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THESIS
Defended on: March 13, 2014 in
To obtain Diploma of
Doctor
In
Information and Communications Technology
Elaborated by:
Ramzi BELLAZREG
Thesis Committee:
This Thesis is elaborated in Communication Networks and Security Research Unit CNAS, SUP'COM
www.cnas.org.tn
Acknowledgment
Several people gave me support to achieve this thesis and I would like to use this opportunity
to thank them all for their help and assistance.
First of all, I would like to express my deep and sincere gratitude to my advisor, Professor
Noureddine Boudriga. His wide knowledge and his logical way of thinking have been of great
value for me. His invaluable comments, ideas, encouragement, and guidance have provided a
good basis for the present thesis.
I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor Ahmed Mehaoua and Professor Yahya
Slimani for reviewing the manuscript of this thesis, and to Dr. Nabil Tabbane and Dr. Slim
Rekhis for evaluating this work.
During this work, I have collaborated with many colleagues, from the Communication
Networks and Security Research Laboratory (CN&S), for whom I have great regard. It has
been a pleasure cooperating with and learning from them.
My thanks go also to the faculty and staff of the Engineering School of Communications
(Sup’Com), who provided me a great environment and the resources needed to complete this
work.
i
Contents
ii
Contents Contents
7.5. The comparison of the proposed model to the random deployment . . . . . . . 128
7.5.1. The variation of PLC in relation with Rc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
7.5.2. The variation of PLC in relation with δD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
7.5.3. The variation of PLC in relation with WED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.5.4. Interpretation of the simulation results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
7.6. The evaluation of DWBS connectivity and coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.6.1. The evaluation of DWBS connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
7.6.2. The evaluation of DWBS coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
7.7. The DWBS global performance probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
7.7.1. The inter strips connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.7.2. The linear connectivity and coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
7.8. Conclusion of the chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Bibliography 141
vi
List of Figures List of Figures
ix
List of Tables List of Tables
Abstract
Ramzi BELLAZREG. TITLE. PhD thesis, Engineering School of Communications
(Sup’Com), Networks and Security Research Lab (CN&S), Date 2014. (Under the direction
of Pr. Noureddine Boudriga).
The WSNs are used in many fields to build surveillance systems to detect and report intru-
sion related events. Many research works have focused on the implementation of WSNs and
treated many issues related to the Wireless Sensor Networks. In this thesis, we will address
research issues related to the wireless sensor networks to provide solutions adapted to different
applications and implementation contexts.
In the first issue, we took interest to provide new deployment strategies for WSNs. We
developed several deployment techniques adapted to many contexts while resolving a set of
constraints. We first developed a deployment technique that takes into account the radio
irregularities. We also provided a deployment technique taking into account the variation of
the sensing range in relation to the energy consumed by the sensors. An other deployment
technique based on the geographical nature of the monitored area was developed. As a fourth
deployment technique, we developed a heterogeneous network suitable for Border Surveillance
applications and presented deployment and routing techniques to ensure both coverage and
connectivity. An other framework for Border Surveillance is provided and a new deployment
technique based on paving the monitored area with paving patterns is introduced. In this
model, we consider an aerial deployment of several types of nodes. The paving patterns cor-
respond to the landing area of the sensors in relation with the environmental factors.
In the second issue, we focused on the scheduling schemes to extend the lifetime of the
network. We propose two scheduling schemes based on different decision factors. The first
scheduling scheme allows the sensors to alternate between active and sleep status is depending
on their energy. The proposed scheduling scheme updates in time the number of activated
sensors to cover the monitored area with the reduced density depending on the sensors energy.
The second scheduling scheme is based on the analysis of the targets mobility. A prediction
of the next positions of the targets will give decisions on the sensors that will be activated.
The scheduling scheme generates a non uniform coverage of the monitored area to use only
the needed sensors while preserving full monitoring of the operation area.
In the third issue, we proposed a dynamic tunneling protocol named DynTunKey. The pro-
posed security protocol ensures the authentication of sensor nodes, along with the integrity
and the confidentiality of the exchanged data. DynTunKey constructs many-to-many tun-
nels and establishes group keys. All the trusted nodes contribute in the establishment of the
secured tunnels. We introduced in DynTunKey the concept of the CSA (Cluster Security
Association) to represent the many-to-many tunnel based on the group key established. Dyn-
TunKey is shown suitable to applications that necessitate secured communication between
sensors that belong to the same group.
Introduction to the Wire-
less Sensor Networks
1
1.1. Introduction to the chapter
Recent advances in micro-electro-mechanical systems (MEMS) technology and digital elec-
tronics have enabled the development of low-cost, low-power, multifunctional sensor nodes
that are small in size. In their first implementations, the sensors were deployed to detect
specific event in their sensing area. The researchers in many related disciplines were inter-
ested in conducting many research works based on the developed sensors because of their
low cost and sensing capabilities. They found in the sensors technology, the best solution
that permits a continuous and efficient monitoring of events in a given area. For example,
based on micro digital electronics, many recent research works have focused on the use of the
sensors. The main results of the works have focused on the development of a new concept
called the Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN). Using the network technology, the sensors are
no longer used in a single manner but are organized in a network and take benefits of the
advances of wireless communications to implement larger and more efficient networks. These
networks permit a monitoring of a larger area using collaborating sensor nodes. Wireless
sensor networks represent a significant improvement over traditional sensing systems.
The introduction of the WSN has attracted many researchers to work on this field and has
become one of the most investigated research domain during the last years. The design goals
and applications related to the WSNs are currently considered in many recent research works.
In this introductive chapter we will present the general aspects of the WSNs and the
thesis statement. We will introduce in Section 1.2 the Wireless Sensor Networks architecture.
Section 1.3 will present the most investigated research issues related to WSNs. Section 1.4
will be devoted to the presentation of the most current applications using the WSNs. In
Section 1.5 we will present the statement and contributions of this thesis. Section 1.6 will
present the outline of the dissertation.
1
1.2. THE
CHAPTER
WSN ARCHITECTURE
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
A sensor node is generally composed of four main components. These components are the
processing unit, the power unit, the transceiver, and the sensors.
• The processing unit is the device entity that executes all the tasks performed by the
sensor node. The processing unit is generally a micro-controller. It processes the sensed
data and controls the hardware components of the sensor node. To each processing unit
is associated an external memory. Two categories of memory based on the purpose of
storage can be distinguished: the user memory is used for storing application related to
personal data, and the program memory is used for programming the unit. Program
memory also contains identification data of the device.
