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Yu Con vs.

Ipil | Araullo (1916)

FACTS
 Respondent, Yu Con (Yu Con), chartered the banca “Maria” – owned by petitioner Narciso Lauron
(Lauron) with Gilcerio Ipil (Ipil) as its master and Juto Solamo (Solamo) as it supercargo – to transport certain
merchandise and money from the port of Cebu to Catmon.
 Yu Con loaded the merchandise and delivered the money, placed in a trunk, to Ipil and Solamo.
 Allegedly because there was no more room for Yu Con’s trunk, Ipil and Solamo transferred the money to their own
trunk in the stateroom.
 Before the ship could sail, the trunk and the money placed therein disappeared.

ISSUES/HELD
 Are the petitioners liable for the loss? – YES.

RATIONALE
 It is therefore beyond all doubt that the loss of the money occurred through the manifest fault and
negligence of Ipil and Solamo.
o They failed to take the necessary precautions in order that the stateroom containing the trunk in which they
kept the money should be properly guarded by members of the crew and they also did not expressly station
some person inside the stateroom for the guarding and safe-keeping of the trunk.
o All of these circumstances, together with that of its having been impossible to know who took the trunk and
the money, make the conduct of Ipil, Solamo, and the other crew members eminently supicious and prevent
our holding that the disappearance or loss of the money was due to a fortuitous event, to force majeure.
 Ipil and Solamo were depositaries of the sum in question and, having failed to exercise the diligence required by
the nature of the obligation of safe-keeping assumed by them and by the circumstances of the time and the place,
it is evident that they are liable for its loss or misplacement and must restore it.
 With respect to Lauron, he is also liable in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Commerce in force
because, as the proprietor and owner of the vessel who executed a contract of carriage with Yu Con,
there occurred the loss, theft, or robbery of the P450 that belonged to Yu Con through the negligence of Ipil and
Solamo and which theft does not appear to have been committed by a person not belonging to the craft.
 The old Code of Commerce absolved the shipowner from liability for the negligence of the captain
and its crew but, in the light of the principles of modern law, this doctrine on the non-liability of the
shipowner for the unlawful acts, crimes or quasi crimes, committed by the captain and the crew can
no longer be maintained in its absolute and categorical terms.
o In maritime commerce, the shippers and passengers in making contracts with the captain do so through the
confidence they have in the shipowner who appointed him; they presume that the owner made a most careful
investigation before appointing him, and, above all, they themselves are unable to make such an investigation,
and even though they should do so, they could not obtain complete security, inasmuch as the shipowner can,
whenever he sees fit, appoint another captain instead.
o Thus, it is only proper that the shipowner should be made liable.

Lopez vs. Duruelo Case Digest


Lopez vs. Duruelo
52 Phil 229

Facts: On February 10, 1927, plaintiff Augusto Lopez was desirous of embarking upon the interisland
steamer San Jacinto in order to go to Cebu, the plaintiff embarked at the landing in the motorboat
Jison which was engaged in conveying passengers and luggage back and forth from the landing to
the boats at anchor.

As the motorboat approached San Jacinto in a perfectly quiet sea, it came too near to the stern of the
ship, and as the propeller of the ship had not yet ceased to turn, the blades of the propeller strucked
the motorboat and sank it at once. As it sank, the plaintiff was thrown into the water against the
propeller, and the revolving blades inflicted various injuries upon him. The plaintiff was hospitalized.
He filed a complaint seeking to recover damages from the defendant. The defendant however alleged
that the complaint does not have a right of action, a demurrer was submitted directed to the fact that
the complaint does not allege that the protest had been presented by the plaintiff, within twenty-four
hours after the occurrence to the competent authority at the port where the accident occurred as
provided for Article 835 of the Code of Commerce.

Issue: Whether the motorboat Jison is a vessel provided for by Article 835 of the Code of Commerce?

Held: The word vessel as used in the third section of tile IV, Book III of the Code of Commerce, dealing
with collisions, does not include all ships, craft or floating structures of any kind without limitation. The
said section does not apply to minor craft engaged in a river and bay traffic.Therefore, a passenger
on boat like the Jison, is not required to make protest as a condition precedent to his right of action for
the injury suffered by him in the collision described in the complaint.Article 835 of the Code of
Commerce does not apply.

