*

Bibliography
Philosophy of Science, Annotated Stanford, Fall, 1980

Prepared by Lindley Darden of the Committee on the History and Philosophy

of Science, University of Maryland, College Park
Prepared for Seminar on Theory Constaiction and Analogical Reasoning, cotaught with Bruce
Buchanan

BOOKS

A. Old but with selections still worth readin

John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Book 111, "Of Induction"

an old but useful source, especially for the methods of experimental inquiry, a discussion of their
limitations and the role of hypotheses and analogical reasoning

William Whewell's Theory of Scientific Method, cd. Robert Butts (University of

Pittsburgh, 1968)
a good selection from Whewell's numerous writings; see especially Whewell's
idea of a "consilience of inductions," namely cases in which a single hypothesis
explains two classes of different kinds of facts. For example, Newton's
hypothesis of tlie existence of the force of universal gravitation explains both
Kepler's laws and laws of falling bodies.

Charles Peirce: .Selected Writings, cd. Philip Wiener (Dover, 1958)

this book is one of several that contain selections from Peirce's writings in
philosophy of science. Especially pertinent is his work on abduction (also
called rctroduction) which, he argued, is a method of reasoning that is different
from induction and deduction; it yields new hypotheses.

J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (London, 1921), Chs.lB and 19 on

analogical argument

B. Classics of Twentieth Century Philosophy of Science

Carl Hcmpcl, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (Free Press, 1965)

contains essays that are usually taken as definitive statements of the logical empiricist analyses of
science; particularly relevant is "The Theoretician's Dilemma: A Study in the Logic of Theory
Construction."

Carl Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science (Prentice-Hall, 1966)

a simplified and quick introduction to logical empricism; contains a brief statement of the problem
of obtaining new theoretical terms via induction.

Ernest Nagcl, The Structure of Science (Harcourt-Brace, 1961)

another logical empiricist classic with more material on biology and social science than
Aspects.

Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (actually Logik der Forschuung which is
better translated Logic of Scientific Investigation) (Hutchinson, 1959)
this statement of falsification ism may be the most influential philosophy of science work of the
twentieth century; it is logical empiricist in character but stresses falsification rather than
confirmation; does more with modus tollens than one would have thought possible.

Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd cd. (Chicago, 1970)
a different paradigm in philosophy of science: less concern with the logical form of science and
 »
V 2

more with scientific change; argues that changes occur as the result of revolutionary change of
world view; vague and much criticized but very influential, especially in the soft sciences.

Readings in the Philosophy of Science, cd. Baruch Brody (Prcntice-Ha11,1970)

a bit dated but still the best single collection of articles by diverse authors;a heavy emphasis on
logical empiricism and its critics but some newer matieral also, including one of Fcyerabend's saner
articles "How to be a Good Empiricist-A Plea for Tolerance in Matters Epistemological," and an
absolutely essential article by N. R. Hanson "Is There a Logic of Scientific Discovery?

Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, cd. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge, 1970)
a collection of articles discussing Kuhn's work and also a defmtive piece by Lakatos "Falsification
and tlie Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes" in which a more sophisticated Popperian
position is used in discussing the growth of scientific knowledge.
C. Other books

Current Research in Philosophy of Science, cd. Peter Asquith and Henry Kyburg (Philosophy of
Science Association, East Lansing, Michigan, 1979--may be ordered directly from PSA)
this book was the result of a recent conference to determine the state of the field. It and the PSA
volumes ( also published by the Association) , which are proceedings of the bienniel meetings, are a
good way of finding out about current research in the field

Max Black, Models and Metaphors (Cornell, 1962)

argues for an "interactional" view of metaphor: both things become changed as a result of the.
metaphorical relation

Richard Blackwcll, Discovery in the Physical Sciences (Notre Dame, 1969)

a disappointing book that is nonetheless useful as a guide to some of the discovery literature; it is
very poor when Blackwell tries to develop his own view

Ronald Giere, Understanding Scientific Reasoning (Holt, Rinchart and Winston, 1979)
a new textbook with a very narrow view of science but useful for its flawed, but still interesting,
attempt at providing a formalism for testing theories and causal hypotheses
i
Clark Glymour, Theoty and Evidence (Princeton, 1980) ' >
die newest attempt at confirmation Uieory; has a strong logical empiricist flavor.
Norwood Russell Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge, 1965)
one of the very few books in philosophy of science dealing with the logic of discovery (rather than
the logic of justification) but the discussion of rctroduction was superceded by Hanson's article "Is>
There a Logic of Scientific Discovery?"