• The power unit is the power source of the sensor. Power is stored either in batteries or
capacitors. Batteries, both rechargeable and non-rechargeable, are the main source of
power supply for sensor nodes. The sensor node consumes power for sensing, communi-
cating and data processing. More energy is required for data communication than any
other process. An important aspect in the development of a wireless sensor node is to
ensure that there is always energy available to power the system.
• The Transceiver unit is a single communication device of the sensor node and combines
both transmitter and receiver. The transceiver is used by the sensor node to send and
receive data and communicate with the different neighboring sensors and in case of ne-
cessity to the outside of the network. In general cases, the sensor nodes communicate
on a wireless transmission media to avoid the installation of heavy wired connections.
The wireless transmission media can be either radio frequency (RF) or optical commu-
nication (laser) or infrared. The Lasers consume less energy but need direct line-of-sight
for communication. The infrared, like lasers, do not need antenna but the broadcasting
capacity is limited. The most used wireless media for the sensors is the Radio Frequency
based communication, because it satisfies the requirements of most of the sensors based
applications.
1.2. THE
CHAPTER
WSN ARCHITECTURE
1. INTRODUCTION TO THE WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
The transceiver can operate in one of four operational states which are transmit, receive,
idle, and sleep. The energy consumption level differs from one state to another. For a
better utilization of the power, a sensor operates either in idle or sleep mode to consume
less energy, if it is not sending or receiving data,.
• Sensors are the most important hardware devices in a sensor node. The processing unit,
transceiver and power unit are important devices since they are needed to support the
main functionality of the sensor nodes, which is the detection of events. The sensing
unit measures and controls particular events or parameters and produces a measurable
response to a change in a physical condition like temperature, pressure or also objects
presence. Each sensor has a certain coverage area in which it can sense efficiently
and report the events observed. Sensors measure physical data of the parameter to be
monitored and generates an analog signal. The analog signal is digitized by an Analog-
to-Digital Converter (ADC) and sent to the processing unit for further data processing.
Some sensor nodes contain more than one sensor to be able to detect various types
of events using the same sensor node. The evolution and development of sophistical
sensors units have improved the possibilities of sensor node utilization.
In addition to the four essential components, a sensor node may have additional components
to ensure some supplementary tasks.
• A sensor node can include a location finding system that permits accurate determination
of the sensor node position. This information is needed in many WSN applications.
Generally, a Global Positioning System (GPS) is attached to the sensor node to operate
as a location finding system.
• Some sensor nodes can be equipped with energy generators to extend the lifetime of
the sensor node. Generally, these devices produce power by energy scavenging and
extraction from the environment. An example of energy generators is the solar cells-
based system.
• In some implementations and applications of WSN, the sensor node position is not static
but it is dynamic and may change its position, when needed. In that case, the sensor
node is equipped with an additional device called a mobilizer to move the senor node.
Figure 1.2 depicts the architecture of a sensor node including the most common included
hardware components.
• Simple vs flat networks. In a flat WSN, all the sensor nodes have the same sensing,
communication and processing roles. For this kind of architecture, all the sensor nodes
operate as sensing nodes and collaborate to ensure simple routing tasks. This kind of
network is used for low cost deployment providing a simple monitoring of a supervised
area without need of complex treatments and tasks.
Monitoring friendly forces: Headquarters can continuously monitor the status of friendly
troops and their locations. Small sensors can be installed in troops, soldiers and vehicles
to gather informations about their functioning and/or positions and send the information
periodically to the analysis center. The reports relative to a given troop can also be sent to
the troop headquarter to let it aware of anything going wrong for the troop.
Battlefield surveillance and target tracking: Inaccessible regions and critical areas can be
rapidly covered with sensor networks and closely watched for the activities of the opposing
forces. The self-organizing feature of such networks makes the deployment of them very
fast without human intervention. One particular case of battle field surveillance is the targets
tracking application. In this application, the deployed WSN will detect the presence of enemies
entities and also will permit a tracking of the path followed by this target. Additional advanced
analyses permit an anticipation of the targets future movements.
collected data to an analysis center. This solution provides an easily to implement solution
for a real time surveillance of border crossings.
Forest fire detection: An example of environmental application on WSNs is forest fire de-
tection. In this application, the sensors are deployed in a forest and help to determine the
exact origin of a fire before it becomes spread uncontrollable. The early detection is crucial
for a successful action of the firefighters; thanks to Wireless Sensor Networks, the fire brigade
will be able to know when a fire has started and how it is spreading.
Flood detection: The WSNs can also be used for flood detection. WSNs composed of many
sensing nodes used in this system to detect, predict, and prevent the damages that can be
caused by floods. Wireless nodes are distributed in rivers so that changes of the water level can
be effectively monitored. This kind of surveillance is difficult to achieve by humans because
the monitored regions are large and sometimes not accessible.
Monitoring Bio-diversity: Satellite and airborne sensors are used in observing large bio
diversity, but they are not fine grain enough to observe small size bio diversity. WSNs can be
used to control, monitor and observe the finest details of bio-complexity of the environment.
Ground level sensor nodes are used to observe the bio-complexity.
1.3.4. Agriculture
Using wireless sensor networks within the agricultural industry is becoming increasingly com-
mon; using a wireless network frees the farmer from the maintenance of wiring in a difficult
environment. Gravity feed water systems can be monitored using pressure transmitters to
monitor water tank levels, pumps can be controlled using wireless devices and water use can
be measured and wirelessly transmitted back to a central control center for billing. Irrigation
automation enables more efficient water use and reduces waste.
Accurate agriculture: Wireless sensor networks let users make precise monitoring of the
crop at the time of its growth. Hence, farmers can immediately know the state of the item at
all its stages which will ease the decision process regarding the time of harvest.
Irrigation management When real time data is delivered, farmers are able to achieve in-
telligent irrigation. Data regarding the fields such as temperature level and soil moisture
are delivered to farmers through wireless sensor networks. When each plant is joined with
a personal irrigation system, farmers can pour the precise amount of water each plant needs
and hence, reduce the cost and improve the quality of the end product. The networks can be
employed to manage various actuators in the systems using no wired infrastructure.
1.3. APPLICATIONS
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
OF THE WIRELESS
TO THE
SENSOR
WIRELESS
NETWORKS
SENSOR NETWORKS
Greenhouses: Wireless sensor networks are also used to control the temperature and humid-
ity levels inside commercial greenhouses. When the temperature and humidity drops below
specific levels, the greenhouse manager must be notified via e-mail or cell phone text message,
or host systems can trigger misting systems, open vents, turn on fans, or control a wide vari-
ety of system responses. Recent research in wireless sensor networks in agriculture industry
give emphasis on its use in greenhouses, particularly for big exploitations with definite crops.
