Diego Molina Ochoa

POL S 328 A
February 25, 2018

Policy Recommendation for the Rohingyan

Crisis in Myanmar.

By: Diego Molina Ochoa

Diego Molina Ochoa
POL S 328 A
February 25, 2018
To the Secretary of State of the United States of America,

Since the 2012 Rakhine State riots in Myanmar, ethnic conflict between the Rohingya

Muslim minority and the Burmese Buddhist majority has escalated, culminating with the recent

reports of state sponsored programs of persecution and violence towards the Rohingya Muslim

population of Myanmar (BBC). As the reported casualties numbers rise, and the regional refugee

crisis threatens to draw in neighboring nations such as Bangladesh, it has become increasingly

vital in determining the role of the international community, the United Nations, and most

importantly the United States, in responding to this crisis. As escalation and further

complications of the crisis intensify, and regional stability is threatened, intervention in the crisis

will be inevitable. The question now is what form said intervention would take, be it under a flag

of a UN peacekeeping coalition, or through unilateral action by regional powers. Section 1 will

describe the national interests the US has in protecting both human rights and stability in the

region, in the face of further escalation and the involvement of regional nuclear powers. Section

2 will compare and contrast the costs and benefits of unilateral US intervention versus supporting

UN peacekeeping action. Section 3 describes my policy recommendation.

Section 1: Arguments for Intervention

There is a moral and political advantage to the US intervening in the current Rohingya

crisis in Myanmar: state sponsored acts of genocide are not unheard of, and the US has had

similar experiences in the past, such as with the Rwandan genocide. During that crisis, the US

advocated for non-intervention, a move that not only allowed for the wanton slaughter of

countless Rwandan citizens but also tarnished international views of the US as a leading force

for peacekeeping and order for decades (Barnett, 2004: 131-135). Calculated intervention in this

crisis will improve the standing of the US among its allies, giving us political capital critical in
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February 25, 2018
maintaining national interests abroad. Of course, the monetary cost of intervention for the US

will be non-trivial, even through UN led multilateral action, however, the ultimate price for

refusing to intervene will be much more severe. Rohingya based insurgency, both nationalistic

and Islamic in nature, have been involved in the Rohingya conflict for decades, drawing support

from disenfranchised and oppressed members of the Islamic community throughout Myanmar

(Myanmar Peace Monitor). Continued acts of aggression by the Myanmar military towards the

Rohingya people will only fuel regional insurgency, and potentially draw in support from outside

extremists, which is of particular concern given the proximity of Pakistan, which is home to

offshoots of the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS (HRW). In effect, the destabilization of the region

would inspire a similar situation as seen in the Syrian civil war, where violence and a severe

refugee crisis establishing the conditions for the insertion of foreign terrorist groups and

increased rates of radicalization

Risk of insurgency alone is enough to justify intervention in the Rakhine state;, however,

there is another factor that makes US action not just recommended, but critical. Myanmar is

flanked by two major regional powers, China and India; . Bboth are nuclear powers, possess

significant economic, political and military resources, and as regional powers have a vested

interest in maintaining their national goals throughout South Asia. There is little doubt that these

two nations are keeping a close eye on the situation in Myanmar, and that both, given their

proximity to the crisis, have considered the question of intervention. Should the Myanmar

military continue their acts of aggression against the Rohingya people and further destabilize the

region, there is a high probability that either one of them will intervene. This is no mere theory:

both China and India have precedence for utilizing military action to further their national

interests in the region (Watson, 2009)(Hindustantimes, 2016). Whether they act unilaterally or
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POL S 328 A
February 25, 2018
through the UN is irrelevant: should either nation choose to intervene, they will be able to turn

the intervention process to best meet their own ends, setting the rules for intervention in the

region as they choose. Furthermore, should both nations choose to intervene

independentlyunilateraly, then it is likely that tension between these two nuclear powers, already

heightened due to the ongoing standoff in the Doklam region (NYTimes, 2017), will flare and

further threaten US interests in the region.

