CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1

CASE DOCTRINES

SY 2017-2018
 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

ABON, Paine Palma

TANADA V. TUVERA, G.R. NO. L-63915, DECEMBER 29, 1986
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.

DE ROY V. CA, G.R. NO. 80718 JANUARY 29, 1988

There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer
in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions
(G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

ALIMAGNO, Maria Alexis A.

PEOPLE V. QUE PO LAY, G.R. NO. L-6791, MARCH 29, 1954
Circulars and regulations, especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a penalty
for its violation, should be published before becoming effective. Before the public may be bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must be published and the people
officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties

GARCIA V. RECIO, G.R. NO. 138322, OCTOBER 2, 2001

Under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
However, the provision only applies to Philippine Law, as foreign laws, including divorce, do not prove
themselves in the Philippines. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction
that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason
of their judicial function.

A divorce decree must be presented and proven as fact based on the rules of evidence. Respondent, in
merely presenting the Australian divorce decree is insufficient because appearance of its authenticity is
not sufficient. The rules of evidence must still be complied. In this case, the petitioner’s lack of objection
to the admissibility of the decree resulted in such being admitted in evidence.

AMORES, Ma. Patricia Ysabel B.

D.M. CONSUNJI VS. CA AND JUEGO, G.R. NO. 137873, APRIL 20, 2001
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the
election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the
absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. Equitable in nature, the
doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the
moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not
to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong. The choice of
a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election.

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EMETERIO CUI VS ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, G.R. NO. L-15127, MAY 30, 1961
The stipulation in a contract, between a student and the school, that the student's scholarship is good
only if he continues in the same school, and that he waives his right to transfer to another school without
refunding the equivalent of his scholarship in cash, is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void,
because scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit and to help gifted students in whom society has
an established interest or a first lien, and not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige
and increase its business potential.

ARIENZA, Ellen Lovea J.

NAVARRO V. JUDGE DOMAGTOY, 259 SCRA 129
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple.
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a
subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family
Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions
of law. In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted
the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage
shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous marriages not falling under Article 41."||

BESO V. DAGUNAN, 323 SCRA 566

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to
respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala.
What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize
the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was “an overseas worker, who, respondent
realized deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy." Respondent
Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "he believed in good faith that by doing
so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be too expensive and complicated
for citizens to get married."

BAGALIHOG, Francis Aleli H.

PEOPLE V. LICERA, G.R. NO. L-39990, JULY 2, 1975
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees the judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed
by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s
application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed
law purports to carry into effect.

PEOPLE V. JABINAL, G. R. NO. L-30061, FEBRUARY 27, 1974

The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, of
the land, at the time appellant was found by possession of the firearm in question and when he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a
doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied

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prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.

BALMONTE, Dante A.
CHU JAN V. BERNAS, 34 PHIL 631
Ignorance of the special law applicable to a case does not justify the court in terminating the proceeding
by dismissing it without a decision.

PEOPLE V. VENERACION, 249 SCRA 244

The law mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper penalty provided
for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case, the judge must
impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code (Article 9 thereof)
which provides that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity,
or insufficiency of the laws.

BELTRAN, Wilander M.
PEOPLE V. PURISIMA, G.R. NO. L-42050-66, NOVEMBER 20, 1978
When ambiguity exits, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of
the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in
favor of the accused and strictly against the state. In the construction or interpretation of the legislative
measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.

MARTINEZ V. VAN BUSKIRK, G.R. NO. 5691, DECEMBER 27, 1910

It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to
deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which
that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in
which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. The act of defendant's
driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. The acts, the
performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced
in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, cannot be held to be themselves
unreasonable or imprudent.

BERNARDO, Mark Ebenezer A.

YAO KEE V. SY-GONZALES, G.R. NO. 55960, NOVEMBER 24, 1988
Custom is defined as 'a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a
social rule, legally binding and obligatory.' The law requires that 'a custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence' [Article 12, Civil Code]. On this score the Court had occasion to state
that 'a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. The same evidence, if not one of a higher
degree, should be required of a foreign custom. To establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be
proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign
marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922)].

GARCIA V. RECIO, G.R. NO. 138322, OCTOBER 2, 2001

it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our
jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce
must be proven.

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The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The
certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal
capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is
prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.

BONITA, Ray Karlo M.

CIR V. PRIMETOWN, G.R. NO. 162155, AUGUST 28, 2007
Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent
to 365 days. However, in 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31,
Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides: Sec. 31.Legal Periods. — "Year" shall be understood to be twelve
calendar months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall
be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day of twenty-four
hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset.

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987
deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is
equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,
however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of
1987, the number of days is irrelevant. There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we
hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law,
governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

MICIANO V. BRIMO, G.R. NO. 22595, NOVEMBER 1, 1924

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must
respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being
contrary to law, for article 792 of the Civil Code provides the following: "Impossible conditions and those
contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide." And said condition is
contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the
Civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions. Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten,
and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to
the herein oppositor.

CABLING, Carolyn M.
VAN DORN V. RONILLO, JR., 139 SCRA 139
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, “ Laws relating to
family rights and uties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad.” only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus,
pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,

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and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA, 174 SCRA 653

The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who shall file
the complaint shall be the spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in
civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition. After the divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse has no longer the right to institute the prosecution for adultery. Therefore, marital bonds must be
unsevered before commencement of action for adultery or concubinage.

CONSERVADO, Sheena Marie V.

BARRETO V. GONZALES, 58 PHIL 67
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to this
court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose
to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change
of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the matrimonial domicile
of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by
the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer
jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in
1919. Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit
the personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a
manner which our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals.

GOVT. VS. FRANK 13 PHIL 238

No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of
a contract are determined b the law of the place where the contract is made. (Scudder vs. Union National
Bank, 91 U. S., 406.) Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the
place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence,
and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.

CRUZ, Gianina T.
BARNUEVO V. FUSTER, 29 PHIL 606
The authority of jurisdictional power of the courts to decree a divorce is not comprised within the personal
status of the husband and wife, simply because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights which
belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the
are not a matter of private law of persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. In order to foster
their relations and develop their commerce, all civilized nations are interested in doing justice, not alone
to their own people, but to those foreigners who contract within the country or outside of its juridical ties
which in some manner affect their sovereignty. In the present action, the CFI of the Philippines have
jurisdiction to try the actions for divorce over the persons of the litigants, for although they are Spanish
Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and had their domicile therein.

TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN V. BOHANAN, 106 PHIL 997

According to Article 16 of NCC, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the
national law of the person whose succession is in question. In the case at bar, the testator was a citizen
of the State of Nevada. Since the laws of said state allow the testator to dispose of all his property

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according to his will, his testamentary dispositions depriving his wife and children of what should be their
legitimes under the laws of the Philippines, should be respected and the project of partition made in
accordance with his testamentary dispositions should be approved

CRUZ-CLAUDIO, Valerie May M.

BELLIS V. BELLIS, 20 SCRA 358
Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot
be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be
governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law,
which is the national law of the deceased.

AZNAR V. GARCIA, 2 SCRA 95

Application of Laws – Foreign Law – Nationality Principle – Internal and Conflict Rule Application of the
Renvoi Doctrine: The Renvoi Doctrine is a judicial precept whereby the Conflict of Laws Rule in the place
of the forum refer a matter to the Conflict of Laws Rule in another, and the latter refers the matter back to
the forum (remission) or to a third state (transmission). Thus, owing to its french translation: “to send back”
or “to refer back unopened”. In the case of Aznar vs. Garcia. The Decedent was a national of California
and a domiciliary of the Philippines. The acknowledged natural child claimed her right to her legitime
pursuant to Philippine law. This was opposed by the decedent’s executor contending that the will, not
mentioning her legitimes, was valid pursuant to Californian law. The Court in the Philippines ruled in favor
of the child. The reason: while the Philippine laws hold that it is the law of the country of nationality of the
decedent which should govern, where the law of the latter refers back the matter to the forum or
domiciliary, there is Renvoi. Thus the Philippine Court will take cognizance of the issue and apply the law
of the Philippines. The law of the state of California provides for the applicBility of the law of the domicile,
by reason of which the Court validly ruled in favor of the acknowledged natural child.

DADUA, Charles Oliver III P.

ROEHR V. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. NO. 142820, JUNE 20, 2003
Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognized in our jurisdiction, but the legal
effects thereof, such as custody must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the
effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment
had been given ample opportunity to do so.

GARCIA V. RECIO, G.R. NO. 138322, OCTOBER 2, 2002

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and
recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, it does not prove
respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. The decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible
to court because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.

A document may be proven as an official record of a foreign country by either:

1. An official publication;

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 2. Attested by the officer having legal custody of the document;

3. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

4. Accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular officer

stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

5. Authenticated by the seal of his office.

DE LA PENA, Arah Bea V.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILS V. CA, 449 SCRA 57
When the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons or in case of two
corporations, merge them into one.

UYPITCHING V. QUIAMCO, 510 SCRA 172

“Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere.”
To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are
the underlying principles of law and order in society.

The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19, also known as the “principle of abuse of
right,” prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith,
otherwise he opens himself to liability. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice
or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.
Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach.

DE LEON, Linda T.
WASSMER V. VELEZ, 12 SCRA 648
Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized,
is quite different.This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN V. REYES, G.R. NO. 154259, FEBRUARY 28, 2005
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the
Civil Code.

DE LOS SANTOS, Patricia Camille M.

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH V. CA, 219 SCRA 115 19 FEBRUARY 1993
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.

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PE V. PE, 5 SCRA 200 30 MAY 1962
Defendant won Lolita's affection thru an ingenious scheme or trickery and seduced her to the extent of
making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on
the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits
to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was
considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted
clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When
the rumors about their illicit affair reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from
going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiff even filed deportation proceedings against
defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until
she disappeared from the parental home, Held; The wrong defendant has caused Lolita and her family is
indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to
Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article
21 of the New Civil Code.

DELA CRUZ, Jacqueline H.

SPOUSES QUISIMBING V. MERALCO, G.R. NO. 142943
Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of
property without due process of law are violated. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, such damages may be recovered if they
are the proximate results of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. Exemplary damages on the other
hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE V. CA, 176 SCRA 778

Article 19 of the Civil Code known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in
the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to
apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called for its application the question of
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or
Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.

DELA CRUZ, Michael Paul Bryan T.

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST VS. JADER, 325 SCRA 804, G.R. NO. 132344 FEBRUARY 17, 2000
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the
latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the
person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Want of
care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause
naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable.

VILLALVA VS. RCBC SAVINGS BANK, 499 SCRA 774, G.R. NO. 165661 AUGUST 28, 2006
Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in
money. It may also take the form of avoidance of expenses and other indispensable reductions in the
patrimony of a person. It may also include the prevention of a loss or injury.

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DEVELA, Matt Kaiser L.
TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO, 15 SCRA 355
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño
remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute
divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of
Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the
time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She
was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her
previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise,
that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her
husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the
corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an
anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate
excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with
a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant
Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code,
Art. 333).

ST LOUIS REALTY V. CA, 133 SCRA 179

"Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce
a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief".
The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code.
Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by
Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.

St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a
widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology
and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ".

ENCINAS, Jade
CHING V. CA, G.R. NO. 110844, APRIL 27, 2000
As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and
resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.||

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TE V. CA, G.R. NO. 126746. NOVEMBER 29, 2000
The pendency of annulment of marriage is not a prejudicial question to criminal prosecution for bigamy.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of marriage had no bearing upon the determination of the
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. The
prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which states that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may not be invoked for purposes of marriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Thus, under the law a marriage even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

Annulment of marriage is likewise not a prejudicial question to administrative proceedings. The concept of
prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. There is no prejudicial question where one case
is administrative and the other is civil. Furthermore, Section 32 ofthe Rules and Regulations Governing
the Regulation and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative
proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case
against the respondent involving the same facts as the administrative case.

By: ERUM, Margaret Anne C.

MERCADO V. TAN G.R. NO. 137110. AUGUST 1, 2000
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration
of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only
after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage
while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To
repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages
delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous
marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We
cannot allow that.
Case no. 44

MORIGO V. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 145226. FEBRUARY 6, 2004

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado vs Tan. In the latter case, the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was
already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be
legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes
as "void."
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but
twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later
before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired,
although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The
mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs
no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

11
By: ESTRELLA, Jin Paula C.
SPOUSES YU V. PCIB, G.R. NO. 147902, MARCH 17, 2006
No prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale
and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a special proceeding since the two cases are
both civil in nature which can proceed separately and take their own direction independently of each other.
A prejudicial question is “one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into
play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
issue raised in civil action would be determinative de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a
criminal case”.

DONATO V. LUNA, G.R. NO. 53642, APRIL 15, 1988

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of question is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct or separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear
not only in the said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The issue before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relation Court is not determinative of petitioner’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. It was
petitioner’s second wife, who filed the complainant for annulment of the second marriage on the ground
that her consent was obtained through deceit.

The rule on prejudicial question cannot be applied since a case for annulment of marriage can only be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was proved that
petitioner’s consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation in order
to establish that his act in the second marriage was involuntary one and as such cannot be the basis of
his conviction for the crime of bigamy.

EVANGELISTA, Maria Clara G.

QUIMIGUING V. ICAO, G.R. NO. L-26795, 31 JULY 1970
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given provisional personality of its own for all purposes
favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code. The unborn child, therefore, has a right
to support from its progenitors, even if the child said is unborn, it may receive donations as provided in
Article 742.

It may that Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that
are favorable to it,” adds further that the fetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mother’s womb. This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for
if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.

GELUZ V. CA, G.R. NO. L-16439, 20 JULY 1961

A conceived child, in this case, has no provisional personality under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because
that same article expressly limits such personality by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive. The circumstances in this case disputes not that the child was dead when
separated from its mother’s womb.

12
Hence, no action for damages could be filed on its behalf. If no action for damages could be instituted on
behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively
accrue to its parents or heirs.

By: FERNANDEZ, Therese Marie L.

LIMJUCO V. ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGAN, GR NO. L-770, APRIL 27, 1948
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for
certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice
or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal
obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.

It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificial person. it is the
creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made

DUMLAO V. QUALITY PLASTICS, G.R. NO. L-27956, APRIL 30, 1976

“He was not, and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality.
His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death.”

By: GARDIANO, Von Joven Kristian R.

MO YA LIM YAO V. CID, G.R. NO. L-21289, OCTOBER 4, 1971
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

FRIVALDO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 123755. JUNE 28, 1996

Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by
repatriation.

GENER, Stephanie Ann A.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC, 258 SCRA 300
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established, it is
residence. If a person's intent is to remain, it becomes his domicile. The law provides that: (1) a minor
follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained; (2)
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate:
(a) An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (b) A bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one; and (c) Acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue; (3) a wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in
Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. Therefore, if a person retains his domicile of
origin for purposes of the residence requirement, the 1-year period is irrelevant because wherever he is,
he is a resident of his domicile of origin. Second, if a person reestablishes a previously abandoned
domicile, the 1 year requirement must be satisfied.

NINAL V. BAYADOG, G.R. NO. 133778, MARCH 14, 2000

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio. However, a marriage license is dispensed with, as provided in Article

13
76 of the Civil Code, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least 5 years
before the marriage. The law further provides, however, that the 5-year cohabitation period contemplated
by Article 76 should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity. Meaning, no third party was involved at any time within the 5
years and continuity is unbroken. Furthermore, the subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either
spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife”.

GERONIMO, Francis L
GARCIA V. RECIO, G.R. NO. 138922, OCTOBER 2, 2002
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

REP. V. CIPRIANO OBRECIDO III, G.R. NO. 154380, OCTOBER 5, 2005

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.

GRIMARES, Francis Derek L.

EDGAR SAN LUIS V. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS GR. NO. 134029, FEBRUARY 6, 2007

There is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of
fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.
Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.

VAN DORN V. ROMILLO 139 SCRA 139

It is not necessary to determine the property relations between petitioner and private respondent after
their marriage, whether absolute or relative community property, complete separation of property or any
other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is that the Nevada divorce of the parties that the Nevada Court
obtained jurisdiction over the petitioner and private respondent.

LAZARO, Charissa Elaine B.

PILAPIL V. SOMERA, 174 SCRA 653
The Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien
spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence
the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other."

EDGAR SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS, GR. NO. 133743, FEBRUARY 6, 2007
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,
would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving
spouse. However, it held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its

14
authenticity and due execution must be presented. The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws
as they must be alleged and proved.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,nevertheless, we find
that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may
be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint
efforts during their cohabitation.
If respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision
would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by
expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry.

LIMBO, Robbe Millicent T.

REPUBLIC V. IYOY 470 SCRA 508
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting
married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain
and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his
wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by
Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was
already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses.

REPUBLIC V. OBRECIDO 472 SCRA 114

Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. The reckoning point is not their
citizenship at the time of celebration of marriage, but their citizenship at the time the divorce decree is
obtained abroad by alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry.

MAGDARAOG, Jethro C.
LLORENTE V. CA, 345 SCRA 592
For failing to apply the doctrines in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr., Quita v. Court of Appeals, and Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity. Now, the effects of this divorce as to the succession to the estate of the decedent are matters
best left to the determination of the trial court.

SARAO V. GUEVARRA, G. R. NO. 47063, 40 OG 263

Marriage may not be annulled on the ground of incompetency. US law generally held that incompetency
is not the ability to procreate but the inability to copulate. It is thus a defect of copulation and not of
reproduction. Barrenness will not invalidate the marriage . The operation made her sterile but by no
means made her unfit for sexual intercourse. It was due to plaintiff’s own voluntary desistance, memory of
first unpleasant experience that made him give up the idea of again having carnal knowledge with her
even after she had already been rid of her disease.

15
MALAGA, Cybel Shephered S.
BUCAT V. BUCAT, 72 PHIL 19
El matrimonio es una institucion sacratisima; es el cimiento en que descansa la sociedad. Para anularlo,
son menester pruebas claras y fehacientes. En este asunto no existen tales pruebas.

Even assuming that the annulment is based on the fact that at the time of the marriage, defendant was
pregnant by a man other than her husband, there would still be no ground because the law is explicit.
There should have been a concealment of such fact. If the defendant was already about 6 months
pregnant at the time of marriage, there can be no possibility of concealment. At such an advanced stage
of pregnancy, concealment would be impossible.

AQUINO V. DELIZO, 109 PHIL 21

Concealment of the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other
than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation
to Art. 86, par. (3), New Civil Code).

MANUEL, Voz Eduardo C.

TUASON V. CA, G.R. NO. 116607, APRIL 10, 1996
Prosecuting attorney or fiscal may be ordered by the court to intervene on behalf of the state to prevent
collusion between the parties. A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught
with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of
preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. If the defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in
default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the
parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment
through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and
fabricated.

CORPUS V. ORCHOTORENA, A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1861, JULY 30, 2004

The Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in cases involving declaration of nullity of marriage.
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: "If the defending party in an action for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order
the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there
is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated." Thus, the report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non for further proceedings
to go on in the case. Respondent judge ignored this procedural rule. This case is a classic example of
"railroading" or "procedural short-cut."

MODESTO, Diane Erika L.

CERVANTES V. FAJARDO 251 PHIL 528-532
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is
paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will
not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the
custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending
parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion.|||

16
REPUBLIC V. IYOY 507 PHIL 485-508
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said
Article. As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume."|||

MOVIDO, Ana Rose L.

ESPIRITU V. CA, 242 SCRA 362, MARCH 15, 1995
With regard to the custody of children, the courts must take into account all relevant considerations in
ascertaining the welfare and best interest of the child. If a child is under seven years of age, the law
presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can
be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the
court is not bound by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award
custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances. Respondent
court should have scrutinized the records to discover the choice of the children and verified whether that
parent is fit or unfit. Respondent court should not have simply followed statutory presumptions and
general propositions applicable to ordinary or common situations. The seven-year age limit must not be
mechanically treated as an arbitrary cut off period but a guide based on a strong presumption.

MANGONON V. CA, 494 SCRA 1, JUNE 30, 2006

A court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order.
Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it
can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is to determine the kind and amount
of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that the facts be
established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.
The obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However,
the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those
who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so.
The person obliged to give support is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give
support. Thus, he may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to
stay in the family dwelling. The second option cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances, legal
or moral, which should be considered.

NOVAL, Christopher M.
ANAYA V. PALAROAN G.R. NO. L-27930
Non-disclosure of a husband’s premarital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated
circumstances that would constitute as fraud as a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the
last paragraph of Article 86 (Old Civil Code), providing that “no other misrepresentation or deceit as
to ...chastity” shall be a ground for an action to annul a marriage.

17
FRANCISCO V. TAYAO, 50 PHIL 42
As stated in the Philippine Divorce Law (Act 2710), a petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on
the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband. Such petition cannot prosper if there is no
final judgment of concubinage rendered against the husband. If the husband is co accused in an adultery
filed by the aggrieved husband of an adulterous wife, it is not tantamount to make the co accused
husband guilty of concubinage as there must be a separate judgment of concubinage.

ORTEGA, Danielle
GAUDIONCO V. HON. PENARANDA, G.R. NO. 79284
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance
of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.

ONG V. ONG, 505 SCRA 76

The argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should
not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be
denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation is without merit. The abandonment
referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was
established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated by the said provision.

PASCUA, Le Bon Eirres R.

REPUBLIC V. IYOY 470 SCRA 508
Abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy may be grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
same Code.

GINES V. BUGAYONG 100 PHIL 616

Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of
matrimonial cohabitation.

PEREZ, Rachel Kay A.

LAPUZ-SY V. EUFEMIO, 100 PHIL 616
The death of the plaintiff before final decree in an action for legal separation abates the action. An action
for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there
being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines
recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal
separation and in its article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by reconciliation, stop or abate the
proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character,
it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis
moritur cum persona. A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that
they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the
plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree.

CERVANTES V. FAJARDO, G.R. NO. 79965, JANUARY 27, 1989

In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is
paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will
not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the
custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child

18
concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending
parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion.

RAFAEL, Kristine Denise C.

ESPIRITU V. CA, G.R. NO. 115640, MARCH 15, 1995
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to
take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that
the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by
"compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound
by that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other
parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances. Respondent court should have
scrutinized the records to discover the choice of the children and verified whether that parent is fit or unfit.
Respondent court should not have simply followed statutory presumptions and general propositions
applicable to ordinary or common situations. The seven-year age limit must not be mechanically treated
as an arbitrary cut off period but a guide based on a strong presumption.

GOITIA V. CAMPOS-RUEDA, G.R. NO. 11263, NOVEMBER 2, 1916

Article 152 of the (Old) Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease.
The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them. Besides, where the wife, as in this case,
is forced to leave the conjugal home on account of her husband’s indecorous demands (blow jobs on his
penis) and maltreatment of her, she is justified in leaving the husband. Thus, although she lives
separately from the husband, she is entitled to receive support from him.

RAKIM, Amer Zaakaria

ARROYA V. VASQUEZ, 42 PHIL 54
“It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the
pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to
sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. “

CHI MING TSOI V. CA, G.R. NO. 119190, JUNE 16, 1997
“If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is ‘to procreate children based
on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage.’ Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.”

RAMOS, Abraham III P.

CARATING-SIAYNGCO V. SIAYNGCO, G.R. NO. 158896, OCTOBER 27, 2004
Sexual infidelity per se is not a ground to declare a marriage null and void based on psychological
incapacity. It must show that respondent unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality
which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligation of the marital state and not
merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood.

19
REPUBLIC V. MOLINA, G.R. NO. 108763, FEBRUARY 13, 1997
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of
the celebration" of the marriage. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. (5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage (6) The
essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.

RAMOS, Israel M.
MARCOS V. MARCOS, G.R. NO. 136490. OCTOBER 19, 2000
“Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the
totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent should be examined
by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration.Although this Court is
sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.Verily, the behavior of respondent can
be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than
six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support,and even left the family home.Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said
period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.In sum, this Court
cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged
psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her
failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.”

NOEL BUENAVENTURA V. CA, G.R. NO. 127358 31 MARCH 2005

“The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as proof
of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Psychological incapacity has been defined, as no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to

20
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.”

“Based on the above definition of psychological incapacity, by declaring the petitioner as psychologically
incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The
award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on
specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or
her disability and yet wilfully concealed the same.”

REGENCIA, Nicole Joy R.

BOBIS V. BOBIS, G.R. NO. 138509, JULY 31, 2000
He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on
the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, it
was held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question.

LUCIO MORIGO V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 145226, FEB. 6, 2004

The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus,
needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an
ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

ROSIT, Jasmine Ann A.

GOMEZ V. LIPANA, G.R. NO. L-23214
Section 29 of the Marriage Law, Act 3613, the controlling statute when the two marriages in this case
were celebrated, particularly the first paragraph thereof, says that "any marriage contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse
shall be illegal and void from its performance.” There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930
marriage had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez in 1935. The defendant has not
discharged the burden to prove that he comes under the exceptions; no evidence whatsoever having
been adduced by him at the trial.

