1. People v. Lacson, G.R. No.

149453, October 7, 2003

SUMMARY:

FACTS:
1. Lacson asserts that the retroactive application of penal laws should also cover procedures and that
these should be applied only to the sole benefit of the accused.
2. He also asserts that Sec. 8 was meant to reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line
with the constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy trial. In this case, the State had been given more
than sufficient opportunity to prosecute the respondent anew after March 29, 1999 dismissal of the
cases by Judge Agnir, Jr. and before the RRCP took effect on Dec. 1, 2000.
● Thus according to Lacson, the petitioners filed the informations with the RTC beyond the 2
year bar, in violation of his right to speedy trial, and was designed to derail his bid for the
Senate.
3. However, petitioner’s assert that the prospective application of Sec. 8 is in keeping with the
Constitution which provides that the rules of procedure shall not diminish, increase or m odify
substantial rights. It should also not preclude the equally important right of the State to public justice.
4. Furthermore, the offended parties must be given notices of the motion for provisional dismissal of the
cases under Sec. 8 since the provision states. Thus, if no requisite notices to the heirs of the deceased
would be taken into consideration, the 2 year period had not yet even commenced to run.

ISSUE:
1. WON the Court is mandated to apply Sec. 8, Rule 117 retroactively without reservations on the
basis of it being favorable to the accused
HELD: No

RATIO:
● The rule should be applied prospectively. The Court upheld the petitioner’s contention that
while Sec. 8 secures the rights of the accused, it does not and should not preclude the equally
important right of the State to public justice. If a procedural rule impairs a vested right or would
be unjust, the said rule may not be given its retroactive application.
● The Court is not mandated to apply rules retroactively simply because it is favorable to the
accused. The time-bar under the new rule is intended to benefit both the State and the
accused. When the rule was approved by the court, it was intended that the rule be applied
prospectively and not retroactively, for to do so would be tantamount to the denial of the State’s
right to due process. A retroactive application would result in absurd, unjust and oppressive
consequences to the State.
○ The Court emphasized that it has fixed a time bar of 1 or 2 years for the revival of
criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and a
prior notice to the offended party. It balances the societal interests of all parties.

DOCTRINE:

2. Heirs of Honrales v. Honrales, G.R. No. 182651, August 25, 2010

SUMMARY:

FACTS:
1. On August 19, 2002, Jane Honrales was fatally shot by her husband, respondent Jonathan
Honrales.
2. In resolution dated October 28, 2002, Bernardino Camba, Assistant Prosecutor of Manila,
recommended the filing of an information for parricide against respondent.
3. On November 18, 2002, an Information was filed against respondent with the RTC of Manila stating:
That on or about August 19, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon one JANE HONRALES y
ILAGAN, his legal wife, by then and there shooting her with a 45 cal. pistol, thereby inflicting upon the latter a gunshot
wound of the head and neck which was the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter. Commented [1]: Hi janice, don't forget :--)
4. On November 22, 2002, respondent moved to reconsider the October 28, 2002 resolution of ACP
Camba which recommended the filing of parricide charges. Respondent later also filed a supplement to
his motion
5. In view of respondents motion for reconsideration, 2nd ACP Alfredo E. Ednave moved that the RTC
defer proceedings.
6. Respondent in turn filed an Urgent Ex-PArte Motion to Recall Warrant of Arrest

PROCEDURE:
1.
2.
3.
4.

ISSUE:
HELD:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

3. People v. Andrade, et.al., November 24, 2014

SUMMARY:

FACTS:
Director of the Bureau of Corrections Santiago instructed a random drug test to be conducted in the
National Bilibid Prison.
● Urine samples of 38 inmates were collected. 21 urine samples, which included respondents,
tested positive.
● Those 21 inmates were charged with violation of Section 15, Article II of RA 9165.

PROCEDURE:
1. Upon arraignment, all the respondents pleaded “not guilty” to the crime charged. Respondents then
filed a Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the facts alleged in the Information do not
constitute a violation of Section 15, RA 9165.
● That under RA 9165, the offense is committed by a person apprehended or arrested for using
dangerous drug, and who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug after a confirmatory
test.
● That here, the accused were never apprehended or arrested for using a dangerous drug or for
violating the provisions of RA 9165, which would warrant drug testing and serve as basis for filing the
proper Information in court. In fact, the accused were merely made to undergo drug testing, pursuant to
a directive, and on this basis, was an Information filed.
2. RTC granted respondents’ Motion to Dismiss. People filed a Petition for Certiorari with CA.
3. CA affirmed RTC’s Order.
4. People filed this Petition for Review of Certiorari under Rule 45, alleging:
● CA erred because respondents had lost the remedy under Section 3 (a), Rule 117 having been
already arraigned before availing of the said remedy.
5. Respondents insist that since the ground they relied on is Section 3 (a), Rule 117, their Motion to
Quash may be filed even after they have entered their plea.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in upholding RTC’s grant of respondents’ Motion, and eventually
dismissing the case based on lack of probable cause?