G.R. No. 108433 October 15, 1996

WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and WALLEM


SHIPMANAGEMENT LTD., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSELITO V.
MACATUNO,
FACTS: Private respondent Joselito V. Macatuno was hired by Wallem
Shipmanagement Limited thru its local manning agent, Wallem Maritime Services,
Inc., as an able-bodied seaman on board the M/T Fortuna, a vessel of Liberian
registry. Pursuant to the contract of employment, private respondent was employed
for ten (10) months covering the period February 26, 1989 until December 26, 1989
with a monthly salary of two hundred seventy-six US dollars (US $276); among
others xxxx
On June 24, 1989, while the vessel was berthed at the port of Kawasaki, Japan, an
altercation took place between private respondent and fellow Filipino crew member,
Julius E. Gurimbao, on the one hand, and a cadet/apprentice officer of the same
nationality as the captain of the vessel on the other hand. The master entered the
incident in the tanker’s logbook.
As a consequence, private respondent and Gurimbao were repatriated to the
Philippines where they lost no time in lodging separate complaints for illegal
dismissal with the POEA. According to the affidavit private respondent executed
before a POEA administering officer, the following facts led to the filing of the
complaint.
At about 5:50 a.m. of June 24, 1989, private respondent was on duty along with
Gurimbao, checking the manifold of the vessel and looking for oil leakages, when a
cadet/apprentice who was of the same nationality as the vessel’s captain (Singh),
approached them. He ordered Gurimbao to use a shovel in draining the water which,
mixed with oil and dirt, had accumulated at the rear portion of the upper deck of the
vessel.
Gurimbao explained to the cadet/apprentice that throwing dirty and oily water
overboard was prohibited by the laws of Japan; in fact, port authorities were roaming
and checking the sanitary conditions of the port. The cadet/apprentice got mad and,
shouting, ordered Gurimbao to get a hose and siphon off the water. To avoid trouble,
Gurimbao used a shovel in throwing the dirty water into the sea.
Having finished his job, Gurimbao complained to private respondent about the
“improper and unauthorized act” of the cadet/apprentice. The two then went to the
cadet/apprentice who was idly standing in a corner. They reminded him that as a mere
apprentice and not an officer of the vessel, he had no right whatsoever to order around
any member of the crew. However, the cadet/apprentice reacted violently — shouting
invectives and gesturing “as if challenging” the two to a fight. To prevent him from
“intimidating” them, private respondent pushed twice the cadet/apprentice’s chest
while Gurimbao “mildly hit” his arm. Frantic and shouting, the cadet/apprentice ran to
the captain “who happened to witness the incident” from the cabin’s window.
The captain summoned private respondent and Gurimbao. With
their bosun (head of the deck crew), they went to the captain’s
cabin. The captain told them to pack up their things as their
services were being terminated. They would disembark at the next
port, the Port of Ube, from where they would be flown home to the
Philippines, the repatriation expenses to be shouldered by them.
The two attempted to explain their side of the incident but the
captain ignored them and firmly told them to go home.

xxxxx
A few days after their arrival in Manila or on July 1, 1989, one James Nichols told
private respondent that they could not secure a reimbursement of their repatriation
expenses nor could they get their salaries for the month of June.
Petitioner’s Defense: [basta pasaway daw ung mga respondents] alleged that the
incident was not the first infraction committed by the two xxx
POEA held the dismissal to be illegal; NLRC affirmed; Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was illegal dismissal.
HELD: YES.
An employer may dismiss or lay off an employee only for the just and authorized
causes enumerated in Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code. However, this basic
and normal prerogative of an employer is subject to regulation by the State in the
exercise of its paramount police power. One’ s employment, profession,
trade or calling is a property right within the protection of the
constitutional guaranty of due process of law.
We agree with petitioners that the ship captain’s logbook is a vital evidence as Article
612 of the Code of Commerce requires him to keep a record of the decisions he had
adopted as the vessel’s head. Thus, inHaverton Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC, 10 the Court
held that a copy of an official entry in the logbook is legally binding
and serves as an exception to the hearsay rule.
However, the Haverton Shipping ruling does not find unqualified application in the
case at bar. In said case, an investigation of the incident which led to the seaman’s
dismissal was conducted before he was dismissed.11
Consequently, the facts appearing in the logbook were supported
by the facts gathered at the investigation. In this case, because no
investigation was conducted by the ship captain before
repatriating private respondent, the contents of the logbook have
to be duly identified and authenticated lest an injustice result
from a blind adoption of such contents which merely serve
as prima facie evidence of the incident in question.