NIÑAL V. BAYADOG, G.R. NO. 133778

Our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by the same
person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual
severance of the lial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either
spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife."

RUIZ, Steven Charles R.

VILLANUEVA V. CA, G.R. NO. 132955
Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will
depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The
failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for
annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence.
Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the
validity of his marriage must be upheld

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SANTOS V. CA, G.R. NO. 112019
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have
sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which
considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be
"legitimate."

The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism,
merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code.

SABILI, Francis Meynard P.

REPUBLIC V. CA, 268 SCRA 198

In order to prove Psychological Incapacity, the following shall be considered:
1. The burden of proof pertains to the plaintiff;
2. The root cause of the incapacity must be clinically inclined;
3. The same must exist at the time of the marriage;
4. The incapacity should be so grave as to disable the person to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage;
5. It must be embraced in Arts 68-71 and 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code;
6. Respect must be given to the National Matrimional Appelate Court or the Catholic Church’s
decision;
7. The court shall order the prosecuting attorney to act in behalf of the state.

LUCITA HERNANDEZ V. CA, G.R. NO. 126010, DECEMBER 8, 1999

Psychological incapacity refers to a mental, not a mere physical incapacity which causes one to be
unable to meet the obligations which are essential to the marriage as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code.

In addition, the condition must exist at the time of the marriage. It does not consider an inability of the
spouse, however, to have sexual relations with another. As to the other forms of psychoses, as being of
unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, among others, merely renders the marriage voidable
under our laws. They do not, however preclude being indicia of psychological incapacity that would very
well fall under the definition of our laws for the purpose of Article 36 of the Family Code.

SACLAYAN, Kathleen Kaye V.

DAVID B. DEDEL VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL, GR NO. 151867,
JANUARY 29, 2004
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional

22
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts
are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual
promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Art. 55 of the
Family Code. However, Art. 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not
be rooted in psychological inacapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like.

JOSE LAM VS. ADRIANA CHUA, GR NO. 131286, MARCH 18, 2004
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is
essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her
alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the
means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.

YAOKASIN, Trisha Anne C.

MALLION V. ALCANTARA, G.R. NO. 141528. OCTOBER 31, 2006
Res judicata as a bar by prior judgment requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the
former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is—between the first and second
actions— identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.

The instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid celebration
of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95,
however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in
accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage
license which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to
state that parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat
their claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that
purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case.

CARATING-SIAYNGO V. SIAYNGO, G.R. NO. 158896. OCTOBER 27, 2004

Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of
the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood.

An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of “irreconcilable
differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. As we stated in
Marcos v. Marcos: Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.

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ABRENILLA, Maida M.
NAVARRO, Jr. vs CECILIO-NAVARRO, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007
Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some
marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

LEONILO ANTONIO vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to
a mere inability to comply with them. Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by
a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this
constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the
foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding
interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio
marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as
they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to
understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Though Article 36 contemplates only psychological incapacity to comply, it has been consistently
recognized that the intent of the Family Code Committee was to allow some resiliency in its application.
The preference was for the judge to interpret the provision on a case to case basis case-to-case guided
by the experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions
of church tribunals, which although not binding on civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law. And while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely
persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of Supreme Court in interpreting psychological incapacity
are binding on lower courts.
The present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines set in the Molina case as follows:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
2. The root cause of psychological incapacity must be:
- Medically identified
- Alleged in the complaint
- Sufficiently proven by experts
- Clearly explained in the decision.
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existent at the time of marriage celebration.
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be clinically permanent or incurable. Incurability may be
absolute or even relative to the other spouse.
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of the marriage. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligations must be stated in the petition.
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
8. Psychological incapacity is incurable and that such must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. However, in formulating the doctrinal rule, the Court in Santos omitted
any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.

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9. The intendment of the law was to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.

AMULONG, Mary Grace L.

REPUBLIC vs. QUINTERO-HAMANO, 428 SCRA 735
Psychological defect cannot be assumed from mere abandonment of family immediately after the
celebration of the marriage. As ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing
so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
If no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder,
although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could
have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
In proving psychological incapacity, there is no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse.

LANDICHO vs. RELOVA, 22 SCRA 731

The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case
does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the
suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's
consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation
to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction
for the crime of bigamy.
Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not
be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriages should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and
only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.

ANG, Arthur, Angelo G.

DONATO vs. LUNA G.R NO. 53642, April 15, 1988
The rule on prejudicial question in a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a
prejudicial question to a bigamy case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such
marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation. This is to show that his act in
the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of
bigamy.

WEIGEL vs. SEMPIO-DIY 143 SCRA 449

A marriage which was allegedly vitiated by force committed against both parties, if true, will make the
marriage voidable, and not void. A succeeding marriage by one of the parties with another would
necessarily be void in the eyes of the law as the previous marriage still exists.

ARANA, Carna Mae M.

DOMINGO vs. CA 226 SCRA 572
The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposes of remarriage. However, it is
also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her

25
partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being charged
with bigamy. When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for
the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be the
necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage.

BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE G.R NO. 137567, JUNE 20, 2000

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltran’s marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only
that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined. Article 40 of the Family Code provides: “The absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.”

ARANZANSO, Jeffrey N.
MERCADO VS. TAN, G.R. NO. 137110, AUGUST 1, 2000
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage,
as follows: ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void. Thus, a marriage of a
person may be null and void but there is need of judicial declaration of such fact before that person can
marry again; otherwise, the second marriage will also be void It is now settled that the fact that the first
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage,
there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the second marriage.

REPUBLIC vs. NOLASCO, G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993

Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of
the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the
absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed
dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes a
"well founded belief " that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive
death can be granted.

ARCILLA, Jinky Jane A.

ARMAS vs. CALISTERIO, G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08 May
1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03
August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it
thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision is Article 83 of the New Civil Code. Under the foregoing provision,
a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless

26
the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above
rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held
valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so
in good faith. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
wrong - it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill
will. The Court does not find these circumstances to be here extant.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the
contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger
of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b)
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is,
unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the
spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition
is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as
so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William
Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a
second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been
contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence
of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to indicate another
property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of
Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in two equal portions -- one portion going to the surviving
spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of
a surviving spouse over the net estate of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or
nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers and
sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only
succeed by right of representation in the presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand,
nephews and nieces can succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude
nephews and nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are
incapacitated to succeed.

MANUEL vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005

With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390
of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
absentee spouse.

AREVALO, Maria Isabella Katrina Y.

MORIGO vs. PEOPLE, G.R No. 145226, February 6, 2004
In the case at bar, Morigo is not guilty of Bigamy. There was no marriage ceremony performed in his
marriage with Lucia Barrete by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Barrete merely
signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.

27
TENEBRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R No. 150758, February 18, 2004
The declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioner’s 2nd marriage lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the
validity of a marriage are classified under the Family Code which were all satisfied by Petitioner and
Ancajas.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. There is a recognition
written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy.

ARIOLA, Maria Guadalupe T.

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO vs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, G.R. 132529, Feb. 2, 2001
Deceased contracted 2 marriages. The wife from the subsequent bigamous marriage is claiming a certain
portion from the deceased's monetary benefits. In this case, Art. 148 of the Civil code will govern for it
deals with the property regime of bigamous marriages. This means that only the properties acquired by
the parties through their actual join contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Hence, the bigamous wife is only entitled to the
properties acquired with the deceased through their actual joint contribution, and not to a share in the
property exclusively earned by the deceased.

OFELIA P. TY vs. CA and EDGARDO M. REYES, G.R. 127406, Nov. 27, 2000
Decree of nullity of the first marriage is not a requirement for a subsequent marriage to be valid. The first
and second marriages having been contracted in 1977 and 1979, the provisions of the civil code should
govern. Since it has no express provision for such requirement to invalidate the subsequent marriage,
such is not needed. Hence the subsequent marriage is valid even if the decree of nullity of Reyes' first
marriage had not been issued yet when he contracted the subsequent marriage with the petitioner.

ARREOLA, Renz Homer S.

VALDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 266 SCRA 324
Art 147 of FC applies when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. The legal effect of would
be that their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares, and property acquired by them
is governed by rules on co-ownership. Therefore, the law does not require actual contribution so that
rules on co-ownership may apply.
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations
of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in
the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the
legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38"7 of the Code.

28
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.

AGAPAY vs. PALANG, 276 SCRA 341

Art 148 of FC applies to cohabitation when man and woman are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively as husband and wife without benefit of marriage. The legal effect would be that properties
acquired by them shall be owned by in in common in proportion to their respective contribution.
Therefore, there has to be actual contribution so that presumption of co-ownership may be appreciated.
Supreme Court held that the agricultural land and house and land cannot be granted to Erlinda (party to
the second marriage). The sale of the riceland was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision
of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation when a man
and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. The marriage of Miguel and Erlinda
was null and void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected
by the latter's de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision,
in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary
or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-
ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy
and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade SC that she actually contributed money to buy the
subject riceland.
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, we find no
basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same. Consequently, the riceland should, as
correctly held by the CA, revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and Carlina
Palang (party to the first marriage)
NOTE: The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda was void. Article 87 of the
Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise,
the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

AZADA CHUA, Jan Carlo K.

RODRIGUEZ vs. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. L-23002, July 31, 1967
Appellant contends that the sale by her to her daughter, and the subsequent sale by the latter to appellant
and her husband, the late Domingo Rodriguez, were done for the purpose of converting the property from
paraphernal to conjugal, thereby vesting a half interest in Rodriguez, and evading the prohibition against
donations from one spouse to another during coverture (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 1334). If this is true, then
the appellant and her daughter must have intended the two conveyance to be real and effective; for
appellant could not intend to keep the ownership of the fishponds and at the same time vest half of them
in her husband. The two contracts of sale then could not have been simulated, but were real and intended
to be fully operative, being the means to achieve the result desired.
Nor does the intention of the parties to circumvent by these contracts the law against donations between
spouses make them simulated ones.

29
What would invalidate the conveyances now under scrutiny is the fact that they were resorted to in order
to circumvent the legal prohibition against donations between spouses contained in Article 1334,
paragraph 1, of the Civil Code of 1889, then prevailing. That illegal purpose tainted the contracts. The
illicit purpose then becomes illegal causa within the terms of the old Civil Code.
Unfortunately for herein appellant, in contracts invalidated by illegal subject matter or illegal causa,
Articles 1305 and 1306 of the Civil Code then in force apply rigorously the rule in pari delicto non oritur
action, denying all recovery to the guilty parties inter se.

HARDING vs. COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY, G.R. No. L-12707, August 10, 1918
Even assuming that defendant might have invoked article 1334 as a defense, the burden would be upon it
to show that the gift in question does not fall within the exception therein established. We cannot say, as
a matter of law, that the gift of an automobile by a husband to his wife is not a moderate one. Whether it
is or is not would depend upon the circumstances of the parties, as to which nothing is disclosed by the
record. Therefore, plaintiff was the owner of the automobile in question and had an insurable interest
therein; that there was no fraud on her part in procuring the insurance; that the valuation of the
automobile is binding upon the defendant corporation.

BANDIOLA, Dawna Fya Osio

CIRILA ARCABA vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, G.R No. 146683, November 22,
2001
Cohabitation or living together as husband and wife means not only residing under one roof, but also
having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse,
especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least,
cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together
as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such.
BA FINANCE CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AUGUSTO YULO, LILY YULO (doing
business under the name and style of A & L INDUSTRIES), 161 SCRA 608
A conjugal partnership is liable only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing of some advantage which
clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses, otherwise, such debts and obligations will be
answerable by the exclusive property of the debtor spouse.

BAYANI, Alyanna Dia Marie B.

MARMONT RESORT vs. GUIANG, 168 SCRA 373
The signing of the other spouse as witness is tantamount to consent in binding the conjugal partnership
property.
Article 165 and 172 state the general principle under our civil law, that the wife may not validly bind the
conjugal partnership without the consent of the husband, who is legally the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. In this particular case, however, as noted earlier, the second Memorandum of Agreement,
although ostensibly contracted solely by Aurora Guiang with Maris Trading, was also signed by her
husband Federico, as one of the witnesses thereto. This circumstance indicates not only that Federico
was present during the execution of the agreement but also that he had, in fact, given his consent to the
execution thereof by his wife Aurora. Otherwise, he should not have appended his signature to the
document as witness. Respondent spouses cannot now disown the second Memorandum of Agreement
as their effective consent thereto is sufficiently manifested in the document itself.

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PNB vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 153 SCRA 435
The presumption of conjugality of properties cannot prevail when the title to the property is registered in
the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved, absent any indication
as to when the property was acquired.
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it
appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was
already a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing
as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs
exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when
the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

BOHOL, Vincent Joshua D.

CRUZ vs. DELA CRUZ, 130 Phil 324, January 30, 1968
REMEDIES OF PRESENT SPOUSE IN CASE OF ABANDONMENT. The extraordinary remedies
afforded to the wife by article 178 when she has been abandoned by the husband for at least one year
are the same as those granted to her by article 167 in case of abuse of the powers of administration by
the husband. To entitle her to any of these remedies, under article 178, there must be real abandonment,
and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to
financial and moral desertion.
The concept of abandonment in article 178 may be established in relation to the alternative remedies
granted to the wife when she has been abandoned by the husband, namely, receivership, administration
by her, or separation of property, all of which are designed to protect the conjugal assets from waste and
dissipation rendered imminent by the husband's continued absence from the conjugal abode, and to
assure the wife of a ready and steady source of support. Therefore, physical separation alone is not the
full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society
of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to
his wife.
The word "abandonment", when referring to the act of one consort of leaving the other, is "the act of the
husband or the wife who leaves his or her consort wilfully, and with an intention of causing per perpetual
separation." Giving to the word "abandoned", as used in article 178, the meaning drawn from the
definitions above reproduced, it seems rather clear that to constitute abandonment of the wife by the
husband, there must be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights, with the intention of
perpetual separation.

ABUSE OF ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP. The mere refusal or failure of the
husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the family
businesses does NOT constitute abuse of administration. For "abuse" to exist, it is not enough that the
husband perform an act or acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he commits acts injurious to
the partnership, for these may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse
connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of
deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter.

METROBANK ET. AL. vs. TAN, G.R No. 163712, November 30, 2006
PRESUMPTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP: In any event, lack of respondent Eliza Go Tans
consent to the mortgage covering the title in question would not render the encumbrance void under the
second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code. For proof is wanting that the property covered by the
title is conjugal that it was acquired during respondents marriage which is what would give rise to the
presumption that it is conjugal property. The statement in the title that the property is registered in
accordance with the provisions of Section 103 of the Property Registration Decree in the name of JOSE

31
B. TAN, of legal age, married to Eliza Go Tan does not prove or indicate that the property is conjugal.
So Ruiz v. Court of Appeals instructs:

The property subject of the mortgage is registered in the name of Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married
to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos. Thus, title is registered in the name of Corazon alone because the phrase
married to Rogelio Ruiz is merely descriptive of the civil status of Corazon and should not be
construed to mean that her husband is also a registered owner. Furthermore, registration of the property
in the name of Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz is not proof that such property
was acquired during the marriage, and thus, is presumed to be conjugal. The property could have been
acquired by Corazon while she was still single, and registered only after her marriage to Rogelio Ruiz.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. The presumption under Article 116 of the
Family Code that properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in
the instant case. Before such presumption can apply, it must first be established that the property was in
fact acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition
sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. No such proof was
offered nor presented in the case at bar.

BONCAYAO, Paty Karie Cedro

RODRIGUEZ vs. DELA CRUZ, 8 Phil. 665
Can the husband be declared the owner of the lands of the wife for the simple reason that he
administered the lands during the period of marriage? The Court held that there is no provision in the Civil
Code, which prohibits a husband from administering the property of his wife, as her representative, and
certainly it cannot be concluded that the property, which he administers for his wife, is his for the mere
reason that he has administered the same for a long time.
Article 1382 of the Civil Code provides that the wife shall retain the ownership of her property, which she
brings to the marriage relation. It is true that article 1384 prescribes that she shall have the management
of the property, unless she delivered the same to her husband by means of a public document, providing
that he may administer said property; but it cannot be claimed; from the mere fact that she has permitted
her husband to administer her property without having his authority to do so evidenced by a public
document, that she has thereby lost her property and that the same has become the property of her
husband.

PELAYO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R No. 141323, June 8, 2005

Whether the affixing of the signature of the spouse to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for
witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale? The Court held that Sale
is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or implied. A
wife’s consent to the husband’s disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set
forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval
was indeed given.
In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza (wife) signed only as
an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to the fact that
Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale.

BULLECER, Cazzandhra Mae N.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA DAILO, G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both
the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of
the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property

32
pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. As shall be discussed next, there is no legal basis to
construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. . .

SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. MAR TIERRA CORP., G.R. No. 143382, November 29,
2005
Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." But when are debts and obligations
contracted by the husband alone considered for the benefit of and therefore chargeable against the
conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband
in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision?
We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia that, in acting as a guarantor or surety
for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly
intended for a third party. To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the
husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well-being of the family
as a unit. The underlying concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership. Hence, it
limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

CACAPIT, Lian Marco S.

VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal
partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
under the Civil Code or other laws.

VILLANUEVA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No. 74577, December 4, 1990
Article 148 of the Civil Code clearly decrees: that to be considered as "the exclusive property of each
spouse" is inter alia, "that which is brought to the marriage as his or her own," or "that which each
acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.

CACHERO, Noel D.
ALFONSO TAN AND ETERIA TEVES TAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES CELESTINO U. TAN
AND ROSARIO DY KUSHIN AND SPOUSES MAXIMO U. TAN AND TERESITA SY TAN, G.R. No.
120594, June 10, 1997
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership; unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Said
presumption is, however, rebuttable with strong, clear, categorical, and convincing evidence that the
property belongs exclusively to one of the spouses and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting
it.
In the case at bar, conclusive evidence points to the fact that the undivided one-third (1/3) of the parcel of
land in question is not the conjugal partnership property of the spouses Alfonso Tan and Eteria Teves
Tan. It is the former's exclusive property which he had inherited from his mother. There can be no doubt
then, that although acquired during Alfonso's marriage to Eteria, the one-third portion of the property

33
should be regarded as Alfonso's own exclusively, as a matter of law pursuant to Article 148 of the Civil
Code which provides that: those acquired during the marriage by lucrative title shall be considered as
exclusive property of each spouse.

FLORENTINO GENATO, FRANCISCO GENATO AND GENATO COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs.

FELISA GENATO DE LORENZO, G.R. No. L-24983, May 20, 1968
In donation wherein there is a joint donation to two donees, acceptance by both of them are required
unless they be husband and wife.
In this case, assuming that the late Simona Vda. de Genato gave the Certificates of Stock Nos. 7 and 18
to Florentino with instructions to transfer the same to him and his brother, this act did not constitute a
valid manual donation in law for lack of proper acceptance. One of the two donees was not present at the
delivery, and there is no showing that he, Francisco Genato, had authorized his brother, Florentino to
accept for both of them. The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by donee must be simultaneous,
and the acceptance by a person other than the true donee must be authorized by a proper power of
attorney set forth in a public document. None has been claimed to exist in this case. Since by appellants'
own version, the donation intended was a joint one to both donees, one could not accept independently of
his co-donee, for there is no accretion among donees unless expressly so provided (Article 637) or unless
they be husband and wife.

CAGOCO, Anna Kristine L.

BPI vs. POSADAS, G.R. No. L-34583, October 22, 1931
Whether or not the life insurance policy belongs to the conjugal partnership.
(1) That the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums
were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to the
husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively;
(2) That if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are
likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and,

JOCSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. L-55322, February 16, 1989
For the application of the presumption that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife”, proof that
the properties were indeed conjugal or that they have been acquired during the marriage of the spouses,
and therefore conjugal, must first be established. In this case, there being no such proof, the condition
sine qua non for the application of the presumption does not exist.
In numerous cases, the SC consistently held that registration of the property in the name of only one
spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal, if there was proof that the properties, were
indeed conjugal properties, or that they have been acquired during the marriage of the spouses, and
therefore, presumed conjugal, without the adverse party having presented proof to rebut the presumption.

CANCIO, Ryan John C.

MAGALLON vs. MONTEJO, G.R No. L-73733, December 16, 1986
It is without doubt that the land in question, which rightfully pertained to the conjugal partnership of Martin
Lacerna and Eustaquia Pichan, the plaintiff's mother, and should have been titled in the names of the said
spouse, was, through fraud or mistake, registered in the names of Martin Lacerna and petitioner Epifania
Magallon. In such a situation, the property should be regarded as impressed with an implied, or a
constructive, trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto.
Even if the judgment awarded the plaintiff's one-half of the land in litigation as their share of their mother's
estate, the court cannot, on execution, order the sheriff to order the defendant to divide the land and
deliver the half portion to the plaintiffs. The mechanics of partition outlined in Rule 69 must be followed.

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MARAMBA vs. LOZANO, G.R No. L-21533, June 29, 1967
The presumption that property is conjugal refers to property acquired during marriage. When there is no
showing as to when the property was acquired by a spouse, the fact that the title is in the spouse's name
is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.
The house constructed on separate lot of a spouse does not automatically become conjugal. The
construction of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of a spouse does not automatically
make it conjugal. It is true that, in the meantime, the conjugal partnership may use both the land and
building, but it does so not as owner but as usufructuary. The ownership of the land remains the same
until the value thereof is paid. This payment can only be demanded in the liquidation of partnership.

CAÑITA, Dianne Hazel D.

IN RE ESTATE OF NARCISO PADILLA, 74 Phil 377
The ownership of the land is retained by the spouse until she is paid the value of the lot, as a result of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
ART 1404 (2) of the Spanish Code provides that the improvements made on the separate property of the
spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either the husband or wife,
belong to the conjugal partnership. Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the
marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land
shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
Based on the above provision, the ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value
of the lot, as a result of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Mere construction of a building from
common funds does not automatically convey the ownership of the wife’s land to the conjugal partnership.
Construction and improvements are simply an exercise of the usufruct (legal right to use a property)
pertaining to the conjugal partnership over the wife’s land. Before the payment of the value of land is
made from the common funds, all the increase or decrease in its value must be for her benefit or loss and
she can only demand payment after the conjugal partnership is liquidated. Furthermore, the wife should
not be allowed to demand payment of the lot during the marriage and before liquidation because this
would disturb the husband’s management of the conjugal partnership.
The scheme of the Civil Code is that in the interest of successful administration of the common property,
the wife should not interfere with the husband's way of directing the affairs of the partnership. Besides,
such premature requirement of the value making improvements, whereas article 1404, par. 2, has for its
purpose the encouragement of construction by the husband. (Manresa's comment on Art. 1404.) On the
other hand, if the payment for the lot is deferred till the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the initial
outlay for the erection of the building would be less, and consequently the construction would be
facilitated

WONG vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 200 SCRA 792

The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are exclusively owned
by Romarico.
While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an
officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries,
then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount
importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during
coverture, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for with
them her obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the
conjugal partnership. In addition to the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to

35
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur such
indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial.
Furthermore, under the Civil Code (before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988), a wife
may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family
or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of the family
if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; when the administration of the conjugal partnership is
transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband and when the wife gives moderate donations for
charity. Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the
conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them.

CARVAJAL, Karl Michael C.

CARANDANG vs. HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN, 508 SCRA 469
All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved. Credits are personal properties, acquired during the time the loan or other credit
transaction was executed. Therefore, credits loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to be
conjugal property.

LILIUS vs. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, 62 Phil 56

Therefore, under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husband's rights is to count on his
wife's assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the home and the performance of
household duties, including the care and education of the children and attention to the husband upon
whom primarily devolves the duty of supporting the family of which he is the head. When the wife's
mission was circumscribed to the home, it was not difficult to assume, by virtue of the marriage alone,
that she performed all the said tasks and her physical incapacity always redounded to the husband's
prejudice inasmuch as it deprived him of her assistance. However, nowadays when women, in their
desire to be more useful to society and to the nation, are demanding greater civil rights and are aspiring
to become man's equal in all the activities of life, commercial and industrial, professional and political,
many of them spending their time outside the home, engaged in their businesses, industry, profession
and within a short time, in politics, and entrusting the care of their home to a housekeeper, and their
children, if not to a nursemaid, to public or private institutions which take charge of young children while
their mothers are at work, marriage has ceased to create the presumption that a woman complies with
the duties to her husband and children, which the law imposes upon her, and he who seeks to collect
indemnity for damages resulting from deprivation of her domestic services must prove such services. In
the case under consideration, apart from the services of his wife Sonja Maria Lilius as translator and
secretary, the value of which has not been proven, the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius has not presented any
evidence showing the existence of domestic services and their nature, rendered by her prior to the
accident, in order that it may serve as a basis in estimating their value.

CHAN, Mark Flourine B.