Such micro climatic ambiances need to preserve accurate weather status all time. Moreover,
using multiple distributed sensors will better control the above process, in open surface as
well as in the soil.
Smart Homes: In smart homes, sensors make intelligent decisions about how to adapt, what
changes to make, what actuation to do on the basis of statements of environmental change.
A scenario example could be turning lights on when someone enters the room at night, by
controlling the temperature by switching the cooling/heating levels at an air conditioner, etc.
Smart sensor nodes and actuators can also be placed into appliances such as refrigerators,
furnace and air-conditioner. Thus, users can manage their home via Internet or satellite.
Environmental control in office buildings: For many cases, adequate airflow is needed to
distribute air throughout the facility in order to maintain uniform air temperatures. The
WSNs are implemented in that case to monitor the repartition of the air temperature. If
the air temperature is not uniformly distributed, the fans are then automatically ordered to
reduce or augment their speed and have an intermittent or constantly operation.
1.4. THE
CHAPTER
RESEARCH
1. INTRODUCTION
ISSUES FOR WIRELESS
TO THE WIRELESS
SENSOR NETWORKS
SENSOR NETWORKS
Home and buildings safety: Sensor networks provide an inexpensive way to implement a
security system able to monitor both indoor and outdoor. Small sensors can be placed on
windows, doors or common areas to generate alerts in the case of intruder presence. A sensor
network can also be deployed in parking to provide security monitoring against car thefts.
The same WSN can be used for another purpose and inform about the number and position
of free parking places.
Interactive museums : Some museums use WSNs to bring interactivity between visitors and
museum so to let them learn more. Each visitor has a multimedia device that displays com-
ments about he museum contents. The rooms and expositions of the museums are equipped
with sensing nodes and when a visitor is near an exposition automatically the audio played
in the multimedia device describes the corresponding exposition. This kind of application is
very easy to implement using WSNs and enhances the quality of expositions and permits an
enjoyable and easier navigation in the museum.
• defining the kind of network either simple or hierarchical, meaning composed on a unique
kind of sensors or many types of sensors. The choose of the network kind depends widely
on the needed sensing quality and type.
• the choice of the kinds of needed sensors to ensure the monitoring performances and
goals of the network. Based on the phenomena that will be monitored, the kind of the
sensor node should be selected.
• a definition of the relation rules between the different deployed sensors either for pro-
cessing, communication or hierarchical relations and dependance.
Given the importance of the infrastructure and network architecture choice on the ulterior
network performances many research works have focused on this aspect.
1.4. THE
CHAPTER
RESEARCH
1. INTRODUCTION
ISSUES FOR WIRELESS
TO THE WIRELESS
SENSOR NETWORKS
SENSOR NETWORKS
• The sensors can be organized as a star network where all the nodes are connected to a
single sink node.
• The sensors can be physically organized as a mesh or a single hop network. In this
topology any sensor node is able to communicate directly with every other node.
• A multiple hop networks form either an arbitrary graph or a tree structure of the sensors
deployed.
• The sensors can also be physical arranged in the form of linear network for which all
the sensors deployed form a line.
The topology chosen depends on the application that will be implemented. It also affects
many network characteristics such as the latency, the routing, the data processing, the network
lifetime and the robustness.
1.4.3.1. Coverage
The sensors have a sensing range which defines the coverage area that can be sensed by a
sensor node. One of the most important goals of a deployed WSN is to ensure the coverage
of the monitored area. We can classify the coverage into the following categories.
• The total coverage : In that case all the monitored area should be fully covered meaning
that any point in the operation area should be in the coverage area of at least one sensor
node.
• The sparse or partial coverage : Some applications do not need a total coverage of the
area but an efficient surveillance of some parts is adequate.
• The redundant coverage : For that case, multiple sensors cover the same physical loca-
tion.
• The non homogeneous coverage : In that case, some interesting parts of the monitored
area are more densely covered than the others.
1.4. THE
CHAPTER
RESEARCH
1. INTRODUCTION
ISSUES FOR WIRELESS
TO THE WIRELESS
SENSOR NETWORKS
SENSOR NETWORKS
Despite the type of coverage, the deployment process should be performed to guarantee
the needed coverage. A bad deployment strategy will generate a lack in the coverage, then
the sensing goal of the WSN will not be ensured. For that reason, many research works have
addressed the problem of coverage oriented deployment.
1.4.3.2. Connectivity
In addition to the sensing range, every sensor node has a communication range. The com-
munication range defines the communication area of the sensor node. The sensor node can
communicate to any node belonging to its communication area. The network is said to be
connected if there is a communication path between any pair of nodes. The pair nodes com-
munication can be done either directly or over multiple hops throw other nodes.
The connectivity is of a great importance because if a sensor node is isolated, it will not be
able to report its data to the analysis center for processing. In that case, even if the deploy-
ment satisfies a full coverage of the monitored area, the final resulting coverage will not be
sufficient because some nodes are isolated as if they do not exist.
Due to the importance of the deployment process and its impact on the performances of
the network deployed many research works have focused on proposing deployment schemes.
The deployment strategies proposed aims at ensuring a set of requirements. In particular,
the major considered goals to be addressed are coverage or connectivity or both of them.
• Node Mobility: The sensor nodes change their positions to enhance the quality of cov-
erage or connectivity of the network. As a solution to the lack of coverage, one or more
sensors move to the non covered portion of area. In some cases, the positions of the
sensors may change unintentionally on deployment due to environmental factors such
as wind or water. In the last case, the mobility will permit that sensors to get to the
required positions to avoid non covered areas.
• Event based mobility: In this mobility scheme, the sensors react to the changes or events
in their environment. The sensor nodes move to the location of the detected event to
ensure a better sensing in the event surroundings. For example, when a major event is
detected in an area, additional sensors move to this location to ensure better coverage
of the occurred event.
• Sink mobility: The data gathered by the sensors is sent to the sink node directly or in
multiple hops transmission, one can easily notice that the closest sensor nodes to the sink
will deplete their battery power faster due to their heavy overhead of relaying messages.
Recent research works have proposed that the sink node moves in the monitored area
to reduce and balance energy expenditure among all the network sensors.
1.4. THE
CHAPTER
RESEARCH
1. INTRODUCTION
ISSUES FOR WIRELESS
TO THE WIRELESS
SENSOR NETWORKS
SENSOR NETWORKS
The researchers has found in sensors mobility a practical solution to implement a dynamic
network. The dynamicity of the network nodes gives the possibility of changing the network
operating when needed to adapt the network to additional functional requirements such as
for example new coverage or connectivity needs.
