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TRANQUILINO CACHERO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB Co., INC., defendant and
Bernardino Guerrero and /. G. Madarang for plaintiff and
appellant.
appellant.
1.CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; BREACH OF; DAMAGES; AGAINST
Castaño & Ampil for the defendant and appellant.
WHOM THE ACTION MUST BE MAINTAINED TO RECOVER
MORAL DAMAGES.— FÉLIX, J.:
While under the law, employers are made responsible for the There is no dispute as to the following facts: on December 13,
damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of 1952, Atty. Tranquilino F. Cachero boarded a Yellow Taxicab,
their assigned task, plaintiff, in the present case, does not with plate No. 2159-52 driven by Gregorio Mira Abinion and
maintain his action against all the persons who might be liable owned by the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc. On passing
for the damages caused but on an alleged breach of contract of Oroquieta between Doroteo
carriage and against the defendant employer alone. However,
the defendant taxicab company has not committed any criminal José and Lope de Vega streets, Gregorio Mira Abinion bumped
offense resulting in physical injuries against the plaintiff. The said taxicab against a Meralco post, No. 1-4/387, with the result
one that committed the offense against plaintiff is the driver of that the cab was badly smashed and the plaintiff fell out of the
defendant's taxicab but he was not made party defendant to the vehicle to the ground, suffering thereby physical injuries, slight
case. Therefore, plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for in nature.
moral damages as his case does not come within the exception
of paragraph 1 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
The chauffeur was subsequently prosecuted by the City Fiscal
2.ID. ; ATTORNEY'S FEES ; WHEN MAY BE RECOVERED ; CASE and on February 26, 1953, upon his plea of guilty the Municipal
AT BAR.—The present case does not come under any of the Court of Manila sentenced him to suffer 1 month and 1 day of
exceptions enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, arresto mayor, and to pay the costs.
specially of paragraph 2 thereof, because defendant's failure to
meet its responsibility was not the cause that compelled the On December 17, 1952, Tranquilino F. Cachero addressed a
plaintiff to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interests. letter to the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., which was followed
The present action was instituted because plaintiff demanded by another of January 6, 1953, which reads as follows:
an exorbitant amount for moral damages and naturally the
"MANILA, January 6, 1953
defendant did not and could not yield to such demand. This is
neither a case that comes under paragraph 11 of said Article The MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB Co., INC.
because the Lower Court did not deem it just and equitable to
1338 Arlegui, Manila
award any amount for attorney's fees, on which point this Court
agrees. Dear Sirs:
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Macadaeg, J.
As you have been already advised by the letter dated December "(a) The sum of P72,050.20, the total sum of the itemized losses
17, 1952, on December 13, 1952, while I was a passenger of and/or damages under paragraph 7 of the complaint, with legal
your taxicab bearing plate No. 2159 and driven by your interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint;
chauffeur Gregorio Mira and through his negligence and the bad
(b) The sum of P5,000 as attorney's fee; and the costs of the suit;
condition of the said car, he bumped the same against the
and
pavement on the street (Oroquieta—between Doroteo Jose and
Lope de Vega streets, Manila) and hit the Meralco post on said Plaintiff further respectfully prays for such other and further
street, resulting in the smashing of the said' taxicab, and as a reliefs as the facts and the law pertaining to the case may
result thereof I was gravely injured and suffered and is still warrant."
suffering physical, mental and moral damages and not being
able to resume my daily calling. The defendant answered the complaint setting forth affirmative
defenses and a counterclaim for P930 as damages and praying
For the said damages, I hereby make a demand for the payment for the dismissal of plaintiff's action. After hearing the Court
of the sum of P79,245.65, covering expenses for transportation rendered decision only July 20, 1954, the dispositive part of
to the hospital for medical treatment, medicines, doctors bills, which is as follows:
actual monetary loss, moral, compensatory and exemplary
damages, etc., within 5 days from date of receipt hereof. "IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
I trust to hear from you on the matter within the period of 5 days sentencing the latter to pay the former the following: (1) For
above specified. medicine, doctor's fees for services rendered and transportation,
P700; (2) professional fee as attorney for the defendant in
Truly yours,
Criminal Case No. 364, 'People vs. Manolo Maddela et al., of the
(Sgd.) TRANQUILINO F. CACHERO Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, P3,000; (3)
professional fees as attorney for the defendant in Civil Case No.
2256 Int. B, Misericordia St.,
23891 of the Municipal Court of Manila, 'Virginia Tangulan vs.
Sta. Cruz, Manila" Leonel da Silva,' and for the taking of the deposition of Gabina
Angrepan in a case against the Philippine National Bank, P200;
(Exhibit K) and (4) moral damages in the amount of P2,000.
Defendant's counterclaim is hereby dismissed.
The Taxicab Co. to avoid expenses and time of litigation offered Defendant shall also pay the costs."
to settle the case amicably with plaintiff but the latter only
agreed to reduce his demand to the sum of P72,050.20 as his From this decision both parties appealed to Us, plaintiff limiting
only basis for settlement which, of course, was not accepted by his appeal to the part of the decision which refers to the moral
said company. So plaintiff instituted this action on February 2, damages awarded to him which he considered inadequate, and
1953, in the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying in the to the failure of said judgment to grant the attorney's fees asked
complaint that the defendant be condemned to pay him: for in the prayer of his complaint. Defendant in turn alleges that
the trial Court erred in awarding to the plaintiff the following:
"(1) P700—for medicine, doctor's fees and transportation plaintiffs body (see Exhibit E), which strap was not removed
expenses; until after a period of six weeks had elapsed. Dr. Modesto
Purísima, a private practitioner, testified that he advised, and
(2) P3,000—as supposedly unearned full professional fees as
treated plaintiff from December 14, 1952, to the end of March
attorney for the defendant in Criminal Case No. 364, 'People vs.
(1953). Plaintiff was never hospitalized for treatment of the
Manolo Maddela et al.';
injuries he received in said accident.
(3) P200—as supposedly unearned professional fees as attorney
Counsel for the defendant delves quite extensively on these
for the defendant in Civil Case No. 23891 of the Manila
injuries. He says in his brief the following:
Municipal Court, 'Virginia Tangulan vs. Leonel de Silva', and for
failure to take the deposition of a certain Gabina Angrepan in an "Just what is a subluxation? Luxation is another term for
unnamed case; and dislocation (Dorland, W.A.N., The American Illustrated Medical
Dictionary (13th ed.), p. 652), and hence, a subluxation is an
(4) P2,000—as moral damages, amounting to the grand total of
incomplete or partial dislocation (Ibid., p. 1115). While a
P5,900, these amounts being very much greater than what
dislocation is the displacement of a bone or bones from its or
plaintiff deserves."
their normal setting (and, therefore, applicable and occurs only
In connection with his appeal, plaintiff calls attention to the to joints and not to rigid or non-movable parts of the skeletal
testimonies of Dr. Modesto S. Purísima and of Dr. Francisco system) (Ibid., p. 358; Christopher, F., A Textbook of Surgery
Aguilar, a member of the staff of the National Orthopedic (5th ed.), p. 342), it should be distinguished from a fracture
Hospital, which he considers necessary as a basis for which is a break or rupture in a bone or cartilage, usually due
ascertaining not only the physical sufferings undergone by him, to external violence (Christopher, F., A Textbook of Surgery (5th
but also for determining the adequate compensation for moral ed.), p. 194; Dorland, W.A.N., The American Illustrated Medical
damages that he should be awarded by reason of said accident. Dictionary (13th ed.), p. 459). Because, unlike fractures which
may be partial (a crack in the bone) or total (a complete break in
The exact nature of plaintiff's injuries, their degree of the bone), there can be no half-way situations with regard to
seriousness and the period of his involuntary disability can be dislocations of the shoulder joint (the head or ball of the
determined by the medical certificate (Exhibit D) issued by the humerus—the humerus is the bone from the elbow to the
National Orthopedic Hospital on December 16, 1952, and the shoulder) must be either inside the socket of the scapula or
testimonies of Dr. Francisco Aguilar, physician in said hospital, shoulder blade (in which case there is no dislocation) or out of
and of Dr. Modesto Purísima, a private practitioner. The medical the latter (in which event there is a dislocation), to denote a
certificate (Exhibit D) lists: (a) a subluxation of the right condition where due to external violence, the muscles and
shoulder joint; (b) a contusion on the right chest; and (c) a ligaments connecting the humerus to the scapula have
"suspicious fracture" of the upper end of the right humerus. Dr. subjected to strain intense enough to produce temporary
Aguilar who issued the medical certificate admitted, however, distension or lessening of their tautness and consequently
with regard to the "suspicious fracture", that in his opinion with resulting in the loosening or wrenching of the ball of the
(the aid of) the x-ray there was no fracture. According to this humerus from its snug fit in the socket of the scapula, by using
doctor plaintiff went to the the terms subluxation or partial dislocation (as used in the
National Orthopedic Hospital at least six times during the period medical certificate), is to fall into a misnomer—a term often used
from December 16, 1952, to April 7, 1953; that he strapped by chiropractors' and by those who would want to sound
impressive, but generally unfavored by the medical profession. healed (Christopher, F., A Textbook of Surgery, pp. 343 and
To describe the above condition more aptly, the medical 344). No evidence was submitted that plaintiff ever received the
profession usually employs the expression luxatio im perfecta, latter kind of treatment. Dr. Purísima even declared that after
or, in simple language, a sprain (Dorland, W.A.N., The American the plaintiff's first visit to the Orthopedic Hospital the latter
Illustrated Medical Dictionary (13th ed.), p. 652). The condition informed him that there was no fracture or dislocation (t.s.n., p.
we have described is a paraphrase of the definition of a sprain. 26). Dr. Purísima's statement is the truth of the matter as we
Plaintiff suffered this very injury (a sprained or wrenched have already explained—joints of the shoulder being only
shoulder joint) and a cursory scrutiny of his x-ray plates subject to total dislocation (due to their anatomical design), not
(Exhibits A and B) by a qualified orthopedic surgeon or by a to partial ones, and any injury approximating dislocation but
layman with a picture or x-ray plate of a normal shoulder joint not completely, it being classified as mere sprains, slight or bad.
(found in any standard textbook on human anatomy; the one we
The second and last injury plaintiff sustained was a contusion.
used was Scheffer, J.P., Morris' Human Anatomy (10 ed., p. 194)
What is a contusion? It is just a high flown expression for a
for comparison will bear out our claim.
bruise or the act of bruising (Dorland, W.A.N., The American
Treatment for a sprain is by the use of adhesive or elastic Illustrated Medical Dictionary (13th ed., p. 290). No further
bandage, elevation of the joint, heat, effleurage and later discussion need be made on this particular injury since the
massage (Christopher, F., A Textbook of Surgery (5th ed., p. nature of a bruise is of common knowledge (it's a bit
116). The treatment given to the plaintiff was just exactly that uncomfortable but not disabling- unless it occurs on movable
Dr. Aguilar bandaged (strapped) plaintiff's right shoulder and parts like the fingers or elbow, which is not the case herein
chest (t.s.n., p. 31) in an elevated position (with the forearm having occurred in the right chest) and the kind of medical
horizontal to the chest (see photograph, Exhibit E), and certain treatment or help it deserves is also well known." (pp. 10-14,
vitamins were prescribed for him (t.s.n., p. 131). He also defendant-appellant's brief).
underwent massage for some time by Drs. Aguilar and Purísima.
The trial Judge undoubtedly did not give much value to the
The medicines and appurtenances to treatment purchased by
testimonies of the doctors when in the statement of facts made
plaintiff from the Orthopedic Hospital, Botica Boie and Metro
in his decision he referred to the physical injuries received by
Drug Store were, by his own admission, adhesive plaster,
the plaintiff as slight in nature and the latter is estopped from
bandage, gauze, oil and 'tintura arnica' (t.s.n., p. 3—
discussing the same in order to make them appear as serious,
continuation of transcript), and Dr. Purísima also prescribed
because in the statement of facts made in his brief as appellant,
'Numotizin', a heat generating ointment (t.s.n., p. 23), all of
he says the f ollowing:
which are indicated for a sprain, and by their nature, can cure
nothing more serious than a sprain anyway. Fractures and true "The facts of the case as found by the lower court in its decision,
dislocations cannot be cured by the kind of treatment and with the permission of this Honorable Court, we respectfully
medicines which plaintiff received. A true dislocation, for quote them hereunder as our STATEMENT OF FACTS for the
instance, is treated by means of reduction through traction of purpose of this appeal."
the arm until the humeral head returns to the proper position
in the scapular socket (pulling the arm at a 60 degree angle and! Before entering into a discussion of the merits of plaintiff's
guiding the ball of the humerus into proper position, in its appeal, We will say a few words as to the nature of the action on
socket) while the patient is under deep anaesthesia, and then, which his demand for damages is predicated.
completely immobilizing the part until the injured capsule has
(8) Malicious prosecution;
"The nature of an action as in contract or in tort is determined (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
from the essential elements of the complaint, taken as a whole,
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29,
in the case of doubt a construction to sustain the action being
30, 32, 34 and 35.
given to it.
* * * * * * *"
While the prayer for relief or measure of damages sought does
not necessarily determine the character of the action, it may be Of the cases enumerated in the just quoted Article 2219 only the
material in the determination of the question and therefore first two may have any bearing on the case at bar. We find,
entitled to consideration and in cases of doubt will often however, with regard to the first that the defendant herein has
determine the character of the action and indeed there are not committed in connection with this case any "criminal offense
actions whose character is necessarily determined thereby." (1 resulting in physical injuries". The one that committed the
C.J.S. 1100) offense against the plaintiff is Gregorio Mira, and that is why he
has been already prosecuted and punished therefor. Although
A mere perusal of plaintiffs complaint will show that his action
(a) owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
against the defendant is predicated on an alleged breach of
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
contract of carriage, i.e., the failure of the defendant to bring him
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on
"safely and without mishaps" to his destination, and it is to be
the occasion of their functions; (b) employers are likewise liable
noted that the chauffeur of defendant's taxicab that plaintiff
for damages caused by their employees and household helpers
used when he received the injuries involved herein, Gregorio
acting within the scope of their assigned task (Article 2180 of
Mira, has not even been made a party defendant to this case.
the Civil Code); and (c) employers and corporations engaged in
Considering, therefore, the nature of plaintiffs action in this any kind of industry are subsidiarily civilly liable for felonies
case, is he entitled to compensation for moral damages? Article committed by their employees in the discharge of their duties
2219 of the Civil Code says the following: , (Art. 103, Revised Penal Code), plaintiff herein does not maintain
this action under the provisions of any of the articles of the codes
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
just mentioned and against all the persons who might be liable
and analogous cases:
for the damages caused, but as a result of an admitted breach
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; of contract of carriage and against the defendant employer
alone. We, therefore, hold that the case at bar does not come
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; within the exception of paragraph 1, Article 2219 of the Civil
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts; Code.
(4) Adultery or concubinage; The present complaint is not based either on a "quasidelict
causing physical injuries" (Art. 2219, par. 2, of the Civil Code).
