[A.C. No. 6052.

December 11, 2003]

IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND
MORAL GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN
MINDANAO IN THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS
OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY
VELEZ, petitioners, vs. ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD OF
GOVERNORS,respondents.
DECISION
TlNGA, J.:
This is a Petition[1] filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and
Tony Velez, mainly seeking the disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera from
being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th Intergrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Regional Governors elections. Petitioner Garcia is the Vice-President of the
Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past President and
the incumbent President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
The facts as culled from the pleadings of the parties follow.
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) was set on April 26,
2003, a month prior to the IBP National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The
election was so set in compliance with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws, which
reads:
SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At least one month before the
national convention, the delegates from each region shall elect the governor of their
region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in
the region.
Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution[2] No. XV-2003-99 dated April 16,
2003, reset the elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention.
Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP
Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the
IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a letter[3] dated 28 March 2003, requesting the IBP Board to
reconsider its Resolution of April 6, 2003. Their Motion was anchored on two
grounds viz. (1) adhering to the mandate of Section 39 of the IBP By Laws to hold the
election of Regional Governors at least one month prior to the national convention of the
IBP will prevent it from being politicized since post-convention elections may otherwise
lure the candidates into engaging in unacceptable political practices, and; (2) holding the
election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board from
resolving protests in the election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed
in Section 40 of the IBP By Laws, to wit:
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall,
within two days after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the
President of the Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon
receipt of such petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing
Board of Governors to consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending
parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the following May
31, and shall be final and conclusive.
On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in
its Resolution No. XV-2003-162.[4]
On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the
afternoon of May 24, 2003, the petitioners filed a Petition[5] dated 23 May 2003 before the
IBP Board seeking (1) the postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the
second or third week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent De Vera
from being elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region.
The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29, 2003. The
pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first, the postponement of the
elections for regional governors and, second, the disqualification of Atty. Leonard de
Vera.
WHEREAS, anent the first relief sought, the Board finds no compelling justification for the
postponement of the elections especially considering that preparations and notices had
already been completed.
WHEREAS, with respect to the disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de Vera, this Board finds
the petition to be premature considering that no nomination has yet been made for the
election of IBP regional governor.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby resolves, to deny the
petition.[6]
Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on their Petition, on the same
date, May 29, 2003, the petitioners filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking
the same reliefs as those sought in their Petition before the IBP.
On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners application, this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), directing the IBP Board, its agents,
representatives or persons acting in their place and stead to cease and desist from
proceeding with the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao.[7]
Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the mechanics for the selection
of the IBP officers from the Chapter Officers up to the Regional Governors constituting
the IBP Board which is its highest policy-making body, as well as the underlying dynamics,
to wit:
IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for a term of two years.
The IBP Chapter Presidents in turn, elect their respective Regional Governors following
the rotation rule. The IBP has nine (9) regions, viz: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon,
Greater Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern
Mindanao and Western Mindanao. The governors serve for a term of two (2) years
beginning on the 1st of July of the first year and ending on the 30th of June of the second
year.
From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an Executive Vice President
(EVP) shall be chosen, also on rotation basis. The rationale for the rotation rule in the
election of both the Regional Governors and the Vice President is to give everybody a
chance to serve the IBP, to avoid politicking and to democratize the selection process.
Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the By-Laws, whoever is the
incumbent EVP will automatically be the National President for the following term.
Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao,
have had two (2) National Presidents each. Following the rotation rule, whoever will be
elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional Governors
elections will automatically become the EVP for the term July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005.
For the next term in turn, i.e., from July 1, 2005 to June 20, 2007, the EVP immediately
before then will automatically assume the post of IBP National President.
Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred
his IBP membership from the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM)
Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter, stressing that he indeed covets the IBP
presidency.[8] The transfer of IBP membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners went on,
is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a
great insult to lawyers from Eastern Mindanao for it implies that there is no lawyer from
the region qualified and willing to serve the IBP.[9]
Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional
governor, executive vice-president and national president, the petitioners submit that
respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral aptitude. According to them, respondent
De Vera was sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly attacking the integrity of
the SC Justices during the deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. They
add that he could have been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his clients
funds had he not surrendered his California license to practice law. Finally, they accuse
him of having actively campaigned for the position of Eastern Mindanao Governor during
the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, a prohibited act under the IBP By-
Laws.[10]
After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June 9, 2003 a Respectful
Comment [11] on the Petition.
In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has
no jurisdiction over the present controversy, contending that the election of the Officers
of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the
organization, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and
exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP. Respondent De Vera also assails the
petitioners legal standing, pointing out that the IBP By-Laws does not have a provision
for the disqualification of IBP members aspiring for the position of Regional governors,
for instead all that it provides for is only an election protest under Article IV, Section 40,
pursuant to which only a qualified nominee can validly lodge an election protest which is
to be made after, not before, the election. He posits further that following the rotation rule,
only members from the Surigao del Norte and Agusan del Sur IBP chapters are qualified
to run for Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region for the term 2003-2005, and the
petitioners who are from Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental are not thus qualified to be
nominees.[12]
Meeting the petitioners contention head on, respondent De Vera avers that an IBP
member is entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter membership. [13] He cites the
last paragraph of Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws,
thus:
Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for
a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the
province, city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his
residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises all members registered in
its membership roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is
terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he
transfers his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter,
provided that the transfer is made not less than three months immediately preceding any
Chapter election.
The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera stresses, is also recognized
in Section 4, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court which is exactly the same as the first of the
above-quoted provisions of the IBP By-Laws, thus:
Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular
Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city,
political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his residence is
located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan
del Sur IBP Chapter that he transferred his IBP membership, respondent De Vera submits
that it is unfair and unkind for the petitioners to state that his membership transfer was
done for convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify him for the Eastern Mindanao
governorship.[14]
 On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited
disrespect to the Court or to any of its members during its deliberations on the
constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the administrative complaint filed against him
by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled
him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve
as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is
aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the
administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary
findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory in character similar to the
recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to
the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the
complainant in the California administrative case has retracted the accusation that he
misappropriated the complainants money, but unfortunately the retraction was not
considered by the investigating officer. Finally, on the alleged politicking he committed
during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, he states that it is baseless
to assume that he was campaigning simply because he declared that he had 10 votes to
support his candidacy for governorship in the Eastern Mindanao Region and that the
petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate their claim that he or his handlers
had billeted the delegates from his region at the Century Park Hotel.[15]
On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply[16] to the Respectful Comment of
respondent De Vera who, on July 15, 2003, filed an Answer and Rejoinder.[17]
In a Resolution[18] dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed the other respondent in
this case, the IBP Board, to file its comment on the Petition. The IBP Board, through its
General Counsel, filed a Manifestation[19] dated 29 August 2003, reiterating the position
stated in its Resolution dated 29 May 2003 that it finds the petition to be premature
considering that no nomination has as yet been made for the election of IBP Regional
Governors.[20]
Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the main issues, to wit:
(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;
 (2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the
determination of which in turn requires the resolution of two sub-issues,
namely:
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper
remedy under the IBP By-Laws; and
(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;
(3) whether the present Petition is premature;
(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition
is not premature, whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run for
Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao Region;
Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that
the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on the present controversy. As noted earlier,
respondent De Vera submits that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the
determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal
matter and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the IBP.
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers
on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and the legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the
IBP, including the election of its officers.
 The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935
Constitution. Section 13, Art. VIII thereof granted the Supreme Court the power to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law. It reads:
SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to
the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have
the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly
worded provision in the intervening 1973 Constitution[21] through all the years have been
the sources of this Courts authority to supervise individual members of the Bar. The term
Bar refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys.[22] Pursuant to this power of supervision, the Court initiated the integration of
the Philippine Bar by creating on October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration,
which was tasked to ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. [23] Not long
after, Republic Act No. 6397[24] was enacted and it confirmed the power of the Supreme
Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Finally, on January 1, 1973, in the per
curiam Resolution of this Court captioned In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar to the
Philippines, we ordained the Integration of the Philippine Bar in accordance with Rule
139-A, of the Rules of Court, which we promulgated pursuant to our rule-making power
under the 1935 Constitution.
The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP
independence from the Supreme Court, ironically recognizes the full range of the power
of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP. For one, Section 77 [25] of the IBP By-
Laws vests on the Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws,
either motu propio or upon recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP. Also
in Section 15,[26] the Court is authorized to send observers in IBP elections, whether local
or national. Section 44[27] empowers the Court to have the final decision on the removal
of the members of the Board of Governors.
On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into
the irregularities which attended the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar
Matter No. 491 entitled In the Matter of the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry into the 1989
elections. The results of the investigation showed that the elections were marred by
irregularities, with the principal candidates for election committing acts in violation of
Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws.28 The Court invalidated the elections and directed the
conduct of special elections, as well as explicitly disqualified from running thereat the IBP
members who were found involved in the irregularities in the elections, in order to impress
upon the participants, in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which
attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore
the non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive
electioneering.
The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed
direct election by the House of Delegates of the (a) officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) IBP President; and (c) Executive Vice-President (EVP). Second, it restored the former
system of the IBP Board choosing the IBP President and the Executive Vice President
(EVP) from among themselves on a rotation basis (Section 47 of the By-Laws, as
amended) and the automatic succession by the EVP to the position of the President upon
the expiration of their common two-year term. Third, it amended Sections 37 and 39 by
providing that the Regional Governors shall be elected by the members of their respective
House of Delegates and that the position of Regional Governor shall be rotated among
the different chapters in the region.
The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the
IBP and establish without doubt its jurisdiction to hear and decide the present controversy.
In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of
action against him, respondent De Vera argues that the IBP By-Laws does not allow
petitions to disqualify candidates for Regional Governors since what it authorizes are
election protests or post-election cases under Section 40 thereof which reads:
SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall,
within two days after the announcement of the results of the elections, file with the
President of the Integrated Bar a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon
receipt of such petition, the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing
Board of Governors to consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending
parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the following May
31, and shall be final and conclusive.
Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the
disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. The remedy it provides for questioning
the elections is the election protest. But this remedy, as will be shown later, is not available
to just anybody.
Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of
nominees for the position of regional governor. This was carefully detailed in the former
Section 39(4) of the IBP By-Laws, to wit:
SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to the eligibility of
a candidate must be raised prior to the casting of ballots, and shall be immediately
decided by the Chairman. An appeal from such decision may be taken to the Delegates
in attendance who shall forthwith resolve the appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall be by
raising of hands. The decision of the Delegates shall be final, and the elections shall
thereafter proceed. Recourse to the Board of Governors may be had in accordance with
Section 40.
The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election
of the Board of Governors. Before, members of the Board were directly elected by the
members of the House of Delegates at its annual convention held every other year.29 The
election was a two-tiered process. First, the Delegates from each region chose by secret
plurality vote, not less than two nor more than five nominees for the position of Governor
for their Region. The names of all the nominees, arranged by region and in alphabetical
order, were written on the board within the full view of the House, unless complete
mimeographed copies of the lists were distributed to all the Delegates.30 Thereafter, each
Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate voted for only one nominee for Governor for
each Region.31 The nominee from every Region receiving the highest number of votes
was declared and certified elected by the Chairman.32
In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this
Court deemed it best to amend the nomination and election processes for Regional
Governors. The Court localized the elections, i.e, each Regional Governor is nominated
and elected by the delegates of the concerned region, and adopted the rotation process
through the following provisions, to wit:
SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be
governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9)
regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of
one Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates
from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different
chapters in the region.
SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1) month before
the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their
region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in
the region.
The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it
less controversial. The grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated,
for the pool from which the Delegates may choose their nominees is diminished as the
rotation process operates.
The simplification of the process was in line with this Courts vision of an Integrated
Bar which is non-political33 and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the
standards of the legal profession, improving the administration of justice and contributing
to the growth and progress of the Philippine society.34
The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision
on disqualification proceedings. Consequently, under the present IBP By-Laws, the
instant petition has no firm ground to stand on.
Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of
the IBP By-Laws, petitioners are not the proper persons to bring the suit for they are not
qualified to be nominated in the elections of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He
argues that following the rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as amended,
only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be
nominated.
Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition,
petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit. As provided in the aforesaid section,
only nominees can file with the President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the
grounds therefor. As claimed by respondent De Vera, and not disputed by petitioners,
only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be
nominated and elected at the election for the 16th Regional Governor of Eastern
Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37
and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the
other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.
Consequently, the petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming
election.
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition.
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the
petitioners to seek the disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP
Governor for the Eastern Mindanao Region. Before a member is elected governor, he
has to be nominated first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been
nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the
members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming
that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he
is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paraaque and he was
originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter
membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which
is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership,
respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a
lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the
particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
Section 19. Registration. -
....
Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer
shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political
subdivision or area where his office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is
located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
(Underscoring supplied)
It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic
that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work
is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain
membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he will become a
member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains his office. The only
proscription in registering ones preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more
than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section,
transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions
set forth therein, thus:
SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its
membership roll. Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is
terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he
transfers his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter,
provided that the transfer is made not less than three months immediately preceding any
Chapter election.
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made
not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the
lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership
to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime
M. Vibar wrote a letter35 addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP
PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter,
informing them of respondent De Veras transfer and advising them to make the necessary
notation in their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the
certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that De Veras transfer was
made effective sometime between August 1, 2001 and September 3, 2001. On February
27, 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the
Philippines, as mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that
elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February
of every other year.36 Between September 3, 2001 and February 27, 2003, seventeen
months had elapsed. This makes respondent De Veras transfer valid as it was done more
than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.
Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not
morally fit to occupy the position of governor of Eastern Mindanao.
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements
provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred. The basic qualifications for one who
wishes to be elected governor for a particular region are: (1) he is a member in good
standing of the IBP;37 2) he is included in the voters list of his chapter or he is not
disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-
Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs;38 (3) he does not belong to a chapter from
which a regional governor has already been elected, unless the election is the start of a
new season or cycle;39 and (4) he is not in the government service.40
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit
before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of
moral fitness of a candidates lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House
of Delegates. Indeed, based on each members standard of morality, he is free to
nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements
under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of
moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law
by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.
Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the alleged
sanction imposed by the Supreme Court during the deliberation on the constitutionality of
the plunder law, is apparently referring to this Courts Decision dated 29 July 2002 in In
Re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case
Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera.41 In this case, respondent De Vera was found guilty of
indirect contempt of court and was imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) for his remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in
the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of the report, with De Veras
statements written in italics.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001
Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers
Plunder Law
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition
filed by Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed
vagueness.
De Vera said he and his group were greatly disturbed by the rumors from Supreme Court
insiders.
Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law, with two other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said
Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the
prosecution of Estrada.
We are afraid that the Estrada camps effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices-
considering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-
will most likely result in a pro-Estrada decision declaring the Plunder Law either
unconstitutional or vague, the group said.42
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001
SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes
Xxx
People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged. said lawyer Leonard
De Vera of the Equal Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada
Resign movement.
He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law
unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led
to People Power II.
Xxx
De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the jueteng scandal that led to People Power
II if the rumor turned out to be true.
People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong.
Sovereignty must prevail. 43
In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have
made said statements but denied to have uttered the same to degrade the Court, to
destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into disrepute.44 He explained that he was
merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were
aimed at influencing and threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality
of the Plunder Law.45
The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act
for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines46 cited in Villaber v. Commission on
Elections,47 the Court defines moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity
in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. 48 The determination of
whether an act involves moral turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends on the
circumstances attending the violation of the statute.49
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing ones opinion on a public
interest issue can be considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity.
Respondent De Vera did not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public
when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law. 50 Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of respondent De Veras alleged
immorality.
 On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he
was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by
the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license
to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it
impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the
absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has
the burden to prove the same.51 In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the
administrative complaint affects respondent De Veras moral fitness to run for governor.
Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the
delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his
candidacy, again petitioners did not present any proof to substantiate the same. It must
be emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof under our Rules of Court.52
WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for
the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board
of Governors is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this
Court on 30 May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the election for the IBP Regional
Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED. Accordingly, the IBP Board of
Governors is hereby ordered to hold said election with proper notice and with deliberate
speed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 97239 May 12, 1993
INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) AND NESTOR B.
MICOSA, respondents.
Jimenez & Associates for petitioner.
Santos & Associates for private respondent.

