Snyder (Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics)

Syria's Relations with Iran: Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance
Author(s): Fred H. Lawson

Source: Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Winter, 2007), pp. 29-47
Published by: Middle East Institute
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Syria's Relations with Iran: Managing
the Dilemmas of Alliance
Fred H. Lawson
Syria's relations with Iran illustrate the importance of what Glenn Snyder calls
the "alliance dilemma." Efforts to strengthen the strategic partnership with Teh-
ran have had a direct impact on Damascus's policies toward regional rivals.
Nevertheless, the connection between the alliance game and the adversary game
is not as straightforward as one might think. Whenever one ally adopts a posture
of moderate hostility toward an adversary, the other is likely to engage in initia-
tives that might entrap both of them in unwanted conflicts. But if one partner
assumes an inordinately hostile stance toward an adversary, the other tends to
restrain itselffor fear of being caught up in a general war. Likewise, when one
ally makes moderate overtures to a rival, the other takes steps to realign pre-
emptively. But if one partner acts in an extremely conciliatory manner toward
an adversary, the other is more apt to shore up the alliance than to look for new
partners. Making sense of the connection between Syria's alliance with Iran and
its recent policies toward Turkey, Iraq, and Israel requires a refornulation of the
alliance dilemma.
F or the last twenty-five years, Syria has confronted a trio of strategic adversaries:
Turkey, Iraq, and Israel. At the same time, Syria has cultivated a major ally: the Islamic
Republic of Iran.' Using somewhat technical language, one can say that the Ba'thi
leadership in Damascus has been engaged in a set of three adversary games, and si-
multaneously has been involved in a crucial alliance game. These games are almost
impossible to keep separate from one another. Damascus's relations with its primary
adversaries have had important consequences for relations with its key strategic part-
ner, while the moves that Syria has made in the alliance game with Iran have had a
Fred H. Lawson is Rice Professor of Government at Mills College. His study Constructing International
Relations in the Arab World was published by Stanford University Press in August 2006. Elizabeth Picard
and Matteo Legrenzi encouraged the initiation and completion of this essay, respectively.
1. Yair Hirschfeld, "The Odd Couple: Ba'athist Syria and Khomeini's Iran," in Moshe Ma'oz and
AvnerYaniv, eds., Syria under Assad (New York: St. Martin's, 1986); Elie Chalala, "Syria's Support
of Iran in the Gulf War," Journal of Arab Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1988); Yosef Olmert, "Iranian-
Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik," in Devid Menashri, ed., The Iranian Revolution
and the Muslim World (Boulder: Westview, 1990); Christin Marschall, "Syria-Iran: A Strategic Al-
liance, 1979-1991," Orient, Vol. 33, No. 3 (September 1992); Shireen T. Hunter, "Iran and Syria:
From Hostility to Limited Alliance," in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar, eds., Iran and the
Arab World (New York: St. Martin's, 1993); Hussein J. Agha and Ahmad S. Khalidi, Syria and Iran:
Rivalry and Cooperation (London: Pinter, 1995); Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hin-
nebusch, Syria and Iran (London: Routledge, 1997); Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic
Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East (London: Tauris Academic, 2006).
MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL * VOLUME 61, NO. 1, WINTER 2007
30 * MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
direct impact on its dealings with Turkey, Iraq, and Israel.
More precisely, Syria's partnership with the Islamic Republic entails what Glenn
Snyder calls an "alliance dilemma." Whenever Damascus takes firm steps to confront
one of its adversaries, Iran can be expected to grow more confident and assertive. The
leadership in Tehran is then likely to carry out risky foreign policy initiatives that have
the potential to draw Syria into conflicts in which it has no intrinsic interest. Snyder
calls this dynamic "entrapment."2 On the other hand, whenever the Syrian government
moves to conciliate a major adversary, Iran is apt to worry that Damascus is preparing
to abandon it. The leadership in Tehran then will refrain from pursuing dangerous for-
eign policy initiatives and may even make overtures of its own to the adversary, a move
that Snyder labels "pre-emptive realignment."3 A state's policies toward adversaries,
therefore, have a significant impact on relations with its allies, and the consequences
often prove detrimental to that state's underlying security interests.
Faced with this underlying dilemma, Syria has for the most part kept its com-
mitments to Iran loose and fluid. This posture has enabled Damascus to avoid being
dragged into simmering conflicts in the Gulf, although it has left Syria vulnerable to
being abandoned by Tehran.4 Still, Syria's comparatively loose ties to the Islamic Re-
public have not eliminated the possibility that it will become entrapped in unwanted
conflicts. For example, as the 1980s drew to a close, Syria and Turkey adopted more
belligerent postures toward one another. Ankara expressed growing irritation over Da-
mascus's failure to rein in Kurdish and Armenian militants and stop them from carrying
out armed attacks against Turkish targets.5 In October 1989, a pair of Syrian MiG-21
interceptors crossed into Turkish airspace east of Iskandarun and shot down a Turkish
survey plane, killing the five civilians on board.6 Turkey responded by announcing that
it planned to shut off the southward flow of the Euphrates River for an entire month,
purportedly to fill the massive reservoir behind the newly-completed Ataturk Dam.
Escalating tensions between Damascus and Ankara prompted Tehran to un-
dertake a provocative foreign policy initiative of its own. The Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps (IRGC) stepped up its material and moral support for the Lebanese
Islamist organization Hizbullah, precipitating a series of armed clashes during the
spring of 1988 between that organization and its primary rival for leadership among
the Lebanese Shi'a, the Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance (Afwaj al-Muqawamah
2. Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4
(July 1984), p. 467; Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997),
pp. 182-183.
3. Snyder, "Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," p. 467; Snyder, Alliance Politics, p. 195.
4. Bruce Stanley, "Drawing from the Well: Syria in the Persian Gulf," Journal of South Asian
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Winter 1990); Rosemary Hollis, "'Whatever Happened to th
Damascus Declaration?': Evolving Security Structures in the Gulf," in M. Jane Davis, ed., Politics
and International Relations in the Middle East (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995).
5. Suha Bolukbasi, "Ankara, Damascus, Baghdad and the Regionalization of Turkey's Kurdis
Secessionism," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Summer 199
6. "Chronologies: Syrie" ["Chronology: Syria"], Maghreb/Machrek, No. 127 (January-March
1990), p. 181; Middle East Contemporary Survey 1989, pp. 642-643; Ken Mackenzie, "Turkey: Ter-
rorism and Water," Middle East International, December 15, 1989.
SYRIA'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN * 31
al-Lubnaniyyah or Amal).7 Iran's Foreign Minister played a pivotal role in persuading