Section 2: Options for US Intervention

With regards to peacekeeping, our nation has two options: engage in intervention

unilateraly and thus take full control of peacekeeping in Myanmar, or go through the UN and Commented [DM1]: You use unilaterally several times
in a row, try to mix it up.
advocate a UN led peacekeeping program. There are benefits and costs to each strategy, which I

will explain in this section.

With regards to US action in the Rohingya crisis, uUnilateral action by the US is indeed an

attractive option, as doing so allows for our nation to maximize our own interests in the region

while minimizing the ability for India and China to take advantage of the crisis. Reducing the

number of actors in the intervention will limit the complexity of the crisis, and allow us to

directly manage the scale, length, and goals of peacekeeping efforts. This will allow for a much

more rapid intervention, as the bureaucracy of the UN Security Council will be circumvented,

which would not only potentially save more lives but also reduce the likelihood of unilateral

action by another party before we are able to act. Setting the rules of engagement alone will also

allow the US to more effectively put diplomatic pressure on the Myanmar government: although

the previousast administration has allowed ties with Myanmar to warm, the weight of US

sanctions on Myanmar is still a fresh memory, and can serve as a powerful negotiation tool to

coerce the government to bring their military to heel (US Senate, 2010). Offers to further
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February 25, 2018
improve trade relations can both incentivize the Myanmar government to reduce violence and

improve US economic interests in the region. Of course, the threat of new sanctions and even

continued military intervention can simultaneously make cooperation with the US more

attractive.

However, unilateral intervention carries a significant amount of risk. For one, the US will

have to bear the entirety of the economic and military burden of intervention, and even if

Myanmar is made to pay reparations, the cost will be non-trivial. There is also the political cost

associated with unilateral action: such an intervention will fit well with the “America First”

stance yourour current administration has supported, one that has put great strain on our Commented [DM2]: Since you are addressing the
secretary of state, should it be directed as “your”
administration?
relationship with our economic and political allies. Acting alone will no doubt further draw ire

from the international community, and continue to put the legitimacy of the US as a leader in

world politics at risk (Claude, 1966, 368-369). This will have long term implications on our

ability to garner support for UN Security Council resolutions, especially if we further alienate the

other four permanent members. Speaking of which, China and India will undoubtedly not remain

silent at US intervention: while military retaliation is unlikely, they both have the financial

mettle to retaliate through economic means.

The approach of a UN led intervention has a number of benefits. For one, the burden of

intervention will be shared among a larger number of nations: while most likely the US will have

to deliver the majority of peacekeeping forces for an intervention we advocate, the overall costs

will be much lower for the US as we will have access to the shared resources of UN security

council members. There will also be a reduced diplomatic cost associated with the intervention

should the US show a willingness to go through official UN channels and advocate for a joint

effort. Indeed, as acting through the UN will legitimize US national interests in the region, the
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February 25, 2018
gains for supporting joint intervention will be immense (Claude, 1966, 370-374). Not only will

US interests in maintaining peace in the region and in checking Indian and Chinese unilateral

action be achieved, but by acquiring UN support, US standing in world politics will rise, granting

us vital political capital for passing future resolutions and furthering US global interests. Gaining

the support of the UNSC will also apply more pressure on the Myanmar government to reign in

their military: if the US alone has sufficient weight to coerce, then the pressure of US action

backed by the United Nations will ensure that the Myanmar government acts to quell violence.

Finally, India and China will be less likely to condemn an intervention if it is done through the

UNSC, and may even restrict unilateral action on their own end in favor of joining a UN led

intervention.

There are some costs to this strategy: for one, action will not be as immediate as if the US

acted alone, due to the bureaucracy of pushing forward on UNSC peacekeeping efforts, which

will cost more Rohingyan lives and increase the risk of unilateral action by regional powers

should the crisis escalate rapidly. There is also the risk of our proposed peacekeeping action

failing to garner enough support from the other members of the UNSC, which would put any

action through the UN into question. As the US will have to cooperate with the other members of

the UNSC in establishing the rules of engagement for peacekeepers, there is also the price of

sacrificing US gains in intervening to gain consensus, and allow other UNSC nations to

potentially further their own interests in the region.