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; From the report of the Code Commission on the new Civil Code
We copy the following:
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
""A question of nomenclature confronted the Commission. After Article 1903 is not applicable to obligations arising EX
a careful deliberation, it was agreed to use the term 'quasi-delict' CONTRACTU, but only to extra-contractual obligations—or to
for those obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to
quasicontracts, or criminal offenses. They are known in Spanish CULPA AQUILIANA and not to CULPA CONTRACTUAL."
legal treatises as 'culpa aquiliana', 'culpa-extra-contractual' or
The decisions in the cases of Castro vs. Acro Taxicab (82 Phil.,
'cuasidelitos'. The phrase 'culpa-extra-contractual' or its
359, 46 Off. Gaz., No. 5, p. 2023) ; Lilius et al. vs. Manila
translation 'extra-contractual fault' was eliminated because it
Railroad, (59 Phil. 758) and others, wherein moral damages were
did not exclude quasi-contractual or penal obligations. 'Aquilian
awarded to the plaintiffs, are not applicable to the case at bar
fault' might have been selected, but it was thought inadvisable
because said decisions were rendered before the effectivity of the
to refer to so ancient a law as the 'Lex Aquilia'. So 'quasi-delicts'
new Civil Code (August 30, 1950) and for the further reason that
was chosen, which more nearly corresponds to the Roman Law
the complaints filed therein were based on different causes of
classification of obligations, and is in harmony with the nature
action.
of this kind of liability." "The Commission also thought of the
possibility of adopting the word 'tort' from Anglo-American law. In view of the foregoing the sum of P2,000 awarded as moral
But 'tort' under that system is much broader than the Spanish- damages by the trial Court has to be eliminated, for under the
Philippine concept of obligations arising- from non-contractual law it is not a compensation awardable in a case like the one at
negligence. 'Tort' in Anglo-American jurisprudence includes not bar.
only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as
assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the As to plaintiff's demand for P5,000 as attorney's fees, the Civil
general plan of the Philippine legal system, intentional and Code provides the following:
malicious acts are governed by the Penal Code, although certain "ART. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and
exceptions are made in the Project." (Report of the Code expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be
Commission, pp. 161-162). recovered, except:
In the case of Cangco vs. Manila Railroad, 38 Phil. 768, We (1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
established the distinction between obligation derived from
negligence and obligation as a result of a breach of a contract. (2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
Thus, We said: plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his interest;
"It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability
of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the (3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the
obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered plaintiff;
arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding
failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That
against the plaintiff;
is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially
in the legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
the negligence of its servants, imposed by Article 1903 of the refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and
Civil Code (Art. 2180 of the new), which can be rebutted by proof demandable claim;
of the exercise of due care in their selection or supervision.
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, the amount of which was not disclosed, though it was
laborers and skilled workers; incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish how much he had been
paid of said fees;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and
employer's liability laws; (3) Approves the award of P200 as unearned professional fees as
attorney for the defendant in Civil Case No. 238191 of the
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from
Municipal Court of Manila whom plaintiff was unable to
a crime;
represent, and for the latter's failure to take the deposition of
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; one Agripina Angrepan due to the automobile accident referred
to in this case.
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and
equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should Before closing this decision We deem it convenient to quote the
be recovered. following passage of defendant's brief as appellant:
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must "Realizing its obligation under its contract of carriage with the
be reasonable." plaintiff, and because the facts of the case, as have been shown,
mark it as more proper for the Municipal Court only, the
The present case does not come under any of the exceptions defendant, to avoid the expense and time of litigation, offered to
enumerated in the preceding article, specially of paragraph 2 settle the case amicably with plaintiff, but the latter refused and
thereof, because defendant's failure to meet its responsibility insisted on his demand for P72,050.20 (Exhibit K) as the only
was not the cause that compelled the plaintiff to litigate or to basis for settlement, thus adding a clearly petty case to the
incur expenses to protect his interests. The present action was already overflowing" desk of the Honorable Members of this
instituted because plaintiff demanded an exorbitant amount for Court. We admire and respect at all times a man for standing up
moral damages (P60,000) and naturally the defendant did not and fighting for his rights, and when said right consists in
and could not yield to such demand. This is neither a case that injuries sustained due to a breach of a contract of carriage with
comes under paragraph 11 of Article 2208 because the Lower us, sympathy and understanding are added thereto. But when
Court did not deem it just and equitable to award any amount a person starts demanding P72,050.20 for a solitary bruise and
for attorney's fees. As We agree with the trial Judge on this point, sprain, injuries for which the trial court, even at its generous
We cannot declare that he erred for not awarding to plaintiff any although erroneous best, could' only grant P5,900, then respect
such fees in this case. and sympathy give way to something else. It is time to fight, for,
Coming now to the appeal of the defendant, the Court, after due in our humble opinion, there is nothing more loathsome nor
consideration of the evidence appearing on record: truly worthy of condemnation than one who uses his injuries for
other purposes than just rectification. If plaintiff's claim is
(1) Approves the award of P700 for medicine, doctors' fees and granted, it would be a blessing, not a misfortune, to be injured."
transportation expenses; (p. 34-35)
(2) Reduces the award of P3,000 as attorney's fees to the sum of This case was instituted by a lawyer who, as an officer of the
P2,000, as Manolo Maddela, defendant in Criminal Case No. 364 courts, should be the first in helping Us in the administration of
of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya testified that he justice, and after going over the record
has already paid to plaintiff part of the latter's fees of P3,000,
of P72,0 50.20 for a subluxation of the right humerus bone and
an insignificant contusion in the chest, has not even the
semblance of reasonableness. As a matter of fact, Dr. Aguilar
himself said that the x-ray plates (Exhibits A, B and C) "did not
show anything significant except that it shows a slight
subluxation of the right shoulder, and that there is a suspicious
fracture", which ultimately he admitted not to exist. The plaintiff
himself must have felt embarrassed by his own attitude when
after receiving defendant's brief as appellant, he makes in his
brief as appellee the categorical statement that he "DOES NOT
NOW INSIST NOR PRETEND IN THE LEAST to col-lect from the
defendant all the damages he had claimed in his complaint, but
instead he is submitting his case to the sound discretion of the
Honorable Court for the award of a reasonable and equitable
damages allowable by law, to compensate the plaintiff of the
suffering and losses he had undergone and incurred because of
the accident oftentimes mentioned in this brief in which plaintiff
was injured" (p. 17-18). This acknowledgment comes too late, for
plaintiff has already deprived the Court of Appeals of the
occasion to exercise its appellate jurisdiction over this case
which he recklessly dumped to this Court. We certainly cannot
look with favor at this attitude of plaintiff.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by
reducing the amount awarded as unearned professional fees
from P3,000 to P2,000 and by eliminating the moral
damages of P2,000 awarded by the Lower Court to the
plaintiff. Said decision is in all other respects affirmed,
without pronouncement as to -costs. It is so ordered.
Almazán & Ereñeta for respondent. A point to be further remarked is petitioner's contention that on
March 21, 1953, or one day before the accident happened, she
REYES, J. B. L., J.: allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a
Defendant-petitioner Paz Fores brings this petition for review of certain Carmen Sackerman.
the decision of the Court of Appeals (C. A. Case No. 1437-R) The initial problem raised by the petitioner in this appeal may
awarding to the plaintiff-respondent Ireneo Miranda the sums of be formulated thus—"Is the approval of the Public Service
P5,000 by way of actual damages and counsel fees, and P10,000 Commission necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle
as moral damages, with costs. even without conveying therewith the authority to operate the
same ?" Assuming the dubious sale to be a fact, the Court of
Appeals answered the query in the affirmative. The ruling should
be upheld. Section 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth those cases, the operator did not convey, by lease or by sale, the
Act No. 146) provides: vehicle independently of his rights under the franchise. This line
of reasoning does not find support in the law. The provisions of
"SEC. 20. Subject to established limitations and exceptions and
the statute are clear and prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, or
saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any
encumbrance of the property, franchise, certificate, privileges or
public service or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof,
rights, or any part thereof of the owner or operator of the public
without the previous approval and authority of the Commission
service without approval or authorization of the Public Service
previously had—
Commission. The law was designed primarily for the protection
(g) To sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its property, of the public interest; and until the approval of the Public Service
franchises, certificates, privileges, or rights, or any part thereof; Commission is obtained the vehicle is, in contemplation of law,
or merge or consolidate its property, franchises, privileges or still under the service of the owner or operator standing in the
rights, or any part thereof, with those of any other public service. records of the Commission which the public has a right to rely
The approval herein required shall be given, after notice to the upon.
public and after hearing the persons interested at a public
The proviso contained in the aforequoted law, to the effect that
hearing, if it be shown that there are just and reasonable
nothing therein shall be construed "to prevent the transaction
grounds for making the mortgage or encumbrance, for liabilities
from being negotiated or completed before its approval", means
of more than one year maturity, or the sale, alienation, lease,
only that the sale without the required approval is still valid and
merger, or consolidation to be approved and that the same are
binding between the parties (Montoya vs. Ignacio, supra). The
not detrimental to the public interest, and in case of a sale, the
phrase "in the ordinary course of its business" found in the other
date on which the same is to be consummated shall be fixed in
proviso "or to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by any public
the order of approval: Provided, however, That nothing herein
service of any of its property". as correctly observed by the lower
contained shall be construed to prevent the transaction from
court, could not have been intended to include the sale of the
being negotiated or completed before its approval or to prevent
vehicle itself, but at most may refer only to such property that
the sale, alienation, or lease by any public service of any of its
may be conceivably disposed or by the carrier in the ordinary
property in the ordinary course of its business."
course of its business, like junked equipment or spare parts.
Interpreting the effects of this particular provision of law, we
The case of Indalecio de Torres vs. Vicente Ona (63 Phil., 594,
have held in the recent cases of Montoya vs. Ignacio,* 50 Off.
597) is enlightening; and there, it was held:
Gaz. No. 1, p. 108; Timbol vs. Osias, et al., G. R. No. L-7547,
April 30, 1955, and Medina vs. Cresencia, 99 Phil., 506; 52 Off. "Under the law, the Public Service Commission has not only
Gaz. No. 10, p. 4606, that a transfer contemplated by the law, if general supervision and regulation of, but also full jurisdiction
made without the requisite approval of the Public Service and control over all public utilities including the property,
Commission, is not effective and binding in so far as the equipment and facilities used, and the property rights and
responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in relation to franchises enjoyed by every individual and company engaged in
the public is concerned. Petitioner assails, however, the the performance of a public service in the sense this phrase is
applicability of these rulings to the instant case, contending that used in the Public Service Act or Act No. 3108 (sec. 1308). By
in virtue of the provisions
of said Act, motor vehicles used in the performance of a service, Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent,
as the transportation of freight from one point to another, have the same must be discarded. We have repeatedly ruled (Cachero
to this date been considered—and they cannot but be so vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc., 101 Phil., 523; 54 Off. Gaz.,
consideredpublic service property; and, by reason of its own [26], 6599; Necesito, et al vs. Parás, 104 Phil., 75; 56 Off. Gaz.,
nature, a TH truck, which means that the operator thereof [23] 4023, that moral damages are not recoverable in damage
places it at the disposal of anybody who is willing to pay a rental actions predicated on a breach of the contract of transportation,
for its use, when he desires to transfer or carry his effects, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which
merchandise or any other cargo from one place to another, is provide as follows:
necessarily a public service property." (Emphasis supplied)
"ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
Of course, this Court has held in the case of Bachrach Motor Co. and analogous cases:
vs. Zamboanga Transportation Co., 52 Phil., 244, that there may
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
be a nunc pro tunc authorization which has the effect of having
the approval retroact to the date of the transfer; but such (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
outcome cannot prejudice rights intervening in the meantime. It
appears that no such approval was given by the Commission ART. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
before the accident occurred. awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule
The P10,000 actual damages awarded by the Court of First applies to breaches of contract where the def endant acted f
Instance of Manila were reduced by the Court of Appeals to only raudulently or in bad faith."
P2,000, on the ground that a review of the records failed to
disclose a sufficient basis for the trial court's appraisal, since By contrasting the provisions of these two articles it immediately
the only evidence presented on this point consisted of becomes apparent that:
respondent's bare statement that his expenses and loss of (a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation)
income amounted to P20,000. On the other hand, "it cannot be proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e., wanton or deliberately
denied," the lower court said, "that appellee (respondent) did injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral
incur expenses." It is well to note further that respondent was a damages; and
painter by profession and a professor of Fine Arts, so that the
amount of P2,000 awarded cannot be said to be excessive (see (b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in
Arts. 2224 and 2225, Civil Code of the Philippines). The the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in Art. 2219; not
attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000 also awarded to the only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages
respondent are assailed on the ground that the Court of First that are caused by contractual breach, but because the
Instance did not provide for the same, and since no appeal was definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly
interposed by said respondent, it was allegedly error for the excludes the cases where there is a "preexisting contractual
Court of Appeals to award them motu proprio. Petitioner fails to relation between the parties."
note that attorney's fees are included in the concept of actual
"ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
damages under the Civil Code and may be awarded whenever
another, there being f ault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
the court deems it just and equitable (Art. 2208, Civil Code of
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
the Philippines). We see no reason to alter these awards.
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it was due
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter." to an unforseen event or to force majeure (Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768, 777). Moreover, the carrier, unlike
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under
in suits for quasi-delict, may not escape liability by proving that
consideration is -a mishap resulting in the death of a passenger,
it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly
its employees (Art, 1759, new Civil Code; Cangco vs. Manila
subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that entitles the spouse,
Railroad Co., supra; Prado vs. Manila Electric Co., 51 Phil., 900).
descendants and ascendants of the deceased passenger to
"demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as the
death of the deceased" (Necesito vs. Parás, 104 Phil., 84, codal concept of quasi-delict .as essentially extra contractual
Resolution on motion to reconsider, September 11, 1958). But negligence, compel us to differentiate between action ex
the exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident contractu, and actions quasi ex delicto, and prevent us from
that where the injured passenger does not die, moral damages viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously
are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty embodying an action on tort. Neither can this action be taken as
of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear that the mere one to enforce on employee's liability under Art. 103 of the
carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute or Revised Penal Code, since the responsibility is not alleged to be
justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the subsidiary, nor is there on record any averment or proof that the
carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such driver of appellant was insolvent. In fact, he is not even made a
malice to support the award of moral damages by the Court of party to the suit.
Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract,
It is also suggested that a carrier's violation of its engagement to
therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the
safely transport the passenger involves a breach of the
defendant, as required by Art. 2220, would be to violate the clear
passenger's confidence, and therefore should be regarded as a
provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial
breach of contract in bad faith, justifying recovery of moral
legislation.
damages under Art. 2220. This theory is untenable, for under it
The Court of Appeals has invoked our rulings in Castro vs. Acro the carrier would always be deemed in bad faith, in every case
Taxicab Co., R. G. No. 49155, December 14, 1948 and Layda vs. its obligation to the passenger is infringed, and it would be never
Court of Appeals, 90 Phil., 724; but these doctrines were accountable for simple negligence; while under the law (Art.
predicated upon our former law of damages, before judicial 1756). the presumption is that common carriers acted
discretion in fixing them became limited by the express negligently (and not maliciously), and Art. 1762 speaks of
provisions of the new Civil Code (previously quoted). Hence, the negligence of the common carrier.
aforesaid rulings are now inapplicable.
"ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
Upon the other hand, the advantageous position of a party suing common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
a carrier for breach of the contract of transportation explains, to acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
some extent, the limitations imposed by the new Code on the extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
amount of the recovery. The action for breach of contract
"ART. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does
imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon
not bar recovery of damages for his death or injuries, if the
mere proof of injury to the passenger; that latter is relieved from
the duty to establish the fault of the carrier, or of his employees,
proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier,
but the amount of damages shall be equitably reduced."
On June 3, 1994, they recovered their baggages and discovered “SO ORDERED.
that some of its contents were destroyed and soiled. “Given this 10th day of June, 1996 at Makati City.
Claiming that they “suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights “ERNA FALLORAN ALIPOSA
and great damage” because of Northwest’s failure to inform them
in advance that their baggages would not be loaded on the same “Judge”
flight they boarded and because of their delayed arrival, they
Respondent Northwest Airlines, Inc. appealed from the trial
demanded from Northwest Airlines compensation for the
court’s decision to the Court of Appeals contending that the
damages they suffered. On June 15, 1994 and June 22, 1994,
court a quo erred in finding it guilty of breach of contract of
petitioner sent demand letters to Northwest Airlines, but the
carriage and of willful misconduct and awarded damages which
latter did not respond. Hence, the filing of the case with the
had no basis in fact or were otherwise excessive.
regional trial court.
On September 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
In its answer to the complaint, respondent Northwest Airlines
decision partially granting the appeal by deleting the award of
did not deny that the baggages of petitioners were not loaded on
moral and exemplary damages and reducing the attorney’s fees,
Northwest Flight 29. Petitioner’s baggages could not be carried
specifically providing that:
on the same flight because of “weight and balance restrictions.”
However, the baggages were loaded in another Northwest “WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is hereby
Airlines flight, which arrived in the evening of June 2, 1994. GRANTED partially. The Decision of the lower court dated June
10, 1996 is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of
When petitioner received her baggages in damaged condition,
moral and exemplary damages is deleted and the amount of
Northwest offered to either (1) reimburse the cost or repair of the
attorney’s fees is reduced to ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00).
bags; or (2) reimburse the cost for the purchase of new bags,
upon submission of receipts. “No pronouncement as to costs.
“SO ORDERED.” “Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence,
it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
The issue is whether respondent is liable for moral and
conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through
exemplary damages for willful misconduct and breach of the
some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of
contract of air carriage.
fraud.”
The petition is without merit.
“Where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant
We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent was not airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith,
guilty of willful misconduct. “For willful misconduct to exist, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable
there must be a showing that the acts complained of were consequences of the breach of obligation which the parties had
impelled by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In that case, such
disregard of one’s rights. It must be evidenced by a flagrantly or liability does not include moral and exemplary damages.”11
shamefully wrong or improper conduct.”
Consequently, we have no reason to reverse the decision of the
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, there was nothing in the Court of Appeals.
conduct of respondent which showed that they were motivated
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for lack of
by malice or bad faith in loading her baggages on another plane.
merit. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Due to weight and balance restrictions, as a safety measure,
Appeals deleting, however, the award of attorney’s fees.
respondent airline had to transport the baggages on a different
flight, but with the same expected date and time of arrival in the No costs.
Philippines. As aptly explained by respondent:
SO ORDERED.
“To ensure the safety of each flight, Northwest’s personnel
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-
determine every flight’s compliance with “weight and balance
Santiago, JJ., concur.
restrictions.” They check the factors like weight of the aircraft
used for the flight gas input, passenger and crew load, baggage Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
weight, all in relation to the wind factor anticipated on the flight.
If there is an overload, i.e., a perceived safety risk, the aircraft’s Notes.—In determining the amount of compensatory damages in
breach of contract involving misplaced luggage, it is vital that the
load will be reduced by off-loading cargo, which will then be
claimant satisfactorily prove during the trial the existence of the
placed on the next available flight.” factual basis of the damages and its causal connection to defendant’s
It is admitted that respondent failed to deliver petitioner’s acts. (British Airways vs. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 450 [1998])
luggages on time. However, there was no showing of malice in In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the
such failure. By its concern for safety, respondent had to ship breach must be wanton and deliberately injurious or the one
the baggages in another flight with same date of arrival. responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad faith. (Cervantes
vs. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 25 [1999])
Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly held that respondent did
not act in bad faith.9
Tan vs. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 327 SCRA 263, G.R. No. 135802
March 3, 2000
Alitalia vs. Intermediate Appellate Court been applied, or ignored, depending on the peculiar facts
presented by each case.
G.R. No. 71929. December 4, 1990.*
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Nominal Damages; Private
ALITALIA, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
respondent is entitled to an award of nominal damages for the
COURT and FELIPA E. PABLO, respondents.
injury she suffered as a result of the carrier's failure to deliver her
Transportation; Common Carriers; The Warsaw Convention does luggage on time.—In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise
not operate as an absolute limit of the extent of an airline's improper conduct may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner
liability; it does not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches airline; and Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to her,
of contract by the carrier, or misconduct of its employees, or for belatedly, it is true, but without appreciable damage. The fact
some particular or exceptional type of damage.—The Convention is, nevertheless, that some special species of injury was caused
does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the to Dr. Pablo because petitioner ALITALIA misplaced her baggage
instances of an airline's liability, or as an absolute limit of the and failed to deliver it to her at the time appointed—a breach of
extent of that liability. Such a proposition is not borne out by its contract of carriage, to be sure—with the result that she was
the language of the Convention, as this Court has now, and at unable to read the paper and make the scientific presentation
an earlier time, pointed out. Moreover, slight reflection readily (consisting of slides, autoradiograms or films, tables and
leads to the conclusion that it should be deemed a limit of tabulations) that she had painstakingly labored over, at the
liability only in those cases where the cause of the death or prestigious international conference, to attend which she had
injury to person, or destruction, loss or damage to property or traveled hundreds of miles, to her chagrin and embarrassment
delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended by any and the disappointment and annoyance of the organizers. She
wilful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise felt, not unreasonably, that the invitation for her to participate
improper conduct on the part of any official or employee for at the conference, extended by the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of
which the carrier is responsible, and there is otherwise no Atomic Energy in Food and Agriculture of the United Nations,
special or extraordinary form of resulting injury. The was a singular honor not only to herself, but to the University of
Convention's provisions, in short, do not "regulate or exclude the Philippines and the country as well, an opportunity to make
liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier" or some sort of impression among her colleagues in that field of
misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular scientific activity. The opportunity to claim this honor or
or exceptional type of damage. Otherwise, "an air carrier would distinction was irretrievably lost to her because of Alitalia's
be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its breach of its contract. Apart from this, there can be no doubt
absolute refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a contract of that Dr. Pablo underwent profound distress and anxiety, which
carriage, which is absurd." Nor may it for a moment be supposed gradually turned to panic and finally despair, from the time she
that if a member of the aircraft complement should inflict some learned that her suitcases were missing up to the time when,
physical injury on a passenger, or maliciously destroy or damage having gone to Rome, she finally realized that she would no
the latter's property, the Convention might successfully be longer be able to take part in the conference. As she herself put
pleaded as the sole gauge to determine the carrier's liability to it, she "was really shocked and distraught and confused."
the passenger. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify Certainly, the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo
the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to cannot under the circumstances be restricted to that prescribed
a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transport of baggage.
by said Convention. It is in this sense that the Convention has She is not, of course, entitled to be compensated for loss or
damage to her luggage. As already mentioned, her baggage was PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the then
ultimately delivered to her in Manila, tardily but safely. Intermediate Appellate Court.
She is however entitled to nominal damages—which, as the law The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
says, is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which
Santiago & Santiago for petitioner.
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of Alfredo L. Bentulan for private respondent.
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered—and this Court
agrees that the respondent Court of Appeals correctly set the NARVASA, J.:
amount thereof at P40,000.00. Dr. Felipa Pablo—an associate professor in the University of the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A prayer "for such other and Philippines,1 and a research grantee of the Philippine Atomic
further just and equitable relief in the premises" is broad enough Energy Agency—was invited to take part at a meeting of the
to comprehend an application as well for nominal damages.—As Department of Research and Isotopes of the Joint FAO-IAEA
to the purely technical argument that the award to her of such Division of Atomic Energy in Food and Agriculture of the United
nominal damages is precluded by her omission to include a Nations in Ispra, Italy.2 She was invited in view of her
specific claim therefor in her complaint, it suffices to draw specialized knowledge in "foreign substances in food and the
attention to her general prayer, following her plea for moral and agriculture environment." She accepted the invitation, and was
exemplary damages and attorney's fees, "for such other and then scheduled by the organizers, to read a paper on "The Fate
further just and equitable relief in the premises," which certainly of Radioactive Fusion Products Contaminating Vegetable
is broad enough to comprehend an application as well for Crops."3 The program announced that she would be the second
nominal damages. Besides, petitioner should have realized that speaker on the first day of the meeting.4 To fulfill this
the explicit assertion, and proof, that Dr. Pablo's right had been engagement, Dr. Pablo booked passage on petitioner airline,
violated or invaded by it—absent any claim for actual or ALITALIA.
compensatory damages, the prayer thereof having been She arrived in Milan on the day before the meeting in accordance
voluntarily deleted by Dr. Pablo upon the return to her of her with the itinerary and time table set for her by ALITALIA. She
baggage—necessarily raised the issue of nominal damages. was however told by the ALITALIA personnel there at Milan that
Attorney's Fees; Attorney's fees may be awarded when her luggage was "delayed inasmuch as the same x x (was) in one
defendant's acts or omission has compelled plaintiff to litigate or of the succeeding flights from Rome to Milan."5 Her luggage
incur expenses to protect her interests.—This Court also agrees consisted of two (2) suitcases: one contained her clothing and
that respondent Court of Appeals correctly awarded attorney's other personal items; the other, her scientific papers, slides and
fees to Dr. Pablo, and the amount "of P5,000.00 set by it is other research material. But the other flights arriving from Rome
reasonable in the premises. The law authorizes recovery of did not have her baggage on board
attorney's fees inter alia where, as here, "the defendant's act or By then feeling desperate, she went to Rome to try to locate her
omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third bags herself. There, she inquired about her suitcases in the "
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest," or "where domestic and international airports, and filled out the forms
the court deems it just and equitable." prescribed by ALITALIA for people in her predicament. However,
her baggage could not be found. Completely distraught and
discouraged, she returned to Manila without attending the the plaintiff s frustration and disappointment in not being able
meeting in Ispra, Italy. to appear at said conference; and for the embarrassment and
humiliation she suffered from the academic community for
Once back in Manila she demanded that ALITALIA make
failure to carry out an official mission for which she was singled
reparation for the damages thus suffered by her. ALITALIA
out by the faculty to represent her institution and the country.
offered her "free airline tickets to compensate her for any alleged
After weighing carefully all the considerations, the amount
damages x x." She rejected the offer, and forthwith commenced
awarded to the plaintiff for nominal damages and attorney's fees
the action6 which has given rise to the present appellate
should be increased to the cost of her round trip air fare or at
proceedings.
the present rate of peso to the dollar at P40,000,00."
As it turned out, Prof. Pablo's suitcases were in fact located and
ALITALIA has appealed to this Court on certiorari. Here, it seeks
forwarded to Ispra,7 Italy, but only on the day after her
to make basically the same points it tried to make before the
scheduled appearance and participation at the U.N. meeting
Trial Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court, i.e.:
there.8 Of course Dr. Pablo was no longer there to accept
delivery; she was already on her way home to Manila. And for 1) that the Warsaw Convention should have been applied to limit
some reason or other, the suitcases were not actually restored ALITALIA'S liability; and
to Prof. Pablo by ALITALIA until eleven (11) months later, and
2) that there is no warrant in fact or in law for the award to Dr.
four (4) months after institution of her action.
Pablo of nominal damages and attorney's fees.14
After appropriate proceedings and trial, the Court of First
In addition, ALITALIA postulates that it was error for the
Instance rendered judgment in Dr. Pablo's favor:
Intermediate Appellate Court to have refused to pass on all the
'(1) Ordering the defendant (ALITALIA) to pay x x (her) the sum assigned errors and in not stating the facts and the law on which
of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine its decision is based.15
Currency, by way of nominal damages;
Under the Warsaw Convention,16 an air carrier is made liable
(2) Ordering the defendant to pay x x (her) the sum of FIVE
for damages for:
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for
attorney's fees; (and) 1) the death, wounding or other bodily injury of a passenger if
the accident causing it took place on board the aircraft or in the
(3) Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of the suit."
course of its operations of embarking or disembarking;17
ALITALIA appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court but
2) the destruction or loss of, or damage to, any registered
failed to obtain a reversal of the judgment.11 Indeed, the
luggage or goods, if the occurrence causing it took place during
Appellate Court not only affirmed the Trial Court's decision but
the carriage by air;"18 and
also increased the award of nominal damages payable by
ALITALIA to P40,000.00.12 That increase it justified as follows: 3) delay in the transportation by air of passengers, luggage or
goods.19
"Considering the circumstances, as found by the Trial Court and
the negligence committed by defendant, the amount of In these cases, it is provided in the Convention that the "action
P20,000.00 under present inflationary conditions as awarded x for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to
x to the plaintiff as nominal damages, is too little to make up for the conditions and limits set out" therein.20
and other expenses of the litigation, does not exceed the sum
which the carrier has offered in writing to the plaintiff within a
The Convention also purports to limit the liability of the carriers
period of six months from the date of the occurrence causing the
in the following manner:
damage, or before the commencement of the action, if that is
1. In the carriage of passengers the liability of the carrier for later.
each passenger is limited to the sum of 250,000 francs. x x x
The Warsaw Convention however denies to the carrier availment
Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger
"of the provisions which exclude or limit.his.liability, if the
may agree to a higher limit of liability.
damage is caused by his wilful misconduct or by such default
2. a) In the carriage of registered baggage and of cargo, the on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court seized of
liability of the carrier is limited to a sum of 250 francs per the case, is considered to be equivalent to wilful misconduct," or
kilogramme, unless the passenger or consignor has made, at the "if the damage is (similarly) caused x x by any agent of the carrier
time when the package was handed over to the carrier, a special acting within the scope of his employment."22 The Hague
declaration of interest in delivery at destination and has paid a Protocol amended the Warsaw Convention by removing the
supplementary sum if the case so requires. In that case the provision that if the airline took all necessary steps to avoid the
carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared damage, it could exculpate itself completely,23 and declaring the
sum, unless he proves that that sum is greater than the actual stated limits of liability not applicable "if it is proved that the
value to the consignor at delivery. damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier, its
servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage or
b) In the case of loss, damage or delay of part of registered recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably
baggage or cargo, or of any object contained therein, the weight result." The same deletion was effected by the Montreal
to be taken into consideration in determining the amount to Agreement of 1966, with the result that a passenger could
which the carrier's liability is limited shall be only the total recover unlimited damages upon proof of wilful misconduct.