the two parties to accept a truce in February 1989, but nevertheless insisted that Hiz-
bullah guerrillas be permitted to return to strongholds in southern Lebanon from which
they had been ousted by Amal nine months earlier.8 A week after Syrian warplanes
violated Turkish airspace, Iran's Foreign Minister arrived in Damascus to coordinate
efforts on the part of a collection of radical Lebanese groupings to undermine the peace
agreement for Lebanon that had just been drawn up under Arab League auspices in the
Saudi resort city of Ta'if.9 The Foreign Minister was joined by Iran's influential, and
strongly pro-Hizbullah, former Ambassador to Damascus, Hujjah al-Islam 'Ali Akbar
Mohtashemi, who went on to Lebanon's Biqa' Valley to rally the organization's cadres
and supporters to do all they could to resist the implementation of the Ta'if accords.
This Iranian initiative threatened to drag Syria deeper into two whirlpools that
it had a clear interest in avoiding. One was a resumption of large-scale fighting in
Lebanon, not only between Hizbullah and Amal militants but also between Christian
forces commanded by the dissident General Michel 'Aoun and army units loyal to
the nascent Lebanese central government; the other was a military confrontation with
Israeli troops stationed in southern Lebanon. No sooner had Mohtashemi arrived in
the Biqa' than fighting erupted between the militias of Hizbullah and Amal.'0 So even
though observers at the time tended to interpret the situation as one in which Syria's
"unnatural alliance with Iran" was teetering on the brink of dissolution,"1 it is more
insightful to see relations between the two states in terms of an Iran emboldened, as
a result of greater Syrian firmness vis-a-vis Turkey, to carry out risky initiatives that
threatened to entrap Syria in renewed warfare in Lebanon.
In much the same way, Syria immediately condemned Iraq's August 1990 inva-
sion of Kuwait, and then joined Egypt and Saudi Arabia in orchestrating the emer-
gency summit meeting at which the Arab League Council voted to resist the Iraqi
occupation by force. Damascus justified the organization's active collaboration with
United States, British, and French military units on two main grounds: first, that Arab
governments should not devolve responsibility for handling inter-Arab conflicts to
outside powers and second, that Baghdad's aggression against Kuwait weakened the
Arab world as a whole in its ongoing struggle against Israel."2 As President Hafiz al-
7. Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik," pp. 183-184.

8. Jim Muir, "Lebanon's Shi'ites Forced to Call a Truce," Middle East International, February 3,
1989.
9. Ihsan A. Hijazi, "Iran, Fearing Loss of Syria Tie, Widens Aid to Lebanon Shiites," New York
Times, December 29, 1989; "Chronologies: Liban" ["Chronology: Lebanon"], Maghreb/Machrek,
No. 127 (January-March 1990), p. 173; Godfrey Jansen, "Syria and Iran: The Glue is Thinning,"
Middle East International, November 17, 1989; Graham E. Fuller, The "Center of the Universe:"
The Geopolitics of Iran (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 131.
10. "Chronologies: Liban" ["Chronology: Lebanon"], Maghreb/Machrek, No. 127 (January-
March 1990), p. 174; Jim Muir, "Lebanon Faces Partition or War," Middle East International, Janu-
ary 19, 1990.
11. Jansen, "The Glue is Thinning;" Fida Nasrallah, "Factors Behind the Amal-Hizbullah War,"
Middle East International, March 2, 1990; Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations," p. 185.
12. Gerald Butt, "Seizing the Opportunity," Middle East International, August 31, 1990; Ann
[Continued on next page]
Asad told the summit, "If we want the foreigners to leave [the Gulf] quickly, t
us quickly resolve the problem so as to remove any pretext for their stay, espe
there are hidden motives for their presence."'3 Units of the Syrian armed forces,
ing an armored division pulled directly out of its forward position on the Golan
began arriving on Saudi territory on August 20th.
Syria's hostility vis-a-vis Iraq led Tehran to distance itself from Damascus, and
even to make guarded overtures to Baghdad. Following a visit by Iraqi Foreign Min-
ister Tariq 'Aziz in late August, Iranian officials announced that formal diplomatic
relations would soon be restored between the two states.'4 The Syrian President's sub-
sequent trip to Tehran did little to bridge the rift between the two partners: in its wake,
"Iranian and Syrian experts agreed that President Asad's visit to Iran did more harm
than good to Iranian-Syrian relations. It weakened their 'strategic alliance' instead
of strengthening it, as the two sides stood by their [initial] positions" and refused to
compromise.'" An Iraqi mission returned to Tehran in mid-October to negotiate out-
standing boundary disputes and a timetable for exchanging prisoners left over from the
Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88.16
Syrian belligerence toward Iraq also accompanied a marked reduction in Iran's
assertiveness in Lebanon. Throughout the fall of 1990, Syrian and Iranian officials
engaged in a series of discussions concerning both the future of the Lebanese politi-
cal system and the fate of western hostages held by Iranian-sponsored organizations.
These talks resulted in Tehran's adopting a much more concilitatory posture with re-
gard to Lebanese affairs, culminating in a four-party summit in Damascus that Novem-
ber which produced an agreement whereby Hizbullah and Amal promised to lay down
their arms and recognize the authority of Lebanon's regular armed forces.'7 Equally
important, Syria's decision to play an active role in the anti-Iraq military campaign
left Iran with little choice but to adopt a posture of strict neutrality as the conflict in
the Gulf continued to intensify. In the wake of President al-Asad's visit to Tehran, the
Iranian authorities finally agreed to honor the terms of the United Nations embargo on
trade with Iraq.'8
[Continuedfrom previous page]

