Flexible Pipe Study

State of the Art Flexible
Riser Integrity Issues

Study Report
Prepared For
By
MCS International
Job No. 2-1-4-181
Doc No. 2-1-4-181 / SR01 Rev. 04
April 2001
Aberdeen Office:
Exploration House, Offshore Technology Park, Aberdeen AB23 8GX, Scotland
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State-of-the-Art
Flexible Riser Integrity Issues
Study Report
Prepared for
by
MCS International
4 5th April, 2001 Final Revision including Executive Summary Patrick

O’Brien
John
Picksley
John
Picksley
3 28th February 2001 Final Revision incorporating Client Comments John
Picksley
Patrick
O’Brien
John
Picksley
2 7th February 2001 Second Draft for Client Review Patrick
O’Brien
John
Picksley
John
Picksley
th John Patrick John
1 11 January 2001 Draft Issue for Client Review Picksley O’Brien Picksley
Rev. Date Description Author Checked Project
Aberdeen Office Galway Office
Job No: Revision No:
MCS International, Tel: +353 91 566455 2-1-4-181 04
Exploration House, Fax: +353 91 566457
Offshore Technology Park, e-mail: Document No: No. of Pages:
Bridge of Don, info@mcs-international.com
2-1-4-181 / SR01 46 +
Aberdeen AB23 8GX, Appendix A
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UKOOA Work Group
Study Contributors
Copyright © 2000 Marine Computation Services Ltd Doc. No. TD-18 Rev.3, Approved by K.K. 29/03/96
State-of-the-Art
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report presents the results of a study to investigate the current state of the art on flexible riser
integrity and flexible riser integrity management practice in the industry. The study was
commissioned by UKOOA and was funded by many of the UKOOA FPSO committee member
companies. The work is mainly focused on the UK sector of the North Sea and West of Shetland
although significant input from the Norwegian Sector of the North Sea was gathered during the study.
In this study, MCS has acted as a “knowledge interrogator” of the industry. Information was gathered
from selected contacts by seeking a written response to a “tick box” questionnaire and this was
followed up by a series of face-to-face interviews with relevant individuals. Questionnaires were sent
out to seventy contacts in 40 different organisations including platform operators, flexible pipe
suppliers, offshore installation contractors, regulatory authorities and research institutions. Thirty-
one completed questionnaires were returned to MCS and twenty follow-up interviews were
conducted. The survey covered some thirty floating production platforms throughout the North Sea
and West of Shetlands.
The key achievements of this study has been to:
• Gather statistical information on the flexible riser population including size, riser type,
operating pressure and temperature, duty and other relevant issues and present this
information in a way that characterises the extent of the flexible pipe integrity task facing the
industry at present.
• Provide information on recent practical use of the various flexible pipe inspection and
monitoring techniques currently available to the industry.
• Gather significant and valuable information of flexible pipe damage and failure modes and
some of the lessons learnt from operational use of flexible pipe offshore. Failure and
damage modes have been characterised and statistics of their occurrence presented under
various headings.
• Identify the key research and development activities of the industry into flexible pipe
technology at present.
This study provides an insight into current integrity management practice for flexible pipe in the
industry. Conclusions have been drawn and recommendations on a way forward for the industry has
been made. The study provides a sound basis from which to take forward these recommendations.
MCS Page No. (i) Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

International April 2001
State-of-the-Art
Contents
1. INTRODUCTION AND STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE........................................................................................1
1.1 GENERAL .......................................................................................................................................................1

1.2 STUDY METHODOLOGY..................................................................................................................................1
1.3 SCOPE OF WORK ............................................................................................................................................2
1.4 PROJECT STATISTICS ......................................................................................................................................2
1.4.1 Questionnaires Issued / Returned and Follow-up Interviews ............................................................3
1.4.2 Participating Companies ...................................................................................................................3
1.4.3 Field Developments............................................................................................................................3
1.5 NORWEGIAN SEMINAR ON FLEXIBLE PIPES ....................................................................................................4
2. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................................................6
2.1 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................6

2.2 RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................................................8
3. CURRENT INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PRACTICE ................................................................................10
3.1 GENERAL .....................................................................................................................................................10

3.2 FLEXIBLE RISER POPULATION STATISTICS ....................................................................................................10
3.3 CURRENT INDUSTRY GUIDELINES AND REGULATORY REGIME.....................................................................14
3.3.1 API Standard and Recommended Practice ......................................................................................14
3.3.2 Industry Guidelines for Integrity Monitoring...................................................................................15
3.3.3 UKCS Regulatory Regime................................................................................................................16
3.4 CURRENT INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PRACTICE...........................................................................................17
3.4.1 General Response ............................................................................................................................17
3.4.2 Perceived Flexible Pipe Risk Issues.................................................................................................18
3.4.3 Integrity Management and the Regulations .....................................................................................19
3.4.4 Experience With Management Strategy Development And Implementation....................................19
3.4.4.1 General Experience with the Industry Guidelines.................................................................................19
3.4.4.2 Perceived Strengths ..............................................................................................................................20
3.4.4.3 Perceived Weaknesses ..........................................................................................................................20

3.4.5 Further Developments in Strategy Implementation .........................................................................20
4. MONITORING METHODS ...............................................................................................................................23
4.1 OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................................................................23

4.2 SPECIFIC MONITORING METHODS ................................................................................................................23
4.2.1 General Visual Inspection (GVI) .....................................................................................................23
4.2.2 Polymer Coupon Sampling and FDEMS .........................................................................................23
4.2.3 Annulus Integrity & Condition Monitoring......................................................................................24
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State-of-the-Art
4.2.4 Eddy Current and Radiography Methods ........................................................................................26

4.2.5 Intelligent Pigging ...........................................................................................................................28
4.2.6 Temperature Monitoring..................................................................................................................28
5. FLEXIBLE PIPE DAMAGE, DEGRADATION AND FAILURE...................................................................30
5.1 OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................................................................30

5.2 SPECIFIC DAMAGE AND FAILURE MODES .....................................................................................................31
5.2.1 External Sheath Damage .................................................................................................................31
5.2.2 Internal Sheath Degradation ...........................................................................................................32
5.2.3 PVDF End Fitting Failure Modes....................................................................................................33
5.2.4 Tensile Armour Wire Disarray or Birdcaging .................................................................................33
5.2.5 Vent Port Blockage ..........................................................................................................................34
5.3 DAMAGE/FAILURE INCIDENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF RISERS SURVEYED .....................................................34
6. RISER TECHNOLOGY ISSUES........................................................................................................................40
6.1 JIP WORK ....................................................................................................................................................40

6.1.1 API 17 J and API RP 17B Standards...............................................................................................40
6.1.2 Robit Rilsan Ageing / FDEMS .........................................................................................................41
6.1.3 Rilsan Users Group..........................................................................................................................42
6.1.4 Annulus Environment and Corrosion Fatigue .................................................................................42
6.1.5 Amitec / Robit Balmoral Riser Dissection........................................................................................43
6.1.6 MCS / Robit Flexible Pipe Integrity Guidelines...............................................................................43
6.1.7 MERL / MCS High Temperature Polymers......................................................................................44
6.1.8 Optical Fibres in Flexible Pipes ......................................................................................................44
6.2 MANUFACTURER R&D EFFORTS .................................................................................................................44
7. REFERENCES .....................................................................................................................................................46
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A INDUSTRY QUESTIONNAIRE
MCS Page No. (iii) Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

State-of-the-Art
1. INTRODUCTION AND STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE
1.1 GENERAL
MCS International has been contracted by the UKOOA FPSO Engineering Work Group to
report on the current industry practice on flexible riser integrity management. In this role,
MCS has acted as a ‘knowledgeable interrogator’ of the industry in order to determine its
views on a range of integrity management issues related to flexible pipe.
A key objective in compiling this study report is to present an accurate interpretation of the
industry response and to conclude on the present state-of-the art of flexible pipe integrity
management particularly in relation to flexible risers connected to floating production
vessels.
1.2 STUDY METHODOLOGY
The study is focussed on experiences gained in the UK sector of the North Sea and West of
Shetland locations in water depths up to 500m. However, relevant information from the
Norwegian sector and other international regions is also presented in this report.
Prior to conducting industry interviews, MCS developed a standard questionnaire as a means

of obtaining industry feedback in a systematic manner. The questionnaire was split into key
sections as follows:
• Questions on key field information and flexible pipe data such as numbers, type, size,
pressure and temperature rating, internal sheath material and riser configuration type.
• Questions relating to how operators develop and implement their flexible pipe
integrity management strategy. We also posed questions on what operators perceived
to be the most common risks or most likely cause of failure of their flexible riser
system.
• Questions on what monitoring methods are being employed, how effective they are at
detecting damage and any lessons learnt or good practice developed in using these
monitoring methods.
• Questions on any failure / damage incidents and the background or likely cause of the
failure.
MCS Page No. 1 Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

State-of-the-Art
• Questions on flexible pipe R&D, joint industry projects, and new technology
initiatives.
The questionnaire was laid out in a “tick-box” type format for ease of completion.
Following the receipt of questionnaires, MCS performed a considerable number of follow-up
interviews with key contacts in the industry to get first-hand and more detailed information
using the questionnaire as the agenda for the meeting. This report is compiled from the
information gained following this exercise and combined with some relevant pipe data
information that MCS already had available to it in-house prior to the study.
In some instances, particularly relating to failures, confidentiality is an important issue and

MCS has made every effort to ensure that information that should remain confidential is kept
confidential. Our aim has been to present information in this report that is a distilled and
non-attributable version of the original information and in such a format that general lessons
can be learnt to the benefit of the industry as a whole.
1.3 SCOPE OF WORK
The scope of work for this study is presented in full in [1] and summarised below:
• Prepare a standard questionnaire to gather operator, installer and manufacturer

information.
• Compile a list of industry contacts to whom the questionnaire should be sent.
• Conclude on how operators are currently managing the integrity of their flexible riser
systems and what represents current best industry practice.
• Review the practical experience of various flexible riser monitoring and inspection
techniques and to what extent these techniques have been adopted by the industry.
• To determine the latest R&D advances and initiatives in flexible riser technology
• Perform a review of the key ongoing and previous Joint Industry Projects (JIPs) relevant
to flexible pipe integrity.
1.4 PROJECT STATISTICS
This section outlines the project statistics in terms of questionnaires sent out to industry and
returned and the follow-up interviews conducted. We also present here a list of the
companies / organisations invited to participate and the flexible riser field developments that
are included in the study.