NOCON, J.:
Posed for determination in this petition for certiorari is the question of whether a
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for dismissal from employment
and corollarily, whether a conviction of a crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) is an international organization recognized by
the Philippine government and accorded privileges, rights and immunities normally
granted to organizations of universal character. In 1977, it hired private respondent Nestor
B. Micosa as laborer, who thereby became bound by IRRI Employment Policy and
Regulations, the Miscellaneous Provisions of which states viz:
C. Conviction and Previous Separation
l. . . .
2. An employer who has been convicted of a (sic) criminal offense involving
moral turpitude may be dismissed from the service. 1
On February 6, 1967, Micosa stabbed to death one Reynaldo Ortega inside a beer house
in Los Baños, Laguna.
On September 15, 1987, Micosa was accused of the crime of homicide. During the
pendency of the criminal case, Micosa voluntarily applied for inclusion in IRRI's Special
Separation Program. However, on January 9, 1990, IRRI's Director General, Klaus L.
Lampe expressed deep regret that he had to disapprove Micosa's application for
separation because of IRRI's desire to retain the skills and talents that persons like him
possess. 2
On January 23, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision fending Micosa guilty of
homicide, but appreciating, however, in his favor the presence of the mitigating
circumstances of (a) incomplete self-defense and (b) voluntary surrender, plus the total
absence of any aggravating circumstance.
Subsequently, Micosa applied for suspension of his sentence under the Probation Law.
On February 8, 1990, IRRI's Director General personally wrote Micosa that his
appointment as laborer was confirmed, making him a regular core employee whose
appointment was for an indefinite period and who "may not be terminated except for
justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor Code. 3
On March 30, 1990, IRRI's Human Resource Development Head, J.K. Pascual wrote
Micosa urging him to resign from employment in view of his conviction in the case for
homicide.
On April 4, 1990, the Laguna Parole and Probation Office No. II wrote IRRI informing the
latter that said office found Micosa's application for probation meritorious as he was
evaluated "to possess desirable social antecedents in his life." 4
On April 6, 1990, Micosa informed J.K. Pascual that he had no intention of resigning from
his job at IRRI.
On April 22, 1990, J. K. Pascual replied to Micosa's letter insisting that the crime for which
he was convicted involves moral turpitude and informing him that he is thereby charged
of violating Section I-AA, Par VII, C-2 of the Institute's Personnel Manual.
On April 27, 1990, Micosa explained to J.K. Pascual that the slaying of Reynaldo Ortega
on February 6, 1987 arose out of his act of defending himself from unlawful aggression;
that his conviction did not involve moral turpitude and that he opted not to appeal his
conviction so that he could avail of the benefits of probation, which the trial court granted
to him.
On May 7, 1990, Micosa sought the assistance of IRRI's Grievance Committee who
recommended to the Director General, his continued employment. However, on May 21,
1990, J.K. Pascual issued a notice to Micosa that the latter's employment was to
terminate effective May 25, 1990.
On May 29, 1990, Micosa filed a case for illegal dismissal.
On August 21, 1990, Labor Arbiter Numeriano D. Villena rendered judgment finding the
termination of Micosa illegal and ordering his reinstatement with full backwages from the
date of his dismissal up to actual reinstatement. The dispositive portion of the same is
hereunder quoted:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders are hereby
entered:
1. Finding the termination of complainant's services illegal;
2. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to reinstate
complainant Nestor B. Micosa to his former position without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges appurtenant, thereto immediately upon receipt
hereof;
3. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute to pay
complainant Nestor B. Micosa his full backwages computed from the date
of his dismissal on May 25, 1990 up to actual reinstatement based on his
latest salary rate of P41,068.00 per month.
4. Ordering respondent International Rice Research Institute, to pay
complainant's counsel the amount of Five Thousand Pesos P5,000.00,
representing his attorney's fees; and.
5. Dismissing the claim for damages for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 5
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission was basically in agreement with the
findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, in a resolution dated January 31,
1991, it affirmed the appealed decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modification
deleting the award of attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 6
Accordingly, petitioner filed this instant petition raising the following issues:
1. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION HAS ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT IRRI HAD NO
RIGHT NOR AUTHORITY TO PRESCRIBE ANY OTHER CAUSE/S FOR
DISMISSAL IF THE SAME IS NOT AMONG THOSE ENUMERATED IN
ARTICLE OF THE LABOR CODE.
 2. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT "THERE IS NO
BASIS TO APPLY PETITIONER'S INSTITUTE PERSONNEL MANUAL IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINANT ON THE SOLE GROUND THAT HIS
CONVICTION OF HOMICIDE CONSTITUTE MORAL TURPITUDE. 7
The basic premise of petitioner is that Micosa's conviction of the crime of homicide, which
is a crime involving moral turpitude, is a valid ground for his dismissal under the
Miscellaneous Provisions of IRRI's Employment Policy Regulations.
In addition to its claim that it has the prerogative to issue rules and regulations including
those concerning employee discipline and that its employees are bound by the aforesaid
personnel manual, petitioner justifies its action as a legitimate act of self-defense. It
admits that Micosa's interests — in his employment and means of livelihood — are
adversely affected; that a convict should not be discriminated against in society and that
he should be given the same opportunities as those granted to other fellow citizens but
claims that at times, one's right is deemed superior than that of another. In this case,
petitioner believes that it has a superior right to maintain a very high degree or standard
not only to forestall any internal problem hampering operations but also to prevent even
the smallest possibility that said problems could occur considering that it is an
international organization with concomitant obligation to the host country to avoid creating
disturbance or give occasion for such disturbance.
It should be recalled, however, that Micosa was issued an appointment with an assurance
from the IRRI's Director General that as regular core employee he "may not be terminated
except for justifiable causes as defined by the pertinent provisions of the Philippine Labor
Code." 8 Thus, IRRI could not remove him from his job if there existed no justifiable cause
as defined by the Labor Code.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes wherein an employer may
terminate an employment. Verily, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is not
one of these justifiable causes. Neither may said ground be justified under Article 282 (c)
nor under 282 (d) by analogy. Fraud or willful breach by the employees of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative under Article 282 (c)
refers to any fault or culpability on the part of the employee in the discharge of his duty
rendering him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.
It cannot be gainsaid that the breach of trust must be related to the performance of the
employee's function. 9 On the other hand, the commission of a crime by the employee
under Article 282 (d) refer to an offense against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative. Analogous causes
must have an element similar to those found in the specific just cause enumerated under
Article 282. Clearly lacking in the ground invoked by petitioner is its relation to his work
or to his employer.
In the case at bar, the commission of the crime of homicide was outside the perimeter of
the IRRI complex, having been committed in a restaurant after office hours and against a
non-IRRI employee. Thus, the conviction of Micosa for homicide was not work-related,
his misdeed having no relation to his position as laborer and was not directed or
committed against IRRI or its authorized agent.
Besides, IRRI failed to show how the dismissal of Micosa would be in consideration of the
safety and welfare of its employees, its reputation and standing in the community and its
special obligations to its host country. It did not present evidence to show that Micosa
possessed a tendency to kill without provocation or that he posed a clear and present
danger to the company and its personnel. On the contrary, the records reveal that
Micosa's service record is unblemished. There is no record whatsoever that he was
involved in any incident similar to that which transpired on that fateful night of February
6, 1987. In fact, even after his conviction, the IRRI's Director General expressed his
confidence in him when he disapproved his application for special separation in a letter
dated January 8, 1990 and when he conveyed to him IRRI's decision to promote him to
the status of a regular core employee, with the commensurate increases in benefits in a
letter dated February 1990. Respondent IRRI derogates the letters' significance saying
that they were mere pro-forma communications which it had given to numerous other
workers. But whether or not such letters were "form letters, they expressed the message
that were meant to be conveyed, i.e., that Micosa is fit for continued employment. In
addition, the employees at IRRI's Grievance Committee interceded favorably in behalf of
Micosa when they recommended his retention despite his conviction showing that the
very employees which IRRI sought to protect did not believe that they were placing their
very own lives in danger with Micosa's retention.
Likewise, noteworthy is the fact that Micosa, although found guilty as charged, was also
found worthy of probation. This means that all the information regarding his character,
antecedents, environment, as well as his mental and physical condition were evaluated
as required under Section 8 of the Probation Law and it was found that there existed no
undue risk that Micosa will commit another crime during his period of probation and that
his being placed on probation would be to the benefit of society as a whole.
In the face of all these, IRRI remained adamant and insisted on Micosa's termination.
Certainly, said termination cannot be upheld for it lacked not only a legal basis but factual
basis as well.
Even under IRRI's Employment Policy and Regulations, the dismissal of Micosa's on the
ground of his conviction for homicide cannot be sustained. The miscellaneous provisions
of said personnel manual mentions of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude as
a ground for dismissal. IRRI simply assumed that conviction of the crime of homicide is
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. We do not subscribe to this view.
Moral turpitude has been defined in Can v. Galing 10 citing In Re Basa 11 and Tak Ng v.
Republic 12 as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals.
As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to
determine. 13 Thus, the precipitate conclusion of IRRI that conviction of the crime of
homicide involves moral turpitude is unwarranted considering that the said crime which
resulted from an act of incomplete self-defense from an unlawful aggression by the victim
has not been so classified as involving moral turpitude.
IRRI argues that the crime of homicide committed by Micosa involves moral turpitude as
the killing of a man is conclusively an act against justice and is immoral in itself not merely
prohibited by law. It added that Micosa stabbed the victim more than what was necessary
to repel the attack.
IRRI failed to comprehend the significance of the facts in their totality. The facts on record
show that Micosa was then urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his
fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy
urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was
while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt
and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the
latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to
slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
circumstances of self- defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any
aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not
inherently vile, immoral or unjust.
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral
turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of
the crime. 14 Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every
known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves
moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. 15 While . . . generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral
turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, it, cannot always be ascertained whether
moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral
turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala
prohibita only. 16 It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and
indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or
exclusion as the cases are reached.
In fine, there is nothing in this case to show any abuse of discretion by the National Labor
Relations Commission in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding that Micosa
was illegally dismissed. For certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance
with centuries of both civil and common traditions. 17 The abuse of discretion must be
grave and patent, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or
despotically. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792

Complainant,
Present:
Panganiban, CJ,
Puno,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio,
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ

Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated:

Respondent. January 25, 2006
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed

by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime
involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction,
violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; [2] and
constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court.[3]

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint,
the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and
that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.[4] After that hearing,
complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint
and its attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBDdirected him to file his Position Paper, which
he did on July 27, 2004.[6] Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and

Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in
its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for
frustrated homicide,[7] which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:

x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on
his way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion,
Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car
driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had
overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the
Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the
accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the]
Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the
taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver
forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi
driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he smelled of
 liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out
of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up
immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter
boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got
up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist
and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he
could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car
and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a
handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he
noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up
intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same
to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused
who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the
accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was
witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi
driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.[8]

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano
and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery
on the left side of his neck,[9] complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had
not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco
Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left
part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18,
2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on
several conditions. These included satisfaction of the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court
in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano.[10]
 According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to
comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of
Appeals.[11]

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that

respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such
crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based
on the following facts:

1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because
the latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault,
Respondent went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with
a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and
fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent
denied that he had shot Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he
was the one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons;
and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,]
not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant.[12]

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution
adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
 We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as
approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is
deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer
possessed of good moral character.[13] In the instant case, respondent has been found
guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his
conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues
that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide
involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and
social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.[14]
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been
discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor case
concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide.
Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this
Court rejected the employers contention and held that homicide in that case did not
involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRIs
Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that,
having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was
precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved
moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:

x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending

on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal
act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute,
 but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude,
the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of
aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the
circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:

x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then
urinating and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto
Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the
filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was
ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan
knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim
who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him
several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay the
victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the
mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the
total absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's
character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.[17]

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly
evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant
when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be
mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the
circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers
assault.

We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed
morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend
himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed
complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter
unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his
gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly
intention to escape punishment for his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his
conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As
it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be
slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his
fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced
vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a
lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of
a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false
sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed
firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities. [19] He has thus brazenly
violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in
his attorneys oath[20] and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to
obey the laws of the land.

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a
basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended
his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four years [21] since he was
ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant
in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown
by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning
capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges
complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter has
lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of
the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character. [22] Where their
misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally
unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by their license
and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.[23]

We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good
moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the
practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty. [24]

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous

behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel
Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants family.[25] But when this effort failed,
respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainants family
that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely
implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.[27] The
trial court had this to say:

The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors

who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people
including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The
injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright
 unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to
death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the
complainants version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed
the accused on the chest. x x x.[28]

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is

more important than truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a
premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. [30] Hence, lawyers must not
mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are
expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal
profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. Law is a
noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who
are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they
are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[31]

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they
reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find
the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of

justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent,
honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that
vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.
 We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,
and that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish
the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence
to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society
and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would
be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be
a shining exemplar of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high

degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also
as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen
short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances not
the mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal
profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty
of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his

name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only
legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a
profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and,
at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of
a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and
eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice
of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice
to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law
by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's
Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be
in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act
or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-
177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
mattersconnected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
 public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953
ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms
as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind
usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and
he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a
practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell,
155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is
to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
 qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the
provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members
of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions
and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by
a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that
is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed
in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in
accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the
answer is yes.
 MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that
this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be
certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous
with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice,
it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering
legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of
the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and
the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
(Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank &
Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be
too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most
lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate
and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self
perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not
reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer,
once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who
principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most
cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the
planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed]
that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number
of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers
in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from
one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much
else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional
lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective
for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained
in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient
features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the
client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that
work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government
legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are
emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of
practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an
accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate
legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures
in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the
sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein
a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to
test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects
flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in
predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention
in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those
trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to
multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling
such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate
degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently
engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would
require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to
as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type
of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel
only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles
the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with
the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated
from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the
work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to
see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of
the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein,
to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who
surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm,"
so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method
of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities
Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management
issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types
of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a
shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a
corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is
being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies
toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of
collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is
world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders,
promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer
vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors
are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts
of systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system
dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio
of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can
be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that
comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such
legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach.
It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
 Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The
general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant
subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility
for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is
not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him
a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even
if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only
the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation.
"Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their
work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the
lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding
and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same
day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying
his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the
field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for
and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and
which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff
Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11).
(Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays
down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and
legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development
of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by
the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in
legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an
economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
 contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they
should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent
counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support
personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts,
an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321).
( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the
set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for
a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis issine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they
are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and
4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly
the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the
Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed
by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
 condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the
ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission,
171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment
on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position.
It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice.
To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3)
issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v.
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-
Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
 Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition
would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or
three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year
for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because
the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice
of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my
statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations,
most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means,
are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact
that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising
law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without
first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President
of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter,
I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon
a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there
is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less
a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,
may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth
life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron
rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This
blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on
his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow
from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
[A.C. No. 5737. October 25, 2004]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In an administrative complaint dated July 7, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz charges Atty.
Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001,
he instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in
his own cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a
hearing on January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112,
Pasay City, presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange transpired:
xxx xxx So, may we know your honor, if he is a lawyer or not?
The Court having been inhibited by the respondent from hearing the case,
replied:
You are asking for my inhibition and yet you want me to rule on his appearance
xxx xxx.
Thereafter, the respondent said:
Because your honor, he (pertaining to the complainant) is misrepresenting
himself to be a lawyer!
To this the complainant remarked:
Your Honor, Im not xxx xxx.
Respondent, this time engulfed with anger in a raising voice said:
Appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna; x x x.
Respondents imputations were uncalled for and the latters act of compelling the court to
ask complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the
public, inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared
for and in his behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondents imputations of
complainants misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his
honor, with the intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was
handling; the manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words appear ka ng appear,
pumasa ka muna! were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate,
malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.
Complainant claims that respondents display of improper attitude, arrogance,
misbehavior, misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of
the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics
that lawyers are sworn to uphold in their dealings with society and corresponding
appropriate penalty or sanctions for the said administrative violations should be imposed
on the respondent.
In his Comment, respondent contends that the complaint filed against him is a vicious
scheme to dissuade him from appearing as counsel for the Mina family against whom
complainant had filed several civil and criminal cases including him to further
complainants illegal practice of law; complainants complaint occurred during a judicial
proceeding wherein complainant was able to represent himself considering that he was
appearing in barong tagalog thus the presiding judge was misled when she issued an
order stating [i]n todays hearing both lawyers appeared; because of which, respondent
stated: Your honor I would like to manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant) who
represents the plaintiff in this case is not a lawyer, to which complainant replied: The
counsel very well know that I am not yet a lawyer; the reason he informed the court that
complainant is not a lawyer was because the presiding judge did not know that
complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform the presiding judge that he is
not a lawyer when he stated: for the plaintiff your honor; he stated pumasa ka muna out
of indignation because of complainants temerity in misrepresenting himself as lawyer; it
is surprising that the City Prosecutor of Pasay City filed a complaint for oral defamation
against him considering that in a precedent case the Supreme Court stated: It is a settled
principle in this jurisdiction that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are
absolutely privileged (Navarrete vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 540); in another
malicious prosecution being perpetuated by the complainant against the Mina family
pending before Judge Priscilla Mijares of RTC Branch 108, Pasay City, they were able to
prohibit the appearance of complainant as counsel for himself as authenticated by an
Order of Judge Priscilla Mijares which allegedly stated among other; to wit:
In connection with Ferdinand A. Cruzs motion to appear as counsel, the motion is likewise
denied, movant not having satisfied the requirements and conditions under Rule 138-A,
Sections 1 and 2.
Respondent alleges that when complainant filed an administrative case against
Judge Priscilla Mijares when said Judge stated in Tagalog in open court Hay naku
masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes! OK? the same was dismissed by the Honorable
Courts Third Division which stated among others: That the questioned remarks of
respondent were uttered more out of frustration and in reaction to complainants
actuations and taking into account that complainant is not yet a lawyer but was already
lecturing the court on a matter which is not even a point of discussion was sheer
arrogance on the part of the complainant. Respondent prays that the complaint against
him be dismissed for lack of merit.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In a report, dated March 4, 2004, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended
respondents suspension from the practice of law for a period of three months for violating
Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive
or otherwise improper.
In her report, Commissioner Navarro stated:
After going over the evidence submitted by the parties, the undersigned noted that
respondents averment that the utterances he made in open court is (sic) privileged
communication does not hold water for the same was (sic) not relevant to the issue of the
case in question under trial before the said court.
Respondent did not refute the fact that the same utterances he made in open court
against the complainant had been the basis for his indictment of Oral Defamation and
later Unjust Vexation under Criminal Cases Nos. 02-1031 and No. 02-2136 respectively,
pending trial before MTC Branch 45, Pasay City.
Likewise respondent did not refute complainants allegation that in 1979 he was held in
contempt and was not allowed to practice law for seven years by the Supreme Court in
the administrative case filed against him by Emilia E. Andres on December 14, 1979
docketed as A.M. L-585 for his fondness in using contumacious language in his dealing
with others.
From the facts obtaining, it is apparent that the utterance hurled by the respondent in the
manner, substance and tone of his voice which was not refuted by him that appear ka ng
appear, pumasa ka muna in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive
but insulting specially on the part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the
bar examination required of them.
Respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in informing the court if it was
his purpose relative to complainants appearance in court; although the latter appeared
only in his behalf but not for others if he had complied with the requirements of Rule 138
(Sections 1 and 3) of the Rules of Court.
Respondent should have been more temperate in making utterances in his professional
dealings so as not to offend the sensitivities of the other party as in this case.
On April 16, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution to annul and set
aside the recommendation of the investigating commissioner and to approve the
dismissal of the case for lack of merit.
Prefatorily, we note that the IBP Board of Governors failed to observe the procedural
requirements of Sec. 12 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on review and decision by
the Board of Governors which states:
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a) Every case heard by an
investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and
evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board
upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not
exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of
the Investigators report. (Emphasis supplied)
In Teodosio vs. Nava,[1] the Court stressed the important function of the requirement
that the decision of the Board of Governors state the facts and the reasons on which it is
based, which is akin to what is required of the decisions of courts of record, thus:
For aside from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point
out to the appellate court the findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any
of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an assurance that the judge, or the Board
of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal reasoning.[2]
In this case, the Board of Governors resolution absolving respondent of any
misconduct does not contain any findings of facts or law upon which it based its ruling.
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the rule would result in the remand of the case.
Nonetheless, where the controversy has been pending resolution for quite sometime and
the issues involved could be resolved on the basis of the records on appeal, the Court
has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of
cases.[3] This case falls within the exception.
We hold that respondents outburst of appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna does
not amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when respondent pointed
out to the trial court that complainant is not a lawyer to correct the judges impression of
complainants appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14, 2002,
noted that complainant is a lawyer.[4] Such single outburst, though uncalled for, is not of
such magnitude as to warrant respondents suspension or reproof. It is but a product of
impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an argument between them. It
has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in
the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for
the court to condone even contemptuous language.[5]
Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating
personally his cases. A partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
In Maderada vs. Mediodea,[6] this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its
progress -- from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their
own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those
qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals
have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when
they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law. One does not practice
law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to
himself.
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a
profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative
capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been
defined by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the
prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding
herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such
services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.[7]
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of
the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the
dignity of the legal profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and
fairly.[8] Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be
dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial
forum.[9]
WHEREFORE, the complaint against respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera for
misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. He is, however, admonished to be more circumspect in the performance of his
duties as an officer of the court.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private
practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special
Administratrix of his estate. 1Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of
Taggat Industries, Inc. 2
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained
Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of
timber concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good
Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal
complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No.
97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took
over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld
payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July
1997. 8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary
investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651
Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code
of the Philippines. 13
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.
Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat,
knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from
hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. 14Furthermore,

complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed
and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the
complaint. 15
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of
law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove
that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and
February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000
for the month of April 1996. 18
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law
while working as government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely
aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to
her expectation. 19
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned
from Taggat for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his
undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct
the necessary preliminary investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed
to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that
complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal
complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit
without mental reservation. 25
Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her
impression that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from
complainant’s statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and
he was supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna
help me. x x x. 26
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not
representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely
performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 27Respondent argues that
complainant failed to establish that respondent’s act was tainted with personal interest,
malice and bad faith. 28
Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases,
threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is
bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or
present them for cross-examination. 29
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government
prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the
fees were paid for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent
submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that rendering
consultancy services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat
without the respondent’s asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case
basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a
specie of ‘conflict of interest’. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or
connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat
employees. 32
Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal
complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent
was still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33

While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent
to file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional
State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the
criminal complaint was dismissed. 35
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M.
Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties
to submit their respective memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation,
the case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner
Funa"). 38
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November
2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and
Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to
safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private
practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of
law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue
will require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former
position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago,
was being accused as having the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution
of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein
Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat.
Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of
Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in
I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with
Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the
mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a
former client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing
anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented
him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any
client or any interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has
an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled
for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor
relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it
would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent
had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No.
97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being
sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and
management involved are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager
and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary
relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of its
management.
xxxx
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein
Complainant while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal
consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long
been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private
practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People
v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal
consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts
that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any
activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice
or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105
Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and
instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard
a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law
while being a government prosecutor. 40
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section
12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against
unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section
7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition
"not [to] represent conflicting interests." 44However, this rule is subject to certain
limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no
conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full
disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover,
considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty. 46
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x
x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a
government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend
to conflict with [his] official functions." 47
Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented
conflicting interests
In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of
interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use
against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment. 49 In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain
inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. 50