• Dynamic Voltage Scaling (DVS): In a DVS scheme the power levels used for the sen-
sors are not constant and depend on the non-deterministic workload. By the use of
lower power levels when needed will permit a reduction in energy consumption and by
consequence extend the lifetime of the network.
• Dynamic Power Management (DPM): For the DVS scheme the sensors are always in
operating modes but changes the power level used. DPM conserves power by shutting
down parts of the sensor node which are not currently used or active. In this case,
the sensors may be in idle or sleep mode to reduce the energy consumption. In other
cases, some sensors may also be shutdown when needed which extends their lifetime.
This solution is referred in the research work to as a scheduling scheme. A scheduling
schemes alternate the sensors between sleep and active status for an optimal power
consumption.
Many research works have focused on proposing scheduling schemes suitable for the appli-
cations based on the WSNs.
1.4.6. Security
It is imperative to protect the communications done over WSNs because the sensor nodes may
communicate sensitive data and operate in hostile environments. However, due to the specific
constraints of WSNs adapted security protocols are needed. Currently enormous research
works propose security protocols and mechanisms suitable for WSNs context.
The security requirements investigated by the researchers are presented in the followings.
• Data integrity: With data confidentiality an intruder may be unable to steal information.
However, it can change the data to prevent the nodes to read the correct content of the
sent data. For example a malicious node may add some fragments or delete some parts
of the sent data packet. A change in the content of the sent data may also occur due
1.5. THESIS
CHAPTERSTATEMENT
1. INTRODUCTION
AND CONTRIBUTIONS
TO THE WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
• Data freshness: Given that the communication on WSNs is done over wireless links,
an adversary can easily listen and take copies of some transmitted packets. Even if it
cannot read the content of the packets due to the data confidentiality but it can store
the packets and send them at ulterior moments. This replayed data packet will disrupt
the normal work of the sensing network because false events will be reported and may
cause false decisions. Data freshness suggests that the data is recent and ensures that
no old messages have been replayed.
• Self organization: The WSNs are ad hoc networks and their infrastructures is dynamic.
For sensing and management reasons, some sensors may be added and others may change
their locations. The dynamics of the whole network inhibits the idea of pre-installation
of fixed security mechanisms like fixed shared keys between the sink and all the sensors.
When the network infrastructure is not fixed, the security protocols should be able to
self organize, adapt the security management and built updated trust relation among
the sensors.
We can easily notice that the presented research axes for WSNs are complementary and
are dependent to ensure a global efficient sensing quality.
A geographic based deployment technique To better address this type of deployment tech-
nique, we consider the particular case of a military target tracking application. In the proposed
deployment scheme, the density of deployed sensors depends on the geographic characteristics
of the monitored area. Given that the monitored area is large, it can contain more than one
geographical category. We will then perform a non-uniform deployment. A redeployment
mechanism is also proposed in relation with the targets presence in the monitored area. Then
the proposed deployment strategy is a non uniform, dynamic and geographical based strategy
which was not addressed previously.
Energy based scheduling scheme One of the factors that affect the radio range of a sensor
is the residual energy. Globally speaking, it can be said that the transmission power of a
network device decreases with respect to time. We studied the effect of the power decay of
the coverage range of the sensor and by consequence on the global sensing performance of the
network. The existing deployment solutions suppose that the sensor radio range is constant
and does not take into account its variability in relation to the sensors power. In a first
part, we proposed a deployment technique that permits an efficient sensing for any battery
power level. Based this deployment, we proposed a scheduling scheme that activates only the
required number of sensors.
Targets based scheduling scheme The second scheduling scheme presented is based on
the analysis of the targets movements. We consider the particular case of a wireless sensor
network for military target tracking. The principle of our solution is to predict the positions
of the targets. This prediction is calculated relatively to the previously detected positions.
Then, the scheduling will appropriately select the sensors that are likely to detect targets
and orders them to wake up. The main contribution is that the prediction model reflects the
characteristics of the sensed area and also provides an heterogenous coverage of the monitored
area to provide a minimal coverage of all the area and the parts that are likely to contain
targets are densely covered. The advantage of the proposed solution is that it ensures both a
scheduling scheme and a dynamic distribution of sensors in the monitored area.
A Border surveillance framework using a thick linear architecture: In this part we propose
a thick linear architecture that permits an efficient sensing and tracking of targets near a
border line. We proposed a deployment strategy to ensure coverage, connectivity and routing
efficiency. We also proposed a dynamic routing mechanism to ensure an efficient and optimal
relay of data between the nodes and a self-organized elaboration of routes when the network
topology changes.
A dynamic deployment scheme for Border Surveillance In this part, we built a WSN based
surveillance system that is able to provide a controllable surveillance of infiltration within a
large area neighboring the border. In this deployment model, the sensors are supposed to be
thrown from an airplane. The first contribution is the setup of a new deployment method
which consists at paving the monitored area with paving patterns of predetermined shapes
translating the environment conditions. The paving patterns are not randomly chosen but
have predetermined shapes translating the environment conditions. We conducted detailed
kinematic studies to characterize precisely the shapes of the paving patterns.
In addition to the paving based deployment strategy, we proposed mathematical models that
permit the compute of sensing and coverage probabilities. The mathematical models are
built to provide a tight control on the quality of sensing and communication and evaluate the
network sensing efficiency. In addition, the mathematical models are developed to plan and
dimension the deployed network.
• Chapter 3 addresses the power consumption control for WSNs. We present two devel-
oped scheduling solutions. In the first scheduling scheme, we present an analysis of the
impact of power decay on the sensing performances of a deployed network. We present
an amelioration of the deployment technique proposed in the second chapter to take
into account these factors. Then based on the energy consumption of the sensing nodes
we propose a scheduling scheme to provide an efficient control of the power and extend
1.6. OUTLINE
CHAPTEROF
1. DISSERTATION
INTRODUCTION TO THE WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
the network lifetime. We will then present the second developed scheduling solution.
This solution is based on a thorough analysis of the targets movements and deduces the
sensors that are likely to detect targets.
• Chapter 4 takes a particular interest to the WSNs security tasks. We present a new
key management protocol proposed for Wireless Sensor Networks that guarantees au-
thentication, data confidentiality, and data integrity. We will present a new concept
called the Cluster Security Association (CSA) and the tunnels establishment process.
We also provide a mechanism of dynamic integration of newly deployed sensors. We
then present a performance evaluation of the proposed protocol.
• Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and provides a set of perspectives which have been
opened up by the achieved results.