Mosely Lesch, "Contrasting Reations to the Persian Gulf Crisis," The Middle East Journal, Vol. 4
No. 1 (Winter 1991). Eyal Zisser observes that "Syria's ardent stand was all the more blatant again
the background of the hesitant and dithering attitudes taken by most other Arab countries in the f
stages of the crisis." Zisser, "Syria and the Gulf Crisis-Stepping on a New Path," Orient, Vol. 34,
No. 4 (December 1993), p. 567.
13. Quoted in Ghayth N. Armanazi, "Syrian Foreign Policy at the Crossroads," in Youssef M.
Choueiri, ed., State and Society in Syria and Lebanon (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), p. 115.
14. Safa Haeri, "Iran and Iraq: Mending Fences," Middle East International, September 14,
1990.
15. Safa Haeri, "Iran and Syria: Fruitless Visit," Middle East International, September 28, 1990.
16. "Fourteen Days in Brief," Middle East International, October 26, 1990, p. 15; Shahram Chu-
bin, "Iran and the Gulf Crisis," Middle East Insight, December 1990.
17. Safa Haeri, "Iran and Syria: Axis Revived," Middle East International, November 9, 1990.
18. "Iran Says It Seized Food," New York Times, September 25, 1990; Alan Cowell, "Iran Joins
Syria Opposing Invasion," New York Times, September 26, 1990.
These two episodes pose a significant analytical puzzle: Why did the 1989 es-
calation of Syria's long-running conflict with Turkey precipitate heightened Iranian
activism in Lebanon, whereas the 1990 escalation of conflict with Iraq led Tehran
to act with notable restraint? Snyder's classic formulation of the alliance dilemma
predicts that any belligerent move towards an adversary will tend to reassure partners
that the alliance is likely to persist, which in turn encourages allies to carry out risky
initiatives that increase the potential for entrapment. This tendency may be mitigated
if the degree of interdependence between alliance partners is minimal, or if the level
of member-states' commitment to the alliance is relatively low."9 But even though it is
conceivable that these two factors might have changed dramatically in the ten months
from October 1989 to August 1990, it seems unlikely that such fundamental features
of the Syrian-Iranian alliance could have fluctuated so quickly.
REFORMULATING THE ALLIANCE DILEMMA
One way to resolve this puzzle is to distinguish between moderate hostility and
severe hostility in a state's dealings with its adversaries. Instances of moderate hostil-
ity, such as Syria's falling out with Turkey at the end of the 1980s, can be expected to
lead allies to undertake adventurous initiatives that create the possibility of entrapment
in an unwanted conflict, such as Iran's heightened activity in Lebanon. By contrast,
an outbreak of severe hostility with regard to an adversary, like Damascus's startling
decision to take an active part in the United States-led military campaign against Iraq
in 1990-91, is more likely to alarm allies than it is to reassure them. Inordinate bellig-
erence toward an adversary therefore reduces the potential for entrapment, since allies
can be expected to curtail their own initiatives whenever they find themselves both
uncertain that the alliance will survive the crisis and confronted with a high probability
of general war.
Along the same lines, moderately conciliatory actions toward an adversary may
well give allies an incentive to restrain themselves and take steps to realign pre-emp-
tively. Extremely conciliatory actions, by contrast, are most likely to lead a state's
strategic partners to make efforts to prop up the existing alliance. They can be expected
to do this in order to forestall the rapid emergence of some new arrangement that might
prove more detrimental to their interests than the status quo. Furthermore, allies are
less likely to restrain themselves under these circumstances, since 1) they stand to lose
nothing if the initiatives they undertake further alienate their (soon to be former) alli-
ance partners and 2) dangerous initiatives might actually convince straying partners to
return to the fold.
Such considerations suggest that the relationship between the adversary game
and the alliance game is curvilinear, or U-shaped, rather than monotonic. In other
words, standing more and more firm vis-'a-vis an adversary does not generate greater
and greater incentives for allies to undertake risky initiatives. Instead, highly belliger-
19. Snyder, "Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," pp. 471-475; Snyder, Alliance Politics, pp.
166-177.
ent actions with regard to an adversary have a different impact on the alliance than
do moderately belligerent actions. Extremely conciliatory moves toward an adversary
likewise tend to prompt alliance partners to respond differently from the way they do
to more measured overtures.
REVISITING THE SYRIA-IRANALLIANCE
This revised conception of the alliance dilemma offers considerable insight into
recent relations between Syria and Iran. Damascus took a sharp turn away from con-
frontation with Turkey in the wake of the crisis that erupted between the two states in
October 1998.20 On that occasion, Syrian officials backed down in the face of Turkish
sabre-rattling, and promised to stop supporting the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK),
to set up links between the two countries' internal security services, and to take steps
to reduce long-standing barriers to bilateral economic activity. A year later, Syria's
Chief of Staff General Hikmat Shihabi signed a mutual security agreement that com-
mitted Damascus to increase surveillance along the Syrian-Turkish border. Not even
persistent tensions over the distribution of water from the Euphrates River dampened
the steadily improving relations between the two governments.21
Tehran responded to Damascus's wholesale rapprochement with Ankara by
keeping its distance from successive Turkish governments.22 In July 1999, Turkish
aircraft bombed districts around the Iranian city of Piranshahr, leading Iranian officials
to charge that Turkey was carrying out an "invasion" of the Islamic Republic.23 Rela-
tions plummeted once again in October, when Turkish police arrested 92 members of
a clandestine Iranian-trained organization called Hizbullah.24 Another militant group
with connections to Iran's IRGC was broken up seven months later.25 At the same time,
however, the Iranian government refrained from pushing Lebanon's Hizbullah to take
advantage of the unexpected resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri to
enhance its domestic political position.26 Iran's President Muhammad Khatami visited
Damascus in May 1999 and reaffirmed his country's commitment to the Syria-Iran
alliance, along with concluding agreements to implement a number of bilateral eco-
20. Mahmut Bali Aykan, "The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish View," Middle
East Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4 (June 1999); Yuksel Sezgin, "The October 1998 Crisis in Turkish-Syrian
Relations: A Prospect Theory Approach," Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Autumn 2002).
21. Patrick Seale, "Turkey and Syria: The War over Water," Middle East International, June 4,
1999.
22. Robert Olson, Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia, 1991-2000 (Costa Mesa,
CA: Mazda, 2001), pp. 21-43; Nader Entessar, "Whither Iranian-Turkish Relations?" Journal of
Iranian Research and Analysis, No. 16 (2000).
23. Olson, Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia, p. 56.
24. Olson, Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia, pp. 59-60; Robert Olson, Tur-
key-Iran Relations, 1979-2004 (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2005), pp. 56-69.
25. Olson, Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia, p. 64; Nicole Pope, "Turkey:
Iran Crisis Cools," Middle East International, June 2, 2000.
26. Reinoud Leenders, "Lebanon's Democratic Coup," Middle East International, December 11,
1998.
nomic projects.27
Improvements in relations between Syria and Turkey accelerated in the m
surrounding the death of Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad in June 2000. A delegation of
one hundred prominent Turkish businesspeople, led by Minister of Economy Recep
Onal, traveled to Damascus in early May to revive the long-dormant Joint Economic
Commission.28 The two countries' Foreign Ministers met in Doha, Qatar, that Novem-
ber and intimated that they were putting the finishing touches on a "memorandum
of understanding" that would consolidate closer ties between them.29 Senior Syrian
military officers traveled to Ankara in January 2001 to propose that relations be fully
normalized.30 Two months later, Syria's Minister of Electricity announced that large
portions of the country's electrical grid were to be integrated with those of Turkey and
Lebanon by the end of the year.3' On September 10th, the two ministers of the inte-
rior signed a wide-ranging security cooperation pact, according to the terms of which
their respective governments would work together to fight terrorism, organized crime,
smuggling, the drugs trade, and illegal immigration.32 Plans to inaugurate a variety of
cultural exchanges quickly followed.33
By the spring of 2002, there were strong hints that the Syrian and Turkish armed
forces were preparing to carry out joint military exercises.34 Syria's Chief of Staff,
General Hasan al-Turkmani, journeyed to Ankara in June to meet with his Turkish
counterpart; the two commanders initialed an agreement that provided for combined
maneuvers and closer cooperation with regard to military manufacturing. Other agree-
ments laid the foundation for greater bilateral trade and investment.35 In January 2003,
Turkey's Prime Minister, 'Abdullah Gill, held discussions in Damascus with Syria's
President Bashar al-Asad concerning the imminent war in Iraq; the talks culminated
in the signing of an unprecedented crisis management pact. The two governments also
collaborated in organizing a regional conference in Istanbul to promote foreign policy
27. Syrian Arab Republic Television, "Khatami Says in Damascus that Islam Must Adapt to Ways
of a Secular World," May 17, 1999; Saeed Barzin, "Evolving New Axis?" Middle East International,
May 21, 1999; Jubin Goodarzi, "Behind Iran's Middle East Diplomacy," Middle East International,
September 17, 1999.
28. "Turkey Takes Another Step to Improve Relations with Syria," Turkish Press Review, May 8,
2000; "Turkey Wants to Vastly Increase Trade with Syria," Middle East News Line, May 9, 2000.
29. "Damascus and Ankara Make Up," Daily Star, November 13, 2000.
30. "Syria: Onward March," Middle East International, February 9, 2001.
31. "Syria: Foreign Ventures," Middle East International, March 23, 2001.
32. Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), "Syria and Turkey Sign Security Cooperation Agree-
ments," September 11, 2001; "Syrian Ambassador al-Bunni Says Security Agreement Reflects the
Confidence Set Up Between the Two Neighbors," Turkish Daily News, September 12, 2001; "Side-
lining Contentious Issues Turkey and Syria Seal Security Ties with an Agreement," Turkish Probe,
September 16, 2001.
33. "Current Turkish-Syrian Relations in a Completely Different Mode," Turkish Daily News,
December 26, 2001.
34. Yusif al-Sharif, "Turkish-Syrian Relations Remain Steady," Al-Hayat, March 1, 2002.
35. Ma'mun Kiwan, "Turkey and Iran Talk Business," Al-Mustaqbal, July 24, 2002; Malik Mufti,
"Turkish-Syrian Rapprochement: Causes and Consequences," Policywatch (Washington Institute for
Near East Policy) No. 630, June 21, 2002.
coordination among six Middle Eastern states (Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Jorda
Arabia, and Iran) in light of escalating US threats to carry out military operations
against Iraq.36
Heightened Syrian-Turkish cooperation accompanied a virtual freeze in Tehran's
relations with Ankara.37 Tensions between the latter pair steadily rose during the course
of 2000-01 as Turkey strengthened ties to both Azerbaijan and Israel; indeed, Turkey
and Iran narrowly avoided an armed confrontation in the Caspian Sea in July 2001.38
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi's participation in the January 2003 Istanbul confer-
ence and his subsequent visit to Ankara both appeared to be pro forma, and resulted in
no new agreements between the two governments.39 Meanwhile, Iran refrained from
carrying out destabilizing initiatives in Lebanon. The authorities in Tehran watched
passively as Damascus bolstered the influence of Amal at Hizbullah's expense in early
2002.40 Kharrazi visited Beirut that April and reportedly warned Hizbullah and other
Lebanese militant organizations to restrain themselves, lest they give Israel an excuse
to crack down on radical Palestinian groups.4' On the other hand, the government in
Tehran took concrete steps to reinvigorate the alliance with Syria. Iranian officials
proposed a bilateral industrial cooperation agreement, which was signed in April 2002,
and then set up a $50 million fund to finance joint ventures with Syrian private manu-
facturers;42 that September, a delegation of Iranian industrialists arrived in Damascus
to discuss a wide range of prospective investments. Iran's Minister of Security, 'Ali
Yunesi, visited the Syrian capital in October to explain his government's position re-
garding the future of Iraq to President Bashar al-Asad.43
At the same time that Damascus was undertaking an extensive rapprochement
with Ankara, the Syrian government made increasingly friendly overtures to Baghdad.
Relations between the two Ba'thi rivals warmed steadily during the late 1990s,44 and
improved dramatically in 2000-01. Syrian Prime Minister Muhammad Miru welcomed
a delegation headed by Iraq's Minister of Trade to Damascus in August 2000, which
eventuated in the resumption of railroad traffic from Mawsil to the Mediterranean port
36. Sa'ti Nur al-Din, "The Istanbul Conference: A New Role for Turkey," Al-Safir, January 23,
2003; Oxford Business Group, Syria: Weekly Briefing, January 26, 2003.