HELD: YES

RATIO:

1. It is emphasized that respondents filed their Motion to Quashafter they have been arraigned.
● Under ordinary circumstances, such motion may no longer be allowed after arraignment because
their failure to raise any ground of a motion to quash before they plead is deemed a waiver of any of
their objections.
● However, since the ground asserted by respondents is one of the exceptions provided under Sec.
9 of Rule 117, the timeliness of the filing is inconsequential.
2. The mistake lies in the RTC's dismissal of the case as the RTC went beyond it authority when it
dismissed the cases based on lack of probable cause; not on ground raised by respondents.
● Sec. 2 of Rule 117 states that in a Motion to Quash, court shall not consider any ground other than
those stated in motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.
● In the present case, what the respondents claim in their Motion to Quash is that the facts alleged
in the Informations do not constitute an offense; not lack of probable cause as ruled by the RTC.
3. In this particular case, by proceeding with the arraignment of respondents, there was already an
admittance that there is probable cause. Therefore:
● RTC should have denied the Motion to Quash and allowed the prosecution to present its evidence
and wait for a demurrer to evidence to be filed by respondents, if they opt to, or allowed the prosecution
to amend the Information and in the meantime suspend the proceedings until amendment of the
Information without dismissing the case.
● Sec. 4, Rule 117 clearly states that if the ground based upon is that "the facts charged do not
constitute an offense," the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect
by amendment.
4. If the defect in the Information is curable by amendment, the Motion to Quash shall be denied and
the prosecution shall be ordered to file an Amended Information.
● In this case, the RTC outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the prosecution an opportunity
to amend the defect in the Informations. CA erred in affirming RTC.
● Thus, the RTC and the CA, by not giving the State the opportunity to present its evidence in court
or to amend the Informations, have effectively curtailed the State's right to due process.

DOCTRINE: If the Motion to Quash was based on the ground that the facts alleged in the
Information do not constitute the offense (Sec. 3(a), Rule 117), the timeliness of filing, whether
it be before or after arraignment, is inconsequential. If the defect in the Information is curable
by amendment, the Motion to Quash shall be denied and the prosecution shall be ordered to
file an Amended Information.

4. Magno v. People, G.R. No. 149725, October 23, 2003

EMERGENCY RECIT:
Petitioner was charged with the homicide of Dov Dunuan. On arraignment he pleaded no guilty. During
trial, the prosecution presented a witness named Buss who saw Petitioner strangle the accused and
box or punch him in the chest. The Medico-legal’s findings stated that there were Multi-Linear
abrasions on the victim’s neck. The Accused/Petitioner herein, then presented evidence proving that
the incident was an accident. He did not know that the victim was under his Isuzu truck when he had
started the engine and sped off.
The trial court convicted the accused of Homicide. But on appeal the CA reversed the RTC decision
and found Petitioner guilty of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide.
Petitioner contends that the charge of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Homicide is not necessarily
included in the original charge of Homicide, hence the case should be dismissed.
The SC held that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide is necessarily included in Murder.
Numerous cases were cited holding this.

(SORRY! SOBRANG DAMING FACTS PERO SOBRANG IKSI LANG NG RULING)

Accused: Oscar Magno Victim: Dov Dunuan

Oscar Magno’s house was a 3 storey building. The 1st floor cannot be seen on the street. The 2nd floor
was on the level of the national highway. On the 2nd floor was the Sari-sari store & Snack House, and
Platinum Office. The 3rd floor was where Magno’s family lived.

Facing the house was the Top side Restaurant. Distance between Restaurant and the House was 10
meters, separated by the national highway.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner, Oscar Magno, was charged with homicide of Dov Lourenz Dunuan on or about June 4,
1992 in Lagawe, Ifugao.
2. On arraignment, Magno pleaded not guilty.