State-of-the-Art
1.4.1 Questionnaires Issued / Returned and Follow-up Interviews
Table 1.1 below shows the statistics in terms of questionnaires issued and returned and the
number of follow-up interviews conducted.
Table 1.1 Project Statistics
Questionnaire Statistics Totals
No. of Questionnaires sent • Industry individuals 70

out to:
• Companies / Organisations 40
No. of Questionnaires returned 31
No. of Follow-up Interviews conducted 20
1.4.2 Participating Companies
Table 1.2 below lists the companies / organisations who contributed to the study.
Table 1.2 Participating Companies
Oil Companies Field Operators / Regulatory Flexible Pipe

Authorities / Offshore Manufacturers
Contractors
Agip Shell AEA Technology Coflexip Stena Offshore
Amerada Hess Statoil Corrocean NKT Flexibles
BP Talisman Energy DSND Wellstream
Chevron Texaco Health & Safety Executive
Conoco TotalFinaElf Maersk Contractors
Enterprise Oil Woodside North Sea Production
Esso Norge PGS Production
ExxonMobil Saipem
Kerr McGee Stolt Offshore
Norsk Hydro
1.4.3 Field Developments
Data on flexible riser field developments gathered as part of this study are presented in Table
1.3.

State-of-the-Art
Table 1.3 Flexible Riser Field Developments
Projects
Alba Foinaven
Anasuria Galley
Asgard Gryphon
Balder Ivanhoe / Rob Roy
Balmoral Janice
Banff Jotun
Buchan MacCulloch
Captain Pierce
Curlew Schiehallion
Fergus / Flora / Fife Wanea Cossack
1.5 NORWEGIAN SEMINAR ON FLEXIBLE PIPES
On the 24th January 2001 the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) organised a one day
seminar on Flexible Pipe Technology [4]. The timing of the seminar relative to this study
was quite coincidental, but very useful. With the permission of UKOOA, MCS gave a
presentation at the seminar on the findings of this study up to the date of the seminar. The
other presentations at the seminar broadly confirmed our findings but added an extra level of
detail to our work and helped to incorporate the Norwegian experiences into the study.
A number of the oil companies presented case studies of flexible pipe failures or damage
incidents that they had experienced. There were papers on current research work into PVDF,
PA11, wet annulus and corrosion fatigue issues. Statoil gave a presentation on how it
developed and implemented an integrity management strategy for the flexible risers on the
Asgard floating production facility. There was lots of information here on the monitoring
techniques they are utilising.
In addition to the paper presented on this study, there were two other papers from the UK.
BP gave a presentation on their experience West of Shetland and the HSE gave a
presentation about its views of flexible pipe integrity in the UK Sector.
There was a “Manufacturers Corner” section in which Coflexip Stena Offshore, NKT and
Wellstream gave presentations of the new technology areas they are currently working on.

State-of-the-Art
Overall, the seminar was very well organised by NPD; the technical content of the
programme and presentations was strong; and there was significant attendance at the
conference from the various Norwegian operators, contractors, research institutes and the
flexible pipe suppliers. With the kind permission of NPD and some of the presenters, we
have incorporated the key learnings from the seminar at various points throughout this
report.

State-of-the-Art
2. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
2.1 CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions from this preliminary technical review are as follows:
a) The guidelines on flexible pipe integrity management developed with the support of 15
oil industry participants and published by the Health and Safety Executive in 1998 are
not widely known in the industry and apparently have been applied to only about 5-6
installations in the North Sea.
b) In general, where the guidelines have been applied they are considered to have been very
useful in identifying and understanding the potential failure modes of the flexible pipe
system and in providing a systematic framework to perform the risk analysis and to map
this to an inspection strategy. It can be a big challenge though to ensure ongoing follow
through of the strategy and any mitigating actions developed as part of the strategy.
c) Risk based integrity (RBI) management has been applied to the flexible riser system in a
number of instances, although this did not involve applying the guidelines. For these
cases, the RBI strategy was developed as part of the overall inspection strategy for the
subsea pipeline system. However, little specialist knowledge of the operation and failure
modes of flexible pipe appears to have been used in performing the risk analysis.
d) In terms of understanding and verifying the integrity of the flexible riser system, we have
found that the link during hand-over from the design project team to operations is poor
and also there is little feedback from operations into new or ongoing project designs.
e) General visual inspection by ROV is universally used to inspect the integrity of flexible
riser systems and is performed most commonly at annual intervals. The method is
sometimes difficult to use up near the turret region of the riser system due to congestion
in this area.
f) A total of 61% of the risers surveyed use PA11 (Rilsan) as their internal pressure sheath.
Because of the potential degradation of PA11 under the combined conditions of high
water cut and temperature, the use of polymer coupons in the flow that can be sampled
and tested either continuously or at regular intervals to assess the level of degradation is
gaining ground as an important integrity measure. An industry wide group known as the
Rilsan Users Group are putting significant research effort into understanding the
degradation process and how it can be monitored through the life of the flexible pipe.

State-of-the-Art
g) Testing and monitoring the annulus of the flexible pipe is also gaining ground as a
valuable integrity monitoring measure. Actual field measurements of the gas vent rate
emanating from the vent valve at the top riser connection have been successfully used to
verify gas permeation models for flexible pipe. In one case, moisture found in the
annulus gas provided evidence that the external sheath of the riser was damaged.
Nitrogen or vacuum testing of the annulus has been successfully used to establish
whether or not the annulus is flooded with liquid such as water.
h) Monitoring of internal temperature, pressure, bore contents at the platform is carried out
on a widespread basis but not necessarily tied into the integrity management strategy of
the flexible riser system. This is true also of environmental monitoring and vessel
heading and excursion.
i) It could be generally concluded that present effort and use of inspection techniques is
broadly in line with the perceived and known failure modes of flexible pipe.
j) Damage to the external sheath of the flexible pipe during installation is by far the most
common failure / damage incident at 25% of all damage / failure incidents surveyed.
The second most common failure mode is PA11 pressure sheath degradation at 19%.
k) Pull out of the PVDF internal pressure sheath from its end fitting is also high at 16%
although all these failures are prior to the new end fitting designs introduced by the
manufacturers in the wake of the initial failures. There is concern however, that while
the new end fitting design will prevent pull out, the relatively high thermal expansion
coefficient of PVDF combined with temperature cycling throughout the life of the riser
will induce corresponding stress cycles and fatigue failure of the PVDF sheath at the end
fitting location.
l) There is considerable focus at the moment on what happens to a riser if the annulus does
become flooded. For example, present fatigue models predict that a riser with an
original design life of say 20 years, can have its service life reduced to as low as 2 years
as a result of the annulus being flooded. The general consensus is that these models may
be much too conservative, but further testing on corrosion fatigue of the tensile armour
wires combined with an understanding of the environment in a wet annulus is required to
prove this. Presently, this testing is being done on a project by project basis.
m) The API Spec 17J standard for the specification of flexible pipe has received widespread
use by the industry and is now accepted as the industry standard for the specification,
design, manufacture, material selection and testing of flexible pipe. However, there are
some anomalies in the second edition of the document that need to be rectified.

State-of-the-Art
2.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
The main recommendations from this preliminary technical review are as follows:
a) This study has had considerable success in building an initial database of riser population
statistics and flexible pipe failures in the North Sea. We have gathered valuable damage
and failure information as part of this study and we have been able to present this
information in a non-attributable yet informative manner in this report. We strongly
recommend that this effort be continued to build up the database and to improve on the
accuracy and extent of the statistics that we have presented here. It may also be prudent
to take advantage of the present industry support and desire to compile this type of
information. Up-to-date knowledge of damage and failure statistics that is easily
available to the industry will help to focus where R&D should be spent to resolve these
problems in the future. The work could probably best by done under the present
UKOOA banner or as an extension to PARLOC. We should also strongly consider
uniting efforts between the UKCS and Norway in this regard, as there are considerable
benefits to exchange of information between these sectors.
b) It is clear from this work that there has been some considerable external sheath damage
to flexible pipe during installation. There are two ways forward here: a) we look at the
design or cost impact of a more robust external sheath or b) we identify how we can
improve and effect best practice installation across the industry to avoid these problems
in the future. APR RP 17B provides guidance on best practice installation. Are these
guidelines best practice today or are they in sufficient detail that they can be effectively
used by the industry? Even if they are, how can we be sure that they will be adhered to
in the industry? We recommend a focussed joint industry effort to address this problem.
c) The one issue, well above all other factors, that has hindered the development of
integrity management strategy for flexible pipe, is the perceived and indeed real fact that
there are little available industry techniques to monitor the integrity of flexible pipe.
What has emerged from this study, is that there are a number of techniques or integrity
measures gaining good acceptance in the industry at present. Knowledge and experience
of their use however varies widely between operators. Furthermore, there is not a clear
understanding in the industry of the capability and suitability of use of the various
monitoring methods. We recommend that the industry captures the best experience
gained to-date and makes this experience available to the whole industry in the form of
guidance. We have a good starting point in the Monitoring Methods document [3]
published by the HSE. This document could be improved and updated. Also, it would
be quite beneficial if the industry could use this initiative to independently qualify