Deployment strategies for
large areas
2
2.1. Introduction to the chapter
One of the most investigated research field for the wireless sensor networks is the deployment
of the nodes to ensure the goals of the network implementation. The WSNs can be used in
several applications ranging from patient monitoring to battle fields surveillance. A common
factor for all these WSN use-cases is that monitoring a phenomenon encompasses coverage
requirements to avoid missing valuable measurements. One important issue for being able
to develop an efficient WSN is to have an optimal node placement strategy. The WSNs are
used either in indoor applications where the goal of the network is to monitor a small area
or outdoor applications where the area to be monitored is of large scale. In the first part
of the thesis, we propose two strategies of coverage control suitable for large outdoor areas
through efficient deployment of sensors. The characteristics of the deployment strategies are
summarized in the following.
• In the first strategy, we propose a solution to determine the required density for a
uniform deployment of sensors to provide k-coverage in a large monitored area. The
main contribution in this part is the determination of the radio irregularity impact in
the deployment process;
• For the second deployment strategy, we propose a non uniform deployment strategy
in large areas. The network considered in this part has an heterogeneous architecture
composed of several kinds of sensors. In addition to the non uniformity of sensors’
repartition, the main contribution in this deployment process is the integration of the
sensors density repartition, as it depends on the geographical nature of the monitored
area.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 will present the deployment
strategy based on the radio irregularities. In this section we will present the existing works
related to radio irregularity for the WSNs and present the details of the proposed coverage
control strategy. Section 2.3 will present the results of the conducted simulations to compare
the proposed deployment scheme with the deployment schemes that do not take into account
the radio irregularity. In Section 2.4, we present the second deployment strategy based on
geographical patterns of the monitored area. Section 2.5 assesses the efficiency of the geo-
graphical based deployment scheme through some conducted simulations. Finally, Section 2.6
concludes the chapter.
16
2.2. DEPLOYMENT
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2. DEPLOYMENT
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RADIO IRREGULARITIES
FOR LARGE AREAS
nel model at 868 MHz is validated, and compared to the widely used one-slope model, which
is the log-normal path loss model. The model is validated using three outdoor environments:
a ground plain area, a university yard and a green park. This work gives a parameter adjust-
ment model for the three scenarios. Nonetheless, these values are not deduced or resulted in
an analytic model and cannot be applied in general. Therefore, it cannot be used to develop
a deployment model because these values cannot be generalized to all the radio environment
cases.
In [8], the authors analyze the impact of radio irregularities and in particular the RIM model
on typical localization algorithms. They conducted experiments to show that the radio irreg-
ularities has a significant impact on some main evaluation aspects of localization algorithms.
Despite of their relevance, these researches only focus on the analysis of the radio irregularity
impact but they do not propose deployment models that take into account these irregularities.
In the following, we will study the impact of radio irregularities on the sensing quality of the
network and propose a deployment model for coverage control supporting irregular radio
propagation.
3. Variance of transmission power according to time: After having operated for some time,
the energy of the sensor nodes begins to deplete. Consequently, the intensity of the
transmission signal is affected. Globally speaking, it can be said that the transmission
power of a network device decreases with respect to time. It is noteworthy that, due
to the non-uniform activity scheduling of the WSN nodes, the decreasing rate of the
transmission range is not identical for all nodes.
We rely on the log-normal shadowing model detailed in [9] to represent radio propagation in
natural environments. In fact, both theoretical and measurement based propagation models
indicate that average received signal power decreases logarithmically with distance. This
model represents the path loss in relation with the distance by using path loss and shadowing
components. The path loss is expressed by the following relation.
d
P L(d)dB = P L(d0 ) − 10n log( ) + χσ, (2.1)
d0
2.2. DEPLOYMENT
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The log-normal distribution describes the shadowing effect which occurs over a large num-
ber of measurement locations that have the same T-R separation, but have different levels of
clutter in the propagation path. This phenomenon is referred to as log-normal shadowing.
Log normal shadowing implies that measured signals levels at a specific T-R separation have
a Gaussian normal distribution.
The close-in reference distance d0 , the path loss exponent n and the standard deviation
σ, statistically describe the path loss model for an arbitrary location having a specific T-R
separation. In the sequel, we use this model to determine the number of sensors to be deployed
in the monitored region to reach a specific coverage degree.
In [10], the authors demonstrated that, when the coverage of a sensor S has a perfect circular
form, k sensors should be present in the disc centered in S of radius Rs + Rt , where Rs is the
sensor sensing range and Rt is the target radius, so that the k-coverage condition is fulfilled
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in the neighborhood of S. In other terms, the sensor density ρS is given by the following
formula.
k
ρS = (2.3)
π(Rs + Rt )2
In this work, we adapt this result by considering a disc of radius Rt and expanding this area
with the respective Rsi in each direction. We will denote by Sc the surface of this area rep-
resenting the coverage domain of the sensor.
An example is depicted in Figure 2.2, where it is clear that the sensors S1 and S2 detect the
target of radius Rt because their coverage surfaces intersect with the area Sc . However, sensor
S3 does not cover the target. Based on this reasoning, it can be said that for the target to be
k-covered, the area Sc must contain at least k sensors.
k
ρS = (2.4)
Sc
The next step consists in calculating the area of the surface Sc analyzing the statistical
properties of the variation of Rsi . As it has been mentioned in the foregoing section, this
variation is log-normal Gaussian distributed and characterized by the standard deviation σ,
the mean range µ and the maximal range Rsmax . The corresponding probability density
function is given by the following equation.
1 (Rs − µ)2
p(R) = √ exp(− ) (2.5)
σ 2π 2σ 2
Consequently, the area of the surface Sc is then given by the following formula.
Z Rs =Rsmax Z θ=2Π∗pθ (Rs )
Sc = (Rt + Rs )dRs dθ, (2.6)
Rs =0 θ=0
2.3. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE RADIO IRREGULARITIES
DEPLOYMENTCHAPTER 2. DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES FOR LARGE AREAS
where pθ (Rs ) is the probability that the range is equal to Rs . Then, we will calculate the
integral of (Rt + Rs ) when varying θ between 0 and 2Π ∗ pθ (Rs ). This gives the area of the
sector of radius Rt + Rs and angle 2Π ∗ pθ (Rs ).
The ALUL in an area A, denoted by ALU L(A) is the mean uncovered distance that can
be traveled by a target without being detected by any of the nodes deployed in the region of
interest. The expression of ALU L(A) is given by:
R
ALU L(x)dx
ALUL(A) ≡ x∈A , (2.8)
kAk
• 3-coverage condition: we require that every target must be located by at least 3 sensors;
Under these conditions, we compare the proposed coverage model, called Irregular (k;t)-
coverage, as based on Equation 2.4, to the traditional (k;t)-coverage based on Equation 2.3.
