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Political Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1991
INTRODUCTION
making [see Dror (1964, 1968), Etzioni (1967), and Lindblom (1979) for clas-
sical statementsof alternativenormativemodels].
Alternativesto the rationalperspectivehave takenmany forms. One impor-
tant set of alternativeapproacheshas stressed the political dimensions of deci-
sion-makingprocesses: many actors, diverse interests, interagencyconflict, and
ad hoc coalitions. In political models of choice, decisions are not the productof
calculatedchoices by a governmentor a company as a unitaryactor, but rather
the outcome of a bargaining process among different players in a political-
bureaucraticarena. The model of bureaucraticpolitics postulatesthatconflicts of
interest and power games between differentsections, departmentsand agencies
within a governmentadministrationare the most powerfuldeterminantsof policy
choices (Allison, 1971; Halperin, 1974; Rosenthal, 't Hart, & Kouzmin, 1991).
The model entailed a definite break with traditionalperspectives of rational
decision-makingand a strictseparationbetween politics and administration.One
of the most intriguingvariantsof the political model focuses on the empiricalfact
that on many occasions, the outcome of the process is such that no decisions are
taken at all (non-decision-making).The analysis should then seek to explain why
some social issues receive attention from policy-makersand are finally acted
upon, whereasothersdon't. This takes the analystto identify the social, political
and bureaucraticforces and barriersthat shape decision agendas (Bachrachand
Baratz, 1970; Cobb and Elder, 1975; Kingdon, 1985).
Otheralternativesto the rationalmodel have stressed the importanceof the
organizational dynamics involved in political decision-making. Paradoxically,
organizationalmodels of choice have emphasized the relative unimportanceof
decisions (Marchand Shapira, 1982). Instead,they discuss the impactof routines
and standardoperatingproceduresfor coping with problems(Steinbruner,1974).
Explainingthe contentand the dynamicsof these organizationalproblem-solving
regimes, attentionis directed towardthe impact of differentorganizationstruc-
turesand culturalfactorsas they affect choice-relatedproblemperceptions,infor-
mation and communicationprocesses, and action propensities. In this view, a
complex decision "is like a great river, drawing from its many tributariesthe
innumerablecomponent premises of which it is constituted"(Simon, 1957, p.
XII). The organizationalperspectivehas found its most radicalformulationin the
so-called "garbage-cantheory" of organizationalchoice (Cohen et al., 1972;
March, 1988). In organizationsdepicted as "organized anarchies," decision-
makingdoes not conformto the rationalistsequenceof stages. On the contrary,at
any time, there are decision opportunitiesthat bring together various kinds of
problems and solutions "lumped"by various organizationalparticipants.Orga-
nizationalchoice is seen, at best, as a by-productof variousindependentstreams
of participantsand activities that occasionally interactin such a manner as to
match "solutions"and "problems"at a time when the opportunityfor choice is
there.
250 't Hart
Psychological Perspectives
alities of key politicians and bureaucrats(for example, the classic George and
George, 1956);
Leadershipand interpersonalstyle of prominentpolitical leaders and bu-
reaucraticentrepreneurs,specifying how key actors interactwith others in their
social and professional environments [for example: Lewis (1980), Doig and
Hargrove(1987); elements of this approachcan be found in Janis(1989)]; Group
processes, focusing on the formation and dynamics of small groups as much-
neglected fora of political and bureaucraticdecision-making (Golembiewski,
1978).
Janis'swork on groupthinkfits into the latter category. In fact, it has been
one of the pioneering studies in this area. At the time of its publication, it was
rare in its broad interdisciplinary(social psychology, political science, history)
approachand its extensive use of comparablecase studiesoutliningthe argument
and developing and illustratingthe theory. This methodology, as well as Janis's
lucid style, made it appeal to an unusually broad audience, including many
political scientists and international-relationsanalysis who were otherwise not
inclined to consult psychological studies employing strictly experimentalmeth-
ods. Lateron, the book was also adoptedby studentsof organizationalbehavior
and managerialdecision-making(for example:DuBrin, 1984; Swap, 1984; Leav-
itt and Bahrami, 1985; Pennings et al., 1985).
In this sense, Janis's study on groupthinkhas stimulatedinterdisciplinary
efforts. At the same time, these very qualitieshave made this work vulnerableto
various discipline-boundcriticisms. Historiansare boundto criticize the focused
and potentially superficialcase accounts and interpretations(Welch, 1989), and
experimentally inclined psychologists will point to empirical ambiguities and
difficulties in pinpointing causality due to the post hoc nature of case study
research(Longley and Pruitt, 1980).
