III.

DEDUCTIVE REASONING IN LAW

A contract is a meeting of minds.

Between A who offered to sell a car without any servicing guarantee, and B who accepted to buy the car
with a one-year servicing guarantee, there is no meeting of minds. Therefore, between A and B, there is
no contract.

1. This form of reasoning is the most commonly used form in law, and it is governed by the rules of the
traditional syllogism already explained by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.

2. One must be aware, however, that since Aristotle and Aquinas, a very powerful system of logic –
symbolic or mathematical logic – has evolved that allows such valid conclusions as:

All corporations are juridical entities. Therefore, all representatives of corporations are representatives
of juridical entities. Which the entire logic of Aristotle and Aquinas would never have permitted to be
drawn.

3. In legal logic, the major premise will be supplied by the law, supported by the judicial precedent
involved. However, before the appropriate law or administrative rule is determined and isolated, the
facts must be threshed out. It is only after the facts are considered that it can be determined which law
controls. And then again, it will be necessary to take note of exceptive clauses, exclusive clauses, the
applicability provisions of the law, and other modifying variables.

Example:

A orally agreed with B that B should construct A’s house for Php4.5 million. It was further agreed that
the construction be completed in eight months. Two and a half years into the contract, A having paid
over Php2 million thus far, B is far from complete. A sues for breach of contract, and B pleads
unenforceability of the contract since it does not comply with the statute of frauds. Any contract
involving an amount of over Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) is subject to the statute of frauds. The
agreement between A and B is one such agreement, involving as it does Php4.5 million. Therefore, the
contract between A and B is subject to the statute of frauds.

4. The conclusion is false, not because the reasoning is erroneous, but because the legal (or major)
premise is not properly qualified; the correct statement of the law being that where there is partial
performance (performance on the part of one of the parties), the statute of frauds is no longer
applicable. 5. The minor premise – the key facts – must be so stated as to allow for an application of the
law. Put otherwise, the facts must be so stated as to allow a middle term to exist between the
statement of the law and the statement of facts. It must be, however, that the evidence adduced and
admitted by the court, allows such a statement.

If one starts with the constitutional premise: Every revenue measure must originate exclusively in the
Lower House. Then, one introduces the statement of fact: The new tax law was passed on the basis of a
bill produced by the Bicameral Conference Committee. Then, hardly any conclusion can be drawn.
Obviously, a question of fact (as well as an interpretation of a legal term – “originate”) will be involved.
Did the revenue measure originate in the Lower House? Since the Supreme Court has ruled that
“originate” simply means “initiated by,” one can then construct the syllogism thus: A revenue measure
that the Lower House initiates is valid. The E-VAT was initiated by the Lower House. Therefore, the E-
VAT is valid.
IV. ANALOGICAL REASONING IN LAW

1. The common-law element that has found its way into our otherwise civil law system in this
jurisdiction is the doctrine of stare decisis et quieta non movere.

2. The application of judicial precedent is known even to law students, but some points need
highlighting:

a. Is the doctrine still maintained, or has it been abandoned or qualified?

b. Is the doctrine uniformly stated by the court (considering that different divisions of the same
Supreme Court do sometimes produce different results on the same facts)?

c. What are the factual similarities and differences that either warrant or do not warrant the application
of precedent?

d. Which is ratio and which is obiter dictum in any particular Supreme Court decision?

3. It is obviously not necessary that all facts of the case at Bench correspond to the facts in the judicial
precedent. It is of the essence though that the key facts be similar and the constellation of facts be also
similar.

Key facts – facts that produce a result which, if otherwise, would yield a different result.

Constellation of facts – the arrangement of facts and their relation to each other.

4. There are cases that indisputably call for the application of judicial precedent. In penumbral cases,
however, the application (or non-application) of precedent will depend in large measure on whether or
not the judge considers the differences significant enough to distinguish or similar enough to apply
precedent. And whether or not the differences are significant or similar depends on considerations such
as equity and fairness.

5. Whether or not some differences are significant or not, however, does not always depend completely
on the judge, but is itself circumscribed by certain rules, e.g., the rule that unless the law itself
distinguishes, the courts should not; the rule that minor inconsistencies on the part of a witness’
testimony strengthen, not detract from, the probative value of her testimony.
V. INDUCTIVE REASONING IN LAW

1. It might not be easy at first, seeing how inductive reasoning has a function in law, for it is more
frequently encountered in the empirical and experimental sciences. Senior Circuit Judge Aldisert of the
United States Court of Appeals insists, however, that inductive reasoning is at the heart of common law.
Even if we are not a common law jurisdiction, our legal system in the Philippines has more than just
vestiges of it. I have always believed it to be a hybrid of common and civil law systems.

2. Such persuasions, however, as falsus in unu, falsus in omnibus, and techniques for the impeachment
of witnesses rely on inductive reasoning that would proceed thus: In Statement 1, the witness lied. In
Statement 2, the witness lied. In Statement 3, the witness lied. In Statement 4, the witness lied.
Therefore, in the present statement, the witness is lying. It is obvious that the presumption this
reasoning works with is that the witness’ behavior will be consistent. While there is some consistency in
human behavior, the human person, though, can make options for contrary behavior, often without
notice or predictability.

3. Similarly, when the court rules that the testimony given is “incredible” because it is contrary to
“human experience,” the court presumes that it has an idea of what human nature is, or about how
human beings behave or react on the basis of familiarity with an indefinite number of individuals.

4. At all times, the problem with inductive reasoning, however, has to be reckoned with: Is it not
possible that this person’s reaction was different from the reaction of most other people? Should it not
be granted that the accused could have behaved otherwise than his usual pattern of behavior suggests?
Is it not to be granted that the witness could have been untruthful in some parts of his testimony, but is
now being truthful?

5. This is the reason that in reasoning of this sort, cumulative evidence or the concurrence of indicators
is more reliable accompanied, of course, by a constant willingness to re-think one’s position that, in
turn, presupposes a healthy intellectual humility and reticence.