Mind Association

Morality and Importance

Author(s): Neil Cooper
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 77, No. 305 (Jan., 1968), pp. 118-121
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2252606
Accessed: 29-09-2017 13:32 UTC

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 MORALITY AND IMPORTANCE

IN an article entitled " Akrasia and Criteria of Assent to Practical

Principles" (MIND (July 1956), pp. 400-407), Professor C. K. Grant
maintains (p. 406) that " it simply cannot be assumed without
argument that nothing can be rationally regarded as more important
than morally righteous conduct ". I want in this paper to examine
the assumption which Grant challenges, and to show that the issue
between Grant and his opponents can be clarified, if not dissolved,
by making a distinction between two concepts of morality, which I
shall distinguish as the positive and the autonomous concepts.1
There are many different human activities, interests and aspects
of life to which different people assign different degrees of importance.
Sometimes a single activity, interest or aspect of life is assigned
supreme importance by some individual or group. A theory which
assigns supreme importance to some single activity or interest I shall
call a " monolithic " theory. There are many examples of mono-
lithic theories. The militarist considers that making war is the
most important activity. The capitalist considers that the most
important thing is to produce and acquire wealth. The Macchiavellian
thinks that the interests of the state are paramount. Aestheticists
hold that Art is more important than anything else and that the
appreciation and production of works of art are the most worthwhile
human activities. All these theories are monolithic in that they
would, if put into practice, bring it about that " political institutions
and social arrangements and intellect and morality and religion are
crushed into a mould made to fit one activity " (R. H. Tawney,
The Acquisitive Society, Penguin Edition, p. 43). I want to suggest
that these monolithic theories are themselves moralities in the
autonomous sense of the word " moralities " and that any auto-
nomous morality provides an answer to the question " What order
of importance should be assigned to our activities and interests ? ".
The language of morals in this sense is " the language of priorities ".
In the first place, there plainly is a sense in which morality is one
among many aspects of human life. When we study a culture, we
attend to the different interests, activities and aspects of life which
make up that culture, a people's law, religion, morality and so on.
In such contexts the word " morality " is used to refer to a social
phenomenon, a positive morality, a framework of rules and ideals
conformity to which is enforced by a distinctive kind of social
pressure or sanction, " the reproaches of one's neighbours ". A
person may hold that morality in this sense of the word is less
important than, say, religion, or he may change his mind about the
order of importance of these social phenomena. The rules of a
positive morality are independent of the individual's attitudes and
preferences and so the body of rules and ideals which constitute a
1 This distinction is treated more fully in my " Two Concepts of Morality "
Philosophy, January 1966).

118

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 MORALITY AND IMPORTANCE 119

positive morality is relatively stable. It is because of this stability

that a positive morality can become the object of attitudes; it is
possible for the individual to fluctuate in his attitude towards
morality and to come to think that something else is more important.
In the limiting case a person may come to regard morality in this
sense as of no importance at all and cease to regard the rules of the
positive morality of his society, as furnishing any reasons for action
at all. Perhaps this is the condition of Tawney's militarists (op. cit.
p. 45) who " resent any activity which is not coloured by the pre-
dominant interest because it seems a rival to it. So they destroy
religion and art and morality." Again, some of the great Immora-
lists have described themselves as going " beyond good and evil ",
when they were rejecting the positive morality of their era and
culture. Gide in his Journals (Pleiade Edition, Vol. 1, p. 953)
writes: " L'idee du bien, confortable, rassurante et telle que la
cherit la bourgeoisie, invite a la stagnation, au sommeil. Je crois que,
souvent, le mal ... est d'une plus grande vertu educatrice et initiatrice
-que ce que vous appelez le bien." Gide's own morality is revealed
by his use of words like "vertu " as terms of praise. He is not
rejecting the concept of "le bien " but " ce que vous appelez le
bien ", the positive morality of his society.
If then, by " morally righteous conduct " is meant conduct which
is required by the positive morality of a given society, then other
activities, interests and aspects of life can " be rationally regarded
as more important than morally righteous conduct ". It should be
noticed that the expression " morally righteous conduct " need not
be used " from the external point of view " (Hart, The Concept of
Law, pp. 86-87). It can be used from the internal point of view.
For one may regard the morality of one's society as providing reasons
for action, albeit not conclusive or overriding reasons. Such is the
attitude of the man who conforms to the positive morality out of
sheer habit or unreflective respect for tradition.
The seconul sense of the word " morality " is that in which it is
used when we talk, for example, of " Gide's own morality ". For
we not only talk of the morality of a group, but also of the moral
beliefs and principles of individuals. In this " autonomous " sense
of the word " morality ", a person's morality cannot be independent
of his attitudes and preferences. The main question, to which an
autonomous morality is an answer is, I suggest, " What considera-
tions ought we to hold most important in making up our minds what
to do ? ", or, to employ a useful term of Matthew Arnold's (Culture
and Anarchy, Chap. 5), " What ought our master-concern(s) to be ? ".
In this sense of the word Grant's opponents are right; nobody can
consistently think that anything is more important than his own
morality, and so, to put it in an " Irish " fashion, if anybody does
think something more important than morality, then this too is
part, and the most important part, of his morality. That this view
is true of autonomous morality I shall try to show by means of