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the
preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The
issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1
April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat
during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be
presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any
confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established
participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one
who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily
follow that respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment
with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel
of Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a
sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s
immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the
lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer
the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the
former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations.
Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government
prosecutor
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –
x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill." 51
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently

and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument
is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and
retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered
by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the
term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant
while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the
payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by
complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of
Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no
jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 – the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts involved also transgress
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon
1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal
services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which
constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when
respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and
indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name
removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:
xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office
and in his dealings with the public. 54
On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts. 55
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in
unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to
one year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended
to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A.
EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-
1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon)
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the
said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2,
Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the
Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including
a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall
be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the
Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution
and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating
his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors
to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties
were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter
was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that
the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence
conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-
A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the
IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the
removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2
Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to
issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default
in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name
of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these
words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national
body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all
persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll
of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court
Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-
condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the
IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic,
he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from
the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases
triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an
administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional
issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are
made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the
license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before
the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court
exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there
made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the
arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized
by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of
which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations
of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and
legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and
personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of
the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police
power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a
privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the
State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law
being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of
control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S.
Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a
public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia
vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme
Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the
State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the
integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the
President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate
personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State
(U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est
supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power
of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some
freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar
integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines,
which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar
to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic
Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution
granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law
and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)
subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as
might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent
of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an
interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with
them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel
him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the
Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to
associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a
member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All
that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-
defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
member.8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend
or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program — the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member
of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of
the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule
requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that
prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from
requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee
toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would
amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of
his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its
being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under
the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's
right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided
altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the
name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar
Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the
court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the
conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory
grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary
power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are
inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be
assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable
profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the
duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly
granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5)
the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-
Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional
nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM
PAYMENT OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment
of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years
1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became
part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked
in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that
he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil
Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in
government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working
in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment[3] stating inter alia: that
membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues
to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP;
that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by
the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on
the IBP members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar
Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment
of dues is but an implementation of the Courts directives for all members of the IBP to
help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule
allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what
is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what
petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay
abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his
obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of
Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status
for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will
exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning
is the IBP Board of Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual
membership dues of lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or
inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of
annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection
clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP
annual membership dues would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has
been in an inactive status and is without income derived from his law practice. He adds
that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute
deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-
practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law
practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community where the inactive
lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from
payment of his dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is,
when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-
2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized
by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of
which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause
appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote
in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the States legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers.[7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar[8] - which power required
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise
funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the
Philippine Bar,[9] thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court
is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose
of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that
as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would
not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose
such exaction.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by
the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting
from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of
which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues
subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of
practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of
membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the
Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case,
his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues
could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors
is in the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the
nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound
to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount
to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles
the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length,
as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then
a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions,[11] one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to
abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such
drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is
DENIED. He is ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as
membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days
from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension
from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.
LLAMAS, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M.
Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate
sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years
now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date &
place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal
259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as
shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995,
1996 and 1997: (originals available)

Annex "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated

A.......- December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253,
RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated

B.......- November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br.
259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM

Annex "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of

C.......- Time to File Required Comment and Opposition"
dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil
Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.

This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which
qualifies that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A,
Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for
 six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal
of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate
action on the bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar
Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty.
Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060"
sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of
an attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the
Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing
some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas,
as shown by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter
No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim.
Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order
dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November
13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof,
what appears to be respondents signature above his name, address and the receipt
number "IBP Rizal 259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated February
14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66,
Makati, denying respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal
Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification[3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or
remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days
from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent
alleged:[5]
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995,
1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is
automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member
of the bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in
good standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court
decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of
Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances. Chief
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set
aside and reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of
Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No.
11787 was appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of
dismissal as a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the
decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to
practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been
delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax
Return, up to the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact,
in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he
 is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan,
Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen
since 1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took
effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being
thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total
practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by
him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact,
he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the
exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and
deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at
any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and
surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment,
not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly
insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act
of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his
candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary. Esmsc
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution[6] adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found
respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three
months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the
decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, [7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on
the decision of the IBP ordering respondents suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of
the proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B"
and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal
259060 for at least three years."
 The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal
Chapter President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment
of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by
respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since
1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which
took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
....
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In
fact, respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he
alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his
Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice
of law." (par. 4 of Respondents Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Esmmis
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the
court about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in
his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without
having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings
submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings
he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that
such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those
pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice
and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as
income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%)
 of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund
for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased
members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default
in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name
of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only
by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that
R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income
taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year,"
the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting
to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent
is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH
TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he
filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law,[8] we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice
of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy
of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he
took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume
his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay
lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in
May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule
138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every
applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected
with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. 3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in
good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a
lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which
the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance
with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to
practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an
applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years
of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce
before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory
proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar
examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving
from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment
of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional
tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject
to judicial disciplinary control.14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in
the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. 15 Since Filipino citizenship is
a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen
of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is
also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic
right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and
he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise,
before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his
law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
 (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s
knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his
pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,
subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such
compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded
on pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution
dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay
City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal
Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal
Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave
Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as
private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the
ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may
appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the
prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner
to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law
student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student
Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down
in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration
seeking to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law
Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138,
for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme
Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
against the private respondent and the public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC
Judge from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari
proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance
of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal
Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil
indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally
tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The
petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has
no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which
expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an
agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the
petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC
seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength
of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002
of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before
the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second
Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground
that the RTC had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and
assigns the following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the
prayer for the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having
established the necessity of granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN
ACCORD WITH THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS
DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF
THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY
PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT,
CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730,
PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER
COURTS (MTC’S).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature
of the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing
law student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court
in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior
court as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-
A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his
appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without
the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully
completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled
in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme
Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case
before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by
the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall
be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for
and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc
clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where
the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may
appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138
provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently
changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138,
thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal
or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the
MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of
the Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-
A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant,
is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not
as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a
quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law
student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a
quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple
reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer
is allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar
Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent
or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil
liability may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of
a private prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC.
In denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there
was no claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records
of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s
appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense,
such as espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against
popular representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior
institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect
arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the
private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the
direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998]
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURO L.
TAPUCAR, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez
Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of
continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under
scandalous circumstances.[1]
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times
for conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740,
resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted
the penalty of six months suspension without pay,[2] while in Administrative Matter Nos.
1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated,[3] this Court on January 31, 1981
ordered the separation from service of respondent.[4]
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it
appears that complainant and respondent were married on October 29, 1953 at the
Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence
in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent
relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos City), where his last
three children were born and where he practiced his profession until his appointment as
a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began
cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December
28, 1977 Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Pea.
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative
complaint against respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of
suspension from office for a period of six months without pay was meted by this Court
upon respondent.[5]
 Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to
another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were
consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and separation from
the service.[6]
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued
living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child
named Laella Pea Tapucar. Moreover, he completely abandoned complainant and his
children by her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal,
bringing along Elena and their two children. And on March 5, 1992, respondent
contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court
Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondents
marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her
retirement from the government service in 1990. However, her children, who remained in
Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they allegedly suffered because of their fathers
acts, including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having previously
withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the
present petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the material impulse to shield and
protect her children from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant
secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to
represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred
to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the
Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent
be disbarred, and his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised
on the ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the
Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.[7]
 In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the
charges against him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the
law and the Court, as when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in 1980
for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being ordered
separated in later administrative case constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for
marrying Ms. Elena Pea will constitute triple jeopardy. If thats the law so be it.[8]
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
passed on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioners recommendation, as
follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-titled case,
herein made part of the Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED
and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved
and adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support
the foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said
Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the Rules of Court.* We are in agreement
that respondents actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones
good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. [9] There is perhaps no profession
after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more imperative than
that of law.[10] The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
 Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.*
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards
and norms expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high
standards of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and
community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private
fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings,
penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the
judiciary, a fact that aggravates this professional infractions. For having occupied that
place of honor in the Bench, he knew a judges actuations ought to be free from any
appearance of impropriety.[11] For a judge is the visible representation of the law, more
importantly, of justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies
their will to obey the law.[12] Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law
in all of his actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others. [13] Surely, respondent
could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to lose its moral
imperatives.[14]
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct, [15] an
attorney-at-law is also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the
administration of justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers must ensure the faith
and confidence of the public that justice is administered with dignity and civility. A high
degree or moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He
must maintain due regard for public decency in an orderly society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients.[16]Exacted from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility
to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency,
truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as moral
character. To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and
maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the
Bar but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court.[17]
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in
a clear case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court of and member of the bar.[18] For disbarment proceedings
are intended to afford the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate their cause before
disciplinary action is taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked with
the duty of administering justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women
in whom the Courts and the clients may repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a complaint for disbarment was filed against
a member of the bar by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife
and their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a married but separated
woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that
he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another case,[20] a lawyer was disbarred
when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne
him a child. The Court held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of
morality expected and required of a member of a bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon
by this Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-
wedded wife.The report of the Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the
complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier
attitude, even arrogance; in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of Governors,
tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the
legal profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly
immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be explained away. Keeping a
mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as
abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of
family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyers oath. Such gross
misbehavior over a long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondents
character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance
of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and
place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but
appropriate disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The
Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. G.R. No. 156643
ACEJAS III,
Petitioner, Present:

Panganiban, CJ,
Chairman,
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No. 156891

Petitioner,

- versus -

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. June 27, 2006

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

T his Court defers to the Sandiganbayans evaluation of the factual issues. Not having
heard any cogent reasons to justify an exception to this rule, the Court adopts the anti-
graft courts findings. In any event, after meticulously reviewing the records, we find no
ground to reverse the Sandiganbayan.

The Case

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review[1] assailing the March 8,

2002 Decision,[2] and the January 3[3] and 14, 2003[4] Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 20194. Francisco SB. Acejas III and Vladimir S. Hernandez were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Vladimir S. Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, SPO3 Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB.
Acejas III and Jose P. Victoriano were charged on February 8, 1994, in an
Information that reads thus:
That on or about January 12, 1994, or sometime prior thereto in the
City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused VLADIMIR S. HERNANDEZ and VICTOR
CONANAN, being then employed both as Immigration officers of the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation, Intramuros, Manila, hence are public
officers, taking advantage of their official positions and committing the
offense in relation to office, conspiring and confederating with Senior Police
Officer 3 EXPEDITO S. PERLAS of the Western Police District Command,
Manila, together with co-accused Atty. FRANCISCO SB. ACEJAS III, of the
LUCENARIO, MARGATE, MOGPO, TIONGCO & ACEJAS LAW OFFICES,
 and co-accused JOSE P. VICTORIANO, a private individual, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand, ask, and/or extort One
Million (P1,000,000.00) PESOS from the spouses BETHEL GRACE
PELINGON and Japanese TAKAO AOYAGI and FILOMENO PELINGON,
JR., in exchange for the return of the passport of said Japanese Takao
Aoyagi confiscated earlier by co-accused Vladimir S. Hernandez and out of
said demand, the complainants Bethel Grace Pelingon, Takao Aoyagi and
Filomeno Pelingon, Jr. produced, gave and delivered the sum of Twenty
Five Thousand (P25,000.00) Pesos in marked money to the above-named
accused at a designated place at the Coffee Shop, Ground Floor, Diamond
Hotel, Ermita, Manila, causing damage to the said complainants in the
aforesaid amount ofP25,000.00, and to the prejudice of government
service.[5]

After trial, all the accused -- except Victoriano -- were convicted. The challenged
Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Vladimir S.

Hernandez, Victor D. Conanan, Expedito S. Perlas and Francisco SB.
Acejas III are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Direct Bribery, and are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of three million pesos
(P3,000,000.00). Accused Vladimir S. Hernandez and Victor D. Conanan
shall also suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification. Costs
against the accused.

On ground of reasonable doubt, accused Jose P. Victoriano is

hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The surety bond he posted for
 his provisional liberty is cancelled. The Hold Departure Order against him
embodied in this Courts Order dated July 24, 2000 is recalled.[6]

The first Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied reconsideration of the other
accused. The second Resolution denied Petitioner Acejas Motion for New Trial.

Hence, petitioners now seek recourse in this Court.[7]

The Facts

The facts[8] are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:

At around 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. of December 17, 1993, accused Bureau

of Immigration and Deportation (BID) Intelligence Agent Vladimir
Hernandez, together with a reporter, went to the house of Takao Aoyagi
and Bethel Grace Pelingon-Aoyagi at 27 Pacific Drive, Grand Villa, Sto. Nio,
Paraaque, Metro Manila. His purpose was to serve Mission Order No. 93-
04-12 dated December 13, 1993, issued by BID Commissioner Zafiro
Respicio against Takao Aoyagi, a Japanese national. Hernandez told
Takao Aoyagi, through his wife, Bethel Grace, that there were complaints
against him in Japan and that he was suspected to be a Yakuza big boss,
a drug dependent and an overstaying alien.

To prove that he had done nothing wrong, Takao Aoyagi showed his
passport to Hernandez who issued an undertaking (Exh. B) which Aoyagi
signed. The undertaking stated that Takao Aoyagi promised to appear in an
investigation at the BID on December 20, 1993, and that as a guarantee for
his appearance, he was entrusting his passport to Hernandez. Hernandez
acknowledged receipt of the passport.

On December 18, 1993, Bethel Grace Aoyagi called accused Expedito Dick
Perlas[9] and informed him about the taking of her husbands passport by
Hernandez.Perlas told her he would refer their problem to his brother-in-
law, Atty. Danton Lucenario of the Lucenario, Margate, Mogpo, Tiongco and
Acejas III Law Firm. It was at the Sheraton Hotel that Perlas introduced the
Aoyagis to Atty. Lucenario. They discussed the problem and Atty. Lucenario
told the Aoyagis not to appear before the BID on December 20, 1993.

As advised by Atty. Lucenario, Takao Aoyagi did not appear before the
BID. Instead, Atty. Rufino M. Margate of the Lucenario Law Firm filed with
the BID an Entry of Appearance (Exh. 6 Acejas). Atty. Margate requested
for copies of any complaint-affidavit against Takao Aoyagi and asked what
the ground was for the confiscation of x x x Aoyagis passport.

Hernandez prepared a Progress Report (Exh. 5 Hernandez) which was

submitted to Ponciano M. Ortiz, the Chief of Operations and Intelligence
Division of the BID. Ortiz recommended that Takao Aoyagi, who was
reportedly a Yakuza and a drug dependent, be placed under custodial
investigation.

In the evening of December 22, 1993 at the Diamond Hotel, the Aoyagis
met accused Atty. Francisco Acejas III who was then accompanied by
Perlas. Atty. Acejas informed them that it would be he who would handle
their case. A Contract for Legal Services (Exh. D) dated December 22,
1993 was entered into by Takao Aoyagi and Atty. Acejas, who represented
the Lucenario Law Firm.
In the morning of December 23, 1993, Perlas and Atty. Acejas accompanied
the Aoyagis to the Domestic Airport as the latter were going to Davao. It
was here that Takao Aoyagi paid Atty. Acejas P40,000.00, P25,000 of
which is 50% of the acceptance fee, and the P15,000.00 is for filing/docket
fee (Exh. O). The Aoyagis were able to leave only in the afternoon as the
morning flight was postponed.

On December 24, 1993, while attending a family reunion, Bethel Grace

Pelingon-Aoyagi informed her brother, Filomeno Jun Pelingon, Jr., about
her husbands passport.

On January 2, 1994, Jun Pelingon talked to BID Commissioner Zafiro

Respicio in Davao and told the latter of Takao Aoyagis problem with the
BID. Respicio gave Pelingon his calling card and told Pelingon to call him
up in his office. That same day, Jun Pelingon and Mr. and Mrs. Aoyagi flew
back to Manila.

On January 5, 1994, Jun Pelingon, Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas, Vladimir

Hernandez, Vic Conanan and Akira Nemoto met at the Aristocrat
Restaurant in Roxas Boulevard.

Another meeting was arranged at the Manila Nikko Hotel

in Makati on January 8, 1994 with Jun Pelingon, Perlas, Atty. Acejas and
Hernandez attending.

On January 11, 1994, on account of the alleged demand of P1 million for

the return of Takao Aoyagis passport, Jun Pelingon called up Commissioner
Respicio. The latter referred him to Atty. Angelica Somera, an NBI Agent
detailed at the BID. It was Atty. Carlos Saunar, also of the NBI, and Atty.
Somera who arranged the entrapment operation.
 On January 12, 1994, Vladimir Hernandez returned the passport to Takao
Aoyagi at the Coffee Shop of the Diamond Hotel. The NBI Team headed by
Attorneys Saunar and Somera arrested Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Jose
Victoriano after the latter picked up the brown envelope containing marked
money representing the amount being allegedly demanded. Only Perlas,
Acejas and Victoriano were brought to the NBI Headquarters.[10]

Version of the Prosecution

Testifying for the prosecution were Bethel Grace Pelingon Aoyagi, Filomeno Jun
Basaca Pelingon, Jr., and Carlos Romero Saunar.[11]

The prosecution evidence showed that it was during a meeting on January 5,

1994, when P1 million as consideration for the passport was
demanded.Conanan averred that Aoyagi was a drug trafficker and Yakuza member. The
money was to be used to settle the alleged problem and to facilitate the processing of a
permanent visa. When Pelingon negotiated to lower the amount demanded, Conanan
stated that there were many of them in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID).[12]

During the second meeting held at Hotel Nikko, Pelingon was informed that the
press and government enforcers were after Aoyagi. Hernandez asked for a partial
payment of P300,000, but Pelingon said that the whole amount would be given at just
one time to avoid another meeting.[13]

After talking to Commissioner Respicio on January 11, 1994,[14] Pelingon called up

Dick Perlas to schedule the exchange.
 Regarding the involvement of Petitioner Acejas, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) adds the following facts:

1.2. On 5 January 1994, [Acejas] and Perlas met Pelingon at the

Aristocrat Restaurant. [Acejas] informed Pelingon that he would file a P1
million lawsuit against the BID agents who confiscated the passport of
Takao Aoyagi. [Acejas] showed Pelingon several papers, which allegedly
were in connection with the intended lawsuit. However, when Hernandez
and Conanan arrived at the Aristocrat Restaurant, [Acejas] never
mentioned to the BID agents the P1 million lawsuit. [Acejas] just hid the
papers he earlier showed to Pelingon inside his [Acejas] bag.

1.3. [Acejas] was present when Hernandez proposed that Takao

Aoyagi pay the amount of P1 million in exchange for the help he would
extend to him (Takao) in securing a permanent visa in the
Philippines. [Acejas], who was Aoyagis lawyer, did nothing.