SPOUSES GO vs. LEANDRO YAMANE, G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006
Property purchased by spouses during the existence of their marriage is presumed to be conjugal in
nature. This presumption stands, absent any clear, categorical, and convincing evidence that the property
is paraphernal. Conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one
spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.

JOVELLANOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 100728, June 18, 1992
Property acquired during the existence of a marriage should only be considered as such when the same
is acquired in the concept of an owner and not in any other capacity.

36
DANSAL, Angelica Krystle L.
MARCELO CASTILLO, JR., ET AL. vs. MACARIA PASCO, G.R. No. L-16857, May 29, 1964
Under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, the law applicable to the case at bar, the property acquired for
onerous consideration during the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate property depending on the
source of the funds employed for its acquisition, irrespective of in whose name the property was acquired.
Property acquired during the effectivity of the old Civil Code partly with paraphernal funds of the wife and
partly with conjugal funds is held to belong to both patrimonies in common, in proportion to the
contributions of each to the total purchase price.
Where the initial payment for property acquired during coverture under the old Civil Code was made
partly out of indebtedness of third persons due to the wife alone, in the absence of proof that the husband
authorized her to use conjugal funds, such payment was considered made out of private funds of the wife.
Money obtained during coverture by loans to the husband or to both spouses, even if guaranteed by
mortgage on the paraphernal property of the wife, was considered, under the old law, conjugal property
repayable at maturity with conjugal partnership funds.
The payment by the widow with her private funds, after her husband's death, of a loan to the conjugal
partnership secured by her paraphernal property, the proceeds of which were used to acquire property
during coverture under the old Civil Code, does not result in increasing her share in said property but only
in creating a lien in her favor over the share of the conjugal partnership in the property so required for the
repayment of the amount she had advanced.

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 118305,
February 12, 1998
This court does not agree that is a difference between the terms "redounded to the benefit of" or
"benefited from" on the one hand; and "for the benefit of" on the other. They mean one and the same
thing. Article 161 (1) of the Civil Code and Article 121 (2) of the Family Code are similarly worded, i.e.,
both use the term "for the benefit of". On the other hand, Article 122of the Family Code provides that "The
payment of personal debts by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged
to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family." As can be seen,
the terms are used interchangeably. From jurisprudential rulings of this Court, the following conclusions
can be derived: (A) If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received
the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls
within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be
proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract.
From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility
or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations
on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. (B) On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another
person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself,
alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for
the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of
surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be
presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. In all our decisions involving
accommodation contracts of the husband, we underscored the requirement that: "there must be the
requisite showing . . . of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses" or "benefits
to his family" or "that such obligations are productive of some benefit to the family."

37
The provisions of the Family Code highlight the underlying concern of the law for the conservation of the
conjugal partnership; for the husband's duty to protect and safeguard, if not augment, not to dissipate it.
This is the underlying reason why the Family Code clarifies that the obligations entered into by one of the
spouses must be those that redounded to the benefit of the family and that the measure of the
partnership's liability is to "the extent that the family is benefited." (Article 121, Nos. 2 & 3, Family Code.)
These are all in keeping with the spirit and intent of the other provisions of the Civil Code which prohibits
any of the spouses to donate or convey gratuitously any part of the conjugal property. (Article 174, Civil
Code.)

DE GUZMAN, Janell Marie S.

ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALLIED
BANKING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband, or to the wife. In Tan v. Court of Appeals, we held that it is not even necessary to prove that the
properties were acquired with funds of the partnership. As long as the properties were acquired by the
parties during the marriage, they are presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact, even when the manner in
which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties
will still be considered conjugal. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during
the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the
same.
In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in
the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of
the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done
during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus,
presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners. The private respondent failed to
adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. The
barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment
Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-
husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there
must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the
objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well being of the family
as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to
the financial stability of the conjugal partnership.
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was
benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement
with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private
respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the
fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety,
the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish
that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.

38
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO, G.R. No. 153802, March 11,
2005
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife,
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their
conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court)
authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property
shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the
disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the
Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.20 Thus, both the trial
court and the appellate court are correct in declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject
property for lack of respondent’s consent.
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3) Debts and
obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may
have been benefited; . . . ." For the subject property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the
requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly,
to make a conjugal partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to
defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove). Petitioner’s sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the
benefit of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than
petitioner’s bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed,
the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently,
the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.

DE VILLA, Kristine Joy N.

LACSON vs. DIAZ, 14 SCRA 183, May 31, 1965
As a general rule, therefore, debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, as well as
fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed thereon, are not chargeable to the conjugal partnership.
However, such obligations may be enforced against the conjugal assets if the responsibilities enumerated
in Article 161 of the new Civil Code have already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive
property or the same is insufficient. Considering that the enforceability of the personal obligations of the
husband or wife, against the conjugal assets, forms the exception to the general rule, it is incumbent upon
the one who invokes this provision or the creditor to show that the requisites for its applicability are
obtaining.

PEOPLE vs. LAGRIMAS, 29 SCRA 153, August 28, 1969

Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife "may be enforced against the partnership
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound
should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; ... ." It is quite plain, therefore, that the
period during which such a liability may be enforced presupposes that the conjugal partnership is still
existing. The law speaks of "partnership assets." It contemplates that the responsibilities to which
enumerated in Article 161, chargeable against such assets, must be complied with first. It is thus obvious
that the termination of the conjugal partnership is not contemplated as a prerequisite. Whatever doubt
may still remain should be erased by the concluding portion of this article which provides that "at the time

39
of the liquidation of the partnership such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes
above-mentioned."

DEL ROSARIO, Janine Gabrielle A.

JOSE UY vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 109557, November 29, 2000
RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE FAMILY CODE NOT APPLICABLE TO CASES
WHERE THE NON-CONSENTING SPOUSE IS INCAPACITATED OR INCOMPETENT TO GIVE
CONSENT; PROPER REMEDY IS JUDICIAL GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS: In regular manner, the
rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the proceedings under Article 124
of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or
has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases
where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. A spouse who is an
incompetent who was in comatose or in semi-comatose condition, a stroke victim or one without motor or
mental faculties. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of
the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
A spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe
the procedure for the sale of the wards estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 Revised
Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.

THELMA JADER-MANALO vs. SPOUSES CAMAISA, G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002
DISPOSITION BY THE HUSBAND REQUIRES WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE WIFE. The law requires
that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires
the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code
provides that “the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the
court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.” It should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 Par. 2
is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated.
The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. Failure to show the wife’s incapacity to give
consent does not warrant court authorization.

DEL ROSARIO, Karen Razon

SPS. ANTONIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R No. 125172, 26 June 1998
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of
the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely
voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
The Guiang spouses allege that absence of Gilda’s consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under
Article 1390 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no
damage to the contracting parties…
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are susceptible of
ratification.
The error in petitioners’ contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of
consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated
through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this instance, private respondent’s
consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent.

40
The said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly
applied by the lower court:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership properly shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the
court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court
or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition
or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offers.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners were
perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged
during trial that barangay authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and
coercion. In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the deed of sale between the
husband and the petitioners-spouses, as will be discussed later. The fact remains that such contract was
entered into without the wife’s consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent’s consent. To
constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause,
(2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.

VALDEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 260 SCRA 221

In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period
of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision refers to the legal capacity of a party to
contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said parties "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains,
the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live
exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion
to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima
facie presumed to be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage. If the party
who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner already heretofore expressed.

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DIMANLIG, Suyen N.
NICDAO CARIÑO vs. YEE CARIÑO, G.R. No. 132529, February 2 2001
The marriage between Yee and Cariño falls under the Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the
property regime of bigamous or polygamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her marriage to the deceased is
void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the properties acquired with the deceased through their actual
joint contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Hence,
they are not owned in common by Yee and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has
no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the
deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to absence
of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim the death benefits by the deceased even if she did not
contribute thereto. Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to share one-
half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first marriage, she can claim one-half of
the disputed death benefits and the other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without
the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40, if a
party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a
judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. However, for purposes other than to remarry, no prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.

NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G. R. No. 127449, March 31, 2005
Article 21 of the New Civil Code is one of the instances when moral damages may be recovered. It must
be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There is a
need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. However, the marriage was declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. The latter is confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the
control of the party because an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts
as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral
damages on the same facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the
mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with
malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No
such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.

DIMAPILIS, Abigail E.
GONZALES vs. GONZALES, G.R. No. 159521, December 16, 2005
The provisions of Article 147 of the Family Code enumerate the two instances when the property relations
between spouses shall be governed by the rules on co- ownership. These are: (1) when a man and
woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage. Under this
property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will
be owned by them in equal shares.

42
AGAPAY vs. PALANG, G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997
The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of cohabitation
when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. Under Article 148, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be
stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the
acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual
contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.
Even assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would
still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.

ENCIO, Flores B.
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY COMPANY, INC. VS TRINIDAD TEODORO, G.R. NO. L-20530, 29
JUNE 1967
Paraphernal properties cannot be the subject of co-ownership under Article 144. They remain exclusive
properties of the wife.

VICTOR JUANIZA VS EUGENIO JOSE, G.R. NO. L-50127-28, 30 MARCH 1979

The co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman
living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.

FERRER, Cyrelle Kim A.

FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, G.R. No. 151967.
February 16, 2005
Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that invalidates such marriage, Art
148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that the wife/husband has actually contributed money,
property, or industry to the properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will
not arise.

BELCODERO vs COURT OF APPEALS, 227 SCRA 303, October 20, 1993

Under both the new Civil Code (Article 160) and the old Civil Code (Article 1407), “all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife.” This presumption has not been convincingly rebutted.

FRIAS, Ma. Jia Denise M.

ATIENZA vs. DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006
It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because petitioner Lupo
Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their
property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man
and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this
regime, . . . only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions . . . Proof of actual contribution is required.
As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership

43
will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof
of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

JOAQUINO vs. REYES, G.R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004

Though registered in the paramour's name, property acquired with the salaries and earnings of a husband
belongs to his conjugal partnership with the legal spouse. The registration of the property in petitioner's
name was clearly designed to deprive Rodolfo's legal spouse and compulsory heirs of ownership. By
operation of law, petitioner is deemed to hold the property in trust for them. Therefore, she cannot rely on
the registration in repudiation of the trust, for this case is a well-known exception to the principle of
conclusiveness of a certificate of title.

GABORNES, Maris Cay E.

TUMLOS vs. SPOUSES FERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000
Article 144 of the Civil Code does not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage. It
applies only to a relationship between man and woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other, or
to one in which the marriage of parties is void from the beginning.
Article 148 of the Family Code governs property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage. It can be retroactively applied if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights.
Mere cohabitation without proof of actual contribution to purchase property will not result in a co-
ownership.

ABING vs. WAEYAN, G.R. No. 146294, July 31, 2004

Pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code, in the absence of proofs to the contrary, any property
acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained
thru their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal shares. Their property relation is governed by the
rules on co-ownership.

GARCIA, Albertito D.
GAYON vs. GAYON G.R. No. L-28394, November 26, 1970
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as
none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 — which should be construed
strictly, it being an exception to the general rule — and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as
party in the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and
plaintiff's failure to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.

OLACO vs. CO CHO CHIT, 220 SCRA 656

While respondent-spouses did not formally amend their complaint, they were nonetheless allowed to
introduce evidence purporting to show that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made, that is,
respondent O Lay Kia importuned Emilia O'Laco and pressed her for the transfer of the title of the
Oroquieta property in the name of spouses O Lay Kia and Valentin Co Cho Chit, just before Emilia's
marriage to Hugo Luna. But, instead of transferring the title as requested, Emilia sold the property to the
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. If the defendant permits evidence to be introduced without
objection and which supplies the necessary allegations of a defective complaint, then the evidence is
deemed to have the effect of curing the defects of the complaint.

44
GARCIA, Jo Alfonso D.
MANACOP vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 277 SCRA 57
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of
the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at
the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from
execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is
therefore not exempt form attachment.

MONDEQUILLO vs. BREVO, 185 SCRA 766

Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing
family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153
shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
are exempt from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The
said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the FC. The debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the
effectivity of the Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.

GARINGO, Vanessa Q.
GOMEZ vs. STA. INES, G.R. no. 132537, October 14, 2005
Under Article 155 of the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale, or
attachment, except for, among other things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home.
Article 162 of the Family Code does not give Articles 152 and Art. 153 retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Art. 162 does not state that the provisions of
Chapter 2, Title 5 (The Family Home) have retroactive effect.
The house of Marrieta can be subject of execution because it is not considered a family home. It is not
deemed constituted in 1977, but only on August 3, 1988 upon effectivity of the Family Code, because Art.
162 does not provide retroactive effect on the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V. And in relation to Art. 155,
since Marrietta’s debt was incurred prior to the constitution of their family home, her family home shall not
be exempt from execution.

PATRICIO V. DARIO III, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006

The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in this wise: If there are beneficiaries
who survive and are living in the family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10
years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home continues until that beneficiary
becomes of age. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the interests of the minor
beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would now be capable of supporting himself. However, three
requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship
enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent
for legal support upon the head of the family.
In this case, Marcelino III, grandson of deceased Marcelino is not considered a dependent for legal
support of his deceased grandfather and grandmother who were the owners of the family home. Instead,
Marcelino III is a dependent of his parents. Therefore, having no minor beneficiary after the 10 year
period, the family home ceases to exist and can be subject of partition.

45
GERONIMO, Allen F.
SPOUSES VERSOLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 164740, July 31, 2006
A family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family
residence; there is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but
by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person
claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be
set up and proved to the Sheriff.

TANEO, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 108532, March 9, 1999
A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family. It is said, however, that the family home is
a real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place
and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such
properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by
creditors except in certain special cases.
A family home may be constituted judicially and extrajudicially, the former by the filing of the petition and
with the approval of the proper court, and the latter by the recording of a public instrument in the proper
registry of property declaring the establishment of the family home. The operative act then which created
the family home extrajudicially was the registration in the Registry of Property of the declaration
prescribed by Articles 240 and 241 of the Civil Code. Under the Family Code, however, registration was
no longer necessary. Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied in the family residence.
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful considering that such
constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law. The trial court found that the house was
erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the very
definition of the law that the "family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides and
the land on which it is situated," it is understood that the house should be constructed on a land not
belonging to another.

GO, Joaquin Oscar III Y.

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. AGUAS, 483 SCRA 383
Indeed, impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional
cases, his heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during
his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn’s status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested.

BENITEZ-BADUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 105625, Jan 24, 1994
A careful reading of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or
biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his
heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the
legitimacy of said child by proving; (1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with
his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2)
that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of
children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent
was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs
should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child.

46
GUERZON, Randolph Jon P.
ANTONIO MACADANGDANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ELIZABETH MEJIAS, G.R. No. L-49542,
September 12, 1980
A child is presumed to be the legitimate child of spouses. This presumption becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the spouses in the first 120 days
of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This physical impossibility of access may be caused by
any of these:

1. Impotence of the husband;

2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible; and
3. Serious illness of the husband.

This presumption of legitimacy is based on the assumption that there is sexual union in marriage,
particularly during the period of conception. The modern rule is that, in order to overthrow the
presumption, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access as could have enabled
the husband to be the father of the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is
not disproved. Hence, a circumstance which makes sexual relations improbable, cannot defeat the
presumption of legitimacy; but it may be proved as a circumstance to corroborate proof of physical
impossibility of access.
Impotence refers to the inability of the male organ to copulation, to perform its proper function. As defined
in the celebrated case of Menciano vs. San Jose (89 Phil. 63), impotency is the physical inability to have
sexual intercourse. It is not synonymous with sterility. Sterility refers to the inability to procreate, whereas,
impotence refers to the physical inability to perform the act of sexual intercourse. In respect of the
impotency of the husband of the mother of a child, to overcome the presumption of legitimacy based on
conception or birth in wedlock or to show illegitimacy, it has been held or recognized that the evidence or
proof must be clear or satisfactory: clear, satisfactory and convincing, irresistible or positive.

TEOFISTA BABIERA vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a
certificate which shows that the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of the child's birth and
which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance
rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for
the cancellation of the said certificate.

GUSI, Francisco III B.

TIZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 121027, July 31, 1997
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is
the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. The issue whether petitioners are the
legitimate children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for re-
conveyance. This is aside from the further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to
impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor
of petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.

MARIATEGUI v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 57062, January 24, 1992

The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven. However,
considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under a
new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the
popular phrase. Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of children, legitimate

47
and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated.
Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the
record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child.

HERNANDEZ, Annabel F.
REYES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 39537, March 19, 1985
The doctrine that for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit must be first recognized voluntarily or
by court action is well settled in our jurisprudence.
There are two (2) general classifications of illegitimate children or those who are conceived and born out
of wedlock. They may be either natural (actually or by fiction) or spurious (the incestuous, adulterous or
illicit). Natural children are defined as those born outside of wedlock of parents, who at the time of
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (Article 269, New
Civil Code). On the other hand, spurious children are those born of parents, who at the time of their
conception, are disqualified to marry each other on account of certain impediment. Because of this basic
distinction between these children, it is not legally possible to classify unrecognized natural children under
the class of spurious children. Besides, commentators construe the phrase "illegitimate children other
than natural" as excluding from the grants of rights under Article 287 of the New Civil Code those children
who are natural child proper by birth and who have not secured voluntary or compulsory recognition.
It is an elementary and basic principle under the old and new Civil Code, that an unrecognized natural
child has no rights whatsoever against his parent or his estate. His rights spring not from the filiation itself,
but from the child's acknowledgment by the natural.
The birth certificate, to be sufficient recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly, or by the
mother alone if the father refuses, otherwise she may be penalized (Sec. 5, Act 3753; Madredejo vs. De
Leon, 55 Phil. 1 [1930]); and if the alleged father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his
name by the mother, or doctor or registrar, is incompetent evidence of paternity of said child.
In the case of Macadangdang vs. CA [100 SCRA 73 [1980]), this Court said that while baptismal
certificates may be considered public documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of
the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the statements or declarations made
therein with respect to his kinsfolk.
Article 285 of the New Civil Code provides "that the action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except when the father or mother dies during
the minority of the child, the action shall be brought within four years from the age of majority, or if after
the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and
in which either or both parents recognize the child, the action shall be brought within four years from the
finding of the document." Since Irene was already of age (35 years old) when her alleged father died, and
she had not presented any discovered document wherein her presumed father recognized her, the action
to compel recognition is already barred (Canales vs. Arrogante, 91 Phil. 6 [1952]).

JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 124853, February 24, 1998
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be established in the
same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. . . . For the success of an action to
establish illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph, which MONINA relies upon given that she has
none of the evidence mentioned in the first paragraph, a "high standard of proof" is required. Specifically,
to prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of
the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also
the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not

48
accidentally, but continuously. By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not
require any particular length of time. The foregoing standard of proof required to establish one's filiation is
founded on the principle that an order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
atmosphere or may be an irritant in the family or lives of the parties, so that it must be issued only if
paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
MONINA's reliance on the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar concerning her birth is clearly
misplaced. It is settled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority to record
the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person. Simply put, if the alleged father
did not intervene in the birth certificate, e.g., supplying the information himself, the inscription of his name
by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void; the mere certificate by the registrar without the
signature of the father is not proof of voluntary acknowledgment on the latter's part. In like manner,
FRANCISCO's lack of participation in the preparation of the baptismal certificates and school records
renders these documents incompetent to prove paternity, the former being competent merely to prove the
administration of the sacrament of baptism on the date so specified.|||

HERNANDEZ, Mark Dondee L.

CASIMIRO MENDOZA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA TORING TUÑACAO, G.R. No.
86302, September 24, 1991
To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to
comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The
possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through
others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate).
There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his
own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.
With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been in continuous
possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of
the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.

An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the
defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal
certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

MARCELO LEE, et.al vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the
instant case, where a child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.
Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his
wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1)
it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific
reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the

49
prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child.

JIMENEZ, Joseph James I.

LIYAO, JR. vs. LIYAO, G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002.
While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds
for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy
of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper
cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the
legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the
simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his
wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of
the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to
contest such legitimacy.

ECETA vs. ECETA, G.R. No. 157037, May 20, 2004

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record,
or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further
court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval.

LAGUIO, Ysrael Joseph Jr. P.

RODRIGUEZ vs. CONCORDIA ONG LIM, G.R. No. 135817, November 30, 2006
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in, any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself
a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.

TEOFISTO VERCELES vs. MARIA POSADA, G.R. No. 159785, April 27, 2007
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record,
or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further
court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval.

50
LEYNES, Philip Aldrin S.
BELEN SAGAD ANGELES vs. ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA, G.R. No. 153798
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element
of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiations between parents and child. Article 164 of the
Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents are legitimate." Legal presumption of legitimacy should flow from a lawful marriage between
alleged father and mother. Absent such a marriage or failure to present sufficient evidence as to the
existence of such marriage, as here, there is no presumption of legitimacy.

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and minor MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE,
represented by his mother/guardian FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, G.R. No. 162571
Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific
ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are
analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as
evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate
to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of
science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress.

LIBAN, Daren Tudor

HERRERA vs. ALBA, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005
DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity.
If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable presumption of
paternity.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The
burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of
the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have
to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and child.
a) A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative
father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to
the putative father.
b) There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative father may show
incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either physical absence or impotency.
The putative father may also show that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time
of conception.
c) A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. 17 The child's
legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law.
d) Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part of
evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding.
However, although likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could
quantify how much a child must or must not look like his biological father. This kind of evidence
appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact.

51
MENDOZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991
To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to
comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The
possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through
others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate).
There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his
own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.

MACAVINTA, Mervin Karl C.

CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CAYUGAN, 209
SCRA 664
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, therefore, if the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a
final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the child’s filiation in a public document or in a private
handwritten signed instrument, then the action may be brought during the lifetime of the child. However, if
the action is based on the open and continuous possession by the child of the status of an illegitimate
child, or on other evidence allowed by the rules of court and special laws, the view has been expressed
that the action must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B.

CATINDIG, 454 SCRA 541
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to
carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interest and welfare of the adopted child are the
primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to
promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Article 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
“In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail”
This provision, according to the code commission, “is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of
right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to
avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.

MAESTRADO, Moniko G.
LANDINGIN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 164948, June 27, 2006
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and informed of
his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the
adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and
adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter
and the latter’s souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

52
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural
parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of
adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained
before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this
case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos (Biological Mother) to the adoption.
In relation to the issue on financial support: As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate
children did not comply with the afore-cited law (Section 2 of Act No. 2103), the same can at best be
treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw
the document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the makers. Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the
written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence. In reversing the ruling of
the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to support the children and is only relying on
the financial backing, support and commitment of her children and her siblings. Accordingly, it appears
that she will rely on the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor
adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide support in
keeping with the means of the family.
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the financial
capacity of prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter
should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the
family.

MANGONON vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006
Rule 61 SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE: SECTION 1. Application. - At the commencement of the proper
action or proceeding, or at any time prior to the judgment or final order, a verified application for support
pendente lite may be filed by any party stating the grounds for the claim and the financial conditions of
both parties, and accompanied by affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in support thereof.
xxxx
SEC. 4. Order. - The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such orders
as justice and equity may require, having due regard to the probable outcome of the case and such other
circumstances as may aid in the proper resolution of the question involved. If the application is granted,
the court shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally paid or such other forms of support as should
be provided, taking into account the necessities of the applicant and the resources or means of the
adverse party, and the terms of payment or mode for providing the support. If the application is denied,
the principal case shall be tried and decided as early as possible.
Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment
or final order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the
case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind
and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application. It is enough that
the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. After the
hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence presented, we find that petitioner was able to
establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents and the twins
entitlement to support pendente lite.
The next question is who should be made liable for said award. The pertinent provision of the Family
Code on this subject states: ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the
liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The
descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and
sisters. There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the

53
parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their
children’s college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support
should be borne by respondent Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco
(Grandfather), as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters in default of their parents.
Accordingly, the next issue, applicable provision of the Family Code provides: Art. 204. The person
obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or
by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The
latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. Under the above-
cited provision, the obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support.
Thus, he may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in
the family dwelling. The second option cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or
moral, which should be considered. In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco could not
avail himself of the second option. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who
they had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all
these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who
have disowned them.

MASCULINO, Jenine-anne V.
ZAGUIRRE vs. CASTILLO, A.C. No. 4921, August 3, 2005.|||
The respondent continued to practice his profession and regularly received his salary and other benefits.
As early as August 28, 2003, respondent admitted that acknowledging complainant's daughter and giving
support remain his undertakings. He even volunteered to comply unconditionally if they are the required
proofs of his remorse. He professed that he did not disown his responsibility to give support. If, indeed,
respondent was so remorseful and willing to comply unconditionally with his own undertaking, why then
did he wait until after the lapse of one (1) year and seven (7) months before attempting to give support to
complainant's daughter. It was only on March 31, 2005, that respondent furnished us with photocopies of
ten (10) postdated checks payable to Zaguirre at P2, 000.00 each. He failed to mention or offer a
concrete or permanent settlement. In his Plea for Reconsideration, Atty. Castillo also claims that: The
respondent is now living in peace and happiness with his family. The darkness of the past has been
buried beneath the earth a long time ago. I am perplexed how Atty. Castillo can claim that he is now
"living in peace and happiness with his family" while complainant Zaguirre and her daughter are
encountering hardships brought about by his non-support.