Since this latter is based on an isotropic radio range, we consider the three following cases:
1. The trivial model: In this case we do not take into accounts the radio effects. Hence, the
required sensor density depends only on the range Rs . In this simulation, we deployed
the sensors uniformly in the monitored area while the sensors density repartition is
given by Equation 2.3. As an evaluation metric, we measured the Averaged Linear
Uncovered Length (ALUL). Since the length of the uncovered path varies substantially
from a deployment configuration to another, we repeated the experiment (i.e., ALUL
measurement) until the standard deviation of the ALUL process is less than a threshold,
set to 2 m. The evaluation of the ALUL for the trivial model is illustrated by Figure
2.3.
2. The Log-normal shadowing model: The second simulation scenario adds the irregular
radio propagation effects to the functioning of the sensor network. We deploy the same
number of sensors as for the trivial model using Equation 2.3. But, when we compute
the ALUL, we took into account the radio irregularities meaning that we will consider
that the sensed area by a sensor is not a disc of range Rs but depends on the radio
irregularities. The aim of this simulation is to study the impact of a deployment that
does not take into account the radio propagation effects on the coverage quality of the
network evaluated as ALUL.
To describe the radio environment, we adopted the log-normal shadowing model. These
effects are described by the values P L(d0 ), n and χσ. By assumption, P L(d0 ) is equal
to 36 dB, n is equal to 4 and χσ has a variation of 4.70. The path loss threshold is
equal to 100 dB. The evaluation of the ALUL for the Log-normal shadowing model is
illustrated by Figure 2.4.
3. The averaged log normal shadowing model: The density of the uniformly deployed sen-
sors in that case is computed using Equation 2.3. The range Rs used is considered as the
2.3. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE RADIO IRREGULARITIES
DEPLOYMENTCHAPTER 2. DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES FOR LARGE AREAS
average range computed as the mean of transmission ranges Rsi for all directions in the
case of an irregular radio propagation. An example of the average range is illustrated
by Figure 2.5 where the averaged range is plotted in dotted line.
The evaluation of the ALUL for the averaged log normal shadowing model is illustrated
by Figure 2.6.
We also conducted simulations to evaluate the ALUL value for the proposed deployment
technique called Irregular (k; t)-coverage. In this scenario, either in the deployment process
or in the computation of ALUL we considered that the area covered by a sensor is not a
uniform disc but is function of the radio propagation effects. The results of these simulations
are represented by Figure 2.7.
2.3. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE RADIO IRREGULARITIES
DEPLOYMENTCHAPTER 2. DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES FOR LARGE AREAS
Figure 2.6.: ALUL evaluation for the averaged log-normal shadowing model
Figure 2.7.: ALUL evaluation for the irregular (k,t) coverage model
A first major remark is that, between the trivial and the log-normal shadowing model,
the ALUL difference is 42% in average. This feature clearly highlights the limitations of
traditional density computation approaches that rely on perfect radio propagation. Obviously,
this reinforces the pertinence of our idea to develop a new coverage control model. Therefore,
the impact of the radio irregularities is foreseeable. Moreover, comparing the first model to
the third allows concluding that averaging the radio irregularity would be equivalent, in terms
of performance, to the trivial model. Hence, despite its low computational complexity, the
averaged log-normal shadowing model does not give satisfactory results. More importantly, it
can be noticed that our model, the irregular (k,t)-coverage, returns the lowest ALUL values.
More concretely, the consideration of the radio irregularities substantially enhances the ability
of the WSN to detect malicious targets. These results are corroborated by Table 2.1 where
2.3. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE RADIO IRREGULARITIES
DEPLOYMENTCHAPTER 2. DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES FOR LARGE AREAS
the maximum and minimum ALUL values are given for each of the four models.
1. Measure of P L(d0 ) impact: We fix the variance of χσ to 4.70 and n to 4 and vary
P L(d0 ) in the interval [30,43]. For every value of P L(d0 ) we measured the correspondent
ALUL. These measures are represented in Figure 2.8. It is noticeable that the ALUL
is between 31.8031 and 17.0461. Its standard deviation is equal to 5.4375. Therefore,
P L(d0 ) has an important impact on the performances of the WSN. In fact, when P L(d0 )
varies from 30 to 43, the ALUL is enhanced by a factor of 0.42.
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2. Measure of the impact of χσ: For fixed values of P L(d0 ) and n respectively equal to
36 dB and 4, we vary the variance of χσ in the interval [3.7,4.9] with a step of 0.2. The
corresponding ALUL values are given in Figure 2.9. Clearly, the ALUL decreases with
regard the variance of χσ. It takes values between 21.0915 and 23.9145. Consequently,
we can deduce that the parameter χσ does not considerably affect the ability of the
WSN to track malicious intruders.
• The deployment scheme adapts the number of needed sensors relatively to the charac-
teristics of the covered area in the sense that the density of deployed sensors depends
of the geographic characteristics and class of the monitored area;
In order to have an efficient target tracking, we need several types of sensors with different
sensing, communication capabilities and functions. Therefore we consider an heterogenous
WSN. The proposed network is three-layered; each layer consists of a type of nodes with a
given role. Those nodes are: the Intruder Detecting Sensors, the Image nodes, and the Sink
Nodes (or core nodes). The network architecture is depicted in Figure 2.11. In this figure, we
represent a snapshot of a sub zone of the area to be monitored.
1. The sensing Layer consists of Intruder Detecting Sensors which are miniature devices
whose role is the detection of intruders. After detecting trespassers, those nodes generate
real-time alerts and transmit them to the closest Sink Node. In some cases, those nodes
can relay the generated alerts through other sensors to the sink;
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2. The image Layer contains the Image Sensors which are equipped with an image acqui-
sition card. The main role of those sensors is to take an image snapshot of a given
area. With those nodes, through a multimedia analysis of the detected snapshots we
can deeply analyze the kind of the present object within the monitored area to check
whether it is an intruder or a harmless object;
3. The Core Layer is composed of the Sink Nodes which are equipped with powerful sensing
and transmission capabilities. Hereinafter, those nodes will be referred to as Sink Nodes.
They are able to acquire and exchange voluminous high-resolution data related to the
alerts generated by the low-level sensors. The other goal of implementing such nodes is
to manage the other nodes by giving instructions to the sensors and ordering the Image
Nodes to take and report snapshots when needed.