PROSECUTION’S CASE/EVIDENCE:
3. On June 4, 1992, Buss, Gilbert Baccay, and Herman Dinamling were drinking (beer) inside the
backroom of the Top Side Restaurant owned and managed by Emerita Danao.
4. While the three were drinking, the victim, Dov Dinuan arrived and drank with them. After consuming
a bottle, Dov informed the group that he will go to the other side (referring to house of the accused) but
he was followed by Gilbert.

(TESTIMONY of BUSS)
5. Realizing that Gilbert was staying outside long, Buss told Herman to stay put as he was going out to
see the two.
6. Buss saw Gilbert standing near the Platinum Office and near him was Dov.
7. Buss decided to join the two in front of the house of the accused. Gilbert decided to go back to Top
Side Restaurant. So, Dov and Buss wento inside the store.
8. Inside the store, Buss saw Accused at the counter, and the maid inside the kitchen. Dov sat near a
table while Buss went to the counter to order coca-cola. Magno did not answer, instead, Lorraine
Magno (12 year old daughter of Accused) informed him that there was no more coca-cola. Buss
retorted that earlier he bought soft drinks and how come now it’s not available.
9. With the exchange of words, Accused eyed sharply Dov and Buss. Buss then urged and tried to pull
Dov to get out but Dov refused because he saw the Accused getting angry. Dov persisted in staying.
10. Buss, feeling the need to urinate, left to relieve himself. After, he turned to call Dov but saw the
Accused strangling Dov. Aside from this, he saw the Accused land more blows on Dov’s chest and
twisted Dov’s hand.
11. According to Buss he was about 4 meters away from the scene. And the scene took place beside
the Accused’s Isuzu cargo truck parked in front of the house of the accused.
12. Shocked by what he saw, Buss ran away, proceeding to the nearby Top Side Restaurant then went
to the direction of Don Bosco High School. But went back to the Restaurant because he thought about
his companions. Back at the restaurant, he sat down and leaned his head on the table and did not tell
anyone what he saw. Then he heard Emerita Danao (owner of restaurant) screaming “It’s Dov, it’s Dov”
13. Buss went out and saw his companions, Herman and Gilbert carrying the body of Dov. and the
noticed that the Isuzu truck was gone.

(TESTIMONY of GILBERT)
14. Gilbert, after leaving Buss and Dov in front of the house of the accused, returned to the restaurant
to join herman. They were drinking and telling stories when they heard Emerita Danao scream. He
went out of the restaurant and saw Dov lying on the ground. He held Dov and asked “Dov, what
happened to you?” but Dov did not move and answer. Herman then arrived.
15. Gilbert continued asking Dov what happened, but the son of Emerita Danao (who was standing
there) pointed to the Accused (who by then arrived still driving the Isuzu truck).
16. The accused told them to look for a tricycle to take Dov to the hospital.
17. Then the accused drove the truck and proceeded towards Don Bosco Teacher’s Quarters.

(TESTIMONY OF DR. ANGOBUNG, MEDICO-LEGAL’S FINDINGS)

18. Dr. Ruben Angobung, conducted an autopsy or exhumation on the body and found “Multi-linear
contused abrasions on the neck of Dov and Confluent abrasions at the upper-half of his chest.”
19. Cause of Death: Hemorrhagic shock; traumatic.

DEFENSE’S CASE/EVIDENCE:
(I think, this is TESTIMONY OF LORRAINE MAGNO & NERRY ANN BRAVO)
1. At around 6-7pm, on June 4, 1992, Nerry Ann Bravo (10 yr. Old niece of accused) and Lorraine
Magno (12 year old daughter of accused) were at the store with Accused when 2 drunk persons (Buss
and Dov) entered the store and asked for coca-cola from Lorraine. Lorraine told them that they were
out of coke. Buss then stood up and called Dov, “come now.” Dov replied “you go.” So Buss left Dov.
2. Dov stood up and went to the counter and looked at the accused who was reading his newspaper
near the counter. The accused advised Dov to go home because he was drunk. Dov went out.
3. The accused ordered Nerry and Lorraine to close the store. Lorraine went to close to accordion door
but dov was forcing the door open wanting to tell something to the accused.
4. Dov told Lorraine “Can I talk to you papa?” to which Lorraine retorted, “What will you talk about?”
5. Then Dov turned to leave, so Lorraine shut the accordion door.
6. Moments later, they heard banging sounds, particularly the sound of stones thrown at the door.
7. The accused stood up and opened the door and went out to look for anybody who stoned. He went
to the street while Lorraine followed her father but only until the door while Nerry was behind Lorraine.
8. They saw nobody on the street.
9. Immediately, the accused passed in front of the Isuzu truck, went inside and started the engine and
proceeded to the plaza.
10. Before the accused drove away, Lorraine noticed a boy under the truck “crawling towards her” so
she screamed to her father to stop but the accused didn’t hear her and sped off, leaving the boy in the
same spot where the truck was parked.
11. Lorraine went to the boy and realized it was Dov, who was lifeless. She then ran to the Top Side
Restaurant to call for help and she met Emerita Danao on the steps. Both of them went to the body of
Dov. Emerita lifted the head of Dov and rested it again on the ground. Lorraine looked for a tricycle.
12. A few seconds later, the accused arrived and was surprised as to what happened. Lorraine told him
that Dov was ran over.
13. The accused told them to look for a tricycle, while he went to report the incident to the police.
14. Lorraine and Nerry Ann never saw any strangulation made by the accused on Dov, nor did they see
any mauling or boxing nor any quarrel between them.