DADIVAS DE VILLANUEVA vs. VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 29959, December 3, 1929

Husband cannot relieve himself from his duty to support his wife by his own wrongful acts.
The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose
incurable propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable. Deeply rooted
instincts of human nature sanction the separation in such case, and the law is not so unreasonable as to
require acquiescence on the part of the injured party which is beyond the capacity of nature. In order to
entitle a wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance from her husband it is not
necessary that the husband should bring a concubine into the marital domicile. Perverse and illicit
relations with women outside of the marital establishment are enough.
The proof with respect to the charge of cruelty shows that the defendant has not infrequently treated the
plaintiff roughly and that he has at times directed abusive words to her and challenged her to carry her
troubles into court. The proof in support of this charge does not in our opinion establish a case for
separate maintenance, without relation to the graver charge of conjugal infidelity; and if the case
defended, for its solution, upon cruelty alone, the case could doubtless be affirmed

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MATIBAG, Kevin Christian S.
QUINTANA vs. LERMA, 24 Phil 285
While a wife has a right of action against her husband for support and maintenance, adultery by the wife
is a good defense to such action for support.

MENDOZA vs. PARUÑGAO, 41 Phil 271

While a wife is entitled to support during the pendency of an annulment suit, this right ceases along with
other mutual obligations of marriage after the decree of nullity is issued. However, the court may order
that a certain sum be advanced on her on account of her share in the conjugal property of the marriage.

MIROY, Jasmin D.
LUIS FRANCISCO VS. HON. FRANCISCO ZANDUETA & EUGENIO LEOPOLDO FRANCISCO,
REPRESENTED BY HIS NATURAL MOTHER AND CURATOR AD LITEM, ROSARIO GOMEZ, G.R.
NO. 43794, AUGUST 9, 1935
Under article 143 of the Civil Code the following are bound to support each other:
(1) Husband and wife,
(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants,
(3) Parents and acknowledged natural children and the legitimate descendants of the latter,
(4) Parents and illegitimate children not having the legal status of natural children and
(5) Brothers and sisters.
In all these cases, it is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the action for support, the
civil status of marriage or that of relationship.
If the action for support is brought by a minor, through his guardian ad litem, and the former alleges that
he is the child of the adverse party; it is, therefore, necessary for him to prove his civil status as such child.
If a civil status of sonship is denied by the Court, it is thus apparent that no effect can be given to a claim
of support until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause.

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING & JACOBA CABILIN vs.
FELIX ICAO, G.R. No. L-26795, July 31, 1970
A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from it progenitors, even if the said child is only "en ventre
de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by
Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be
born after the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code). Thus, Article 291 has, within its purview,
unborn children, in relation to Article 40 of the same Code.

MOLINA, Marc Joseph N.

MANUELA ADVINCULA, represented by her guardian-ad litem, Pura Borbon vs.
MANUEL ADVINCULA, 10 SCRA 109
JUDGMENTS FOR SUPPORT NEVER FINAL. Judgment for support does not become final, because the
right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional

JOCSON vs. EMPIRE INSURANCE CO., G.R. No. L-10792

Support includes what is necessary for the education and clothing of the person entitled thereto. But
support must be demanded and the right to it established before it becomes payable. For the right to
support does not arise from the mere fact of relationship, but "from imperative necessity without which it
cannot be demanded, and the law presumes that such necessity does not exist unless support is

55
demanded" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Tolentino, Vol. 1, p. 181, citing 8 Manresa 685). In
the case at bar, it does not appear that support for the minors, be it only for their education and clothing,
was ever demanded from their father and the need for it duly established. Hence, the disbursements
made from the guardianship funds, with the approval of the court, for the education and clothing of the
said minors are not illegal and the guardian's bond should not be made to answer therefor.

NAJARRO, Violeta Jr. M.

BALTAZAR vs. SERFINO, G.R. No. L-17315, July 31, 1965
AMOUNT OF SUPPORT. Under Article 296 of the Civil Code (Old), support shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.
WHEN SHOULD PAYMENT OF SUPPORT BEGIN. Under Article 298 of the Civil Code (Old) the
obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the
same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date it is extra-judicially demanded.
PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES. Where the duty to support is admitted, but despite demands, the
duty is not complied with and the person to be supported has to resort to the court for the enforcement of
his right, then the person obliged to give support must pay reasonable attorney's fees. In actions for legal
support, even in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees are recoverable.

MARCAIDA vs. REDFERN, G.R. No. L-26062, December 31, 1926

Article 1894 of the Civil Code provides that “When without the knowledge of the person who is bound to
give support to a dependent, a stranger supplies it, the latter shall be entitled to recover the same from
the former, unless it appears that he gave it out of charity, and without the expectation of recovering it."
To recover under this provision, 2 requisites must be proved:
1. Support has been furnished to a dependent of a person, bound to give support, but fails to do so
2. Support was supplied without the knowledge of the person charged with the duty

NAÑADIEGO, Yvette Marie Y.

SANTOS, SR., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R No. 113054, March 16, 1995
The right of custody accorded to parents spring from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority
or patria potestas in Roman law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume control and
protection of their unemancipated children to the extent required by the latter's needs. It is a mass of
rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the children's physical
preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart
and senses. As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum
of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in
cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or
an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and
entitled to keep them in their custody and company. The child's welfare is always the paramount
consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. The law vests on the father and mother
joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absences or death of either
parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death,
absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.

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SAGALA-ESLAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997
[Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the children's physical preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their
intellect and the education of their heart and senses. As regards parental authority, 'there is no power, but
a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor.' "Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, allows
a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home
or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. The father and mother, being the natural
guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company. (Family Code).
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that "the right of parents to the
custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law
and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the
courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship.

PABALAY, Mary Rocelyn C.

VANCIL vs. BELMES, G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001
MOTHER SHOULD BE THE GUARDIAN OF HER MINOR CHILD AND NOT THE LATTER'S
GRANDMOTHER. Being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of the
grandmother to be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code.
GRANDMOTHER CAN BE GUARDIAN OF MINOR ONLY BY WAY OF SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL
AUTHORITY; INSTANCES WHEN GRANDPARENT CAN EXERCISE SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL
AUTHORITY OVER MINOR GRANDCHILD. The law vests on the father and mother joint parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the
parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.

ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 242 SCRA 362

The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be
determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven
years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests. Discretion is given to the court
to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that
consideration.

PEREÑA, Albert Caesar M.

MEDINA vs. MAKABALI, 27 SCRA 502
While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the
basic principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the latter's
welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and that for compelling reasons,
even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother (Do.)
As remarked by the Court below, petitioner Zenaida Medina proved remiss in these sacred duties; she
not only failed to provide the child with love and care but actually deserted him, with not even a visit, in his
tenderest years, when he needed his mother the most. It may well be doubted what advantage the child
could derive from being coerced to abandon respondent's care and love to be compelled to stay with his
mother and witness her irregular menage a trois with Casero and the latter's legitimate wife.

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CERVANTES vs. FAJARDO, 169 SCRA 575
In all cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latter's welfare is
paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of age, will
not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all controversies regarding the
custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending
parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion.
A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents
over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural parent of the
adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses.
The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and exercise parental
authority and responsibility over him.

RAFOLS, Margarita P.
DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 111180, November 16, 1995
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of age at
least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother's custody. Even now
that the child is over seven years of age, the mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because
the child categorically expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code,
courts must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit"
and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if
private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the grant of support for him on the award of his
custody to him (private respondent).

LUNA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No. L-68374, June 18, 1989
The right of the parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not
created by the state or by the decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of parental relationship.
Since the rights of parents to the custody of their minor children is both a natural and a legal right, the law
should not disturb the parent-child relationship except for the strongest reasons, and only upon a clear
showing of a parent's gross misconduct or unfitness, or of other extraordinary circumstances affecting the
welfare of the child.
As long as the parents are living and they have not lost their parental authority, patria potestas is limited
to them. Other ascendants have no authority over the children, even if the parents of the latter are minors.
Parental authority is inalienable and every abdication of this authority by the parents is void.
Whatever agreement or arrangement there was between petitioners and respondents when the child
Shirley was given to the former, the same has not been validated nor legalized by the mere fact that the
said girl had stayed with the petitioners for a number of years, in view of the explicit provision of Article
313 mandating that parental authority cannot be renounced or transferred, except in cases of
guardianship or adoption approved by the courts, or emancipation by concession.

RAVAGO, Justin Nico L.

PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. GUALBERTO, G.R. No. 154994, June 28, 2005
As a general rule, a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the age of seven. It
may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness.
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive the
mother of custody.

58
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even
the fact that a mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have
custody of her minor child.
To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an
adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper
parental care.

TAN vs. JUDGE ADRE, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1898, January 31, 2005
The law grants the mother the custody of a child under seven (7) years of age. In the case at bar, it is
uncontroverted that the child subject of the habeas corpus case is only four years old, thus, the custody
should be given to the mother.
Be it noted also that the questioned order was only provisional. As the term implies, provisional means
temporary, preliminary or tentative. The provisional custody granted to the mother of the child does not
preclude complainant from proving the compelling reasons cited by him which can be properly ventilated
in a full-blown hearing scheduled by the court for that purpose.

REAMICO, Krizia Mae P.

JOEY D. BRIONES vs. MARCIEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL, G.R.
No. 156343, October 18, 2004
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause
to order otherwise. Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole
parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone
else.

ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL,
JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 143363, February 6,
2002
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody:

(1) The school, its administrators and teachers; or

(2) The individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.

This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to
field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside the school premises whenever
authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special
parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody. However, for petitioner to be
liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause
of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of
the death of the victim. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not
be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.

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Rentillo, Garry Butz S.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG, G.R. No. 97906,
May 21, 1992.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for the purpose of identification,
and a change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light
of reasons adduced and the consequences that will likely follow; it is a privilege which may be granted
only upon a showing of a proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason therefor.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason
therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for
change of name which have been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d) Having continuously used and been known
since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was
for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE: PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

PASAJOL, Joan G.
EULOGIO VS BELL GR NO. 186322 JULY 8, 2015
The exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to P300,000 in
urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by law. If it is
shown, though, that those amounts do not match the present value of the peso because of currency
fluctuations, the amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most favorable to the
constitution of a family home. Any amount in excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of any
of the obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.

Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its owners,
or any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the
following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been
determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an
increase in its value exceeding the statutory limit.45 Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a
forced sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155
and 160.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to
establish these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from
voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting the family home, its
owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed
under Article 157.

PASCASIO, Alfred Robinson

PNB VS VENANCIO GR NO. 212483 OCTOBER 5, 2016
I.) A spouse’s consent is indispensable for the disposition and encumbrance of conjugal properties. The
real estate mortgage over conjugal property is void if the non-contracting spouse did not give consent.
Any disposition or encumbrance of a conjugal property by one spouse must be consented to by the other;
otherwise it is void. (See Article 124 of the Family Code)

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II.) The mortgage may have been declared void, but the principal obligation is not affected (it remains
valid). The mortgage is merely an accessory agreement and does not affect the principal contract of loan.
Though the mortgage is void, it can still be considered as an instrument evidencing indebtedness.

III.) If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. (See Article 121 of the Family Code) if the
conjugal properties are not sufficient to answer for the loan, then the creditor can recover the remaining
unpaid balance from the separate properties of either spouse.

PATRON, Christine Marie

VIRGINIA OCAMPO VS. DEOGRACIA OCAMPO GR NO. 198908 AUGUST 3, 2015
In a void marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code, the
property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or
Article 148 of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage.

Article 147 of the Family Code provides that "When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under
a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership."

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to
have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of
their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the
co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or
all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.

This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to
marry each other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the
benefit of marriage. It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must
be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void, as in the instant case. The term
"capacitated" in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal capacity of a party to contract
marriage.

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PICARDAL, Donn Ferdinand E.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SERENOGON GR NO. 199194 FEBRUARY 15, 2016
To comply with the requirement under Article 41, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was
the result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already
dead. It requires exertion of active effort.

PISEC, Erol Stephen B.

CASTILLO VS. DE LEON CASTILLO GR NO. 189607 APRIL 18, 2016
Marriage is governed by law in effect at the time of its celebration. - The validity of a marriage and all its
incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In this
case, both marriages were contracted before the Family Code took effect, i.e. the Civil Code governs both
marriages. Under the Civil Code, one distinct difference between void marriages and voidable marriages
is the requirement of a judicial decree to establish invalidity - in a void marriage, no judicial decree is
needed; while in a voidable marriage, a judicial decree is mandatory. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is
immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Thus, the second marriage is valid.

RAMOS, Karissa Marie, R.

KHO VS. REPUBLIC GR NO. 187462 JUNE 1, 2016
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence
of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.

AGUSTIN, Pauline Marie M.

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 200233 JULY 15, 2015
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated
by them that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We chastise this deceptive scheme
that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape criminal prosecution. Our
penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent
and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, we had
the occasion to emphasize that the State’s penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by
allowing individuals “to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to
thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless
women with the promise of futurity and commitment.” We cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of
feigning a marriage and, in the same breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would
only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.

ALGABRE, Louiela S.
VALERIO E. KALAW V MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, G.R NO. 166357, JANUARY 14, 2015
Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to enact its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some
resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the
verity that no case would be on “all fours’ with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.

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(NOTE: The guidelines in the Molina case (Republic vs. CA) were not abandoned in this case.)

ANTALAN, Carlo Mayo P.

GLENN VIÑAS VS. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, G.R. NO. 208790, JANUARY 21, 2015
That the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality
Disorder declared to be grave and incurable" – is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference
from her previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered
on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this
same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one
side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the
content of such evidence.

CARIDO, Fidel Jr. R.

Mallilin Vs. Jamesolamin, GR No. 192718 February 18, 2015
“Psychological incapacity,” as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should
refer to no less than a mental – not merely physical – incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render help and support. There is
hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

CARREON, Camille Francesca G.

REPUBLIC V. ROMERO II, G.R. NOS. 209180 & 209253, FEBRUARY 24, 2016
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the Constitution decrees marriage as
legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Thus, it has consistently been
held that psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It must be a malady that is so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.

Verily, all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain
personality disorders and there is hardly any doubt that the intention of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases. Thus, to warrant the declaration of nullity
of marriage, the psychological incapacity must: (a) be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and (c) be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved.

In Republic v. CA, the Court laid down definitive guidelines on the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code. Among others, it clarified that the illness must be grave enough to bring about the
incapacity or inability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage such that "mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as

63
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person,
an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

CARVAJAL, Kim Apple S.

PHILIP YU V VIVECA LIM YU, G.R NO. 200072, JUNE 20, 2016
To this Court, when Philip declared before the Batangas court that Viveca's last known address was still
their conjugal home with full and undisputed knowledge that she had already intentionally abandoned the
same and had even established a more recent, local residence herein evinces a clear lack of good faith.
As a result, Viveca never had knowledge of the filing of the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage suit, only
finding out about the same when the Pasig City RTC had promulgated its decision on the Legal
Separation case. It is clear, therefore, that because of the service of summons at the erroneous address,
Viveca was effectively prevented from participating in the proceedings thereon.

CHING, Benazir P.
VITANGCOL VS. PEOPLE, GR NO. 207406 JANUARY 13, 2016
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their
first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of
bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is
suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license.
Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar.

CO, Thomas Joseph D.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. NILDA B. TAMPUS, GR NO. 214243, MARCH 16, 2016
There are four essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: that the absent spouses as
been missing for four consecutive years, or two years in cases where there is danger of death under the
circumstances provided by Article 391 of the Civil code; that the present spouse wishes to remarry; that
the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is dead; and that the present spouse
files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death.

In order to find the present spouse as having a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse who is a
combatant is dead, it is not enough that the present spouse attempted to locate the absent spouse by
inquiring from the latter's parents, relatives, and neighbors as to the latter's whereabouts. Due diligence
entails that the present spouse ought to request for information regarding her absent combatant-spouse
and the status of his mission from the AFP.

Further, the courts cannot give merit to a testimony of bare assertions that one had asked for the
whereabouts of the absent spouse without identifying the resource persons nor presenting them as
witnesses.

CONCEPCION, Dominico Emmanuel O.

AGUILAR V. SIASAT, G.R. NO. 200169, JANUARY 28, 2015
Filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required.

64
Adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent
in any private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child
is made:

1. Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent.|.

2. Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.|||

DOMINGO, Rozette del Mundo

EDNA MABUGAY-OTAMIAS V REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 189516, JUNE 8, 2016
Even before the passage of the Family Code, this Court has given primary consideration to the right of a
child to receive support.

In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be
instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support
until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. An excerpt from the
early case of De Leon v. Soriano is relevant, thus:

The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and
without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered
because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot
delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long afterwards,
however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused.
The children with such belated payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat
voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may
they enrol in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the
years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the funds when needed.aw

GUILLERMO, Evan S.
ROSARIO BANGUS-TAMBUYAT V. WENIFREDA BALCOM-TAMBUYAT, G.R NO. 202805, MARCH
23, 2015

Doctrine: Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public
as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may
be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman
living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner
has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even
legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art.

65
188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried
Property) stated: “Be it noted however that with respect to ‘spouse’, the same must be the legitimate
‘spouse’ (not common-law spouses).

2014 Cases: Persons and Family Relations

MARTINEZ, MARA

Francisco Lim v. Equitable PCI Bank, now known as Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc., G.R. No. 183918,
January 15, 2014.
Republic of the Philippines v. Rodolfo O. De Gracia, G.R. No. 171557, February 12, 2014.
Fe Floro Valino v. Rosario D. Adriano, Florante D. Adriano, Ruben D. Adriano, Maria Teresa Adriano
Ongoco, Victoria Adriano Bayona, and Leah Antonette D. Adriano, G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014.
Dr. Filoteo A. Alano v. Zenaida Magud-Logmao, G.R. No. 175540, April 14, 2014.
Visayas Geothermal Power Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 197525, June 04,
2014.
Gerardo R. Villaseñor and Rodel A. Mesa v. Ombudsman and Hon. Herbert Bautista, City Mayor, Quezon
City, G.R. No. 202303, June 04, 2014.
Philippine National Bank v. Jose Garcia and Children Nora Garcia, Jose Garcia, Jr., Bobby Garcia and
Jimmy Garcia and Heirs of Rogelio Garcia, namely: Celedonio Garcia, Danilo Garcia, Elsa Garcia, Fermin
Garcia, Heherson Garcia, Gregorio Garcia, Imelda Garcia and Jane Garcia, G.R. No. 182839, June 02,
2014.
Atty. Aileen R. Maglana v. Atty. Jose Vicente R. Opinion, B.M. No. 2713, June 10, 2014.
Arco Pulp and Paper Co., Inc. and Candida A. Santos v. Dan T. Lim, doing business under the name and
style of Quality Papers & Plastic Products Enterprises, G.R. No. 206806, June 25, 2014.
Soledad L. Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna, represented by Gregorio Z. Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna, G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014.
Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al., G.R. No. 209287, July 01, 2014.
Edelina T. Ando v. Department of Foreign Affairs, G.R. No. 195432, August 27, 2014.
David A. Noveras v. Leticia T. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014.
Willaware Products Corporation v. Jesichris Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No. 195549, September 03,
2014.
Marietta N. Barrido v. Leonardo V. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014.
Carlos A. Loria v. Ludolfo P. Muñoz, Jr., G.R. No. 187240, October 15, 2014.
Celerina J. Santos v. Ricardo T. Santos, G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014.

66
 PROPERTY

RENTILLO, Garry Butz S.

LADERA vs. HODGES, G.R. No. 8027-R, September 23, 1952
Since it is a rule in our law that buildings and constructions are regarded as mere accessories to the land
(following the Roman maxim omne quod solo inaedificatur solo credit) it is logical that said accessories
should partake of the nature of the principal thing, which is the land, forming, as they do, but a single
object (res) with it in contemplation of law

SANTIAGO, Martin Kevin P.

MINDANAO BUS CO. VS. CITY ASSESSOR AND TREASURER 6 SCRA 197
The tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential and principle
municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They
are merely incidentals — acquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve
its service. Even without such tools and equipments, its business may be carried on, as petitioner has
carried on, without such equipments, before the war. The transportation business could be carried on
without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging
to another. In the case at bar the equipments in question are destined only to repair or service the
transportation business, which is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as
demanded by the law. Said equipments may not, therefore, be deemed real property. Resuming what we
have set forth above, we hold that the equipments in question are not absolutely essential to the
petitioner's transportation business, and petitioner's business is not carried on in a building, tenement or
on a specified land, so said equipment may not be considered real estate within the meaning of Article
415 (c) of the Civil Code.

MAKATI LEASING & FINANCE CORPORATION VS. WEAREVER TEXTILES 122 SCRA 296
If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in the above Tumalad case, may be considered as
personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the
contract so agree and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason
why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose,
may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from
denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
In rejecting petitioner's assertion on the applicability of the Tumalad doctrine, the Court of Appeals lays
stress on the fact that the house involved therein was built on a land that did not belong to the owner of
such house. But the law makes no distinction with respect to the ownership of the land on which the
house is built and we should not lay down distinctions not contemplated by law.
It must be pointed out that the characterization of the subject machinery as chattel by the private
respondent is indicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the
parties. As stated in Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, it is undeniable that the
parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real
property, as long as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby.
From what has been said above, the error of the appellate court in ruling that the questioned machinery is
real, not personal property, becomes very apparent. Moreover, the case of Machinery and Engineering
Supplies, Inc. v. CA, 96 Phil. 70, heavily relied upon by said court is not applicable to the case at bar, the
nature of the machinery and equipment involved therein as real properties never having been disputed
nor in issue, and they were not the subject of a Chattel Mortgage. Undoubtedly, the Tumalad case bears
more nearly perfect parity with the instant case to be the more controlling jurisprudential authority.

67
SANTIAGO, Nemei S.
EVANGELISTA vs. ALTO SURETY, G.R. No. G.R. No. L-11139, April 23, 1958
The house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal property not capable of
manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in Laddera vs. Hodges "a true building (not
merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the
land or by usufructuary or lessee. However, parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider
a house as personal property for purposes of said contract. However, this view is good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned. It does not apply to strangers to the contract.
Therefore, the house of mixed materials levied upon on execution, although subject of a contract of
chattel mortgage between the owner and a third person, is real property within the purview of Rule 39,
section 16, of the Rules of Court as it has become a permanent fixture of the land, which, is real property.

TSAI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 120098, October 2, 2001

The disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged
does not make them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code. While it is
true that the properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage
executed by the parties reveals that the true intention of the parties is to treat the machinery and
equipment as chattels.
Assuming that the properties were considered immovables, nothing detracts the parties from treating it as
chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel.

SIATON, Alfred Cyrus P.

SERG'S PRODUCTS, INC. vs. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., G.R. No. 137705,
August 22, 2000
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as
personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.
Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any
material fact found therein. Hence, in Tumalad v. Vicencio, the Court upheld the intention of the parties to
treat a house as a personal property because it had been made the subject of a chattel mortgage. The
Court ruled: ". . . . Although there is no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal
property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property by way of chattel mortgage defendants-
appellants could only have meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same
as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise."
Applying Tumalad, the Court in Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Wearever Textile Mills also held that
the machinery used in a factory and essential to the industry, as in the present case, was a proper subject
of a writ of replevin because it was treated as personal property in a contract.

Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 64261, December 26, 1984
Under Article 415 [5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptacles. instruments or
implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are
considered immovable property . In Davao Sawmill Co. vs. Castillo (61 Phil. 709) where this legal
provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized
when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner. In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted
to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

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SILVA, Maria Kathrina V.
LOPEZ vs. OROZA JR. AND PLAZA THEATER, G.R. Nos. L-10817-18, February 28, 1958
BUILDING IS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM A LAND. While it is true that generally, real estate
connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building,
separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could mean
only one thing – that a building is by itself an immovable property. In the absence of any specific provision
of law to the contrary, a building is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or not said structure
and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner.

YAP vs. TAÑADA, G.R. No. L-32917, July 18, 1988

Article 415, par. 3 of the Civil Code considers and immovable property as “everything attached to an
immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the
material or deteriorating the object.” The pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was, in fact,
separated from Yap’s premises without being broken of suffering deterioration. Obviously, the separation
or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated that the loosening of bolts or dismantling of
other fasteners. The water pump and its accessories are therefore NOT immovable properties.

TAMONTE, Juan Paolo N.

SALVADOR H. LAUREL vs. RAMON GARCIA, G.R. No. 92013
A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership
until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v.
Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).