1.4. On 10 January 1994, [Acejas], Pelingon, Perlas and Hernandez

met at the Hotel Nikko. Thereat, Hernandez informed the group that certain
government officials and even the press were after Takao
Aoyagi. Hernandez said that Takao Aoyagi can make a partial payment
of P300,000.00. Pelingon however, assured the group that Takao Aoyagi
would pay in full the amount of P1 million so as not to set another meeting
date. [Acejas] kept quiet throughout the negotiations.

xxxxxxxxx

1.5.a. [Acejas] was present during the entrapment that took place at
the Diamond Hotel. Hernandez handed the passport to [Acejas], who
handed it then to Perlas and thereafter to Takao Aoyagi. After Takao Aoyagi
went over his confiscated passport, Bethel Grace handed to Hernandez the
 envelope[15] containing the supposed P1 million. Hernandez refused and
motioned that [Acejas] be the one to receive it. [Acejas] willingly got the
envelope and placed it beside him and Perlas.

x x x before Hernandez handed out Aoyagis pass- port, he reminded

the group of their earlier agreement of kaliwaan, i.e., that after the passport
is released, the Aoyagis should give the P1 million.[16]

Version of the Defense

Vladimir S. Hernandez, Expedito S. Perlas, Francisco SB. Acejas III, Victor D. Conanan
and Ponciano M. Ortiz testified for the defense.[17]

To the Sandiganbayans narration, Hernandez adds:

6. x x x [Hernandez], an intelligence agent of the Bureau of Immigration and

Deportation (BID), went to the house of Private Respondents Takao and
Bethel Grace Aoyagi to enforce and serve a Mission Order issued and
assigned to him by BID Commissioner Zafiro Respicio on December 13,
1993, for the arrest of Takao Aoyagi.

7. When Bethel Grace showed [Hernandez] her husbands passport,

[Hernandez] found out that the latters [authority] to stay had already been
duly extended. He invited private respondents to go with him to the BID
office. They declined, but made a written undertaking to appear at the BID
office for investigation on December 20, 1993. As security for said
undertaking, Bethel Grace Aoyagi entrusted to [Hernandez] her husbands
passport, receipt of which [Hernandez], in return, acknowledge[d] in the
same instrument.
 8. On January 19, 1994, [Hernandez] signified that the record of
Aoyagi has been cleared and that he can pick up his passport at the BID
office. In connection therewith, [Hernandez] was invited by Perlas to make
the return at a lunchtime meeting to be held at the Diamond Hotel Coffee
Shop. Upon arrival thereat, [Hernandez] gave the passport to Atty. Acejas,
Aoyagis counsel, and within less than ten minutes, he left the coffee
shop.[18]
In his Petition, Acejas narrates some more occurrences as follows:

1. 18th December 1993 The law firm of Lucenario Margate Mogpo Tiongco
& Acejas was engaged by the spouses Takao Aoyagi and Bethel Grace
Pelingon Aoyagi. x x x.

xxxxxxxxx

3. 22nd December 1993

a) The managing partner of the law firm, Atty. Lucenario, briefed [Acejas]
about the facts regarding the confiscation by agents of the BID of the
passport belonging to a Japanese client. x x x.

b) Thereafter, [Acejas] was tasked by Atty. Lucenario to meet his brother-

in-law Mr. Expedito Perlas, who happened to be a policeman and a friend
of Mr. Takao Aoyagi. Thus, [Acejas] met Mr. Perlas for the first time in the
afternoon of this date.

c) Also, for the first time, [Acejas] met the clients, spouses Aoyagis, at the
Diamond Hotel, where they were staying. x x x [Acejas] advised them that
the law firm decided that the clients can file an action for Replevin plus
Damages for the recovery of the Japanese passport.
d) The CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES was signed between the client
and the law firm, thru [Acejas] as partner thereof. x x x The amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php.50,000.00) was agreed to be paid by way of Case
Retainers/Acceptance Fees, which was supposed to be payable upon (the)
signing (t)hereof, and the sum of Php.2,000.00 by way of appearance
fee. However, the client proposed to pay half only of the acceptance fee
(Php.25,000.00), plus the estimated judicial expenses for the filing or docket
fees (Php.15,000.00). x x x It was then further agreed that the balance of
Php.25,000.00 was supposed to be given upon the successful recovery of
the Japanese passport.

e) The clients informed [Acejas] that they are supposed to leave for Davao
the following day on the 23rd because they will spend their Christmas in
Davao City; but they promised that they will be back on the 26 th, which is a
Sunday, so that on the 27th, which is a Monday, the complaint against the
BID officers will have to be filed in Court.

xxxxxxxxx

6. 27 th December 1993 (T)he law office received word from Mr. Perlas
that the Japanese did not come back on the 26 th (December), x x x so
that the case cannot be filed on the 27 th instead (it has) to wait for
clients instruction.

7. 4th January 1994 In the late afternoon, the law firm received a telephone
call from Mr. Perlas informing (it) that the Japanese is already in Manila and
he was requesting for an appointment with any of the lawyer of the law firm
on January 5, 1994.

8. 5th January 1994 [Acejas] met for the first time Mr. Filomeno Pelingon
Jr. including a certain Nimoto Akira.
x x x.

b) [Acejas] told Mr. Pelingon Jr. that all the pleadings are ready for filing but,
of course, the Japanese client and the wife should first read the complaint
and sign if they want to pursue the filing of the complaint against the BID
agents.

c) For the first time, Mr. Pelingon advised against the intended filing of the
case. x x x He instead suggested that he wants to directly negotiate with the
BID agents.

d) Thereafter, Mr. Pelingon instructed Mr. Dick Perlas to contact the BID
agent who confiscated the Japanese passport. Mr. Perlas and Mr. Pelingon
were able to contact the BID agent.

e) For the first time [Acejas] saw Mr. Hernandez, when the latter arrived and
also accused Victor Conanan. In the course of the meeting, a confrontation
ensued between [Acejas] and [Hernandez] concerning the legal basis for
the confiscation of the passport. [Acejas] demanded for the return of the
Japanese passport x xx. Mr. Hernandez said that if there are no further
derogatory report concerning the Japanese client, then in a matter of week
(from January 5 to 12), he will return the passport.

f) [Acejas] gave an ultimatum to Mr. Hernandez that if the Japanese

passport will not be returned in one (1) weeks time, then (the law firm) will
pursue the filing of the replevin case plus the damage suit against him
including the other BID agents.

g) x x x Mr. Pelingon Jr. for the second time advised against the filing
thereof saying that his Japanese brother-in-law would like to negotiate or in
his own words magbibigay naman [i.e. will give money anyway].
9. 8th January 1994

a) Again, Mr. Perlas called the law office and informed x x x that the
Japanese client is now in Manila. Petitioner attended the meeting they
arranged in (Makati) and meet Dick Perlas, Vladimir Hernandez and
Pelingon Jr. x x x.

b) x x x according to Pelingon Jr., the Japanese does not want to meet with
anybody because anyway they are willing to pay or negotiate.

c) [Hernandez was also] present at the meeting and [Acejas] met him for
the second time. x x x [Acejas] said that if [Hernandez] will not be able to
return the passport on or before January 12, 1994, then the law firm will
have no choice but to file the case against him x x x. Again, for the third time
Mr. Pelingon warned against the filing of the case because he said that he
would directly negotiate with the BID agents.

d) The Makati meeting ended up with the understanding that Mr.

Hernandez will have to undertake the return [of] the Japanese passport on
or before January 12, 1994.

10. 12th January 1994

a) Mr. Perlas called up the law office informing that the Japanese client was
already in Manila and was requesting for an appointment with the lawyers
at lunchtime of January 12 at the Diamond Hotel where he was billeted.

xxxxxxxxx

c) x x x x x x x x x
At this meeting, the Japanese was inquiring on the status of the case and
he was wondering why the Japanese passport is not yet recovered when
according to him he has already paid for the attorney fees. And so, [Acejas]
explained to him that the case has to be filed and they still have to sign the
complaint, the Special Power of Attorney and the affidavit relative to the
filing of replevin case. But the Japanese would not fully
understand. So, Pelingon Jr. again advised against the filing of the
case saying that since there is no derogatory record of Mr. Aoyagi at the
BID office, then the BID agents should return the Japanese passport.

xxxxxxxxx

e) Thereafter, Pelingon, Jr. and Dick Perlas x x x tried to contact Mr.

Hernandez. Since, they were able to contact the latter, we waited until
around 2:00 p.m..When Mr. Hernandez came, he said that the Japanese
client is cleared at the BID office and so, he can return the Japanese
passport and he gave it to [Acejas].x x x When [Acejas] received the
Japanese passport, (he) checked the authenticity of the documents and
finding that it was in good order, (he) attempted to give it to the Japanese
client.

Very strangely when [Acejas] tried to hand-over the Japanese passport to

the Japanese across the table, the Japanese was motioning and wanted to
get the passport under the table. x x x [Acejas] found it
strange. (He) x x x thought that it was a Japanese custom to receive things
like that under the table. But nonetheless, [Acejas] did not give it under the
table and instead passed it on to Mr. Dick Perlas who was seated at (his)
right. And so, it was Mr. Dick Perlas who took the passport from [Acejas]
and finally handed it over to Mr. Aoyagi. x x x. After that, there was a little
chat between Mr. Hernandez and the client, and Mr. Hernandez did not stay
for so long and left.

Still, thereafter, (w)hen the Japanese passport was received, Bethel Grace
Aoyagi and [Acejas] were talking and she said since the Japanese passport
had been recovered, they are now willing to pay the Php.25,000.00 balance
of the acceptance fee.

Mrs. Aoyagi was giving [Acejas] a brown envelope but she want[ed] Mr.
Hernandez to receive it while Mr. Hernandez was still around standing. But
Mr. Hernandez did not receive it.

Since, the payment is due to the law firm, [Acejas] received the brown
envelope.

xxxxxxxxx

Not long after, [Acejas] saw his companion, accused Mr. Victoriano,
who was signaling something as if there was a sense of urgency. [Acejas]
immediately stood up and left hurriedly. When [Acejas] approached Mr.
Victoriano, he said that the car which [Acejas] parked in front of the
Diamond Hotel gate, somebody took the car. [Acejas] went out and
checked and realized that it was valet parking so it was the parking
attendant who took the car and transferred the car to the parking
area. [Acejas] requested Mr. Victoriano to get (the) envelope and the
coat, at the table.

g) When [Acejas] went out, [Acejas] already looked for the parking
attendant to get the car. When the car arrived, [Acejas] just saw from the
doors of theDiamond Hotel Mr. Jose Victoriano and Mr. Dick Perlas coming
 out already in handcuffs and collared by the NBI agents. They then were
taken to the NBI, except the accused Vladimir Hernandez.[19]

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the elements of direct bribery, [20] as well as conspiracy in
the commission of the crime,[21] had been proven. Hernandez and Conanan demanded
money;[22] Perlas negotiated and dealt with the complainants;[23] and Acejas accepted the
payoff and gave it to Perlas.[24]

Victoriano was acquitted on reasonable doubt.[25] Although he had picked up the

envelope containing the payoff, this act did not sufficiently show that he had conspired
with the other accused.[26]

The Sandiganbayan did not give credence to the alleged belief of Acejas that the money
was the balance of the law firms legal fees.[27] If he had indeed believed that the money
was payable to him, he should have kept and retained it. The court then inferred that he
had merely been pretending to protect his clients rights when he threatened to file a suit
against Hernandez.[28]

The January 3, 2003 Resolution acquitted Conanan and denied the Motions for
Reconsideration of Hernandez, Acejas and Perlas. According to the Sandiganbayan,
Conanan was not shown to be present during the meetings on January 8 and 12,
1994.[29] His presence during one of those meetings, on January 5, 1994, did not
conclusively show his participation as a co-conspirator.

The January 14, 2003 Resolution denied Acejas Supplemental Motion, which prayed for
a new trial.
The Issues

Petitioner Hernandez raises the following issues:

I. Whether or not respondent court erred in ruling that [Hernandez] was part
of the conspiracy to extort money from private respondents, despite
lack of clear and convincing evidence.

II. Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its

discretion when it overlooked the fact that the legal requisites of the
crime are not completely present as to warrant [Hernandez]
complicity in the crime charged.

III. Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan, 5th Division, ruled

erroneously when it relied solely on the naked and uncorroborated
testimonies of the late Filomeno Jun Pelingon, Jr. in order to declare
the existence of a conspiracy to commit bribery, as well as the guilt
of the accused.

IV. Whether or not [respondent] courts acquittal of co-accused Victor

Conanan and its conviction of [Hernandez] for the offense as
charged effectively belies the existence of a conspiracy.

V. Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction when it
found [Hernandez] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
direct bribery.[30]
On the other hand, Petitioner Acejas simply enumerates the following points:

1. The Conspiracy Theory

2. The presence of lawyer-client relationship; duty to clients cause; lawful
performance of duties
3. Instigation not entrapment
4. Credibility of witness and testimony
5. Affidavit of desistance; effect: creates serious doubts as to the liability of
the accused
6. Elements of bad faith
7. Elements of the crime (direct bribery)
8. Non-presentation of complaining victim tantamount to suppression of
evidence[31]

In the main, petitioners are challenging the finding of guilt against them. The points
they raised are therefore intertwined and will be discussed jointly.

The Courts Ruling

The Petitions have no merit.

Main Issue:
Finding of Guilt
The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1) agrees to perform an act that
constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present; 2) accepts the
gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime; or 3)
abstains from the performance of official duties.[32]

Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of direct bribery, which contained
the following elements: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2) who received the gifts or
presents personally or through another, 3) in consideration of an act that did not constitute
a crime, and 4) that act related to the exercise of official duties.[33]

Hernandez claims that the prosecution failed to show his involvement in the
crime. Allegedly, he was merely implementing Mission Order No. 93-04-12, which
required him to investigate Takao Aoyagi.[34] The passport was supposed to have been
voluntarily given to him as a guarantee to appear at the BID office, but he returned it upon
the instruction of his superior.[35]
The chain of circumstances, however, contradicts the contention of Hernandez. It was he
who had taken the passport of Takao Aoyagi.[36] On various dates,[37] he met with Takao
and Bethel Grace Aoyagi, and also Pelingon, regarding the return of the
passport. Hernandez then asked for a down payment on the payoff,[38] during which he
directed Bethel Grace to deliver the money to Acejas.[39]

Bethel Grace Aoyagis testimony, which was confirmed by the other witnesses, proceeded
as follows:

PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

Q: When Vlademir Hernandez arrived, what happened?

A: He got the passport from his pocket and passed it on to Atty.
Acejas, sir.

Q: What happened after he gave the passport to Atty. Acejas?

 A: [Acejas] gave the passport to Mr. Expedito Perlas, sir.

Q: After that, what happened?

A: Then, [Perlas] gave it to Mr. Aoyagi, sir.

Q: The passport?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And when Mr. Aoyagi received the passport, what did you do or
what did Mr. Aoyagi do?
A: He checked all the pages and he kept it, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q: What did you do with that money after Mr. Aoyagi received the
passport?
A: Because our agreement is that after giving the passport we would
give the money so when Mr. Perlas handed to my husband
the passport, I gave the money placed on my lap to my
husband and he passed it to Mr. Hernandez who refused the
same.

ATTY. ACEJAS:
Your Honor, please, may I just make a clarification that when the witness
referred to the money it pertains to the brown envelope which allegedly
contains the money x x x .

AJ ESCAREAL:

Noted.
 PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

Q: Did Mr. Hernandez got hold or touched the envelope?

A: No, sir.

Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your
husband do?
A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he
pointed to Atty. Acejas so my husband handed it to Atty.
Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr.
Perlas.

Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say

anything?
A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.

INTERPRETER:
Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right.

PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom?

A: Expedito Perlas, sir.

Q: Did Expedito Perlas [receive] that envelope?

 A: Yes, sir.

Q: After that, what happened?

A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty.
Acejas, sir.

Q: And then, what happened?

A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I
think, it happened in just seconds[.] Mr. Vlademir Hernandez
immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came and
picked up the envelope, sir.[40]

Significantly, Hernandez does not address the lingering questions about why Takao
Aoyagi or his representatives had to negotiate for the retrieval of the passport during the
meetings held outside the BID. Ponciano Ortiz, chief of the Operation and Intelligence
Division of the BID, testified that it was not a standard operating procedure to officially
return withheld passports in such locations.[41] It can readily be inferred that Hernandez
had an ulterior motive for withholding the passport for some time despite the absence of
any legal purpose.

Also, Hernandez cannot claim innocence based on Conanans acquittal.[42] While the
testimony of Pelingon was the only evidence linking Conanan to the conspiracy,[43] there
was an abundance of evidence showing Hernandezs involvement.

Acejas, on the other hand, belies his involvement in the conspiracy. He attacks the
prosecutions version that he was silent during the negotiations for the return of the
passport.[44] According to him, he kept giving Hernandez an ultimatum to return the
passport, with threats to file a court case.
Acejas testified that he had wanted to file a case against Hernandez, but was prevented
by Spouses Aoyagi. His supposed preparedness to file a case against Hernandez might
have just been a charade and was in fact belied by Pelingons testimony regarding
the January 5, 1994 meeting:
ATTY. VALMONTE:

Q: Who arrived first at Aristocrat Restaurant, you or Acejas?

A: Acejas arrived together with Dick Perlas[. T]hey arrived ahead of
me, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q: When the three (3) of you were talking that was the time that Atty.
Acejas was showing you documents that he was going to file
[a] P1 million damage suit against Hernandez?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, is it not that when Hernandez and Cunanan arrived and you
were talking with each other, Atty. Acejas also threatened,
reiterated his threat to Hernandez that he would file [a] P1
million damage suit should Hernandez [fails] to return the
passport?
A: When the group [was] already there, the P1 million [damage suit]
was not [anymore] mentioned, sir.[45]

Even assuming that Acejas negotiated for the return of the passport on his clients behalf,
he still failed to justify his actions during the entrapment operation. The witnesses all
testified that he had received the purported payoff. On this point, we recount the testimony
of Bethel Grace Aoyagi:
PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

xxxxxxxxx

Q: When he [did] not want to receive the envelope, what did your
husband do?
A: When Mr. Vlademir Hernandez refused to receive the money, he
pointed to Atty. Acejas so my husband handed it to Atty.
Acejas who received the same and later on passed it to Mr.
Perlas.

Q: When Mr. Hernandez pointed to Atty. Acejas, did he say

anything?
A: None, sir, he just motioned like this.

INTERPRETER:

Witness motioning by [waving] her two (2) hands, left and right.

PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

Q: And at the same time pointed to Atty. Acejas?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And your husband gave the envelope to Atty. Acejas?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And Atty. Acejas, in turn, handed the said envelope to whom?

A: Expedito Perlas, sir.

xxxxxxxxx
 Q: After that, what happened?
A: Mr. Perlas put the money on his side in between him and Atty.
Acejas, sir.

Q: And then, what happened?

WITNESS:

A: After the money was placed where it was, we were surprised, I

think, it happened in just seconds[.] Mr. Vladimir Hernandez
immediately left and then all of a sudden somebody came and
picked up the envelope, sir.

PROSECUTOR MONTEMAYOR:

Q: Do you know the identity of that somebody who picked up the

envelope?

xxxxxxxxx

A: Victoriano, sir.[46]

Acejas failed to justify why he received the payoff money. It would be illogical to sustain
his contention that the envelope represented the balance of his firms legal fees. That it
was given to Hernandez immediately after the return of the passport leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the money was a consideration for the return. Moreover,
Acejas should have kept the amount if he believed it to be his. The Court agrees with the
Sandiganbayans pronouncement on this point:
 x x x. If he believed that the brown envelope contained the balance of the
acceptance fee, how come he passed it to Perlas? His passing the brown
envelope to Perlas only proves that the same did not contain the balance of
the acceptance fee; otherwise, he should have kept and retained
it. Moreover, the three prosecution witnesses testified that the brown
envelope was being given to Hernandez who refused to accept the
same. This further shows that the brown envelope was not for the balance
of the acceptance fee because, if it were, why was it given to Hernandez.

xxxxxxxxx

Acejas defense was further weakened by the fact that his testimony as to
why he left immediately after the brown envelope was given to him was
uncorroborated.He should have presented accused Victoriano to
corroborate his testimony since it was the latter who allegedly called him
and caused him to leave their table.This, he did not do. The ineluctable
conclusion is that he was, indeed, in cahoots with his co-accused.[47]

Lawyers Duty

Acejas alleges that the Sandiganbayan failed to appreciate his lawyer-client relationship
with the complainants. He was supposedly only acting in their best interest[48] and had the
right to be present when the passport was to be returned.[49]

True, as a lawyer, it was his duty to represent his clients in dealing with other
people. His presence at Diamond Hotel for the scheduled return of the passport was
justified. This fact, however, does not support his innocence
 Acejas, however, failed to act for or represent the interests of his clients. He knew
of the payoff, but did nothing to assist or protect their rights, a fact that strongly indicated
that he was to get a share. Thus, he received the money purporting to be the payoff,
even if he was not involved in the entrapment operation. The facts revealed that he was
a conspirator.