State-of-the-Art
selected monitoring techniques on their ability to inspect specific aspects of flexible

pipe.
d) To achieve a consistent approach to flexible pipe integrity management across the

industry, we recommend that the initial industry guidelines [2] are updated to reflect the
experience of their use to date, and to streamline their application and ease of use by
operators. This time we need to identify a mechanism that ensures the guidelines get
well disseminated in the industry and that they are broadly adhered to.
e) We recommend an industry initiative to look closely at the critical interface between

design completion and handover to operations. Could the independent verification at the
end of the design provide this link? What role can the suppliers play? Also, we need to
get integrity management issues raised at this critical interface so it can be incorporated
into the design of the system.
f) There are a number of API initiatives presently ongoing and these are: Revisions to API
17J and API RP 17B, API Technical Bulletin for PA11, API Recommended Practice for
Flexible Pipe Ancillary Equipment. We recommend that these initiatives are co-
ordinated to ensure best practice on flexible pipe integrity, design and installation.
g) We recommend that the industry continue its research efforts on PA11 degradation and
corrosion fatigue. We also believe that efforts to include fibre optics into flexible pipe as
an online monitoring technique to be an important initiative. On corrosion fatigue, we
recommend that designers should at least assess the impact of annulus flooding on the
service life of the pipe and assess the risk of external sheath damage during installation.
h) A number of recommendations can be made regarding the flexible pipe annulus and its
integrity. Firstly, annulus volume measurement can be recommended as a means to
detect annulus flooding – there is an increasing body of evidence to demonstrate the
effectiveness of this technique. As a general integrity measure, we recommend that vent
ports are regularly checked to ensure that they do not become blocked and that vent
plugs are removed on start-up. We should also pay particular attention to the design of
the annulus vent pipework – there needs to be sufficient isolation to avoid the situation
where a flooded annulus in one damaged riser does not flood the annuli of other
undamaged risers.

State-of-the-Art
3. CURRENT INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PRACTICE
3.1 GENERAL
In this section, we will aim to establish the current state of practice on flexible riser integrity
management. To this end we will firstly present statistics of the flexible riser population as
this provides a measure of the extent of the “integrity management task” we presently have
in the industry. Secondly we will outline the relevant industry guidelines and standards that
exist and the regulatory regime against which the integrity of flexible pipe is managed.
Finally, from the response to the questionnaires and interviews, we will report on what is
actually being done in practice and the experiences gained by operators in developing and
implementing management strategies.
3.2 FLEXIBLE RISER POPULATION STATISTICS
Prior to this study, MCS had compiled a database of flexible riser projects in the North Sea
and West of Shetland, mainly from projects in the UKCS sector, but also some projects from
the Norwegian Sector. We have now incorporated the data we received from the
questionnaires into this database. We cannot say at this stage that the database is completely
accurate in every respect, but for the purposes of this study, it is a representative sample of
what is installed and in operation. It has at least enabled us to draw reasonably accurate
conclusions on the State-of-the-Art of flexible pipe integrity. The full list of projects for
which information was gathered and included in the database is given in Table 3.1.
In this section, we present the following flexible riser statistics:
• Total number of operational riser years to date.
• Riser Statistics in terms of function and configuration.
• Production riser statistical analysis in terms of: a) Internal Diameter
b) Internal Pressure Sheath Material
c) Operating Pressure Range
d) Operating Temperature Range
Figure 3.1 below shows how flexible pipe operational experience has increased from 1990
up to the beginning of 2001. The data is presented in terms of cumulative operational riser
years and shows continuing growth in the use of flexible risers in this region. The graph
shows how the growth has been almost exponential between 1995 to the present.

State-of-the-Art
The total number of flexible risers in operation and their function is presented in Figure 3.2.
It is shown that 52% of the 277 total are Production risers with 12% each for Water Injection
and Gas Injection. Note that this total includes field developments listed in Table 3.1.
Figure 3.3 shows the results of a statistical analysis of flexible riser configuration. This
figure shows the Lazy-S to be the most common configuration at exactly 50%. The second
most popular riser is the pliant or tethered lazy-wave configuration at 27% of the riser
population. A sketch of each of these configurations can be found in Fig. 4 of API RP 17B.
The Pliant Wave or Tethered Lazy Wave riser configurations are merely a modification of
the Steep Wave riser where riser tension close to the seabed is transferred via a flexible pipe
clamp to a tether connected to a gravity base on the seabed. The remaining untensioned riser
/ flowline section continues down and along the seabed to the well or manifold connection.
Since the production riser is the most common and safety critical riser function, a further
statistical analysis of pipe size, inner sheath material and operational pressure and
temperature is performed. This data is compiled specifically from the results of the
questionnaires (Ref. Table 1.3) and not the full combined database. The results are
presented in Figure 3.4 and show that the most common sheath material is PA11 with 61%
compared to 37% PVDF. This split correlates with the operating temperature range.

State-of-the-Art
Figure 3.1 Operational Experience of Flexible Risers
Total Number of Operational Riser Years

in North Sea and West of Shetland
1200 1112
1000
866
800
Riser
Years 600
Cumulative
400
185
200
38
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Up to Year
Figure 3.2 Analysis of Riser Function
Analysis by Riser Function

Total No. of Risers = 277
60%
52%
50%
40%
Percentage of Operating Risers - North
30%
all Risers (%) Sea & West of Shetland
Region
20%
12% 12%
10% 8% 6% 5%
2% 3%
0%
Prod
Oil Ex
Others
Gas Ex
Test
Gas Inj
Wat Inj
Gas Lift
Riser Function

State-of-the-Art
Figure 3.3 Flexible Riser Configuration Statistics
Flexible Riser Configuration Statistics
60%
50% Operating Risers -
50%
North Sea & West of
Shetland Region
40%
Percentage 27% Key:
30%
(%) ls = Lazy-S
20% ss = Steep-S
lw = Lazy-wave
9%
10% 6% sw = Steep-wave
4% 1% 2% pw / tlw = Pliant or
0% tethered lazy-wave
lw
pw/tlw
ls
sw
ss
fhc
other
fhc = free-hanging
catenary
Riser Configuration
Figure 3.4 Production Riser Design and Operational Statistics
Internal Pressure Sheath Material Internal Diameter Range Design Pressure

44%
67%
45%
70% 61% 70%
40%
60% 60%
35% 29%
Percentage (%)
Percentage (%)
Percentage (%)
50% 50% 30%

38% 22%
40% 40% 25%
27%
30% 30% 20%
15%
20% 20%
6% 10% 4%
10% 2% 10% 5%
0% 0% 0%
PA11 PVDF XPE 0"-6" 6"-10" 10"+ 0-204 204-340 340-476 476-680
Pressure Sheath Material Internal Diameter (inches) Pressure Range (bar)
Operating Temperature Operation Pressure
60%
40%
35% 50%
Percentage (%)
Percentage (%)
30%
40%
25%
20% 30%
15% 20%
10%
10%
5%
0% 0%
0-60 60-80 80-110 0-50 50-100 100-150 150-220
Temperature Range (degC) Pressure Range (bar)

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Table 3.1 Flexible Riser Field Developments – MCS In-house database
Projects
Alba Janice
Anasuria Jotun
Asgard MacCulloch
Balder Njord
Balmoral Norne
Banff Pierce
Buchan Ross
Blenheim Schiehallion
Captain Teal / Guillemot
Cook Triton
Curlew Troll
Fergus / Flora / Fife Veslefrikk
Foinaven Visund
Galley
Gryphon
Harding
Heidrun
Ivanhoe / Rob Roy
3.3 CURRENT INDUSTRY GUIDELINES AND REGULATORY REGIME
This section gives an overview of the current industry guidelines for the design,
specification, manufacture, testing and ongoing integrity assessment for flexible pipe. We
also outline the regulatory regime as it relates to these issues.
3.3.1 API Standard and Recommended Practice
In 1995, a JIP was initiated involving 23 oil operator, supplier and contractor companies
including the Health and Safety Executive. This JIP led in 1997/98 to the development of
the API 17J specification and a revision to API RP 17B; representing new industry standards
for the specification, design, manufacture, testing and use of flexible pipe. A key point here
is that this JIP had strong support from the industry, and these API standards are now widely
regarded as best industry practice.

State-of-the-Art
The specification standard API 17J has a clause in it directly related to inspection and
condition monitoring of flexible pipe. Under the section on functional requirements, API
17J states “the requirements … to design and implement flexible pipe inspection, monitoring
and condition assessment systems and procedures should be specified”. The API
Recommended Practice document 17B includes a full chapter on integrity monitoring that
outlines general philosophy and best practice.
3.3.2 Industry Guidelines for Integrity Monitoring
A second JIP supported by 15 industry participants was launched in 1996 to tackle the issue
of integrity management of flexible flowlines and risers. This project achieved significant
advances in the understanding of flexible pipe failure modes and developed a systematic and
consistent approach to the implementation of an Integrity Management Strategy (IMS). The
Health and Safety Executive, who were also participants to the JIP, published the two
documents produced from the JIP as follows:
1. Guidelines for Integrity Monitoring of Unbonded Flexible Pipes (OTO 98019) [1]
2. Monitoring Methods for Unbonded Flexible Pipe (OTO 98018) [2]
These OTO documents are available on the HSE website or single copies can be obtained
from RSU Merton House.
The guidelines document [1] provides a framework and methodology for developing a
systematic and risk consistent inspection / monitoring programme for unbonded flexible
pipe. The document gives guidance on the following:
a) How to subdivide the flexible pipe / riser system into integrity groups with similar
potential failure modes and/or consequences of failure. The division of the system into
integrity groups simplifies the development of the management strategy.
b) How to evaluate all the relevant failure modes for each integrity group. In this context,
the guidelines bring specialist knowledge of the structural and materials behaviour of
flexible pipe combined with historical experience of previous failures in operation.
c) How to determine the risk ratings for different failure modes. Most of the guidance here
is at a very top level and not flexible pipe specific. Indeed for this section an operator
could alternatively apply its own practices and philosophy to assessing risk.
d) How to map the risk analysis onto the specification of an inspection / monitoring
programme for the flexible pipe system. Initially, this is achieved by mapping the risk
analysis onto a set of Strategic Inspection / Monitoring Levels for each integrity group.