37. Robert Olson, "Turkey-Iran Relations, 2000-2001," Middle East Policy, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June
2002), pp. 111-114.
38. Olson, "Turkey-Iran Relations, 2000-2001," pp. 114-119.
39. Ibrahim Khayat, "Turkey Keeps Lines Open to Syria and Iran," Al-Hayat, April 8, 2003.
40. Jim Quilty, "Duelling Triumvirs," Middle East International, January 11, 2002.
41. Jim Muir, "Iran: Focus on Palestine," Middle East International, April 19, 2002; Anders
Strindberg, "USA Hardens Stance against Syria," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 2002.
42. "Iranian-Syrian Industrial Cooperation Accord Signed," Al-Wifaq, April 27, 2002.
43. Nasir al-As'ad, "The 'Correction' of the Joint Syrian-Iranian Vision Raises Debate on Hizbul-
lah's 'Regional Dimension,"' Al-Safir, October 29, 2002; Ibrahim Hamidi, "Syrian-Iranian Differ-
ences over Iraq," Al-Hayat, November 7, 2002.
44. Murhaf Jouejati, "The Syrian-Iraqi Rapprochement," Middle East Insight, November-Decem-
ber 1997; Ahmad S. Moussalli, "The Geopolitics of Syrian-Iraqi Relations," Middle East Policy, Vol.
7, No. 4 (October 2000); Ed Blanche, "Syria and Iraq Find Common Cause," Jane's Intelligence
Review, October 1, 2001.
of Tartus.4s An agreement to phase out duties on trade between the two countr
signed in January 2001, and some 150,000 barrels of oil per day started to flow
the long-abandoned pipeline linking northern Iraq to the docks at Baniyas.46 Mi
group of state officials, economic advisers, and businesspeople to Baghdad in mid-Au-
gust. The trip resulted in a mutual defense pact, along with treaties to expand bilateral
commercial and technical exchanges.47
Syria's wholesale opening to Iraq sparked no attempt on Tehran's part to realign
pre-emptively with Baghdad. On the contrary, knowledgeable observers speculated
that the Islamic Republic planned to provide tacit support for Washington's campaign
to overturn Iraq's Ba'thi regime, as it had done in the case of the Taliban in neighbor-
ing Afghanistan.48 The authorities in Tehran hosted a delegation of leading figures of
the Iraq-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in September 2002, and quietly
arranged for the Iran-sponsored Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI) to coordinate its future activities with the KDP.49 SCIRI representatives joined
a number of other organizations working to combat the Iraqi regime for a general con-
ference in London that December. The organization's presence at the meeting led the
leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Jalal Talabani, to remark that "Iran
is a great neighbour which has always supported the Iraqi opposition, and some sort of
understanding between Iran and the United States, direct or indirect, would be a great
help in the liberation of Iraq."50
Iranian overtures to Kurdish organizations operating inside Iraq prompted Syria
to undertake a series of discussions with these same groups. Talabani met with officials
in Damascus in October 2002, while the head of the KDP, Massud Barzani, arrived
in the Syrian capital a month later.51 More importantly, Iran's redoubled efforts to
undermine the Iraqi regime forced Syria to make the unpalatable decision to vote in
favor of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, which required the Iraqi
government to give UN weapons inspectors complete access to all suspected chemical,
biological, and nuclear production and storage facilities. To have abstained, as most
observers expected Damascus to do, would have alienated Syria not only from Egypt
and Saudi Arabia but from the Islamic Republic as well.52 Damascus quickly tried to
45. "Prime Minister Discusses Economic Cooperation with Iraq," Tishrin, August 7, 2000; "Syria
and Iraq Forge Closer Ties," British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), September 27, 2000.
46. Mona Ziade, "Iraq-Syria Pipeline Opens Soon, With Tripoli Next," Daily Star, November 13,
2000; Barbara Plett, "Syria and Iraq Strengthen Ties," BBC, January 29, 2001; Gary C. Gambill,
"Syria's Foreign Relations: Iraq," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 3, No. 3 (March 2001).
47. "Iraq and Syria Turn New Page after 20 Years of Broken Ties," Agence France Presse, August
12, 2001; Salah Hemei, "Make One Friend, Lose Several," Al-Ahram Weekly, August 16-22, 2001;
Taha Hassib, "Bolstering Syrian-Iraqi Economic Ties," Al-Ittihad, August 21, 2001.
48. Ibrahim Hamidi, "Syrian-Iranian Differences Over Iraq," Al-Hayat, November 7, 2002.
49. Jim Muir, "Iran: Challenges on Two Fronts," Middle East International, September 27, 2002;
Muhammad Nun, "Iran Keeps Its Options Open," Al-Hayat, January 29, 2003.
50. Jim Muir, "Opposition Gathers," Middle East International, December 20, 2002.
51. "Syria: Bashar's Manoeuvres," Middle East International, November 22, 2002.
52. Ibrahim Hamidi, "Explaining Syria's UN Vote," Al-Hayat, November 12, 2002; Najm Jarrah,
"Arabs' Brave Face," Middle East International, November 22, 2002.
win assurances from Washington that the United States would take steps to blo
emergence of a fully autonomous Kurdish entity in the event that war ensued, a
est that Syria shared with both Turkey and Iran.53
Consequently, when the US government launched the March 2003 mil
campaign to overthrow Saddam Husayn, Syria's strategic alliance with Iran
buttressed rather than undermined by Damascus's conciliatory moves toward A
and Baghdad. Not even Syria's deep-seated suspicions that the Islamic Repub
predisposed to coordinate its Iraq policy with the United States proved to b
to disrupt the partnership.54 More importantly, in the wake of the US offensi
between Syria and Hizbullah, Iran's primary client in Lebanon, strengthene
edly.55
POSTWAR COMPLICATIONS
Shortly after the Ba'thi regime in Baghdad was overthrown, Iran embarked
a campaign of guarded conciliation toward the new Iraq.56 The change in postur
foreshadowed by comments on the part of former President Akbar Hashemi Ra
jani, who told reporters in April 2003 that "the dissolution of the Ba'th regime
was neither good nor bad; it all depended on the kind of regime that replaced it
United States succeeded in establishing a client state in Iraq, that would be extre
detrimental to Iran's national security. On the other hand, if elections were hel
an independent government emerged, that would be in Iran's interests because i
bound to be dominated by a Shiite majority."57 Such sentiments lay behind Teh
pressed support for the Iraqi Interim Government that took office in June 200
members accepted ministerial positions in the new cabinet, including the post o
ister of Finance.58 Iranian officials subsequently convened a high-level work
"Opportunities for Iran and Iraq Economic Co-operation," during the course of w
it was announced that the Islamic Republic had set up an Office for Iraq's Recon
tion and had authorized $300 million for reconstruction projects.59
Meanwhile, Iran handed the United States a detailed proposal, in which
53. "Syria: Fear of the US," Middle East International, December 6, 2002; Olson, Turke
tions with Iran, Syria, Israel and Russia, 1991-2000; Robert Olson, "Turkey-Iran Relation
2004: Accommodation and Competition," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Stud
28, No. 2 (Winter 2005).
54. Salim Mashkur, "Syria and Iran Consult on Iraq," Al-Nahar, March 20, 2003.
55. Anders Strindberg and Mats Waern, "Syria, Hizbullah and the Iraqi Dimension," Middle East
International, June 13, 2003.
56. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, "Iran-Iraq Relations after Saddam," The Washington Quarterly, Vol.
26, No. 4 (Autumn 2003).
57. Kamran Taremi, "Iranian Foreign Policy towards Occupied Iraq, 2003-05," Middle East Poli-
cy, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Winter 2005), pp. 35-36.
58. Taremi, "Iranian Foreign Policy towards Occupied Iraq, 2003-05," p. 39.
59. Taremi, "Iranian Foreign Policy towards Occupied Iraq, 2003-05;" "Iran Seeks Better Ties
with Iraq, Active Rebuilding Role," Comtex News Network, Dow Jones Newswires, August 2,
2004.
offered to curtail its support for radical organizations in Lebanon and Palestine, accept
the Arab League's proposal to restart peace talks with Israel, and cooperate with the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency in exchange for an end to US-sponsored diplomatic
and economic sanctions and a pledge from Washington that it would stop all efforts
to undermine the country's system of government.60 Despite intense opposition to the
offer from influential officials in Washington, the US Ambassador to Afghanistan was
dispatched to Geneva in May 2003 to meet personally with high-ranking Iranian repre-
sentatives.61 These discussions, however, conflicted with the basic tenets of a National
Security Policy Directive regarding the Islamic Republic that was being prepared by
the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans, and they quickly collapsed.
Tehran's moderate steps to conciliate its long-standing regional and global ad-
versaries triggered parallel efforts on Damascus's part to resuscitate relations with
Baghdad and Washington. Syrian officials welcomed successive delegations of Iraqi
notables as 2003 passed, and did their best to re-establish commercial and transporta-
tion links to postwar Iraq.62 President al-Asad told reporters in January 2004 that some
$200 million that had been deposited in Syrian banks by high-ranking figures in Iraq's
Ba'thi regime would soon be repatriated.63 That July, al-Asad welcomed Iraq's Prime
Minister and Deputy Prime Minister for National Security Affairs, laying the ground-
work for a substantial improvement in bilateral relations.,, The two governments then
signed a deal whereby Syria agreed to provide Iraq with a wide range of refined pe-
troleum products in exchange for shipments of crude oil.65 Meanwhile, the head of
Syria's internal security apparatus published an unprecedented article in the Beirut
newspaper Al-Safir that outlined a number of ways in which a reconciliation might be
effected with Washington, while at the same time opening the door to discussions with
elements of the "patriotic opposition" at home.66 In July 2003, Syrian commanders
ordered a large-scale withdrawal of troops from southern Lebanon; immediately after
Syrian forces left the area, however, Hizbullah guerrillas launched a cluster of attacks
on Israeli military outposts around the Sheb'a Farms.67
As Iran's rapprochement with Iraq progressed, and Damascus's overtures to
Washington were rebuffed, Syria undertook riskier initiatives. Over widespread op-
position, both inside and outside Lebanon, in September 2004 Damascus orchestrated
a three-year extension of the term in office of pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud.68
60. Gareth Porter, "Iran Proposal to US Offered Peace with Israel," Z Magazine, May 26, 2006.
61. Gareth Porter, "'Cabal' Blocked 2003 Nuclear Talks with Iran," Inter Press Service, March
28, 2006
62. Nabil Yassin, "Normal Relations, Not Just a Card," Al-Hayat, December 12, 2003.
63. "Syria to Return $200 Million," Bloomberg News, January 9, 2004.
64. Sha'ban 'Abbud, "A Syrian-Iraqi Rapprochement," Al-Ra'i al-'Amm, July 23, 2004; Zeina
Karam, "Allawi Plans to Restore Syria Ties," Associated Press, July 24, 2004; Cilina Nasser, "Bagh-
dad-Damascus Ties Improve Despite US-Syria Rift," Daily Star, July 26, 2004.
65. "Iraq, Syria Sign Oil Cooperation Accord," Agence France Presse, July 25, 2004.
66. "Damascus and the World," Middle East International, May 30, 2003.
67. Jim Quilty, "Lebanon: More Syrians Out," Middle East International, August 8, 2003; Jim
Quilty, "Lebanon: Border Tensions," Middle East International, August 22, 2003.
68. Jim Quilty, "Lebanon and Syria against the World," Middle East International, September
[Continued on next page]
The move elicited sharp criticism from a broad range of Lebanese politicians and com-
munity leaders, which in turn prompted several of Hizbullah's elected representatives
in the National Assembly to speak out "to support Lahoud and to reject the policies of
the American administration." Moreover, Hizbullah's Secretary General, Hasan Nas-
rallah, publicly denounced a draft United Nations Security Council resolution that had
been introduced by the United States and France, which demanded that Syria pull all
of its armed forces out of Lebanon and refrain from interferring in the election of the
President.69
Such moves complemented strenuous efforts on Damascus's part to reinvigorate
the alliance with Tehran. A memorandum of understanding concerning the possibility
of creating a free trade area to link the two countries was signed during Khatami's visit
to Damascus in May 2003.70 Vice President 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam traveled to Iran in
September, and attempted to hammer out a mutually agreeable policy toward Iraq with
Khatami, Rafsanjani, and Supreme Leader 'Ali Khamene'i.71 Additional economic
projects were discussed over the course of the following months.72 Syria's chief client
in Lebanon, Nabih Berri of Amal, invited the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Me-
hdi Karrubi, to come to Beirut to meet with senior government officials there in April
2004.73 Then in July al-Asad, Khaddam, and Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar' made an
unexpected journey to Tehran to confer with Khatami and Khamene'i; the visit was
reciprocated by Khatami and Kharrazi three months later.74 Plans to set up a higher
committee to promote bilateral trade and investment were announced in September.75
Iran's engagement with Iraq picked up speed following the January 2005 elec-
tions for the Iraqi Transitional Government. In the wake of the balloting, "consolidat-
ing the Shiite-dominated government of Ibrahim al-Jafari became Iran's chief goal. If
pro-Iranian Shiite groups could be kept in power," observes Kamran Taremi, "Tehran
[Continuedfrom previous page]