Rom Harre, The Principles of Scientific Thinking (Chicago, 1970)

a bit dated but quite useful for Ch. 2, "Models in Theories," which contains some useful
distinctions and a somewhat baroque classification of different types of models..

Mary B. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (Notre Dame, 1970)

although written in an annoying dialogue style, this book has been influential in discussions of
models and analogies and has made standard the terminology of positive, negative and neutral
analogy; she stresses the importance of neutral analogy in theory construction.

Larry Laudan, Progress and Its Problems. Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth (University of
California, 1977)
a new book currently getting a lot of attention that argues that the growth of science is to be seen
as the solution of empirical and conceptual problems; much of the book consists of old ideas
expressed in new terminology.

W.H. Lcathcrdalc, The Role of Analogy, Model and Metaphor in Science (North Holland, 1974)
 "f

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3

a useful introduction to the diverse views on the topic; a large, eclectic bibliography.

Logic and Rationality and Scientific Discovery: Case Studies, cd. Thomas Nickles
Scientific Discovery,
(Rcidel, 1980)
These volumes are the proceedings of a good conference in 1978 and include very recent discussions
on logic of discovery work in philosophy of science.

The Sttvcture of Scientific Theories, cd. Frederick Suppe, 2nd. cd. (University of Illinois
Press, 1977)
This book is tlie proceedings of a conference in 1969 \. itli an extremely useful "Introduction" that
traces the history of much of twentieth century philosophy of science and, in the second edition, has
a very useful "Afterward-1977" that updates that history and discusses some very recent work,
especially on tlie problems of theory structure and the growth of scientific knowledge.

Stephen Toulmin, Hitman Understanding, V. I, The Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts
(Princeton, 1972)
a vague and diffuse book that does too much but has sections mat are very suggestive, especially in
Chs. 2 and 3 on the evolution of intellectual disciplines and their explanatory goals

ARTICLES (in alphabetical order)

Peter Achinstein, "Inference to Scientific Laws," in Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of

Science, Roger Stuewer, cd., v. 5, Minnesota Studies in tlie Philosophy of Science, University of
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1970.
a useful article for considering the additions necessary to simple induction in order to get a
universal generalization; uses Guy-Lussac's law as an example.
Richard Boyd, "Metaphor and Theory Change: What is 'Metaphor' a Metaphor for?"in Andrew
Ortony, cd., Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, pp. 356-408.
a dense article that takes on many complex problems of twentieth century philosophy; the first
section is useful for the claims about the roles of metaphors in scientific dieories; later sections
defend a causal theory of reference.

Lindley Darden,"Reasoning in Scientific Change: Charles Darwin, Hugo de Vries, and the
Discovery of Segregation," Studies in the Histoty and Philosophy of Science 7 (1976) 127-169.
a long article that proposes a schema for hypothesis construction and traces an episode of theory
change.

Lindley Darden,"William Bateson and the Promise of Mendelism," Journal of the History of Biology
10 (1977) 87-106.
discusses why Bateson was able, when many of his contemporaries were not, to see the new
conceptions of Mendelism as promising for future work; proposes several general reasons for
regarding new ideas as promising for future research.

Lindley Darden and Nancy Maull, "Interfield Theories," Philosophy of Science 44 (1977) 43-64.
discusses Dardcn's concept of a scientific field and discusses the generation and function of theories
that bridge two different fields of science; examples arc from twentieth century biology: tlie
chromosome theory of Mendelian heredity, the operon theory of gene regulation and the theory of
allostcric interaction.

Lindley Darden, "The Heritage from Logical Positivism: A Reassessment," PSA 1976, v.2, cd. F.
Suppe and P. Asquith (Philosophy of Science Association Publication, 1977) pp. 242-258.
discusses ways that study of case studies has provided alternatives to some positivistic categories for
discussing science: fields provide a broader category than theory; theory construction and
modification replaces the dichotomy between discovery and justification; and interfield theories
provide an alternative to derivational reductions as an analysis of progress and unification in science.
 )

L.
/

Lindley Darden," Commentary on J. Hciman's, 'Hugo de Vries and the Gene Theory,' in Human
Implications of Scientific Advance, cd. E.G. Forbes, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh,
Scotland, 1978, pp. 444-446.
discusses a case that illuminates tlie relation between claims about the way tlie world is andfield
the
scientific fields that develop to study it: if de Vries's mutation theory had been true then the
of genetics and evolutionary biology would not have developed separately.
Lindley Darden/'Discoveries and the Emergence of New Fields in Science, "PSA 1978, v. 1, cd.P.
Asquith and I. Hacking, Philosophy of Science Association Publication, 1978, pp. 149-160.
traces a pattern of reasoning from the diiscovery of a new kind of entity, to its generalization inu a
theory, to tlie emergence of a new field to study it; found in tlie cases of the emergence of the
fields'of cytology and biochemistry.

Lindley Darden, "Theory Construction in Genetics," Scientific Discovery: Case Studies, cd. T.
Nickles, Reidcl, forthcoming 1980.
argues tiiat the schema for hypothesis construction found in the Darwin-dc Vries case can also be
applied to the early construction of the theory of the gene and that scientists making use of
that, a good strategy
interfield connections rather than analogies produced a better theory; suggests
in theory constaiction is to search for appropriate interfield relations prior to search for analogic
relations.

Lindley Darden, "Aspects of Theory Construction in Biology " Invited Symposia, 6th International
Congress of the Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Hanover, 1979, forthcoming,
using an example from classical genetics, the paper argues for steps to be used in modifying a
theory when an anomaly is found, beginning with investigation of the generality of the anamolous
evidence to a simple complication of a single postulate to more fundamental changes in the
postulates of -tlie theory.

Lindley Darden, "Theory Construction and Classical Genetics: The Anatomy of the Theory of the
Gene and Constraints on Its Modification," presented at the History of Science Society Meetings,
Toronto, 1980. .
constraints on theory modification
outlines tlie structure of the theory of the gene and argues that
general adequacy constraints; suggests
are of different kinds: empirical, theoretical, interfield and
that we should develop a strategy of systematically enumerating and altering constraints to generate
alternative hypotheses.
PK Fcyerabcnd, "How to be a Good Empricist-a Plea for Tolerance in Matters
Epistcmol'ogical/'originally appeared in Philosophy of Science: The Delaware Seminar, 11, reprinted
in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, cd. Barach Brody,(Prcntice Hall, 1970), pp. 319-342.
one of his saner articles: argues against consistency and meaning invariancc; proposes that science
should have numerous mutually inconsistent frameworks; provides no way of choosing among them
and thus is a position of conceptual relativism; concludes with the remark that absurdity is
desirable.

G. K. Gilbert, "The Inculcation of Scientific Mediod by Example, with an illustration drawn from
tlie Quaternary Gclology of Utah," American Journal of Science, 3rd Series 31 (1886) 284-299.
method; argues for the
an old bur very interesting discussion of the teaching of scientific
importance of analogies in hypothesis formation and suggests that the person who is acquainted
with the largest number of different types of hypotheses will have the best basis for drawing
analogies. Gives an example of his own reasoning in the construction of hypotheses in geology.

G X Gilbert, "The Origin of Hypotheses, Illustrated by the Discussion of a Topographic

Problem,"
Science NS 3 (1896) 1-13.
argues that hypotheses arc always suggested by analogy; proposes that one should always start with
as many hypotheses as one can devise and then proceed to devise crucial experiments to choose
among them.

Gary Gutting, "The Logic of Invention," in Scientific Discover)', Logic, and Rationality, cd. T.
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* 5

Nickels (Rcidcl, 1980), pp. 221-234.

a good discussion of the relations between a hypothetico-deductive mode of inference and an
abductivc (retroductive) one; argues for the importance in discovery of the following: heuristic
principles (analogy and simplicity), scientific intentions (goals of the scientific activity), and
cosomological principles (e.g. matter has an atomic structure)

Gary Gutting, "Science as Discovery," in Revue Internationale de Philosophic, Revue Trimestrielle

34 annee, no. 131-132, 1980, pp. 26-48.
argues that methods of discovery are also methods of justification; proposes tiiat discovery takes
place in a question-context constituted by three main types of elements: empirical facts to be
explained; theoretical concepts, laws and models; and methodological considerations such as
"heuristic tricks" (e.g. faiitful oversimplifications, intuitively helpful analogies), mathematical and
experimental techniques and substantive assumptions about the nature of the world and of scientific
inquiry (search for conservation laws; look for reductive explanations; prefer simpler hypotheses).