(TESTIMONY OF JUN MAR DANAO)

15. Jun Mar Danao was sitting at the step located in front of their house when he saw somebody throw
a stone at the house of the accused. So he went inside and peeped through the window of their sala
and saw Dov at the front of the house of the accused.
16. Dov was standing there and then suddenly ran under the Isuzu truck. Then the accused and his
daughter, Lorraine came out from the store.
17. The accused went to the edge of the road as if looking for somebody, then entered the Isuzu truck
and left. Then, Jun saw Dov lying on the ground where the truck came from.
18. He ran to his mother and shouted “Ma, Dov Dov was ran over by the truck.”

(TESTIMONY of EMERITA DANAO mother of Jun and owner of restaurant)

19. Emerita Danao was at the time busy doing kitchen chores and at the same time attending to some
customers who were drinking (Gilbert, Herman, Dennis Baliti and others). Then Buss entered with Dov
both using separate doors all located at the back of the restaurant. But before their entrance, Buss and
Dov were playing throwing stones at each other and also at the back of the restaurant.
20. When Dov entered she cautioned him to go home because he was a little drunk. But Buss and Dov
proceeded to their friends.
21. Pursuant to an Ordinance, the restaurant was supposed to close at 7pm. she told the group to
leave after finishing their last order. She continued to work when suddenly she heard her son shouting
“Dov was ran over by a vehicle.”
22. Emerita rushed to the front of the door and also heard Lorraine saying “you come and see Dov
because he was ran over by my daddy, the truck of my daddy.”
23. She went down to see dov but noticed the truck was not there. She observed Dov, a little bit
unconscious and not talking. She went back to the restaurant to ask for help.
24. Emerita saw Buss lying his head down on a table so she shook him and told him that “please go to
the house of Dov Dunuan and ask the parents to come.” Buss ran to the direction of house of Dov.
25. Just then the accused arrived and he appeared surprised after being told by Lorraine that he ran
over Dov with his truck. The accused told them to look for a vehicle and bring Dov to the hospital while
he will report to the police.
26. Emerita found a tricycle and rushed Dov to the hospital.

(TESTIMONY of SPO3 Agustin Nabanalan)

27. SP03 Nabanalan (assigned investigating officer) was on duty and at around 7pm, accused Oscar
Magno, driving the Isuzu truck appeared before the Lagawe PNP Station. The Accused informed him
that he had accidentally ran over Dov Dunuan in front of his house. The accused stayed at the station
until the following morning for security reasons and to surrender himself.
28. SP03 Nabanalan interviewed the accused and gathered information at the crime scene. He then
issued a Spot Report which basically involved a vehicular accident. His findings were:
a. “Initial investigation conducted by this Police Station reveals that allegedly the victim hid himself
under the vehicle which pas parked and without the knowledge of the driver of his presence,
the accused drove the vehicle thus the incident happened.”
29. He submitted a progress report to his superiors which stated that the relatives of the victim will be
responsible in filing the case directly in Court or with the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office.
30. Then a certain Atty. Evelyn Dunuan interviewed him and prepared an affidavit which he signed.
31. SP03 Nabanalan also stated that what was narrated by the accused was entered in the police
blotter but the entry in the blotter was missing. Almost ½ of the pages were missing from the blotter
hence he could not bring the blotter to court. (In fact, blotter entries covering January-November 1992
were missing)
32. 3 months after the death of Dov, SPO3 Nabanalan was relieved and re-assigned at the Patrol
Center so that all the records were left in the office. Even SP03 Clemencio Kimmayong (head of
investigation section) and other investigation officers were also relieved.

