SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC.

AND OSCAR
VIOLAGO, Petitioners, v. MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG, Respondent.

Facts

On April 15, 2000, petitioner SLR Builders (then known as Violago Builders, Inc), as
seller, and respondent Ma. Cristina F. Bayang (Cristina), as buyer, entered into a "contract to
sell" of a sixty (60)-square meter lot in Violago Homes Parkwoods Subdivision, located
in Barangay Payatas, Quezon City.

Upon full payment of the monthly amortizations on the purchased lot, Cristina
demanded from SLR Builders the execution of the deed of absolute sale and the lot's certificate
of title but the latter failed to deliver, prompting Cristina to file a complaint for specific
performance and damages against SLR Builders and its President, Oscar Violago (petitioners)
before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

On February 16, 2004, Housing and Land Use Arbiter Atty. Joselito F. Melchor ruled in
Cristina's favor ordering the respondents (referring to the petitioners) to execute the Deed of
Absolute Sale of the subject property in the name of the complainant (referring to the
respondent) and deliver the title thereof free from all liens and encumbrances.
The petitioners appealed Arbiter Melchor's decision to the HLURB Board of
Commissioners.
The Board dismissed and denied, respectively, the petitioners' appeal and subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners then brought their case to the Office of the President (OP).

On November 17, 2006, the OP dismissed the petitioners' appeal for having been filed
out of time.

The petitioners moved to reconsider and argued that the "fresh period rule" enunciated
in the case of Domingo Neypes, et at. v. Court of Appeals, et al. should be applied to their case.

The Office of the President denied the petitioners' motion with finality, stating that the
"fresh period rule" applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals, such as in
petitioners' case.
 The petitioners then appealed to the CA.

In its assailed decision, the CA denied the petitioners' petition for review.
The CA, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration; hence, the filing of
the present petition for review on certiorari with this Court.

Issue

Whether the "fresh period rule" in Neypes applies to administrative appeals, such as an
appeal filed from a decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office to the
President.

Ruling:

No. The Court denied the petition. It is settled that the "fresh period rule"
in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals.

The "fresh period rule" in Neypes declares:

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from
the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to
the Court of Appeals; and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of
the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution.
xxxx

As reflected in the above-quoted portion of the decision in Neypes, the "fresh period
rule" shall apply to Rule 40_(appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals or Supreme
Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43
(appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner's present case is administrative in nature involving an appeal from the

decision or order of the DENR regional office to the DENR Secretary. Such appeal is indeed
governed by Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 87, Series of 1990. As earlier quoted, Section
1 clearly provides that if the motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall perfect his
appeal "during the remainder of the period of appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution
of denial;" whereas if the decision is reversed, the adverse party has a fresh 15-day period to
perfect his appeal. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, the subject appeal, i.e., appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board of
Commissioners to the OP, is not judicial but administrative in nature; thus, the "fresh period
rule" in Neypes does not apply.

JUDITH YU, Petitioner, v. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents

Facts:

An information for estafa against Judith Yu was filed with the RTC.
On May 26, 2006 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged.
14 days later, Judith Yu filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she
discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was
convicted.
The Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad denied the petitioner's motion for new trial for lack of
merit.
Judith Yu filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging she had a fresh period of 15 days
based on the ruling on Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, from the receipt of the denial of her motion
for new trial, within which to file a notice of appeal.
The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being belatedly filed and a
Motion for execution of the decision.
Issue:

Does the fresh period rule enunciated in Neypes vs Court of Appeals applies to appeals
in criminal cases?

Ruling:

Yes, to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the
confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted.
The 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration, litigants today need not concern themselves with counting
the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from the
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final
order or resolution.

DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 141524 (September 14, 2005)

FACTS:

Domingo Neypes and petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of
land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against
the private respondents.
The RTC dismissed Domingo Neypes and other petitioners complaint on the ground that
the action had already prescribed.
Domingo Neypes and other petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of
dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a
motion for reconsideration.
On July 1, 1998, the RTC issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration
which petitioners received on July 22, 1998.
Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal
fees on August 3, 1998.
 On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed
eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998.
Domingo Neypes and other petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too
was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus
under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA.
In the appellate court, Domingo Neypes and other petitioners claimed that they had
seasonably filed their notice of appeal.
They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July
22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their
motion for reconsideration.
When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed and
they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.
On September 16, 1999, the CA dismissed the petition.
It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3,
1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.
According to the appellate court, the order was the “final order” appealable.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time.

HELD:

Yes. The SC thus held that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the
fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their
motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of
the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or
final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in the above provision supposes that the
notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days
from notice of the “final order,” which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order
denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.