State-of-the-Art
The Monitoring Methods document [2] has classified the strategic level of each of the
monitoring / inspection techniques available to the industry and this can be used to assist
the operator in choosing the actual technique most suitable in terms of cost and
applicability for the particular integrity group. By repeating this process for each
integrity group, the complete inspection / monitoring programme for the flexible riser
system is developed.
e) How to review and update the management strategy and inspection programme based on
the results of any inspection / monitoring to-date.
The Guidelines document was written to be functional rather than prescriptive and this was
deliberate for such an industry document. The key benefit of the document is that it provides
a framework for managing the integrity of flexible pipe in a consistent manner right across
the industry. Its detailed application to a particular project would still require the input of
personnel with expert knowledge on flexible pipe technology.
An important objective of this study is to determine how widespread the use of these
guidelines are in the industry and how successful their implementation has been in practice.
3.3.3 UKCS Regulatory Regime
Regulations governing pipeline systems (which includes risers) are principally:
• The Health and Safety Regulations
• The Environmental Assessment Regulations
• The Petroleum Act
Under the Management of the Health and Safety Regulations, the Design and Construction
Regulations (DCR) came out in 1995 and the Pipeline Safety Regulations (PSR) came out in
1996.
The DCR regulations specified the requirement for a “Verification Scheme” to be set in
place for “Safety Critical Elements” (SCEs). An SCE is one that could substantially
contribute to a major accident of an offshore installation. In fact the DCR amended the
Safety Case Regulations (1992) and so the “Verification Scheme” requirement is really part
of the Safety Case Regulations. Not all risers to a floating production system will be safety
critical elements, but almost certainly some will. Risers that are safety critical must satisfy
both the PSR and Verification Scheme Requirements.

State-of-the-Art
The Verification Scheme requires an independent design verification to be performed for all
safety critical elements. The Verification Scheme should be in place at the design stage and
handed over to operations, as the scheme requires that the operator must continue to verify
the integrity of the safety critical elements throughout the field life. The design of the
flexible riser system and its associated mountings should therefore facilitate the lifetime
monitoring activities specified as part of the scheme. The Verification Scheme also requires
the setting of “Performance Standards”. A sound set of performance standards will usually
emanate from the mitigation measures identified by a risk based assessment of the system.
The “Pipeline Safety Regulations” (PSR), which are non-prescriptive, goal setting and risk
based, lay down some key duties for the operator of offshore or onshore pipeline systems.
Under these regulations, the operator must maintain the pipeline / riser in good repair. The
operator must systematically identify all the major accident potentials for the pipeline
through a Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) process and present these in a
Major Accident and Prevention Document (MAPD). The establishment of an Emergency
Procedures and Operations Manual (EPOM) is also a requirement laid down by the PSR and
these together with the HIRA and MAPD constitute a safety management system or Pipeline
Integrity Management System (PIMS). The operator must continue to demonstrate that the
pipeline / riser is operating within its “Safe Operating Limits”. This is generally achieved
through maintaining the MAPD, EPOM and Performance Standards by regular and stringent
revision.
3.4 CURRENT INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PRACTICE
An important objective of this study is to determine what in practice operators are currently
doing on inspection, maintenance and in-service monitoring of flexible pipes. This section
reports on the findings from the questionnaires and follow-up interviews on this topic. We
also report on how operators perceive that these activities fit into the current regulatory
regime.
3.4.1 General Response
The following general yet key points arose during discussions with the industry contacts:
• The “Guidelines for Integrity Monitoring of Unbonded Flexible Pipes” published in

1998 by the HSE are not widely known to industry. Despite being positive towards the
Guidelines, the HSE do not want to be prescriptive and therefore are not responsible for
promoting the use of this document. Several contacts noted that too few JIPs / Initiatives
ever reach the industry.

State-of-the-Art
• Other pipeline-orientated risk-based methodologies have been used to determine the

required level of condition monitoring. However, it is not clear to what extent these
methodologies incorporate specialist flexible pipe technology knowledge. Operators
overcome this by ensuring that sufficiently qualified and experienced personnel sit at
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (HIRA) meetings during the design and
subsequent development of pipeline integrity management strategies.
• The basic monitoring measure is General Visual Inspection (GVI) by ROV. This is
performed by all flexible riser operators, most commonly at annual intervals.
• Many key integrity measures although monitored at some stage are not directly tied into
an overall integrity management strategy. These include product pressure and
temperature, vessel excursions and heading, environmental conditions and bore fluid
sampling. This is very useful information to enable the present integrity status to be
determined and also for retrospective failure investigation work. The industry recognises
that capturing all this data in a structured framework is of key importance.
• A primary problem in current integrity practice is communication between the initial

design team and the project team. Several critical integrity issues highlighted in the
design were found not to have been implemented as initially planned.
3.4.2 Perceived Flexible Pipe Risk Issues
In the questionnaire, we asked operators what they considered to be high risk or high damage
probability issues for the integrity of their flexible riser system. In some instances, they
would have reached their conclusions based on the results of a systematic risk analysis, or
simply on a combination of knowledge of their riser system, their own past experience or the
experience of others. In some instances, respondents considered flexible pipe to be a low
maintenance product with little associated probability of failure. More generally, the most
common perceived risk areas / failure modes were found to be:
i) Internal pressure sheath degradation due to high temperature and rising water cut.
ii) End-fitting failure mechanisms.
iii) Overbending / bend stiffener failure at the riser-vessel interface. This is the area of
highest dynamic loading and is often quite difficult to inspect.
iv) External sheath damage during installation leading to reduction in pipe fatigue life.

State-of-the-Art
3.4.3 Integrity Management and the Regulations
As part of this study, we wanted to understand how ongoing integrity issues relating to
flexible pipe were seen within the overall context of the regulations. We can summarise the
feedback with the following points:
1. Operators develop their flexible pipe integrity management strategy within the
overall pipeline integrity management system and in accordance with the pipeline
safety regulations. It could be generally concluded that operators are not bringing
specialist knowledge of flexible pipe into their assessments when developing the
management strategy for the overall pipeline.
2. As part of the pipeline safety regulations, operators prepare an annual “MOT” of the
riser for presentation to the regulatory authorities to demonstrate that the riser is
operating within its safe operating limits, such as temperature, pressure, etc.
3. For risers that are Safety Critical Elements, the operator issues an annual inspection
report to the Independent Competent Person (ICP) for review. It is not clear
however, if the follow up from the initial design verification as part of the
Verification Scheme is being properly carried forward onto the ongoing verification
of integrity during operation. Furthermore, there is little feedback from operations or
realtime data of operations to the initial conditions for which the riser was originally
designed.
3.4.4 Experience With Management Strategy Development And Implementation
Only five of the field developments included in Table 1.3, have developed Integrity
Managements Strategies (IMS’s) based on the Guidelines [2]. This section outlines the
operator’s evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses in developing and maintaining an IMS
in accordance with the Guidelines.
3.4.4.1 General Experience with the Industry Guidelines
The IMS prescribes the flexible riser inspection requirements which are then
incorporated into the verification scheme for the whole installation, covering all
other SCE’s. Experience has shown some difficulty in the structuring of this
process.
The structured history provided by the strategy review process is very beneficial to
the operator, as future inspection needs can be based on well-documented
experience.

State-of-the-Art
3.4.4.2 Perceived Strengths
The key strengths of the implemented strategy are as follows:
Strategy Development
§ Ability to rationally assess risk level along the riser system.
§ Identifying and understanding potential failure modes and their progression over
time.
§ Mapping identified risks to an inspection requirement.
Strategy Implementation
§ Demonstrating ongoing riser integrity to the ICP.
§ As a means of collecting and storing operational and realtime instrumented data

from the riser system. This information has proved valuable in fatigue re-
analysis, integrity reassessment and failure investigations.
§ IMS is flexible and can be altered in accordance with the results of monitoring.
§ Design of periodic strategy review process is efficient.
3.4.4.3 Perceived Weaknesses
§ IMS development is a systematic process and represents a significant task of

work. Furthermore, keeping the strategy up-to-date requires an ongoing
resource and can lag behind schedule.
§ Failures have occurred, and in some instances the failure modes had not been
originally identified in the original strategy development. In this respect, the
Guidelines need to be updated.
3.4.5 Further Developments in Strategy Implementation
Since the development of the industry guidelines [2,3], further work has been done to
streamline and improve the guidelines although this is not yet in the public domain. Some of
the key improvements in methodology are:
• In the Guidelines document [2], for a particular integrity group the user has to
conclude on the potential failure modes for that group from a large list of overall
flexible pipe failure modes in an Appendix to the Guidelines. This can be a very
intensive task, and is sometimes not necessary. An alternative approach has been
developed which results in identifying the potential failure modes easier and quicker.
The concept of “Failure Drivers” is introduced: a Failure Driver is defined as the

