ELECTION LAWS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS May 2004 lections.
May 2004 lections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate for
Q — Rev. Nardo B. Cayat filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Buguias,
Benguet for the May 2004 elections. Thomas Palileng, another candidate for Mayor
filed a petition to annul/nullify his certificate of candidacy and/or to disqualify on the
ground that Cayat has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Twenty
three days before the election, Cayat’s disqualification became final and executory.
He, however won and was proclaimed and assumed office. Palileng filed an electoral
protest contending that Cayat was ineligible to run for mayor. The Vice-Mayor
intervened and contended that he should succeed Cayat in case he is disqualified
because Palileng was only a second placer, hence, he cannot be declared as the
winner. Is the contention of the Vice-Mayor correct? Why?
ANS: No, because there was no second placer, hence, Palileng should be
proclaimed as the winner on the following grounds:
First, the COMELEC’s Resolution of 12 April 2004 cancelling Cayat’s certificate of
candidacy due to disqualification became final and executory on 17 April 2004 when
Cayat failed to pay the prescribed filing fee. Thus, Palileng was the only candidate
for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet in the 10 May 2004 elections. Twenty-three days
before the election day, Cayat was already disqualified by final judgment to run for
Mayor in the 10 May 2004 elections. As the only candidate, Palileng was not a
second placer. On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to
none. The doctrine on the rejection of the second placer, which triggers the rule on
succession, does not apply in the present case because Palileng is not a second-
placer but the only placer. Consequently, Palileng’s proclamation as Mayor of
Buguias, Benguet is beyond question.
Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor,
regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the
decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004,
resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the
elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final only after the
elections. (Cayat v. COMELEC, April 27, 2007).
Q — It was contended that the doctrine of rejection of the second placer laid down
in Labo v. COMELEC should apply. Is the contention correct? Why?
ANS: No. Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of
the second placer, does not apply because in Labo there was no final judgment of
disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the rejection of the second
placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment
declaring the candidate’s disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not
become final before the elections. Labo and other cases applying the doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer have one common essential condition – the
disqualification of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This
essential condition does not exist in the present case. (Cayat v. COMELEC).
Reason in Labo.
In Labo, Labo’s disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three days after
the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still legally a candidate.
In the case of Cayat he was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10
mayor. In short, Cayat’s candidacy for Mayor was legally non-existent in the 10 May
2004 elections.
Q— What is the effect if a candidate is disqualified by final judgment? Explain.
ANS: The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment
before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted.
This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is
when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation
covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification
becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second
sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms
Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final
judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be
counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way
before the 10 May 2004 elections. Therefore, all the 8, 164 votes cast in Cayat’s
favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004 elections.
Palileng’s proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only candidate,
second to none. (Cayat v. COMELEC).
Q— Why is the proclamation of Cayat void? Explain.
ANS: Cayat’s proclamation is void because the decision disqualifying him had
already become final on 17 April 2004. There is no longer any need to ascertain
whether there was actual knowledge by the voters of his disqualification when they
casted their votes on election day because the law mandates that Cayat’s votes
“shall not be counted”. There is no disenfranchisement of the voters. Rather, the
voters are deemed by law to have deliberately voted for a non-candidate, and thus
their votes are stray and “shall not be counted”. (Cayat. v. COMELEC).
Q— Is the intervention of the Vice-Mayor proper? Why?
ANS: No. The petition-in-intervention should be rejected because the doctrine on
the rejection of the second placer does not apply to this case. The doctrine applies
only if the winning candidate’s disqualification has not yet become final and
executory before the election. In this case, the disqualification was final and
executory before the election, hence, there was no second placer. (Cayat v.
COMELEC).
Three-term limit; even if “as caretaker”.
Q — Mayor Marino Morales ran for a fourth term despite having served for three
(3) consecutive terms as Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga. In answer to a petition to
cancel his certificate of candidacy, he alleged that while he served his second term,
he did it as a “caretaker of the office” or as a “de facto officer” because he was
suspended by the Ombudsman from January 16, 1999 to July 15, 1999 and that his
proclamation was declared void and which became final and executory on August 6,
2001. The COMELEC declared him disqualified. Before the Supreme Court, he
contended that his second term from July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2001 may not be
counted since his proclamation was void. Is the contention correct? Why?
