(ii) but long term it is the best way of pleasing teachers, pasinng examination, satisfying

employers, and achieving goals in a variety of future situations for which mathematical methods
are necessary.

Relations mathematics thus offers the best both world. Unfortunately many imposed learning
situations are not conducive to this kind of learning.

Logical Understanding2

It has been suggested that this category is unnessary, being no different from relations
understanding. But ( using buyers’ and Harscovis’ axample ) suppose tha pupil writes something
like

X+3=7

=7–3

=4

We ask why he writes this, and he answer in a way which confinces ask that he has relational
understanding the top line says that adding 3 to x give us 7 so that fine what x is we take the 3
away again.

If we now point out to him the exact meaning of what he has written, and he then rewrite is
correctly, this would be evidence that he was capable of logical understanding, which we had
helped to bring about by causing him to reflect. By “………… rewrites it correctly” we mean in
an acceptable form which sets down a valid sequence of logical inferences. If however he cannot
see anything wrong he has written, and continue emphasis that he has given the right answers (as
evidence by putting 4 for x in top line 4 + 3 = 7, so I’ve got if right, heven’t I) we might find it
hard to convince him that we we’re not just being awkward. For there indeed nothing wrong with
his relations understanding, which related finding the value of x which makes the equastion the
true statement. What he lacks is logical understanding. Which concerns the relationship of
implication between the successive statement. We van thus discern two kind of not-having it, and
not knowing that one hasn,t because one has not a scema of a kind which of enable one to
recognise its presence or absence.

Logical understanding is closely related to defference between being convince one self. For
which relating understanding is sufficient, and being able to convinse other people. To emphasis
this I propose the following formulation.
Logical understanding is evidenced by the ability to demonstrate that what has been stated
follows of logical necessity , by a chain of inferences, from (i) the given premises, together with
(ii) suitably chosen items from what is accepted as estabilished mathematical knowledge (axiom
and theorem).

In this activity, the goal are not the acquisitions of new concept, not the constructions of new
shemas, not the divising of new method to solve new problem. These must already be in
existence as operands foe the next stage, the goal now being to be sure that the shemes which
have been constructed, the solution have been devised, are sound and accurate, the methods are
what brunner (1960) calls. The analysis apparatus of on’s scarf analisys and the constructions of
chains of logical reasoning to produce what we call demonstrations or proofs.

The primary operand are thus mathematical ideas with one already both has and understand. I
think that we can also identify some secondary operands, namely one’s fellow mathematicians,
whose critical evaluations we have ti statisfy before distributins we offer will be recived into the
body of accepte mathematical knowlage. So I would regard a mathematical proof or
demonstrations as corresponding to a replicable experiment in the natural sciences.

How does the term formal become attacted to proof or demonstrations. I suggest that a formal
demonstrations or proof is a method for exposing one’s statement to the judgment of one’s pers,
by putting it in a form in which every implication is clearly shown, every theorem or axiom
clearly referred to form here refers to the of presentations and formal means conforming to
accepted forms of presentations.

Most of us will also subject our ideas to self-criticism and self- criticism before the making them
public, formally or informally and the constructions of a proof which satisfies oueselve gives us
confidence to do so. In some cases, all we want is to satisfy ourselves. But I would regard the
satiscfations of critism and self-critisism as the secondary to the main goal. And indeed as also as
aids its acievment the contruction of ever more axtensive and powerful mathematical knowledge,
coherent, and without weaknesses or internal inconsistencies. This is clearly quite an anvanced
activity yet as buxton has pointed out (1978b) at one time.

One can hardly find a clearer example than this of the need to distinguish between different goals
for learning, and the corresponding kinds of understanding which are required.

What kind of schema are involved in this kind of understanding.. Here I am working in my own
frontier zone, perhaps others will help to takes our knowledge further. It seems to me that
relationship involved are between the truth values statement, if it is true that ABC is a triangle
with AB, AC equals in length. Then it must also be true that angles ABCand ACB are equal in
size. The reasoning involves syllogistic, in every triangle which has two sides equal in length. So
the schema involved seems to be one in which the concept represent classes of statements, and
the conections are those of logical implications, I would alsp seem that its located is in delta-two,
since it is by means of this schema that delta two operate on delta one to produces schema within
delta-one which are free from inconsistencies. This might explain its inaccessibility to reflectins,
which s normally an activity in which delta-two become conscious of schema within delta-one.

The intuitive/reflective dimension

From the new model of intelligence we can also derive two modes of mentals fucsioning. These
do not related to different kinds of understanding. On the contrary, they can occur in
combination with all three of the kind of understanding already discussed as indicated below.

KINDS OF UNDERSTANDING

INSTRUMRNTAL RELATIONS LOGICAL

MODES OF INTUITIVE I1 R1 L1
MENTAL REFLECTIVE I2 R2 L2
ACTIVITY

Though what follows may be recognize as a development of an earlier formulation, to save space
I will not compare the two, in the present model, as we states earlier, the job of delta two is goal
directed mental activity, including learning but not only learning. “goal Directed” does not imply
“ consciously goal-directed” either for delta-two or for delta one. Many goal directed activities of
delta-one may take place unconsciously, such use those by which we maintain our state of
balance while reading a bicycle and possible holding conversations at the same time, likewihs for
delta-two. Much learning takes places unconsciously. And since children learn from birth
onwards, in the present model delta-two is assumed present from the beginning. (I conceive it as
innate.) But we also know that reflective intelligence develops only gradually throughout
childhood and adolescence. By this I mean the ability to make one’s own concept and mental
processes objects of conscious attention, perhaps to describe them, perhaps also consciously and
deliberately to change them. So what I now suggest is developing during this period is not delta-
two itself, but the ability to shift our centre of consciousness from delta-one (the objects of
consciousness being in the physical environment) to delta-two (the objects of consciousness
being now delta-one).

