4/18/16 ‘Reconversion’ Paradoxes - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

‘Reconversion’
Paradoxes
Christophe
Jaffrelot

OP­ED
JANUARY
7,
2015
INDIAN
EXPRESS
SUMMARY The
BJP
has
a
majority
in
the
Lok
Sabha,
which
could
enable
it
to
revisit
the
subject
of
outlawing
conversion
in
the
context
of
an
increasingly
adverse
attitude
towards
Christianity.



While
Hindu
nationalism
developed
a
strong
opposition
to
Islam
in
the
wake
of
the
Khilafat
movement,
which
was
largely
responsible
for
the
creation
of
the
RSS
in
1925,
this
“ism”
first
crystallised
as
a
reaction
to
Christianity
—
and
has
remained
focused
on
this
other
“non­Indian”
religion.
Indeed,
the
Hindutva
movement
harks
back
to
the
Punjab­based
Arya
Samaj,
whose
founder,
Swami
Dayananda,
defended
Hinduism
against
the
missionaries
who
denigrated
a
“polytheist”
and
“idolatrous”
creed.
The
swami,
fearing
that
Christian
priests
would
reduce
the
number
of
Hindus
(at
a
time
when
demographic
data
was
becoming
available
thanks
to
the
census),
was
the
first
to
invent
a
ritual
of
reconversion.

Since
one
is
“born”
a
Hindu,
Hinduism
ignores
conversion.
Swami
Dayananda,
therefore,
had
to
resort
to
a
procedure
of
“purification”
of
the
upper
castes,
known
as
shuddhi,
in
order
to
endow
Hinduism
with
a
ritual
permitting
what
is
know
as
“conversion”
in
the
religions
of
the
book
—
to
join
a
body
of
believers
and
adhere
to
a
new
faith.
Paradoxically,
Hinduism
started
imitating
the
religion
that
some
of
its
leaders
rejected
most
vociferously,
Christianity,
in
order
to
resist
it
more
effectively.

This
semitisation
of
Hinduism
reflected
the
sense
of
emergency
created
by
the
official
figures:
From
1881
to
1911,
the
Hindu
population
in
Punjab
went
down
from
92,52,295
to
87,73,621,
or
from
43.8
per
cent
to
36.3
per
cent,
as
opposed
to
an
increase
from
1,16,62,434
to
1,22,75,477
(50.7
per
cent),
and
from
33,699
to
1,99,751
(0.8
per
cent
of
the
population,
but
an
increase
of
593
per
cent)
for
Muslims
and
(mostly
Dalit)
Christians,
respectively.

Some
of
the
Arya
Samajist
supporters
of
the
shuddhi
movement
claimed
that
Hindus
were
a
“dying
race”,
as
U.N.
Mukherji
wrote
in
1909.
As
early
as
the
19th
century,
conversions
were
seen,
not
as
the
sum
of
individual
decisions,
but
as
collective
migrations
weakening
the
majority
community.
They
were
perceived
as
stratagems
designed
by
the
churches
to
attract
the
poor
on
the
basis
of
material
promises.

But
Lala
Lajpat
Rai,
in
1909,
considered
the
ball
to
be
in
the
court
of
the
upper
castes
and
believed
that
they
could
retain
Dalits
in
the
fold
of
Hinduism
only
by
reforming
their
religion.
Swami
Shraddhananda
developed
the
Shuddhi
Sabha
in
this
vein
and
concentrated
his
efforts
on
Dalit
“purification”
in
order
to
dissuade
them
from
converting
to
Christianity.
Paradoxically,
his
plans
were
resisted
by
Congressmen,
like
Madan
Mohan
Malaviya,
who
did
not
try
to
accommodate
Dalits
within
Hinduism.

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The
reading
of
conversion
as
a
communal
game
of
numbers
explains
some
Congressmen’s
reservations
about
the
idea
of
changing
one’s
religion.
During
the
Constituent
Assembly
debates,
Article
25,
which,
in
its
final
form,
guarantees
the
right
to
“propagate”
one’s
religion,
was
discussed
almost
as
much
as
the
issue
of
language.
The
advocates
of
Hindi
were
also
those
who
refuted
the
very
idea
of
conversion.

Congress
leaders
are
credited
for
seeing
Article
25
through.
Paradoxically,
in
the
1950s,
missionaries
were
targeted
in
many
Congress­governed
states.
Madhya
Pradesh
is
a
case
in
point.
Chief
Minister
R.S.
Shukla
commissioned
the
Niyogi
report,
which
pointed
out
in
1956
that
foreign
missionaries
and
funds
were
increasing,
before
concluding:
“Evangelisation
in
India
appears
to
be
a
part
of
the
uniform
world
policy
to
revive
Christendom
for
re­establishing
Western
supremacy
and
is
not
prompted
by
spiritual
motives.
The
objective
is
apparently
to
create
Christian
minority
pockets
with
a
view
to
disrupting
the
solidarity
of
the
non­Christian
societies,
and
the
mass
conversions
of
a
considerable
section
of
Adivasis
with
this
ulterior
motive
is
fraught
with
danger
to
the
security
of
[the]
state.”