We will deploy the sensors in a strip-based manner in the monitored area respecting the
previously presented relationship between the coverage range and the distance between the
sensors. An example of the Image Sensors is depicted by Figure 2.12. To determine the
number of the required sensors and their placements, we will use the following steps:
2.4. DEPLOYMENT
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STRATEGIES
PATTERNS
FOR LARGE AREAS
• Considering the monitored area A(LEN GT H ∗ W IDT H), we will reduce it in all the
sides by RCIm ;
• We determine the number of the needed Image Sensors to cover the length of the area.
This number is given by the following formula: NLEN GT H = LEN GT√H−(2×R
3R
CIm )
+ 1;
CIm
• Accordance with the length, we determine the number of the Image Sensors needed to
cover the width of the area. The required number is NW IDT H = W IDT√H−(2×R
3R
CIm )
+ 1;
CIm
• The total number of needed Image Sensors is given by NIm = NLEN GT H ∗ NW IDT H .
The Geographic Grid-Based Classification: Any area can be classified into many types such
as mountains, roads, rivers, and forests. It is obvious that the probability of appearance of
intruders differs between the geographic categories. The uniform deployment strategies do
not take into consideration these characteristics. Therefore, our idea is to proceed to a non-
uniform deployment that depends on the geographic nature of the monitored area.
At a first step, we have as inputs a classification of the geographic categories which corre-
sponds to each category the probability of appearance of the targets in this kind of geographic
areas denoted by PGC . Based on those probabilities, we can determine for each geographic
category GCi , a coverage degree Ki . The relationship between the probability PGCi and
its corresponding coverage degree Ki is given by equation 2.9 where KM ax is the maximum
quality of coverage needed for the most vulnerable areas.
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PGCi
Ki = f (PGCi ) = KM ax ∗ (2.9)
PGCM ax
The following step of the deployment scheme is to subdivide the monitored area in a grid
manner. Each sub-area corresponds to a geographic category and is Ki − covered. As a result,
the sub-areas within the grid have different coverage degrees and therefore our monitored area
is said to be non-uniformly K-covered.
The number of required Intruder Detecting Sensors: Once the coverage degree of each
sub-area has been determined, we will determine the required number of sensor that will
ensure this coverage quality. This number will be determined using the sensor density within
the considered sub-area. The sensor density ρi is function of the sensor nodes sensing range
denoted by Rs and the coverage degree Ki , as stated in the following formula:
Ki
ρi = (2.10)
π ∗ Rs 2
The number of the required sensors is given by equation 2.11 where ABlock is the area of the
block.
NBlock = ρi ∗ ABlock (2.11)
former Ki value, if many intruders has been detected in this block and will decrease if the
number of the detected intruders is not high.
At this step, we determined for each Blocki the new value of k-coverage denoted by KN ewi ,
Table 2.2.: The new coverage required densities for the Re-deployment
and we will determine the new number of needed sensors at each block. This value is given
by equations 2.10 and 2.11. We should now update the number of the deployed sensors in
each block:
• If the previous number of sensors at the block is less than the newly required one, we
have two possible actions; the first possible one is that the Sink Node will order some
unused sensors in the other blocks to move to this block to reach the required coverage
value. The second option is to deploy new sensors;
• If the previous number of sensors is greater than the new required number, the extra
sensors will be either placed in sleep mode or displaced to another block if needed.
Under the assumption that the targets crossing our WSN move according to the Gauss-
Markov mobility model, the main objective of the simulation is to assess the efficiency of the
developed deployment strategy. This efficiency is measured by the probability of intrusion
detection using a new metric called LUP (Length of Uncovered Path) which is inspired from
the ALUL (Average Linear Uncovered Length). Details of LUP are provided in the following
sub-section.
The idea of the above algorithm is to consider a given path and to compute the LUL (Linear
Uncovered Length) of each of its line-segments. Initially, the value of LUP is set to 0. This
means that the path is totally covered and no intrusion can occur. Then, in each iteration a
line segment is considered and its LUL is computed and added to the previous value of LUP.
Also, a test is made to check whether the LUL of the segment is less than its length, if the
result is true the algorithm stops and this mean that we met the first covered point of the
path. The above algorithm is not applied to paths whose origin if sufficiently covered, i.e the
obtained coverage degree of the origin is equal or beyond the expected coverage degree. The
LUP of such paths is null.
The LUL metric that we adopted is similar to the one used in the ALUL, in fact our metric
is an enhanced version of the proposed one and which takes into consideration the non-
uniformity of the sensor node deployment. The LUL algorithm is detailed in the following.
The main idea of the LUL algorithm is to look into the line segment and to find the first point
that is sufficiently covered. A point is sufficiently covered if its coverage degree is equal or
more than its expected coverage degree. The expected coverage degree is the coverage of the
sub-area to which this point belongs. The actual coverage degree corresponds to the number
of sensors that are actually covering this point. This algorithm is applied to segments whose
origin is not sufficiently covered. In case where the origin is sufficiently covered the LUL is
set to 0.
Figure 2.13.: Impact of the number of division per cell on the intrusion percentage
The coordinates of the sensor nodes within a given sub-area are uniformly generated using the
function unifrnd. The limitation of this function is that the obtained coordinates are not per-
fectly uniformly distributed when dealing with high dimensions such as our case (150 ∗ 150m).
This will lead to an inefficient deployment which will negatively affect the intrusion detection
of our network. In order to solve this problem, we propose a modification of our deployment
strategy, in fact we will split each sub-area into small portions and generate the coordinates
of the sensor contained in this portion. Through the simulations depicted by Figure 2.13, we
2.6. CONCLUSION
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2. CHAPTER
DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES FOR LARGE AREAS
proved that the more portions we have the better the detection percentage is.
To reach such deployment, we suppose that the sensors are dropped from an aircraft which is
going back and forth and for each sub-area not all the sensors are dropped at the same time
but by small quantities.
In the second simulations, we intend to check the impact of the mean direction of the targets
on the intrusion percentage. The results of this simulation are depicted by the following
figure.
Figure 2.14.: Impact of the mean direction of the targets on the intrusion percentage
Figure 2.14 shows that whatever the mean directions chosen by the targets, the detection
ability of our network remains high.
• The first scheduling scheme is based on a monitoring of the nodes energy. Based on
their current energies, the sensors will be put in active or sleep status. In this scheme,
we investigate the impact of the sensors energy decrease on the coverage quality and
use this property as a decision factor in the scheduling solution;
• The second scheduling method is based on a thorough analysis of the targets’ movements
and their variations. Based on the estimated movements, the sensors will be put in sleep
or active mode. The proposed scheduling method ensures a minimal coverage of the
monitored area that permits the detection of any target present in this area.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we present a classification
of the existing scheduling schemes. Section 3.3 introduces and describes the detailed steps of
the energy based scheduling scheme. In Section 3.4, we present the results of simulations to
evaluate the performances of the energy based scheduling scheme. Section 3.5 is devoted to
the presentation of the scheduling scheme based on the targets mobility. The performances
of this scheduling scheme will be presented in section 3.6. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes the
chapter.