10, 2004.
69. Quilty, "Lebanon and Syria against the World."
70. Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), "Iran and Syria Sign Free Trade Agreement," BBC
Monitoring International, May 14, 2003.
71. Ibrahim Humaidi, "Syria, Iran Agree to Help Iraqis 'Overcome' Ethnic, Sectarian Differ-
ences," Al-Hayat, October 1, 2003.
72. SANA, "Syrian, Iranian Ministers Discuss Boosting Industrial Cooperation," BBC Moni-
toring International, October 13, 2003; SANA, "Syrian-Iranian Higher Committee Ends Meetings,
Agreements Signed," BBC Monitoring International, February 18, 2004; IRNA, "Iranian, Syrian En-
ergy Ministers Discuss Building Power Stations," BBC Monitoring International, May 5, 2004; and
IRNA, "Iran's Vice President, Syrian Industries Minister Discuss Expansion of Ties," BBC Monitor-
ing International, May 10, 2004.
73. Rita Boustani, "Iran Keen on Promoting Economic Ties with Lebanon," Daily Star, April 22,
2004.
74. "Syrian President Wraps Up Two-Day Visit to Tehran," Agence France Presse, July 6, 2004;
IRNA, "Iran's Khatami Arrives in Syria for a 24-Hour Unexpected Visit," October 7, 2004; IRNA,
"Khatami: Iran Supports Syria's Approach," October 8, 2004.
75. IRNA, "Committee to be Formed on Iran-Syria Economic Cooperation," September 16, 2004;
IRNA, "Iran, Syria Stress Expansion of Industrial Cooperation," October 27, 2004; IRNA, "Iran,
Syria Sign MoU on Bilateral Cooperation," December 20, 2004.
could then rightly claim to have won Iraq over without firing a shot or sustaining a sin-
gle casualty."76 A succession of bilateral agreements was signed and implemented dur-
ing the spring and summer of 2005. These included "a memorandum of understanding
on security cooperation to guarantee border security to prevent terrorists from entering
Iraq from Iranian territory, to cooperate in locating the remains of the victims of the
Iran-Iraq War, and to establish a joint commission to exchange maps and information
on minefields planted on both sides of the border."77 A further agreement committed
the Islamic Republic to supply refined petroleum products to Iraq on concessionary
terms.
Damascus responded to the blossoming of Iran-Iraq ties by redoubling its ef-
forts to revivify the alliance with Tehran. Prime Minister Muhammad Naji' 'Utri an-
nounced in February 2005 that his government intended to implement plans to set up a
free trade zone in order to encourage greater bilateral trade.78 'Utri then traveled to the
Iranian capital to confer with senior officials on ways to counter charges that Syria was
responsible for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri.
The visit ended with 'Utri and Iranian Vice President Muhammad Reza Aref declar-
ing that the two countries had concluded a mutual defense pact.79 That the announce-
ment was instigated by the Syrian delegation is evident from Iranian Foreign Minis-
ter Kharrazi's quick disavowal that any sort of formal agreement had been reached.80
President al-Asad was the first foreign head of state to visit newly-elected President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad, prompting the host to remark that "Syria represents the front
line of the Muslim nation; shared threats bring us together and make our cooperation
even more necessary."'" The influential head of Syrian military intelligence made a
quick trip to Iran that October to meet with the commanders of the IRGC.82 And when
the United Nations Security Council insisted that officials in Damascus cooperate fully
with the commission investigating al-Hariri's assassination, al-Asad is reported to have
requested that Ahmadinejad "activate the 'strategic pact' between the two nations."83
More importantly, Damascus openly and unreservedly endorsed Tehran's deci-
sion to resume its nuclear research program, despite widespread international con-
demnation of the decision. Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs 'Abdullah
al-Dardari praised the uranium enrichment project in September 2005, and expressed
76. Taremi, "Iranian Foreign Policy towards Occupied Iraq," p. 42.