While
the
Constitution
seemed
to
allow
conversion,
traditionalist
Congressmen,
therefore,
presented
it
as
anti­national.
Since
then,
this
issue
has
been
exploited
by
the
Sangh
Parivar.
The
proportion
of
Christians
remains
just
above
2
per
cent,
but
the
Hindutva
movement
has
identified
them
as
posing
a
threat
to
India
because
of
their
“denationalisation”
impact,
which,
in
their
view,
was
evident
from
the
separatism
of
tribal
populations
like
the
Nagas.
This
conception,
well
in
tune
with
the
equation
of
India
with
Hinduism,
resulted
in
the
creation,
first,
of
the
Vanavasi
Kalyan
Ashram
(VKA)
in
1952,
which
was
intended
to
resist
the
missionaries’
activities
among
the
tribals
of
Chhattisgarh
and
elsewhere,
and
second,
of
the
Vishva
Hindu
Parishad
(1964).
Indeed,
the
creation
of
the
VHP,
which
had
been
conceived
in
the
early
1960s
by
S.S.
Apte,
an
RSS
leader,
and
Swami
Chinmayananda,
was
precipitated
in
August
1964
by
the
announcement
of
the
visit
of
Pope
Paul
VI
to
Bombay
on
the
occasion
of
the
International
Eucharistic
Congress
in
December.

The
VHP
emulated
the
Christian
forces
it
intended
to
fight
and,
therefore,
made
Hinduism
even
more
analogous
to
the
religion
it
criticised.
One
of
its
first
“aims
and
objectives”
was:
“To
establish
an
order
of
missionaries,
both
lay
and
initiate,
for
the
purpose
of
propagating
dynamic
Hinduism
representing
the
fundamental
values
of
life…”
Ironically,
conversion
became
a
legitimate
activity
for
only
one
creed.

In
the
late
1960s,
the
Jana
Sangh
asked
for
a
law
against
conversions.
When
it
came
to
power
in
Madhya
Pradesh,
by
means
of
a
shortlived
coalition
in
1967­69,
it
had
a
law
passed
called
the
Dharma
Swatantrya
Adhiniyam
(Religious
Freedom
Act),
1968,
which
prescribed
a
punishment
of
two
years’
imprisonment
for
persons
involved
in
conversions
that
did
not
strictly
comply
with
the
principle
of
voluntary
change
of
religion.
Odisha
passed
a
similar
law
in
1967.
But
the
question
reached
the
top
of
the
national
agenda
10
years
later,
when
Jana
Sangh
members,
part
of
the
Janata
government
at
the
Centre,
attempted
to
have
a
similar
law
passed
in
Parliament.
The
Freedom
of
Religion
Bill
was
aimed
at
preventing
anyone
from
“converting
or
attempting
to
convert,
directly
or
otherwise,
a
person
from
one
religious
faith
to
another
by
the
use
of
force
or
by
fraud
or
blackmail
or
deception,
or
by
whatever
other
fraudulent
means”.
This
bill
was
not
passed
because
of
the
opposition
of
other
components
of
the
Janata
party,
including
the
Socialists.

Today,
the
BJP
has
a
majority
in
the
Lok
Sabha
and
may
revisit
this
subject
in
the
context
of
an
increasingly
adverse
attitude
towards
Christianity
—
as
evident
from
the
suspicious
fire
that
gutted
a
Delhi
church
and
the
questioning
of
Christmas
as
an
Indian
holiday.
The
new
law
could
draw
its
inspiration
from
the
one
that
was
passed
in
Gujarat
in
2003,
according
to
which
those
who
want
to
convert
must
first
get
the
district
magistrate’s
authorisation.

If
such
a
law
is
passed,
the
judiciary
will
have
to
appreciate
whether
it
complies
with
Article
25
of
the
Constitution.
But
it
will
also
have
to
say
whether
so­called
reconversions
fall
within
the
ambit
of
the
law.
Are
the
tribals
of
Chhattisgarh
—
one
of
the
VKA’s
earliest
targets
—
or
Dangs
in
Gujarat
returning
or
being
converted
to
Hinduism
when
they
are
subjected
to
ghar
wapsi
rituals?
Here
is
our
last
paradox:
In
some

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4/18/16 ‘Reconversion’ Paradoxes - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

cases,
Hindu
organisations
may
not
be
allowed
to
continue
with
their
proselyte
activity
under
an
anti­
conversion
law.

But
the
main
lesson
of
this
long
series
of
paradoxes
lies
elsewhere,
in
the
fact
that,
while
Hindus
represent
more
than
80
per
cent
of
the
population,
Hindu
nationalists,
who
equate
Indianness
with
Hindudom,
continue
to
exploit
the
“dying­race”
syndrome
to
polarise
society
and
imitate
the
clearly
“un­Hindu”
proselyte
tradition
of
the
semitic
religions.
And
some
SCs
and
STs
are
still
candidates
for
conversion,
because
the
reforms
Lala
Lajpat
Rai
and
Swami
Shraddhananda
recommended
more
than
a
century
ago
are
still
unachieved
—
partly
because
of
the
conservative
attitude
of
pre­
and
post­Independence
Congressmen.

This
article
was
originally
published
in
the
Indian
Express.

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Source
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/01/07/reconversion­paradoxes/hz2u

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