BENJAMIN RABUCO vs. HON. ANTONIO VILLEGAS, G.R. No. L- 24661

The act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power which
will not be interfered with by the courts.

TORRES, Justin V.
BENJAMIN RABUCO, ET. AL. vs. HON. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, ET. AL., G.R. No. L-24916,
February 28, 1974
The lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity and are
therefore public property over which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial
property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due
process and without just compensation. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property
calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power, which will not be interfered with by the courts.

LEVY D. MACASIANO vs. HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, G.R. NO. 97764,

August 10, 1992
Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under
the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or
regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be
disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due
process which should be complied with before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for the
sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show
that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already
withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit.
It is only then that the respondent municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other

69
real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in accordance
with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as Local Government Code.

UBALDO, Pauline Marie I.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 100709,
November 14, 1997
Foreshore lands, not included. Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
proscribes the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired under a free patent or homestead within five
years from the grant of such patent. Furthermore, such encumbrance results in the cancellation of the
grant and the reversion of the land to the public domain. It is indisputable that Respondent Morato cannot
fully use or enjoy the land during the duration of the lease contract as such contract "impairs the use of
the property" by the grantee.

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA,

G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968
Under the Civil Code, all municipal properties except those enumerated in Art. 424 are patrimonial.
Under Art. 424, property for public, use, consists of provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the
squares, fountains, public waters, promenades and public works for public service paid for by said
municipal corporations. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and is governed by the
Code without prejudice to provisions of special laws. Under this classification, all the properties in
question save two lots used as High School playgrounds are patrimonial properties of Zamboanga
Province; this includes the capitol site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites which are
patrimonial as they are not for public use. They fall outside the phrase "public works for public service"
because under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and for the indiscriminate
use by anyone.

YABUT, Lee Anne Therese E.

CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES, 384 SCRA 152
Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas are owned by the State. The State owns all lands
and waters of the public domain.
Can natural resources alienable?
GR: NO. All natural resources are owned by the State and are inalienable.
EXCEPTION: Agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the
State may alienate to qualified parties.

Are foreshore and submerged areas alienable?

NO. Submerged areas are part of the public domain. In their present state, they are inalienable
and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these areas are owned by the
State, forming part of the public domain and consequently, inalienable.
If foreshore and submerged areas are reclaimed, do they become alienable lands of the
public domain?
NO. These must be classified as public agricultural lands first. Once reclaimed and transformed
into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable
or disposable lands open to disposition.
When can an alienable land become private or patrimonial property of the State?
It must follow the following:
1. Natural resource must be classified as a public agricultural land
2. Government must declare, through legislative or executive grant, that the property is no
longer devoted to public use or defense of territory.

70
 Once a land of public domain is classified as alienable, may this be automatically subjects
of a sale?
It depends. The Constitution bans private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land
of the public domain. Meanwhile, Philippine citizens may acquire through purchase but only up
to 12 hectares.
1. Private corporations or associations may hold it through lease for a period not exceeding
25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years, and not to exceed 1,000 hectares in
area.
2. Philippine citizens may lease only up to 500 hectares, or acquire not more than 12
hectares by purchase, homestead, or grant.

Can government sell reclaimed lands?

GR: NO. Reclaimed lands, foreshore lands and marshy lands cannot be sold to private parties.
These can only be leased.
EXCEPTION: If the land is granted, donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch
or subdivision of government, it may be sold to private parties. There must be a congressional
grant authorizing such sale.

Does registration covert public lands into private lands?

NO. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands.
Registration of alienable land under the Torrens System does not convert it into private lands. It
does not vest private or public ownership of the land. It is merely evidence of ownership
previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does
not give the registrant a better right than what the registrant had prior to the registration. The
registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert
public lands into private lands.

VILLARICO vs. SARMIENTO, 442 SCRA 110

Under ART 420, properties intended for public use constructed by the State are properties of public
dominion. Public use is that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public.
Stairways built as a public passageway to a highway qualifies in this category.
Properties public dominion are outside the commerce of man:
1. It cannot be alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts
2. It cannot be acquired by prescription against the State
3. It is not subject to attachment and execution
4. It cannot be burdened by any voluntary easement.
5. Person cannot appropriate it for himself. He cannot claim any right of possession over it as only
things and rights susceptible of being appropriated are objects of possession.

Abunales, Hanna Juvenil

JAVIER V. VERIDIANO II 237 SCRA 565
The complaint in Civil Case No. 2203-0 (accion reinvindicatoria) definitely raises the question of
ownership and clearly gives defendants therein notice of plaintiff's claim of exclusive and absolute
ownership, including the right to possess which is an elemental attribute of such ownership. Thus, this
Court has ruled that a judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than
possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an
action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.

71
And, applying the ruling of the Court En Banc in Quimpo v. De la Victoria, even if we treat Civil Case No.
2203-0 as a petition to quiet title, as its caption suggests, still it has a cause of action different from that
for ejectment. Consequently, there being no identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 926 and
Civil Case No. 2203-0, the prior complaint for ejectment cannot bar the subsequent action for recovery, or
petition to quiet title.

BUSTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS 350 SCRA 155

Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical consequence of the
decision declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. One of the essential attributes of
ownership is possession. It follows that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to
possession of the same. An owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) juses or attributes of ownership--
the right to possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to
recover or vindicate and to the fruits--is a crippled owner.

Afan, Ma. Elizabeth

HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO V. COURT OF APPEALS 363 SCRA 87
Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one
person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights
of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which are the right to enjoy the thing
owned and the right to exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is
defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and
physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in
the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A person may be declared owner but he may not be
entitled to possession. The possession may be in the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A
judgment for ownership, therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.

It is important to note that although private respondents have been declared titled owners of the subject
land, the exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to limitations that may be imposed by law. The
Tenancy Act provides one such limitation. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they
have the right to work on their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established.
Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. The
exercise of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant.
However, petitioners status as tenant has not yet been declared by the DARAB.

A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of the land, whose
security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB. Stated differently, the
prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is being
occupied by one claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latters occupancy
was unlawful.

GARCIA V. COURT OF APPEALS 312 SCRA 180

We stress again that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a
thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and
consistent with the rights of others. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or
the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or
without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways:possession in the concept of an owner and
possession of a holder. "A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who
claims to be so." On the other hand, "one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a

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superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong." The records show
that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by
his parents. We held in Caniza v. Court of Appeals that an owner's act of allowing another to occupy his
house, rent-free does not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor.
Consequently, it is of no moment that petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale
to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership.

Agraam, Angeli Newin

RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS 371 SCRA 79
The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established
by law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and
this rule has no exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys the
prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as
lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements
required for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are present.

ISAGUIRRE V. DE LARA 332 SCRA 803

A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation. It is
constituted by recording the document in which it appears with the proper Registry of Property, although,
even if it is not recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties. Thus, the only right
granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is to demand the execution and the recording of the document in
which the mortgage is formalized. As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged
property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass to the mortgagee.
However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the property, there is no impairment of
his security since the mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed,
whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.

Arriba, Edward Vange

CUSTODIO V. COURT OF APPEALS 253 SCRA 483
The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that “(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon.”

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although
the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful
means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no
cause of action arises in the latter’s favor

ABEJARON V. NABASA 359 SCRA 47

Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of
P.D. 1073on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least
30 years, or atleast since January 24, 1947 may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the [PLA]

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Aseron, Xavier Alexen
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS 177 SCRA 495
The doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is
absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial
process for the recovery of property. This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no
case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing,
must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.

CAISIP V. PEOPLE 36 SCRA 17

The principle of self-help is embodied in Article 429 which states:" The owner or lawful possessor of a
thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he
may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property."

The order to vacate was until June 26 (or 20 days from the execution of the decision.) On June 17, the
spouses REMAINED in possession of the said lot. At the very least the owner of the hacienda is just a co-
possessor of the land, thus the spouses still had rights over it.

Although the spouses were ordered to vacate the land, it doesn’t necessarily mean that they don’t have
rights to the land (they still have right to necessary expenses they used to till the land)
What petitioner did was not ―repel or prevent in actual or threatened x x x physical invasion or
usurpation. They EXPELLED Gloria from a property which they were still in possession of.

Baguilat, Genelyn
PEOPLE V. PLETCHA, JR. 22 CA REP. 807
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
third person." Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining
landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or
damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or
damage suffered.

ANDAMO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 191 SCRA 195

It is a well-settled rule that ours is a government of laws and not of men and no person may take the law
into his hands. But this principle is not absolute. Under Article 429 of the Civil Code: The owner or lawful
possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For
this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. The Above-quoted law confirms the
right of the appellant, an owner and lawful possessor, to use reasonable force to repel an invasion or
usurpation, actual, threatened or physical, of his property. The principle of self-defense and the protective
measures related thereto, covers not only his life, but also his liberty and property. The principle of self-
help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force, not only to prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or
usurpation thereof; it is a sort of self-defense. It is lawful to repel force by force. He who merely uses force
to defend his possession does not possess by force. The use of such necessary force to protect propriety
or possessory right constitutes justifying circumstances under our Penal Code.

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Bocalan, Allena
BACHRACH MOTOR CO. V. TALISAY-SILAY MILING CO. 56 PHIL. 117
Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the rents of buildings; second, the
proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the income from perpetual or life annuities, or other similar
sources of revenue. It may be noted that according to the context of the law, the phrase "u otras
analogas" refers only to rent or income, for the adjectives "otras" and "analogas" agree with the noun
"rentas," as do also the other adjectives "perpetuas"and "vitalicias." That is why we say that by "civil
fruits" the Civil Code understands one of three and only three things, to wit: the rent of a building, the rent
of land, and certain kinds of income.
As the bonus in question is not rent of a building or of land, the only meaning of "civil fruits" left to be
examined is that of "income."
Assuming that in broad juridical sense of the word "income" it might be said that the bonus in question is
"income" under article 355 of the Civil Code, it is obvious to inquire whether it is derived from the land
mortgaged by Mariano Lacson Ledesma to the appellant bank for the benefit of the central; for it is not
obtained from that land but from something else, it is not civil fruits of that land, and the bank's contention
is untenable.
It is to be noted that the said bonus bears no immediate, but only a remote accidental relation to the land
mentioned, having been granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected one's land to a lien in
favor of the bank, for the benefit of the entity granting said bonus

EQUATORIAL REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. V. MAYFAIR THEATER 370 SCRA 56

CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; CIVIL FRUIT OF OWNERSHIP; RENTALS. — Rent is a civil fruit that belongs
to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession. Consequently and ordinarily, the rentals
that fell due from the time of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment
should belong to the owner of the property during that period.
ID.; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; RESCISSIBLE CONTRACTS; NOT ONLY THE LAND AND
BUILDING SOLD SHALL BE RETURNED TO THE SELLER BUT ALSO THE RENTAL PAYMENTS PAID,
IF ANY. — [T]he point may be raised that under Article 1164 of the Civil Code, Equatorial as buyer
acquired a right to the fruits of the thing sold from the time the obligation to deliver the property to
petitioner arose. That time arose upon the perfection of the Contract of Sale on July 30, 1978, from which
moment the laws provide that the parties to a sale may reciprocally demand performance. Does this
mean that despite the judgment rescinding the sale, the right to the fruits belonged to, and remained
enforceable by, Equatorial? Article 1385 of the Civil Code answers this question in the negative, because
“[r]escission creates the obligation to return the things which were the object of the contract, together with
their fruits, and the price with its interest; . . . .” Not only the land and building sold, but also the rental
payments paid, if any, had to be returned by the buyer.

Camacho, Helene Rose

IGNACIO V. HILARIO 76 PHIL. 605
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the
possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453 of the Civil Code. The
owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or
to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for
the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it
is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party
fails to pay for the same.

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IGNAO V. INTERMIDIATE APPELLATE COURT 193 SCRA 17
When the co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile co-
owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner which was however made in good
faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the respective rights of the parties.

Cana, Aldrin Jose

FILIPINAS COLLEGE INC. V. GARCIA TIMBANG, ET AL 164 SCRA 287
Under the terms of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, it is true that the owner of the land has the right
to choose between appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder of the value thereof or compelling
the builder in good faith to pay for his land. Even this second right cannot be exercised if the value of the
land is considerably more than that of the building. In addition to the right of the builder to be paid the
value of his improvement, Article 546 gives him the corollary right of retention of the property until he is
indemnified by the owner of the land. There is nothing in the language of these two articles which would
justify the conclusion that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is
demanded by the landowner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under
Article 445 of the Civl Code.

MANOTOK REALTY, INC. V. TECSON 164 SCRA 587

Although the bad faith of one party neutralizes that of the other and hence as between themselves their
rights would be as if both of them had acted in good faith at the time of the transaction, this legal fiction of
Yap's good faith ceased when the complaint against him was filed, and consequently the court's
declaration of liability for the rents thereafter is correct and proper. A possessor in good faith is entitled to
the fruits only so long as his possession is not legally interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon
service of judicial summons (Arts. 544 and 1123, Civil Code)." Thus, the repairs and improvements
introduced by the said respondents after the complaint was filed cannot be considered to have been built
in good faith, much less, justify the denial of the petitioner's exercise of option. Since the improvements
have been gutted by fire, and therefore, the basis for private respondent's right to retain the premises has
already been extinguished without the fault of the petitioner, there is no other recourse for the private
respondent but to vacate the premises and deliver the same to herein petitioner.

Castillejo, Agatha Faye

BERNARDO V. BATACLAN 66 PHIL. 598
The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of property. One of these is the
principle of accession whereby the owner of property acquires not only that which it produces but that
which is united to it either naturally or artificially. (Art. 353.) Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land
of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land (art. 358).
Where, however, the planter, builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between
the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice
to the owner of the land. In view of the impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced
coownership" (vol. 3, 4th ed., p. 213), the law has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the
owner of the land the option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to
oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent (art. 361). It is the
owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because his right is older and because, by the
principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing (3 Manresa, 4th ed., p. 213).
In the case before us, the plaintiff, as owner of the land, chose to require the defendant, as owner of the
improvements, to pay for the land.

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HEIRS OF RAMON DURANO, SR. V. UY 344 SCRA 328
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or
sown without right of indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may
demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things
in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the
builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the builder,
planter or sower.
Based on these provisions, the owner of the land has three alternative rights: (1) to appropriate what has
been built without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, or (2) to demand that the builder remove what
he had built, or (3) to compel the builder to pay the value of the land In any case, the landowner is entitled
to damages under Article 451, abovecited.

Cauilan, Paolo Simeon

BALLATAN V. COURT OF APPEALS 304 SCRA 34
It was established in the case that the parties had no knowledge of the encroachment until Ballatan
noticed it there. All of them were builders in Good faith. In that scenario they have two options. 1st option
is that the land owner will buy the improvements and the 2nd option is to oblige the builders to buy the
land given that the value of the land is not considerably more than the buildings or tree; other wise the
owner may remove the improvements thereon.
The builder, planter or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the land if its value is considerably
more than the building, planting or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or sower must pay rent to the
owner of the land. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix
the terms thereof. The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or selling the land on
which the improvement of the builder, planter or sower stands, is given to the owner. If the option
chooses is to sell the lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment.

SPOUSES DEL CAMPO V. ABIESA 160 SCRA 379

When the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of defendants
overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants
obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. The
plaintiffs have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity
to defendants as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, the plaintiffs may oblige the
defendants to pay the price of the land occupied by their house. However, if the price asked for is
considerably much more than the value of the portion of the house of defendants built thereon, then the
latter cannot be obliged to buy the land. The defendants shall then pay the reasonable rent to the plaintiff
upon such terms and conditions that they may agree. In case of disagreement, the trial court shall fix the
terms thereof. Of course, defendants may demolish or remove the said portion of their house, at their own
expense, if they so decide.

Claveria, Maria Patrese

PACIFIC FORMS, INC. V. ESGUERRA 30 SCRA 684
Article 447 of the Civil Code contemplates a principal and an accessory, the land being considered the
principal, and the plantings, constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of the land who in good
faith — whether personally or through another — makes constructions or works thereon, using materials
belonging to somebody else, becomes the owner of the said materials with the obligation however of
paying for their value. The owner of the materials, on the other hand, is entitled to remove them, provided

77
no substantial injury is caused to the landowner. Otherwise, he has the right only to reimbursement for
the value of his materials. Applying article 447 by analogy, we perforce consider the buildings as the
principal and the lumber and construction materials that went into their construction as the accessory.
Thus the appellee, if it does own the six buildings, must bear the obligation to pay for the value of the said
materials; the appellant — which apparently has no desire to remove the materials, and even if it were
minded to do so, cannot remove them without necessarily damaging the buildings — has the
corresponding right to recover the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials. Well-
established in jurisprudence is the rule that compensation should be borne by the person who has been
benefited by the accession.

PECSON V. COURT OF APPEALS 244 SCRA 407

Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built
some works, or sown or planted something. The building, sowing or planting may have been made in
good faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be applied
in determining whether a builder, sower or planter had acted in good faith. Article 448 does not apply to a
case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the
land by sale or donation. Elsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on his own
land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not
apposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be
applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-
ownership and that the parties, including the two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and
546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they differ
as to the basis of the indemnity.

Cordero, Kimberly Ionne

TECHNOGAS PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF APPEALS 268 SCRA 5
Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the
encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of private respondents land was done in bad faith by
the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them in good faith. It
is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until
the contrary is proved. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his,
and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. Hence, such good faith, by law passed on to Pariz's
successor, petitioner in this case. Further, "(w)here one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against
the former." And possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in case and from
the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully. The good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title are made known to
the possessor, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true owner.

Petitioner did not lose its rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code on the basis merely of the fact that
some years after acquiring the property in good faith, it learned about — and aptly recognized — the right
of private respondent to a portion of the land occupied by its building. The supervening awareness of the
encroachment by petitioner does not militate against its right to claim the status of a builder in good faith.
In fact, a judicious reading of said Article 448 will readily show that the landowner's exercise of his option
can only take place after the builder shall have come to know of the intrusion — in short, when both
parties shall have become aware of it. Only then will the occasion for exercising the option arise, for it is
only then that both parties will have been aware that a problem exists in regard to their property rights.

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PLEASANTVILLE DEV’T CORP. V. COURT OF APPEALS 253 SCRA 10
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of
any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith
on the part of the respondent (Kee). At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot
was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus,
Kee's good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.

Cristobal, Maria Katrina

GEMINIANO V. COURT OF APPEALS 259 SCRA 344
Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows full reimbursement
of useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a
possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does
not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always
be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.

AGUSTIN V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 187 SCRA 218

Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which provides: "Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
(366)", supports the finding that the private respondents did not lose the ownership of such accretions
even after they were separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river.

Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the
land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river.

These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made. The
reason for this principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other
damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to
encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice
the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion.

Cuadra, Luis Alfonso

CUREG V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 177 SCRA 313
The increase in the area of one’s land, formed through an accretion left by the change of course or the
movement of a River, does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which receives
such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. As such, it must also be placed under the operation of the
Torrens System.

VIAJAR V. COURT OF APPEALS 168 SCRA 405

Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through
gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366
of the Old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the New). Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on
running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Registration
Act.

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Destajo, Pierre Honcel
VDA. DE NAZARENO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 257 SCRA 589
A person cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner when the accretion was formed by the dumping of
boulder, soil and other filling material on portion of the creek and river.

Heirs of Navarro v. Intermediate Appellate Court 268 SCRA 74

A person cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner when the accretion was formed by the action of the
Manila Bay and not because of the river current in the boundaries of the lands.

Domingo, Ala Mei

DEL BANCO V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 156 SCRA 55
A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the other co-owners or a judicial decree of partition,
adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of the lot owned in common, as his share therein,
to the exclusion of other co-owners. It is of no moment that some of the co-owners have succeeded in
securing cadastral titles in their names to some portions of the Island occupied by them.
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a subdivision plan
drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in
the plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly.
Actual possession and enjoyment of some portions cannot be considered a repudiation of the co-
ownership. Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners.

PARDELL V. BARTOLOME 23 PHIL. 450

Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and
enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, for the
reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder cannot be determined and every
one of the co-owners exercises together with his other co-participants, joint ownership over the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.|||

For the use and enjoyment of a particular portion of the lower part of a house, not used as living quarters,
a co-owner must, in strict justice, pay rent, in like manner as other people pay for similar space in the
house; he has no right to the free use and enjoyment of such space which, if rented to a third party, would
produce income.

Escasinas, Paula Jane

CARO V. COURT OF APPEALS 113 SCRA 10
Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator has the right to the possession of the real and personal
estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the expenses of administration, and the
administrator may bring and defend action for the recovery or protection of the property or right of the
deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88), such right of possession and administration do not include the right of legal
redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger by one of the co-owners after the death of another,
because in such case, the right of legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to the
stranger was perfected and formed no part of the estate of the deceased co-owner; hence, that right
cannot be transmitted to the heir of the deceased co-owner.

BAILON- CASILAO V. COURT OF APPEALS 160 SCRA 738

There are 4 basic elements of laches 1) Conduct on the part of the defendant or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a
remedy; 2) Delay in asserting the corporations complainant's rights, the complainant having had

80
knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit;
3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on
which he bases his suit; and,4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred. The second and third elements are missing. The second
element speaks of delay in asserting the complainant's rights. However, the mere fact of delay is
insufficient to constitute laches. It is required that (1) complainant must have had knowledge of the
conduct of defendant or of one under whom he claims and (2) he must have been afforded an opportunity
to institute suit. This court has pointed out that laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time.

Evidente, Fiel Aldous

ROQUE V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT 165 SCRA 118
An action for partition —which is typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified
property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners — may be
seen to present simultaneously two principal issues. First, there is the issue of whether the plaintiff is
indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned. Second, assuming that the plaintiff
successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the property is to be divided
between plaintiff and defendant(s) — i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner.

Should the trial court find that the defendants do not dispute the status of the plaintiff as co-owner, the
court can forthwith proceed to the actual partitioning of the property involved. In case the defendants
assert in their Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the court should not dismiss
the plaintiff's action for partition but, on the contrary and in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve
the question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should the trial court find that the plaintiff was
unable to sustain his claimed status as co-owner, or that the defendants are or have become the sole and
exclusive owners of the property involved, the court will necessarily have to dismiss the action for partition.
This result would be reached, not because the wrong action was commenced by the plaintiff, but rather
because the plaintiff having been unable to show co-ownership rights in himself, no basis exists for
requiring the defendants to submit to partition the property at stake. If, upon the other hand, the court
after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties litigant, the court may and should
order the partition of the property in the same action. Judgment for one or the other party being on the
merits, the losing party (respondents in this case) may then appeal the same. In either case, however, it
is quite unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another action, separate and independent from that for
partition originally instituted. Functionally, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property
involved. This is the import of our jurisprudence on the matter and is sustained by the public policy which
abhors multiplicity of actions.

DELIMA V. COURT OF APPEALS 201 SCRA 641

As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to
benefit all. It is understood that the co-owner or co-heir who is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso
for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes
care of the rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same
situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at any
time by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor. In other words, no prescription shall run in
favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership.

However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of
the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition

81
but of ownership. In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or
applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period
sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order that such possession is
considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following
elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust;
and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.

We have held that when a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of partition and on the
strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of
a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating
the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute of limitations started to run for the
purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership
and of their rights thereunder. Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective
assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted.

Fermin, Rudolph Lad

AGUILAR V. COURT OF APPEALS 227 SCRA 472
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership,
and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his
share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is
essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall
indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when
the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the
property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b)
the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire
property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case,8 this Court upheld the order of the
trial court directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of
the Civil Code.

TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS 316 SCRA 502
On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only the seller's share pro indiviso,
and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor's share in the partition of the property owned
in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the
co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. The proper action
in a case like this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of possession of the property
owned in common from the third person, but for division or partition of the entire property if it continued to
remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it. Such partition should
result in segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.

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Fullante, John Elan
ROBLES V. COURT OF APPEALS 328 SCRA 97
A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of other co-owners absent any clear indication of
repudiation of co-ownership. An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud
or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property.

RIZAL CEMENT CO., INC. V. VILLAREAL 135 SCRA 15

Neither tax receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutes sufficient
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty. They must be supported by other effective proofs.
Neither can the survey plan or technical descriptions prepared at the instance of the party concerned be
considered in his favour, the same being self-serving.

Galo, Ian Ervin

WONG V. CARPIO 203 SCRA 118
The law and jurisprudence indicate that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary . But there’s a catch. Even
if there exists the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material
tenancy of the purchased thing when such tenancy and enjoyment is opposed by another. In this case,
delivery has not been effected.

SOMODIO V. COURT OF APPEALS 235 SCRA 307

Possession in the eyes of the law doesn’t mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said he is in possession.

Gapit, Jan Kyla

MAGLUCOT- AW V. MAGLUCOT 329 SCRA 78
The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of
respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner. One who
possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership,
whether his belief be right or wrong. Since the possession of respondents were found to be that of lessors
of petitioners, it goes without saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of
an owner from 1952 up to the time the present action was commenced.