ANS: No, because his service from July 1, 1999 to June 30, 2001 was for a full
term, hence, the three-term limit rule applies to him. This is especially so that he
assumed office. He served as mayor up to June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the
entire period notwithstanding the decision in the electoral protest case ousting him
as mayor. As held in Ong v. Alegre, G.R. Nos. 162395 and 163354, January 23,
2006, 479 SCRA 473, such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in
serving the full term. In Ong, he served the full term even as there was a
declaration of failure of election.
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution provides that the terms of the office of
elected local officials x x x, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. x x x
Section 43(b) of R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code) clearly provides that
no local official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same
position.
Morales has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1,
1995, hence, he is disqualified. (Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167591 and
Dee v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 170577, May 6, 2007).
Q— Explain the reason for the maximum term limit.
ANS: The framers of the Constitution wanted to establish some safeguards against
the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive terms.
As held in Latasa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA
601, the three-term limit is an exception to the people’s freedom to choose those
who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged
stay in the same office. (Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 167591 and
companion case, May 9, 2007).
Q — Is not the case of Morales similar to the case of Lonzanida v COMELEC?
Explain.
ANS: No. In Lonzanida v. COMELEC, while he assumed office, he voluntarily
vacated when there was a declaration of failure of election. He did not fully serve
the term, hence, he was qualified to run for a third term.
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For
one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty elections was declared a nullity for
the stated reason of “failure of election”, and, as a consequence thereof, the
proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him
to vacate the office of the mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the
1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a
result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the
continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case.
But more importantly, here, there was actually no interruption or break in the
continuity of Francis’ service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida,
Francis was never unseated during the term in question; he never ceased
discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte
for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
Instead, Ong v. Alegre applies to Morales. Francis Ong was elected and assumed the
duties of the mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms.
But his proclamation as mayor in the May 1998 election was declared void. As ruled,
his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the full term. Clearly, the three-term
limit rule applies to him. There is no reason why this ruling should not also apply to
Morales who is similarly situated. (Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., May 9,
2007).
Q — Morales cited Borja v. COMELEC to apply to him. Is this case applicable?
Why?
ANS: No, because with the death of Mayor Cruz, Capco assumed office as mayor by
virtue of the principle of succession, he being the vice-mayor. He was not therefore,
elected even if he served the rest of the term of the mayor, hence, his assumption
of the office of the mayor upon the death of the incumbent mayor may not be
regarded as a term.
Similarly, in Adormeo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA
90, it was held that assumption of the office of mayor in a recall election for the
remaining term is not the “term” contemplated under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of R.A. 7160 (the Local Government Code). There
was a “break” in the service of the mayor. He was a “private citizen” for a time
before running for mayor in the recall elections. (Rivera III, e al. v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007).
Q — What is the effect if the certificate of candidacy of a candidate is cancelled?
Explain.
ANS: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. (Secs. 6 and
7, RA 6646).
Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or in favor
of a candidate for an office for which he did not present himself shall be considered
as a stray vote but it shall not invalidate the whole ballot. (Sec. 211, Omnibus
Election Code).
Morales can not be considered a candidate in the May 2004 elections. Not being a
candidate, the votes cast for him should not be counted and must be considered
stray votes. (Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007).
Q — It was contended that since Morales was disqualified, the second placer
should be proclaimed as the winner. Is the contention correct? Why?
ANS: In Labo v. COMELEC, the Court has ruled that a second place candidate
cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner.
The rule is that, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be
declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the
office.
As a consequence of ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has
occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Sec. 44 of
the Local Government Code. (Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 167591,
May 9, 2007 citing Labo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105111, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA
297).
Q — What are the requirements which must concur for the three-term limit to
apply?