weight of the package or packages concerned. Nevertheless,
when the loss, damage or delay of a part of the registered The Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive
baggage or cargo, or of an object contained therein, affects the enumeration of the instances of an airline's liability, or as an
value of other packages covered by the same baggage check or absolute limit of the extent of that liability. Such a proposition
the same air way bill, the total weight of such package or is not borne out by the language of the Convention, as this Court
packages shall also be taken into consideration in determining has now, and at an earlier time, pointed out.25 Moreover, slight
the limit of liability. reflection readily leads to the conclusion that it should be
deemed a limit of liability only in those cases where the cause of
3. As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge the death or injury to person, or destruction, loss or damage to
himself the liability of the carrier is limited to 5000 francs per property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or
passenger. attended by any wilful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or
4. The limits prescribed x x shall not prevent the court from otherwise improper conduct on the part of any official or
awarding, in accordance with its own law, in addition, the whole employee for which the carrier is responsible, and there is
or part of the court costs and of the other expenses of litigation otherwise no special or extraordinary form of resulting injury.
incurred by the plaintiff. The foregoing provision shall not apply The Convention's provisions, in short, do not "regulate or
if the amount of the damages awarded, excluding court costs exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier"26
or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct
particular or exceptional type of damage. Otherwise, "an air may be ascribed to the employees of petitioner airline; and Dr.
carrier would be exempt from any liability for damages in the Pablo's luggage was eventually returned to her, belatedly, it is
event of its absolute refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a true, but without appreciable damage. The fact is, nevertheless,
contract of carriage, which is absurd."27 Nor may it for a that some special species of injury was caused to Dr. Pablo
moment be supposed that if a member of the aircraft because petitioner ALITALIA misplaced her baggage and failed
complement should inflict some physical injury on a passenger, to deliver it to her at the time appointed—a breach of its contract
or maliciously destroy or damage the latter's property, the of carriage, to be sure—with the result that she was unable to
Convention might successfully be pleaded as the sole gauge to read the paper and make the scientific presentation (consisting
determine the carrier's liability to the passenger. Neither may of slides, autoradiograms or films, tables and tabulations) that
the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some she had painstakingly labored over, at the prestigious
extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and international conference, to attend which she had traveled
preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said hundreds of miles, to her chagrin and embarrassment and the
Convention. It is in this sense that the Convention has been disappointment and annoyance of the organizers. She felt, not
applied, or ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented unreasonably, that the invitation for her to participate at the
by each case. conference, extended by the Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Atomic
Energy in Food and Agriculture of the United Nations, was a
In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. I.A.C.,28 for example,
singular honor not only to herself, but to the University of the
the Warsaw Convention was applied as regards the limitation on
Philippines and the country as well, an opportunity to make
the carrier's liability, there being a simple loss of baggage
some sort of impression among her colleagues in that field of
without any otherwise improper conduct on the part of the
scientific activity. The opportunity to claim this honor or
officials or employees of the airline or other special injury
distinction was irretrievably lost to her because of Alitalia's
sustained by the passenger.
breach of its contract.
On the other hand, the Warsaw Convention has invariably been
Apart from this, there can be no doubt that Dr. Pablo underwent
held inapplicable, or as not restrictive of the carrier's liability,
profound distress and anxiety, which gradually turned to panic
where there was satisfactory evidence of malice or bad faith
and finally despair, from the time she learned that her suitcases
attributable to its officers and employees.29 Thus, an air carrier
were missing up to the time when, having gone to Rome, she
was sentenced to pay not only compensatory but also moral and
finally realized that she would no longer be able to take part in
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, for instance, where its
the conference. As she herself put it, she "was really shocked
employees rudely put a passenger holding a first-class ticket in
and distraught and confused."
the tourist or economy section,30 or ousted a brown Asiatic from
the plane to give his seat to a white man, or gave the seat of a Certainly, the compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo
passenger with a confirmed reservation to another,32 or cannot under the circumstances be restricted to that prescribed
subjected a passenger to extremely rude, even barbaric by the Warsaw Convention for delay in the transportof baggage.
treatment, as by calling him a "monkey."33
She is not, of course, entitled to be compensated for loss or
damage to her luggage. As already mentioned, her baggage was
ultimately delivered to her in Manila, tardily but safely. She is
however entitled to nominal damages—which, as the law says,
is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated
and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered—and this Court agrees that the
respondent Court of Appeals correctly set the amount thereof at
P40,000.00. As to the purely technical argument that the award
to her of such nominal damages is precluded by her omission to
include a specific claim therefor in her complaint, it suffices to
draw attention to her general prayer, following her plea for moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees, "for such other and
further just and equitable relief in the premises," which certainly
is broad enough to comprehend an application as well for
nominal damages. Besides, petitioner should have realized that
the explicit assertion, and proof, that Dr. Pablo's right had been
violated or invaded by it—absent any claim for actual or
compensatory damages, the prayer thereof having been
voluntarily deleted by Dr. Pablo upon the return to her of her
baggage—necessarily raised the issue of nominal damages.
On that date, do (sic) you have occasion to handle or deal with This Exhibit I-TWA, could you tell what it is, what it shows?
the transfer of cargo from TWA Flight No. 603 to PAL San
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
Francisco?
It shows transfer of manifest on 10-27-76 to PAL at 1400 and
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
verified with two signatures as it completed the transfer.
Yes, I did.
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.:
Very good, Who was the PAL employee who received the cargo?
What was your participation with the transfer of the cargo?
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
Saludo, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
The name is Garry Marcial.”37
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
The deposition of Alberto A. Lim, PAL’s cargo supervisor at San
I manifested the freight on a transfer manifest and physically Francisco, as deponent-witness for PAL, makes this further
moved it to PAL and concluded the transfer by signing it off. clarification:
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.: “ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
You brought it there yourself? You mentioned Airway Bill, Mr. Lim. I am showing to you a PAL
Airway Bill Number 01180454 which for purposes of evidence, I
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
would like to request that the same be marked as evidence
Yes, sir. Exhibit I for PAL.
Do you have anything to show that PAL received the cargo from In what circumstances did you encounter Exhibit I-PAL?
TWA on October 27, 1976?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
MICHAEL GIOSSO:
If I recall correctly, I was queried by Manila, our Manila office
Yes, I do. with regard to a certain complaint that a consignee filed that this
shipment did not arrive on the day that the consignee expects
(Witness presenting a document) the shipment to arrive.
ATTY. JUAN COLLAS, JR.: ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
For purposes of clarity, Exhibit I is designated as Exhibit I-TWA. Okay. Now, upon receipt of that query from your Manila office,
xxx did you conduct any investigation to pinpoint the possible
causes of mishandling?
ALBERTO A. LIM: Yes. We have on our records a Transfer Manifest from American
Airlines Number 204312 showing that we received a human
Yes.
remains shipment belong to Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo or the
xxx human remains of Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo.
What is the result of your investigation? At this juncture, may I request that the Transfer Manifest
referred to by the witness be marked as an evidence as Exhibit
ALBERTO A. LIM: II-PAL.
In the course of my investigation, I found that we received the xxx
body on October 28, 1976, from American Airlines.
Mr. Lim, yesterday your co-defendant TWA presented as their
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY: Exhibit I evidence tending to show that on October 27, 1976 at
What body are you referring to? about 2:00 in the afternoon they delivered to you a cargo bearing
human remains. Could you go over this Exhibit I and please give
xxx us your comments as to that exhibit?
ALBERTO A. LIM: ATTY. ALBERTO C. MENDOZA:
The remains of Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo. That is a vague question. I would rather request that counsel
propound specific questions rather than asking for comments
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
on Exhibit I-TWA.
Is that the same body mentioned in this Airway Bill?
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
ALBERTO A. LIM:
In that case, I will reform my question. Could you tell us whether
Yes. TWA in fact delivered to you the human remains as indicated in
that Transfer Manifest?
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
ALBERTO A. LIM:
What time did you receive said body on October 28, 1976?
Yes, they did.
ALBERTO A. LIM:
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
If I recall correctly, approximately 7:45 of October 28, 1976.
I noticed that the Transfer Manifest of TWA marked as Exhibit
ATTY. CESAR P. MANALAYSAY:
I-TWA bears the same numbers or the same entries as the
Do you have any proof with you to back the statement? Airway Bill marked as Exhibit I-A PAL tending to show that this
is the human remains of Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo. Could you
ALBERTO A. LIM: tell us whether this is true?
ALBERTO A. LIM:
It is true that we received human remains shipment from TWA
as indicated on this Transfer Manifest. But in the course of
“The foregoing points at C.M.A.S., not defendant TWA much less
investigation, it was found out that the human remains
defendant PAL, as the ONE responsible for the switching or mix-
transferred to us is not the remains of Mrs. Cristina (sic) Saludo
up of the two bodies at the Chicago Airport terminal, and started
which is the reason why we did not board it on our flight.”
a chain reaction of the misshipment of the body of Crispina
Petitioners consider TWA’s statement that “it had to rely on the Saludo and a one-day delay in the delivery thereof to its
information furnished by the shipper” a lame excuse and that destination.
its failure to prove that its personnel verified and identified the
Verily, no amount of inspection by respondent airline companies
contents of the casket before loading the same constituted
could have guarded against the switching that had already
negligence on the part of TWA.
taken place. Or, granting that they could have opened the casket
We uphold the favorable consideration by the Court of Appeals to inspect its contents, private respondents had no means of
of the following findings of the trial court: ascertaining whether the body therein contained was indeed
that of Crispina Saludo except, possibly, if the body was that of
“It was not (to) TWA, but to C.M.A.S. that the Pomierski & Son
a male person and such fact was visually apparent upon opening
Funeral Home delivered the casket containing the remains of
the casket. However, to repeat, private respondents had no
Crispina Saludo. TWA would have no knowledge therefore that
authority to unseal and open the same nor did they have any
the remains of Crispina Saludo were not the ones inside the
reason or justification to resort thereto.
casket that was being presented to it for shipment. TWA would
have to rely on the representations of C.M.A.S. The casket was It is the right of the carrier to require good faith on the part of
hermetically sealed and also sealed by the Philippine Vice those persons who deliver goods to be carried, or enter into
Consul in Chicago. TWA or any airline for that matter would not contracts with it, and inasmuch as the freight may depend on
have opened such a sealed casket just for the purpose of the value of the article to be carried, the carrier ordinarily has
ascertaining whose body was inside and to make sure that the the right to inquire as to its value. Ordinarily, too, it is the duty
remains inside were those of the particular person indicated to of the carrier to make inquiry as to the general nature of the
be by C.M.A.S. TWA had to accept whatever information was articles shipped and of their value before it consents to carry
being furnished by the shipper or by the one presenting the them; and its failure to do so cannot defeat the shipper’s right
casket for shipment. And so as a matter of fact, TWA carried to to recovery of the full value of the package if lost, in the absence
San Francisco and transferred to defendant PAL a shipment of showing of fraud or deceit on the part of the shipper. In the
covered by or under PAL Airway Bill No. 079-ORD-01180454, absence of more definite information, the carrier has the right to
the airway bill for the shipment of the casketed remains of accept shipper’s marks as to the contents of the package offered
Crispina Saludo. Only, it turned out later, while the casket was for transportation and is not bound to inquire particularly about
already with PAL, that what was inside the casket was not the them in order to take advantage of a false classification and
body of Crispina Saludo so much so that it had to be withdrawn where a shipper expressly represents the contents of a package
by C.M.A.S. from PAL. The body of Crispina Saludo had been to be of a designated character, it is not the duty of the carrier
shipped to Mexico. The casket containing the remains of to ask for a repetition of the statement nor disbelieve it and open
Crispina Saludo was transshipped from Mexico and arrived in the box and see for itself.41 However, where a common carrier
San Francisco the following day on board American Airlines. It has reasonable ground to suspect that the offered goods are of
was immediately loaded by PAL on its flight for Manila. a dangerous or illegal character, the carrier has the right to
know the character of such goods and to insist on an inspection, remains was indeed at fault, the liability therefor would
if reasonable and practical under the circumstances, as a supposedly still be attributable to private respondents.
condition of receiving and transporting such goods.
While we agree that the actual participation of CMAS has been
It can safely be said then that a common carrier is entitled to sufficiently and correctly established, to hold that it acted as
fair representation of the nature and value of the goods to be agent for private respondents would be both an inaccurate
carried, with the concomitant right to rely thereon, and further appraisal and an unwarranted categorization of the legal
noting at this juncture that a carrier has no obligation to inquire position it held in the entire transaction.
into the correctness or sufficiency of such information. The
It bears repeating that CMAS was hired to handle all the
consequent duty to conduct an inspection thereof arises in the
necessary shipping arrangements for the transportation of the
event that there should be reason to doubt the veracity of such
human remains of Crispina Saludo to Manila. Hence, it was to
representations. Therefore, to be subjected to unusual search,
CMAS that the Pomierski & Son Funeral Home, as shipper,
other than the routinary inspection procedure customarily
brought the remains of petitioners’ mother for shipment, with
undertaken, there must exist proof that would justify cause for
Maria Saludo as consignee. Thereafter, CMAS booked the
apprehension that the baggage is dangerous as to warrant
shipment with PAL through the carrier’s agent, Air Care
exhaustive inspection, or even refusal to accept carriage of the
International.45 With its aforestated functions, CMAS may
same; and it is the failure of the carrier to act accordingly in
accordingly be classified as a forwarder which, by accepted
theface of such proof that constitutes the basis of the common
commercial practice, is regarded as an agent of the shipper and
carrier’s liability.
not of the carrier. As such, it merely contracts for the
In the case at bar, private respondents had no reason transportation of goods by carriers, and has no interest in the
whatsoever to doubt the truth of the shipper’s representations. freight but receives compensation from the shipper as his agent.
The airway bill expressly providing that “carrier certifies goods
At this point, it can be categorically stated that, as culled from
received below were received for carriage,” and that the cargo
the findings of both the trial court and appellate courts, the
contained “casketed human remains of Crispina Saludo,” was
entire chain of events which culminated in the present
issued on the basis of such representations. The reliance
controversy was not due to the fault or negligence of private
thereon by private respondents was reasonable and, for so
respondents. Rather, the facts of the case would point to CMAS
doing, they cannot be said to have acted negligently. Likewise,
as the culprit. Equally telling of the more likely possibility of
no evidence was adduced to suggest even an iota of suspicion
CMAS’ liability is petitioners’ letter to and demanding an
that the cargo presented for transportation was anything other
explanation from CMAS regarding the statement of private
than what it was declared to be, as would require more than
respondents laying the blame on CMAS for the incident, portions
routine inspection or call for the carrier to insist that the same
of which, reading as follows:
be opened for scrutiny of its contents per declaration.