CEQUENA V. BOLANTE 330 SCRA 216

Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the land. But
by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner — public, peaceful, and uninterrupted— had
already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid
realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled
with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription.

General, Jose Luis

ARAGON V. INSULAR GOVERNMENT 19 PHIL. 223
Under Articles 446 (now, Art. 539) and 460 (555) of the Code, if the Government is justified in disturbing
the possession of the applicants, it can only be on the ground that they (the applicants) have abandoned
their property, or that it has been totally destroyed and has now become a part of the public domain by
the erosive action of the sea.

In a case of gradual encroachment or erosion by the ebb and flow of the tide, private property may

83
become "property of public ownership," as defined in article 339 (420) of the Code, where it appears that
the owner has to all intents and purposes abandoned it and permitted it to be totally destroyed, so as to
become a part of the "playa" (shore of the sea), "rada" (roadstead), or the like.

CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE V. CA 183 SCRA 639

Article 555 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

"Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:

XXX

(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has lasted
longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. (460a)"
(Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provision of the law, it is clear that the real right of possession of a previous
possessor over the property was lost or no longer exists after the lapse of 10 years that a subsequent
possessor had been in adverse possession thereof. Thus, an action for recovery of possession of said
property filed by the previous possessor against the subsequent one must fail.

Gonzales, Ma. Isabelle

EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP. V. SANTOS 134 SCRA 614
If there was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between the seller and the buyer and the former
voluntarily caused the transfer, title thereto was acquired. The subsequent dishonor of the check merely
amounted to a failure of consideration which does not render the contract of sale void, but merely allows
the prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or rescission of the contract and to prosecute the
impostor for estafa under Art 315 of the RPC.

DE GARCIA V. COURT OF APPEALS 37 SCRA 129

Generally, one who has lost any movable or who has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it
from the person in possession of the same. But, if the possessor of the movable lost acquired it thru
public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid because, possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to title. (Art. 559 of the Civil Code)

Guingona, Francesca Angela

DIZON V. SUNTAY 47 SCRA 160
Unlawful deprivation is not merely contained in the specific sense of deprivation by robbery or theft but
extends to all cases where there has been no valid transmission of ownership, including depositary or
lessee who sold the same. It extends to all cases where there has been no valid transmission of
ownership. "The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from
the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return
without reimbursing the price therefore." Petitioner cannot assert that his appeal finds support in the
doctrine of estoppel. He is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would manifest
itself to ascertain whether or not an individual who is offering a jewelry by way of pledge is entitled to do
so. If no such care be taken, perhaps because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity for profit, he should
be the last to complain if thereafter the right of the true owner of such jewelry should be recognized.

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LEDESMA V. COURT OF APPEALS 213 SCRA 195
It is quite clear that a party who has lost a movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof can recover
the same from the present possessor even if the latter acquired it in good faith and has, therefore, title
thereto for under the first sentence of Article 559 of the Civil Code, such manner of acquisition is
equivalent to title. There are three requisites to make the possession of movable property equivalent to
title, namely: a) the possession should be in good faith; b) the owner voluntarily parted with the
possession of the thing; and c) the possession is in the concept of owner.
Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable or who has been unlawfully deprived of it cannot be said to
have voluntarily parted with the possession thereof. In the case at bar, there was a perfected
unconditional contract of sale between private respondent and the original vendee. The former voluntarily
caused the transfer of the certificate of registration of the vehicle in the name of the first vendee- even if
the said vendee was represented by someone who used a fictitious name – and likewise voluntarily
delivered the cars and the certificate of registration to the vendee’s alleged representative; title thereto
was forthwith transferred to the vendee.

Gutierrez, Inna Therese

AZARCON AND ABOBO V. EUSEBIO 105 SCRA 569
Generally, a person who has been ordered to leave certain premises is ordinarily not prohibited from
taking with him his own effects and possession. An exception would be: when there is an express
prohibition to this effect.

CORDERO V. CABRAL 123 SCRA 532

The defendants, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed land. There is no evidence
that they were possessors in bad faith. However, their good faith ceased when they were served with
summons to answer the complaint. (Art. 528, Civil Code; Tacas vs. Tobon, 53 Phil. 356 [1929].) As
possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons they "shall reimburse the fruits received and
those which the legitimate possessor could have received, ... (Art. 549, Civil Code.)

Hernandez, Mariane
MENDOZA AND ENRIQUEZ V. DE GUZMAN 52 PHIL. 164
Article 361 of the Civil Code in the original Spanish text uses the word "indemnizacion." However one
may speculate as to the true meaning of the term "indemnizacion" whether correctly translated as
"compensation” or "indemnity," the amount of the "indemnizacion" is the amount of the expenditures
mentioned in Articles 453 and 454 of the Civil Code, which in the present case is the amount of the
necessary and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant.
Necessary expenses have been variously described by the Spanish commentators as those made for the
preservation of the thing; as those without which the thing would deteriorate or be lost; as those that
augment the income of the things upon which they are expanded. Among the necessary expenditures are
those incurred for cultivation, production, upkeep, etc.
Here, the plaintiffs have chosen to take the improvements introduced on the land and are disposed to pay
the amount of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by the defendant. Inasmuch as the retentionist,
who is not exactly a possessor in good faith within the meaning of the law, seeks to be reimbursed for the
necessary and useful expenditures, it is only just that he should account to the owners of the estate for
any rents, fruits, or crops he has gathered from it.

ROBLES AND MARTIN V. LIZZARAGA HERMANOS , ETC. 42 PHIL. 584

Necessary expenditures shall be refunded to every possessor, but only the possessor in good faith may
retain the thing until they are repaid to him.

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Useful expenditures shall be paid the possessor in good faith with the same right to retention, the person
who has defeated him in his possession having the opinion of refunding the amount of such expenditures
or paying him the increase in value which the thing has acquired by reason thereof.

This provision of law is in force and applies to personal as well as real property.

The expenditures incurred in these improvements were not necessary inasmuch as without them the
house would have continued to stand just as before, but were useful, inasmuch as with them the house
better serves the purpose for which it was intended, being used as a residence, and the improvements
consisting of the addition of a dining room, kitchen, closet, and bathroom in the lower and upper stories of
the house, and a stable, suitable as a coach house and dwelling, it is beyond doubt that such
improvements are useful to the building. One of the chiefs of the firm of Lizarraga Hermanos, on the
occasion of a luncheon in the house, on noting the improvements, could not refrain from expressing that
such improvements added much to the value of the building.”

Herrera, Ma. Asuncion

METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM V. CA 143 SCRA 623
The right of a possessor in bad faith to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure
luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing does not suffer any injury and the lawful possessor does not
prefer to retain them by paying their value at the time of his possession

BACHRACH V. SEIFERT AND ELIANOFF 87 PHIL. 483

When the cash in the possession of the administratrix corresponding to the 1/2 of the estate adjudicated
to the heirs is sufficient for the monthly allowance being paid to the latter, there is no necessity for the
sale of the 1/2 of the estate corresponding to them, and the lower court may not order said sale especially
when the heirs are opposed to it.

Ignacio, Sharmaine
HEMEDES V. COURT OF APPEALS 316 SCRA 347
USUFRUCT DOES NOT INCLUDE JUS DISPONENDI

Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance. The usufructuary is entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil fruits of the property and may
personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or alienate his right of usufruct, even by a
gratuitous title, but all the contracts he may enter into as such usufructuary shall terminate upon the
expiration of the usufruct.
Clearly, only the jus utendi and jus fruendi over the property is transferred to the usufructuary. The owner
of the property maintains the jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform, and even
destroy the same. This right is embodied in the Civil Code, which provides that (Article 581) the owner of
property the usufruct of which is held by another, may alienate it, although he cannot alter the property's
form or substance, or do anything which may be prejudicial to the usufructuary.

FABIE V. GUITERREZ DAVID 75 PHIL. 536

RIGHT OF USUFRUCTUARY OF RENTS TO OCCUPY PROPERTY

As a corollary to the right of the usufructuary to all the rent, to choose the tenant, and to fix the amount of
the rent, the usufructuary necessarily has the right to choose herself as the tenant thereof, if she wishes
to; and, as long as she fulfills her obligation to pay the taxes and insure and conserve the property
properly, the owner has no litigate cause to complain.

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Lee, Il Nam
VDA. DE ARANAS V. ARANAS 150 SCRA 415
Upon effectivity of PD 27, the lease payments made on and after 21 October 1972 by the private
respondent tenants-farmers constituted amortization payments on the cost of the land that they were
required to pay under Presidential Decree No. 27, which legally pertain to landowners, as part of the
compensation for the dominion over land of which they were deprived by operation of Presidential Decree
No. 27.

We believe that the usufruct was effectively extinguished by Presidential Decree No. 27. To hold that her
usufruct was not extinguished but rather remained impressed upon the land passing on to the new
owners, would obviously defeat the very purpose of the land reform statute. To hold respondent entitled
to continue enjoying, as usufructuary, the natural or civil fruits of Lot No. 2-C-A-3, would be to set at
naught the major purpose projected by Presidential Decree No. 27 and maintained by Executive Order
No. 228.

But we must apply, Art. 609.

Rights as usufructuary persist under the instrument which gave birth to such rights, would be entitled to a
replacement reasonably equivalent to the land previously burdened with her usufructuary right, or to
LEGAL INTEREST on the amount of the indemnity or cost of the land paid by private respondent tenants-
farmers and the Land Bank. While the option or choice belongs to petitioners, considering that the
usufractuary had already received part of the purchase price of the land previously owned by petitioners
from private respondent tenants-farmers, and in the interest of expeditious justice, we consider it the
second alternative that should be given effect.

LOCSIN V. VALENZUELA 173 SCRA 454

A usufructuary has the right to enjoy the property of his deceased uncle with all the benefits which result
from the normal enjoyment (or exploitation) of another's property, with the obligation to return, at the
designated time, either the same thing, or in special cases its equivalent. This right to enjoy the fruits of
the properties is temporary and therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or his
refusal. Likewise his designation as administrator of these properties is limited by his refusal and/or death
and therefore it does not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners.

Art. 870. The dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty
years are void.

After death or refusal to act as administrator by the usufractuary the property can be properly disposed of,
subject to the limitations provided in Art. 863 of the Civil Code concerning a fideicommissary substitution,
said Article says: A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir instituted is
entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the
inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one
degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further, that the fiduciary or first heir and the
second heir are living at the time of the death of the testator.

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Libunao, Monica Vida Richel
VALISNO V. ADRIANO 161 SCRA 398
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a
parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land
cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person.

RONQUILLO, ET AL. V. ROCO, ET AL. 103 PHIL. 84

An easement of right of way though it may be apparent is, nevertheless, discontinuous or intermittent and,
therefore, cannot be acquired through prescription, but only by virtue of a title. Under old as well as the
New Civil Code, easements may be continuous discontinuous (intermittent), apparent or non-apparent,
discontinuous being those used at more or less long intervals and which depend upon acts of man
(Articles 532 and 615 of the Old and New Civil Codes, respectively). Continuous and apparent easements
are acquired either, by title or prescription, continuous non-apparent easements and discentinuous ones
whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title (Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622
of the Old and New Civil Codes, respectively).

Under the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, particularly the articles thereof aforecited, it would
therefore appear that the easement of right of way may not be acquired through prescription. Even Article
1959 of the Old Civil Code providing for prescription of ownership and other real rights in real property,
excludes therefrom the exception established by Article 539, referring to discontinuous easements, such
as, easement of right of way.

Llano, Kristine Joy

TANEDO V. BERNAD 165 SCRA 86
Article 631 of the Civil Code enumerates the grounds for the extinguishment of an easement. the
alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the grounds for the
extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by operation of law.
Art. 624. Provides, “The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or
maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in
order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two
estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign
aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of
the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.” That when there is no statement
abolishing or extinguishing the easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to
Eduardo Tañedo. Nor did Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the
occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is
continued by operation of law.

COSTABELLA CORPORATION V. COURT OF APPEALS 193 SCRA 333

An easement of right of way, which is discontinuous and as such may not be acquired by prescription.
Under Articles 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a
compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the
(dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and
(4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. Additionally, the burden of
proving the existence of the foregoing pre-requisites lies on the owner of the dominant estate. Servitudes
of right of way are an ancient concept, which date back to the iter, actus, and via of the Romans. They
are demanded by necessity, that is, to enable owners of isolated estates to make full use of their

88
properties, which lack of access to public roads has denied them. Under Article 649 of the Civil Code,
they are compulsory and hence, legally demandable, subject to indemnity and the concurrence of the
other conditions. The isolation of the dominant estate is also dependent on the particular need of the
dominant owner, and the estate itself need not be totally landlocked. What is important to consider is
whether or not a right of way is necessary to fill a reasonable need therefor by the owner. Thus, as
Manresa had pointed out, if the passageway consists of an "inaccessible slope or precipice," it is as if
there is no passageway, that is, one that can sufficiently fulfill the dominant owner's necessities, although
by the existence of that passageway the property can not be truly said that the property is isolated. So
also, while an existing right of way may have proved adequate at the start, the dominant owner's need
may have changed since then, for which Article 651 of the Code allows adjustments as to width. But while
a right of way is legally demandable, the owner of the dominant estate is not at liberty to impose one
based on arbitrary choice. Under Article 650 of the Code, it shall be established upon two criteria: (1) at
the point least prejudicial to the servient state; and (2) where the distance to a public highway may be the
shortest.

Lopez, Dana Beatrice

ENCARNACION V. COURT OF APPEALS 195 SCRA 74
Encarnacion has sufficiently established his claim. Generally, a right of way may be demanded: (1) when
there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and (2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or
dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient. In the case at bar, although there is a dried river bed, t it
traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no egress or ingress from the highway. For the jeep to
reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump 4-5 meters up. And during rainy season, it is
impassable due to the floods. When a private property has no access to a public road, it has the right of
easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. With the non-availability of the dried river bed
as an alternative route, the servient estates should accommodate the needs of the dominant estate. Art.
651 provides that “the width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs
of the dominant estate …” To grant the additional easement of right of way of 1 ½ meters, Encarnacion
must indemnify Sagun and Masigno the value of the land occupied plus amount of the damages caused
until his offer to buy the land is considered.

CASE V. HEIRS OF TUASON 14 PHIL. 521

Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of party walls is presumed, unless there is a title or
exterior sign, or proof to the contrary, among others, in dividing walls adjoining buildings up to the
common point of elevation.

The legal presumption as to party walls is limited to the three cases dealt with in the said article of the
code, and is that of juris tantum unless the contrary appear from the title of ownership of the adjoining
properties, that is to say, that the entire wall in controversy belongs to one of the property owners, or
where there is no exterior sign to destroy such presumption and support a presumption against the party
wall. (Art. 573, Civil Code.)

Lucero, Janelle Winli

CHOCO V. SANTAMARIA 21 PHIL. 132
Article 581 of the Civil Code: The owner of the wall which is not a party-wall, adjoining anothers estate,
may make in it windows or openings to admit light, at the height of the ceiling joists or immediately under
the ceiling, of the dimentions of 30 centimeters square and, in any case, with an iron grate embedded in
the wall and a wire screen.

We said elsewhere that these (the joists) were horizontal timbers that rest upon the tops of the uprights;

89
they form, then, the upper limit of the different stories of a house; and therefore, in referring to the top
story, which can not be said to have joists, article 581 makes use of the phrase or immediately under "los
techos."

This does not mean that the italicized phrase refers solely and exclusively to the top story, since lower
stories also have techos. Each floor necessarily has joists, that is, beams, since, in the last analysis they
are what support and secure the structure of the story immediately above; therefore it is not true that
there may be joists only in the top story, as the appellants claim. On the contrary, carefully considered, it
is precisely the top story that does not need joists, since it does not have to support any other higher
portion of the building. It has only to support the weight of the roof, which undoubtedly much less than
that of a whole story.

The object of the law in authorizing the opening of the windows in question in all the stories of a building,
without any exception, is clear. Their purpose is, as article 581 itself says, to furnish light to the rooms,
and it is evident at a glance that the rooms of the lower stories have as much need for light as those of
the top story. No good reason exists for having one story in better condition than another, whichever it
may be, connection with this provision of law.

Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc. 195 SCRA 748
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part. Although they are
possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere accessories, they can not, however, be alienated
from the tenement, or mortgaged separately. The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an
easement, is inseparable from the main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as
an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient estate,
specifically, his right to use (jus utendi).

Albeit the private respondent did acquire ownership over the property –– including the disputed alley ––
as a result of a conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions
thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be
open to the public. The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals, that
no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent corporation.
According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is
consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both estates.
One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is a personal servitude, that is to
say, one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the
general public.

Macaibay, Jed
FLORO V. LLENDO 244 SCRA 713
To be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, the preconditions provided
under Articles 649 and 650 thereof must be established. These preconditions are:
(1) that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
(2) after payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
(3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and,
(4) that the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest (Art. 650).

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The burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory right of way lies on
the owner of the dominant estate.

QUIMEN V. COURT OF APPEALS 257 SCRA 163

An easement is a real right on anothers property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the
latter must refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property,
for the benefit of another person or tenement. It is jus in re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and perpetual,
unless extinguished by causes provided by law. A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by
covenant or granted by law to a person or class of persons to pass over anothers property when his
tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway.
The owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he
indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property.

The conditions sine qua non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are:
(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public
highway;
(b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity;
(c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and,
(d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate

Manabat, Leandro Mari

DE JESUS, ET AL. V. HOWMART CORP., ET AL. 12 CA REP. 831
Article 684 of the Civil Code mandates that no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to
deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. A fair reading of the
provision reveals that the duty of an adjacent owner not to deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support is an absolute one. It does not depend on the degree of care and
precaution made by the proprietor in making the excavation or building on his land. Plaintiffs’ house
adjoining the seven-storey building constructed by the defendant had sunk by about eight inches. The
sinking of the left side of the house of the plaintiffs was due to the weakening of subjacent support and to
the weight of the seven-storey building constructed by the defendant. As the defendant failed to provide
plaintiff’s land with sufficient lateral and subjacent support, it is held liable for damages.

LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS 278 SCRA 498

A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law for public use or for private interest.
Under Arts. 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may claim a legal or compulsory
right-of-way only after he has established the existence of four (4) requisites, namely: (a) the estate is
surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after payment of
the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (d) the right-of-way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where
the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be shortest. A voluntary easement on the
other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties.

Here, it is very apparent that the parties and their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to
establish an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and
servient estates. This is quite evident when: (a) the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation in
1949 stipulated in par. 3 of their Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the "boundary line between the property
sold and the adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of
which shall be taken from the property herein sold to the VENDEE and the other half from the portion
adjoining belonging to the vendors"; (b) the Tuasons in 1951 expressly agreed and consented to the

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assignment of the land to, and the assumption of all the rights and obligations by ATENEO, including the
obligation to contribute seven and one-half meters of the property sold to form part of the 15-meter wide
roadway; (c) the Tuasons in 1958 filed a complaint against MARYKNOLL and ATENEO for enforcement
of the reciprocal easement on Mangyan Road, and demanded that MARYKNOLL to restore Mangyan
Road to its original width of 15 meters, after MARYKNOLL constructed a wall in the middle of the 15
meter wide roadway; and (d) LA VISTA, in its offer to buy the hillside portion of the ATENEO property in
1976, acknowledged the existence of the contractual right of-way. Taken together, these certainly are
indubitable proofs that the parties concerned had indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way
over Mangyan Road and, like any other contract, the same could be extinguished only by mutual
agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.

Mangotara, Sitty Hannan

ALCANTRA V. RETA, JR. 372 SCRA 364
Petitioners have no right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517. Presidential Decree No.
1517, otherwise known as The Urban Land Reform Act, pertains to areas proclaimed as Urban Land
Reform Zones. Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any right under the said law since the land
involved is not an ULRZ.
To be able to qualify and avail oneself of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, one must
be: (1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on the land
by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. Obviously, those who do not fall
within the said category cannot be considered legitimate

Prosperity Credit Resources, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 301 SCRA 52

There is no question as to the meaning of the terms "ingress" and "egress." They give Prosperity the right
to use the private road as a means of entry into and exit from its property on the northwestern side of the
compound. The question concems the meaning of the phrase "for whatever kind of passage." The trial
court read this phrase to mean that Prosperity had the right to make excavations on the side of the
access road in order to install a network of water pipes. The word "passage" does not, however, "clearly
and unmistakably" convey a meaning that includes a right to install water pipes on the access road.
Hence writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Metropolitan to allow Prosperity to undertake
excavations along the access road for the purpose of installing water pipes should not be allowed.

Marco, Ma. Teresa

VILLANUEVA V. VELASCO 346 SCRA 99
A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest, and becomes
a continuing property right. As a compulsory easement, it is inseparable from the estate to which it
belongs, as provided for in said Article 617 of the Civil Code. The essential requisites for an easement to
be compulsory are:
(1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
(2) proper indemnity has been paid;
(3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate;
(4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and
(5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest.
It is in the nature of legal easement that the servient estate (of petitioner) is legally bound to provide the
dominant estate (of private respondents in this case) ingress from and egress to the public highway.
A decision in a case is conclusive and binding upon the parties to said case and those who are their
successor in interest by title after said case has been commenced or filed in court.

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National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals 440 SCRA 661
Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either by law or by the will of the
owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements." In the present case, the court
find and declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the government. The land was
originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling would be
otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case, just compensation must be paid for
the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way.
The annotation on the transfer certificate of title imposed on Manglapus the duty to refer to the conditions
annotated on the back of the original certificate of title. This, he did not do. The law cannot protect him.
Manglapus is a transferee with notice of the liens annotated in the title.

Mendoza, Manuel Antonio

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. V. BALANDAN 91 PHIL
The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural,
in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the
danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently
presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own
property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, he is not liable.

ACAP V. COURT OF APPEALS 251 SCRA 30

Ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the
juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in
question.
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified into two (2)
classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual
creation) and the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain
contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).
There is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The
first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is, technically
speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of
a known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who
are co-heirs in the succession.
A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not prove ownership. A notice of adverse claim is nothing
but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be established in
court at some future date, and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already
pending in court.

Molaer, Airisa Fe Esperanza

DE LUNA V. ABRIGO 181 SCRA 150
From the viewpoint of motive, purpose or cause, donations may be 1) simple, 2) remuneratory or 3)
onerous. A simple donation is one the cause of which is pure liberality (no strings attached). A
remuneratory donation is one where the donee gives something to reward past or future services or
because of future charges or burdens, when the value of said services, burdens or charges is less than
the value of the donation. An onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future
services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing donated .

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REYES V. MOSQUEDA 187 SCRA 661
In the later case of Bonsato, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. this Court, distinguished the characteristics
of a donation inter vivos and "mortis causa" in this wise: "Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations
inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents
should reveal any or all of the following characteristics: (1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee
before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain
the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive; (2) That before his death, the transfer
should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer
should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. Applying the above principles to the instant
petitions, there is no doubt that the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos.

Obias, Jacques Michele

LIGUEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS 102 PHIL. 577
Under Article 1274, of the Civil Code of1889, liberality of the donor is deemed causa only in those
contracts that are of "pure" beneficience that is to say, contracts designed solely and exclusively to
procure the welfare of the beneficiary, without any intent of producing any satisfaction for the donor;
contacts, in other words, in which the idea of self-interest is totally absent on the part of the transferor. For
this very reason, the same Article 1274 provides that in remuneratorycontracts, the consideration is the
service or benefit for which the remuneration is given; causa is not liberality in these cases because the
contract or conveyance is not made out of pure beneficience, but "solvendi animo”.
The motive of the parties may be regarded as causa when it predetermines the purpose ofthe contract.
The right of the husband to donate community property is strictly limited by law (Article 1409, 1413, 1415,
Civil Code of 1889; Baello vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 213). However, the donation made in contravention
ofthe law is not void in its entirely, but only in so far as it prejudices the interest of the wife. The rule
applies whether the donation is gratuitous or for a consideration.
The forced heirs are entitled to have the donation set aside in so far as inofficious; i.e., in excess of the
portion of free disposal (Civil Code of 1889, Arts. 636, 654), computed as provided in Article 818 and 819,
and bearing in mind that "collationable gifts" under Article 818 should include gifts made not only in favor
of the forced heirs, but even those made in favor of strangers. (Decision of the Supreme Court Spain,
May 4, 1889 and June 16, 1902.)
The rule that the parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty, will not be aided by the law but will both be
left where it finds them, has been interpreted by this Court as barring the party from pleading the illegality
of the bargain either as a cause of action or as a defense.
Improvements made in good faith are governed by the rules of accession and possession in good faith.

PERSHING TAN QUETO V. COURT OF APPEALS 148 SCRA 54

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found as a fact that the lot in question is the paraphernal
property of Restituta T. Guangco. How the Court of Appeals reached this conclusion is well explained in
its decision. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts; it cannot be reviewed by
this Court.
The factual conclusion that Tan Queto is a builder in bad faith is well-taken. He knew that he acquired no
title to lot in question because of the barter and when he built on it he did so in bad faith. As a builder in
bad faith he has no right to be refunded the value of the building pursuant to Article 449 of the Civil Code.