ANS: For the three-term limit to apply, the following two conditions must concur:
1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post; and
2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Lonzanida v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157; Ong v. Alegre,
479 SCRA 473; Adormeo v. COMELEC, 376 SCRA 90; Rivera III, et al. v. COMELEC,
et al., G.R. No. 167591, May 9, 2007).
Effect if there is a tie.
Q— What is the proper procedure to be resorted to in case of a tie? Explain.
ANS: To resolve the tie, there shall be drawing of lots. Whenever it shall appear
from the canvass that two or more candidates have received an equal and highest
number of votes, or in cases where two or more candidates are to be elected for the
same position and two or more candidates received the same number of votes for
the last place in the number to be elected, the board of canvassers, after recording
this fact in its minutes, shall by resolution, upon five days notice to all the tied
candidates, hold a special public meeting at which the board of canvassers shall
proceed to the drawing of lots of the candidates who have tied and shall proclaim as
elected the candidates who may favored by luck, and the candidates so proclaimed
shall have the right to assume office in the same manner as if he had been elected
by plurality of votes. The board of canvassers shall forthwith make a certificate
stating the name of the candidate who had been favored by luck and his
proclamation on the basis thereof.
Nothing in this section shall be construed as depriving a candidate of his right to
contest the election. (Sec. 240, BP 881; Tugade v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No.
171063, March 2, 2007).
Withdrawal of certificate of candidacy.
Q — Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy but withdrew the same. He was
substituted by Joy Luna but the COMELEC denied due course to her certificate on
the ground that Hans being under age, he could not have filed a valid certificate of
candidacy. There was, however, no petition to deny Hans certificate of candidacy.
Did the COMELEC act correctly? Why?
ANS: No. The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be
considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be
validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper
proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due
form. (Cipriano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004, 436 SCRA 45). In
Sanchez v. Del Rosario, the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility
of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the
COMELEC.
If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his
certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified
petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section
78 of the Election Code.
In this case, there was no petition to deny due court to or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a
valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to
deny due course to or cancel Luna’s certificate of candidacy. In effect, the
COMELEC, without the proper proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of
candidacy and declared the substitution of Luna invalid. (Luna v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 165983, April 24, 2007).
Pre-proclamation controversy; extent of power of COMELEC.
Q — What is the extent of the power of the COMELEC in pre-proclamation
controversy? Explain.
ANS: It is a well-established rule in pre-proclamation cases that the Board of
Canvassers is without jurisdiction to go beyond what appears on the face of the
election return. The rationale is that a full reception of evidence aliunde and the
meticulous examination of voluminous election documents would run counter to the
summary nature of a pre-proclamation controversy. However, this rule is not
without any exception. In Lee v. Commission on Elections, it was held that if there is
a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been
omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply. The
COMELEC is thus not powerless to determine if there is basis for the exclusion of the
questioned returns. (G.R. No. 157004, July 4, 2003, 405 SCRA 303; Ewoc, et al. v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 171882, April 3, 2007).
Handwritings have only one general appearance.
Q — May the COMELEC invalidate certain ballots merely on a finding that the
writings have the same general appearance and pictorial effect? Explain.
ANS: No. General resemblance is not enough to warrant the conclusion that two
writings are by the same hand. (Silverio v. Clamor, 125 Phil. 917 (1967)).
In order to reach the conclusion that two writings are by the same hand there must
not only be present class characteristics but also individual characteristics or ‘dents
and scratches’ in sufficient quantity to exclude the theory of accidental coincidence;
to reach the conclusion that writings are by different hands we may find numerous
likeness in class characteristics but divergences in individual characteristics, or we
may find divergences in both, but the divergence must be something more than
mere superficial differences. (Osborn’s Questioned Documents, p. 244; Delos Reyes
v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 170070, February 28, 2007).
Neighborhood rule.
The votes contested in this appeal are all misplaced votes, i.e., votes cast for a
candidate for the wrong or inexistent office. In appreciating such votes, the
COMELEC may applied the “neighborhood rule.” As used by the Court, this
nomenclature, loosely based on a rule of the same name devised by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in Nograles v. Dureza, HRET Case No. 34,
June 16, 1989, 1 HRET Rep. 138), refers to an exception to the rule on appreciation
of misplaced votes under Section 211(19) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code) which provides:
Any vote in favor of a person who has not filed a certificate of candidacy or in favor
of a candidate for an office for which he did not present himself shall be considered
as a stray vote but it shall not invalidate the whole ballot.