In the intuitive mode of metal activity, consciousness is centred in delta-one. In the refrective
mode , consciousness is centred in delta two. “Intuitive” thus refers to spontaneous processes,
those within delta-one, in which delta-two takes part either not at all, or not consciously.
“Reflective” refers to conscious activity by delta-two on delta-one.

Which this formulation and with that of ealier sections, I can now try to justify the six
categories in the 3x2 table above by offering example of each.

Category l1
This corresponds to “rules withour reasons.” Mechanical arithmetic comes into this category, but
not the learning of skill to a degree where they can be performed fluently and with little or no
thought, provided that when necessary they can be re-connected to an appropriate schema.

Category l2

this is an interesting one, since until I had set up this model I would have regarded reflective
activity as necessarily relational. But consider this example.

Someone can differentiate the fuction

y=𝑥 3

by using the rule

he might have been told why some years ago, but he forgot it quite soon afterwards. Now he is
asked to differentiate.

His rule no longer applies; but on reflection, he remembers another rule:

By cobining these rules, he gets

He has given the right answer without necessarily having relational understanding of either rule.
What is more, logical understanding has been used for the inference, “If the first rule is correct,
and if also the second rule is correct, then the result of using both rules in sequence will also be
correct. “Given that all he had to work with was an assortment of rules, he had tackled the
problem quite intelligently. So we have an interesting implication, that reflective intelligence can
be brought to bear on material in delta-one which is instrumental in quality. I now realise that is
what I have often been doing when, reflecting on mathematics I learn many years ago, I came to
realise that I had never understood it “properly” (i.e. relationally or logiacally).

Category R1

I think that this is what is what Bruner is referring to in the passages cited by Byers and
Herscovics (1960):

Intuition implies the act of grasping the meaning or significance or structure of a problem
without explicit reliance on the analytic apparatus on one’s craft....... it precedes proof;
indeed, it is what the techniques of analysis and proof are designed to test and check.
In terms of the present model, intuitive understanding takes place when input to delta-one is
directly assimilated to an appropriate schema, which thereby structure our perception of the
problem. But intuition does not by itself imply understanding-the input may have activated
inappropriate ideas, and our perception of the problem may on reflection prove to have been
faulty. Hence the need for proof, as Bruner points out.

This emphasises the need to distinguish between intution and insight. As Byers and Herscovics
point out, “Many authors identify intution with the Eureka phenomenon, the flash of sudden
insight.” But to do this is in my view mistaken. Insight (which I would equate with relational
understanding) may indeed take place by an intuitive leap, but it may also be the result of
prolonged reflection. And the result of an intuitive leap may, when tested by the tecniques of
analysis and proof, turn out not to have been a genuine insight.

Category R2

Using the calculus example again, let us imagine a student who not only knew the routines for
differentiating the given function, and for rewriting 1/𝑥 𝑝 without the fraction bar by using a
negative index, but also had relational understanding of them. He might make an intelligent
guess along the same lines an already described, and then proceed to verify this. To do this, he
would need to relate these two routines to quite extensive mathematical schemas, including the
binomial expansion for negative exponent.

Category L1

Can logical understanding be identified at an intuitive as well as a reflective level? I believe so.
Most children over ten, and many younger, would quickly say that “All dogs have tails. This
animal is dog; therefore, this animal has a tail” is a valid argument, whereas “All dogs have tails.
This animal has a tail, therefore this animal is dog” is not. Asked to say the latter was false, they
might give counter-examples, such as cats, squirrels. These might be taken as evidence of an
intuitive awareness that a single counter-example was enough to reveal a false inference, but it
might also be argued that all that was demonstrated was empirical knowledge. Stronger evidence
for intuitive logic would be similar responses to statements like “All wonks have tails ....” I have
not yet however been able to collect any mathematical example for category L1; contributions
and suggestions will be welcomed.

Category L2

Understanding in this category would be evidence by someone who responded to the example
just given by drawing the appropriate Venn diagrams for the two cases. A more advanced pair of
examples is provided by Russell’s famous paradox. (In a certain village, the barber shaves
everyone except those who shave themselves. Who shaves the barber?) L2 understanding of this
took a long time to achieve; yet we may assume that most people had an L1 conviction that there
was something wrong, from the start!

These apart, a major part of all mathematics at sixth form and university level comes into
category L2. Wherever an exercise or problem begins “Show that .....” or “Prove that .....” L2
understanding is needed and must be evidenced in the reply. And it is even more a key feature at
research level, where “full mathematical rigour” means the same as a logically unassailable chain
of implications.

Elsewhere (Skemp, 1971, Chapter 1 p. 15) have distinguished between a logical and a
psychologial presentation, and have argued that it is a mistake to think that comprehension is
best achieved by a strictly logical presentation. What is needed first is a presentation which is
carefully planned psychologically, in order to bring about relational understanding. Until a
learner understands what it is that one is trying to convince him about the truth of, then a logical
argument is premature and out of place. But when relational understanding has been achieved, I
think that there is a place for logical understanding even at quite an elementary level. Acceptance
of a need both to give and to receive a logical proof says, by implication, “I don’t expect you to
believe this on my say-so. I hope to convince you that what I am saying follows of logical
necessity from things we both agree about. If you will follow my chain of inferences step by
step, I think that you will be convinced by the exercise of your own reason.” This further implies
that the final authority for accepting or not accepting a statement lies in the mathematics itself;
which is something which, in ways appropriate to the level of the learner, I think we should be
teaching from early years onwards.