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Ofalsa, Rebecca
PIJARILLO V. INTERMIDIATE APPELLATE COURT 176 SCRA 340
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly
communicated to the donor. In the case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of the
acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that the donated land be not registered during
her lifetime by Salud. Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience declare the donation
ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee's acceptance. That
would be placing too much stress on mere form over substance. It would also disregard the clear reality
of the acceptance of the donation as manifested in the separate instrument and as later acknowledged by
Juana.

CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS 140 SCRA 245

In an action for revocation of donation, the donor has the burden to show that the donation has impaired
the legitime of the subsequent child. The donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation
within four years from the date of adoption, if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking into
account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. Of course, the burden of
proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the requirements prescribed by law, on the
basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation can be adjudged. Unfortunately, in the case at bar,
the complaint for annulment does not allege that the subject donation impairs the legitime of the adopted
child. Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime.

Padilla, Aileen Joy

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA V. COURT OF APPEALS 198 SCRA 300
When the deed of donation expressly provides for automatic reversion of the property donated in case of
violation of the condition, a judicial declaration revoking the same is no longer necessary. When a deed of
donation, as in this case, expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property
donated, the rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of
the Civil Code.
The prohibition in the deed of donation against the alienation of the property for 100 years, being an
unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an
illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code.

EDUARTE V. COURT OF APPEALS 253 SCRA 391

The falsification of signature constitutes an act of ingratitude which is a valid ground for revocation of the
donation. In commentaries of Tolentino, it is said that “all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude
and are causes of revocation.”

Patawaran, Pocholo Rae

QUILALA V. ALACNTARA 371 SCRA 311
The donation is valid even if the acknowledgment was only signed by the donor. The requirement that the
contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not
absolute. The specification of the location of the signatures is merely directory. The intendment of the law
merely is to ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties and to
avoid falsification after execution of the document. The lack of acknowledgement by the donee before the
notary public does not also render the donation null and void.
It is the conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act.
The signature of the donee on the second page of the instrument which is explicitly set forth on the first
page of the notarized deed of donation is sufficient to convey the property.

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HEMEDES V. COURT OF APPEALS 316 SCRA 347
The declarations of real property by a party, his payment of realty taxes, and him being designated as
owner of the subject property in a cadastral survey and in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
Office cannot defeat a certificate of title, which is absolute and indefensible evidence of ownership of the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. Particularly, with regard to tax declarations
and tax receipts, the Supreme Court held on several occasions that the same do not by themselves
conclusively prove title to the land.

PELAYO, MICHAEL LAWRENCE

Siguan v. Lim 318 SCRA 725
There is a presumption of fraud to creditors when the donor did not leave adequate properties to pay his
debt prior to the donation. In such cases, the action to rescind contracts in fraud of creditors is known as
accion pauliana. For this action to prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) the plaintiff asking
for rescission has a credit prior to the alienation, although demandable later; (2) the debtor has made a
subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a third person; (3) the creditor has no other legal
remedy to satisfy his claim; (4) the act being impugned is fraudulent; (5) the third person who received the
property conveyed, if it is by onerous title, has been an accomplice in the fraud.

NOCEDA V. COURT OF APPEALS 316 SCRA 504

An act of also occupying the portion of land of the donor without the latter’s consent and knowledge is an
act of usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and is considered as an act of
ingratitude of a donee against the donor (Art 756 par1).

Moreover, Art 769 states that the action granted to the donor by reasons of ingratitude prescribes within
one year, to be counted form the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to
bring the action.

Perlas, J’xel
HEIRS OF CESARIO VELASQUEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS 325 SCRA 552
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over the property from
the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of
the property donated. The donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons provided in Articles
760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code. The deed of donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-
performance of the marriage and the other causes mentioned in article 86 of the Family Code. The
alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e., that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all
their properties since Anatalia (Leoncia's sister) had several children to support is not one of the grounds
for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious.

GONZALES V. COURT OF APPEALS 358 SCRA 393

Article 749 of the Civil Code provides that "in order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it
must be made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges
which the donee must satisfy." Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that "the titles of
ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the
Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons." From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred
that as between the parties to a donation of an immovable property, all that is required is for said donation
to be contained in a public document. Registration is not necessary for it to be considered valid and
effective

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Polca, Lovejoy
IMPERIAL V. COURT OF APPEALS 316 SCRA 393
Since the action is one for reduction of an inofficious donation the 30 year prescriptive period is
inapplicable. A claim for legitime does not amount to a claim of title. Since the donation in the case at bar,
the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime, is not controlled by a
particular prescriptive period the ordinary rules of prescription apply. Under A.1144, NCC, actions upon
an obligation created by law must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action
accrues. Thus, the 10 year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations
required under A. 771, NCC, to the extent that they impair the compulsory heirs’ legitime. The 10 year
period accrues upon the donor-decedent’s death. It took private respondents 24 years since Leoncio’s
death to initiate the case. The action thus, has long prescribed. Further, the private respondents are also
guilty of estoppel by laches.

REPUBLIC V. SILIM 356 SCRA 1

The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is
duly communicated to the donor. The actual knowledge by the donor of the construction and existence of
the school building pursuant to the condition of the donation fulfills the legal requirement that the
acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.

Prieto, Valentin Eduardo

GESTOPA V. COURT OF APPEALS 342 SCRA 105
A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of officiousness, failure by the
donee to comply with the charges imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. Acceptance is a mark that the
donation is inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted
by the donee during the donor’s lifetime.

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE: PROPERTY

REYES, Ma. Celina Noreen D.

VICTORIA VS. PIDLAOAN GR NO. 196470
Mere construction of a house on another's land does not create a co-ownership. Article 484 of the Civil
Code provides that co-ownership exists when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons. Verily, a house and a lot are separately identifiable properties and can pertain to
different owners.

Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that if a person builds on another's land in good faith, the land
owner may either: (a) appropriate the works as his own after paying indemnity; or (b) oblige the builder to
pay the price of the land. The law does not force the parties into a co-ownership. A builder is in good faith
if he builds on a land believing himself to be its owner and is unaware of the defect in his title or mode of
acquisition.

SAPITULA, Ralph Errold

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION VS. CASIBANG GR NO. 192268
Laches, in a general sense, is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

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There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot work to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice.

Elements: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant's conduct and
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred.

TALORONG, Hayde
ALOLINO VS. FLORES APRIL 4, 2016
EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW - An easement of light and view can only be acquired through
prescription or by virtue of a voluntary title.

EASEMENT AGAINST NUISANCE - Every building is subject to the easement which prohibits the
proprietor or possessor from committing nuisance. A barrio road is designated for the use of the general
public who are entitled to free and unobstructed passage thereon. Permanent obstructions on these
roads, such as the respondents' illegally constructed house, are injurious to public welfare and
convenience. The occupation and use of private individuals of public places devoted to public use
constitute public and private nuisances and nuisance per se. This is so because the interests of the few
do not outweigh the greater interest of public health, public safety, good order, and general welfare.

UBANA. Ysabel B.
QUESADA VS BONANZA RESTAURANT GR NO. 207500
Construction of concrete structures on the property without the registered owner's permission does not
forestall the sale of the property

There is no logical connection between the construction of concrete structures on the property by the
lessee and the registered owner's inability to sell it. The argument is a non sequitur. In this case, the
lease contract itself specifically recognized the lessee's right to construct on the property and the
registered owner's approval is only relevant with respect to the lessee's right to the turnover of materials
used upon the sale of the property. Other than that, the contract does not oblige the lessee to secure the
owner's consent prior to constructing improvements. Article 1657 of the Civil Code enumerates the
statutory obligations of a lessee among which is to use the thing leased as a diligent father of a family,
devoting it to the use stipulated; and in the absence of stipulation, to that which may be inferred from the
nature of the thing leased, according to the custom of the place. The registered owner failed to show how
any of the lessee's constructions go against the permissible use of the property based on its nature.

Asummary proceeding for unlawful detainer contemplates a situation where the defendant-lessee’s
possession, while initially lawful, had legally expired

Under the Article 1673 of the Civil Code, a lessor may judicially eject the lessee for any of the following
causes: x x x (4) When the lessee devotes the thing leased to any use or service not stipulated which
causes the deterioration thereof; or if he does not observe the requirement in No. 2 of article 1657, as

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regards the use thereof. x x x In this case, the registered owner failed to show that the lessee had
dedicated the property to a use that is contrary to its commercial nature and that caused its deterioration.
On the contrary, the lessee maintained the property and made improvements on it.

VALENCIANO, Aylwyn Maria S.

DACLISON VS. BAYTION GR NO. 219811
(1) ACCRETION - Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human intervention.
General rule is that the deposits must not be artificial and man-made.

NCC, Art. 457. The following requisites must concur in order for an accretion to be considered, namely:
(1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and,
(3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of

In this case, respondent failed to prove the attendance of the 2nd element. The contested filled-up portion
between the riprap constructed by the government and the property owned by respondent Baytion is not
an accretion that would form part of the latter’s property.

(2) NCC, Art. 445 uses the adverb "thereon" which is simply defined as "on the thing that has been
mentioned.” This means that the supposed improvement must be made, constructed or introduced within
or on the property and not outside so as to qualify as an improvement contemplated 'by law.

The Court further ruled that the disputed property cannot also be considered an improvement or
accession.

YCONG, Cherrey Joy

SPS. ESPINOZA VS. SPS. MAYANDOC GR NO. 211170
In proving bad faith.— The settled rule is bad faith should be established by clear and convincing
evidence since the law always presumes good faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong. It
means breach of a known duty through some motive, interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
For anyone who claims that someone is in bad faith, the former has the duty to prove such.

YRAOLA, Marison Mayumi

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY VS. MANILA SEEDLING BANK FOUNDATION GR NO. 183543
A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and
substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. Since respondent had no right to
act beyond the confines of the seven-hectare area granted to it, and since it was fully aware of this fact,
its encroachment of nine additional hectares of petitioner's property rendered it a possessor in bad faith
as to the excess. While respondent may have been allowed by then Minister of Natural Resources
Ernesto Maceda to lease the excess to various establishments, such authority did not come from
petitioner, who is the owner. As provided in the law, respondent shall be made to account for the fruits it
received from the time it took possession until the time it surrendered the excess to petitioner.
Respondent has admitted that it leased out the excess to various establishments and earned profits
therefrom. Having done so, it is bound to pay the corresponding amounts to petitioner.
JULARBAL, Elaine Joyce G.
NORMA V. JAVATE V. SPOUSES RENATO J. TIOTUICO AND LERMA C. TIOTUICO, G.R. NO.
187606, MARCH 09, 2015

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It is but logical that Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court be applied to cases involving extrajudicially
foreclosed properties that were bought by a purchaser and later sold to third-party-purchasers after the
lapse of the redemption period. The remedy of a writ of possession, a remedy that is available to the
mortgagee-purchaser to acquire possession of the foreclosed property from the mortgagor, is made
available to a subsequent purchaser, but only after hearing and after determining that the subject property
is still in the possession of the mortgagor. Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgagee or a third party during
the redemption period, a writ of possession may issue ex-parte or without hearing. In other words, if the
purchaser is a third party who acquired the property after the redemption period, a hearing must be
conducted to determine whether possession over the subject property is still with the mortgagor or is
already in the possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor or
mortgagor. If the property is in the possession of the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus be issued.
Otherwise, the remedy of a writ of possession is no longer available to such purchaser, but he can wrest
possession over the property through an ordinary action of ejectment.

To be sure, immediately requiring the subsequent purchaser to file a separate case of ejectment instead
of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, albeit not ex-parte, will only prolong the proceedings
and unduly deny the subsequent purchaser of possession of the property which he already bought.

LINGAHAN, Zephora Jane A.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CECILIA GRACE L. ROASA, G.R. NO. 176022, FEBRUARY 2,
2015
Therefore, what is important in computing the period of possession is that the land has already been
declared alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration. Upon satisfaction of this
requirement, the computation of the period may include the period of adverse possession prior to the
declaration that land is alienable and disposable.

Although adverse, open,continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion
of law to be determined by courts, it has more to do with a person’s belief in good faith that he or she has
just title to the property that he or she is occupying. It is unrelated to the declaration that land is alienable
or disposable. A possessor or occupant of property may, therefore, be a possessor in the concept of an
owner prior to the determination that the property is alienable and disposable agricultural land.

MANALAC, Ma. Francesca

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. APOLONIO BAUTISTA, JR., G.R. NO. 166890. JUNE 28, 2016
The requisite period of possession of the property should conform to that provided for in Section 48 (b) of
thePublic Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which has limited the right to apply for
judicial confirmation to citizens of the Philippines "who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure.

MARIANO, Ivy Carisse M.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. FEDERICO DACLAN ET AL, G.R. NO. 197115, MARCH 23, 2015
Devolution cannot have any effect on the donations made by the Daclans to the Republic. As defined,
"devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the
various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities." It includes "the transfer
to local government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies
and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities." While the breeding

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station may have been transferred to the Province of La Union by the Department of Agriculture as a
consequence of devolution, it remained as such, and continued to function as a breeding station; and the
purpose for which the donations were made remained and was carried out. Besides, the deeds of
donation did not specifically prohibit the subsequent transfer of the donated lands by the donee Republic.
The Daclans should bear in mind that "contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law." Thus, as a general rule, rights and obligations derived
from contract are transmissible.

MELCHOR, Robert Jian A.

HERMINIO DE GUZMAN, ET AL VS. TABANGAO REALTY DEV’T. INC. GR NO.154262, FEB. 11,
2015
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur as provided for
collectively in Arts. 476, 477 and 478 of the New Civil Code: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or
equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance,
or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

Petitioners’ Complaint in Civil Case No. TM-1118 failed to allege these two requisites for an action to
quiet title, and hence was not given recourse by the court.

MOYA, Maeryl Laiza B.

CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. V PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORP., G.R.
NO. 160728, MARCH 11, 2015
In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, two requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the
deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Thus, the cloud
on title consists of: (1) any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently
valid or effective; (3) but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable; and (4) may
be prejudicial to the title sought to be quieted.

NADAL, Leandro Agustine P.

REYES VS. SPS. VALENTIN & RAMOS, G.R. NO. 194488, FEBRUARY 11, 2015
Petitioner points out that Respondents’ property was previously owned by her mother. She alleged that
her uncle, who was her mother’s caretaker of the property, fraudulently caused the titling of the whole
1,500-square-meter property instead of just the 500-square-meter portion under his name. These
allegations are relevant only if we are determining the issue of the property’s ownership. However, this is
not an issue in this case. Petitioner does not question the ownership or the registration of respondents’
title over the property. We are limited to the issue of petitioner’s easement rights. On that matter,
petitioner’s act of filing a Complaint for easement of right of way is an acknowledgement that the property
is owned by respondents. It is tantamount to a waiver of whatever right or claim of ownership petitioner
had over the property.

ORTEGA, Regine Marie N.

SPS. MERCADER VS. SPS. BARDILAS, G.R. NO. 163157, JUNE 27, 2016
It is settled that road right of way is a discontinuous apparent easement in the context of Article 622 of the
Civil Code, which provides that continuous non-apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether
apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of title. But the phrase “with existing Right of Way” in the

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TCT is not one of the modes of acquisition of the easement by virtue of a title. Acquisition by virtue of title,
as use in Art. 622 of the Civil Code, refers to “the juridical act which gives birth to the easement, such as
law, donation, contract, and will of the testator.”

It is noteworthy that an encumbrance “subject to 3 meters wide right of way” was annotated on TCT No.
107915, which covers Lot No. 5808-F-2-B of the Spouses Bardilas. As the owners of the servient estate,
the Spouses Bardilas retained ownership of the road right of way even assuming that said encumbrance
was for the benefit of Lot No. 5808-F-2-A of the Spouses Mercader. The latter could not claim to own
even a portion of the road right of way because Article 630 of the Civil Code expressly provides that “the
owner of the servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and
may use the same in such manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement.”

PAÑO, Maria Regina Victoria L.

CRUZ V. PANDACAN HIKER'S CLUB, INC., G.R. NO. 188213, JANUARY 11, 2016
Prevailing jurisprudence holds that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may not be summarily
abated. There is a nuisance when there is "any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) annoys or
offends the senses; or (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) obstructs or interferes
with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the
use of property." But other than the statutory definition, jurisprudence recognizes that the term "nuisance"
is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of
the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort. A nuisance is
classified in two ways: (1) according to the object it affects; or (2) according to its susceptibility to
summary abatement. As for a nuisance classified according to the object or objects that it affects, a
nuisance may either be: (a) a public nuisance, i.e., one which "affects a community or neighborhood or
any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon
individuals may be unequal"; or (b) a private nuisance, or one "that is not included in the foregoing
definition" which, in jurisprudence, is one which "violates only private rights and produces damages to but
one or a few persons."
A nuisance may also be classified as to whether it is susceptible to a legal summary abatement, in which
case, it may either be: (a) a nuisance per se, when it affects the immediate safety of persons and property,
which may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity; or, (b) a nuisance per accidens,
which "depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence being a question of fact, it
cannot be abated without due hearing thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing
does in law constitute a nuisance;" it may only be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose and
may not be summarily abated without judicial intervention.

RAMIREZ, Ma. Bernadette

GINA ENDAYA V. ERNESTO V. VILLAOS, G.R NO. 202426, JANUARY 26, 2016
The registered owner of the property is preferred over the transferee under an unregistered deed of sale.

Under Article 777 of the Civil Code, "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent."

If there are strong reasons of equity, such as when the execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer
case would result in the demolition of the premises such that the result of enforcement would be
permanent, unjust and probably irreparable, then the unlawful detainer case should at least be
suspended, if not abated or dismissed, in order to await final judgment in the more substantive case
involving legal possession or ownership.

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 2014 Cases: Property

MARTINEZ, MARA

The Heirs of Victorino Sarili, namely, Isabel A. Sarili, et al. v. Pedro F. Lagrosa, represented in this act by
his Attorney-in-Fact, Lourdes Labios Mojica, G.R. No. 193517, January 15, 2014.
Magdalena T. Villasi v. Filomena Garcia, substituted by his heirs, namely, Ermelinda H. Garcia, et
al., G.R. No. 190106, January 15, 2014.
Sps. Bernadette and Rodulfo Vilbar v. Angelito L. Opinion, G.R. No. 176043, January 15, 2014.
Teodoro S. Teodoro, et al. v. Danilo Espino, et al., G.R. No. 189248, February 5, 2014.
Republic of the Philippines v. Emmanuel C. Cortez, G.R. No. 186639, February 5, 2014.
Republic of the Philippines v. Remman Enterprises, Inc. represented by Ronnie P. Inocencio, G.R. No.
199310, February 19, 2014.
Heirs of Pacifico Pocido, et al. v. Arsenia Avila and Emelinda Chua, G.R. No. 199146, March 19, 2014.
Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita Dela Cruz v. Genaro Nolasco and Jeremy Spencer Nolasco, G.R. No.
189420, March 26, 2014.
Carmencita Suarez v. Mr. and Mrs. Felix E. Emboy, Jr. and Marilou P. Emboy-Delantar, G.R. No. 187944,
March 12, 2014.
Sps. Antonio Fortuna and Erlinda Fortuna v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173423, March 5, 2014.
Republic of the Philippines represented by Aklan National Colleges of Fisheries (ANCF) and Dr. Elenita R.
Adrade, in her capacity as ANCF Superintendent v. Heirs of Maxima Lachica Sin, namely: Salvacion L.
Sin, Rosario S. Enriquez, Francisco L. Sin, Maria S. Yuchintat, Manuel L. Sin, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Ramon
L. Sin, and Ceferina S. Vita, G.R. No. 157485, March 26, 2014.
Raul Saberon, Joan F. Saberon and Jacqueline Saberon v. Oscar Ventanilla, Jr., and Carmen Gloria D.
Ventanilla, G.R. No. 192669, April 21, 2014.
Department of Education, represented by its Regional Director Teresita Domalanta v. Mariano Tuliao,
G.R. No. 205664, June 09, 2014.
Bonifacio Piedad, represented by Maria Inspiracion Piedad-Danao v. Spouses Victorio Gurieza and
Emeteria M. Gurieza, G.R. No. 207525, June 10, 2014.
Paul P. Gabriel, Jr., Ireneo C. Calwag, Thomas L Tingga-an, and the Heirs of Juliet B. Pulkera v.
Carmeling Crisologo, G.R. No. 204626, June 09, 2014.
Vilma Quintos, represented by her attorney-in-fact Fidel I. Quintos, Jr.; Florencia I. Dancel, represented
by her attorney-in-fact Flovy I. Dancel; and Catalino L. Ibarra v. Pelagia I. Nicolas, Noli L. Ibarra, Santiago
L. Ibarra, Pedro L. Ibarra, David L. Ibarra, Gilberto L. Ibarra, Heirs of Augusto L. Ibarra, namely Conchita
R. Ibarra, Apolonio Ibarra, and Narciso Ibarra, and the Spouses Recto Candelario and Rosemarie
Candelario, G.R. No. 210252, June 25, 2014.
Linda Rana v. Teresita Lee Wong, Sps. Shirley Lee Ong and Ruben Ang Ong, represented by their
attorney-in-fact Wilson Uy, and Sps. Rosario and Wilson Uy, G.R. No. 192861, June 30, 2014; Sps.
Rosario and Wilson Uy, Wilson Uy as attorney-in-fact of Teresita Lee Wong, and Sps. Shirley Lee Ong
and Ruben Ang Ong v. Sps. Reynaldo and Linda Rana, G.R. No. 192862.
Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casinos, Inc. v. Bernard C. Fernandez, G.R. No. 193426, September 29,
2014.
Heirs of Telesforo Julao, namely Anita Vda. de Enriquez, Sonia J. Tolentino and Roderick Julao v.
Spouses Alejandro and Morenita de Jesus, G.R. No. 176020, September 29, 2014.
Crisostomo B. Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, et al., G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014.
Esperanza C. Carinan v. Spouses Gavino Cueto and Carmelita Cueto, G.R. No. 198636, October 08,
2014.

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Automobile Realty and Development Corporation, et al. v. Spouses Marciano Dela Cruz, Sr. and Ofelia
Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 192026, October 01, 2014.
Fe U. Quijano v. Atty. Daryll A. Amante, G.R. No. 164277, October 08, 2014.
Extraordinary Development Corporation v. Herminia F. Samson-Bico and Ely B. Flestado, G.R. No.
191090, October 13, 2014.

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 WILLS AND SUCCESSION

Prieto, Valentin Eduardo

ALVAREZ VS. IAC, GR NO. 68053, MAY 7, 1990
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision of our
Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the
residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from
the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact
diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive. Under our law,
therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors.

Pugao, Johnlery
GEVERO VS. IAC, GR NO. 77029, AUGUST 30, 1990
The hereditary share in a decedent' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the
death of the causante or predecessor in interest, and there is no legal bar to a successor disposing of his
hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determined
until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.

It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in the date of extrajudicial partition, when the heir received
his share in the lot as inheritance from the testator.

LOCSIN VS. CA, GR NO. GR NO. 89783, FEBRUARY 19, 1992

The properties which the testator had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no
longer form part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim.

Punzalan, Chezca-ann Margret

OPULENCIA VS. CA, GR NO. 125835, JULY 30, 1998
We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent’s
death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus,
the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the
substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.

EMNACE VS. CA, GR NO. 126334, NOVEMBER 23, 2001

Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent�
As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any
action originally pertaining to the decedent. From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to
demand fulfillment of petitioner's obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were transmitted to
respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court's intervention to compel
petitioner to fulfill his obligations.

Quiapon, Jennifer
TAÑEDO VS. CA, GR NO. 104482, JANUARY 22, 1996
Pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, "no contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance
except in cases expressly authorized by law." Consequently, said contract made in 1962 conveying one
hectare of his future inheritance is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any
obligation between the parties. Hence, the "affidavit of conformity" dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it

105
sought to validate or ratify the 1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court,
"suffers from the same infirmity." Even private respondents in their memorandum concede this.

PEOPLE VS. UMALI, G.R. NO 84450, FEBRUARY 4, 1991

The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article 821 of the
Civil Code which states that persons "convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony"
are disqualified from being witnesses to a will."

Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify
him as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact that said
witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.

The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that he was
actuated by improper motive. Hence, in the absence of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was
actuated by improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full credence.

Razon, Renier Aries

YAP TUA VS. YAP CA KUAN, GR NO. 6845, SEPTEMBER 1, 1914
The one who makes a will may sign the same by the use of a mark, the name having been written by
others. If the writing of a mark simply upon a will is sufficient indication of the intention of the person to
make and execute it, then certainly the writing of a portion or all of the name ought to be accepted as a
clear indication of intention to execute it. The man who cannot write and who is obliged to make his mark
simply therefore upon the will, is held to "sign" as effectually as if he had written his initials or his full name.
It would seem to be sufficient, under the law requiring a signature by the person making a will to make his
mark, to place his initials or all or any part of his name thereon. While the rule is absolute that one who
makes a will must sign the same in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses must sign in the
presence of each other, as well as in the presence of the one making the will, yet, nevertheless, the
actual seeing of the signature made is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are made where it is
possible for each of the necessary parties, if they so desire, to see the signatures placed upon the will.

