Hanns W. Maull

even forgreatpowers like the US, India or China.43 (There is, forexample,
certainlyno shortageof internaldisagreements, borderingon open warfare,
between different of
branches government and even between different
foreign
policydepartments in Washington.)Yet thelack of coherenceand consistency
quality.In America,thepresidentcan and
in European policiesis of a different
does impose a unifiednationalperspectiveif required,and policy disagree-
mentsthustake place withina hierarchicalframeworkof authority, no matter
how dense the criss-crossing policy networksand informalcoalitions.In the
EU, thereare onlynetworksand coalitions;so thereis an abundanceof'govern-
ance', but verylittlereal authority.
The EU thusacquiresinternational actorstatusmostlyby default.Reason-
ably 'common' approachesmay come about as a resultof:
* failureof nationalpolicies (as in the westernBalkansfromabout 1994);
* the desireof memberstatesto proceed with theirnationalpolicies undera
common smokescreen,or to use theEU as a 'forcemultiplier'fornational
policies (as in European policies towardsthe Israeli-Arabconflictfrom
Germany'snationalperspective);
* a consciousrole-playalong the 'good cop/bad cop' linesbetween the EU
and memberstates(as in the case of EU relationswith Russia and China,
where the European level was used to put humanrightspressureon those
countries, while member states focused on developing commercial
cooperation);and even
* a desiresimplyto pronounce on positions'forthe record',withoutmuch
concern about practicalimplicationsand the complexitiesof political
responsibility (as in manyinstancesofhumanrightsdisasters,fromRwanda
the
through Congo to Sudan).

Purpose:is theEuropeanSecurity reallya strategy?

Strategy
Because the European Union rarelyappears as an actor in international
relationsin the traditional,unitarysense,it cannotreallybe expectedto possess
Yet, withthe documentA secure
a strategy. Europein a better
world,theEU now
claimsto have (as the subtitlesuggests),a 'European SecurityStrategy'(ESS).44
In fact,thisdocumentis a succinct,well-writtendescriptionof the EU's 'role
concept' as a civilianforce,itsaimsand purposein international relations;but it
is not really a strategy.The ESS describeswell present-dayinternational
relationsas a profoundlydual system,made up of traditionalstateinteraction
and an international societybeing transformed by the forcesof globalization;it
thenproceedsto identifyinternational terrorism,the proliferationof weapons
of massdestruction, statefailureand organizedcrimeas 'key
regionalconflicts,
43See GrahamAllisonandPhilipZehkov,Theessence 2ndedn
theCubanMissileCrisis,
ofdecision:
explaining
(New York:Longman,I999), as thelocusclassicus
fordifferent on foreign
perspectives policyoutputs.
See alsoChristopherHill, Thechanging offoreign
politics (London:PalgraveMacmillan,
policy 2003).
44A secureEuropeina better
world.

792
Europeand thenewbalanceofglobalorder
threats',and sets out two strategicobjectives, namely building securityin
Europe's neighbourhoodand thepromotionof an international orderbased on
effectivemultilateralism. In its analysis,we easilyfindall the core elementsof
civilianpower: thecommitment to a fundamental transformation ofinternational
relationsand to the need to organizebroad-basedinternationalcooperation;
belief in the 'democratic peace' theory; support for non-violent conflict
resolutionand forall efforts to constrainthe use of force;supportforbroader
international and
participation sustainabledevelopment;and the promotionof
the rule of law and international institutions.
Yet the documentfailsto spell out the policy implicationsof its analysis.It
notes what the EU has done alreadyand identifiescriticalshortcomings(the
documentcallsfora 'more active', 'more capable' and 'more coherent'CFS);
but in sectionIII ('Policy implicationsforEurope') it presentsmainlya long list
of admonitions('The EU should ... We need ... This requires').The document
does littleto relateconcretemeans to specificends in given problemareas-
nor could it be expected to do this:the limitationslie not in the textor those
who produced it, but in the nature of the beast. An EU with its specific
characteristicsas actor cannot but have a perspectiveon its externalrelations
thatis equallypeculiarto it.
To summarize:the EU is not a power in internationalrelationsin the
traditionalsense of the word, and it is unlikelyto become one any timesoon.
But the implicationsof thisconclusion are ambivalent:in some contexts,the
EU seems to be lessinfluentialand lessrelevantto internationalorderthan a
traditionalpower, in othersit is simplydifferent froma traditionalpower but
equallyinfluential, while in yetothersit maybe moreinfluential thantraditional
powers. Where the EU is
clearly laggingbehindis withregardto its (growing,
but stillvery limited) abilityto project militarypower on its own, and in
coping with crisesinvolvingthe use of force.The principalreason forthose
deficienciesliesin whattheEU is, namelya communityof sovereignyetclosely
intertwineddemocraticstatesand peoples. For the same reason the EU may
have limitedabilityto exercisediplomaticleadership,to promotemajor inter-
nationalinitiatives,and generallyto pursue coherent,cohesive and proactive
policies with a clearpurpose.Where the EU maybe different fromtraditional
greatpowers in its behaviourbut equally effectiveis in mechanismsof global
governance,such as the GATT regimeand theWTO. Finally,theEU maybe
more effectiveand more influentialthan traditionalactors in post-modern
realmsof internationalrelations(a) where its abilityto transcendtraditional
conceptionsand inhibitionsof sovereignty can give it a competitiveadvantage,
and (b) where it attractsattentionand supportas a civilizationalmodel, such as
in the ideological and cultural dimensions of internationalrelations (for
example,the whole rangeof relationswith the Islamicworld). Europe's com-
petitiveadvantageswill come intoplaywherevereffective managementofinter-
nationalissueswill requirerestrictions on sovereignty and transfer
of authority
to supranationalinstitutions.