The Court reminds lawyers to follow legal ethics[50] when confronted by public officers
who extort money. Lawyers must decline and report the matter to the authorities.[51] If the
extortion is directed at the client, they must advise the client not to perform any illegal
act. Moreover, they must report it to the authorities, without having to violate the attorney-
client privilege.[52] Naturally, they must not participate in the illegal act.[53]

Acejas did not follow these guidelines. Worse, he conspired with the extortionists.

Instigation

Also futile is the contention of petitioners that Pelingon instigated the situation to frame
them into accepting the payoff.[54] Instigation is the employment of ways and means to
lure persons into the commission of an offense in order to prosecute them.[55] As opposed
to entrapment, criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator.[56]

There was no instigation in the present case, because the chain of circumstances showed
an extortion attempt. In other words, the criminal intent originated from petitioners, who
had arranged for the payoff.

During the cross-examination of Bethel Grace Aoyagi, pertinent was Associate

Justice Escareal clarifying question as follows:
 AJ ESCAREAL:

[Q:] Did Mr. Hernandez say anything when he returned the passport
to your husband?
A: He did not say anything except that he instructed [the] group to
abide with the agreement that upon handing of the passport,
the money would also be given immediately
(magkaliwaan).[57]

Alleged Discrepancies

According to Acejas, Pelingons testimonies given in his Complaint-Affidavit,

Supplemental-Affidavit, inquest testimony, testimony in court, and two Affidavits of
Desistance were contradictory.[58] He cites these particular portions
of Pelingons Affidavit:

5. That having been enlightened of the case, and conscious that I

might be prosecuting innocent men, I have decided on my own disposition,
not to further testify against any of the accused in the Sandiganbayan or in
any court or tribunal, regarding the same cause of action.

6. That this affidavit of desistance to further prosecute is voluntarily

executed, and that no reward, promise, consideration, influence, force or
threat was executed to secure this affidavit.[59]

Pelingon testified that he had executed the Affidavit of Desistance because of a

threat to his life.[60] He did not prepare the Affidavit; neither was it explained to
him. Allegedly, his true testimony was in the first Complaint-Affidavit that he had
executed.[61]

By appearing and testifying during the trial, he effectively repudiated his Affidavit
of Desistance. An affidavit of desistance must be ignored when pitted against positive
evidence given on the witness stand.[62]

Acejas has failed to identify the other material points that were allegedly
inconsistent. The Court therefore adopts the Sandiganbayans finding that these were
minor details that were not indicative of the lack of credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.[63] People v. Eligino[64] is in point:
x x x. While witnesses may differ in their recollections of an incident,
it does not necessarily follow from their disagreement that all of them should
be disbelieved as liars and their testimony completely discarded as
worthless. As long as the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the
slight clashing statements neither dilute the witnesses credibility nor the
veracity of their testimony. Thus, inconsistencies and contradictions
referring to minor details do not, in any way, destroy the credibility of
witnesses, for indeed, such inconsistencies are but natural and even
enhance credibility as these discrepancies indicate that the responses are
honest and unrehearsed.[65]

Suppression of Evidence

Acejas further raises the issue of suppression of evidence. Aoyagi, from whom the money
was supposedly demanded, should have been presented by the prosecution as a
witness.[66]

The discretion on whom to present as prosecution witnesses falls on the People. [67] The
freedom to devise a strategy to convict the accused belongs to the
prosecution.[68] Necessarily, its decision on which evidence, including which witnesses,
to present cannot be dictated by the accused or even by the trial court.[69] If petitioners
believed that Takao Aoyagis testimony was important to their case, they should have
presented him as their witness.[70]

Finally, Acejas claims that his Comment/Objection to the prosecutions Formal

Offer of Evidence was not resolved by the Sandiganbayan.[71] In that Comment/Objection,
he had noted the lateness in the filing of the Formal Offer of Evidence.

It may readily be assumed that the Sandiganbayan admitted the prosecutions

Formal Offer of Evidence upon the promulgation of its Decision. In effect, Acejas
Comment/Objection was deemed immaterial. It could not overrule the finding of
guilt. Further, it showed no prayer that the Sandiganbayan needed to act upon.[72]
Finally we reiterate that, as a rule, factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive
upon this Court.[73] We are convinced that these were clearly based on the evidence
adduced in this case.

In sum, we find that the prosecution proved the elements of direct

bribery. First, there is no question that the offense was committed by a public officer.BID
Agent Hernandez extorted money from the Aoyagi spouses for the return of the passport
and the promise of assistance in procuring a visa. PetitionerAcejas was his co-
conspirator. Second, the offenders received the money as payoff, which Acejas received
for the group and then gave to Perlas. Third, the money was given in consideration of the
return of the passport, an act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the confiscation
and the return of the passport were made in the exercise of official duties.

For taking direct part in the execution of the crime, Hernandez and Acejas are liable as
principals.[74] The evidence shows that the
parties conspired to extort money from Spouses Aoyagi. A conspiracy exists even if all
the parties did not commit the same act, if the participants performed specific acts that
indicated unity of purpose in accomplishing a criminal design.[75] The act of one is the act
of all.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED, and the assailed Decision and
Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco
("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1, 1 Rules
1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed
a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document 4 against Duane O.
Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who
notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for
perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and
notarized by me under the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located
at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and thereby
disqualified to own real property in his name – agreed that the property be
transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several
documents that would guarantee recognition of him being the actual owner of the
property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT,
recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the property for his residence
and business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a
loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement,
despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property
in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code.
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in
violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the
disbarment case against him upon the instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty.
Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in
the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and
notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent
liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended
respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his
commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted, with modification, the Report and recommended respondent’s suspension from
the practice of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as
provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP.
Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005
after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only
means of support for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration
because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been
referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve
defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client
in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified
from owning real property.11Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted
that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent,
however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in
complainant’s name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several
documents,13including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier’s
recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainant’s name.
In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the
Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law
against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve
an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be
suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of
law for three years for preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit
concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the
practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be
single again after nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately
subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of
Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended
to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, A.C. No. 6697
Complainant,

- versus -
ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA,
Respondent.
x-------------------------x

RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD

S. DE VERA, INCOMING PRESIDENT OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF Bar Matter No. 1227
THEPHILIPPINES

x-------------------------x

IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF

ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA FROM
THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC
GOVERNOR
Present:

IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER- PANGANIBAN, C. J.,

COMPLAINT OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE PUNO,
VERA DATEDMAY 18, 2005 TO QUISUMBING,
FORTHWITH DENY/DISAPPROVE THE YNARES-SANTIAGO,
IBP RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND CARPIO,
ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM FROM THE MARTINEZ,
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP CORONA,
 FOR ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND CARPIO MORALES,
FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF DUE CALLEJO,
PROCESS. AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA and
VELASCO JJ.
Promulgated:

July 25, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

Per Curiam:

Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de
Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to
remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Veras letter-
request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns
the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The
resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP for the term
2005-2007.

A.C. No. 6697

 The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation,
report and recommendation on subject case,[1] summarized the antecedents thereof as
follows:

In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez

moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard
de Vera based on the following grounds:

1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in

concealing the suspension order rendered against him
by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called
rotation rule enunciated in Administrative Matter No.
491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP
Elections).

Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own

benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting
moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department San
Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-
18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign
or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the
recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the
respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the countrys
most noble profession.

Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-

called rotation rule provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he
transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent
failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to
transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondents transfer
was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National
President. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from
assuming office as IBP National President.

Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated

that the issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues
raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant
against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already
extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court in its
Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re:
Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the
instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle ofres
judicata.

On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar
Confidant for presentation of evidence in support of their respective
allegations.

Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant

maintained that there is substantial evidence showing respondents moral
baseness, vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his
disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he
used his clients money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to
present evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latters
resignation and even if such was accepted, complainant posited that this
should not absolve the respondent from liability.

Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would

not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case
filed against the respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.
Bar Matter No. 1227
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request
to this Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC,
on the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBPs Resolution,
dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP
EVP, for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general.[2]

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular
meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3
vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the
Petition filed before this Court docketed as Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108. The Petition was intended to question the legality
and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries
of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.[3]

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the
above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and
Governor Carlos L. Valdez.[4]

On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by
the IBP Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy
of the IBP Boards 14 January 2005 Resolution.[5]
On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Veras request for oathtaking
as National President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No.
6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.[6]

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10th National IBP Convention at
the CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at this forum where
Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in
connection with the IBP Boards Resolution to withdraw the Petition questioning the
legality of Republic Act No. 9227.[7]

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty.
de Vera from assuming office as IBP National President.[8]

On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz
a letter wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board
for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP. [9]

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront
Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member
of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President. [10] Quoted
hereunder is the dispositive portion of said Resolution:

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY

RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member
of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for committing
acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:

1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and

blatant lies in public about the Supreme Court and members
of the IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary Session of
the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers, held at CAP-
Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making
it appear that the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to
withdraw the PETITION docketed as Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of
the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
With Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining
Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108, was
due to influence and pressure from the Supreme Court of
the Philippines;

2. For making said untruthful statements,

innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board of
Governors and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and
disrepute;

3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that
A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others, by making untruthful statements,
innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary Session of the
IBP 10thNational Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;

4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters

to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of Governors in
order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue the
aforesaid PETITION;

5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President,

Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of the
10th National Convention in Baguio City of withholding from
 him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25 January
2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby
creating the wrong impression that the IBP National President
deliberately prevented him from taking the appropriate
remedies with respect thereto, thus compromising the
reputation and integrity of the IBP National President and the
IBP as a whole.[11]

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the
then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as Urgent Plea to Correct
a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board
Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in
Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified
and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of
Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without
Formal Investigation.[12]

In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts
inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-
complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste,
without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due
process. Pertinent portions of his letter read:

It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and

serious injustice against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive
Vice President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume my position as National
President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x

I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the
Supreme Court even in administrative cases:
1. The denial of the right to answer the
charges formally or in writing. The complaint against
me was in writing.

2. The denial of the right to answer the charges

within a reasonable period of time after receipt of the
complaint.

3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.

4. The denial of the right to confront the

accuser and the witnesses against me. I challenged
Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could question
him. He refused. I offered to testify under oath so I
could be questioned. My request was denied.

5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on

my behalf.

6. The denial of my right to an impartial

judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor,
and judge all at the same time.

7. Gov. Riveras prejudgment of my case becomes

even more evident because when his motion to expel
me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote),
Gov. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he
can vote to support his own complaint and motion to
expel me.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring in original.)
 On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de
Vera.[14] In their Reply, the IBP Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove
Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a
recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were the
following:

(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign

and solicited resolutions from IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP
Board of Governors for its decision to withdraw thePETITION, all with
the end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors
to reconsider the decision to withdraw the PETITION.

(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP

Board of Governors and the IBP National President in public or
during the Plenary Session at the 10th National Convention of
Lawyers.

(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated solicited speakers (at
the plenary session), Atty. de Vera fanned the fire, so to speak, and
went to the extent of making untruthful statements, innuendos and
blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP
Board of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally did so to
provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him
in an acrimonious public debate and expose the IBP Board of
Governors to public ridicule.

(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and

blatant lies, e.g., that some of the members of the IBP Board of
Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without
mentioning names) because nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court,
 nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga kaibigan tayo sa
Court. He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved
the resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to influence or pressure
from the Supreme Court.[15]

The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Veras actuation during the Plenary Session
was the last straw that broke the camels back. He committed acts inimical to the interest
of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him.

On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and
a position paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from
the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.[16]

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a
special meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005,
the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by
Atty. de Veras removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was
formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.[17]

On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty.

Santiago.[18] On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position
through a letter addressed to the IBP Board.[19] Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last
regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose
Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.

On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to

Chief Justice Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazars election. [20] IBP National
President Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazars election be
approved and that he be allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty.
de Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from
the 2003-2005 Board of Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court. [21] Also on 28
June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar.[22]

In his Extended Comment[23] dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that
there was absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from
the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as
EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his
removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least
compliance with the minimum standards of due process of law.

Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious
charges filed against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention,
although undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and
exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and the IBP Board
of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution
of the Board during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or
expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove
him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized
by the incumbent IBP Board.

Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy
of this Courts Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality
of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As
regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said election
was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national
officers, to wit:

Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice
President shall hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their
election until 30 June of their second year in office and until their successors
shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
 In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions
and duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the
event of death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice
President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the
term. In the event of death, resignation, removal or disability of both the
President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall
elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired portion of the term
or during the period of disability.

Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and

employees appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall
hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may
fix.[24]

To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and
the EVP die, resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the
election of an Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP was
made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the express provision
of the IBP By-Laws.

Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his
replacement should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to
the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.

In response to Atty. de Veras averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its
counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and
authority to protect itself from an intractable member by virtue of
Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;

(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and
as IBP EVP not because of his disagreement with the IBP Boards
position but because of the various acts that he committed which the
IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as
a whole;

(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking

his constitutional right to Free Speech because, as a member of the
Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by
others;

(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera,

observed the fundamental principles of due process. As the records
would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting of
the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of
Governor Riveras Letter-Complaint the day before the said meeting;
was furnished a copy of the said Meetings Agenda; and was allowed
to personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;

(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required

number of votes under Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty.
de Vera as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was duly
complied with;

(vi) Atty. de Veras replacement as IBP EVP need not come from
Eastern Mindanao Region because: (a) the rotation rule under Article
 VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already been complied
with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was
elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be enforced if the
same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and,
finally, that

(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should
now be allowed to take his oath as IBP National President.[25]

The Courts Ruling

AC No. 6697

In his Memorandum[26] dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following

issues for the consideration of the Court:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA

(sic) COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL
T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE
PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED

TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic)
 WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE

THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF
RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO

ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052][27]

The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the
fourth issue. Consequently, we will start with the last issue.

A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present

administrative case.

In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:

To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment

against respondent Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:

1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing

the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar
in California; and
 2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation
rule enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06
October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an

earlier administrative case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were
already argued upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and
discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December
2003 in Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty.
Leonard de Vera).

As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:

As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of

his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in
turn compelled him to surrender his California license to
practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for
determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the
position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no
final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge,
as the records relied upon by the petitioners are mere
preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are
recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar
Discipline which are subject to the review of and the final
decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the
complainant in the California administrative case has retracted
the accusation that he misappropriated the complainants
money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by
the investigating officer. xxx
On the administrative complaint that was filed against
respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in
California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered
by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the
charge. He surrendered his license to protest the
discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and
he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find
these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary
proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact
has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners
have not shown how the administrative complaint affects
respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run for governor.

On the other hand, as regards the second issue:

Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is

disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern
Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paraaque and he was
originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only
changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his
ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the
national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP
membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.

The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of

Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys
of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP
Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:

xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws
that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of
the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He
has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he
wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register
his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of
the place where he resides or maintains office. The only
proscription in registering one's preference is that a lawyer
cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same
time.

The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In

fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed
as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth
therein, thus:

xxx

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the
transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the
election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to
transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer

of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001.
One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar
wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr.,
Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero,
Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of
respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them to make the
necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a
 substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in
Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was
made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3
September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the
IBP Chapter Officers were simultaneously held all over the
Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws
which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors
shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other
year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003,
seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent de
Vera's transfer valid as it was done more than three months
ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.

In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco

(Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared
that:

The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial

proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Courts] administrative
powers.

In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from
service for grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for
surreptitiously substituting the bid price in a Certificate of Sale
from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for
disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the same
incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer
be charged on the basis of the same incident. This Court held that while the
respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this
does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly
administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the first case, the
respondent was proceeded against as an erring court personnel under the
Courts supervisory power over courts while, in the second case, he was
disciplined as a lawyer under the Courts plenary authority over membersof
the legal profession.

In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res

judicata still applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty.
Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No.
RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:

While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it

would be contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize
respondent judge a second time for an act which he had
already answered for.

Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs.

Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes
(Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court
held that:

Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment,

the present administrative case becomes dismissible.

xxx

Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by

a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been
finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent
litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It
provides that
 [a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the
parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to
subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or
cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the
party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity,
has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of
competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate
it again.

This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again
the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the
same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets.Equally
important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule
of law.

In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by

the complainant had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier
administrative case. The complainants contention that the principle of res
judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case
was one for disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one
for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is
worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is denominated
as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension
nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the
respondent from assuming office as IBP National President.[28]

Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, In Re:
Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being
Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election and promulgated
on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No.
6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No.
6052 are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are
not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.

In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential
conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be
final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order
on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties,
identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action.[29] In the absence of any one
of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.

It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and
causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty.
de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In
the present administrative complaint, the subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In
the first administrative case, complainants cause of action was Atty. de Veras alleged
violation or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the
primary cause of action is Atty. de Veras alleged violation of lawyers oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the
complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor
forEastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his
Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Veras suspension or
disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was
resolved on the basis of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held
therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as
there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of
candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm
ground to stand on. Likewise, we held that the complainants therein were not the proper
parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the
complainants were not - can file with the IBP President a written protest against the
candidate. The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on
the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws
do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be
disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar
of California suspending him from the practice of law for three years. We held in that case
that

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one

must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is
so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the
individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed,
based on each member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and
elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements
under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate
involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final
judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.[30]

What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a
proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP
Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be
able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition for disqualification but must
first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer
concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition
is sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in
Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera
can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted
by complainant.

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the

State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof
of malpractice.

In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam
of Atty. Leon G. Maquera,[31] we were confronted with the question of whether or not a
member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction
and who was suspended from the practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be
sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the
foreign jurisdiction.

We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera
who was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California,
U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said
jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension
or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension
of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be
taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino

lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or
disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for
disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino
lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the
basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court
merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court
which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment
or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render
the judgment or final order is as follows:

xxxx

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or

final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by

evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.

In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,[32] we explained

that [a] foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of
proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak

of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not
constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must
prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing
officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are
likewise unethical under Philippine law.

There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the

part of Atty. de Vera independent of the
recommendation of suspension by the hearing
officer of the State Bar of California

Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court;

grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by

a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where
he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove
enumerated.
 The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension.[33]

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public
from the misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable
and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. [34] The statutory
enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation
on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the
court over its officers cannot be restricted.[35]

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed

by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term
Malpractice.[36] That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the
practice of law is a profession, not a business.[37]

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical

code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession.[38]

Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar
of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an
insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an
automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis
(father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because
the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in
settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case
which he then deposited to his personal account;[39]
2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty.
de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years;[40] and

3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was
accepted by the Supreme Court of California.[41]

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he
misappropriated his clients funds as the latters father (the elder Willis) gave him authority
to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this
explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he
expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.
By insisting that he was authorized by his clients father and attorney-in-fact to use
the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own
personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainants allegation in the latters
memorandum that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he
deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account and
that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes.[42]

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-
judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence
or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion.[43] It means such evidence which affords a substantial basis from
which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.[44]

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his clients funds is highly
unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this,
thus:
 CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart
from his own and those of others kept by him.