Moreover, petitioners did not submit as evidence to the POEA the logbook itself, or
even authenticated copies of pertinent pages thereof, which could have been easily
xeroxed or photocopied considering the present technology on reproduction of
documents. 13 What was offered in evidence was merely a typewritten collation of
excerpts from what couldbe the logbook 14 because by their format, they could have
been lifted from other records kept in the vessel in accordance with Article 612 of the
Code of Commerce.
Under the Table of Offenses and Corresponding Administrative Penalties appended to
the contract of employment entered into by petitioners and private respondent, the
offense described by the logbook entry may well fall under
insubordination and may constitute assaulting a superior officer
“with the use of deadly weapon” punishable with dismissal if the
victim is indeed a “superior officer.” However, an “apprentice
officer” cannot be considered a “superior officer.”
The aforequoted entry in the logbook is so sketchy that, unsupported by other
evidence, it leaves so many questions unanswered.
Petitioners’ failure to substantiate the grounds for a valid dismissal was aggravated by
the manner by which the employment of private respondent was terminated. Thus,
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, amending paragraph (b) of Article 278 of the Labor
Code, imposed as a condition sine qua non that any termination of
employment under the grounds provided in Article 283 must be
done only after notice and formal investigation have been accorded
the supposed errant worker.
As regards the notice requirement, the Court has stated:
On the issue of due process . . . , the law requires the employer to furnish the
worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a
statement of the cause or causes for termination and shall afford him ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a representative.
Specifically, the employer must furnish the worker with two (2) written notices before
termination of employment can be legally effected: (a) notice which apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (b)
the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to
dismiss him. (Emphasis supplied.) 22
Neither is the ship captain’s having witnessed the altercation an
excuse for dispensing with the notice and hearing requirements.
Serving notice to private respondent under the circumstances
cannot be regarded as an “absurdity and superfluity.”

Petition Denied.

PHILIPPINE REFINING
COMPANY V. JARQUE
FACTS:
Plaintiff Philippine Refining Co. and defendant Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor
vessels Pandan and Zargazo. The documents were recorded as transfer and encumbrances of the
vessels for the port of Cebu and each was denominated a chattel mortgage.

The first two mortgages did not have an affidavit of good faith. A fourth mortgage was executed by
Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz over motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the Chattel Mortgage
Registry on May 12, 1932, within the period of 30 days prior to the foreclosure/institution of the
insolvency proceedings.

Jose Curaminas filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition praying that Francisco Jarque be declared an
insolvent debtor. This was granted and Jarque’s properties were then assigned to Curaminas.

A problem arose when Judge Jose Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages,
and instead, ruled that they were defective because they did not have affidavits of good faith.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the mortgages of the vessels are governed by the Chattel Mortgage Law
2. Whether or not an affidavit of good faith is needed to enforce achattel mortgage on a vessel
RULING:
Yes. “Personal property” includes vessels. They are subject to the provisions of the Chattel
Mortgage Law. The Chattel Mortgage Law says that a good chattel mortgage includes an affidavit of
good faith. The absence of such affidavit makes mortgage unenforceable against creditors and
subsequent encumbrances. The judge was correct.