State-of-the-Art
primary influencing factor behind certain failure modes. A total of eleven Failure
Drivers are defined, some of which are: Temperature, Pressure, Product Fluid
Composition, and Fatigue. So for example, Temperature is a primary failure driver
for PA11 sheath degradation. If the flexible riser system is operating under high
temperature, this is selected as a failure driver and the key failure modes influenced
by it are considered as potential failure modes in the risk analysis. On the other
hand, if the system is operating at a low temperature, then these failure modes are
simply discounted.
• Pro-forma “Flexible Pipe Integrity Summary” sheets have been developed. These
sheets are completed for each flexible pipe in the riser or flowline system prior to
performing the risk analysis. The sheet contains a series of input and tick boxes to
enable the user to provide information on the original pipe design and construction,
riser configuration, ancillary devices, design criteria data, current operational
environment data and any anomalies found during the original design, manufacture
and installation of the pipe. These sheets provide the opportunity to see at a first
glance any important issues affecting the integrity of the pipe and so significantly
streamline the performance of the risk analysis. To ensure that they are useful, the
operational data on the sheets should be updated on a regular basis to keep the
information current.
• Detailed advice on risk ratings for a whole range of potential flexible pipe failure
modes under a range of specified conditions. This is one level of detail up on that
provided by the Guidelines document [2] consistent with the fact that these
guidelines avoided being too prescriptive.
• Further development of procedures and advice for various monitoring / inspection

techniques. This will always be an issue, as monitoring / inspection technology is
always improving and documents describing their use at one point in time can
quickly become out of date. Advice is also given on how best to employ the
monitoring technique.
• The methodology has been improved to ensure that when a user selects a particular
monitoring / inspection measure, he must set anomaly limits which define
unacceptable inspection or monitoring results. As part of the management strategy
remedial actions are specified in the event that results exceed these apriori specified
anomaly limits.
• Development of a simple Excel failure matrix with the risk values filled in for all the
flexible pipe integrity groups down the column versus the various failure drivers
across the rows. The boxes in the Excel sheet are coloured according to the level of

State-of-the-Art
risk and in this way the Excel sheet provides a strong visual representation of the
state of risk of the flexible pipe system. This focuses the development of the
management strategy on identifying mitigating measures such as monitoring,
analysis, inspection, testing, or change in operational parameters to bring down the
high risk levels (that is, the red boxes).
These improvements could be incorporated into a further revision of the industry guidelines
published by the HSE if the industry considered this to be beneficial.

State-of-the-Art
4. MONITORING METHODS
4.1 OVERVIEW
The objective of this section is to review the practical experience with flexible riser
inspection tools / techniques and condition monitoring methods and the extent of their use in
the industry. The “Monitoring Methods” document [3], is used as a reference document for
this scope of work.
In the Questionnaire we asked respondents what monitoring methods they employed on their
flexible pipe system. Fig. 4.1 provides a statistical analysis of the response to this question.
In the following section, we comment in further detail on some of the inspection /

monitoring techniques most commonly used at present.
4.2 SPECIFIC MONITORING METHODS
4.2.1 General Visual Inspection (GVI)
This method is widely used to demonstrate continued absence of defect. Although the
technique is universally adopted, viewing the critical riser-vessel interface is often difficult
due to riser congestion and vessel motions. In many cases, this method of inspection is used
because it is believed to be the only feasible inspection measure. Even if there were many
other options available, GVI would most likely always be selected as one of the measures
since it is hard to beat seeing the actual structure to check that all is well. There have been
instances though where the GVI missed something, such as a bend stiffener that had failed
and slipped down the riser.
4.2.2 Polymer Coupon Sampling and FDEMS
These monitoring techniques are used to determine the ageing of a PA11 internal pressure
sheath. Polymer coupons from the pressure sheath parent material are inserted into the flow
path via a pipe spool piece either on topsides or at the subsea wellhead. A coupon is
retrieved at regular intervals (say 6 months) for analysis. In the case of FDEMS, dielectric
sensors are integrated into the coupons, which are permanently placed in the flowpath and
sensed electronically by online dielectric equipment.
There have been some problems in the past with the testing and analysis of the polymer
coupons to detect the ageing of PA11. The results are sensitive to the method of testing and

State-of-the-Art
retrieval. In section 6.1.3 of this report we describe the work of the Rilsan Users Group to
determine a standard test protocol so that consistent results can be obtained from different
laboratories around the world. The methodology for testing polymer coupons has now
largely been agreed and developed. Measurement of mechanical and chemical properties is
deemed a valuable and reliable indicator of the current integrity of the internal pressure
sheath.
The results from FDEMS are also significantly influenced by the flow conditions and its
composition and so it can be difficult to interpret the results and accurately predict the
degree of ageing of the material. Corrocean are currently running a joint industry project to
resolve this issue. In particular, this work is focussed on recognising the ‘signatures’ of
various chemicals that are known to corrupt the results.
For the most part, operators have placed coupons on the topsides piping just inside the
flexible pipe connection point. Although this allows for ease of access, this is most likely
the coolest part of the riser system and not the location of worst degradation. Ideally, the
coupons should be placed at the hot end near the subsea wellhead. At least one operator has
recently placed coupons and the FDEMS equipment subsea. For the coupons that need to be
retrieved at a six month or annual basis, this will be done by divers and this adds
considerable cost to the inspection method. Here, FDEMS has an advantage in that the
coupons do not need to be retrieved and the monitored data is continuous rather than
discrete. Also, FDEMS can also reliably monitor the temperature of the flow in parallel with
the sheath condition data. This is important since temperature plays an important role in the
degradation process. The data monitored by FDEMS is stored locally and can be retrieved
by ROV, again at a set interval (6 months), and downloaded for analysis. The FDEMS
technique requires much less laboratory analysis than the polymer coupon sampling method.
Given the extent to which PA11 ageing has been a problem in the past (See Chapter 5) these
monitoring methods are likely to play an important role in the future monitoring of flexible
pipe.
4.2.3 Annulus Integrity & Condition Monitoring
Under this general heading, three integrity measures are being utilised by operators to
varying degrees of success. These are:
• Annulus gas sampling
• Annulus vent rate monitoring
• Annulus vacuum or Nitrogen testing

State-of-the-Art
Annulus gas sampling is used to determine the corrosiveness of the annulus environment and
has been implemented on some field developments. It appears relatively straightforward to
apply and can be used to detect the presence of H2S, CO2, CH4 and moisture content. A
number of successful instances of its use has been reported in the Questionnaire and in one
case, water condensing in the sampled gas indicated an external sheath damage.
Annulus vent rate monitoring is being carried out by 4-5 operators. This initially proved
difficult for a number of reasons as follows:
• Liquid build-up in the instrumentation caused by condensation of the liquid in the

annulus gas. In one instance, there was a few litres of water collected every week
and this affected the working of the instrumentation.
• Low flow rates and the fact that the rate is not constant. For example, the vent rate is
a function of internal fluid temperature and the extent of dynamic riser motions.
Learning how to take care of the liquid build-up is an important consideration to successfully
implement a vent rate monitoring scheme. Nevertheless, this monitoring method is gaining
ground as a credible means to establish the state of the annulus environment. Some
operators have successfully used the results from field monitoring to verify numerical
models of gas permeation into and out of the annulus. Ongoing monitoring is now used as
input to corrosion fatigue work as part of a JIP described in Section 6.1.4 of this report.
Annulus vacuum testing to determine the condition of the annulus is gaining good
acceptance within the industry. Reliable procedures are now developed which determine
whether the annulus can hold a vacuum (i.e. the integrity of the external sheath) and the
annulus free volume. The volume is then measured at periodic intervals to monitor the
stability of the environment. A number of operators have decided that they will regularly
perform Annulus vacuum testing as an ongoing integrity measure to check the extent of
flooding of the flexible pipe annulus. It has been suggested that a vacuum test is performed
on installation and thereafter on an annual basis.
An important integrity measure is to ensure that the vent ports are continually open and
monitored. There has been a significant number of cases of flexible pipe failure caused by
blocked vent ports. Pressure builds up in the annulus when the vent port is blocked and
causes either the external sheath to burst, or where there is no carcass, the internal sheath to
collapse.
Another significant problem is where the vent ports of all the risers in the FPSO turret are
commingled at a manifold and linked by pipework to a common gas release system. There
have been at least two cases reported where spitting water from a leaked annulus of one of

State-of-the-Art
the risers has flooded the annuli of all the other risers. It should be noted that the provision
of a gas venting system is not usually within the scope of the flexible pipe supplier.
4.2.4 Eddy Current and Radiography Methods
These are methods that can be used to inspect the steel armour layers in a flexible pipe. A
general description of each of the methods and their use to-date in the industry is given as
follows:
External Eddy Current Inspection
The eddy current inspection tool comprises a proprietary clamp-on external scanner that
provides 360 degree coverage of the pipe external surface. The external scanner tool can
pass moderate bends and is adapted for use in air and seawater. The method works by
passing an alternating current magnetic field through the external polymer coating of the
flexible pipe and monitoring the eddy currents set up by the tensile armour wires in the
flexible pipe.
Specific use and comments on the method has been reported to us as follows:
• The technique has proven to be particularly useful in detecting anomalies in the outer
armour layer of a flexible pipe. Armour wire disorganisation (birdcaging) and
overlapping has been accurately detected in onshore workshop conditions and
verified through subsequent pipe dissection. The method is time consuming and
therefore requires considered selection of the pipe location to be scanned.
Furthermore, the quality of output data is dependent on the condition of the external
pipe surface. Sheath defects and marine growth will reduce the quality of the scan.
• There is considerable and successful experience in using the eddy current method to
inspect pipe samples undergoing dynamic qualification testing.
• In one instance, an inspection of exposed tensile armours in the mid-line region of a

riser was performed using the eddy current method. The results showed no wire
damage and hence confirmed that the pipe Cathodic Protection (CP) system was
working.
• The method cannot be used to inspect the behaviour or condition of the external
armours through a bend stiffener. This is unfortunate, given that this can be a critical
location for armour wire fatigue damage.

