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TOPIC:
Justification and excuse in the law of State Responsibility
Introduction: - ................................................................................................................ 3
Consent: - ................................................................................................................. 10
Self-defence: - .......................................................................................................... 11
Distress: - ................................................................................................................. 13
Necessity: -............................................................................................................... 14
Bibliography: - ............................................................................................................. 16
2
Introduction: -
International law is a legal system derived from states. This also follows from the
formal sources of law: it is states which conclude international treaties in the sense of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties;1 and it is state practice, combined with
opinio juris which forms customary international law.
Once a treaty is signed, the states are expected to abide by them and do everything in
their power to fulfil the terms of the agreement or treaty. This is thought to be the
responsibility of the state and thus is aptly named, State Responsibility.
The law of state responsibility is said to be secondary in nature because it regulates the
consequences of a breach of a legal obligation, while it does not determine whether or
not there has been a breach of the underlying primary norm.
Wrongfulness is identified under the primary norm—in this case originating in treaty
law—and once this has been established, the law of state responsibility is used to
determine the consequences of wrongfulness.
However, it is possible that the act which is done was done out of some necessity or
any other reason due to which the state considerers itself justified in performing an act
contrary to the treaty. These are known as justifications and excuses in the law of state
responsibility.
1
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969), 1155 UNTS 331, Art. 1.
3
Justifications and excuses have developed in various legal systems as defences for
wrongful acts. In international law, defences appear in the ILC Articles on State
Responsibility.
Justifications are legally authorised exceptions to the primary norm. If a prima facie
wrongful act can be justified, it is not wrongful.
Excuses are defences for acts that are deliberately wrongful but, in the particular
circumstances, may be seen as the choice of the lesser evil.
Excuses do not preclude wrongfulness but only mitigate against responsibility for a
wrongful act. The use of force that is excused but not justified, therefore, cannot be
taken as state practice relevant for an emergence of a customary justification. The
excuses/justifications typology preserves the strength of the prohibition of the use of
force but acknowledges certain mitigating circumstances where force is used illegally.
4
Development of the Rules for Justification and Excuses: -
Thus, it was necessary that some sort of protocol or system was created to regulate and
define the breaches for state responsibilities. Likewise, it was also necessary that a
compilation or list for the justifications and excuses are also produced.
“In the one defence, we accept responsibility but deny that it was bad; in the other, we
admit that it was bad but don’t accept full, or even any, responsibility. The first is a
justification, the second one is an excuse.”3
An act can be wrongful prima facie, but the applicable law can provide for a
justification which precludes wrongfulness. Excuses are different. They cannot
preclude wrongfulness of an act, but under some circumstances the wrongdoer will be
excused from responsibility for the wrongdoing. The act itself will, however, remain
wrongful.4
In international law, the concept of defences is found in the rules on state responsibility.
The topic of state responsibility was one of the first 14 areas provisionally selected for
the International Law Commission's attention in 1949.5 When the ILC listed the topic
for codification in 1953, "state responsibility" was distinguished from a separate topic
2
James Crawford, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law [MPEPIL]
3
J.L. Austin, ‘A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
(1956-1957)
4
K. Greenwalt, ‘The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse’, 84 Col LR (1984)
5
Report to the General Assembly, 1949 Yearbook of the International Law Commission
5
on the "treatment of aliens", reflecting the growing view that state responsibility
encompasses the breach of an international obligation.6
In 1995, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution, telling the
Commission to make progress on the state responsibility articles and other long-
pending projects. Finally, in August 2001, The ILC adopted the Draft Articles on the
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
Within this, they included the definition of wrongful acts committed by states in
international law, the meaning of state responsibility and what it implies, and the
consequences of a breach of the same.