“x x x we were informed that the unfortunate a mix-up occurred
Neither can private respondents be held accountable on the
due to your negligence. x x x.
basis of petitioner’s preposterous proposition that whoever
brought the cargo to the airport or loaded it on the airplane did “Likewise, the two airlines pinpoint the responsibility upon your
so as agent of private respondents, so that even if CMAS whose agents. Evidence were presented to prove that allegation.
services were engaged for the transit arrangements for the
“On the face of this overwhelming evidence we could and should In addition, petitioners maintain that since there is no evidence
have filed a case against you. x x x.” as to who placed the body on board Flight 603, or that CMAS
actually put the cargo on that flight, or that the two caskets at
clearly allude to CMAS as the party at fault. This is tantamount
the Chicago airport were to be transported by the same airline,
to an admission by petitioners that they consider private
or that they came from the same funeral home, or that both
respondents without fault, or is at the very least indicative of the
caskets were received by CMAS, then the employees or agents of
fact that petitioners entertained serious doubts as to whether
TWA presumably caused the mix-up by loading the wrong casket
herein private respondents were responsible for the unfortunate
on the plane. For said error, they contend, TWA must
turn of events.
necessarily be presumed negligent and this presumption of
Undeniably, petitioners’ grief over the death of their mother was negligence stands undisturbed unless rebutting evidence is
aggravated by the unnecessary inconvenience and anxiety that presented to show that the switching or misdelivery was due to
attended their efforts to bring her body home for a decent burial. circumstances that would exempt the carrier from liability.
This is unfortunate and calls for sincere commiseration with
Private respondent TWA professes otherwise. Having duly
petitioners. But, much as we would like to give them consolation
delivered or transferred the cargo to its co-respondent PAL on
for their undeserved distress, we are barred by the inequity of
October 27, 1976 at 2:00 P.M., as supported by the TWA
allowing recovery of the damages prayed for by them at the
Transfer Manifest, TWA faithfully complied with its obligation
expense of private respondents whose fault or negligence in the
under the airway bill. Said faithful compliance was not affected
very acts imputed to them has not been convincingly and legally
by the fact that the remains were shipped on an earlier flight as
demonstrated.
there was no fixed time for completion of carriage stipulated on.
Neither are we prepared to delve into, much less definitively rule Moreover, the carrier did not undertake to carry the cargo
on, the possible liability of CMAS as the evaluation and aboard any specified aircraft, in view of the condition on the
adjudication of the same is not what is presently at issue here back of the airway bill which provides:
and is best deferred to another time and addressed to another
“CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT
forum.
xxx
II. Petitioners further fault the Court of Appeals for ruling that
there was no contractual breach on the part of private “It is agreed that no time is fixed for the completion of carriage
respondents as would entitle petitioners to damages. hereunder and that Carrier may without notice substitute
alternate carriers or aircraft. Carrier assumes no obligation to
Petitioners hold that respondent TWA, by agreeing to transport
carry the goods by any specified aircraft or over any particular
the remains of petitioners’ mother on its Flight 131 from Chicago
route or routes or to make connection at any point according to
to San Francisco on October 27, 1976, made itself a party to the
any particular schedule, and Carrier is hereby authorized to
contract of carriage and, therefore, was bound by the terms of
select, or deviate from the route or routes of shipment,
the issued airway bill. When TWA undertook to ship the remains
notwithstanding that the same may be stated on the face hereof.
on its Flight 603, ten hours earlier than scheduled, it supposedly
The shipper guarantees payment of all charges and advances.”
violated the express agreement embodied in the airway bill. It
Hence when respondent TWA shipped the body on an earlier
was allegedly this breach of obligation which compounded, if not
flight and on a different aircraft, it was acting well within its
directly caused, the switching of the caskets.
rights. We find this argument tenable.
carriage and that the carrier may, without notice, substitute
alternate carriers or aircraft. The carrier did not assume the
The contention that there was contractual breach on the part of
obligation to carry the shipment on any specified aircraft.
private respondents is founded on the postulation that there was
ambiguity in the terms of the airway bill, hence petitioners’ xxx
insistence on the application of the rules on interpretation of
“Furthermore, contrary to the claim of plaintiffs-appellants, the
contracts and documents. We find no such ambiguity. The terms
conditions of the Air Waybill are big enough to be read and
are clear enough as to preclude the necessity to probe beyond
noticed. Also, the mere fact that the cargo in question was
the apparent intendment of the contractual provisions.
shipped in TWA Flight 603, a flight earlier on the same day than
The hornbook rule on interpretation of contracts consecrates the TWA Flight 131, did not in any way cause or add to the one-day
primacy of the intention of the parties, the same having the force delay complained of and/or the switching or mix-up of the
of law between them. When the terms of the agreement are clear bodies.”
and explicit, that they do not justify an attempt to read into any
Indubitably, that private respondent can use substitute aircraft
alleged intention of the parties, the terms are to be understood
even without notice and without the assumption of any
literally just as they appear on the face of the contract.49 The
obligation whatsoever to carry the goods on any specified aircraft
various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together50
is clearly sanctioned by the contract of carriage as specifically
and such a construction is to be adopted as will give effect to all
provided for under the conditions thereof.
provisions thereof.51 A contract cannot be construed by parts,
but its clauses should be interpreted in relation to one another. Petitioners’ invocation of the interpretative rule in the Rules of
The whole contract must be interpreted or read together in order Court that written words control printed words in documents,54
to arrive at its true meaning. Certain stipulations cannot be to bolster their assertion that the typewritten provisions
segregated and then made to control; neither do particular regarding the routing and flight schedule prevail over the printed
words or phrases necessarily determine the character of a conditions, is tenuous. Said rule may be considered only when
contract. The legal effect of the contract is not to be determined there is inconsistency between the written and printed words of
alone by any particular provision disconnected from all others, the contract.
but in the ruling intention of the parties as gathered from all the
language they have used and from their contemporaneous and As previously stated, we find no ambiguity in the contract
subsequent acts. subject of this case that would call for the application of said
rule. In any event, the contract has provided for such a situation
Turning to the terms of the contract at hand, as presented by by explicitly stating that the above condition remains effective
PAL Air Waybill No. 079-01180454, respondent court “notwithstanding that the same (fixed time for completion of
approvingly quoted the trial court’s disquisition on the carriage, specified aircraft, or any particular route or schedule)
aforequoted condition appearing on the reverse side of the may be stated on the face hereof.” While petitioners hinge private
airway bill and its disposition of this particular assigned error: respondents’ culpability on the fact that the carrier “certifies
goods described below were received for carriage,” they may have
“The foregoing stipulation fully answers plaintiffs’ objections to
overlooked that the statement on the face of the airway bill
the one-day delay and the shipping of the remains in TWA Flight
properly and completely reads—
603 instead of TWA Flight 131. Under the stipulation, parties
agreed that no time was fixed to complete the contract of
“Carrier certifies goods described below were received for of the carrier is to be determined from the circumstances
carriage subject to the Conditions on the reverse hereof the surrounding the case and by application of the ordinary rules
goods then being in apparent good order and condition except for the interpretation of contracts.59
as noted hereon.”
Private respondents further aptly observe that the carrier’s
Echoing the findings of the trial court, the respondent court
certification regarding receipt of the goods for carriage “was of a
correctly declared that—
smaller print than the condition of the Air Waybill, including
Condition No. 5—and thus if plaintiffs-appellants had
recognized the former, then with more reason they were aware
of the latter.” “In a similar case of delayed delivery of air cargo under a very
similar stipulation contained in the airway bill which reads: ‘The
In the same vein, it would also be incorrect to accede to the carrier does not obligate itself to carry the goods by any specified
suggestion of petitioners that the typewritten specifications of aircraft or on a specified time. Said carrier being hereby
the flight, routes and dates of departures and arrivals on the authorized to deviate from the route of the shipment without any
face of the airway bill constitute a special contract which liability therefor’, our Supreme Court ruled that common
modifies the printed conditions at the back thereof. We reiterate carriers are not obligated by law to carry and to deliver
that typewritten provisions of the contract are to be read and merchandise, and persons are not vested with the right to
understood subject to and in view of the printed conditions, fully prompt delivery, unless such common carriers previously
reconciling and giving effect to the manifest intention of the assume the obligation. Said rights and obligations are created
parties to the agreement. by a specific contract entered into by the parties (Mendoza vs.
PAL, 90 Phil. 836).
The oft-repeated rule regarding a carrier’s liability for delay is
that in the absence of a special contract, a carrier is not an “There is no showing by plaintiffs that such a special or specific
insurer against delay in transportation of goods. When a contract had been entered into between them and the defendant
common carrier undertakes to convey goods, the law implies a airline companies.
contract that they shall be delivered at destination within a
reasonable time, in the absence, of any agreement as to the time “And this special contract for prompt delivery should call the
of delivery.57 But where a carrier has made an express contract attention of the carrier to the circumstances surrounding the
to transport and deliver property within a specified time, it is case and approximate amount of damages to be suffered in case
bound to fulfill its contract and is liable for any delay, no matter of delay (See Mendoza vs. PAL, supra). There was no such
from what cause it may have arisen.58 This result logically contract entered into in the instant case.”
follows from the well-settled rule that where the law creates a Also, the theory of petitioners that the specification of the flights
duty or charge, and the party is disabled from performing it and dates of departures and arrivals constitute a special
without any default in himself, and has no remedy over, then contract that could prevail over the printed stipulations at the
the law will excuse him, but where the party by his own contract back of the airway bill is vacuous. To countenance such a
creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it postulate would unduly burden the common carrier for that
good notwithstanding any accident or delay by inevitable would have the effect of unilaterally transforming every single
necessity because he might have provided against it by contract. bill of lading or trip ticket into a special contract by the simple
Whether or not there has been such an undertaking on the part
expedient of filling it up with the particulars of the flight, trip or being subversive of public policy, only when the weaker party is
voyage, and thereby imposing upon the carrier duties and/or imposed upon in dealing with the dominant bargaining party
obligations which it may not have been ready or willing to and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it,
assume had it been timely advised thereof. completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal
footing.62 However, Ong Yiu vs. Court of Appeals, et al.63
Neither does the fact that the challenged condition No. 5 was
instructs us that contracts of adhesion are not entirely
printed at the back of the airway bill militate against its binding
prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality free
effect on petitioners as parties to the contract, for there were
to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent.
sufficient indications on the face of said bill that would alert
Accordingly, petitioners, far from being the weaker party in this
them to the presence of such additional condition to put them
situation, duly signified their presumed assent to all terms of
on their guard. Ordinary prudence on the part of any person
the contract through their acceptance of the airway bill and are
entering or contemplating to enter into a contract would prompt
consequently bound thereby. It cannot be gainsaid that
even a cursory examination of any such conditions, terms
petitioners were not without several choices as to carriers in
and/or stipulations.
Chicago with its numerous airways and airlines servicing the
There is a holding in most jurisdictions that the acceptance of a same.
bill of lading without dissent raises a presumption that all terms
We wish to allay petitioners’ apprehension that Condition No. 5
therein were brought to the knowledge of the shipper and agreed
of the airway bill is productive of mischief as it would validate
to by him, and in the absence of fraud or mistake, he is estopped
delay in delivery, sanction violations of contractual obligations
from thereafter denying that he assented to such terms. This
with impunity or put a premium on breaches of contract.
rule applies with particular force where a shipper accepts a bill
of lading with full knowledge of its contents, and acceptance Just because we have said that Condition No. 5 of the airway
under such circumstances makes it a binding contract. In order bill is binding upon the parties to and fully operative in this
that any presumption of assent to a stipulation in a bill of lading transaction, it does not mean, and let this serve as fair warning
limiting the liability of a carrier may arise, it must appear that to respondent carriers, that they can at all times whimsically
the clause containing this exemption from liability plainly seek refuge from liability in the exculpatory sanctuary of said
formed a part of the contract contained in the bill of lading. A Condition No. 5 or arbitrarily vary routes, flights and schedules
stipulation printed on the back of a receipt or bill of lading or on to the prejudice of their customers. This condition only serves to
papers attached to such receipt will be quite as effective as if insulate the carrier from liability in those instances when
printed on its face, if it is shown that the consignor knew of its changes in routes, flights and schedules are clearly justified by
terms. Thus, where a shipper accepts a receipt which states that the peculiar circumstances of a particular case, or by general
its conditions are to be found on the back, such receipt comes transportation practices, customs and usages, or by
within the general rule, and the shipper is held to have accepted contingencies or emergencies in aviation such as weather
and to be bound by the conditions there to be found. turbulence, mechanical failure, requirements of national
security and the like. And even as it is conceded that specific
Granting arguendo that Condition No. 5 partakes of the nature
routing and other navigational arrangements for a trip, flight or
of a contract of adhesion and as such must be construed strictly
voyage, or variations therein, generally lie within the discretion
against the party who drafted the same or gave rise to any
of the carrier in the absence of specific routing instructions or
ambiguity therein, it should be borne in mind that a contract of
directions by the shipper, it is plainly incumbent upon the
adhesion may be struck down as void and unenforceable, for
carrier to exercise its rights with due deference to the rights, III. Petitioners challenge the validity of respondent court’s
interests and convenience of its customers. finding that private respondents are not liable for tort on
account of the humiliating, arrogant and indifferent acts of their
A common carrier undertaking to transport property has the
officers and personnel. They posit that since their mother’s
implicit duty to carry and deliver it within a reasonable time,
remains were transported ten hours earlier than originally
absent any particular stipulation regarding time of delivery, and
scheduled, there was no reason for private respondents’
to guard against delay. In case of any unreasonable delay, the
personnel to disclaim knowledge of the arrival or whereabouts
carrier shall be liable for damages immediately and proximately
of the same other than their sheer arrogance, indifference and
resulting from such neglect of duty.64 As found by the trial
extreme insensitivity to the feelings of petitioners. Moreover,
court, the delay in the delivery of the remains of Crispina
being passengers and not merely consignors of goods,
Saludo, undeniable and regrettable as it was, cannot be
petitioners had the right to be treated with courtesy, respect,
attributed to the fault, negligence or malice of private
kindness and due consideration.
respondents,65 a conclusion concurred in by respondent court
and which we are not inclined to disturb. In riposte, TWA claims that its employees have always dealt
politely with all clients, customers and the public in general.
We are further convinced that when TWA opted to ship the
PAL, on the other hand, declares that in the performance of its
remains of Crispina Saludo on an earlier flight, it did so in the
obligation to the riding public, other customers and clients, it
exercise of sound discretion and with reasonable prudence, as
has always acted with justice, honesty, courtesy and good faith.
shown by the explanation of its counsel in his letter of February
Respondent appellate court found merit in and reproduced the
19, 1977 in response to petitioners’ demand letter:
trial court’s refutation of this assigned error:
“Investigation of TWA’s handling of this matter reveals that
“About the only evidence of plaintiffs that may have reference to
although the shipment was scheduled on TWA Flight 131 of
the manner with which the personnel of defendants treated the
October 27, 1976, it was actually boarded on TWA Flight 603 of
two plaintiffs at the San Francisco Airport are the following
the same day, approximately 10 hours earlier, in order to assure
pertinent portions of Maria Saludo’s testimony.
that the shipment would be received in San Francisco in
sufficient time for transfer to PAL. This transfer was effected in ‘Q When you arrived there, what did you do, if any?