(TESTIMONY of SP01 Orlando Bandao)

33. SP01 Bandao was then off-duty on June 4, 1992 and was athis house when Chief Inspector Lt.
Pascua dropped by and told him that an accident happened. Both of them proceeded to the Ifugao
Provincial Hospital; to the Emergency Room where they were told by Dr. Pasigon that Dov Dunuan was
already dead. There were several people at the hospital so SP01 Bandao inquired who the suspect
was and somebody mentioned the name of the accused.
34. Both of them returned to the PNP Station where they found the accused already there and already
interviewed. But still, SP01 Bandao interviewed the accused himself.
35. From his interview, SP01 Bandao gathered that the accused only came to that Dov was ran over
from his daughter, Lorraine. And this information was given by the Accused 20-30mins after the
incident occured.
36. Thereafter, SP01 Bandao and Lt. Pascua and other policemen went to the crime scene and while
there, a certain Emilio Bugatti (neighbor of the accused) approached them and said that his daughter,
Abbigail (6yrs old) had seen the incident.
37. SP01 Bandao and the group then interviewed Abbigail. Abbigail told them that Dov was peeping
inside the house of the accused and when accused came out, Dov hid under the truck which was
parked in front of the house. The accused went to the street to look for somebody then returned to the
truck and started the engine and when the truck moved away she saw Dov lying on the ground.
38. Bandao testified that Buss was brought to the Police Station by one of the sons of Mr. Gallman, a
relative of Dov, and when Bandao interviewed Buss; Buss stated that he had not witnessed the
incident.

(TESTIMONY of Dr. Bandonill, Medico-Legal’s Findings)

38. Dr. Ronald Bandonill (Medico-Legal Officer of NBI-CAR, Baguio City) affirmed the finding’s of
prosecution expert witness, Dr. Ruben Angobung, specifically the findings on the Multi-linear Contused
Abrasions on the neck of the victim.
39. However, Dr. Bandonill did not see any signs of strangulation. He said that the word “multi-linear” is
usually found in victims of vehicular accidents.
40. And the wound on the chest was not caused or produced by bare fist of a human being.

RTC’S RULING:
1. Trial Court rendered judgment convicting Magno of Homicide under Art. 249 RPC
a. Sentenced to: Reclusion Temporal - 10-12 years imprisonment
b. To pay: indemnity 50k; Actual damages 117k; Moral damages 50k; Exemplary damages 15k

CA’s RULING:
1. Magno appealed to the CA contending that he deserved acquittal of the crime charged.
2. CA reversed RTC decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide under Art. 365
3. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.

Hence this Petition for review under Rule 45.

Petitioner prays that:

1. The case be dismissed because he cannot be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide because the charge was not included in the original charge of Homicide
2. In the alternative, he prays that he be allowed to apply for probation.

PROCEDURE:
1. Information filed charging accused of Homicide
2. Arraignment, accused plead not guilty
3. Trial
4. RTC convicted accused of Homicide
5. Appeal to CA
6. CA reversed decision but found accused guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
7. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
8. Motion for reconsideration denied
9. Petition for review under Rule 45

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide even if the original
charge was Homicide
HELD: YES

RATIO:

Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof . — When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily included in the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. — An offense charged necessarily

includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.

In People v. De Fernando the court ruled that one charged with murder may be convicted of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

In People v. Carmen, the Court convicted the appellants of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
on a charge of murder. The quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is
necessarily included in a charge of murder.

In Samson v. CA, the Court emphasized that while a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality
of a willful crime, but a distinct crime in itself, it may, however, be said that a conviction for the
former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful
offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.

Re: 2nd issue on Probation: The Court ruled that the conviction of petitioner for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide has nothing to do with his qualifications or disqualifications for p robation. It is for
the trial court to ascertain whether or not petitioner is qualified for probation as mandated in Sec. 4 of
PD 968. It is not the SC who decides this.

DOCTRINE: The crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is necessarily included in the
charge of murder (or homicide as in this case).

5. Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010

SUMMARY:

FACTS:
1. Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and
damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
2. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded
guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking
this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him
in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.
3. The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
4. The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition
for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case,
including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
5. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because
of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
6. Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

PROCEDURE:
1.
2.
3.
4.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband.
HELD: YES.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders of the RTC. We DISMISS the
Information pending in the MTC.

RATIO:
1. The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.
2. Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense
of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not."
3. The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses.
4. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-
offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
5. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and
not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
 resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365.
6. These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
7. Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler
protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby
denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for
quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to
quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be
imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less
grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a
lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

DOCTRINE:
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not
merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts,
undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.