77. Taremi, "Iranian Foreign Policy towards Occupied Iraq," p. 43; Neil MacDonald and Najmeh
Bozorgmehr, "Iraq and Iran to Co-operate over Defence," Financial Times, July 7, 2005.
78. "Syria, Iran Plan to Establish Free Trade Zone," Xinhua News Agency, February 15, 2005.
79. Roula Khalaf and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, "Syria and Iran Join Forces against Threats," Finan-
cial Times, February 16, 2005; Ewen MacAskill and Duncan Campbell, "Iran and Syria Confront US
with Defence Pact," The Guardian, February 17, 2005.
80. Bishara Sharbel, "Syria-Iran: Firm Relations with Varied Considerations," Emirates Center for
Strategic Studies and Research, April 24, 2005.
81. "'Shared Threats' Bring Syria and Iran Together: Ahmadinejad," Agence France Presse, Au-
gust 7, 2005; Marwan Al Kabalan, "Can Syria-Iran Ties Pass the Litmus Test?" Gulf News, August
12, 2005.
82. "Damascus Counts on Iran Link," Intelligence Online, November 11, 2005.
83. "Damascus Counts on Iran Link,' Intelligence Online, November 11, 2005.
the hope that the two countries would find innovative ways to strengthen econ
cooperation.84 Syria at the same time encouraged Hizbullah to reinforce its dir
nections to Iran. The authorities in Damascus made a concerted effort to convince
Hizbullah Secretary General Nasrallah to work out new means to obtain financial and
material assistance from the Islamic Republic after Syrian troops withdrew from Leba-
non.85 In addition, Damascus undertook to act as intermediary between high-ranking
Iranian officials and the leaderships of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
General Command and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.86
Meanwhile, in a bid to match Iran's strategic advances, President al-Asad flew
to Moscow in January 2005 and asked the Russian government to supply the Syr-
ian armed forces with medium-range SS-26 surface-to-surface missiles and upgraded,
shoulder-launched SA- 18 anti-aircraft missiles.87 The request was politely rejected,
leading al-Asad to insist to scholars gathered at the Moscow State Institute for Inter-
national Relations that the SA-18s constituted no more than "a defensive air-defense
weapon. If Israel is against us buying it," he continued, "it means it wants to invade
our airspace."88 President Vladimir Putin then somewhat mischeviously remarked that
some sort of deal might still be arranged, and reiterated the Syrian leader's assertion
that the SA- 18 was a purely defensive weapons system. So although al-Asad returned
home empty-handed, reports persisted that the two countries were about to sign a ma-
jor arms contract.89 The Chief of Syria's General Staff received an unusually warm
welcome when he arrived in Moscow for further consultations in September.90
2006 consequently opened with Damascus and Tehran more closely tied to one
another than at any time since the late 1980s. President Ahmadinejad visited Syria in
January, and elicited an unconditional pledge of support from President al-Asad for
Iran's nuclear research program, as well as a firm commitment to work toward greater
mutual cooperation with Hizbullah and other radical organizations.91 To cement the
partnership, Hizbullah's Nasrallah and Amal's Berri made unexpected trips to the Syr-
ian capital to confer with the two heads of state.92 No doubt worried that the evident
strengthening of the Syria-Iran alliance might come at the expense of the Islamic Re-
public's relations with radical forces in Iraq, the militant Iraqi Shi'i leader Muqtada
al-Sadr showed up in Damascus for consultations with Syrian officials in early Febru-
84. IRNA, "Iran-Syria-Damascus," September 27, 2005.