State-of-the-Art
• When it comes to inspecting for armour wire cracks, it has been reported to us that
the results from the eddy current inspection are difficult to interpret and perhaps this
has hindered its wider use in the industry to-date.
Internal Eddy Current Inspection
As far as we are aware, the eddy current tool has only been applied once offshore to inspect
the inside of a flexible pipe. In this instance, the tool was dropped inside the top of a riser in
the connection / bend stiffener location. The purpose of the inspection was to determine the
state of the hoop stress layer of the flexible pipe. The industry does not consider this to have
been a major success, and again, interpretation of the results seemed to be the biggest
problem.
External Radiography Inspection
Radiography can detect density changes in a material through variations in the absorption of
X-rays or Gamma-rays. This inspection method has also been successfully used to detect
outer armour wire disorganisation on topside jumper flexible pipes. The tensile armour wire
disarrangement was clearly visible, thus confirming the mode of failure.
As with eddy current techniques, the monitoring method is time consuming and is suited to
localised failure modes. In contrast to eddy current, one drawback of the method is the
safety considerations associated with the use of a hazardous radiation source.
We are not aware of radiography being used to inspect flexible risers subsea. We have been
made aware that Aker in Norway is pioneering the use of X-ray tomography to inspect the
full cross-section of a flexible pipe. One benefit of this method is that it can also be used to
inspect the condition (cracking etc) of the polymer layers. We understand that the method is
still in the early stage of development, but we have not fully investigated it as part of this
study.
A number of flexible risers recently installed in the UKCS and Norwegian sectors have had a
metal marker inserted in their end fittings during manufacture. Apparently this is relatively
easy to achieve if specified as part of the pipe procurement. Radiography can then be used
to detect the location of the metal marker during operation and hence identify any slipping of
the internal sheath from the end fitting. This integrity measure was adopted following the
significant number of PVDF end fitting failures in 1995 to 1997. Since then, a new end
fitting has been designed to avoid this failure in future. Nevertheless, some views have been
expressed to us that a metal insert should be supplied as standard with all flexible risers. It
has not been reported to us whether any inspection of the end-fitting markers on installed
pipe has taken place to-date.

State-of-the-Art
4.2.5 Intelligent Pigging
No intelligent pigging has been performed to date, but some development work is ongoing.
The proposed pig would have the ability to work in a producing pipe, move along its length
and measure and record: position and orientation of the riser in 3D space; pipe ovality using
ultrasonics; leaks using acoustic detection; pressure and temperature; and vibration response
signatures.
A key issue here is whether it is operationally feasible or desirable to perform pipe pigging
as a routine integrity measure. Furthermore, facilities for pig launching in any future system
would have to be accounted for at the design stage to avoid production shutdowns.
4.2.6 Temperature Monitoring
One novel approach to monitoring internal fluid temperature is to measure skin temperature
of the fixed steel pipework immediately above the riser termination. This is only useful for
older flexible pipe systems where the bend stiffener is fixed over the riser end-fitting, as it
gives a good indication of the internal temperature in the critical fatigue region of the pipe.

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State-of-the-Art
5. FLEXIBLE PIPE DAMAGE, DEGRADATION AND FAILURE
5.1 OVERVIEW
This section details the statistics of flexible pipe damage and failure incidents gathered from
in-house data and industry feedback from this study. A total of 106 flexible pipe failure /
damage incidents are included in the statistical analysis.
Figure 5.1 shows the results of a statistical analysis of damage / failure for four flexible pipe
functions. These four functions are riser, flowline, seabed jumper and FPSO drag-chain
(DC) jumper. For each function, we split the damage / failures into two categories as
follows:
Accidental Damage: Damage caused to the flexible pipe by an accidental source external to
the flexible pipe system. Examples of such damage include, installation damage, dropped
object damage or trawlboard damage. For the vast majority of these incidents, the pipe was
repaired and continued in service. In some cases, particularly for risers, the damage occurred
during installation, and the damaged riser was replaced with a new one.
System Failure: Incident that occurs while the pipe is in service that results in failure of the
flexible pipe system. If the failure occurs for the pipe itself, this means that the pipe has
failed to contain its fluids, that is, it leaks. This can be either catastrophic, or it can be a
small leak, depending on the failure mode. If an ancillary device fails, then this is also
included as a system failure, and is categorised as Ancillary Device failure in the upcoming
statistical analysis.
We will use these two categories again throughout this chapter. The percentages in Figure
5.1 represent the percentage of failures relative to the total number of failures for the
particular flexible pipe function. Since we have focused on risers in this study, our sample
of riser failures will inevitably be greater than that for flowlines for example, so the riser
statistics are more representative than the flowline statistics. Only further research will
conclude on this. Nevertheless, based on the information we have gathered to-date, Figure
5.1 tells us that system failure, in accordance with the above definitions, is at least equal if
not more prominent than accidental damage for all flexible pipe functions.
If we now focus on System Failure, Figure 5.2 splits the failures into various failure mode
categories. Internal sheath ageing or degradation is the most common failure mode (31%)
and this is all degradation of PA11 sheath. Next is PVDF sheath pull-out from its end fitting

State-of-the-Art
at 25% followed by ancillary device failure at 12%. A discussion of the issues associated
with some of these failure modes is given in Section 5.2 below.
Figure 5.3 shows that under the Accidental Damage category, 76% of these have occurred
during installation. An analysis of Accidental Damage by damage modes is given in Figure
5.4. External sheath damage is by far the most common damage mode at 61% and the vast
majority of this occurs during installation.
Figure 5.5 provides information on failures / damage as a function of years in operation.

Zero years in operation implies installation damage. An interesting conclusion from this
figure is that most failures (not including installation damage) are occurring within the first
four years of service. There is a little blip at about 8 or nine years, but we expect that most
of our flexible pipe population has not reached this age yet, and we cannot be conclusive
about likely life-span. Bear in mind that most of these flexible pipes have been designed to
have a twenty years life.
We also show in Figure 5.5, the statistics when we take away PVDF pull-out, and PA11
degradation.
We have also had a significant number of cases reported to us where the annulus of the riser
is known to be flooded although what caused this to happen is not known. However, it
certainly brings the issue of fatigue life prediction of risers with flooded annuli into focus as
a key issue for the future.
To a very large extent, we have not had any failure modes reported to us for which the
original fault lay with a manufacturing defect. This should be investigated further in a future
study on flexible pipe failure modes. It may also be useful to compare the results of this
work with the previous PARLOC industry study.
5.2 SPECIFIC DAMAGE AND FAILURE MODES
In this section, we have selected a number of damage / failure modes that we believe are
worthy of some discussion for the purposes of this report.
5.2.1 External Sheath Damage
From our database we have found that by far the most common damage / failure mode is
external sheath damage. Most of this damage occurs during installation. External sheath
damage offshore most likely results in the flexible pipe annulus being flooded. For a riser
this is significant, since calculations to date have concluded that due to corrosion fatigue of
the tensile armours in a wet annulus environment, the design life of the riser is typically

State-of-the-Art
reduced from its original value of 20 years to just 2. So even though the damage to the pipe
is superficial, the ultimate consequences are serious, and in many cases to-date the riser has
simply been replaced. In other cases, considerable R&D work and riser re-analysis
combined with schemes to flush or purge the riser annulus of its corrosive environment have
been performed to extend the life of the riser.
5.2.2 Internal Sheath Degradation
We have been surprised at the number of PA11 degradation failures. The fact that 61% of
our present database of risers has a PA11 internal pressure sheath means this is an important
integrity issue for the future.
We note from our statistical analysis though, that most of these failures have occurred early
on in the life of the riser, typically within four years. This suggests that the problem is very
much one of design, namely, the riser is simply being operated well above its design limit
and water cut in the fluid flow is higher that what was originally designed for. Is this an
issue for operations, where they may not understand the design limits of the riser system they
are operating? Or is it a problem for the design team that the design basis they were working
to was not correct? We have found elsewhere that the link between the original design team
and the subsequent operations of the pipe is poor in practice. Furthermore there is little
feedback from operations into the design of any new pipes.
On the positive side, we know that the industry recognises the importance of this issue with
the formation of the Rilsan Users Group (See Section 6.1.3) below. They have been co-
ordinating many research projects in the last number of years into the ageing of PA11, and
they intend to produce an API technical bulletin by the end of 2001 on a range of issues
associated with the use of this material in flexible pipe.
Presently API RP 17B has a service life prediction curve for PA11 that it recommends for
design or re-evaluation of service life. It has been reported to us that calculations performed
using this curve tend to predict failure for pipes that are still in operation. One operator
recovered a seabed jumper for physical analysis that it predicted should have failed. A
conclusion from the physical analysis is that you can get varying degrees of degradation
through the thickness of the thermoplastic. While the thermoplastic was close to failure on
its inside diameter, the vast majority of the sheath thickness was still in good order. The API
codes need to account for this effect and generally improve the accuracy of the ageing curves
that they provide. This is presumably being dealt with in the new API bulletin to be issued
later this year.