6. Los Banos v. Pedro, G.R. No. 173588, April 22, 2009

SUMMARY:

FACTS:
1. Joel San Pedro was caught illegally carrying his firearm at a police checkpoint in Boac, Marinduque.
It was illegal due to the fact that he was in possession of his firearm outside of his place of residence or
place of business during election time without any authority from the COMELEC.
2. Marinduque PNP stopped a silver-gray Toyota Hi-Ace with plate number WHT-371 on the national
highway, coming from the Boac town proper. When Pedro (who was seated at the rear portion) opened
the window, Arevalo saw a gun carry case beside him.
3. Pedro could not show any COMELEC authority to carry a firearm when the checkpoint team asked
for one, but he opened the case when asked to do so.
4. The gun case contained a revolver, ammunition, speed reloaders, and an ear protection set.

PROCEDURE:
1. A Boac Election Officer filed a criminal complaint for violation of the election gun ban.
2. After an inquest, the Marinduque provincial prosecutor filed the above Information against
Pedro with the Marinduque Regional Trial Court (RTC)
3. Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, but said Preliminary Investigation did not
materialize.
4. Pedro then filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Information contains averments which, if
true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification and/or that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. Pedro attached to his motion a Comelec Certification dated September
24, 2001 that he was exempted from the gun ban. The provincial prosecutor opposed the
motion.
5. RTC granted the Motion to Quash and ordered the return of the seized articles to Pedro.
6. The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los Baos, representing the checkpoint team, moved to
reopen the case, as Pedros Comelec Certification was a falsification, and the prosecution was
deprived of due process when the judge quashed the information without a hearing.
 7. The RTC reopened the case for further proceedings, as Pedro did not object to Los Baos
motion.
8. Pedro moved for the reconsideration of the RTCs order primarily based on Section 8 of Rule
117, arguing that the dismissal had become permanent. He likewise cited the public
prosecutors lack of express approval of the motion to reopen the case.
9. The public prosecutor, however, manifested his express conformity with the motion to reopen
the case. The trial court, for its part, rejected the position that Section 8, Rule 117 applies, and
explained that this provision refers to situations where both the prosecution and the accused
mutually consented to the dismissal of the case, or where the prosecution or the offended party
failed to object to the dismissal of the case, and not to a situation where the information was
quashed upon motion of the accused and over the objection of the prosecution. The RTC, thus,
set Pedro’s arraignment date.
10. Pedro filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the RTCs
mandated reopening. He argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that the dismissal contemplated
under Section 8, Rule 117 refers to situations where either the prosecution and the
accused mutually consented to, or where the prosecution alone moved for, the
provisional dismissal of the case; in rejecting his argument that the prescriptive periods
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code or Act No. 3326 find no application to his
case as the filing of the Information against him stopped the running of the prescriptive
periods so that the prescription mandated by these laws became irrelevant; and, in
setting the case for arraignment and pre-trial conference, despite being barred under
Section 8 of Rule 117.
11. The CA, at first granted the reopening of the case but through Pedro's Motion for
Reconsideration, his argument that a year has passed by from the receipt of the quashal order,
the CA's decision was reversed.

ISSUE: Whether the rule on provision dismissal is applicable.

HELD: NO.

RATIO: The SC granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.

The SC differentiated Motion to Quash and Provisional Dismissal. Primarily, they are two separate
concepts. In Motion to Quash, the Information itself has deficiency while in Provisional Dismissal, the
Information has no deficiencies. It does not follow that a motion to quash results in a provisional
dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies.

In the case, the SC finds that the granting of the quashal of the RTC had no merit on the ground that
there is a legal excuse or justification in Pedro's offense. Pedro misappreciated the natures of a motion
to quash and provisional dismissal. As a consequence, a valid Information still stands, on the basis of
which Pedro should now be arraigned and stand trial.

DOCTRINE: The granting of a Motion to Quash does not result in a provisional dismissal.

7. Co v. New Prosperity Plastic Products, June 30, 2014

SUMMARY:

FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.

PROCEDURE:
1.
2.
3.
4.

ISSUE:
HELD:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

8. People v. Sandiganbayan 5th Division, et.al., G.R. Nos. 199151-56, July 25, 2016

SUMMARY:

FACTS:
1.
2.
3.
4.

PROCEDURE:
1.
2.
3.
4.

ISSUE:
HELD:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE: