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1
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
COMELEC disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in general
and of Republic Act No. 9225 in particular. The COMELEC ruled by means of reasoning by
analogy and doctrine of precedent. Analogy involves an earlier decision being followed in a later
case because the latter case is similar to the earlier one and doctrine of precedent involves an
earlier decision being followed in a later case because both cases are the same.2 The COMELEC
made reference to the past, normally due to the belief that what it did in the past was the right
thing to do, or at least is a good guide to what is the right thing to do now. In the influential case
of Bengson III v. HRET, repatriation was explained. Republic Act No. 9225 is a repatriation
statue and has been described as such in several cases. The COMELEC includes some cases such
as Pareno v. Commission on Audit and Tabasa v. Court of Appeals. In Bengson III v. HRET,
repatriation is explained as the results in the recovery of the original nationality, meaning, a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen and if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine
citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. The other cases,
Pareno v. Commission on Audit and Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, also used this to describe
repatriation. Also in Bengson III v. HRET, the Supreme Court pointed out that there are only two
types of citizens: natural-born and naturalized, and that there is no third category for the
repatriated citizens. The COMELEC, for that matter, surveyed past decisions, identified ways in
which these decisions are similar to or different from each other and the question before it, and
developed a principle that captures the similarities and differences it considers important.
Consecutively, this principle provides the basis for its decision. The COMELEC regarded earlier
decisions as being relevant by citing them as analogies. It also believed that since courts are
bound to apply the law, and since earlier decisions have practical authority over the content of
the law, later courts are bound to follow the decisions of earlier cases. This is known as the
doctrine of precedent or stare decisis.
On the issue of residency of Grace Poe-Llamanzares, the Supreme Court used reasoning
by analogy, and in Marcos v. COMELEC, it held that “the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy, is decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
Constitution’s residence qualification requirement.3” The Court said that Mrs. Imelda Marcos
2
Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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G.R. No.119976
made an honest mistake in writing seven months residence in her certificate of candidacy for a
congressional seat, which the constitution requires for that position a period of not less than one
year. In the same way, Grace Poe-Llamanzares’ honest mistake in specifying her residence in her
certificate of candidacy for the Senate to be only six years and six months is not necessary proof
of the duration of her domicile in the country. Based on these acts facts, the Supreme Court held
she will exceed the 10-year residency requirement. However, based on the documents submitted
by Grace Poe-Llamanzares to the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the Bureau of Immigration, the
following are the facts that refer to the argument that Grace Poe-Llamanzares’ residence in
relation to her candidacy for President does not meet the 10 year residency requirement: The
Presidential Election is on May 2009, in order to abide by the residency requirement, she should
have been a Filipino by May 9, 2006. On May 2006, she was still a US citizen staying in the
country. On July 2006 and thereafter, she stayed in the country as a dual citizen. On May 2016,
she will only have a period of residence of at most nine years and 10 months which is two
months short of the constitutional requirement of 10 year residency. Thus, using inductive
reasoning, if the Constitution requires the 10 year residency for people running for President,
then all people, including Grace Poe should be disqualified to run for the Presidency.
The Supreme Court stated that there is more than ample evidence that Grace Poe-
Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino. It also said that she has met the 10-year residency
requirement to be qualified to run for presidency. However, in analyzing the facts of the case,
using legal reasoning, one may see some flaws in the decision and may say that Grace Poe-
Llamanzares is not qualified to run for presidency because she is not a natural-born Filipino
citizen and has not met the 10-year residency requirement as required by the law.
References:
Lamond, Grant. “Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning.” Jun 20, 2006. Retrieved from
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/
Republic Act No. 9225 known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003"