At a very general level, field studies have shown that cohesive groups are
more effective in accomplishinggroupgoals than non-cohesive groups. Similar-
ly, studies of group problem-solving show that cohesive groups perform well
(Shaw and Shaw, 1962; Maier, 1970). In the literaturecontrastingindividualand
group performance,the benefits of groupcohesion have been stressed again and
again. The advantages of groups are said to lie mainly in the sphere of the
quantityand quality of informationstorageand retrieval.Also, groups are more
successful than individuals in generating a wide range of alternatives. At the
same time, group decision-making has some costs: It takes more time and it
requires a sometimes difficult give-and-take between group members. In this
context, the value of cohesiveness is stressedas promotinga congenial and task-
oriented atmosphere, which allegedly facilitates group discussion (see, for in-
stance, Miesing and Preble, 1985).
These are all familiararguments.And it was precisely this line of thinking
that Janis was contendingwith. He surmisedthat, at a certainpoint, high cohe-
sion becomes detrimentalto the quality of decision-making.This idea was most
impressive in its counterintuitivepower:the realizationthat, dependingupon the
content of group norms, harmonious, cooperative, teamlike entities may be a
liability ratherthan an asset in producinghigh-qualitydecisions.
This is not what one would expect. At face value, it seems perfectlysensible
that a tightly knit group,where memberslike each otherand cooperatesmoothly,
is likely to produce better decisions at lower costs than groups where members
254 't Hart
JANIS ON GROUPTHINK
Definition
I
+
D
B-2 Symptomsof Defective
Provocative Situational Decisionmaking
1. Gross Omissions in Survey
Context
of Objectives
1. High Stress from External
2. Gross Omissions in Survey
Threats with Low Hope of a
of Alternatives
Better Solution Than the
3. Poor InformationSearch
Leader's
4. Selective Bias in Processing
2. Low Self-Esteem Temporarily
Informationat Hand
Induced by
5. Failure to Reconsider Originally
a. Recent Failures That Make
Members' Inadequacies Rejected Alternatives
6. Failure to Examine Some Major
Salient
Costs and Risks of Preferred
b. Excessive Difficulties on
Choice
CurrentDecisionmaking
7. Failure to Work Out Detailed
Tasks That Lower Each
Member's Sense of Self- Implementation, Monitoring,
and Contingency Plans
Efficacy
c. Moral Dilemmas: Apparent
Lack of Feasible Alternatives
Except Ones that Violate E
Ethical Standards Low Probability of
Etc. Successful Outcome
Antecedent Conditions
Characteristics
DuBrin, 1983; Swap 1984; Luttrinand Settle, 1985; Roberts, 1988). But what
actualresearchwork has been done since 1972? What are its results?Apartfrom
Janis's own follow-up writings on the subject, some critical reviews have ap-
peared, three studies discussing problemsof conceptualizationand theoryforma-
tion, as well as a numberof laboratoryand "real world" replicationsof Janis's
empirical research.
Real-World Replications
Laboratory Replications
the Flowers study, this lack of results may be due to the rathersimplistic experi-
mental manipulationof the cohesiveness variable, yet it may also point toward
the abovementioned multipath explanation of groupthink [Fodor and Smith
(1985); similar results were reportedby Leana (1985)].
Moorhead has developed a clear model of what would be needed to ade-
quately test for groupthinkin decision-making groups (Moorhead, 1982). His
attempts to use the model in an empirical analysis of teams of management
students engaged in a 3-month intergroupcompetition provided material for
additional doubts concerning the overarching(negative) impact of high group
cohesiveness (Moorheadand Montaneri, 1986).
t' Hartet al. (1989) have developed a decision-simulationdesign testing the
effects of differentmodes of accountabilityfor decisions among group members
upon the quality of decision-making. The decisional context was designed to
incorporatemany of the theoreticalantecedentsto groupthink.It was found that
decision-making groups that do not have to account for their judgments and
choices displayed more tendencies toward groupthink-likepatterns of group
decision-makingthangroupswhose members,eithercollectively or individually,
did have to renderaccount.
As Whyte (1989) has rightly noted, Janis does not elaborately discuss a
long-standing research tradition within group dynamics, namely research on
group polarizationand choice shifts. AlthoughJanishypothesizesthat the group
process induces group membersto adopt courses of action that seem to involve
high risks of failure, he has not developed his argumentwith sufficientreference
to the results of experimentaland field studies and criticismsof the "risky shift"
(i.e., group interaction favors more risky solutions than individual members
would have adopted without group discussion), the cautious shift (the reverse
phenomenon) and other work on group polarization(Moscovici, 1976; Lamm
and Meyers, 1978; Meertens, 1980). This gap has partiallybeen filled by follow-
up research.