Note: A mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages. The only difference between
a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that the first must be
noted in the registry of the register of deeds.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK/NATIONAL INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT


CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:

To finance the acquisition of 7 shipping vessels, the Philippine International Shipping


Corporation (PISC) applied for and was granted by National Investment Development
Corporation (NIDC) guaranty accomodations. As security for these guaranty accomodations,
PISC executed chattel mortgages on the vessels to be acquired by it. Meanwhile, PISC entered
into a contract with Hong Kong United Dockyards, Ltd. for the repair and conversion of one of
the vessels, M/V Asean Liberty. The Central Bank of the Phils. authorized PISC to open with
China Banking Corporation (CBC) a standby letter of credit for US$545,000 in favor of
Citibank, N.A. to cover the repair and partial conversion of the vessel M/V Asean Liberty. PISC
executed an Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit for US$545,000 with
CBC in favor of Citibank. CBC then issued its Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit for
US$545,000 in favor of Citibank for the account of PISC. PISC executed a promissory note for
US$545,000 in favor of Citibank pursuant to the Loan Agreement between PISC and Citibank.
Upon failure of PISC to fulfill its obligations, Citibank sent CBC a letter drawing on the Letter of
Credit. CBC then instructed its correspondent Irving Trust Co. to pay to Citibank the amount of
US$242,225. Subsequently, for failure of PISC to settle its obligations under the guaranty
accommodations, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) conducted an auction sale of the
mortgaged vessels. NIDC emerged as the highest bidder in these auctions. PISC, claiming that
the foreclosure sale of its mortgaged vessels was illegal and irregular, instituted a civil case for
the annulment of the foreclosure and auction sale. CBC filed a complaint in intervention for
recovery upon a maritime lien against the proceeds of the sale of the foreclosed vessels.

Issue:

Whether or not CBC’s claim as evidenced by its Irrevocable Letter of Credit is in the nature of a
maritime lien under the provisions of P.D. No. 1521; and if so, whether or not said maritime lien
is preferred over the mortgage lien of PNB/NIDC on the foreclosed vessel M/V Asean Liberty
Held:

Under the provisions of P.D. No. 1521, any person furnishing repairs, supplies, or other
necessities to a vessel on credit will have a maritime lien. Such maritime lien, if it arose prior to
the recording of a preferred mortgage lien, shall have priority over the said mortgage lien. In this
case, it was Hongkong United Dockyards, Ltd. which originally possessed a maritime lien over
the vessel M/V Asean Liberty by virtue of its repair of the said vessel on credit. CBC, however,
stands as guarantor of the loan extended by Citibank to PISC. It was Citibank which advanced
the money to PISC. It was only upon the failure of PISC to fulfill its obligations under its
promissory note to Citibank that CBC was called upon by Citibank to exercise its duties under
the Standby Letter of Credit. The applicable law, which is the Shipping Mortgage Decree of
1978, was patterned closely after the U.S. Ship Mortgage Act of 1920. Being of foreign origin,
the provisions of the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 may thus be construed with the aid of
foreign jurisprudence. Under American jurisprudence, “furnishing money to a master in good
faith to obtain repairs or supplies or to remove liens, in order to forward the voyage of the vessel,
raises a lien just as though the things for which money was obtained to pay for had been
furnished by the lender”. This is in accord with Art5. 1302 of the Civil Code which provides that
there is legal subrogation “when a third person, not interested in the fulfillment of the obligation,
pays with the express or tacit approval of the debtor”. In this case, the amount for the repair of
vessel M/V Asean Liberty was advanced by Citibank and was used for the purpose of paying off
the original maritime lienor, Hongkong United Dockyards, Ltd. As a person not interested in the
fulfillment of the obligation between PISC and Hongkong United Dockyards, Ltd., Citibank was
subrogated to the rights of Hongkong United Dockyards, Ltd. as maritime lienor over the vessel.
CBC, as guarantor, was itself subrogated to all the rights of Citibank as against PISC, the latter’s
debtor. Art. 2067 of the civil Code provides that “the guarantor who pays is subrogated by virtue
thereof to all the rights which the creditor had against the debtor”. When CBC honored its
contract of guaranty with Citibank on March 30, 1983, it also acquired by subrogation the
maritime lien over the vessel which attached to it on March 12, 1979 in favor of Hongkong
United Drydocks, Ltd. The maritime lien of CBC thus arose prior to the recording of
PNB/NIDC’s mortgage on September 25, 1979. As such, the said maritime lien has priority over
the said mortgage lien.

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