Section 211(19) is meant to avoid confusion in the minds of the election officials as
to the candidates actually voted for and to stave off any scheming design to identify
the vote of the elector, thus defeating the secrecy of the ballot which is a cardinal
feature of our election laws. (Amurao v. Calangi, 10 Phil. 347 (1958)). Section
211(19) also enforces Section 195 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides
that in preparing the ballot, each voter must “fill his ballot by writing in the proper
place for each office the name of the individual candidate for whom he desires to
vote.”
Excepted from Section 211(19) are ballots with (1) a general misplacement of an
entire series of names intended to be voted for the successive offices appearing in
the ballot (Cordero v. Hon. Moscardon, 217 Phil. 392 (1984)); (2) a single (Farin v.
Gonzales, 152 Phil. 598 (1973)) or double (Sarmiento v. Quemado, No. L-18027, 29
June 1962, 5 SCRA 438) misplacement of names where such names were preceded
or followed by the title of the contested office or where the voter wrote after the
candidate’s name a directional symbol indicating the correct office for which the
misplaced name was intended (Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199 (1939)); and (3) a
single misplacement of a name written (a) off-center from the designated space
(Mandac v. Samonte, 54 Phil. 706 (1930)), (b) slightly underneath the line for the
contested office (Sarmiento v. Quemado, No. L-18027, 29 June 1962, 5 SCRA 438;
Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199 (1939)), (c) immediately above the title for the
contested office ((Villavert v. Fornier, 84 Phil. 756 (1949)), or (d) in the space for
an office immediately following that for which the candidate presented himself.
((Abad v. Co, G.R. No. 167438, 25 July 2006, 496 SCRA 505 and Ferrer v.
Commission on Elections, 386 Phil. 431 (2000)). In these instances, the misplaced
votes are nevertheless credited to the candidates for the office for which they
presented themselves because the voters’ intention to so vote is clear from the face
of the ballots. This is in consonance with the settled doctrine that ballots should be
appreciated with liberality to give effect to the voters’ will. (Velasco v. COMELEC, et
al., G.R. No. 166931, February 22, 2007).
Marked ballot.
Q— When is a ballot considered as marked? Explain.
ANS: In order for a ballot to be considered marked, in the sense necessary to
invalidate it, it must appear that the voter designedly place some superfluous sign
or mark on the ballot which might serve to identify it thereafter. No ballot should be
discarded as a marked ballot unless its character as such is unmistakable. The
distinguishing mark which the law forbids to be placed on the ballot is that which
the elector may have placed with the intention of facilitating the means of
identifying said ballot, for the purpose of defeating the secrecy of suffrage which the
law establishes. Thus, marked ballots are ballots containing distinguishing marks,
the purpose of which is to identify them. (Perman v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No.
174010, February 8, 2007, Tinga, J).
Failure of election.
Q— When is there failure of election?
ANS: There are three instances where a failure of elections may be declared, thus:
(a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes;
(b) the election in any polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by
law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud or other analogous causes; or
(c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous
causes.
In all three instances, there is a resulting failure to elect. In the first instance, the
election has not been held. In the second instance, the election has been
suspended. In the third instance, the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns give rise to the consequent failure to elect; the third instance is
interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner. (Mutilan v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 171248, April 2, 2007).
Note:
None of the three instances is present in this case. In this case, the elections took
place. In fact, private respondent was proclaimed the winner. Petitioner contests the
results of the elections on the grounds of massive disenfranchisement, substitute
voting, and farcical and statistically improbable results. Petitioner alleges that no
actual election was conducted because the voters did not actually vote and the
ballots were filled up by non-registered voters.
Q — May an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division be the subject of certiorari
to the SC? Explain.