San Francisco at 2:00 P.M. on October 27, 1976.66
A I immediately went to the TWA counter and I inquiredabout
Precisely, private respondent TWA knew of the urgency of the whether my mother was there or if they knew anything about it.
shipment by reason of this notation on the lower portion of the
Q What was the answer?
airway bill: “All documents have been certified. Human remains
of Cristina (sic) Saludo. Please return bag first available flight to A They said they do not know. So, we waited.
SFO.” Accordingly, TWA took it upon itself to carry the remains
of Crispina Saludo on an earlier flight, which we emphasize it Q About what time was that when you reached San Francisco
could do under the terms of the airway bill, to make sure that from Chicago?
there would be enough time for loading said remains on the A I think 5 o’clock. Somewhere around that in the afternoon.
transfer flight on board PAL.
Q You made inquiry it was immediately thereafter?
A Right after we got off the plane. A After we were told that my mother was not there?
Q Up to what time did you stay in the airport to wait until the Q After you learned that your mother could not fly with you from
TWA people could tell you the whereabouts? Chicago to California?
A Sorry, Sir, but the TWA did not tell us anything. We stayed A Well, I was very upset. Of course, I wanted the confirmation
there until about 9 o’clock. They have not heard anything about that my mother was in the West Coast. The flight was about 5
it. They did not say anything. hours from Chicago to California. We waited anxiously all that
time on the plane. I wanted to be assured about my mother’s
Q Do you want to convey to the Court that from 5 up to 9 o’clock
remains. But there was nothing and we could not get any
in the evening you yourself went back to the TWA and they could
assurance from anyone about it.
not tell you where the remains of your mother were?
Q Your feeling when you reached San Francisco and you could
A Yes sir.
not find out from the TWA the whereabouts of the remains, what
Q And after nine o’clock, what did you do? did you feel?
A I told my brother my Mom was supposed to be on the A Something nobody would be able to describe unless he
Philippine Airlines flight. ‘Why don’t’ we check with PAL instead experiences it himself. It is a kind of panic. I think it’s a feeling
to see if she was there?’ We tried to comfort each other. I told you are about to go crazy. It is something I do not want to live
him anyway that was a shortest flight from Chicago to through again.’ (Inting, t.s.n., Aug. 9, 1983, pp. 14-18).
California. We will be with our mother on this longer flight. So,
“The foregoing does not show any humiliating or arrogant
we checked with the PAL.
manner with which the personnel of both defendants treated the
Q What did you find? two plaintiffs. Even their alleged indifference is not clearly
established. The initial answer of the TWA personnel at the
A We learned, Yes, my Mom would be on the flight. counter that they did not know anything about the remains, and
Q Who was that brother? later, their answer that they have not heard anything about the
remains, and the inability of the TWA counter personnel to
A Saturnino Saludo. inform the two plaintiffs of the whereabouts of the remains,
cannot be said to be total or complete indifference to the said
Q And did you find what was your flight from San Francisco to
plaintiffs. At any rate, it is any rude or discourteous conduct,
the Philippines?
malfeasance or neglect, the use of abusive or insulting language
A I do not know the number. It was the evening flight of the calculated to humiliate and shame passenger or bad faith by or
Philippine Airline(s) from San Francisco to Manila. on the part of the employees of the carrier that gives the
passenger an action for damages against the carrier (Zulueta vs.
Q You took that flight with your mother?
Pan American World Airways, 43 SCRA 397; Air France vs.
A We were scheduled to, Sir. Carrascoso, et al., 18 SCRA 155; Lopez, et al. vs. Pan American
World Airways, 16 SCRA 431; Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs.
Q Now, you could not locate the remains of your mother in San Cuenca, 14 SCRA 1063), and none of the above is obtaining in
Francisco could you tell us what did you feel?
We stand by respondent court’s findings on this point, but only extraordinary diligence required of common carriers, and not the
to the extent where it holds that the manner in which private cold insensitivity to their predicament. It is hard to believe that
respondent TWA’s employees dealt with petitioners was not the airline’s counter personnel were totally helpless about the
grossly humiliating, arrogant or indifferent as would assume the situation. Common sense could and should have dictated that
proportions of malice or bad faith and lay the basis for an award they exert a little extra effort in making a more extensive inquiry,
of the damages claimed. It must however, be pointed out that by themselves or through their superiors, rather than just shrug
the lamentable actuations of respondent TWA’s employees leave off the problem with a callous and uncaring remark that they
much to be desired, particularly so in the face of petitioners’ grief had no knowledge about it. With all the modern communications
over the death of their mother, exacerbated by the tension and equipment readily available to them, which could have easily
anxiety wrought by the impassé and confusion over the failure facilitated said inquiry and which are used as a matter of course
to ascertain over an appreciable period of time what happened by airline companies in their daily operations, their apathetic
to her remains. stance while not legally reprehensible is morally deplorable.
Airline companies are hereby sternly admonished that it is their Losing a loved one, especially one’s parent, is a painful
duty not only to cursorily instruct but to strictly require their experience. Our culture accords the tenderest human feelings
personnel to be more accommodating towards customers, toward and in reverence to the dead. That the remains of the
passengers and the general public. After all, common carriers deceased were subsequently delivered, albeit belatedly, and
such as airline companies are in the business of rendering eventually laid in her final resting place is of little consolation.
public service, which is the primary reason for their The imperviousness displayed by the airline’s personnel, even
enfranchisement and recognition in our law. Because the for just that fraction of time, was especially condemnable
passengers in a contract of carriage do not contract merely for particularly in the hour of bereavement of the family of Crispina
transportation, they have a right to be treated with kindness, Saludo, intensified by anguish due to the uncertainty of the
respect, courtesy and consideration.68 A contract to transport whereabouts of their mother’s remains. Hence, it is quite
passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other apparent that private respondents’ personnel were remiss in the
contractual relation, and generates a relation attended with observance of that genuine human concern and professional
public duty. The operation of a common carrier is a business attentiveness required and expected of them.
affected with public interest and must be directed to serve the
The foregoing observations, however, do not appear to be
comfort and convenience of passengers.69 Passengers are
applicable or imputable to respondent PAL or its employees. No
human beings with human feelings and emotions; they should
attribution of discourtesy or indifference has been made against
not be treated as mere numbers or statistics for revenue.
PAL by petitioners and, in fact, petitioner Maria Saludo testified
The records reveal that petitioners, particularly Maria and that it was to PAL that they repaired after failing to receive
Saturnino Saludo, agonized for nearly five hours, over the proper attention from TWA. It was from PAL that they received
possibility of losing their mother’s mortal remains, unattended confirmation that their mother’s remains would be on the same
to and without any assurance from the employees of TWA that flight to Manila with them.
they were doing anything about the situation. This is not to say
We find the following substantiation on this particular episode
that petitioners were to be regaled with extra special attention.
from the deposition of Alberto A. Lim, PAL’s cargo supervisor
They were, however, entitled to the understanding and humane
earlier adverted to, regarding their investigation of and the
consideration called for by and commensurate with the
action taken on learning of petitioner’s problem:
routine nature of their work and a racial or societal culture
which stultifies what would have been their accustomed human
“ATTY. ALBERTO C. MENDOZA: Yes. Mr. Lim, what exactly was
response to a human need under a former and different
your procedure adopted in your so called investigation?
ambience.
ALBERTO A. LIM: I called the lead agent on duty at that time
Nonetheless, the facts show that petitioners’ right to be treated
and requested for a copy of airway bill, transfer manifest and
with due courtesy in accordance with the degree of diligence
other documents concerning the shipment.
required by law to be exercised by every common carrier was
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MENDOZA: Then, what? violated by TWA and this entitles them, at least, to nominal
damages from TWA alone. Articles 2221 and 2222 of the Civil
ALBERTO A. LIM: They proceeded to analyze exactly where PAL Code make it clear that nominal damages are not intended for
failed, if any, in forwarding the human remains of Mrs. Cristina indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or
(sic) Saludo. And I found out that there was not (sic) delay in recognition of a right violated or invaded. They are recoverable
shipping the remains of Mrs. Saludo to Manila. Since we where some injury has been done but the amount of which the
received the body from American Airlines on 28 October at 7:45 evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages being left to
and we expedited the shipment so that it could have been loaded the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of the
on our flight leaving at 9:00 in the evening or just barely one case. In the exercise of our discretion, we find an award of
hour and 15 minutes prior to the departure of the aircraft. That P40,000.00 as nominal damages in favor of petitioners to be a
is so (sic) being the case, I reported to Manila these reasonable amount under the circumstances of this case.
circumstances.”
WHEREFORE, with the modification that an award of
IV. Finally, petitioners insist, as a consequence of the delay in P40,000.00 as and by way of nominal damages is hereby
the shipment of their mother’s remains allegedly caused by granted in favor of petitioners to be paid by respondent
wilful contractual breach, on their entitlement to actual, moral Trans World Airlines, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in
and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees, litigation all other respects.
expenses, and legal interest.
SO ORDERED.
The uniform decisional tenet in our jurisdiction holds that moral
damages may be awarded for wilful or fraudulent breach of Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ.,
contract or when such breach is attended by malice or bad concur.
faith.However, in the absence of strong and positive evidence of
Decision affirmed with modification.
fraud, malice or bad faith, said damages cannot be awarded.
Neither can there be an award of exemplary damages nor of Note.—Petitioner carrier, not being privy to the transaction
attorney’s fees as an item of damages in the absence of proof between HSBC and CMI cannot be expected to look beyond what
that defendant acted with malice, fraud or bad faith. is contained in the bill of lading in question and guess which of
the many banks in Metro Manila could possibly be the
The censurable conduct of TWA’s employees cannot, however,
consignee. (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
be said to have approximated the dimensions of fraud, malice or
190 SCRA 512.)
bad faith. It can be said to be more of a lethargic reaction
produced and engrained in some people by the mechanically
Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport System, Inc. Sadie v. Bachrach Motors Co., Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 636 and Adone
v. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., 57 O.G. 656). But in more recent
No. L-33836. March 16,1987.*
cases where the awards of moral and exemplary damages are far
DRA. SOFIA L. PRUDENCIADO, petitioner, vs. ALLIANCE too excessive compared to the actual losses sustained by the
TRANSPORT SYSTEM, INC. and JOSE LEYSON, et al., aggrieved party, this Court ruled that they should be reduced to
respondents. more reasonable amounts.
Civil Law; Damages; Judgment; Factual findings of the Court of Same; Same; Same; Purpose of award of moral damages.—In any
Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court but they are subject to case the Court held that "moral damages are emphatically not
scrutiny if such are diametrically opposed to those of the trial intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant.
court.—It is well settled that factual findings of the Court of They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain
Appeals are binding on the Supreme Court, but said findings are means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
subject to scrutiny if such are diametrically opposed to those of moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendants'
the trial court (Samson v. CA, et al., G.R. No. L-40071, January culpable action." The award of moral damages must be
29,1986). proportionate to the suffering inflicted (R & B Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA
Same; Same; Moral damages, concept of.—There is no argument 745 [1984] citing Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. vs. Espino,
that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, Jr., 94 SCRA 966).
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Same; Same; Same; Reduction of damages by the Court of
Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages Appeals is both too drastic and unrealistic and cannot pass the
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's test of reasonableness.—On the other hand, it will be observed
wrongful act or omission (People v. Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 that the reduction of the damages made by the Court of Appeals
[1984]). is both too drastic and unrealistic, to pass the test of
reasonableness, which appears to be the underlying basis to
Same; Same; Same; Trial courts are given the discretion to justify such reduction.
determine the amount of moral damages, and that the Court of
Appeals can only modify or change the amount awarded when Same; Same; Same; Petitioner, a doctor by profession, is
they are palpably and scandalously excessive; Awards of moral undeniably a proper recipient of moral damages which are
and exemplary damages which are far too excessive, compared proportionate to her suffering.—While the damages sought to be
to the actual losses of the aggrieved party, should be reduced to recovered were not satisfactorily established to the extent
more reasonable amounts.—In the same manner, it is desired by the petitioner, it was nonetheless not disputed that
undisputed that the trial courts are given discretion to an accident occurred due to the fault and negligence of the
determine the amount of moral damages (Alcantara v. Surro, 93 respondents; that Dra. Prudenciado suffered a brain concussion
Phil. 472) and that the Court of Appeals can only modify or which although mild, can admittedly produce the effects
change the amount awarded when they are palpably and complained of by her and that these symptoms can develop after
scandalously excessive "so as to indicate that it was the result several years and can lead to some serious handicaps or
of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court predispose the patient to other sickness (TSN, July 13, 1960,
(Gellada v. Warner Barnes & Co., Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 7347, 7358; pp. 5254). Being a doctor by profession, her fears can be more
real and intense than an ordinary person. Otherwise stated, she
is undeniably a proper recipient of moral damages which are repair of the car of Plaintiff; (2) the sum of P2,000.00 as moral
proportionate to her suffering. damages. No pronouncement as to costs."
Same; Same; Exemplary or corrective damages; Rationale behind The antecedent facts of this case as found by the trial court and
the award of said damages.—The rationale behind exemplary or by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an
At about 2:05 p.m. of May 11, 1960, Dra. Sofia L. Prudenciado
example or correction for the public good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan
was driving her own Chevrolet Bel Air car along Arroceros Street
American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431).
with the intention of crossing Taft Avenue in order to turn left,
Same; Same; Same; Gross negligence by taxi driver in case at bar; to go to the Philippine Normal College Compound where she
Frequent incidence of accidents caused by taxi drivers demands would hold classes. She claimed that she was driving her car at
corrective measures.—The Court of Appeals conforms with the rate of 10 kmph; that before crossing Taft Ave. she stopped
aforesaid findings of the trial court but is not prepared to accept her car and looked to the right and to the left and not noticing
that there was gross negligence on the part of the driver to justify any on-coming vehicle on either side she slowly proceeded on
the imposition of exemplary damages. However, a driver running first gear to cross the same, but when she was almost at the
at full speed on a rainy day, on a slippery road in complete center, near the island thereof, Jose Leyson who was driving
disregard of the hazards to life and limb of other people cannot People's Taxicab owned and operated by Alliance Transport
be said to be acting in anything less than gross negligence. The System, Inc., suddenly bumped and struck Dra. Prudenciado's
frequent incidence of accidents of this nature caused by taxi car, thereby causing physical injuries in different parts of her
drivers indeed demands corrective measures. body, suffering more particularly brain concussion which
subjected her to several physical examinations and to an
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
encephalograph test while her car was damaged to the extent of
Appeals.
P2,451.27. The damage to the taxicab amounted to P190.00
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. (Decision in Civil Case No. Q-5235, CFI, Rizal; Record on Appeal,
pp. 63-64; Decision, CA-G.R. No. 34832-R, Rollo, pp. 37-38).
PARAS, J.:
Dra. Prudenciado filed a complaint for damages at the Court of
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City against the Alliance
Court of Appeals dated May 4, 1971 in CA-G.R. No. 34832-R Transport System and Jose Leyson docketed as aforestated,
entitled Dra. Sofia L. Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Civil Case No. Q-5232 (Record on Appeal, pp. 2-11).