State-of-the-Art
From an integrity viewpoint, this problem highlights the importance of monitoring

temperature and water-cut in the bore as these are the two key factors that affect PA11
degradation.
Cross-linked polyethelene (XDPE) is being proposed by some of the suppliers as an

alternative material so as to avoid this type of degradation. Our statistics show that there is
very little of this material in operation to-date.
5.2.3 PVDF End Fitting Failure Modes
It is clear from the statistics that this has been a significant failure mode. Compared to the
other thermoplastics used in flexible pipe, PVDF has a high thermal expansion coefficient.
Hence, continuous and cyclic expansion and contraction of the internal sheath caused by
temperature cycles in the pipe (production shutdown followed by start-up) resulted in
gradual pull-out of the internal sheath from its end fitting. Also, the problem was worsened
by the shrinkage of the PVDF material due to loss of plasticiser near the end fitting crimp.
This failure mode is now well known, and all the manufacturers have radically improved the
design of the end-fitting crimp to avoid this type of failure in the future. The PVDF material
has been modified so as to avoid the use of plasticiser and subsequent shrinkage of the
material. It is not clear from our statistics, to what extent old PVDF end fitting designs are
still in operation, and this should be investigated in a further study. We understand that all
those risers that previously failed were replaced with the new end fitting design.
We have noted some concern that the problem may not yet be completely resolved. We still
have the high thermal expansion coefficient to deal with. In the new design, temperature
cycles will induce stress cycles that in turn could result in fatigue failure and cracking of the
PVDF sheath close to the end fitting. It appears that more research work needs to be done
here.
5.2.4 Tensile Armour Wire Disarray or Birdcaging
Disarray of the tensile armour wires over time has been a reasonably significant mode of
failure in flexible pipe. It seems to occur mainly when the pipe is constrained in a tight
radius and the disarray tends to be local rather than through the whole length of the pipe.
Such examples of this include a pipe upheaval buckle, or tight constraint within a drag chain
structure. High lay angle of the tensile armours also contribute to the failure mode.
Once large gaps have occurred between the tensile armours, the pressure armour layer
becomes unprotected. The interlocking mechanism of the pressure armour fails; a gap

State-of-the-Art
occurs and the internal pressure sheath bursts. In some instances a small leak occurs,
whereas in others the failure is catastrophic.
5.2.5 Vent Port Blockage
There have been a surprising number of cases where failure of the pipe has occurred due to
the vent ports at the pipe end connections getting blocked. Permeated gas from the internal
bore builds up in the annulus when the ports are blocked. Eventually the high annulus
pressure either bursts the external sheath catastrophically, or in the case of a pipe without an
internal carcass, collapses the internal sheath.
A clear lesson from this is to implement an integrity measure to check at regular intervals
that the vent valves do not become blocked, and indeed, check that they are all clear at
Factory Acceptance Testing.
5.3 DAMAGE/FAILURE INCIDENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF RISERS SURVEYED
Of all the risers surveyed as part of this study it has been found that 20% have experienced
some form of damage or failure. Of this 20%, two thirds of these incidents have occurred
during installation and one third have occurred during normal operation.

State-of-the-Art
Figure 5.1 Accidental Damage vs. System Failure
Classification of Incidents According to whether they are

Accidental Damage or System Failure
90% 83%
80% 73%
Accidental Damage
70% 61%
System Failure
60%
50% 50%
50%
39%
40%
27%
30%
20% 17%
10%
0%
Riser Flowline Jumper DC Jumper

State-of-the-Art
Figure 5.2 System Failure Mechanisms
System Failure Mechanisms
35%
Other:
31%
Upheaval Buckling
30% Corrosion
PVDF Fracture
25% J-tube Inner Sheath
Collapse
25%
Internal Sheath Fatigue
Pipe Blockage
20%
15% 12%
10%
10%
7% 7%
5%
3%
5%
0%
Other
PVDF Sheath Pull-
Ancillary Device
Birdcaging
Aged Internal
Vent Blockage
Internal Sheath
End Fitting Leak
Sheath
Collapse
Failure
Out

State-of-the-Art
Figure 5.3 Installation vs. Operation Damage
Accidental Damage: Installation vs. Operation
24% Installation
Operation
76%
Figure 5.4 Accidental Damage Mechanisms
Accidental Damage Mechanisms
70% Other:
61%
Pigging Damage
Overpull
60%
Excess Torsion
50%
40%
30% 21%
20% 11%
8%
10%
0%
Overbend
External Sheath
Other
Ovalisation/Kink
Damage

State-of-the-Art
Figure 5.5 Time in service before damage
Time in Service Before Damage
60%
52%
50%
All Cases
41%
40%
34%
30%
All Cases Except
30% PVDF Pull-Out
26%
24% 23%
23%
All Cases Except
20% PVDF Pull-Out and
15% PA11 Aging
10% 6%
4% 5% 3% 4%
2% 3% 3% 2% 1% 1% 0%
0%
0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 11+
Years

State-of-the-Art
Figure 5.6 Summary of Damage/Failure Mechanisms
Damage / Failure Mechanisms

25%
25%
Other:
Pigging Damage
Excess Torsion
19% Overpull
20% Upheaval Buckling
Corrosion
16% PVDF Fracture
End Fitting Failure
15% Inner Sheath Fatigue
Pipe Blockage
10%
9%
8% 8%
4% 4% 4%
5% 3%
0%
Overbend
Aged Internal
Birdcaging
Ancillary Device
Other
External Sheath
PVDF Sheath
Ovalisation /
End Fitting Leak
Vent Blockage
Pull-Out
Sheath
Damage
Kink
Failure

State-of-the-Art
6. RISER TECHNOLOGY ISSUES
6.1 JIP WORK
This section is not meant in any way to represent an extensive presentation of all joint
industry work either previous or ongoing. Rather it represents the feedback from the
questionnaires and interviews we received during the course of this study.
6.1.1 API 17 J and API RP 17B Standards
A common feedback from the industry was that this was a very successful initiative,
resulting in industry standards that all could work to in a consistent manner. Most of the
comments here relate to the experience of the use of these standards since their inception as
follows:
• A positive aspect of the development of the standards was the intimate involvement
of suppliers and potential purchasers in the preparation of the API 17J and 17B
documents. The JIP had the support of 23 companies worldwide with all three
manufacturers, Coflexip, Wellstream and NKT involved. We have received
feedback in this study that perhaps a slight downside from this approach to
developing the API documents is that there is evidence of “consensus” clauses in
them. There are clauses in API 17J and 17B that do not provide sufficiently clear
guidance or set tight enough criteria. The next point is an example of this.
• API 17B does not define sufficiently clear or tight criteria with regard to the need for
prototype testing and this needs to be significantly improved if it is to be of use to the
industry.
• API 17B should provide more detailed guidance on riser configuration design
methodology in terms of extreme and fatigue load cases and how to select them; the
use of regular and irregular wave analysis and how to predict extremes for these
cases; and the appropriate use of time domain versus frequency domain analysis. It
could be said that in terms of beneficial use by the industry, API 17J is ahead of API
17B. It might be concluded that if 17B could move more towards a “Design
Handbook” type format thus establishing a consistent design approach in the
industry, its beneficial use would increase significantly.
• There is still a lot of evidence that the industry is continuing to adopt approaches that
existed prior to the issue of the API documents and some of the changes or

State-of-the-Art
opportunities brought about by these documents have not been fully embraced. The
following two points are examples of this.
• Project specifications for flexible pipe continue to be written in a style as if 17J did
not exist. The perfunctory reference to 17J is added on with the statement that the
pipe must be designed to these standards. More often than not, the project
specification document is not compatible with 17J. A much better approach would
be to have the project specification map the “Functional Requirements” section of
17J and state at the beginning of the project specification document that both it and
17J together form the complete specification for the pipe.
• Suppliers continue to provide the single page “Certifying Authority” stamp as

evidence that their product is fit for purpose with little or no supporting technical
information to back this up. Perhaps, in appropriate cases, proper use has not been
made of the role of the “Independent Verification Agent” in 17J to provide the
purchaser with a transparent set of documentation demonstrating proper design
methodology and fitness for purpose.
• Changes to the second edition of API 17J may have not have been properly thought
out. Firstly, the “design pressure” definition is not clear versus its relation to
maximum operating pressure, and indeed the usage of “design pressure” in the
specification appears to be contrary to common usage. Secondly, the allowable wire
stress utilisations at design pressure are incompatible with those set for the factory
acceptance testing under the current requirement that the factory acceptance test
pressure be performed at 1.5 times the design pressure. These apparent
incompatibilities should be resolved as soon as possible.
• There may be a need to refine the definition of wire stress to properly account for
scenarios of combined wire tension and wire bending stresses.
6.1.2 Robit Rilsan Ageing / FDEMS
Robit have been running joint industry project work over many years on the ageing of PA11
(Rilsan) and contributed significantly to this technology. This has been both on the coupon
testing and the development of the FDEMS technique (Frequency Dependent
Electromagnetic Sensing). The FDEMS technique is an online method of determining the
degradation with time (ageing) of PA11. Robit are now part of the Corrocean group of
companies.
The results from the FDEMS technique are known to be affected by substances in the
internal flow and its temperature and pressure. Robit are currently running a joint industry