793
Hanns W. Maull

Where theEU as a civilianforcediffersfundamentally fromtraditional great

powers is in its dependence on others.Since the EU cannot impose order
throughsuperiorforce,and will not be able, because of what it is, to withdraw
behind the walls of a 'fortressEurope', it will need a benign international
environmentand partnerswilling to accommodate its specificstrengths and
weaknesses,and to work togetherwith the EU on the basis of a divisionof
labour. But the outlook forsuch a benign environment,with strongpartners
and vibrantinternational seemsat bestmixed.
institutions,

TheEUandthenewbalanceofglobalorder
Globalorder:thestateofthings
The presentstateof global orderis bafflingly complex and contradictory, but
thereare at leasttwo majorindicatorsthatsuggestthattheoveralltrendis in the
directionof entropy,ratherthan towardsa 'thicker'global order. The first
concernstheproliferation of actorsof all kindsin international
relations-from
internationalorganizations and states through NGOs and transnational
corporationsto individualsand informalgroupswithoutpublic office-who
are able to have a significant impacton international relationsand ultimately
the demographictransitionof the world population.45The second concerns
'globalization'-that is, the dynamicgrowthand accelerationof the quantities,
the reach,the depth and the impactof transnational interactionsof all kinds,
fromsecurityto culture46-includinglevelsof transnational economic activity,
technological innovation, environmentaldamage, internationaland trans-
nationalsecurity,and migration.Together,those indicatorssuggest,as James
Rosenau has arguedpersuasively, thatthe world since about the late I96os has
entereda period of 'turbulence'in the sense of mathematicalchaos theory.47
On balance, theirinteractionhas produced a diffusionratherthan a concen-
trationof power, at least in the sense of power as controlover outcomes by
individualactors.The implicationis thatthe level of power resourcesneeded
to create,sustainand enhance 'thick'orderwill have to be foundthroughthe
pooling of resourcesby different actorson a largescale. The mostcriticallevel
here is probablystillthe state,which remainsunchallengedas the sovereign
repositoryof authoritativedecision-making;but the need to develop in
addition formsof governancewith comparablepower and authorityat the
supranationallevel, both regionallyand globally,seems more urgentby the
day.

45HannsW. Maull,'WelcheAkteure beeinflussen in KarlKaiserandHans-Peter

dieWeltpolitik?', Schwarz,
(Bonn:Bundeszentrale
imneuenJahrhundert
eds,Weltpolitik ftir
poltische Bildung,2000), pp. 369-82.
46 See David Held,Anthony McGrew,David Goldblatt andJonathan Perraton,Globaltransformations:
economics
politics, andculture CA: Stanford
(Stanford, Press,I999).
University
47JamesN. Rosenau,Turbulence inworld a theory
politics: andcontinuity
ofchange (New York:Harvester,
I990).

794
Europeand thenewbalanceofglobalorder

Ambivalences
ofglobalization:
thedialectics
ofintegration
andidentity
The political implicationsof 'turbulencein world politics' (Rosenau) are
highlyambivalent.On the one hand,globalizationproducesa rapidlygrowing
demand forpoliticalregulationto allow individualsand societiesto reap the
potentialgains,protectthemselvesagainstthe risks,and shape the distribution
of costsand benefitsso as to sustainlegitimacyforexistingelementsof national,
regionaland global order.Much of thisdemandwill tendtowardsintegration,
thatis towardspolitical arrangements regulatingthe dynamicsof ever more
sophisticated formsoftrans-border divisionoflabour.Otherdemands,however,
will focuson protectionand security,on preservingexistingarrangements and
fostering existingidentities.The two dynamicsareprobablynot onlyinseparable
but also dialecticallyinterrelated:
pressuresforintegration produce resistanceto
change,and vice versa.
All thisplaces huge demandson politics.But globalizationnot only needs
politicalorder,it also tendsto corrode existingstructures of order;and since
the malleabilityof technologyand markets,and even of social structures, seems
greaterthanthatofpoliticsand culture,a situationeasilyariseswhere thespeed
of socio-economic change, and in its wake the growingdemand forgovern-
ance, exceeds the possibilitiesfor political, culturaland individual change.
Hence, a supply-demandgap forgovernancewill open, scissor-like,possibly
ever more widely. The most criticaland vulnerablefocus of thiswill be the
state,but problemswill also manifestthemselvesat otherlevels of governance.
Symptomsinclude the breakdownof monopolies of forceand the spreadof
patternsand structures of violence withinand between states-thatis, the so-
called 'new wars',48 and the new economics of violence.49
Today, the stateof European integrationis both a reflectionof the supply-
demand gap in governanceand a responseto it. We may be observingthe
beginningsof a 'melt-downin European politics'in the wake of the referen-
dumson the constitutional treatyin Franceand the Netherlands,50 as structural
problems of national governance in five of the six foundingmembers of the
European Communityinteractpowerfullywith the European level of politics,
which is drawn both into nationalproblemsand into efforts to contain and
solve them.The declininglevelsof supportforEuropean integration acrossthe
Union, and the debate about the alleged 'democraticdeficit'of the EU, are
furtherindicatorsthat the EU is embroiled in political malaise. But, as an
importantregionalframeworkof governance,theEU has also been challenged
by risingdemand forEuropean regulation-witness,for example, the single
marketprogramme,the introductionof the euro, the European regulationof

48See MaryKaldor,Newandoldwars:organised ina globalera(Stanford,

violence CA: Stanford
University
Press, I999).
49 See Kaldor,Newandoldwars;Miinkler,
Die neuenKriege;
alsoMichaelPughandNeil Cooper,eds,War
ina regional
economies context: (Boulder,CO andLondon:LynneRienner,
oftransformation
challenges
2004); Sabine Kurtenbachand Peter Lock, eds, Kriegeals (Uber-)Lebenswelten
(Bonn: Dietz, 2004).
50See Maull,'The melt-down
ofEuropeanpolitics'.

795
Hanns W. Maull

financialmarkets,and the attemptsto overcomeEuropean structural

problems
through the Lisbon Agenda.51

Responses
In manyof its activities,the EU also representsa responseto thisdilemmaof
governance,both with regardto the governanceof its own realm and in its
relationswithitsenvironment.
As the ESS proudlynotes,the EU has contributedimportantly to civilizing
international in
relations the past,and continuesto do so. How exactlyit does
this,however,is muchlessclearthantheEU oftenseemsto assume.The EU at
presentbenefitssignificantly frompast achievements,and its influencemay
well have peaked if the twin challengesof nationalstructural deficienciesand
enlargementare not addressedeffectively. Thus, the contributionof theEU to
the new balance of global order could stillvary significantly, dependingon
what the EU itselfdoes or does not do to strengthen itsown performanceand
itscapacityto exertinfluence.If the EU workswell internally and successfully
husbandsits potentialto influenceinternationalrelations,this will stimulate
cooperationfromothersand enhancethe performance of international
institu-
tions (and vice versa); conversely,a lack of cooperationby othersand further
erosionof theinstitutional infrastructureof globalorderwould probablyhave a
negativeimpacton the performance and influenceof the EU.
What could and should the EU tryto do underthosecircumstances?