Inc. and Jose Leyson, which modified the decision2 of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-5235 After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
reducing the amount of moral damages from P25,000 to P2,000 City, found Jose Leyson guilty of negligence in the performance
and eliminating the award of exemplary damages and attorney's of his duties as taxicab driver which is the proximate cause of
fees but granting actual damages of P2, 451.27. the accident in question. On the other hand, defendant Alliance
Transport System, Inc. failed to prove to the satisfaction of the
The decretal portion of said decision reads: court that it had exercised the required diligence of a good father
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified, of the family in the selection, supervision and control of its
ordering appellants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum employees including defendant Leyson. Consequently, both
of P2,451.27 for actual damages representing the cost of the defendants were held jointly and severally liable for the physical
injuries suffered by the plaintiff Dra. Sofia L. Prudenciado as II THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
well as for the damage to her car, in addition to the other ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF
consequential damages prayed for. P5,000.00 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE FINDING
OF THE SAID COURT ON THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
APPLICABLE JUSTIFIED THE AWARD OF EXEMPLARY
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS judgment is DAMAGES AS HELD BY THE SAID TRIAL COURT;
rendered, one in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, by
III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT HER
ordering the said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the
DEMOTION IN RANK AS A PROFESSOR IN THE UNITED
plaintiff the sum of P2,451.27 for actual damages representing
STATES WAS NOT SUBSTANTIATED AND IN MAKING THIS
the cost for the repair of the car of plaintiff; P25,000.00 as moral
FINDING A BASIS FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE AWARD OF
damages; P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further
MORAL DAMAGES, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT IS ALREADY
sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees, with costs against the
TOO FAR-FETCHED AND IT MERELY CONFIRMS THE TRUTH
defendants." (Record on Appeal, pp. 71-73).
OF THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED SUFFERED LOSS OF HER
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision USUAL LIVELINESS; VIVACITY, ACTIVITY SELF-CONFIDENCE
on May 14, 1971 and denied petitioner's motion for AND THAT SHE FEELS UNCERTAIN AND INSECURE AND THAT
reconsideration in its resolution dated July 20,1971. SHE WAS SUBJECTED TO EXTREME FRIGHT AND SERIOUS
ANXIETY, SERIOUS APPREHENSION OF LOSING HER LIFE OR
Hence, this petition. HER SENSES OR REASON AND OF HER PHYSICAL MOBILITY
The petition was given due course in the resolution of this Court ANYTIME AND THAT SHE SUFFERED GREAT SHOCK AND
dated September 6, 1971 and petitioner filed her brief on SEVERE PAINS ON HER BACK NEAR THE LEFT SIDE OF HER
November 10, 1971 (Rollo, p. 69) while respondents filed their SPINAL COLUMN OF THE LUMBAR REGION;
brief on January 24, 1972 (Rollo, p. 86). Petitioner filed her IV THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN
Reply Brief on March 1, 1972 (Rollo, p. 96); after which the case ELIMINATING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE
was considered submitted for decision on the same date (Rollo, PETITIONERS NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID
p. 99). AWARD IS LEGAL AND PROPER;
In her brief, petitioner raised the following assignment of errors: V THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
I THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ELIMINATING THE COSTS TAXED AGAINST THE
REDUCING THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID
PETITIONER FROM P25,000.00 AWARDED BY THE COURT OF COSTS ARE LEGAL AND PROPER;
FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH V, QUEZON CITY, TO VI THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
P2,000.00 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THERE WAS THAT THE CLAIM OF DR. SOFIA L. PRUDENCIADO OF HER
NO FINDING THAT THE AWARD WAS PALPABLY AND LOSS OF HER USUAL LIVELINESS, VIVACITY, ACTIVITY AND
SCANDALOUSLY EXCESSIVE AS TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS HER USUAL SELF CONFIDENCE, SUCH THAT SHE NOW
THE RESULT OF PASSION OR CORRUPTION ON THE PART OF FEELS UNCERTAIN AND INSECURE. . . EXTREME FRIGHT
THE TRIAL COURT; AND SERIOUS ANXIETY, SERIOUS APPREHENSION OF
LOSING HER LIFE OR HER SENSES OR REASON; OF HER
PHYSICAL MOBILITY ANYTIME . . . GREAT SHOCK AND claim (which was sustained by the trial court) that because of
SEVERE PAINS ON HER BACK NEAR THE LEFT SIDE OF HER aforesaid concussion, she eventually lost her usual liveliness,
SPINAL COLUMN IN THE LUMBAR REGION IS vivacity, activity and her usual self-confidence, to the extent that
UNCORROBORATED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT OF THE now she feels uncertain and insecure, not to mention a sense of
CERTIFICATE, EXHIBIT "G" OF DR. DOMINADOR VERGARA, extreme fright and serious anxiety, serious apprehension of
OF THE VETERANS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND DR. CONRADO losing her life, or her senses or reason or her physical mobility
ARAMIL, BRAIN SPECIALIST AND THE CORROBORATING momentarily, plus experiences of great shock and severe pains
TESTIMONY OF THE LATTER AFTER EXAMINATION AND on her back near the left side of her spinal column in the lumbar
TREATMENT OF PETITIONER; region, was not supported by the deposition of Dr. Conrado
Aramil, the specialist who attended to the plaintiff from May 14
VII THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SO
to May 26, 1960 (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp. 72-73). From said
MODIFYING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
deposition, it was gathered that Dra. Prudenciado suffered a
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT HAD NO POWER TO
mild abnormality, compatible with mild concussion of the brain
DO SO UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
(TSN, July 13, 1960, pp. 47-48); that the symptoms of any brain
CASE AS FOUND BY THE COURT OF APPEALS;
concussion usually are headache, dizziness, vomiting and lack
VIII THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN of pep or alertness; and that the possible after effects that may
MODIFYING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT be produced are persistent or irregular headaches, fluctuating
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE DECISION OF SAID dizziness. Accordingly, Dra. Prudenciado was advised "Just to
TRIAL COURT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. watch herself if she would develop any alarming symptoms such
as headache, dizziness or vomitings, to have her rechecked after
The Court of Appeals and the trial court are in accord in the several months for her to be sure." (16 id, pp. 51-52). It might
finding that the accident was caused by the negligence of the also produce intellectual deterioration or lessening of
taxi driver. The bone of contention is however in the award of intelligence, and even insanity.
damages, which crystalizes the errors assigned into one main
issue, which is whether or not the Court of Appeals is justified Dra. Prudenciado sought to establish that she had precisely
in modifying or changing the grant of damages by the trial court. suffered all those after effects except insanity; but the Court of
Appeals ruled that her proof consisted merely in her own
It is well settled that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are uncorroborated testimony. In support of her allegation she could
binding on the Supreme Court, but said findings are subject to not show any medical certificate tending to prove that she was
scrutiny if such are diametrically opposed to those of the trial indeed medically treated abroad f or her brain ailment nor was
court (Samson v. CA, et al., G.R. No. L-40071, January there any showing in the documents presented that she was
29,1986). demoted to the rank of technical assistant because the San
The Court of Appeals concedes that a concussion of the brain Francisco State College does not believe in her mental capacity
was suffered by Dra. Prudenciado but as to how serious was the any more.
concussion or how it had later become, and the disastrous Finally, her statements that she is almost completely losing her
extent of the injuries which she alleges to have sustained as a voice, that she has a terrible headache when her head is
result of the accident, are seriously doubted by said Appellate pressed, that she has lost her sense of taste, that she is nervous
Court. Specifically, said Court finds that Dra. Prudenciado's and temperamental and that she has lapses of memory, are
belied by the deposition of Dr. Aramil that the patient's EEG was ruling, reduced the awards of moral and exemplary damages
already normal on May 26, 1960; and on cross-examination he which were far too excessive compared to the actual losses
declared that she was clinically symtomless when she was sustained by the aggrieved parties and where the records show
discharged from the hospital (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp. 75-76; 78- that the injury suffered was not serious or gross and, therefore,
79). out of proportion to the amount of damages generously awarded
by the trial court.
There is no argument that moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched In any case the Court held that "moral damages are emphatically
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a
and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to
moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to
of defendant's wrongful act or omission (People v. Baylon, 129 alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the
SCRA 62 [1984]). defendants' culpable action." The award of moral damages must
be proportionate to the suffering inflicted (R & B Surety &
In the same manner, it is undisputed that the trial courts are
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA
given discretion to determine the amount of moral damages
745 [1984] citing Grand Union Supermarket, Coming back to
(Alcantara v. Surro, 93 Phil. 472) and that the Court of Appeals
the case at bar, a careful review of the records makes it readily
can only modify or change the amount awarded when they are
apparent that the injuries sustained by Dra. Prudenciado are
palpably and scandalously excessive "so as to indicate that it
not as serious or extensive as they were claimed to be, to warrant
was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of
the damages awarded by the trial court. In fact, a closer scrutiny
the trial court (Gellada v. Warner Barnes & Co., Inc., 57 O.G. (4)
of the exhibits showing a moderate damage to the car can by no
7347, 7358; Sadie v. Bachrach Motors Co., Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 636
stretch of the imagination produce a logical conclusion that
and Adone v. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., 57 O.G. 656). But in
such disastrous effects of the accident sought to be established,
more recent cases where the awards of moral and exemplary
actually took place, not to mention the fact that such were not
damages are far too excessive compared to the actual losses
supported by the medical findings presented. Unquestionably,
sustained by the aggrieved party, this Court ruled that they
therefore, the damages imposed by the lower court should be
should be reduced to more reasonable amounts.
reduced to more reasonable levels.
Thus, in the case of San Andres v. Court of Appeals (116 SCRA
On the other hand, it will be observed that the reduction of the
85 [1982]) the Supreme Court ruled that while the amount of
damages made by the Court of Appeals is both too drastic and
moral damages is a matter left largely to the sound discretion of
unrealistic, to pass the test of reasonableness, which appears to
a court, the same when found excessive should be reduced to
be the underlying basis to justify such reduction.
more reasonable amounts, considering the attendant facts and
circumstances. Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary While the damages sought to be recovered were not satisfactorily
estimation, are in the category of an award designed to established to the extent desired by the petitioner, it was
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to nonetheless not disputed that an accident occurred due to the
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. fault and negligence of the respondents; that Dra. Prudenciado
suffered a brain concussion which although mild, can
In a much later case (Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA
admittedly produce the effects complained of by her and that
578-579 [1985]), the Supreme court, reiterating the above
these symptoms can develop af ter several years and can lead to
some serious handicaps or predispose the patient to other PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision of the Court
sickness (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp. 52-54). Being a doctor by of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED Insofar as the award of
profession, her f ears can be more real and intense than an damages is concerned; and respondents are ordered to
ordinary person. Otherwise stated, she is undeniably a proper jointly and severally pay the petitioner; (1) the sum of
recipient of moral damages which are proportionate to her suff P2,451.27 for actual damages representing the cost of the
ering. repair of her car; (2) the sum of P15,000.00 as moral
damages; (3) the sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
As to exemplary damages, Article 2231 of the Civil Code
and (4) the sum of P3,000.00 as attorney's fees, No
provides:
pronouncement as to costs.
"In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the
SO ORDERED.
defendant acted with grave negligence."
Fernan (Chairman), Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the
and Cortes, JJ., concur.
name implies, to provide an example or correction for the public
good (Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA Decision modified.
431).
Notes.—While moral damages are incapable of pecuniary
The findings of the trial court in the case at bar which became estimation, they are recoverable, if they are the proximate result
the basis of the award of exemplary damages are to the effect of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. (Yutuk vs. Manila
that it is more apparent from the facts, conditions and Electric Company, 2 SCRA 337.)
circumstances obtaining in the record of the case that
While contributory negligence on the part of the injured party
respondent driver was running at high speed after turning to the
justifies the reduction of moral damages in a breach of contract
right along Taft Ave. coming from Ayala Boulevard, considering
of carriage, it does not justify the exemption from liability of the
that the traffic was clear. Failing to notice petitioner's car, he
driver. (Laguna-Tayabas Bus Co, vs. Cornista, 11 SCRA 181.)
failed to apply his brakes and did not even swerve to the right to
avoid the collision (Record on Appeal, pp. 89-70).
The Court of Appeals conforms with aforesaid findings of the ——o0o——
trial court but is not prepared to accept that there was gross
negligence on the part of the driver to justify the imposition of Prudenciado vs. Alliance Transport System, Inc., 148 SCRA
exemplary damages. 440, No. L-33836 March 16, 1987
It is from said judgment, as thus reconsidered, that both parties As to Cenon S. Cervantes it would appear that in Flight No. 6 of
have appealed. PAN-AM on September 29, 1958 from Bangkok to Hongkong, he
and his wife had to take tourist class, although they had first
Defendant, as stated, has from the start admitted that it class tickets, which they had previously confirmed, because
breached its contracts with plaintiffs to provide them with first their seats in first class were given to “passengers from London.”
class accommodations in its Tokyo-San Francisco flight of May
24, 1960. In its appeal, however, it takes issue with the finding Against the foregoing, however, defendant’s evidence would seek
of the court a quo that it acted in bad faith in the branch of said to establish its theory of honest mistake, thus:
contracts. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, raise questions on the
The first class reservations of Senator Lopez and party were
amount of damages awarded in their favor, seeking that the
made on March 29, 1960 together with those of four members
same be increased to a total of P650,000.
of the Rufino family, for a total of eight (8) seats, as shown in
their joint reservation card (Exh. 1). Subsequently, on March 30, PAN-AM’s reservations supervisor Alberto Jose, discovered
1960, two other Rufinos secured reservations and were given a Herranz’s mistake after “Your Travel Guide” phone on May 18,
separate reservation card (Exh. 2). A new reservation card 1960 to state that Senator Lopez and party were, going to depart
consisting of two pages (Exhs. 3 and 4) was then made for the as scheduled. Accordingly, Jose sent a telex wire on that date to
original of eight passengers, namely, Senator Lopez and party PAN-AM’s head office at San Francisco to report the error and
and four members of the Rufino family, the first page (Exh. 3) asked said office to continue holding the reservations of Senator
referring to 2 Lopezes, 2 Montelibanos and 1 Rufino and the Lopez and party (Annex B-Acker’s to Exh. 6). Said message was
second page (Exh. 4) referring to 3 Rufinos. On April 18, 1960 reiterated by Jose in his telex wire of May 19, 1960 (Annex C-
“Your Travel Guide” agency cancelled the reservations of the Acker’s to Exh. 6). San Francisco head office replied on May 19,
Rufinos. A telex message was thereupon sent on that date to 1960 that it regrets being unable to confirm Senator Lopez and
PAN-AM’s head office at San Francisco by Mariano Herranz, party for the reason that the flight was solidly booked (Exh. 7).