Section 3: Policy Recommendation

In the face of a growing tragedy in the Rakhine state, the threat of both greater insurgent

activity and action by regional powers increasing by the day, I recommend that the US

immediately submit a proposal to the UNSC to begin joint peacekeeping efforts in the region.
Diego Molina Ochoa
POL S 328 A
February 25, 2018
The choice of going through the UN instead of acting unilaterally is an easy one when we

consider what are the ultimate goals of our intervention: maintaining stability and security in the

region, and in doing so check the interests of regional powers. Acting through the UNSC allows

the US to accomplish these goals without sacrificing out future ability to engage in global

politics, and even further legitimize our future actions by establishing precedence that the US is

both willing and able to garner international support for the sake of spreading peace and

prosperity. This is an important resource to have to maintain the US as a primary global power,

especially with nations like China and Russia gaining more political capital.

The risk of failure to garner enough support in the UNSC is minimal: should the US

approach the matter from a humanitarian stand point, and show willingness to cooperate

extensively with other participants, gaining support from the non-permanent members should not

be difficult. Meanwhile, of the 5 permanent members, only 2, China and Russia, may threaten to

use their veto power. It is unlikely that China will veto, as they too should recognize the cost of

unilateral intervention, and for the sake of maintaining stability in the region will likely join in a

joint intervention strategy. Only Russia remains as a potential obstacle, however, since unlike

China and India it does not have a direct stake in maintaining regional stability in the region, and

indeed would also benefit from limiting the growth of extremism, it will most likely abstain and

not veto any plans for intervention. Thus, acting through the UNSC is likely to succeed in

ensuring peacekeeping activity. In fact, merely the threat of a UNSC supported peacekeeping

plan may be enough to coerce the Myanmar government into reducing violence, which may lead

to a resolution of the crisis without even having to put any boots on the ground. Regardless, the

US goal of maintaining peace in the region will be fulfilled, and in doing so our nation will be

credited in averting tragedy and saving the lives of countless Rohingyan people
 Diego Molina Ochoa
POL S 328 A
February 25, 2018

Citations:

Barnett, Michale, and Martha Finnemore. “Genocide and the Peacekeeping Culture at the
United Nations.” Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, Cornell University Press, pp.
121–155.

Claude, Inis L. Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Natins. 1966.
“Burma violence: 20,000 displaced in Rakhine state.” BBC News, BBC, 28 Oct. 2012, www.bbc.com/news/world-

asia-20114326.

“India's surgical strikes across LoC: Full statement by DGMO Lt Gen Ranbir Singh.” Https://Www.hindustantimes.com/,

29 Sept. 2016, www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-s-surgical-strikes-across-loc-full-statement-by-dgmo-lt-

gen-ranbir-singh/story-Q5yrp0gjvxKPGazDzAnVsM.html.

Administrator. “Myanmar Peace Monitor.” Armed ethnic groups, www.mmpeacemonitor.org/stakeholders/armed-

ethnic-groups.

Myers, Steven Lee, et al. “How India and China Have Come to the Brink Over a Remote Mountain Pass.” The New York

Times, The New York Times, 26 July 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/07/26/world/asia/dolam-plateau-china-india-

bhutan.html.

US Senate, Reviewing the Import Restrictions in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. Senate, July 22,

2010
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February 25, 2018
Watson, Cynthia. “The Chinese Armed Forces and Non-Traditional Missions: A Growing Tool of

Statecraft.” Jamestown, 20 Feb. 2009, jamestown.org/program/the-chinese-armed-forces-and-non-traditional-

missions-a-growing-tool-of-statecraft/.

“World Report 2017: Rights Trends in Pakistan.” Human Rights Watch, 12 Jan. 2017, www.hrw.org/world-

report/2017/country-chapters/pakistan.