85. Fayyiz Sara, "Damascus Between Tehran and Washington," Al-Safir, August 9, 2005; Michael
Slackman, "As Syria's Influence in Lebanon Wanes, Iran Moves In," New York Times, March 13,
2006.
86. "Syria, Iran Will Not Be Intimidated by Foreign Powers, Says Assad," Deutsche Presse-Agen-
tur, October 2, 2005.
87. Peter Feuilherade, "Mission to Moscow," Middle East International, February 4, 2005.
88. Feuilherade, "Mission to Moscow."
89. Peter Feuilherade, "Russian Missiles," Middle East International, March 18, 2005.
90. Konstantin Eggert, "Russia Reestablishes the Damascus Connection," http://www.bitter-
lemons-intemational.org, August 17, 2006.
91. "Syria Backs Iran Nuclear Plans as Two Allies Close Ranks," Agence France Presse, January
19, 2006; Michael Young, "Syria and Iran, An Axis of Upheaval," Daily Star, January 20, 2006.
92. "Ahmadinejad Meets with Nasrallah in Damascus," Daily Star, January 21, 2006.
ary.93 Syria and Iran subsequently announced plans to construct a petroleum

linking the oil fields of Khuzestan to the Mediterranean coast, crossing southern Iraq;
a number of other development projects followed.94 In June, the two countries' defense
ministers announced that they had drawn up a military cooperation agreement, which
the Syrian Minister called "purely defensive and pre-emptive" in character; the Iranian
Minister remarked that his government "considers Syria's security its own security,
and we consider our defense capabilities to be those of Syria."95
More comprehensive collaboration between Damascus and Tehran accompanied
a heightening of tensions between Syria and Israel. President al-Asad told a convention
of the Arab Bar Association in Damascus in January that "targeting Syria and Lebanon
is a part of an integrated project to destroy the identity of the region in order to reshape
it under new titles to meet Israeli aspirations which aim at imposing its hegemony on
the region and its resources."96 He added that current international circumstances pre-
cluded any resumption of peace talks with Israel. A Palestinian news agency reported
in early March that representatives of the radical al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade and militant
'Izz al-Din al-Qassam organization were meeting in the Syrian capital to work out ways
to coordinate their activities.97 Officials in Damascus issued a strong condemnation of
Israel's raid on a Palestinian prison in Jericho to seize several militants who had been
detained by the Palestinian Authority.98 Shortly thereafter, the Ministry of Information
flatly denied a report in the Israeli press which claimed that Damascus had proposed to
restart peace negotiations, while the Deputy Foreign Minister sharply criticized Israeli
plans to double the number of Jewish settlers in the Golan.99 The steady deterioration
in relations prompted Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations to charge that Syria
and Iran had come to constitute a "new axis of evil and terror" that was sowing "the
seeds of the first world war of the twenty-first century."100 In reply, President al-Asad
authorized a two-week campaign to solicit contributions from the general public for a
fund to support the "humiliated and subjugated" Palestinian people. 10
93. "Sadr 'At the Service' of Syria and Islamic Republic," Daily Star, February 7, 2006.
94. Jia Xiaohua, "Syria, Iran Boost Economic Ties Amid Mounting Pressure," Xinhua News
Agency, February 24, 2006; "Syria, Iran To Set Up Oil Pipeline Across Iraq," MENAFN.com, March
12, 2006.
95. "Iran, Syria Sign Defence Agreement," Iranian Labor News Agency, June 15, 2006; Farhad
Pouladi, "Iran, Syria Sign Defense Agreement," Agence France Presse, June 15, 2006; Bilal Y. Saab,
"Syria and Iran Revive an Old Ghost," Daily Star, July 4, 2006.
96. "Assad Speaks about International Plot against Syria, Says No Chance for Peace with Israel,"
Al-Bawaba, January 21, 2006.
97. Ma'an News Agency, "Al-Aqsa Brigades Said Holding Summit in Syria on 'Unifying' Fatah
Armed Wings," BBC Monitoring International, March 8, 2006.
98. "Syria Condemns Jericho Prison Raid," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 15, 2006.
99. "Syria Denies Seeking Peace Talks with Israel," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, April 9, 2006;
"Syria Condemns Israel Golan Settlement Plan," InfoProd Research, April 9, 2006.
100. Edith M. Lederer, "Israel Warns that New 'Axis of Terror' Iran, Syria, and Hamas is Sowing
Seeds of War," Associated Press, April 18, 2006.
101. SANA, "Syria Launches Popular Donation Campaign to Aid Palestinians," BBC Monitoring
Middle East, April 30, 2006.
Reassured of the vitality of its alliance with Damascus in the face of renewed
hostility between Israel and Syria, Tehran launched a number of provocative initiatives
in early 2006. Russian officials announced in February that they had signed a contract
to sell Iran more than two dozen Tor-MI ground-to-air missile batteries.102 The IRGC
subsequently tested several new weapons systems, including an improved version of
the Fajr-3 ground-to-ground missile that was designed to evade detection by radar, a
high-speed underwater anti-ship missile and an upgraded patrol hovercraft.'03 In early
April some 17,000 troops joined revolutionary guards and police in week-long military
exercises around the Strait of Hormuz."0" These activities took place in the shadow of
Tehran's adamant refusal to abandon its uranium enrichment program.'05
In conjunction with these military initiatives, the Islamic Republic boosted its
ties to radical Palestinian organizations. President Ahmadinejad met with the leaders of
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Harakah al-Muqawamah
al-Islami or Hamas), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Com-
mand, and a handful of smaller groups during his January 2006 visit to Damascus.106
A month later, the head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council emerged from a
meeting in Tehran with a key leader of Hamas to say that the Islamic Republic intended
to provide the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority with the funds it needed to finance day-
to-day government operations.'07 Estimates of the total sum involved ranged from $50
million to $100 million.'08 There were reports in March that Iran also was sponsoring
the formation of a Higher Shi'i Council to coordinate activities among discontented
Palestinian militants.'09 More than 500 representatives of Palestinian organizations
gathered in the Iranian capital in April to attend the third "Support for the Palestinian
Uprising Conference." The Secretary General of the conference, Hujjah al-Islam 'Ali
Akbar Mohtashami-Pur, explicitly linked the security of "the Palestinian nation" to
that of the Islamic Republic. At the same time, former President Rafsanjani conferred
in Damascus with the leaders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hizbullah, and advised
102. Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Moscow Confirms Missile-Systems Deal with Iran," Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), February 10, 2006.
103. "Iran Test-Fires Radar-Evading Missile," RFE/RL, March 31, 2006; "Iran Test-Fires High-
Speed Underwater Missile," RFE/RL, April 3, 2006; "Iran Reports Testing 'Flying Boat,"' RFE/RL,
April 4, 2006.
104. "Iran Flexes Its Muscles but Does Not Want to Frighten the Gulf," Al-Hayat, April 5, 2006;
Bill Samii, "Iran: Naval Doctrine Stresses 'Area Denial,"' RFE/RL, April 6, 2006.
105. International Crisis Group, "Iran: Is There a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse?" Middle East
Report, No. 51, February 23, 2006.
106. Bill Samii, "Iran: President Meets Terror Group Heads in Damascus," RFE/RL, January 23,
2006.
107. Steven Erlanger, "Iran Pledges Financial Aid to Hamas-Led Palestinians," New York Times,
February 23, 2006; "Fatah Accepts Partnership with Hamas, Iran Offers Finance," Daily Star, Febru-
ary 23, 2006.
108. Anna Mahjar-Barducci, "Fatal Attraction: The Hamas-Iran Alliance," Daily Star, May 8,
2006.
109. Khaled Abu Toameh, "New Shi'ite Group Worries Hamas, PA," Jerusalem Post, March 6,
2006.
them that the key to ensuring the survival of their respective movements lay in unity
of action.110
Mid-2006 brought a sharp spike in hostility between Syria and Israel. The Israeli
Justice Minister threatened that the Israel Defense Force (IDF) might attack targets in-
side Syria if Hamas refused to release Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier seized on the bor-
der with Gaza on June 25. IDF fighter-bombers buzzed the summer residence of Presi-
dent al-Asad on the outskirts of Latakia in the wake of the threat."' After Hizbullah
captured two more Israeli military personnel, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, on
July 12, Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations charged that the Lebanese organiza-
tion was "merely the finger on the blood-stained and long-reaching arms of Syria and
Iran.""112 Israeli warplanes then bombed a training camp for Syrian-backed Palestinian
guerrillas in eastern Lebanon."3 Syria's Vice President Faruq al-Shar' countered by
remarking to reporters that the capture of the two soldiers was Israel's responsibility."14
As Israeli forces pushed across the border into southern Lebanon, the Syrian Minister
of Information warned that Damascus "will not stand with our hands tied" in the face
of a large-scale invasion."5 President al-Asad told the Syrian armed forces at the end
of July that "this is the time of the heroic national public resistance which has been
able to humiliate the occupiers in Iraq, Palestine and today in Lebanon." He called on
the military establishment to make "more extensive efforts in terms of training and
persistent work to reach higher readiness.""116
Iran reacted to the surge in hostility by threatening to inflict a "crushing response"
on Israel if the IDF attacked Syria."7 President Ahmadinejad reportedly telephoned
President al-Asad on the second day of fighting in Lebanon to reassure Damascus of
his government's support, and the Iranian armed forces were put on high alert."I8 Yet
the Chief of the Iranian General Staff told reporters that the Islamic Republic would
"never militarily" take part in the conflict."19 More surprisingly, the commander of
the paramilitary Basij called rumors that Iranians had volunteered to fight in Lebanon
110. Bill Samii, "Intifada Conference in Tehran has Multiple Objectives," RFE/RL, April 14,
2006.
111. Ian Fisher and Steven Erlanger, "Israel Threatens to Widen Conflict Over Captured Soldier,"
New York Times, June 28, 2006.
112. Roger Hardy, "Hezbollah Capture Marks New Escalation," BBC, July 14, 2006.
113. Anthony Shadid and Scott Wilson, "Israel Blockades, Bombs Lebanon While Hezbollah
Rains Rocket Fire," Washington Post, July 14, 2006.
114. "Syria Holds Israel Responsible for Clash with Lebanon's Hizbollah," Xinhua News Agency,
July 12, 2006.
115. "Syria Threatens to Act if Israel Approaches its Territory," Xinhua News Agency, July 24,
2006.
116. SANA, "Syria's al-Asad Urges 'National Public Resistance' against Israel," July 31, 2006.
117. Nasser Karimi, "Iranian President Warns Israel against Attacking Syria," Associated Press,
July 14, 2006; "Iran President Ahmadinejad Warns Israel against Attacking Syria'" Deutsche Presse-
Agentur, July 14, 2006.
1 18. Kamal Nazer Yasin, "Iran Maneuvers for Geopolitical Advantage," Eurasianet.org, July 18,
2006.
119. Mohammad Tabaar, "Iran's Role in Crisis Still Murky," BBC, July 24, 2006.
mere "propaganda" and suggested that "there no doubt exist better ways to defend
the Islamic resistance" than throwing untrained volunteers into battle against Israeli
troops.'20 Iran's Foreign Minister traveled to both Istanbul and Cairo in early August
to discuss ways that the carnage might be brought to an end.121 The most remarkable
aspect of Tehran's behavior, though, was the fact that throughout the crisis Iranian
officials "sought to remain aloof from Hizbullah, pointedly striving not to do or say
anything that could serve as a pretext for widening the conflict."'22 Supreme Leader
Khamene'i urged the country's most senior religious figures not to issue a religious
ruling (fatwa) that would have made it incumbent upon Muslims to take part in the
fighting. And it was only after the August 14 ceasefire that the Iranian armed forces
resumed large-scale exercises, which were concentrated in the country's far northern
and southeastern provinces.'23
CONCLUSION
Syria confronts a fundamental dilemma in managing relations with