6
1949 Year Book of the International Law Commission 46, 49-50, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1949
6
Internationally wrongful act and state responsibility: -
This is the basic principle underlying the articles as a whole, which is that a breach of
international law by a State entails its international responsibility. An internationally
wrongful act of a State may consist in one or more actions or omissions or a
combination of both. Whether there has been an internationally wrongful act depends,
first, on the requirements of the obligation which is said to have been breached and,
secondly, on the framework conditions for such an act.7
This principal has been upheld by the international courts in multiple cases. The PCIJ
in the case of Phosphates in Morocco, stated that:
ICJ has also applied the principle on several occasions, for example in the Corfu
Channel case9, in the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
case10.
Thus the term “international responsibility” in article 1 covers the relations which arise
under international law from the internationally wrongful act of a State, whether such
relations are limited to the wrongdoing State and one injured State or whether they
extend also to other States or indeed to other subjects of international law, and whether
7
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10)
8
Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 74, p. 10, at p. 28
9
Corfu Channel, Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4, at p. 23.
10
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J.Reports 1986, p. 14, at p. 142, para. 283, and p. 149, para. 292.
7
they are centred on obligations of restitution or compensation or also give the injured
State the possibility of responding by way of countermeasures.11
These two elements were specified by the PCIJ in the Phosphates in Morocco case. The
Court linked the creation of international responsibility with the existence of an “act
being attributable to the State and described as contrary to the treaty right[s] of another
State”.12
Article 3 states:
This means that the act must be wrongful in the eyes of International law. It is not
effected by the municipal laws of any member countries. ICJ has referred to and applied
the principle on multiple occasions. In the Reparation for Injuries case, it noted that:
“as the claim is based on the breach of an international obligation on the part of the
Member held responsible, the Member cannot contend that this obligation is governed
by municipal law.”13
Chapter 2 of the Articles talks about the attribution of the wrongful act. Article 4 states
that the wrongful act can also be attributed to the organs of the state if they exercise
power and are recognized by the state.
11
H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., R. W. Tucker, ed. (New York, Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1966)
12
Phosphates in Morocco, Judgment, 1938, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 74, p. 10, at p. 28
13
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports
1949, p. 174, at p. 184.
8
Article 5 says the same when the act is done by a person authorised by the state. In both
these cases, the state will be responsible for their acts and can be held in breach of State
responsibility.
9
Justification and Excuses: -
Chapter 6 of the articles give circumstances and situations under which a normally
wrongful act will not be considered to be wrongful and thus will not incur the liabilities.
These are known as the Justifications and Excuses precluding wrongfulness in the law
of state responsibility.
Consent: -
Article 20 states:
Under this principle, consent by a State to particular conduct by another State precludes
the wrongfulness of that act in relation to the consenting State, provided the consent is
valid and to the extent that the conduct remains within the limits of the consent given.
This means that if a state consents, whether implicitly or explicitly, to the act of another
state, even if that act would normally be considered to be wrongful, that act will not be
considered to be a wrongful act in that situation.
An example of this is the Savarkar case where the arbitral tribunal considered that the
arrest of Savarkar was not a violation of French sovereignty asFrance had implicitly
consented to the arrest through the conduct of its gendarme, who aided the British
authorities in the arrest.14
14
UNRIAA, vol. XI (Sales No. 61.V.4) (1911)
15
Customs Régime between Germany and Austria, Advisory Opinion, 1931, P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 41
10
Self-defence: -
The ICJ in the case of Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons case stated:
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations preserves a State’s “inherent right” of
self-defence in the face of an armed attack. Thus, a State exercising its inherent right
of self-defence as referred to in Article 51 of the Charter is not, even potentially, in
breach of a treaty of International law.16
Self-defence may justify non-performance of certain obligations other than that under
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, provided that such non-
performance is related to the breach of that provision.
This defence however is not absolute. For example, it doesn’t include issues relating to
international humanitarian law and human rights obligations. These include The
Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims and the Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions.
Human rights treaties contain derogation provisions for times of public emergency,
including actions taken in self-defence. As to obligations under international
humanitarian law and in relation to non-derogable human rights provisions, self-
defence does not preclude the wrongfulness of conduct.17
16
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996
17
Ibid.
11
constitutes a countermeasure taken against the latter State in accordance with
chapter II of Part Three.”