In Espiritu v. Ulep[45] we held that

The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature.

Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and
disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended
for the protection of the client.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to

hold in trust all money and properties of his client that may come into his
possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all money or property collected
or received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of
Professional Ethics:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for

his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of
the confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other

trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should
be reported and accounted for promptly and should not
 under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be
used by him.

Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or

property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that
he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public
confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.

Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross

violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence
in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be
disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases
supplied.)

In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his clients
money for personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission
constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera
now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he himself supplied.

In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to
use the funds intended for the latters son. Atty. de Vera also points out that he had
restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative
case against him in the State Bar of California.[46]

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in

the records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the
funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera[47] we declared that
 When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that
he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome
the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.

Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis
had indeed testified that he expected de Vera might use the money for a few days. As
Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this
statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis
expected de Vera might use the money for a few days was not so much an
acknowledgment of consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his clients funds as it was an
acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his clients funds, which
by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character
was perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his clients money without the
latters acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that
Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own
benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and unethical behavior.He
caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For,
it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished
whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence.[48] Respondent
violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.

Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the
practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. [49] Where any
lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[50] we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension
from his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal
account without the latters knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;[51] Castillo v.
Taguines;[52] Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,[53] the respondents were meted one year
suspension each for failing to remit to their clients monies in the amounts
of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for their clients
without the latters permission. InDumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,[54] we indefinitely suspended
respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00
representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the amount
involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years
is appropriate.

Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where

the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for
his suspension or disbarment

Complainant insists that Atty. de Veras transfer of membership from the Pasay,
Paraaque, Las Pias and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter
is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming
IBP National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of
Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.

In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Veras act of transferring to another
IBP Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the
same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the
transfer be made not less than three months immediately preceding any chapter election.

As it was perfectly within Atty. de Veras right to transfer his membership, it cannot
be said that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly
argue that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see
anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the rotation rule will
produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for
the next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyers Oath do
not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing
perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.

Bar Matter No. 1227

Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC

To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following
issues must be addressed:

I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of

discretion in removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13
May 2005.

i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors

complied with administrative due process in removing Atty. de Vera.
ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for
just and valid cause.

II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25
June 2005, and can consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the
term 2005-2007.

The IBP Board observed due process in its removal

of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor
 We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the
power to remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-
Laws, which states:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should

determine after proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise,
has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by
resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his
position vacant, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be

removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board
meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-
thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval
of the Supreme Court.

In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause,

the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from
among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a
member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term.
(Emphasis supplied)

Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause
by resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject
to the approval of this Court.

In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on
procedural and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied very basic rights of
due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases like the right
to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to present witnesses
in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able
to cross-examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that
Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and
judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially
inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his inhibition resulted in
the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera
asked for another round of voting so he could vote to support his own motion.
The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary
session, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Veras actuations, an evidentiary or
formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de
Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer all the charges
imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the
complaint and that he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the
letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the
opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.

We are in agreement with the IBP Board.

First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life,
liberty and property.[55] It cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property
within the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over
said position as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of the board of
governors for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.

Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones
side.[56] At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term due process of law as used in
the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due to the very nature of the
doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of
law, is not susceptible of more than one general statement.[57] The phrase is so elusive of
exact apprehension,[58] because it depends on circumstances and varies with the subject
matter and the necessities of the situation.[59]

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial
in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon
different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure
and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative
character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The
constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly
established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had
before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before
which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and
considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is required for
hearing may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.[60]

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.[61] Nor is an

actual hearing always essential[62] especially under the factual milieu of this case where
the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause
for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the Supreme Court all
witnessed Atty. de Veras actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.

It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that
he was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic
notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that
Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend himself against the accusations made
by Atty. Rivera.

Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the
complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and
judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially
inhibited himself from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of
the necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted
in favor of his motion.

For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty.
de Veras expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de
Vera).

Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed

for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings
without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of
the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution
adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase remaining members refers to the
members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason
therefore is that such members are interested parties and are thus presumed to be unable
to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de
Vera should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining
members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion
while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.

The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP

Governor for just and valid cause
 All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the
removal of an IBP Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit
it includes three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable
excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested with sufficient power and authority
to protect itself from an intractable member whose removal was caused not by his
disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts committed by him which the IBP
Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in particular and the IBP in general.

Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the
Resolution of the Board during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to
remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision
to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not
recognized by the IBP Board.

After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental
objective of the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find
that Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.

Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not

animosity, are inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP
since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree.
However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts
are brought outside its governing body for then there would be the impression that the
IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its
members in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly diminish the IBPs prestige and
repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.

As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the

governing board itself so as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal
cleavages are made public.
The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and
resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the members have been
given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a
decision on a contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the dissenting minority is
bound thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the
governing board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern
in matters within the authority of the board.[63]

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latters
actuations during the 10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP
Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and
the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme
Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as
improve the administration of justice.
In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a
member of the board who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a
policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The
effectiveness of the board as a governing body will be negated if its pronouncements are
resisted in public by a board member.

Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he
should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision
to his hearts content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the

Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal
as EVP as well

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his
removal as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:
 SEC. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
have a President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the Board
of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x

Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of
Governors. Atty. de Veras removal from the Board of Governors, automatically
disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section
47 of the IBP By-Laws.

The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of

the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it was
rendered without grave abuse of discretion

While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of
supervision over the IBP,[64] it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised
prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not
preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the administration
of its internal affairs governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were
precisely drafted and promulgated so as to define the powers and functions of the IBP
and its officers, establish its organizational structure, and govern relations and
transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in place, the Supreme
Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without
the Courts interference.
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been
vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are elective and
representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws.[65] The
Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the majority.The
foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of
personal interest or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions
of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption [66] of validity, which
shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually
declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and substantial
proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse
of discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Boards action or
resolution.
There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as
provided in Article VI, Section 44[67] of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether
the IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera
from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has been previously established herein,
Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the
IBP Board acted well within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There
being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to
interfere in the Boards resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as
IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was
conducted in accordance with the authority
granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws

In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-
2005 IBP Board of Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post
resulting from the removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely
internal matter, done without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented without violating
the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.

With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board
Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there
was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.
Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority
to fill vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section
8 of the Integration Rule,[68] and Section 11 (Vacancies),[69] Section 44 (Removal of
members),[70] Section 47 (National officers),[71] Section 48 (other officers),[72]and Section
49 (Terms of Office)[73] of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient
guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of
Atty. de Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical
competencies of the remaining members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the
situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.

The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will
assume the Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and
prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47,
which provides that [t]he EVP shall automatically become President for the next
succeeding term. The phrase for the next succeeding term necessarily implies that the
EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next succeeding term
(i.e.,2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of
Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano
Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve
the question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of
Governors.

Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and
thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the
relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.

Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his
removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come
from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section
47, of the IBP By-Laws.
 According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen
by the Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491,
wherein we ruled:

ORDER

xxxx

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-
President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors
of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47,
Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic
succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the
expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's
resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is
hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President

shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board
of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated
among the nine (9) IBP regions.One who has served as president may
not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election
until after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall
have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.

xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)
 In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually
rotated among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency
is merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency.
Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP, while the automatic
succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is
but a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP
By-Laws.

In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election
of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP
and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of
Atty. de Veras removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it impossible for him to
assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been
completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.

Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit
and purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the
latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and
enables the new IBP National President to attend to pressing and urgent matters without
having to expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation
period. The time that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on matters
national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual
succession. It should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further underscored by the
fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP Board of Governors,
who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic
in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP must have
been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic
succession rule for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing
the replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors,
the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 in this case, Governor
Salazar who would have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the
highest position.

It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession
rule if the EVP for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the
House of Delegates of the Eastern Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal
of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month before the expiration of the term of
office of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not
have been able to serve in a national capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP
Presidency.

In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase as much as practicable
to clearly indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions
in compelling and exceptional circumstances.

It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the
IBP national presidency should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanaoregion
from where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-
Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience and the perspective
that only one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would
have.

We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the
IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the
leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been
no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section
47 of the IBP By-Laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

 1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the
practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this
Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal
record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts;

2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated

18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of
the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as
Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave
abuse of discretion;

3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose

Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such
having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and

4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his

oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic
succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon
receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 4, 2009

x-----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan
& Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims.[4] To induce them to hire
his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit[5] of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.
Complainant also attached respondents calling card:[6]

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.[7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,[9] found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice
of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of the
Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a
stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify
the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means
employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted
distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner
by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES

SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and
not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their
wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice
of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently
render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.[14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY

ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice,
a ground for disbarment.[16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR

INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY
MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty. [18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the
very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later

admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless

seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and
Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a
lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.[20] Again the Court
notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving
benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to
his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing
fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for
surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the
free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. [22] It seeks to ensure his
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to
the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients
case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an
additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which
may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his
duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.[24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice [25] which calls for
the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose
of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the
public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.
 Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the
prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere
reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate
to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust
based on his character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional
cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The
phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure
clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial
distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of
the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of
substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that
respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of
Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02
and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4984. April 1, 2003]
ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR.
ROGER PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ,
CELEDONIA CORONACION, and JOSE RABALO, complainants, vs. ATTY.
FELINA DASIG, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, [1] an
official of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross
misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorneys Oath for having used her public
office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In
their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants
allege that respondent, while she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed
acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27,[2] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents
designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she
demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel
Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and
later reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for correction
of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service,
CHED, she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of
P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of
name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service,
CHED, she demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of
P5,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending
 before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even
suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of the
existence of a prior registration
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service,
CHED, she demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a considerable
amount which was subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of
P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for correction of name
then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED... In addition, the
Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen
by Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of name.[3]
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by
filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were subsequently dismissed.[4]
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22),
Section 36[5] of Presidential Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing
to Borela Tire Supply and Novas Lining Brake & Clutch as evidenced by the dishonored
checks she issued,[6] the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to respondent.[7]
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime
against complainant Celedonia R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she
encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening
of May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against the
respondent and her son, docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36.[8]
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President
Joseph Estrada a libelous and unfair report, which maligned the good names and
reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors calculated to justify her ill motive
of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an appointment for
herself.[9]
 In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on
the charges.[10] A copy of said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at
Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches, Quezon City, only to be returned to this
Court with the notation Unclaimed.[11]
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be
served by registered mail to respondent at her office address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office
informed the Court that the said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and
signed for by one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent of respondent on August 27,
1999.[12]
On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to refer the complaint to
the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed
respondent to submit her Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be considered
in default and the case heard ex parte. Respondent failed to heed said order and on
January 8, 2002, the Commission directed her anew to file her Answer, but again she
failed to comply with the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that she had waived
her right to file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint and the case was mainly
resolved on the basis of the documents submitted and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline stated as follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation
of her oath as a government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful
demands or attempted to extort money from certain people who had pending
applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act favorably on
said applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public office in order
to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission
on Higher Education.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for the maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning
that similar action in the future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-
393, the full text of which reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A:; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules; and considering that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher
Education, Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
years.[13]
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-
Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her
malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing of the complaint, was Chief
Education Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and
Standards, CHED.
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined
as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government
official.[14]However, if said misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation
of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the
Bar.[15]
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her
tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon,
Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as
consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or requests before her
office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the
opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to
comment on the charges. We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED
is of such a character as to affect her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer,
she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand sums
of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action
by her office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and
any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action.
The Attorneys Oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for
money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[16] Respondents demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing
of pending applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of
the oath she took when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule
1.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional
obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21,
1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers
including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 [17] of said Code.
Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public
service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional
obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests
pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01[18] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any
unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule
6.02[19] of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private
interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary
value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by
the functions of his office. Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and
good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high
public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon
1[20] and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for
acts of dishonesty as well as gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find
that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years suspension from membership
in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors,
but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality
of this decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct
and dishonesty in violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is hereby ordered DISBARRED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the
records of the respondent, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination
to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY,
and JON DE YSASI,respondents.
F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.
Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would indeed
have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private respondent had
reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the
grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial intervention
despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the Court
cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment
accorded any judicial proceeding before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private
respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental
sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager
of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of Top Form
Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a fixed salary,
with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical
and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and
operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing,
harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to the hacienda and attending
to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose,
he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife
and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two
separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November, 1982, he underwent
fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his
recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In
June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious
hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his
medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April,
1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner
made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary
from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and legal adviser, as well as
for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for
brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed
therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages,
thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the
NLRC, 1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his
employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay petitioner the
amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of
employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation
vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al. 2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the
NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto. 3
His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having been denied for lack of
merit, 5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1)
whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to
reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3)
whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume
the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as the exact date when
petitioner ceased to function as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary
amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the same are in
the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment by
petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a
modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and
conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84, 6 for which reason
the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with the
Court's resolution of November 16, 1992, 7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12, 1992
largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor
Arbiter. 8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is
worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that
because of the special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action
involved, this case could very well go down (in) the annals of the
Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For this case is an action filed
by an only son, his father's namesake, the only child and therefore the only
heir against his own father. 9
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were
noted that may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations.
First, most of the complaints that petitioner and private respondent had with
each other, were personal matters affecting father and son relationship. And
secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work, they allow their
personal relationship to come in the way. 10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of
just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also
charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the findings of the
executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his
functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to
terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for
petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as
only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court. Furthermore, in
seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner for
failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes,
erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page
references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that
technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling,
and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts
in each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the
interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be
rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted
the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the judge who penned
the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment, 11 provided that he draws up his
decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly and accurately
reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence
submitted in the case. 12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T.
Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985,
and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided
the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a
presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions, 13 which
petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the
application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process,
ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure must be interpreted
to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private respondent
in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The strength of
one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law
and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker
shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due
process. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which an employer
may validly terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by
the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed
in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or
offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member
of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the
foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of
labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the closing is for the
purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written
notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the corresponding
separation pay rates provided by law.15 Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the
continued employment of the employee is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his
co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his services provided he receives
the prescribed separation pay. 16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment
by an employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from
employment. 17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely
erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner
abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such employment. For
want of substantial bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the
factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent
NLRC, 18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by law
are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19

The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve
acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982
to December 1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work because
he has a justifiable excuse. Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess
in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of
Dr. Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol.
III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills
sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-
50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod
City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and
to handle only administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. As a
manager, petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day
inside Hacienda Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special
circumstances involved and basic human experience, petitioner's illness
and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be
considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence
from work during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. In any
event, such absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and
hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee
are as follows:
 (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the
employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara, Reviewer in
Labor and Social Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute
abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the
Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of
the intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred
that the employee has no more interest to work. Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I
Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. NLRC(184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to
constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. .
. Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts
unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to
work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment.
First, petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside
Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness and strained family relations.
Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail health. Third,
once able to work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private
respondent of his intention to assume again his employment. Last, but not
the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he
realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner
had no intention to abandon his employment. 20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement
in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it
be denied that private respondent was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the
former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the
latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. The disagreement as to whether
or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization and
corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that on
account of said illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending
physician, 21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of
petitioner, there was justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is
clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence
that is required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of
employment. 22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably
may be classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants an amount of
discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned
myself where I want to go," 24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within
the sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly require him to
keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or to be subjected to specific
control from his employer in every aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he
runs the farm as efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may definitely
not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he proved to be quite successful, as there
was at least a showing of increased production during the time that petitioner was in
charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years
1983 to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from
illness and on account of which his attendance and direct involvement in farm operations
were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by private
respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that the control
contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm administrator and
could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no
explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to begin with)
requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of
residence would justify the termination of his employment. That petitioner changed his
residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably among his basic rights,
nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an
employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's
intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on
the payroll, reported him as an employee of thehacienda for social security purposes, and
paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of
December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he became convinced that petitioner
would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have abandoned his work
and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee. According to private
respondent, whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from
a father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made
therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely stopped giving
said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been
saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral
deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes
de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's
intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of
petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon accomplishment
of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel position that the agreement to
support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts
the initial abandonment to implied voluntary resignation. 25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about
petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion
regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued
performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last
quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and legal adviser
about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since April, 1984, and
his indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work
at the farm as expressed in a letter dated September 14, 1984. 26 With these, petitioner
contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated,
whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled
thereto in view of his continued service as farm administrator. 27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly
be made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative
factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find dismally wanting in
this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans
of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged
though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which private respondent had
full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer
returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor substantiates by any
reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even
after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that
petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform services
directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and
correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment
from G.A. Machineries, Inc., 28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment and
machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders, 29 getting
the payment of the additional cash advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from
Agrotex Commodities, Inc., 30 and remitting to private respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the
normal activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or
even command his child to run errands for him. In the present case, however, considering
the nature of these transactions, as well as the property values and monetary sums
involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to just anyone.
Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at
least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the terms, specifications and
other details relative thereto, such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned
his job or was considered to have done so by private respondent, it would be awkward,
or even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters
relating to or expected of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated
employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority an employer can have over a
dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda.
Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a
sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly accredited planter-
member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA
representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to
(sic) as such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in
my name, place and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the power and authority to sign
for me and in my name, place and stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll
for the said check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to turn the
same over to me for my proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts
therefor.
 That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED
CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been
terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for
an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits, 33 the issuance of
withholding tax reports, 34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and
readiness to go back to work, 35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private
respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's
intention to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition
without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve
reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby foreclosing his
opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the
Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant
Celestina G. Ovejera of said office. 36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of
the proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded
equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary,
pension, allowance orex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement
thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his capacity as farm
administrator. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in
the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative of
petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out.
Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of
concern for his child's welfare, it is rather unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be
necessary and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged
abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the
father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As we have
determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by
petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for services rendered
emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that can
qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also
hard put to imagine how abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary
resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to
terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation as a ground for termination
by the employee of his employment38 does not square with the elements constitutive of
abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private
respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and
hearing. 39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the
employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this
case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was
petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment. 40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out
in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker
shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s)
constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work,
notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations as
stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from
receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires.
 Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a
worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons
therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the employer
shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the Regional Branch of the
Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly report
to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all
dismissals effected by him during the month, specifying therein the names
of the dismissed workers, the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of
commencement and termination of employment, the positions last held by
them and such other information as may be required by the Ministry for
policy guidance and statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner
was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his
impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as
private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of
procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits that no notice was
served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on
September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor
that no notice of termination of the employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. 41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be
denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as
the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires
service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of substantial compliance.
While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an employee,
especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be
lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or
prerogative when it has the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security
of tenure in favor of the employee. 42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor
General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his
defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment, records
somehow showed that he failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic)
aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this failure, the
other requisite for a valid termination by an employer was not
complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the
otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The
validity of the cause of dismissal must be upheld at all times
provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the
respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process
requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 80587).
(Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC, 170
SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is
dismissed for just cause, he must not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe
procedural due process. The public policy behind this is that, it may
encourage the employee to do even worse and render a mockery of the
rules of discipline required to be observed. However, the employer must be
penalized for his infraction of due process. In the present case, however,
not only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is
without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he
has a justifiable excuse. 43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory
provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee
to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of
P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. Private
respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in imposing the fine because that
penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed employees
to the DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of
the implementing rules, and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to
be dismissed by the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of
every worker to security of tenure. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory
mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in case of its
denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
actual reinstatement.
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the
absence of just cause for dismissal. 45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has
tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in
some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the practicability
of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there are strained
relations between the employer and the employee, payment of back wages and
severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement, 46 and more particularly when
managerial employees are concerned. 47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer
possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just
share of what the law accords him. 48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:
 As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his
backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to
the time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But
in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable
Court held that when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be made
between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that
a company which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a
competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the difference
between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order
the reinstatement of managers with the same ease and liberality as that of
rank and file workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement
may not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or antagonism
between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated
as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of
petitioner and private respondent (is) so strained that a harmonious and
peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible. 49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal
from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further prays for exemplary
damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other
employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate
one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a wrongful act or
omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. 50Exemplary damages,
under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are not
recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to decide whether or not they
should be adjudicated. 51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery
of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or
fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy, 52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was
effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do not feel, however, that
an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even if, seemingly,
the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal
where moral and exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were
genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious
exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be
faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this
controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their disparate
claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the
undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in good
faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. For this
reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to
petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following
recommendation of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified.
There was no voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a
justifiable excuse for his absence, or such absence does not warrant
outright dismissal without notice and hearing. Private respondent, therefore,
is guilty of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a
period not exceeding three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of
reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of six months being
considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan,
Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for damages should be
dismissed, for both parties are equally at fault. 54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely
disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their
ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal 55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just
as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to
smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the
direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate
that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever
possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for
dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation. 56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer
shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair
settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short of what was expected
of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that
they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a rapprochement between their
clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have
exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes
of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has
been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor
arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his
jurisdiction." 57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records
of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to
make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves
a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring
resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that we have
adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sanssentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have
failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this
dispute, and that our adherence here to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the
breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties
herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the
impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision,
the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences
on more convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a
period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction, 58 and, in lieu of
reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a
fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.
JONAR SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 6252
Complainant,
Present:

Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and
Carpio Morales,* JJ
Promulgated:
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,
Respondent. October 5, 2004

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

N otaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,
which are impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the
solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out
appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance thereof.
__________________
* On leave.
The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the

Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V.
Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with
deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138 [2] of
the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03[3], Canon 5[4], and Canons
12.07[5] and 12.08
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized

the allegations of the complainant in this wise:

x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others,

that Respondent in notarizing several documents on different dates failed
and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or
community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized
documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification
and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all
in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit

in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein
he was actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on
a certain date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for
Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him
of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats. [6]

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD, [7] Atty. Rafanan filed
his verified Answer.[8] He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified

Complaint. He believed, however, that the

non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents

acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases
pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the
affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate
the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija
-- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants residence certificates on
the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for these
documents.