* First,it shouldfocusitsefforts on itscomparativeadvantagesand strengths-

on what it is, ratherthan what it can do. Resolving structural problems
withinthe EU and its membercountriesthroughcoordinatedEuropean
efforts, managingtheimplicationsof enlargement, and adaptingthe consti-
tutionalframeworkfor policy-makingare all essentialnot only in their
own right,but also as preconditionsforretainingand enhancingthe EU's
influenceon international relations.A good European foreignpolicy will
have to begin at home, now more thanever.
* Second, European integrationwill need to findanswersto the pervasive
sense of a loss of purpose in Europe. The old vision of a zone of peace,
freedomand prosperity has runitscourse,and European integration needs
a new vision,a focusforidentification.
* Third,in itsexternalrelationsthe EU should emphasizestructural policies
to strengthen global governance,particularly the and
institutional norma-
tiveinfrastructure of a civilizedinternationalorder,over specificcoursesof
action and bilateral'strategies'(such as thosewithRussia and China).
* Fourth,the EU should focus its externalefforts on its immediateneigh-
bourhood, namelythe Balkans,the Mediterraneanregion (includingthe
s1 See AlasdairMurrayand Aurore Wanlin, The LisbonScorecard
V: can Europecompete?
(London: Centre
forEuropean Reform, 2005).

796
Europeand thenewbalanceofglobalorder

Israeli-Arabconflict),EasternEurope and perhapsalso Africa.Withinthis

regionalcontext,the strategicpriorityoughtto be on the developmentof
sustainable,effectiveand efficient statehood.The EU has alreadyinvolved
itselfdeeplyin effortsto sustainfragilestatehoodand rebuildfailedstates,
but theconceptual,politicaland practicalchallengesofnurturing statehood
throughconcertedinternational effortsremaindaunting.
* Fifth,the EU should develop its capacityto initiatepolicies,and concen-
trateon how to assemble coalitionsto launch, manage and implement
them cooperatively.The Union has unique potentialin this regardas a
widelytrustedand respectedpost-modernactor,but it needs to make sure
thatit is taken seriously.For example,in the contextof the Israeli-Arab
conflictits credibilitywas not enhanced by its willingnessto fund the
PalestinianNational Authoritybut neglect proper supervisionof those
fundsand finallymeeklyaccept the destructionof the European-financed
PNA stateinfrastructure by the IsraeliDefence Force, only to be invited
back in to financereconstruction. What the EU needs is a seriouspolicy
formulationand implementation capacity,forexampleto develop possible
alternativeapproaches to peace and stabilityin the Israeli-Palestinian
conflictin case the United Stateswithdrawsfromitsown efforts at conflict
resolutionor pursuesstrategies which,in the view of the EU, are doomed
to failure.The developmentof policy instruments for traditionalgreat
power policies,on theotherhand,shouldbe pursuedcautiouslyand witha
clearsenseofwhatcan and cannotbe achieved.The EU will not and should
not become a militarypower beyond what is presentlycontemplated,
because the militaryand politicalproblemsof projectingmilitarypower
would probablybe verydifficult to overcome in those instanceswhere it
could make a strategicdifference(say,with an earlymilitaryintervention
in the conflictbetweenSerbiaand Croatiain 1992, or in Rwanda in 1994).
This is not to deny thatthe EU needs, and should get, its own military
capabilitiesforcontingenciesat the lower end of the Petersbergtasks,and
that it should also organize itselfseriouslyfor collective self-defence.It
does not follow,however,thattheESDP needsto be enhancedto build up
Europe's capacity to cooperate with others on their terms. Similar
considerationsmustalso applyto othertraditionalmeansof foreignpolicy,
such as diplomaticmissionsand officialdevelopmentassistanceand other
financialtransfers:
theEU shouldtrywhatit can do best,not competewith
otherson theirown ground.

Europe's influencealone will not be enough to sustainand enhance a

civilized global order. The EU will stillneed others;it will need traditional
great power politics, with their greaterflexibilityto initiatenew policies,
provide crisismanagementand impose authority, ifnecessaryby force,against
the widespreadpropensityforviolence. Globalizationand diffusionof power
have alreadytransformed the world sufficiently
to make it essentiallypost-