Minix has used groupthinkto explain choice shifts in the context of crisis
decision-making(Minix, 1982). The key question was whetherdecision groups,
confronted with various feasible scenarios of internationalcrisis events, would
reach different(more or less risky decisions) than individuals.To enhance exter-
nal relevance, Minix's subjects included military officers, the closest he could
come to runningthe experimentwith officials who actuallymake these decisions
in real-life situations (other groups were cadets and university students). In his
theoreticaldiscussion, Minix discussed at length the crisis literaturein order to
illustratethe validity of a small-groupapproachto the analysis of crisis decision-
IrvingJanis: Groupthink 265
Theoretical Considerations
The quality of high-level policy-makingis a key issue not only with regard
to government action but also in major corporations,whose decisions equally
affect large segments of society. Decision-makersneed to anticipateand circum-
vent the complexities of decision-makingin the multi-actor,multi-interesten-
vironment that characterizesmost issues that require top-level consideration.
Government authorities need to deal with cognitive and value complexities.
While these topics are central to the normative theories of political decision-
making developed in the organizationaland political paradigmsmentioned in
section 2, few of the psychological contributionsdeal with this topic in an
elaborate way.
Groupthinktheory is a markedexception. In fact, groupthinkhas explicitly
been developed as a theory of explainingdecisional failuresand policy fiascoes.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Longley and Pruitt note that "a negative
evaluationof groupthinkpervadesall of Janis'writingsaboutthe topic" (Longley
and Pruitt, 1980, p.77). They signal that even in the revised conception of
groupthinkas concurrence-seeking,the flow chart directly links concurrence-
seeking and groupthinkcharacteristicsto symptoms of defective decision-mak-
ing, which are presentedas a recipe for policy failure.
However, in his 1982 edition, Janisis not entirelyas deterministicaboutthe
alleged adverse effects of groupthinkas Longley and Pruittsuspect. In the final
analysis, according to Janis, groupthink is not a necessary, nor a sufficient
268 't Hart
condition for policy failure (Janis, 1982a, pp. 11, 196-197, 259). He does
suggest that groupthinkincreasesthe likelihood of defective decision processes,
which, in turn, increase the likelihood of disastrouspolicy outcomes. Still it is
quite clear that, in Janis'smind, groupthinkis a certainroadto failure. In fact, in
his researchstrategy,he departedfrom this premise:He chose cases of (alleged)
policy failure first, and then applied groupthinkanalysis to see whether the
decision process was affectedby it. If so, groupthinkwas implied to be one of the
causes of failure. This methodologyplaces a high premiumon the objectivityof
the analyst to withstand(unconscious)biases towardsselective interpretationof
the case study material. Also, this reconstructive-analyticaland evaluative ap-
proach is open to accusations of producingcircular statements:Groupthinkis
inferred from policy failure and failure is explained in terms of groupthink.3
The link between concurrence-seekingand defective decision-making is
evident from the specification of the eight symptoms of groupthink:From a
proceduralpoint of view, they appearto be all bad (see boxes C and D in flow
chart). However, to understandthe implied link between defective decision pro-
cesses and decisional failures, one must first take a look at Janis'sbroaderviews
on the issue of decision quality, as formulatedin his classic study of decision-
making, written with Leon Mann (Janisand Mann, 1977).
Janisadheresto the paradigmprevalentin decision theorythat "good" (i.e.,
systematic, vigilant) proceduresproduce "good" results(goal maximization).In
his view, decision quality is contingent upon the quality of the deliberations
preceding the actual choice. Good proceduresvirtuallyensure good results (de-
fined as optimaloutcomes with the limits of the situation).Therefore,the authors
have adopteda model of decision qualitythatis entirelyprocedural.It comprises
seven "critical tasks" for high-qualitydecision making:
(a) canvassing a wide range of availablecourses of action;
(b) surveying the full range of objectives to be fulfilled and the values
implicated by the choice;
(c) careful weighing of risks, costs, and benefits of each alternative;
(d) intensive search for new informationrelevant to furtherevaluation of
each alternative;
(e) assimilating and seriously consideringnew informationor expertjudg-
ment, even if it is critical of the initially preferredcourse of action;
(f) re-examining positive and negative consequences of all known alter-
natives before final choice;
(g) making detailed provisions for implementationof chosen option, mak-
ing contingencyplans to be used if variousknown risks were to materialize.The
symptoms of groupthink,the authorshold, are squarelyopposed to an adequate
fulfilment of these tasks. Hence, defective deliberationsabout decisions, and
3I am indebted to one of the journal's anonymous referees for drawing my attentionto this point.
IrvingJanis: Groupthink 269
Symptomsof GroupthinkReassessed?
Effects of GroupthinkRe-assessed?
The findings of the presentstudy thus bear out the surmisesof those social scientists who
have concluded that poor-qualityproceduresused in arriving at a decision give rise to
avoidable errors that increase the likelihood of obtaining an unsatisfactoryoutcome.