Norwood Russell Hanson, 1960, "Is There a Logic of Scientific Discovery?" in Current Issues in the
Philosophy of ScienceM. H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1960), pp. 20-42,
reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, cd. Baruch Brody (Prentice Hall, 1970), pp. 620-
-633.
now a classic article in the logic of discovery literature which discusses Hanson's view of Pierces
abductivc (retroductive) inference as a means of inferring a plausible hypothesis of type H; this
articles supercedes eh. 4 of his book, Patterns of Discovery.

N.R. Hanson, "Retroductive Inference," in Philosophy of Science, The Delaware Seminar, v. 1, cd.
Bernard Baumrin, (John Wiley, 1963), pp. 21-37
argues that the hypothetico-deductive(HD) and retroductive(RD) modes of inference are
conceptually (not merely psychologically) different; HD is top down argument; RD is bottom up
argument.

N.R. Hanson, "An Anatomy of Discovery," Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967) 321-352

more like a classification of discovery acts than an anatomy, e.g., discover an X, discover X, discover
diat X, discover an X as a V, etc.

Gerald Holton, Thematic Origins ofScientific Thought: Kepler lo Einstein (Harvard Press, 1973) and
The Scientific ImaginatioivCase Studies (Cambridge University Press, 1978)
argues that scientists arc often guided by very general themata (e.g. simplicity) in their work;
unfortunately presents no way of evaluating themata

Carl Kordig, "Discovery and Justification," Philosophy of Science 45 ((1978)110-117

argues that the context of discovery should be broken down into two parts: the initial thinking up
of a hypothesis and tlie judgment that it is plausible and worthy of test. The former he relegates to
psychology to study; the judgment of plausibility he argues follows reasoning patterns similar to
those in the context of justification, both of which are subjects for philosophy of science.

Robert Monk, "The Logic of Discovery," Philosophy Research Archives 3 (1977) AlO-E6 (53 pages
on microfiche cards)
an excellent article criticizing Hanson's work and proposing a more developed view of discovery as
beginning with a vague idea which gets elaborated in further work.

Thomas Nickles, "Theory Generalization, Problem Reduction and the Unity of Science " in PSA
1974, cd. R.S. Cohen, el. a/.(Rcidel, 1974), pp. 33-75.
argues that problem reduction is an important component in scientific progress; proposes some kind
of step of generalization in theory formation; this view may have relations to the pattern of
reasoning in (Darden, 1978) but neither Nickles nor Darden has fingured out exactly what the
relations are.

Thomas Nickles, "Scientific Problems and Constraints," in PSA 1975. cd. P. Asquith and I. Hacking
(Philosophy of Science Association Publication, 1978), pp. 134-148.
t

begins development of a typology of constraints on problem solution in science.

Thomas Nickles, "Introductory Essay," and "Can Scientific Constraints be Violated Rationally?"in
Scientific Discovery, Logic and Rationality, cd. T. Nickles (Reidel, 1980), pp. 1-59 and pp. 285-315.
a very useful essay about logic of discovery and a good article about when we can reasonably
violate reasonable constraints.
Michael Ruse, "The Nature of Scientific Models: Formal v. Material Analogy," Phil Soc Sci 3
(1973) 63-80.
discusses Darwin's use of Malthus's essay in tlie theory of natural selection; argues for the
importance of material analogy in this case.

Michael Ruse, "The Value of Analogical Models in Science," Dialogue 12 (1973) 246-253
argues that analogical models can play a role in justification; discusses Darwin's discovery of the
theory of natural selection.

Kenneth Schaffncr, "Logic of Discovery and Justification in Regulatory Genetics," Studies in the
History and Philosophy of Science 4 (1970) 349-383.
an excellent article that argues for a unitary logic of scientific inquiry in both discovery and
justificatory contexts; analyzes the discovery of the operon theory of gene regulation and shows the
importance of analogical and deductive reasoning in the discovery of new hypotheses.

Dudley Shaperc, "Scientific Theories and Their Domains,"in The Structure of Scientific Theories,
2nd cd., cd. Frederick Suppe (University of Illinois Press, 1977)
discuss the concept of a scientific domain as a group of related items to be explained by a single
theory; discusses .patterns of reasoning leading to the formation of new scientific domains.