NAYVE VS. MOJAL, GR NO. 21755, DECEMBER 29, 1924

Where each and every page upon which the will is written was signed by the testator and the witnesses,
the fact that the signatures on each page do not all appear on the left margin thereof does not detract
from the validity of the will.
Paging with arabic numerals and not with letters is within the spirit of the law, and is just as valid as
paging with letters. The number of sheets or pages of which the will is composed must be stated in the
attestation clause but where such a fact appears at the end of the will so that no proof aliunde is
necessary of the number of its sheets, then the failure to state in the attestation clause the number of the
pages of the instrument does not invalidate it. The attestation clause must state the fact that the testator
and the witness reciprocally saw the signing of the will, for such an act cannot be proved by the mere
exhibition of the will, if it is not stated therein. But the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each
and every page of the will can be proved also by the mere examination of the signatures appearing on the
document itself, and the omission to state such evident fact does not invalidate the will.

Ret, Kierk Robin

JABONETE VS. GUSTILO, 5 PHIL 541
The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act of
affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining witnesses which
shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the signature

106
was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back was
turned while a portion of the name of the witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the
other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were
together in the same room for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the
document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he
could see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without any
physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact
signed before he finally left the room.

In the matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.), 328) it was held that it is sufficient if the witnesses are together
for the purpose of witnessing the execution of the will, and in a position to actually see the testator write, if
they choose to do so; and there are many cases which lay down the rule that the true test of vision is not
whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him sign, considering
his mental and physical condition and position at the time of the subscription. (Spoonemore vs. Cables,
66 Mo., 579.)

NERA VS. RIMANDO, 18 PHIL 450

True Test on the presence of Subscribing Witness: “The true test of presence of the testator and the
witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they
might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical
condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature.”

But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of
the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do
so. This, of course, does not mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have
executed the instrument in the presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been able to
see each other sign at that moment, without changing their relative positions or existing conditions. The
evidence in the case relied upon by the trial judge discloses that "at the moment when the witness
Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation
to Jaboneta that he could see everything that took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction
and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so." And the decision merely laid down the
doctrine that the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the
instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were
actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment
existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes
in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine further would open
the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose
for which this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the execution of a
will.

Retardo, Arlyn
ICASIANO VS. ICASIANO
The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the
simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of
probate. Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two
other witnesses did sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of
the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law
should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence
of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee

107
the identity of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate
deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.|||
(In re: Icasiano v. Icasiano, G.R. No. L-18979, [June 30, 1964], 120 PHIL 420-429)

That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown
by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures
in every page. The text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public
likewise evidence that no one was aware of the defect at the time.

This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory
requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the
law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses,
but not in the left margin, could nevertheless be probated

TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA VS. ABAJA, GR NO. 147145, JANUARY 31, 2005
The first sentence of the attestation clause reads: "Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada
como su ultima voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien el testador firmado en
nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo." The English
translation is: "Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his last will and testament in our
presence, the testator having also signed it in our presence on the left margin of each and every one of
the pages of the same." The attestation clause clearly states that Abada signed the will and its every
page in the presence of the witnesses.

However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the attestation clause does not indicate the number of
witnesses. On this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the rule on substantial
compliance in determining the number of witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the
number of witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses signed it.

An attestation clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts
attending the execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses,
or other casualty, they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.) A will, therefore,
should not be rejected where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. . . .

We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of Abada's will. Abada's will clearly shows four
signatures: that of Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three
witnesses to the will. The question on the number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the
will itself and without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court explained the extent and
limits of the rule on liberal construction, thus:

[T]he so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious
consequences. The later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the dividing line with
precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing
details that should appear in the will itself. They only permit a probe into the will, an exploration within its
confines, to ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence of the requisite formalities of
law. This clear, sharp limitation eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.

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Rillo, Paul Michael
AZAOLA VS. SINGSON, L-14003, AUGUST 5, 1960
Even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be
interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the
testator, under penalty of the having the probate denied. No witness need be present in the execution of
the holographic will.And the rule requiring the production of three witnesses is merely permissive. What
the law deems essential is that the court is convinced of the authenticity of the will. Its duty is to exhaust
all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested in the proponent that the true intention of
the testator be carried into effect. And because the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts are
still needed, no unfavorable inference can be drawn from a partys failure to offer expert evidence, until
and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.

CODOY VS. CALUGAY, GR NO. 123486, AUGUST 12, 1999

We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The word
shall connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that shall in a statute commonly denotes an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word shall,
when used in a statute is mandatory.

Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to prevent.
In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be
prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat
the wishes of the testator.

Roldan, Deanna
AJERO VS. CA, GR NO. 106720, SEPTEMBER 15, 1994
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally
autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil
Code. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will
that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.
A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date
some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however,
does not render the whole testament void.Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
notwithstanding non- compliance with the provisions of Article 814.
Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the
holographic will or on testator's signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of
authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.

RODELAS VS. ARANZA, L—58507, DECEMBER 7, 1982

If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be
probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary
that there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten
will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison
can be made with the standard writings of the testator.

Sbaiz, Dave James

AJERO VS. CA
Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic
will or on testator’s signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication

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will only result in disallowance of such changes.

In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally
authographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will no
result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionable handwritten by the testator.

People of the Philippines vs. Umali, GR No. 84450, February 4, 1991

The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article 821 of the
Civil Code which states that persons convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony"
are disqualified from being witnesses to a will."

Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to disqualify
him as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact that said
witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness.

Siazar, Lyzette Arianne

NEPOMUCENO VS. CA, L-62952, OCTOBER 9, 1985
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and
resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do
and pass upon certain provisions of the will. Where a testamentary provision is void on its face, such as
when a testator/testatrix is disposing his/her properties to a person with whom he/she is living in adultery
or concubinage, a probate court may pass upon such provision for the purpose of declaring its nullity.

CAYETANO VS. LEONIDAS, GR NO. 54919, MAY 30, 1984

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by
Articles 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. When the national
law of the decedent does not provide for legitimes and all the estate may be given away by the
testator/testatrix to a complete stranger, although contrary to the sound and established public policy to
the specific provisions of Philippine Law, such foreign law will still apply. As ruled in Bellis vs. Bellis,
"whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave,
inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones."

Uy, Diane Margret

MOLO VS. MOLO, L-2538, SEPTEMBER 21, 1951
Doctrine of dependent relative revocation applies where the testator cancels or destroys a will or
executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with the present intention to make a new
testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old; and the new disposition is not made or, if made, fails
of effect for same reason. When applied, the earlier will may be probated as a result of the subsequent
will containing the revocatory clause being null and void.

FRAN VS. CA, GR NO. 53546, JUNE 25, 1992

The annexing of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is clearly evident in Sec.
1 Rule 76 which allows the filing of a petition for probate by persons named therein, regardless of whether
or not he is in possession of the will or the same is lost or destroyed.
The non-distribution of the estate is not a ground for the re-opening of the testate proceedings. A
seasonable motion for execution should have been filed. If the executor or administrator has possession

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of the share to be delivered, the probate court would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding
to order him to transfer that possession to the person entitled thereto. This is authorized under Section 1,
Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. However, if no motion for execution is filed within the reglementary period,
a separate action for the recovery of the shares would be in order.

Uy, Ryan Aaron

REYES VS. CA, GR NO. 124099, OCTOBER 30, 1997
Generally, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated. Court merely inquires on its due execution which is whether it complied with the
formalities prescribed by law, testamentary capacity and identity of the testator. However there are
notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first determined 1.) Defect of the will is apparent
on its face and the probate of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. 2.)
Practical considerations demand (ex. preterition of heirs or testamentary provisions are of doubtful
legality) 3.) Agreement by the parties.

SANCHEZ VS. CA, GR NO. 108947, SEPTEMBER 29, 1997

Hornbook Doctrine means that wherein a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. However it could
decide or resolve questions of title only provisionally.

Uylengco, Kimberly
RABADILLA VS. CA, GR NO. 113725, JUNE 29, 2000
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs
first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of
another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce
the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to
one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommissary substitution.

BORDALBA VS. CA, GR NO. 112443, JANUARY 25, 2002

Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal heirs of Nicanor Jayme
and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence
was presented by them to substantiate their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may assert his right
to the property of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.

Yamat, Joshua
HEIRS OF CONTI VS. CA, GR NO. 118464, DECEMBER 21, 1998
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of
the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by
his will or by operation of law. Legal or intestate succession takes place if a person dies without a will, or
with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent.

NIEVA VS. ALCALA, 4 PHIL 915

Article 811 of the Civil Code which provides that "any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property acquired by the latter gratuitously from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such of the property, as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of

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relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came," does not apply to
illegitimate relatives.

Zapatos, Zari Charisamor

GALA VS. ELLICE AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, GR NO. 156819, DECEMBER 11, 2003
The reliefs sought by petitioners should have been raised in a proceeding for settlement of estate, rather
than in the present intra-corporate controversy. If they are genuinely interested in securing that part of
their late fathers property which has been reserved for them in their capacity as compulsory heirs, then
they should simply exercise their actio ad supplendam legitimam, or their right of completion of legitime.
Such relief must be sought during the distribution and partition stage of a case for the settlement of the
estate of Manuel Gala, filed before a court which has taken jurisdiction over the settlement of said estate.
Furthermore, the extraordinary remedy of piercing the veil of corporate fiction requires that there must be
proof that the corporation is being used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work injustice and
the petitioners have failed to prove that Ellice and Margo were being used thus.

DE LOS REYES VS. PATERNO, 34 PHIL 420

El derecho reservable (the reservable right) may be lost to the holder when he fails or neglects to oppose
the registration of the land in which such right exists under the Torrens system. (Sec. 38, Act No. 496.)

ALVAREZ, Dan Mar Z.

PARISH PRIEST OF ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH VS RIGOR 89 SCRA 493
TESTATOR'S INTENT IS THE LAW OF THE CASE. — In testamentary succession cases, as in cases
involving the law of contracts and statutory construction, where the intention of the contracting parties or
of the lawmaking body is to be ascertained, the primary issue is the determination of the testator's
intention which is the law of the case (dicat estor et eirt lex). The will of the testator is the first and
principal law in the matter of testaments. When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any
interpretation must be in accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may
certainly appear that his intention was different from that literally expressed.

CAPACITY TO INHERIT. — In order to be capacitated to inherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be
living at the moment the succession opens, except in case of representation, when it is proper (Art. 1025,
Civil Code).

WHERE BEQUEST IS INOPERATIVE. — If the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be
merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists (Art.
956, New Civil Code). The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate,
or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's will is no longer
valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as to the
property covered by the said legacy.

WHERE WILL DOES NOT DISPOSE OF ALL PROPERTIES. — Legal succession takes place when the
will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator (Art. 960(2), New Civil Code).

ANCHORIZ, Andrei Dominic D.

BAGUNU VS. PIEDAD GR NO. 140975 DECEMBER 8, 2000
The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the decedent and
excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of representation can
apply. . . . By right of representation, a more distant blood relative of a decedent is, by operation of law,
"raised to the same place and degree" of relationship as that of a closer blood relative of the same

112
decedent. The representative thereby steps into the shoes of the person he represents and succeeds, not
from the latter, but from the person to whose estate the person represented would have succeeded. . . .
In the direct line, right of representation is proper only in the descending, never in the ascending, line. In
the collateral line, the right of representation may only take place in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters of the decedent when such children survive with their uncles or aunts.

The right of representation does not apply to "other collateral relatives within the fifth civil degree" (to
which group both petitioner and respondent belong) who are sixth in the order of preference following,
firstly, the legitimate children and descendants, secondly, the legitimate parents and ascendants, thirdly,
the illegitimate children and descendants, fourthly, the surviving spouse, and fifthly, the brothers and
sisters/nephews and nieces, of the decedent. Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of
nephews and nieces of the decedent concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity,
expressed in Article 962 of the Code, is an absolute rule. In determining the degree of relationship of the
collateral relatives to the decedent, Article 966 of the Civil Code gives direction. Respondent, being a
relative within the third civil degree, of the late Augusto H. Piedad excludes petitioner, a relative of the fifth
degree, from succeeding ab intestato to the estate of the decedent.

ANONUEVO, Ma. Criselda A.

PASCUAL VS PASCUAL- BAUTISTA GR NO. 84240 MARCH 25, 1992
Article 992 of the Civil Code, provides:

An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.

Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what is says. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words. When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be
applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. And even granting
that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably
construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is established by
statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication.

BELTRAN, Jose Miguel Banzon

MANUEL VS. HON. FERRER GR NO. 117246 AUGUST 21, 1995
Iron Curtain. The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court. It states that when
legitimate persons have half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's
inheritance; that the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate child;
that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate of the legitimate
grandparent; that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle who is a
legitimate brother of her natural father; and that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father. Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a
uniform general intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative by, but must always be construed
in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole.

BETITA, Maureen
TISON VS CA GR NO. 121027 JULY 31, 1997

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SUCCESSION; PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY – The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. The
presumption continues to operate unless and until it is rebutted by a proper party. Unless and until it is
rebutted, the presumption may stand in lieu of evidence. This is based on the theory that a presumption
is prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima facie by the legal
presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved.|||

BUCOY, Isagani Jr. B.

HEIRS OF URIARTE VS. CA GR NO. 116775 JANUARY 22, 1998
According to Article 962 of the Civil Code, In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes
the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. The manner of
determining the proximity of relationship are provided by Articles 963 - 966 of the Civil Code. In this case,
plaintiff is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third degree relative of Justa. On the
other hand, defendants and intervenors are the sons and daughters of Justa's cousin. They are thus fifth
degree relatives of Justa. Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest, then plaintiff is the
lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no moment.

INTESTATE SUCCESSION; A NEPHEW IS A COLLATERAL RELATIVE WHO MAY INHERIT IF NO

DESCENDANT, ASCENDANT, OR SPOUSE SURVIVE THE DECEDENT. — Petitioners misappreciated
the relationship between Justa and private respondent. As already stated, private respondent is the son
of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's nephews. A nephew is considered a collateral
relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or spouse survive the decedent. That private
respondent is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not disqualify him from being his
aunt's heir. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, "The determination of whether the relationship
is of the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors."

CABILDO, Josephine Ivane V.

GONZALES VS. CA GR NO. 117740 OCTOBER 30, 1998
SUCCESSION; COLLATERAL RELATIVES; WHEN PRECLUDED FROM INHERITING FROM THE
DECEDENT; CASE AT BAR. — With the finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of
Ricardo Abad, petitioners are precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother. The applicable
provisions are: Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Art. 1003. If there are no . . . illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance
with the following articles. As to petitioners' claim that the properties in the name of Ricardo Abad actually
belong to their mother Lucila de Mesa, both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that the evidence
presented by private respondents proved that said properties in truth belong to Ricardo Abad. As stated
earlier, the findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on
appeal, it being in a better position to examine the real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses while testifying in the case. In fact, petitioners seem to accept this conclusion, their
contention being that they are entitled to the subject estate whether the same is owned by Ricardo Abad
or by Lucila de Mesa.

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CABRERA, Errol D.
NAZARENO VS. CA GR NO. 138842 OCTOBER 18, 2000
The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own. Though Romeo
represented at one time the estate of Maximino, Sr., the latter has a separate and distinct personality
from the former. Hence, the judgment in CA-GR CV No. 12932 regarding the ownership of Maximino, Jr.
over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only, and NOT the estate of Maximino, Sr., which also has a right to
recover properties which were wrongfully disposed.

CRUZ, Lean Richard T.

SANCHEZ VS. CA GR NO. 108947 SEPTEMBER 29, 1997
Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that “[e]very act which is intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a
sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.” For a partition to be valid, Section 1, Rule 74
of the Rules of Court, requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will;
(2) the decedent left no debts, or if there were debts left, all had been paid; (3) the heirs and liquidators
are all of age, or if they are minors, the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal
representatives; and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with
the Register of Deeds. We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case. We therefore
affirm the validity of the parties’ compromise agreement/partition in this case.

DE ELLO, Philip Edwin S.

HEIRS OF CONTI VS CA GR NO. 118464 DECEMBER 21, 1998
A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the heirs can commence any action originally
pertaining to the deceased as we explained in Quison v. Salud. [12 Phil. 109 (pp. 113-114; 1908)]

DE GUINTO, Charlene L.
ALEJANDRINO VS CA GR NO. 114151 SEPTEMBER 17, 1998
RIGHTS OF HEIRS; TO USE AND ENJOY THE UNDIVIDED ESTATE BEFORE PARTITION. — Article
1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent
is, before partition, owned in
common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. Under a co-ownership, the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Eaco-owner of property which is
held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole
property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of
each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint
ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition
to his use and enjoyment of the same. Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is
inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to
exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right.

TO SELL THE PRO INDIVISO SHARE OF THE INHERITED PROPERTY BEFORE PARTITION; CASE
AT BAR. — With respect to properties shared in common by virtue of inheritance, alienation of a pro
indiviso portion thereof is specifically governed by
Article 1088. In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary rights in selling her pro indiviso
share in Lot No. 2798. However, because the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with
the Rules of Court, no particular portion of the property
could be identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale. Thus, interpreting Article 493 of the

115
Civil Code providing that an alienation of a co-owned property "shall be limited to the portion which may
be allotted to (the seller) in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

PARTITION; WAYS IT COULD BE EFFECTED. — Under the law, partition of the estate of a decedent
may only be effected by (1) the heirs themselves extrajudicially, (2) by the court in an ordinary action for
partition, or in the course of administration proceedings, (3) by the testator himself, and (4) by the third
person designated by the testator.

COULD NOT BE EFFECTED IN AN ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE; EXCEPTION. — The trial court
may not, therefore, order partition of an estate in an action for quieting of title. As there is no pending
administration proceeding, the property of the
Alejandrino spouses can only be partitioned by the heirs themselves in an extrajudicial settlement of
estate. However, evidence on the extrajudicial settlement of estate was offered before the trial court and it
became the basis for the order for segregation of the property sold to private respondent.

CAN BE EVIDENCED BY THE OVERT ACT OF A CO-OWNER. — It appears that when a co-owner sells
his inchoate right in the co-ownership, he expresses his intention to "put an end to indivision among (his)
co heirs." Partition among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing
his right over the property regardless of the form it takes. In effect, Laurencia expressed her intention to
terminate the co-ownership by selling her share to private respondent.

DELA CRUZ, Paul Arwin A.

LOPEZ VS CA GR NO. 127827 MARCH 5, 2003
Partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to
whom it may belong. The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of
the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific property and giving to
each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other.

DIATO, Jea Mari D.

BRAVO- GUERRERO VS. CA GR NO. 152658 JULY 29, 2005
We point out that the law on legitime does not bar the disposition of property for valuable consideration to
descendants or compulsory heirs. In a sale, cash of equivalent value replaces the property taken from the
estate. There is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution in values. Donations and other
dispositions by gratuitous title, on the other hand, must be included in the computation of legitimes.

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE: WILLS AND SUCCESSION

FRANCISCO, Migmar Bernped S.

BASCARA VS. SHERIFF ROLANDO JAVIER GR NO. 188069 JUNE 17, 2015
In this case, while it is undisputed that petitioner was in possession of the subject property, it cannot be
said that his right to possess the same is by virtue of being a co-owner, agricultural tenant or
usufructuary; nor is the claim to his right of possession analogous to the foregoing situations. What is
clear is that he allegedly acquired the property from Pardo by reason of a donation mortis causa. He is,
therefore, a transferee or successor-in-interest who merely stepped into the shoes of his aunt. He cannot
assert that his right of possession is adverse to that of Pardo as he has no independent right of
possession. Consequently, under legal contemplation, he cannot be considered as a "third party who is
actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor." The trial court had the ministerial duty to

116
issue, as it did issue, the possessory writ in favor of respondent Pangilinan. As it appeared, there was no
reason for it to order the recall of the writ already issued.
GONZALES, Jo-Anne P.
DOLORES L. HACBANG AND BERNARDO J. HACBANG V. ATTY. BASILIO H. ALO, G.R. NO.
191031, OCTOBER 5, 2015
Article 777 of the NCC provides that the inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent’s death without
a moment’s interruption. Heirs, legatees, and devisees bequeathed with specific properties do not require
court adjudication to identify which particular properties become theirs; the testator had already identified
these. From the very moment of testator’s death, title over these properties vests on the heir, legatee, and
devisee.

LATINA, Christian Michael E.

TESTATE ESTATE OF POTENCIANO VS. POTENCIANO GR NO. 226271 NOVEMBER 9, 2016
Surviving spouse generally cannot be a compulsory heir by way of right of representation. While the
surviving spouse cannot claim to be a compulsory heir of his or her parent-in-law, such rule is not
applicable to Irma P.E. Potenciano because she is not succeeding the decedent by right of representation,
but as one of the heirs of the compulsory heirs of the decedent.|||

MENDOZA, Lauren Antonette M.

HEIRS OF THE LATE ECARMA VS. CA GR NO. 193374 JUNE 8, 2016

Doctrine: Article 495 of the Civil Code provides the remedy of termination of co-ownership in accordance
with Article 498 of the same Code, i.e. sale of the property and distribution of the proceeds. Therefore,'
absolute opposition to the partition of the subject properties which are co-owned has no basis in law. As
mere co-owners representing the share of the deceased, they cannot preclude the other owners likewise
compulsory heirs of the deceased spouses, from exercising all incidences of their full ownership.

MILLERA, Rommel M.
HEIRS OF LEANDRO NATIVIDAD AND JULIANA NATIVIDAD VS. NATIVIDAD GR NO. 198434
FEBRUARY 29, 2016
By operation of law, the heirs succeed not only to the rights of the decedent but also to his obligations.

PAGBILAO, Raymond Eigel R.

ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO, ETC. VS. ANACLETO ALCORAN AND ELENETTE
SUNJACO G.R. NO. 163362 JULY 8, 2015
Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same manner, such children or relatives
shall not inherit from the illegitimate child (Iron Curtain Rule in intestate succession.) The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a
legitimate grandparent (citing Diaz vs. IAC; 182 SCRA 427)

REYES, Mary Louise B.

HENRY H. TENG V LAWRENCE C. TING, EDMUND TING AND ANTHONY TING, G.R. NO. 184237,
SEPTEMBER 21, 2016
Legitime is defined as that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has
reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs.
As to the purpose of an inclusion/exclusion proceeding, where a party in a probate proceeding prays for
the inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property, the court may provisionally pass
upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.

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RUELOS, Rhys Derek S.
IRIS MORALES V. ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ GR. NO. 198994 FEBRUARY 03, 2016
Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is not named or,
although he is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the
estate without expressly being disinherited - tacitly depriving the heir of his legitime. Preterition requires
that the omission is total, meaning the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his
legitime.

SANCHEZ, Jose Maria Paulo R.

DIVINAGRACIA V. PARILLA G.R. NO. 196750. MARCH 11, 2015
In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless it first makes
a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership,
which is the first stage in an action for partition. Indubitably, therefore, until and unless this issue of co-
ownership is definitely and finally resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the disputed
properties.

YOU, Jerico Marcelo

HEIRS OF ANTERO SOLIVA V. SOLIVA GR. NO. 159611, APRIL 22, 2015
There was no accretion of inheritance within the terms of Article 1015 of the Civil Code when Severino did
not repudiate the share in their parent’s inheritance which he received in 1959. A careful reading of this
CA ruling would show that the share of Severino was "added" to the shares of Juana, Victoriano, Cenon,
Dorotea and Antero, not pursuant to the provisions of Article 1015 of the Civil Code. The CA decision, for
one, did not use the term "accretion;" neither did it mention, in any of its portions, Article 1015, or that the
CA was adding Severino's supposed share in accordance with this article. On the contrary, the CA added
Severino's share to those of the other heirs because it recognized the fact that Severino has already
received his share of the estate in 1959.

2014 Cases: Wills and Succession

Martinez, Mara
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang v. Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile,
and Carlito S. Calalang, G.R. No. 184148, June 09, 2014.

Spouse Dominador Peralta and Ofelia Peralta v. Heirs of Bernardina Abalon, represented by Mansueto
Abalon, G.R. No. 183448, June 30, 2014. Heirs of Bernardina Abalon, represented by Mansueto Abalon v.
Marissa Andal, Leonil Andal, Arnel Andal, Spouses Dominador Peralta and Ofelia Peralta, and Heirs of
Restituto Rellama, represented by his children Alex, Immanuel, Julius and Sylvia, all surnamed Rellama,
G. R. No. 183464.

Heirs of Valentin Basbas, et al. v. Ricardo Basbas as represented by Eugenio Basbas, G.R. No. 188773,
September 10, 2014.

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