When actions are taken in accordance to Article 22, the underlying obligation is not
terminated. It is only suspended for the time being. Further, these actions are only
justified against the state which committed the wrongful act in the first place. They can
cannot be used as an excuse to commit a wrongful act to a third state. Such was given
in the Cysne case.20
Force majeure: -
Article 23 reads:
(a) the situation of force majeure is due, either alone or in combination with other
factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it; or
18
Ibid.
19
Gabˇcíkovo-Nagymaros Project, ICJ GL No 92
20
Portuguese Colonies case (Naulilaa incident), UNRIAA, vol. II (Sales No. 1949.V.1)
12
(b) the State has assumed the risk of that situation occurring.
(a) the act in question must be brought about by an irresistible force or an unforeseen
event;
(c) which makes it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.
Distress: -
Article 24 reads:
(a) the situation of distress is due, either alone or in combination with other factors, to
the conduct of the State invoking it; or
Article 24 deals with the specific case where an individual whose acts are attributable
to the State is in a situation of peril, either personally or in relation to persons under his
21
Secretariat (Yearbook 1978, vol. II (Part One) document A/CN.4/315)
13
or her care. The article precludes the wrongfulness of conduct adopted by the State
agent in circumstances where the agent had no other reasonable way of saving life.
This is different from Force majeure, as here the act is not involuntary. It was does with
the knowledge and intent to do a wrongful act, however there was no other way at the
time.
This is usually done in cases of aerial or maritime breach of boundaries. For example,
on two occasions, United States military aircraft entered Yugoslav airspace without
authorization and were attacked by Yugoslav air defences. The United States
Government protested the Yugoslav action on the basis that the aircraft had entered
Yugoslav airspace solely in order to escape extreme danger.22
Necessity: -
The term “necessity” (état de nécessité) is used to denote those exceptional cases where
the only way a State can safeguard an essential interest threatened by a grave and
imminent peril is, for the time being, not to perform some other international obligation
of lesser weight or urgency.
Article 25 states:
(a) is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave
and imminent peril; and
(b) does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards
which the obligation exists, or of the international community as a whole.”
22
O. J. Lissitzyn, “The treatment of aerial intruders in recent practice and international law”, AJIL, vol.
47, No. 4 (October 1953)
14
Unlike consent (art. 20), self-defence (art. 21) or countermeasures (art. 22), it is not
dependent on the prior conduct of the injured State. Unlike force majeure (art. 23), it
does not involve conduct which is involuntary or coerced. Unlike distress (art. 24),
necessity consists not in danger to the lives of individuals in the charge of a State
official but in a grave danger either to the essential interests of the State or of the
international community as a whole.
Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness if:
In March 1967 the Liberian oil tanker Torre Canyon went aground on submerged rocks
off the coast of Cornwall outside British territorial waters, spilling large amounts of oil
which threatened the English coastline. After various remedial attempts had failed, the
British Government decided to bomb the ship to burn the remaining oil. This operation
was carried out successfully.
The British Government did not advance any legal justification for its conduct, but
stressed the existence of a situation of extreme danger and claimed that the decision to
bomb the ship had been taken only after all other means had failed. This was largely
accepted by the world community and no objections were raised.24
What is of paramount importance to see here, is that the act done was the only way
available to the state and that the act was absolutely necessary to prevent further harm.25
23
Jahrbuch des Völkerrechts, vol. III (1916)
24
The “Torrey Canyon”, Cmnd. 3246 (London, HM Stationery Office, 1967).
25
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998
15
Bibliography: -
Books:
1. Malcom N. Shaw, International Law, 7th ed. (2014) Cambridge University Press
2. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two
Dictionaries:
Online Resources:
1. Vidmar, Jure, The Use of Force and Defences in the Law of State Responsibility
(June 15, 2015)
2. Boed, Roman (2000) "State of Necessity as a Justification for Internationally
Wrongful Conduct," Yale Human Rights and Development Journal: Vol. 3: Iss.
1, Article 1.
Statutes:
16