State-of-the-Art
project to quantify these effects and hence calibrate the method to provide consistent and
accurate measures of ageing while taking account of the various internal flow conditions.
This work is scheduled to be complete by the end of 2001.
6.1.3 Rilsan Users Group
The Rilsan Users Group consists of oil companies, flexible pipe suppliers and other relevant
specialist organisations who are working together to resolve issues associated with the use of
PA11 pressure sheath in flexible pipe. The group meet on a regular basis to discuss progress
on their deliberations.
One important task of the group has been to develop a standard laboratory test protocol for
testing PA11 coupons for ageing, or more specifically establishing the inherent viscosity of
the material from which the degree of ageing can be deduced. The problem prior to this task
has been that depending on how and in what laboratory the coupons were tested and
depending on how the samples were originally taken from the flexible pipe, wildly different
results would be obtained. A standard protocol has now been developed and verification has
been obtained with several laboratories that consistent results can now be obtained across
different laboratories once the protocol is properly adopted.
The Rilsan Users Group are now part of an API committee and are actively working on the
production of an API Bulletin for Rilsan (PA11). The bulletin will provide information on
the fundamental chemistry of the material and on how to predict its life accurately. It will
also show how the service life is affected by the pH of the internal fluid in the pipe and the
presence of CO2 and other relevant substances. The present schedule is to have this bulletin
issued by the end of 2001.
6.1.4 Annulus Environment and Corrosion Fatigue
A proper understanding of what is happening in the annulus of a flexible pipe during its time
in operation is crucial to the prediction of its service life. Sijm Last, an ex Shell employee is
currently running a joint industry project on this topic. Two broad objectives of the JIP are
• Establish the environment within the operation including the gases that will permeate
into and out of it.
• Understand the issues associated with the corrosion fatigue of the armour wires in the
annulus environment and its impact on service life of the flexible.
At this stage of the project, actual measurements from flexible pipe annulus monitoring in
the field has been used to calibrate the analytical permeation models that have been

State-of-the-Art
developed. Hence, work done to-date on the project confirms that the permeation models
are correct. Further work on the JIP will concentrate on corrosion fatigue issues.
6.1.5 Amitec / Robit Balmoral Riser Dissection
The dissection of a failed riser from the Balmoral Field in the North Sea was performed as
part of a joint industry project managed by Amitec / Robit during 1999. Amitec and Robit
are now both part of the Corrocean group. The Balmoral riser had failed after 9½years in
service. In this respect, the JIP was important as it gave the industry an opportunity to
investigate the condition of a riser after some considerable number of years in service.
The failure investigation confirmed that the internal Rilsan pressure sheath had aged to the
extent that it cracked at a notch point just under the top riser end fitting. Pressure built up in
the annulus causing the external sheath to burst under pressure. Cracks were also found in
the sheath approximately every 10 metres down the riser. However, the investigation
concluded that these cracks were caused by the reeling / unreeling process when retrieving
the riser from its offshore location. The Rilsan sheath had reached a sufficient degree of
ageing and brittleness that it could not withstand the reeling / unreeling loads during its
retrieval.
In the early days of flexible pipe design, the effect of water cut and high temperatures on the
ageing of Rilsan was not fully understood and the design service life for the pipe was over
predicted. This has resulted in significant research effort by the industry (see Section 6.1.3
above) to better understand this problem. An updated set of ageing curves has been included
in API RP17B, and these curves are presently being used by the industry. The API Bulletin
on Rilsan due out before end of 2001 will no doubt update and improve the accuracy of the
17B curves.
6.1.6 MCS / Robit Flexible Pipe Integrity Guidelines
As stated earlier in Section 3.3.2, this joint industry project had the support of 15 industry
participants between the UK and Norway. The project was jointly managed by Robit and
MCS and resulted in Guidelines being published by the Health and Safety Executive in
1998. The JIP compiled an extensive database of potential pipe failure modes and how these
failure modes would develop from an initial defect / damage through to failure. The
database was compiled based on the balance of known failures of flexible pipe at that time
and a fundamental knowledge of how flexible pipe shares load within its structure and
potential modes of degradation of the various pipe layers.

State-of-the-Art
6.1.7 MERL / MCS High Temperature Polymers
There were two main purposes to this JIP as follows:
• Identify potential polymers that could be used to manufacture the internal pressure
sheath of an unbonded flexible pipe capable of sustaining temperatures up to 220
degrees centigrade.
• Develop a qualification standard including performance criteria and test protocols

against candidate materials could be qualified for use in high temperature flexible
pipe.
The project had some success in identifying potential polymer materials, although full
qualification was not achieved. The key deliverable was the Qualification Standard
Document that could be used by the industry at a future date.
6.1.8 Optical Fibres in Flexible Pipes
A joint industry project is currently being run by OptoPlan, Marintek and NKT Flexibles.
The objective of this JIP is to demonstrate the effectiveness and benefits of integrating
optical fibres into flexible pipe. The project has been running now for over a year.
The project has incorporated an optical fibre into a full scale prototype flexible pipe and
dynamic tests have been carried out at Marintek’s laboratories. To-date the optical fibres
have measured tensile armour wire stresses during dynamic loading and the results have
been compared with numerical modelling. We understand that these comparisons are very
close. This demonstrates that optical fibres can be successfully used to monitor armour wire
stresses and that the numerical methods for predicting dynamic stresses in a flexible pipe
structure are improving significantly. A paper will be published in OTC 2001 describing the
work of the JIP to-date.
6.2 MANUFACTURER R&D EFFORTS
After some significant discussion with the flexible pipe manufacturers, it can be generally
concluded that all are very much focussing their efforts towards the improvement of flexible
pipe design for deepwater 1000 metres and beyond. Such R&D efforts include the
development of new wire cross-section shapes for the hoop stress layer to increase collapse
resistance of the pipe and the use of lightweight composite armours for the tensile armour
layer to reduce its weight.

State-of-the-Art
Coflexip Stena Offshore has developed a flexible pipe with active heating for projects where
flow assurance is a key issue. They are also proposing a replacement for Coflon (PVDF)
known as Gamma-Flex. This material has a low content of plasticiser and so the end of the
internal pressure sheath made from this material will not require deplastification prior to
mounting the end-fitting of the pipe. Wellstream has been performing considerable
qualification testing for deep water application and high temperature end fittings. They have
also modified the shape of their Flexlok pressure armour wire to minimise contact pressures
and to improve its resistance to fatigue.
All the manufacturers are putting some effort into the possibilities of integrating passive
monitoring, such as fibre optics into flexible pipe. In particular, NKTs’ research and
development work in this area has already been documented in Section 6.1.8 above.

State-of-the-Art
7. REFERENCES
1. MCS Proposal to the UKOOA FPSO Engineering Work Group entitled, “State-of-the-
Art Flexible Riser Integrity Issues”, Proposal No. 99-2-1-031, Rev. 03, January 2000.
2. “Guidelines for Integrity Monitoring of Unbonded Flexible Pipes”, OTO 98019, March
1998, published by the Health and Safety Executive.
3. “Monitoring Methods for Unbonded Flexible Pipes”, OTO 98018, March 1998,
published by the Health and Safety Executive.
4. “Industry Seminar – Flexible Pipes, Organised by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate

(NPD), One day Seminar, 24th January, 2001, NPD offices, Stavanger.

State-of-the-Art
Annexe A
Industry Questionnaire
MCS Page No. A-1 Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04


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State of the Art Flexible

Riser Integrity Issues

4 5th April, 2001 Final Revision including Executive Summary Patrick

The key achievements of this study has been to:

MCS Page No. (i) Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

1.1 GENERAL .......................................................................................................................................................1

2. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................................................6

2.1 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................6

3. CURRENT INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PRACTICE ................................................................................10

3.1 GENERAL .....................................................................................................................................................10

3.4.4.2 Perceived Strengths ..............................................................................................................................20

3.4.4.3 Perceived Weaknesses ..........................................................................................................................20

4. MONITORING METHODS ...............................................................................................................................23

4.1 OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................................................................23

MCS Page No. (ii) Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

4.2.4 Eddy Current and Radiography Methods ........................................................................................26

5. FLEXIBLE PIPE DAMAGE, DEGRADATION AND FAILURE...................................................................30

5.1 OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................................................................30

6. RISER TECHNOLOGY ISSUES........................................................................................................................40

6.1 JIP WORK ....................................................................................................................................................40

MCS Page No. (iii) Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

1. INTRODUCTION AND STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE

1.2 STUDY METHODOLOGY

Prior to conducting industry interviews, MCS developed a standard questionnaire as a means

MCS Page No. 1 Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

In some instances, particularly relating to failures, confidentiality is an important issue and

1.3 SCOPE OF WORK

• Prepare a standard questionnaire to gather operator, installer and manufacturer

• Compile a list of industry contacts to whom the questionnaire should be sent.

1.4 PROJECT STATISTICS

MCS Page No. 2 Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

1.4.1 Questionnaires Issued / Returned and Follow-up Interviews

Table 1.1 Project Statistics

Questionnaire Statistics Totals

No. of Questionnaires sent • Industry individuals 70

1.4.2 Participating Companies

Table 1.2 Participating Companies

Oil Companies Field Operators / Regulatory Flexible Pipe

1.4.3 Field Developments

MCS Page No. 3 Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

Table 1.3 Flexible Riser Field Developments

1.5 NORWEGIAN SEMINAR ON FLEXIBLE PIPES

MCS Page No. 4 Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

MCS Page No. 5 Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

2. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

MCS Page No. 6 Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

MCS Page No. 7 Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

MCS Page No. 8 Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

selected monitoring techniques on their ability to inspect specific aspects of flexible

d) To achieve a consistent approach to flexible pipe integrity management across the

e) We recommend an industry initiative to look closely at the critical interface between

MCS Page No. 9 Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

3. CURRENT INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT PRACTICE

3.2 FLEXIBLE RISER POPULATION STATISTICS

In this section, we present the following flexible riser statistics:

• Total number of operational riser years to date.

• Riser Statistics in terms of function and configuration.

• Production riser statistical analysis in terms of: a) Internal Diameter

b) Internal Pressure Sheath Material

c) Operating Pressure Range

d) Operating Temperature Range

MCS Page No. 10 Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

MCS Page No. 11 Doc. No.2-1-4-181/SR01, Rev. 04

Figure 3.1 Operational Experience of Flexible Risers