PAN-AM’s reservations employee at its office in Escolta, Manila. Jose sent a third telex wire on May 20, 1960 addressed to PAN-
(Annex A-Acker’s to Exh. 6.) In said message, however, Herranz AM’s offices at San Francisco, New York (Idlewild Airport), Tokyo
mistakenly cancelled all the seats that had been reserved, that and Hongkong, asking all-out assistance towards restoring the
is, including those of Senator Lopez and party. cancelled spaces and for report of cancellations at their end
(Annex D-Acker’s to Exh. 6). San Francisco head office reiterated
The next day—April 1960—Herranz discovered his mistake,
on May 20, 1960 that it could not reinstate the spaces and
upon seeing the reservation card newly prepared by his co-
referred Jose to the Tokyo and Hongkong offices (Exh. 8). Also
employee Pedro Asensi for Sen. Lopez and party to the exclusion
on May 20, the Tokyo office of PAN-AM wired Jose stating it will
of the Rufinos (Exh. 5). It was then that Herranz sent another
do everything possible (Exh. 9).
telex wire to the San Francisco head office, stating his error and
asking for the reinstatement of the four (4) first class seats Expecting that some cancellations of bookings would be made
reserved for Senator Lopez and party (Annex A-Velasco’s to Exh. before the flight time, Jose decided to withhold from Senator
6). San Francisco head office replied on April 22, 1960 that Lopez and party, or their agent, the information that their
Senator Lopez and party are waitlisted and that said office is reservations had been cancelled.
unable to reinstate them (Annex B-Velasco’s to Exh. 6).
Armando Davila having previously confirmed Senator Lopez and
Since the flight involved was still more than a month away and party’s first class reservations to PAN-AM’s ticket sellers at its
confident that reinstatement would be made, Herranz forgot the Manila Hotel office, the latter sold and issued in their favor the
matter and told no one about it except his co-employee, either corresponding first class tickets on the 21st and 23rd of May,
Armando Davila or Pedro Asensi or both of them (Tsn., 123-124, 1960.
127, Nov. 17, 1961).
From the foregoing evidence of defendant it is in effect admitted
Subsequently, on April 27, 1960, Armando Davila, PANAM’s that defendant—through its agents—first cancelled plaintiffs’
reservations employee working in the same Escolta office as reservations by mistake and thereafter deliberately and
Herranz, phoned PAN-AM’s ticket sellers at its other office in the intentionally withheld from plaintiffs or their travel agent the
Manila Hotel, and confirmed the reservations of Senator Lopez fact of said cancellation, in fact they had none, defendant
and party. wilfully and knowingly placed itself into the position of having to
breach its aforesaid contracts with plaintiffs should there be no
lastminute cancellation by other passengers before flight time,
as it turned out in this case. Such actuation of defendant may cancellation and for which II would like them to know that I am
indeed have been prompted by nothing more than the promotion very sorry.
of its self-interest in holding on to Senator Lopez and party as
x x x x x
passengers in its flight and foreclosing on their chances to seek
the services of other airlines that may have been able to afford “Q So it was not your duty to notify Sen. Lopez and parties that
them first class accommodations. All the time, in legal their reservations had been cancelled since May 18, 1960?
contemplation such conduct already amounts to action m bad
faith. For bad faith means a bleach of a known duty through “A As I said before it was my duty. It was my duty but as I said
some motive of interest or ill-will (Spiegel vs. Beacon again with respect to that duty I have the power to make a
Participations, 8 NE 2d 895, 907). As stated in Kamm v. Flink. decision or use my discretion and judgment whether I should go
113 N J.L. 582, 175 A. 62, 99 A.L.R. 1, 7: “Self-enrichment or ahead and tell the passenger about the cancellation.” (Tsn., pp.
fraternal interest, and not personal ill-will, may well have been 17-19, 28-29, March 15, 1962.)
the motive; but it is malice nevertheless.” At the time plaintiffs bought their tickets, defendant, therefore,
As of May 18, 1960 defendant’s reservations supervisor Alberto in breach of its known duty, made plaintiffs believe that their
Jose knew that plaintiffs’ reservations had been cancelled As of reservation had not been cancelled. An additional indication of
May 20 he knew that the San Francisco head office stated with this is the fact that upon the face of the two tickets of record,
finality that it could not reinstate plaintiffs’ cancelled namely, the ticket issued to Alfredo Montelibano, Jr. on May 21,
reservations And yet said reseivations supervisor made the 1960 (Exh. 22) and that issued to Mrs. Alfredo Monteliba-no,
“decision”—to use his own word—to withhold the information Jr., on May 23, 1960 (Exh. 23), the reservation status is stated
from the plaintiffs Said Alberto Jose in his testimony: as “OK”. Such willful-non-disclosure of the cancellation or
pretense that the reservations for plaintiffs stood—and not
“Q Why did you not notify them? simply the erroneous cancellation itself—is the factor to which
is attributable the breach of the resulting contracts. And, as
“A Well, you see, sir, in my fifteen (15) years of service with the
above-stated, in this respect defendant clearly acted in bad faith.
air lines business my experience is that even if the flights are
solidly booked months in advance, usually the flight departs As if to further emphasize its bad faith on the matter, defendant
with plenty of empty seats both on the first class and tourist subsequently promoted the employee who cancelled plaintiffs’
class. This is due to late cancellation of passengers, or because reservations and told them nothing about it. The record shows
passengers do not show up in the airport, and it was our hope that said employee—Mariano Herranz—was not subjected to
others come in from another flight and, therefore, are delayed investigation and suspension by defendant but instead was
and, therefore, missed their connections. This experience of given a reward in the form of an increase of salary in June of the
mine, coupled with that wire from Tokyo that they would do following year (Tsn., 86-88, Nov. 20, 1961).
everything possible prompted me to withhold the information,
but unfortunately, instead of the first class seat that I was At any rate, granting all the mistakes advanced by the
hoping for and which I anticipated only the tourists class was defendant, there would at least be negligence so gross and
open on which Senator and Mrs. Lopez, Mr. and Mrs. reckless as to amount to malice or bad faith (Fores vs. Miranda,
Montelibano were accommodated. Well, I fully realize now the L-12163, March 4, 1959; Necesito v. Paras, L-10605-06, June
gravity of my decision in not advising Senator and Mrs. Lopez, 30, 1958). Firstly, notwithstanding the entries m the reservation
Mr. and Mrs. Montelibano nor their agents about the erroneous cards (Exhs. 1 & 3) that the reservations cancelled are those of
the Rufinos only, Heri-anz made the mistake, after reading said third, a written contract for an attorney’s services shall control
entries, of sending a wire cancelling all the reservations, the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
including those of Senator Lopez and party (Tsn., pp. 108-109, unconscionable or unreasonable (Sec. 24, Rule 138, Rules of
Nov. 17, 1961). Secondly, after sending a wire to San Francisco Court).
head office on April 19, 1960 stating his error and asking for
First, then, as to moral damages. As a proximate result of
reinstatement, Herranz simply forgot about the matter.
defendant’s breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs,
Notwithstanding the reply of San Francisco head Office on April
the latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious
22, 1960 that it cannot reinstate Senator Lopez and party
anxiety and mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling with
(Annex B-Velasco’s to Exh. 6), it was assumed and taken for
first class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given
granted that reinstatement would be made. Thirdly, Armando
only the tourist class. At stop-overs they were expected to be
Davila confirmed plaintiff’s reservations in a phone call on April
among the firstclass passengers by those awaiting to welcome
27, 1960 to defendant’s ticket sellers, when at the time it
them, only to be found among the tourist passengers. It may not
appeared in plaintiffs’ reservation card (Exh. 5) that they were
be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers.; it is humiliating
only waitlisted passengers. Fourthly, defendant’s ticket sellers
to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully
issued plaintiffs’ tickets on May 21 and 23, 1960, without first
to be expected from the contractual undertaking.
checking their reservations just before issuing said tickets. And,
finally, no one among defendant’s agents notified Senator Lopez Senator Lopez was then Senate President Pro Tempore.
and party that their reservations had been cancelled, a International carriers like defendant know the prestige of such
precaution that could have averted their entering with defendant an office. For the Senate is not only the Upper Chamber of the
into contracts that the latter had already placed beyond its Philippine Congress, but the nation’s treaty-ratifying body. It
power to perform. may also be mentioned that in his aforesaid office Senator Lopez
was in a position to preside in impeachment cases should the
Accordingly, there being a clear admission in defendant’s
Senate sit as Impeachment Tribunal. And he was former Vice-
evidence of facts amounting to a bad faith on its part in regard
President of the Philippines. Senator Lopez was going to the
to the breach of its contracts with plaintiffs, it becomes
United States to attend a private business conference of the
unnecessary to further discuss the evidence adduced by
Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company; but his aforesaid rank and
plaintiffs to establish defendant’s bad faith. For what is admitted
position were by no means left behind, and in fact he had a
in the course of the trial does not need to be proved (Sec. 2, Rule
second engagement awaiting him in the United States: a
129, Rules of Court).
banquet tendered by Filipino friends in his honor as Senate
Addressing ourselves now to the question of damages, it is well President Pro Tempore (Tsn., pp. 14-15, NOV. 25, 1960). For the
to state at the outset those rules and principles. First, moral moral damages sustained by him, therefore, an award of
damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where the P100,000.00 is appropriate.
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art. 2220, New Civil
Mrs. Maria J. Lopez, as wife of Senator Lopez, shared
Code). Second, in addition to moral damages, exemplary or
corrective damages may be imposed by way of example or Lopez, et al. vs. Pan American World Airways
correction for the public good, in breach of contract where the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil Code). And,
his prestige and therefore his humiliation. In addition she recounted, is in fact the reason for the former’s existence, and
suffered physical discomfort during the 13-hour trip (5 hours is recognized by the airline in charging a higher fare for it and
from Tokyo to Honolulu and 8 hours from Honolulu to San by the passengers in paying said higher rate Accordingly,
Francisco). Although Senator Lopez stated that “she was quite considering the totality of her suffering and humiliation, an
well” (Tsn., p. 22, Nov. 25, 1960)—he obviously meant relatively award to Mrs. Maria J. Lopez of P50,000.00 for moral damages
well, since the rest of his statement is that two months before, will be reasonable.
she was attacked by severe flu and lost 10 pounds of weight and
Mr. and Mrs. Alfredo Montelibano, Jr., were travelling as
that she was advised by Dr. Sison to go to the United States as
immediate members of the family of Senator Lopez. They formed
soon as possible for medical check-up and relaxation (Ibid). In
part of the Senator’s party as shown also by the reservation
fact, Senator Lopez stated, as shown a few pages after in the
cards of PAN-AM. As such they likewise shared his prestige and
transcript of his testimony, that Mrs. Lopez was sick when she
humiliation. Although defendant contends that a few weeks
left the Philippines:
before the flight they had asked their reservations to be charged
“A. from first class to tourist class—which did not materialize due
to alleged full booking in the tourist class—the same does not
Well, my wife really felt very bad during the entire trip from
mean they suffered no shared in having to take tourist class
Tokyo to San Francisco. In the first place, she was sick when we
during the flight. For by that time they had already been made
left the Philippines, and then with that discomfort which she
to pay for first class seats and therefore to expect first class
[experienced] or suffered during that evening, it was her worst
accommodations. As stated, it is one thing to take the tourist
experience. I myself, who was not sick, could not sleep because
class by free choice; a far different thing to be compelled to take
of the discomfort.” (Tsn., pp. 27-28, Nov. 25, 1960).
it notwithstanding having paid for first class seats. Plaintiffs-
It is not hard to see that in her condition then a physical appellants now ask P37,500.00 each for the two but we note that
discomfort sustained for thirteen hours may well be considered in their motion for reconsideration .filed in the court a quo, they
a physical suffering. And even without regard to the noise and were satisfied with P25,000.00 each for said persons. (Record on
trepidation inside the plane—which defendant contends, upon Appeal, p. 102). For their social humiliation, therefore, the
the strength of expert testimony, to be practically the same in award to them of P25,000.00 each is reasonable.
first class and tourist class—the fact that the seating spaces in
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the
the tourist class are quite narrower than in first class, there
name implies, to provide an example or correction for public
being six seats to a row in the former as against four to a row in
good. Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith, the
the latter, and that in tourist class there is very little space for
court, as stated earlier, may award exemplary damages in
reclining in view of the closer distance between rows (Tsn.r p.
addition to moral damages (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil Code).
24, Nov. 25, 1960), will suffice to show that the aforesaid
passenger indeed experienced physical suffering during the trip. In view of its nature, it should be imposed in such an amount
Added to this, of course, was the painful thought that she was as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of contracts
deprived by defendant—after having- paid for and expected the in the future by defendant or other airlines. In this light, we find
same—of the most suitable place for her, the first class, where it just to award P75,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages.
evidently the best of everything would have been given her, the
Now, as to attorney’s fees, the record shows a written contract
best seat, service, food and treatment. Such difference in
of services executed on June 1, 1960 (Exh. F) whereunder
comfort between first class and tourist class is too obvious to be
plaintiffs-appellants engaged the services of their counsel—Atty. the following: (1) P200,000.00 as moral damages, divided
Vicente J. Francisco—and agreed to pay the sum of P25,000.00 among plaintiffs, thus: P100,000.00 for Senate President
as attorney’s fees upon the termination of the case in the Court Pro Tempore Fernando Lopez; P50,000.00 for his wife Maria
of First Instance, and an additional sum of P25,000.00 in the J. Lopez; P25.000.00 for his son-in-law Alfredo Montelibano,
event the case is appealed to the Supreme Court. As said earlier, Jr.; and P25,000.00 for his daughter Mrs. Alfredo
a written contract for attorney’s services shall control the Montelibano, Jr.; (2) P75,000.00 as exemplary or corrective
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be damages; (3) interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on
unconscionable or unreasonable. A consideration of the subject the moral and exemplary damages aforestated, from
matter of the present controversy, of the professional standing December 14, 1963, the date of the amended decision of the
of the attorney for plaintiffs-appellants, and of the extent of the court a quo, until said damages are fully paid; (4) P50,000.00
service rendered by him, shows that said amount provided for as attorney’s fees; and (5) the costs. Counterclaim
in the written agreement is reasonable. Said lawyer—whose dismissed. So ordered.
prominence in the legal profession is well known—studied the
Chief Justice Bengzon and Justices Bautista Angelo,
case, prepared and filed the complaint, conferred with
Concepcion, J.B.L. Reyes, Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar
witnesses, analyzed documentary evidence, personally appeared
and Sanchez, concur. Justice Dizon is on leave.
at the trial of the case in twenty-two days during a period of
three years, prepared four sets of cross-interrogatories for Judgment modified.
deposition taking, prepared several memoranda and the motion
for reconsideration, filed a joint record on appeal with defendant, Note.—As to cases similar to the Lopez case, see Northwest
filed a brief for plaintiffs as appellants consisting of 45 printed Airlines, Inc. vs. Cuenca, L-22425, Aug. 31, 1965 and Air France
pages and a brief for plaintiffs as appellees consisting of 265 vs. Carrascoso, L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966. Lopez, et al. vs. Pan
printed pages. And we are further convinced of its American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431, No. L-22415 March 30,
reasonableness because defendant’s counsel likewise valued at 1966
P50,000.00 the proper compensation for his services rendered
to defendant in the trial court and on appeal.
In concluding, let it be stressed that the amount of damages
awarded in this appeal has been determined by adequately
considering the official, political, social, and financial standing
of the offended parties on one hand, and the business and
financial position of the offender on the other (Domingding v. Ng,
55 O.G. 10). And further considering the present rate of
exchange and the terms at which the amount of damages
awarded would approximately be in U.S. dollars, this Court is
all the more of the view that said award is proper and
reasonable.