As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of

Rule 112[9] of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply
or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the

attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.

As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that
lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients on substantial matters, in cases where [their]
testimony is essential to the ends of justice. Complainant charged respondents clients
with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the
alleged crime occurred, his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his
clients after the hearing of their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4,
2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following
day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the
incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted
Certifications[10] from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit[11] of the two police officers who had assisted them.
 Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to
harass him, because he was the counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the
cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.

After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R.

Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the
afternoon. Notices[12] of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the
hearing, only complainant appeared.Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June

8, 2001.[13] The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two oclock in the afternoon.

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply[14] to the verified Answer of
respondent. The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.[15] It also received complainants Letter-Request[16] to

dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order[17] dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner

Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after

which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.

The CBD received complainants Memorandum[18] on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.

The IBPs Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-
2003-172[19] approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent had violated specific

requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the

indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It

modified, however, the recommendation[20] of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to P3,000 with a warning that

any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.

The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and
Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
The Courts Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They
are required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has
presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to
enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. [21] They are also
required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized
by them; and to give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
[them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page
or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded.[22] Failure to perform these
duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public. [23]
 These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the
degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries
public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary
requirements.

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value and meaning of
notarization as follows:

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be

overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts
a private document into a public document thus making that document
admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon
the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties
pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance of the notarial act are
never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of
their duties,[25] which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted --
that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the
residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.
 Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not
mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before the courts and government
agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the
requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these
formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is
appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly
because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an
acceptable justification for breaking the law.
We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint
Counter-Affidavit of respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as
their witnesses Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder,
filed by complainants brother against the aforementioned clients. These documents
became the basis of the present Complaint.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112

of the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the
absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the
oath -- to certify that he has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. Respondent failed to do so with
respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for
the affiants -- he was not required to comply with the certification requirement.
 It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.[26] They are expected to be in
the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with
it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.[27] It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles.Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of
the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by
reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws. [28] No custom or age-old practice provides
sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In
this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial
Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from
the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution.[29] Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should not be decreed.[30] Considering the nature of the infraction and the
absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended
by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo

Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondents clients,
allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of
his client.

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

 Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his
client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing,

authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;

b) on substantial matters, in cases where his

testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he
must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel.

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a

witness,[31] except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged communication arising
from an attorney-client relationship.[32]

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of
dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses
are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are
partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is difficult to
distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an
advocate. The question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who
testify for their clients.
 Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client
will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the
lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a
plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against the lawyers client, they
will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he
fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is
looked upon as partial and untruthful.[33]

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the
same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as
witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active
management of the case.[34]

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty.
Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the
following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that
is authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which
the latters life and liberty are at stake.[35] It is the fundamental right of the accused to be
afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are entitled to suggest
all those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to
ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel,

was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had
the duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating
circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be deprived of
life, liberty or property, except by due process of law.[36]

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of
his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident,
his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged
against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of
respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers

give their testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during
the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. [37] Not being a trial
of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of
securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions;
protecting them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well
as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from useless and
expensive prosecutions.[38]The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to
be followed by the trial proper.

Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from

accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he
may be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in
which his testimony may become essential to serve the ends of justice, the canons of the
profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment

The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and
veiled threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a
bare charge cannot be equated with liability.[39] It is not the self-serving claim of
complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that the
latters allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the
Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is herebyFINED P3,000 with a
warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO,respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR
DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant
Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the
July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an
interested party.She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino
Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree
within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or
custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00,
half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision
thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000
issues of theManila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that
advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to
change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of
the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court
can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old
prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the
charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal
services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long
as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed
Resolution No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that
a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was
noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,[8] which was
denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts
Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether
or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.[10]Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not
submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other
hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority
to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. [12] It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves. [15]The following
elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which
one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving
thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.[16]
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the
fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion
and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing
his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy
& Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to
be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are
a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-
styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in
assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from
the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have
otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage
bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However,
for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If
it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to
the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the
office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is
now acceptable.[21]Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name
and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable
addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions;
public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names
and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be
a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law
list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found
GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672
Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
September 4, 2009

x-----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan
& Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
convinced his clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance[3] and expeditious collection on their claims.[4] To induce them to hire
his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit[5] of James Gregorio
attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with
complainant and utilize respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.
Complainant also attached respondents calling card:[6]

Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and
circulation of the said calling card.[7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
recommendation,[9] found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice
of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of the
Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a
stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify
the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means
employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves constituted
distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner
by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES

SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE
INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and
not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their
wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice
of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently
render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called. [14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY

ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice,
a ground for disbarment.[16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR

INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY
MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the
very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that
respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later

admitted it during the mandatory hearing.

Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless

seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that
respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and
Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a
lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.[20] Again the Court
notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving
benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to
his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal
practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing
fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for
surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the
free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. [22] It seeks to ensure his
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to
the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients
case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an
additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which
may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his
duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.[24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice [25] which calls for
the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose
of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the
public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.
 Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the
prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere
reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate
to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust
based on his character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional
cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The
phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure
clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial
distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of
the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of
substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that
respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of
Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02
and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public
Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO,respondent.
[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR
DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant
Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the
July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT
OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the
Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an
interested party.She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino
Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree
within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or
custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00,
half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision
thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information
Office revealed that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000
issues of theManila Bulletin and August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court
Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint
against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that
advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to
change our views about the prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of
the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court
can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old
prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the
charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal
services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long
as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed
Resolution No. XV-2002-306,[6] finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning that
a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was
noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, [8] which was
denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053
entitled, Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline,
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office,
Respondents. This petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts
Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether
or not they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings.[10]Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not
submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other
hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority
to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.[12] It is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.[15]The following
elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which
one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving
thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.[16]
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself
admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes
repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the
fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion
and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing
his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy
& Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to
be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are
a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-
styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and
undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered
sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in
assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from
the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have
otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage
bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However,
for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If
it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to
the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the
office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is
now acceptable.[21]Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is
likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name
and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable
addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinctions;
public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific
societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names
and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be
a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law
list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found
GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

DIANA RAMOS, A. C. No. 6788

Complainant, (Formerly, CBD 382)

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
-versus- CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,*
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA and
REYES, JJ.

ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG,

Respondent. Promulgated:

August 23, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension[1] against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for
multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

THE COMPLAINT

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty.
Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita
Jovellanos.[2] She gave respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a
receipt for P5,000 only.[3]

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the
Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always
told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the
hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled.[4] This happened six times and for each
appearance in court, respondent charged her P350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She

personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro,
Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the
Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). [5]

RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service
from the very start. In fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney
in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office (predecessor of PAO) of Bian, Laguna and was
assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter.[6]

In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the
Jovellanoses.[7] Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not
an indigent, he declined.[8] Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim
Ungson, a relative who was a private practitioner.[9] Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept
the complainant's case as she was unable to come up with the acceptance fee agreed
upon.[10] Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained
adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she might spend the cash
on hand, the complainant asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she raised the
balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.[11]

A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt

because one of her daughters asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously
given the respondent for safekeeping.[12] Because the complainant was a friend, he
agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.[13]

On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO.[14] A few months later or in
September 1994, the complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the
Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private practitioner, respondent agreed to
prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact with the
complainant.[15]

RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties.
On November 22, 2004, the CBD submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP
Board of Governors.[16]
The CBD noted that the receipt[17] was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still
with the PAO.[18] It also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd
businesswoman and that respondent was a seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the
complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would respondent have
issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to
accommodate a friend's request.[19] It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions
on government lawyers from accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other
than their salaries.[20] The CBD concluded that respondent violated the following
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from a client.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows
or should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render
such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating
counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years
and ordered him to immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which
was substantiated by the receipt.[21]

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that
respondent violated Rules 1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's recommendation with regard to the
restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995 or, in case
of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional suspension of six
months.[22]

THE COURT'S RULING

We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. [23] More
specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their
actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar
but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service. [24]

Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service.

For this reason, the private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials
and employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

 (1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their
official function.[25]

Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected
to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.

In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt
on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from
a client establishes an attorney-client relationship.[26] Respondent's admission that he
accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an
attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt
showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer.
Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on private practice of profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was
created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants.[27] Section
14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 14. xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending
free legal assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor,
administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.[28]

As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the
complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's mission.[29] Respondent violated the
prohibition against accepting legal fees other than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY

THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW
AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.[30] This undertaking includes the observance
of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted
the complainant's cases and received attorney's fees in consideration of his legal
services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule
18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private
practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting
attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he
fail to file a complaint against the Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have
done), respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an action against
the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried and asked the
complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings that never took place. These acts
constituted dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.[31]

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required
of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are
expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A
government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social
responsibility, higher than his brethren in private practice.[32]
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the
benefit of the complainant but accepted it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the
amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in
satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client) [33] nor was it given to him for a
specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond). [34] Nevertheless,
respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to
attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.[35]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyers oath, Canon
1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to return to
complainant the amount of P5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995,
within 10 days from receipt of this resolution.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in

the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
the country.
SO ORDERED.
GISELA HUYSSEN, A.C. No. 6707
Complainant,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ,
Respondent. March 24, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
This treats of a Complaint[1] for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against respondent
Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez.
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American
citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under Section 13[g] of the Immigration
Law. Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa applications will be
favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a
period of one year which could be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit
was indeed required by law, complainant deposited with respondent on six different
occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of US$20,000. Respondent
prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the
complainant but refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her demands. After
one year, complainant demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured
her that said amount would be returned. When respondent failed to return the sum
deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a member) sent a
demand letter to respondent for the immediate return of the money. In a letter dated 1
March 1999, respondent promised to release the amount not later than 9 March
1999. Failing to comply with his promise, the World Mission for Jesus sent another
demand letter. In response thereto, respondent sent complainant a letter dated 19 March
1999 explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of deposited amount. He
enclosed two blank checks postdated to 6 April and20 April 1999 and authorized
complainant to fill in the amounts. When complainant deposited the postdated checks on
their due dates, the same were dishonored because respondent had stopped payment
on the same. Thereafter, respondent, in his letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999,
explained the reasons for stopping payment on the checks, and gave complainant five
postdated checks with the assurance that said checks would be honored. Complainant
deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates but they were all dishonored for
having been drawn against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped
by respondent. After respondent made several unfulfilled promises to return the deposited
amount, complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who sent two demand letters to
respondent. The demand letters remained unheeded.

Thus, a complaint[2] for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline,

required[3] respondent to submit his answer within 15 days from receipt thereof.
In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,[4] respondent denied the allegations in the
complaint claiming that having never physically received the money mentioned in
thecomplaint, he could not have appropriated or pocketed the same. He said the amount
was used as payment for services rendered for obtaining the permanent visas in the
Philippines. Respondent explained thus:

a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and

likewise a friend of the complainant, the latter was introduced to me at my
office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem concerning their stay
in the Philippines, herself and three sons, one of which is already of major
age while the two others were still minors then. Their problem was the fact
that since they have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years
as holders of missionary visas (9G) they could no longer extend their said
status as under the law and related polic[i]es of the government, missionary
visa holders could only remain as such for ten (10) years after which they
could no longer extend their said status and have to leave the country.

b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I

advised them that they better secure a permanent visa under Section 3 of
the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota Visa and
thereafter, provided them with list of the requirements in obtaining the said
visa, one of which is that the applicant must have a $40,000 deposited in
the bank. I also inform that her son Marcus Huyssen, who was already of
major age, has to have the same amount of show money separate of her
money as he would be issued separate visa, while her two minor children
would be included as her dependents in her said visa application. I advised
them to get a lawyer (sic), complainant further requested me to refer to her
to a lawyer to work for their application, which I did and contacted the late
Atty. Mendoza, an Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the complainant and
her family.

c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up

by the said Atty. Mendoza until the same was finished and the
corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant and her
family. Her son Marcus Huyssen was given an independent permanent visa
while the other two were made as dependents of the complainant. In
between the processing of the papers and becoming very close to the
complainant, I became the intermediary between complainant and their
counsel so much that every amount that the latter would request for
whatever purpose was coursed through me which request were then
transmitted to the complainant and every amount of money given by the
complainant to their counsel were coursed thru me which is the very reason
why my signature appears in the vouchers attached in the complaint-
affidavit;

d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount

appeared to be huge for services of a lawyer that I myself began to wonder
why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and inquired from him
regarding the matter and the following facts were revealed to me:

1) That what was used by the

complainant as her show money from the bank is not really
her money but money of World Mission for Jesus, which
therefore is a serious violation of the Immigration Law as there
 was a misrepresentation. This fact was confirmed later when
the said entity sent their demand letter to the undersigned
affiant and which is attached to the complaint-affidavit;

2) That worst, the same amount used

by the complainant, was the very same amount used by her
son Marcus Huyssen, in obtaining
his separate permanent visa.These acts of the complainant
and her son could have been a ground for deportation and
likewise constitute criminal offense under the Immigration Law
and the Revised Penal Code. These could have been the
possible reason why complainant was made to pay for quite
huge amount.

e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant

and her family became very close to undersigned and my family that I was
even invited to their residence several times;

f) However after three years, complainant demanded the

return of their money given and surprisingly they want to recover the same
from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no longer around, he died
sometime 1997;

g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is

now being hidden and that the amount of money is now being sought to be
recovered from me;

h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a

lawyer I know the consequences of having signed the same and therefore I
had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund needed but up to the
present my standby loan application has not been released and was
 informed that the same would only be forthcoming second week of
August. The same should have been released last March but was aborted
due to prevalent condition. The amount to be paid, according to the
complainant has now become doubled plus attorneys fees of P200,000.00.

Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her
Formal Offer of Evidence on 25 August 2003.

On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondents evidence but
the scheduled hearings (11 settings) were all reset at the instance of the respondent who
was allegedly out of the country to attend to his clients needs. Reception of respondents
evidence was scheduled for the last time on 28 September 2004 and again respondent
failed to appear, despite due notice and without just cause.

On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her

report[5] recommending the disbarment of respondent. She justified her recommendation
in this manner:
At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent
received the amount of US$20,000 from complainant, as respondent
himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes A to F of
complainant) showing his receipt of said amount from complainant.
Respondent however claims that he did not appropriate the same for
himself but that he delivered the said amount to a certain Atty. Mendoza.
This defense raised by respondent is untenable considering the
documentary evidence submitted by complainant. On record is the 1 March
1999 letter of respondent addressed to the World Mission for Jesus (Annex
H of Complaint) where he stated thus:

I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of

the deposit but I repeat, nobody really intended that the thing
 would happen that way. Many events were the causes of the
said delay particularly the death of then Commissioner
L. Verceles, whose sudden death prevented us the needed
papers for the immediate release. It was only from compiling
all on the first week of January this year, that all the said
papers were recovered, hence, the process of the release just
started though some important papers were already finished
as early as the last quarter of last year. We are just going
through the normal standard operating procedure and there is
no day since January that I do not make any follow ups on the
progress of the same.

and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated
thus:

I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of

the amount deposited by your good self in connection with the
procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family. It
might take some more time before the Bureau could release
the refund as some other pertinent papers are being still
compiled are being looked at the files of the late
Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa and who
died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would
be fine later as all the documents needed are already intact.
This is just a bureaucratic delay.

From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000
was officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued
by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and
official receipts therefore were never issued by the said Bureau? Also, why
 would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return of the
money to complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the
Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the
inescapable conclusion that respondent received the money from
complainant and appropriated the same for his personal use. It should also
be noted that respondent has failed to establish that the late Atty. Mendoza
referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There is not one
correspondence from Atty. Mendoza regarding the visa application of
complainant and his family, and complainant has also testified that she
never met this Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking

advantage of his position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused
damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted that
respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public

position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow
the latter to interfere with his public duties.

On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved[6] the Investigating

Commissioners report with modification, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
 applicable laws and rules, and considering respondents violation of
Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of
law and ordered to return the amount with legal interest from
receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to the
Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for
appropriate administrative action.

We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be severely
sanctioned.

We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official task have more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral
integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public
office.[7]

It is undisputed that respondent admitted[8] having received the US$20,000 from

complainant as shown by his signatures in the petty cash vouchers [9] and receipts[10] he
prepared, on the false representation that that it was needed in complainants application
for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated the said amount and
interposed the defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted
complainant and children in their application for visa in the BID.[11] Such defense remains
unsubstantiated as he failed to submit evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty.
Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate of said Atty.
Mendoza.Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has been
naturally silenced by fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him.[12] He must
show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times
is expected of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records
show that even though he was given the opportunity to answer the charges and controvert
the evidence against him in a formal investigation, he failed, without any plausible reason,
to appear several times whenever the case was set for reception of his evidence despite
due notice.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled
that denial is inherently a weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong
evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is purely self-serving and is with nil
evidentiary value.

When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he

indirectly admitted the charge. Such admissions were also apparent in the following
letters of respondent to complainant:

1) Letter[13] dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:

Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said
deposit is forthcoming, the latest of which is 09 March 1999. Should it not
be released on said date, I understand to pay the same to you out of my
personal money on said date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send
somebody here at the office on that day and the amount would be given to
you wether (sic) from the Bureau or from my own personal money.