797
HannsW. Maull

modem, thusputtinga premiumon indirect,structural meansto promoteand

enhance global order.52Yet pre-modemand modernformsof organizedvio-
lence and anarchyare stillsufficientlystrongand pervasiveto requireattention
and power in the traditionalsense.
The EU as a civilianforcethuswill have to depend on othersfortraditional
power-but also vice versa. This is why the alliance between Europe and
America in principleseems so attractive,so persuasive.America embodies
many aspectsof a civilianpower, and since the triumphof Wilsonianismin
America'sforeignpolicy cultureit has been keen to promote the transform-
ation of internationalrelations,basicallyalong the lines of the civilizatory
hexagon (but also withmanysubtextsof short-term interests:just like theEU).
The factthatundertheBush administrations Americahas turnedaway fromits
'civilian power' aspects in its foreignpolicy conduct, and thereforehas
jettisonedimportantfoundationsof its huge influence,will probablyturnout
to be one of thegreattragediesofinternational relationsin theearlytwenty-first
century.
Yet therehave also alwaysbeen fundamentaldifferences in the respective
role conceptsof America and the EU, and the 'grandstrategies'which have
flowed from them. America has long been, and shows every intentionof
remaining,a resolutely'modern' greatpower: it puts its own nationalsover-
eignty,conceived in terms of autonomy, above everythingelse and thus
refuses,out of principle,to submit to supranationalauthorityeven if that
authority hasbeen establishedby itself.Partof thatinsistenceon beinga modem
power has been America's attitudetowardsmilitarypower-its determination
to retainhuge militarysuperiorityand its belief in militaryintervention,if
necessary,on its own, as an effectiveway to 'fix' problems.Under the Bush
administrations, these traditionalfeaturesof Americanforeignpolicy culture
have been emphasizedstrongly, sometimesto the point of caricature,but they
will not go away easilyor quicklyeven aftera changein government.
Thus, while it would be splendidif the old transatlantic cooperationcould
be revived,thisdoes not seem verylikely.Of course, the EU should tryto
revitalizethis relationship-but not at any price. Cooperation will anyway
certainlybe possible, and indeed seems quite likely,on a more pragmatic,
business-likelevel: Europe and Americacontinueto sharemanyinterestsand
objectives,and theirthreatperceptionshave become closelyaligned.Yet the
relevanceof sharednormsand values has shrunk,while fundamentaldisagree-
mentsin theirrespectiveviews about thedesirableglobalorder,and about how
to get there,persist.
This leaves a gapinghole in the new balance of global order.Who else but
Americacould serveas a partnerto theEU? For theforeseeablefuture,one can
52 These two modes of governanceand theirrelationshipare exemplifiedin the shiftof stateactivityfrom
state(essentiallya modem formof politico-economic management)to the regulatory
the interventionist
state(which representsthe post-modem approach). See Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe
(London: Routledge, I996); Wolfgang Czada, Susanne Liitz and StefanMette, eds, RegulativePolitik:
ZahmungvonMarktund Technik(Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2003).

798
Europeandthenewbalance order
ofglobal
see no othercivilianpower of sufficient standing.Germany,the countrywhose
role conceptmostcloselyresemblesthatof an ideal-typecivilianpower, in the
pastplayedthisrole, and could do so again,perhapstogetherwith otherssuch
as France, the UK and Poland. But any single member country, even
Germany,is likelyto be overtaxedby theburdenofactingas thecivilianpower
to the EU's civilian force.Japan might have been such a partner,but its
willingnessto assumethatrole fullyhas alwaysbeen doubtful,and itswindow
of opportunityhas probablyalreadyclosed. Russia is also unlikelyto achieve
the statusor the resourcesit would need as a fullyfledgedcivilianor, much
more likely,greatpower. China and India in theirrespectiverole conceptsand
foreignpolicy culturesare both stillquintessentially moderngreatpowers,thus
resemblingthe US, and neitherseemsinclinedto providethe kind of support
to the EU which it would need to push forwardits project of civilizingthe
global order.Non-statecivilsocietyactorsare certainlynaturalalliesof theEU,
but are not sufficiently powerfulin themselvesto help providea new balance
forglobal order.
The best hope for Europe is that its ability to transcenda seemingly
insurmountablehistoryof enmityand interstateconflictthrougha powerful
social reconstruction of sovereignty will be takenup as a relevantexperiencein
otherpartsof the world, such as East Asia. There, it is particularly difficult
to
see how old regional conflictsand tensions,and the potentiallydisastrously
disruptiveimplicationsof socio-economic and culturaltransformation, can be
contained without a fundamental,integrativetransformation of interstate
relations.But thisis a long shot;so far,in East Asia theforcesofnationalismand
modernitystillseem very powerful,as the rise of nationalisttensionsin the
earlymonthsof 2005 betweenJapan,China and Korea has demonstrated. The
balance of global order thereforedoes not appear particularly auspicious for
Europe.

799