strategic ally, the Islamic Republic of Iran. Policies that Damascus adopts
sary game with regional rivals have a direct impact on the alliance game
It requires deft diplomacy to play these intersecting games in such a wa
the former do not put one at a marked disadvantage in the latter, and v
precisely, whenever a state pursues a moderately hostile policy toward a
its strategic partner tends to be reassured of the stability of the alliance
to carry out initiatives that have the potential to drag it into a conflict in
intrinsic interest. On the other hand, whenever a state carries out a mode
tory policy with regard to an adversary, its ally can be expected to restra
make overtures toward the adversary as well. These dynamics conform t
"alliance dilemma" as it has been formulated by Glenn Snyder.
But the connection between the adversary game and alliance game is
der implies, monotonic. Instead, extremely hostile or conciliatory moves
have a different impact from the effects of moderate hostility or concili
of extreme hostility toward the adversary can be expected to prompt al
themselves, in light of the heightened potential for general war that ac
belligerence. By the same token, inordinately conciliatory measures tow
sary are likely to persuade an ally to take steps to reconsolidate the part
occasion by engaging in risky or provocative initiatives that might conv
return to the fold.
This revised conception of the alliance dilemma illuminates importan
120. Bill Samii, "Vocal in Support for Hizballah, Iranians Go to Lebanon," RF

2006.
121. "Iran's Foreign Minister in Turkey for Talks on Mideast Crisis," Daily Star, August 12, 2006;
"Mottaki Brings Mideast Message from Ahmadinejad," Turkish Daily News, August 12, 2006.
122. Kamal Nazer Yasin, "For Iranian Radicals, the Fighting in Lebanon was an Exercise in Self-
Restraint," Eurasianet.org, August 14, 2006.
123. "Iran to Launch Large-scale Military Maneuvers," RFE/RL, August 17, 2006.
in the recent history of interactions between Syria and Iran. Damascus's wholesale
rapprochement with Ankara after 1998 precipitated not pre-emptive realignment on
Tehran's part, but rather a concerted effort to prop up the existing Syria-Iran alliance.
Iran's accelerating ties to Iraq after 2004 prompted Syria to take similar steps to rein-
vigorate the strategic partnership between Tehran and Damascus. On the other hand,
the Islamic Republic's more modest overtures to Iraq in 2003-04 led the leadership in
Damascus to undertake a parallel opening to Baghdad, along the lines of what Snyder
calls pre-emptive realignment. Even more tellingly, Syria's moderate hostility toward
Israel in early 2006 elicited a response from Iran that was very different from the one
that Tehran adopted after hostility between Syria and Israel spiked that summer. Teh-
ran reacted to moderate hostility by carrying out a variety of provocative initiatives,
which threatened to draw Syria into further regional conflict. But the Iranian leadership
drastically curtailed these initiatives in the face of severe hostility between Syria and
Israel, and only resumed a more provocative course of action after the crisis passed.
Such divergent interactions indicate not only the complexity of the Syria-Iran alliance
but also the utility of a revised conception of the alliance dilemma for understanding
relations between these two strategic partners.

Snyder (Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics)

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Syria's Relations with Iran: Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance

Author(s): Fred H. Lawson

al-Lubnaniyyah or Amal).7 Iran's Foreign Minister played a pivotal role in persuading

7. Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relations: Between Islam and Realpolitik," pp. 183-184.

[Continuedfrom previous page]

REFORMULATING THE ALLIANCE DILEMMA

REVISITING THE SYRIA-IRANALLIANCE

[Continuedfrom previous page]

76. Taremi, "Iranian Foreign Policy towards Occupied Iraq," p. 42.

84. IRNA, "Iran-Syria-Damascus," September 27, 2005.

ary.93 Syria and Iran subsequently announced plans to construct a petroleum

Syria confronts a fundamental dilemma in managing relations with

120. Bill Samii, "Vocal in Support for Hizballah, Iranians Go to Lebanon," RF

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