2) Letter[14] dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:

I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the

amount deposited by your goodself in connection with the procurement of
your permanent visa and that of your family.
 It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the
refund as some other pertinent papers are still being compiled and are being
looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your
visa and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would
be fine later as all the documents needed are already intact. This is just a
bureaucratic delay.

xxxx

As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2
checks, one dated April 6, 1999 and the other one dated April 20, 1999. I
leave the amount vacant because I would want you to fill them up on their
due dates the peso equivalent to $10,000 respectively. This is to be sure
that the peso equivalent of your P20,000 would be well exchanged. I have
postdated them to enable me to raise some more pesos to cover the whole
amount but dont worry as the Lord had already provided me the means.

3) Letter[15] dated 25 April 1999 provides:

Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I
have done my very best for the early return of your money but the return is
becoming bleak as I was informed that there are still papers lacking. When
I stopped the payment of the checks I issued, I was of the impression that
everything is fine, but it is not. I guess it is time for me to accept the fact that
I really have to personally return the money out of my own. The issue should
stop at my end. This is the truth that I must face. It may hurt me financially
but it would set me free from worries and anxieties.

I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to
secure one last Saturday the releases of which are on the following:
 May 4, 1999- 200,000
May 11, 1999 -200,000
May 20, 1999-200,000
June 4, 1999-200,000

I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my

collateral.

I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks

which I assure you will be sufficiently funded on their due dates by reason
of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the last time, if any of these
checks, is returned, dont call me anymore. Just file the necessary action
against me, I just had to put an end to this matter and look forward. x x x

4) Letter[16] dated 12 May 1999, which reads:

The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to

cover the first check I issued. In fact I stopped all payments to all other
checks that are becoming due to some of my creditors to give preference
to the check I issued to you.

This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead
of returning the other checks I requested for stop payment - instead honored
them and mistakenly returned your check. This was a very big surprise to
me and discouragement for I know it would really upset you.

In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in

cash which I initially plan to withdraw from the Bank. However, I could not
entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I bring the same to your
 place considering that its quite a big amount. I am just sending a check for
you to immediately deposit today and I was assured by the bank that it
would be honored this time.

Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating
the money of another. As correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner,
respondent would not have issued his personal checks if said amount were officially
deposited with the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.

Respondents act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latters

pending application for visas is violative of Rule 1.01[17] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any
unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule
6.02[18] of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their
private interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be
affected by the functions of his office.[19] Respondents conduct in office betrays the
integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one
occupying a high public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from
any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry
in government; he must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and
observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in
government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of
social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went
on committing another by issuing several worthless checks, thereby compounding his
case.

In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross
misconduct,[20] as the effect transcends the private interests of the parties directly
involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the
public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer
who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his
fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and
duty, justice, honesty or good morals.[21]
Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the
time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with,
thedrawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment, is also a
manifestation of moral turpitude.[22]
Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of
complainant; worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and
issued checks to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue, being
a member of the bar.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a
special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally. A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his
dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the
lawyer to administrative sanctions which includes suspension and disbarment. [23] More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to
the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for
the revocation of such privilege.[24]

Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish
and discipline the erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of
justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to
remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyers oath
have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of
the bar.[25] These pronouncement gain practical significance in the case at bar
considering that respondent was a former member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the
BID. It bears stressing also that government lawyers who are public servants owe fidelity
to the public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be more
sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to
be magnified in the public eye.[26]

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the
strict demands and high standards of the legal profession.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended by this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2)
malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party without authority to do so.[27]
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,[28] we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during her
tenure as OIC, Legal Services, Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of
money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting action by
her office. In Lim v. Barcelona,[29] we also disbarred a senior lawyer of the National Labor
Relations Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in the act
of receiving and counting money extorted from a certain person.
Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain
the high standards of the Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal
profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of expulsion from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers.[30]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law
and ordered to return the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest
from his receipt of the money until payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of
the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action. Let copies of
this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and
the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private
practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special
Administratrix of his estate. 1Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of
Taggat Industries, Inc. 2
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained
Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. 3 until his appointment as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992. 4
Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of
timber concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good
Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. 6
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal
complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No.
97-240 ("criminal complaint"). 7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took
over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld
payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July
1997. 8
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary
investigation. 9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651
Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code
of the Philippines. 13
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.
Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat,
knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from
hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. 14Furthermore,
complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed
and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the
complaint. 15
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of
law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove
that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and
February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000
for the month of April 1996. 18
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private practice of law
while working as government prosecutor.
Respondent refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was merely
aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and contrary to
her expectation. 19
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had resigned
from Taggat for more than five years. 20 Respondent asserts that he no longer owed his
undivided loyalty to Taggat. 21 Respondent argues that it was his sworn duty to conduct
the necessary preliminary investigation. 22 Respondent contends that complainant failed
to establish lack of impartiality when he performed his duty. 23 Respondent points out that
complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal
complaint 24 but instead complainant voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit
without mental reservation. 25
Respondent states that complainant’s reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her
impression that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned from
complainant’s statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:
xxx
Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn’t think he would do it, Madam Witness?
A. Because he is supposed to be my father’s friend and he was working with my Dad and
he was supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he gonna
help me. x x x. 26
Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not
representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely
performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 27Respondent argues that
complainant failed to establish that respondent’s act was tainted with personal interest,
malice and bad faith. 28
Respondent denies complainant’s allegations that he instigated the filing of the cases,
threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this accusation is
bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the employees or
present them for cross-examination. 29
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government
prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims that it
was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996. 30 Respondent contends that the
fees were paid for his consultancy services and not for representation. Respondent
submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that rendering
consultancy services is not prohibited. 31 Respondent, in his Reply-Memorandum, states:
x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by Taggat
without the respondent’s asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a case-to-case
basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show or translate as a
specie of ‘conflict of interest’. Moreover, these consultations had no relation to, or
connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by former Taggat
employees. 32
Respondent insists that complainant’s evidence failed to prove that when the criminal
complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan, respondent
was still the retained counsel or legal consultant. 33
While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by respondent
to file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional
State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999. 34 Hence, the
criminal complaint was dismissed. 35
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M.
Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the parties
to submit their respective memoranda. 37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas’ resignation,
the case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP Commissioner
Funa"). 38
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 November
2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa’s Report and
Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure to
safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private
practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of
law. The Report reads:
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this issue
will require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with his former
position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie Lim-Santiago,
was being accused as having the "management and control" of Taggat (p. 2, Resolution
of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein
Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat.
Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of
Taggat. Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in
I.S. No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with
Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, the
mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with Respondent.
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a
former client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing
anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented
him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed.)
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent any
client or any interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a lawyer has
an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that he previously handled
for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, labor policies, and labor
relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat.
I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it
would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not been labor-related, or if Respondent
had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No.
97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a former Personnel Manager of Taggat.
xxxx
While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries being
sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and
management involved are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager
and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary
relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of its
management.
xxxx
As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein
Complainant while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal
consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had long
been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private
practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People
v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal
consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts
that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any
activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal principles, practice
or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105
Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and
instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.
Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to safeguard
a former client’s interest, and violating the prohibition against the private practice of law
while being a government prosecutor. 40
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section
12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent liable for
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against
unlawful conduct. 42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section
7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition
"not [to] represent conflicting interests." 44However, this rule is subject to certain
limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no
conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full
disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. 45 Moreover,
considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the
administrative penalty. 46
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful x x
x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a
government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend
to conflict with [his] official functions." 47
Complainant’s evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented
conflicting interests
In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict of
interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use
against his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or
previous employment. 49 In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain
inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him. 50

In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the
preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The
issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1
April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with Taggat
during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be
presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any
confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established
participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one
who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily
follow that respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment
with complainant or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint.
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel
of Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor-related is not a
sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A lawyer’s
immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the
lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer
the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled for the
former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her allegations.
Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government
prosecutor
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as –
x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill." 51
"Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 52

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently

and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument
is without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and
retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered
by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the
term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant
while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the
payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." 53 Thus, as correctly pointed out by
complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of
Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no
jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 – the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts involved also transgress
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon
1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal
services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which
constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.
Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct when
respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:
In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and
indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his name
removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:
xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of office
and in his dealings with the public. 54
On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts. 55
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in
unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to
one year. 56 We find this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended
to respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109870 December 1, 1995
EDILBERTO M. CUENCA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:
After his petition for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment 1 affirming his conviction for
violation of the "Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No. 115) was denied by this
Court in a Resolution dated February 9, 1994, 2 petitioner filed on July 6, 1994 a pleading
entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL" 3 setting forth, in relation to the motion for new trial:
6. The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly discovered
evidence and excusible (sic) negligence, and shall be supported by
affidavits of:
(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who will
exculpate petitioner;
(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of the
owner of Ultra Corporation (the Corporation that employed
petitioner), which actually exercised control over the affairs of
Ultra; and
(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for the first
time and explain why he was unable to do so earlier.
The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution, 4 among other things, granted the
substitution but denied the motion for leave to file motion for new trial, "the petition
having been already denied on February 9, 1994."
Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL", 5 and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO
ADMIT" on August 17, 1994. 6 The Court thereafter required the Solicitor General to
comment on said motion and manifestation within ten (10) days from notice, in a
Resolution dated September 7, 1994. 7
In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were given by the Court, 8 the
Solicitor General himself recommends that petitioner be entitled to a new trial, proceeding
from the same impression that a certain Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn
statement is an admission against interest which may ultimately exonerate petitioner from
criminal liability. The full text of Mr. Rodolfo Cuenca's "Affidavit" 9 reads:
RODOLFO M. CUENCA, Filipino, of legal age, with the residence at
Urdaneta Village, Makati, Metro Manila, after being duly sworn and (sic)
state that:
1. During the years 1967 until February 1983, I was the President and Chief
Executive Officer of Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP).
2. During that period, I controlled an effective majority of the voting shares
of stock of CDCP.
3. Sometime in 1974, upon my initiative, CDCP together with its affiliated
companies, organized a number of wholly-owned service corporations. One
of these was Ultra International Trading Corporation, whose purpose was
to serve and supply the needs of CDCP and its other subsidiaries with lower
value goods and using Ultra's financial resources.
4. The directors in Ultra Corporation were nominees of CDCP, and received
the instructions directly from me and or Mr. Pedro Valdez, Chairman of
CDCP.
5. From Ultra's inception, my brother, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca was
appointed President and Chief Executive Officer. On March, 1979, I
instructed Ultra through my brother, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca to purchase for
CDCP various steel materials. These materials were received by CDCP and
are covered by the trust receipts which are the subject of this case.
6. In 1980, CDCP suffered cashflow problems, and consciously omitted
payment to Ultra for the delivery of the said steel materials. As a nominee
of CDCP, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca merely acted as agent for CDCP. As
such, CDCP provided him with the guarantees needed to persuade China
Bank to issue the said trust receipts. On the basis of such guarantees, along
 with informal assurances issued by CDCP to China Bank that the
transactions of Ultra were undertaken for and on behalf of CDCP and CDCP
Mining Corporation, Ultra was able to obtain credit facilities, among which
included the trust receipts subject of this case.
7. However, Mr. Edilberto M. Cuenca had no power to cause the payment
of said trust receipts because the common Treasurer and controller of both
CDCP and Ultra, Ms. Nora Vinluan, acted under my control and I did not
allow her to make the appropriate payments.
8. To my knowledge, CDCP has not paid Ultra the amounts corresponding
to the materials covered by the trust receipts subject of this case.
9. By the time final demand to pay on the trust receipts were (sic) served in
1984, Mr. Edilberto Cuenca was no longer president of Ultra Corporation
and could not have possibly cause (sic) Ultra Corporation to pay.
10. I have executed this affidavit in order to accept personal responsibility
for the trust receipts subject of this case and to exculpate Mr. Edilberto
Cuenca of the criminal charges which he has asked this Honorable Court
to review.
11. Accordingly, I also undertake to pay the civil obligations arising from the
subject trust receipts.
(Sgd.)
RODOLFO M.
CUENCA
Affiant
And the Solicitor General had this to say:
Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial.
However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against
his own interests under Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and
it casts doubt on the culpability of his brother Edilberto Cuenca, the
petitioner. Hence, the alleged confession of guilt should be given a hard
look by the Court.
 The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness and
due execution of his brother's affidavit in the interest of justice and fair play.
Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
prosecutors who represent the People of the Philippines in a criminal case
are not duty bound to seek conviction of the accused but to see that justice
is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:
Canon 6 — These canons shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official tasks.
Rule 6.01 — The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public
prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done.
The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses
capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) that prosecutors represent a
sovereign "whose obligation to govern impartially is compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done (Time
to Rein in the Prosecution, by Atty. Bruce Fein, published on p. 11, The
Lawyers Review, July 31, 1994). (Emphasis supplied.) 10
Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago,
this Court ruled that it is not authorized to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or
new trial predicated on allegedly newly discovered evidence the rationale of which being:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and
cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an appeal
by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has no jurisdiction to entertain
a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, for only
questions of fact are involved therein.
the rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in subsequent cases
like "Helmuth, Jr. v. People" 11 and "People v. Amparado". 12
In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition
of the Solicitor General, granted new trial to the convicted accused concerned on the
basis of proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court considered as
newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of conviction.
Being similarly circumstanced, there is no nagging reason why herein petitioner should
be denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under the circumstances
considering that the "People" does not raise any objection to a new trial, for which reason
the Solicitor General ought to be specially commended for displaying once again such
statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.
WHEREFORE, petitioner's Motion For New Trial is hereby GRANTED. Let the case be
RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the court of origin for reception of petitioner's evidence.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005]
OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition for disbarment[1] filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for
having been found guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of
Deeds of Marawi City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case
earlier filed by complainant against respondent. In said case, which was initially
investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant charged respondent
with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah, [2] Ambobae Bauduli Datu,
Matabae Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and
manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are
relatives of respondent.[3]
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating
officer, Enrique Basa, absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:
It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but
that he has no case at all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises
considered, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against respondent be
dismissed for lack of merit and evidence.[4]
The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report
dated 08 September 1992, then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated
respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity in the custody of documents.
He, however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent issuance of
TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting
Law instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latters co-accused. As a result
of this finding, Secretary Drilon recommended respondents dismissal from service.
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order
No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering
respondents dismissal from government service. Respondent subsequently questioned
said administrative order before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition[5] claiming that the Office of the President did not have the authority and
jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that respondents [6] in that petition
violated the laws on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the
administrator of the LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated
his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition for failure on the
part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned order.[7] Respondent thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution of 15 November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before
us, seeking the disbarment of respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious
that respondent had proven himself unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an
attorney[8] and that he poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession. [9]
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his
issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both
law[10] and jurisprudence support his stance that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register
of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of
the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in
the documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-
bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal
complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad
Abdullah and the latters co-defendants. Respondent explains that his participation in said
case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating
prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved in said dispute.
He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was
based solely on the evidence presented by the parties. Complainants allegation,
therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is totally unjustified.
 Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995,[11] this Court referred this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced the investigation of this disbarment suit.
On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued the following order
relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent portion of this order provides:
ORDER
When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.
The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of
evidence vis--vis this case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of
the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed. Accordingly, transmit the records of this case
to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action.[12]
On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving
Commissioner Fernandezs recommendation for the transfer of venue of this
administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region governor to designate
the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and
recommendation.[13] The IBP Resolution states:
Resolution No. XII-96-153
Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong
RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
for the Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao
Region Governor George C. Jabido to designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to
conduct the investigation, report and recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline,
wrote a letter dated 23 October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President
of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter to receive the evidence in this case and to
submit his recommendation and recommendation as directed by the IBP Board of
Governors.[14]
In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter[15] informed
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel [16] had sent
notices to both complainant and respondent for a series of hearings but respondent
consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five years.
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the
transmittal of the records of this case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the
IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as Commissioner Fernandezs Order
dated 23 February 1996.
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato
Chapter to comment on respondents motion.[17] Complying with this directive, the panel
expressed no opposition to respondents motion for the transmittal of the records of this
case to IBP Marawi City.[18] On 25 September 1998, Commissioner Fernandez ordered
the referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of respondents
evidence.[19] This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors
in its Resolution No. XIII-98-268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides:
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the
transmittal of the case records of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is
directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted by Cotabato Chapter and report
the same to the Board of Governors.[20]
Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October
1998 a motion praying that the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken
from the records.[21] Respondent insists that the investigating panel constituted by said
IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the investigation of this case since IBP
Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner Fernandezs Order of 23 February 1996 clearly
vested IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that
he was never notified of any hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter
thereby depriving him of his right to due process.
Complainant opposed[22] this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches.
According to complainant, the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato
Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly notified of the hearings conducted by
the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did nothing to defend himself. He
also claims that respondent did not even bother to submit his position paper when he was
directed to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter,
complainant maintains that the presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally,
complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP Marawi City would only entail a
duplication of the process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato Chapter.
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,[23] Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP
Cotabato Chapter to submit proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the
investigating panel as well as for the submission of the position paper were duly received
by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP Cotabato
Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the
panels order dated 4 August 1997.[24] Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No.
3663 issued by the local post office. On the lower portion of the registry receipt was a
handwritten notation reading Atty. Mosib A. Bubong.
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo,
Chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and
recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter. This directive had the approval of
the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued on 30 June
2001, to wit:
RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the
Transfer of Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an
investigation, re-evaluation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from
receipt of notice.[25]
Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father,
Omar P. Ali, complainant in this case. According to her, her father passed away on 12
June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic brotherhood, she was requesting the
withdrawal of this case.[26]
Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to
direct the chairman of the Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and
authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter to conduct an investigation of this
case.[27] This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo in an Order dated
19 July 2002.[28]According to Atty. Castillo
After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the
report of the IBP Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of
respondent, the undersigned sees no need for any further investigation, to be able to
make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP Chapter of Cotabato
City.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del
Norte is hereby denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, IBP National Office within ten (10) days from date hereof.
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and
conclusion of IBP Cotabato Chapter ratiocinating as follows:
The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the
President in Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein
respondent was found guilty of Grave Misconduct in:
a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,
b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.
And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In
the Comment filed by respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good
faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and a denial of the charge of manipulating the
criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by the way, was filed
against respondents relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the President in
Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into
account and fully explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words,
the finding of Grave Misconduct on the part of respondent by the Office of the President
was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very strong weight in considering
the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case.
In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing
the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato. [29]
In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved, with modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty.
Castillo. The modification pertained solely to the period of suspension from the practice
of law which should be imposed on respondent whereas Atty. Castillo concurred in the
earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP
Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.
 On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP
which the latter denied as by that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this
Court.[30]
The issue thus posed for this Courts resolution is whether respondent may be
disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in the employ of the government.
We resolve this question in the affirmative.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply
because he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon
6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a
government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show
moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds.[31] Although the general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may
not be disciplined as a member of the bar for infractions he committed as a government
official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a
violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.[32]
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,[33] we ordered the
disbarment of respondent on the ground of his dismissal from government service
because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we
declared
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress
upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose
shoulders rests the grave responsibility of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy
and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid
discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice
triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its
exalted place. From a lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those
qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and
the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which, throughout the centuries,
have been compendiously described as moral character.[34]
 Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig, [35] this Court found
sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she
was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As
we had explained in that case
[A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which
might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must
also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of
the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher
than her brethren in private practice.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the
President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer.
By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing
his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives,
respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a
civil servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is explicit on this matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote
or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidence in the public office
he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived
use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal
of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting
for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as
proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance,
settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same.[37] As we have previously explained in the case
of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:[38]
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest
of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule
is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and
afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice
from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to
answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the
person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens
may have in the proper administrative of justice.[39]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.