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 120 N. COOPER:

several examples. Aestheticists think that one human activity,

Art, is more important than any other. This view can be described
in two different ways. We could say that they " subordinate "
positive morality to Art. Or we could say that their own autonomous
morality consisted in putting Art first. As Gaunt says of the
Bohemians, " They had one law, one morality, one devotion and that
was Art " (The Aesthetic Adventure, Penguin Edition, p. 14). .-Again,
Macchiavelli may be described as " subordinating " morality to
prudence or expediency. But in fact he sometimes uses the language
of autonomous morality. For example, if he were talking the
language of positive morality, one would expect him to say, " While
you (i.e. the Prince) are morally bound to keep your promises, it is
more important to preserve yourself and therefore you ought not to
do what you are morally bound to do ". What he in fact says is that
as men are bad and " would not observe their faith with you, so
you are not [my italics] bound to keep faith with them " (The Prince,
World's Classics Translationp. 78). Itseemsfromhiswayof expressing
his thought that he is not so much allowing considerations of expedi-
ency to override morality as converting them into overriding moral
considerations. Further, those who hold a capitalist morality may
be described as maintaining that the pursuit of profit is more
important than positive morality. In fact, however, capitalist
moralists, if we may believe Tawney (op. cit. pp. 182-183), hold a
morality which gives priority to commercial success. " The idea ",
he says, " that conduct which is commercially successful may be
morally wicked is as unfamiliar to the modern world as the idea that
a type of social organization which is economically efficient may be
inconsistent with principles of right."
Further, there are religious thinkers who hold that religious
considerations are more important than any others. Their views
may be described in two different ways. They may be described as
by Grant (MIND, ibid. p. 405) as holding " not only that the dictates
of morality can conflict with Divine commandments but that when
they do morals must give way ". Here " morals " must refer to the
positive morality regarded from the internal point of view.
Alternatively they may be regarded as holding that religious con-
siderations are moral considerations which ought to override all
others. This would be a distinctive and monolithic morality, a
"Put God first " morality.
It appears, then, that there are two different ways in which
monolithic theories may be described, corresponding to two senses
of the word " morality ". Confusion has arisen partly because the
task of describing a monolithic theory is linguistically embarrassing.
This linguistic embarrassment is similar to that experienced by
Spinozists. Their opponents maintained that because they identified
God and Nature they were atheists. The Spinozists retorted with
equal justification that they were not atheists but " acosmists ";
they denied not God but the universe. In a similar way since

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 MORALITY AND IMPORTANCE 121

monolithic theories appear to make morality coalesce with some

other human activity, it is tempting to regard morality as having
been " subordinated ", " enveloped " or even " destroyed " by the
other human activity. But, as I have tried to show by means of
examples, monolithic theories may be and often have been expounded
in the language of autonomous morality. In this autonomous sense
of the word " morality " to think one activity, interest or avspect of
life more important than some other, even if that other is the
positive morality of one's society, is to commit oneself to a moral
position.

Queen's College, Dundee NEIL COOPER

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