ANS: As a rule, No. The exception is in an unusual case where the petition for
certiorari questioning the interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division was pending
before the SC, the main case which was meanwhile decided by the COMELEC En
Banc was likewise elevated to the Court. Thus, there was a situation where the
petition for certiorari questioning the interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Division
and the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc on the main case were consolidated. The issues raised in the
petition for certiorari were also raised in the main case and therefore there was
actually no need to resolve the petition assailing the interlocutory orders. (Rosal v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 168253 and 172741, March 16, 2007; Soriano, Jr., et al. v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 164496-505, April 2, 2007).
Note:
The general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be
elevated directly to the SupremeCourt through a special civil action for certiorari.
Furthermore, a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a
COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. However, a motion to
reconsider an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division shall be resolved by the
division which issued the interlocutory order, except when all the members of the
division decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc.
Thus, in general, interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division are not appealable, nor
can they be proper subject of a petition for certiorari. To rule otherwise would not
only delay the disposition of cases but would also unnecessarily clog the Court
docket and unduly burden the Court. This does not mean that the aggrieved party is
without recourse if a COMELEC Division denies the motion for reconsideration. The
aggrieved party can still assign as error the interlocutory order if in the course of
the proceedings he decides to appeal the main case to the COMELEC En Banc. The
exception enunciated in Kho and Repol is when the interlocutory order of a
COMELEC Division is a patent nullity because of absence of jurisdiction to issue the
interlocutory order, as where a COMELEC Division issued a temporary restraining
order without a time limit, which is the Repol case, or where a COMELEC Division
admitted an answer with counter-protest which was filed beyond the reglementary
period, which is the Kho case.
The Court has already ruled in Reyes v. RTC of Oriental Mindoro, that “it is the
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC En Banc that, in accordance with Section
7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution, may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari.” The exception provided in Kho and Repol is unavailing in this case
because unlike in Kho and Repol, the assailed interlocutory orders of the COMELEC
First Division in this case are not a patent nullity. The assailed orders in this case
involve the interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Neither will the Rosal
case apply because in that case the petition for certiorari questioning the
interlocutory orders of the COMELEC Second Division and the petition for certiorari
and prohibition assailing the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc on the main case
were already consolidated.
The Court also notes that the COMELEC First Division has already issued an Order
dated 31 May 2005 dismissing the protests and counter-protests in EPC Nos. 2004-
36, 2004-37, 2004-38, 2004-39, 2004-40, 2004-41, 2004-42, 2004-43, 2004-44,
and 2004-45 for failure of the protestants and protestees to pay the required cash
deposits. Thus, the Court have this peculiar situation where the interlocutory order
of the COMELEC First Division is pending before the Court but the main case has
already been dismissed by the COMELEC First Division. This situation is precisely
what the Court are trying to avoid by insisting on strict compliance of the rule that
an interlocutory order cannot by itself be the subject of an appeal or a petition for
certiorari.
Misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy; effect.
Q — When is misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy material? Explain.
ANS: A misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is material when it refers to
a qualification for elective office and affects the candidate’s eligibility. Second, when
a candidate commits a material misrepresentation, he or she may be proceeded
against through a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
under Section 78, or through criminal prosecution under Section 262 for violation of
Section 74. Third, a misrepresentation of a non-material fact, or a non-material
misrepresentation, is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy under Section 78. In other words, for a candidate’s certificate of
candidacy to be denied due course or cancelled by the COMELEC, the fact
misrepresented must pertain to a qualification for the office sought by the
candidate. (Nelson T. Lluz, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 172840, June 7,
2007).
Q — If a candidate misrepresents his profession, is he disqualified? Explain.
ANS: No. No elective office, not even the office of the President of the Republic of
the Philippines, requires a certain profession or occupation as a qualification.
Profession or occupation not being a qualification for elective office,
misrepresentation of such does not constitute a material misrepresentation.
Certainly, in a situation where a candidate misrepresents his or her profession or
occupation in the certificate of candidacy, the candidate may not be disqualified
from running for office under Section 78 as his or her certificate of candidacy cannot
be denied due course or canceled on such ground. (Nelson T. Lluz, et al. v.
COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 172840, June 7, 2007).