(Herek, Janis & Huth, 1987)
While this piece of researchdoes not explicitly deal with the effects of groupthink
on policy outcomes, the gist of its argumentis quite pertinentin this respect. The
assertionsby organizationallyandpolitically orientedanalystsappearto be incor-
rect: Decision process does matterin determiningpolicy outcomes; groupthink,
therefore, is a real danger to effective decision-making.
One might object to this conclusion by criticizing the highly imaginative,
yet many respects debatable, researchdesign. Take the operationalizationof
in
outcome quality. What are vital U.S. interests in any given crisis? Is it not
conventionalwisdom thatnationalinterestsare, at best, an ambiguousmeasuring
rod for success and failure of policies-for instance, if one takes seriously the
perspective on policy-makingas an outcome of political processes between dif-
ferent agencies all defending their own institutionally shaped views of what
actions the national interest seems to requirein any given case (see, however,
George, 1980)? How relevant a criterionis the short-termreductionof interna-
tional tensions from a broad, strategicgeopoliticalperspective?Yet, on the other
hand, Janis and others rightly assert that their interpretationof process-outcome
linkages is, at least, not contradictedor disconfirmed by empirical evidence.
Othersremaincritical. In fact, the articlewas followed by a rathersharppolemic
with Welch who attackedthe article's methodology and main assertions about
decision quality, using the Cuban missile crisis case as an example [Welch
(1989), Herek, et al. (1989), Janis's Cuba 1962 interpretationhas also been
discussed by Lebow (1981) and McCauley (1990)].
Part of the problem in the discussion on groupthinkand decision quality
comes from the choice of criteriafor assessing decision quality. While Welch's
critique focused primarilyon Herek et al.'s assessment of the decision-making
process in view of the Janis and Mann criteria, I suspect that many political
scientists may challenge the criteria themselves. This takes us to the very limits
of interdisciplinarytheorizing. Janis is a psychologist analyzing and evaluating
political decision processes. His analytical instruments,however, are derived
largely from psychological studies of decision-making. The seven criteriapre-
sented by Janis and Mann do seem to be based on an essentially rationalist,
"problem-solving"view of the natureof decision processes. However, in the
"organizational"and "political" paradigms of political decision-making dis-
cussed earlier,othertypes of rationalityaretakeninto account. These pertain,for
instance, to the symbolic natureof many problem-solving activities (Feldman
and March, 1981), the primacyof "domestic"consensus and legitimacy (Lebow,
1981) and the defense of organizationallydefined interestsand definitions of the
common cause (Rosenthal et al., 1991). Adheringto this limited functionalist
272 't Hart
perspective on rationalityand decision quality, Janis and his associates run the
risks of propagatinga one-sided view of success and failureof policy decisions.
As Jervis (1989, p.442) has observed, ". . . psychologists . . . often neglect the
possibility that what appear to be errors on the part of politicians are really
devious strategiesfor seeking less than admirablegoals. Thus, a statesmanwho
seems inconsistentor confused may be seeking the supportof opposed factions."
George (1980) has already indicated that high-level decision-makersare con-
stantly tradingoff competing requirements:analytically-soundproblem-solving,
engenderingand maintainingsupportand legitimacy, and managingscarce deci-
sion resourcessuch as time and expertise. Fromthis perspective,one could go on
to point to recent studies that have indicated that it may be very effective for
political decision-makersto adopt seemingly "irrational"stances and policies
(Brunsson, 1985; Dror, 1971; Mandel, 1984). Finally, Wildavsky's (1988) fas-
cinating study of the managementof risks has made it clear that "the secret of
safety lies in danger,"in other words, what some would consider irresponsible
and reckless policies regarding the stimulation of high-risk technologies and
experiments will be regarded by others-taking a different time perspective,
adopting a different ideological viewpoint-as manifestationsof wise states-
manship.
This brings us to the heart of the matter. The debate on the quality of
processes and outcomes of decision-makingis, ultimately,a political one. It is
loaded with complex issues of value judgment. For example, Wildavsky'sbook
can easily be read as much a political manifesto as a moder-day defense of
liberal capitalism and the entrepreneurialspirit. It is highly critical of many
social interventionsmitigatingthe developmentof hazardoustechnologies, as the
latterare viewed as the key to long-termeconomic and social progress:"richeris
safer versus poorer is sicker". Likewise, one might speculate to which extent
Janis'sstudy on groupthinkreflects its author'sconviction aboutmany American
foreign policy initiatives involving the use of militaryforce in foreign countries.
It is perhaps no coincidence that the two cases of policy success-where
groupthinkwas avoided-were also instanceswhere policy-makingwas directed
toward prevention of large-scale military force (Marshall plan, Cuba 1962).
Many political psychologists studying internationalrelations have shared these
concerns, and have taken more explicitly "dovish" positions (see White, 1986;
Jervis 1989).
Concluding Remarks
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