35
3.2.
CHAPTER
RELATED
3. SCHEDULING
WORKS SCHEMES FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
In [13], Kumar et al. adopt the Randomized Independent Scheduling (RIS) mechanism to
extend network lifetime while achieving asymptotic K-coverage. In this work, the time is
divided into cycles based on time synchronization. At the beginning of each cycle, each
sensor independently of the others decides either to be active or passive node. The node
decides to be in active state with probability p and in passive mode with probability 1 − p.
This solution does not require neighborhood table neither a central managing node and has
no communication overhead. But, because the sensors do not dynamically evaluate their
situation, the algorithm is not robust against unexpected failure of nodes. It is probabilistic
and can give some sub areas that are not covered. The selection of the activated nodes is
random and does not reflect the characteristics of the targets movements or the monitored
area. In addition, this scheduling solution does not take into account the variation of the
sensing range.
In another work, Perillo and Heinzelman in [14] divides the sensors into sets. Every set gives
a complete coverage of the sensed area. At a time, only one subset is active. In this work,
the authors proposed a solution to optimally schedule the sets. This is done by selecting
which set is active, when and for how long. This solution ensures at any time the required
coverage, but does not take into account the probability of the presence of the targets. Then,
many sensors can be activated, where no targets are likely to be in their coverage zone. This
solution supposes that the sensing range is constant and then may provide a lack in coverage
while supposing that the number of sensors activated ensure full coverage.
Cardei and Du [15] divide the sensors into disjoint sets. Unlike the previous solution the sets
are scheduled using Round Robin. In this work, the focus is on the problem of finding the
maximum number of disjoint sets. The main drawback of the proposed work, is that it is
difficult to apply it in a distributed manner. Lu et al. [16] proposed a solution of sensor
scheduling to provide k-coverage. At the initialization of the network, all the sensors are in
passive state. Before being active, each sensor waits a back-off time relative to the amount of
contribution they can provide to the coverage. Sensors are turned on one by one. The sensor
with the highest contribution turns on first and so on. The contribution or coverage merit is
computed based on the probability of detection of an event by that sensor.
In the literature, an other category of scheduling solutions are given. These solutions are Grid
based algorithms [17–22]. In those algorithms, the covered area is partitioned into rectangular
or hexagonal grids. At any time, only one node is scheduled to be active in each grid. Then,
for those solutions, the size of the grid have to be monitored by just one sensor. Then,
those methods are also based on the round robin technique, but they aim at providing only
1-coverage. The contribution of our proposed protocol, is that it permits k-coverage and also
the coverage density is dynamic and changes in function of the behavior of the targets.
An other kind of scheduling solutions are the coverage based solutions. Those methods tries
to select as little sensor nodes as possible. But those sensors have to ensure a full coverage of
the area or same targets points. The other sensors are inactive. Then those solutions are also
3.3.
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AND ENERGY
SCHEMES
BASED
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WIRELESS
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SCHEME
round robin schemes and focuses on the density of the required coverage. Those solutions can
be classified into two categories. The first ones are centralized solutions, where a central sink
node has the topology of the network and orders to the sensors to be either in active or sleep
status [23–25]. The second ones are distributed approaches [26–32], where each node locally
and periodically checks whether it has to be active or no to ensure the required k-coverage.
The aim is then to ensure k-coverage of the targets or the area to be monitored. When
compared to our solution, the distributed approaches are quite similar because it treats the
k-coverage and the dynamic selection of the active sensors. But, the major contribution of
our work is that the sensors to be active are selected as result of a thorough analysis of the
targets movements.
Deploying the sensors using the strategy presented in Section 2.2.3 and considering the mini-
mal value of P L(d0 ) (corresponding to the maximal initial sensor energy) will ensure initially
an efficient coverage of the monitored area. But, as well as the energy of the sensing nodes
decays, the covered area by the sensors becomes less and the number of deployed sensors will
no longer be sufficient to ensure the required coverage of the monitored area.
3.3.
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SCHEME
This lack should be studied in the initial step of deployment. To ensure that the conceived
network ensures along all its lifetime the coverage of the monitored area, we should not
consider the minimal value of P L(d0 ) where the sensor is fully charged. The density and
number of sensors should be determined in the case where P L(d0 ) is equal to a threshold
value denoted by P L(d0 )T hreshold . The value of P L(d0 )T hreshold represents the maximal value
of path loss above which the sensor node cannot detect any target. Determining the number
of sensors Ntotal relatively to the value P L(d0 )T hreshold will ensure that the deployed sensors
will ensure the required coverage till reaching the sensor minimal energy. These sensors will
be deployed in the monitored area using a poisson process.
In the followings we detail the steps of the proposed sleep scheduling strategy.
We suppose as hypothesis that the sensor’s level of power decreases after functioning along a
time interval equal to τ . τ represents the discharges of the nodes. A sensor node is operational
from its first deployment time at the moment 0 until the moment in which the value of P L(d0 )
reaches P L(d0 )T hreshold .
• Step 1: In the first step of the scheduling scheme, we should determine at each instant
t the required number Nt of sensors to be in active status.
We denote by P L(d0 )t the value of P L(d0 ) at the instant t of the sensor node functioning.
Relatively to the value P L(d0 )t , we can determine the number Nt of the sensors required
to ensure the coverage of the monitored area. Initially we deployed Ntotal sensors which
is ≥ to any value Nt .
• Step 2: After determining the required number of sensors Nt , we will partition the
Ntotal sensors into sets of Nt sensors. The Nt sensors should be selected while ensuring
that they are distributed into sets by a poisson process. The number of sets NSets,t at
time t are given by the following formula.
Ntotal
NSets,t = (3.1)
Nt
• Step 3: In the previous step, we decomposed the sensors into NSets,t sets. These
sets will not operate at the same time but will be scheduled using TDMA repartition
3.4.
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3. SCHEDULING
EVALUATION
SCHEMES
OF THE
FOR ENERGY
WIRELESS
BASED
SENSOR
SCHEDULING
NETWORKS
meaning that at a duration time equal to τ only the senors belonging to one set are in
active status and all the others in sleep status. As we presented previously τ is the slot
of time in which the power of the battery decreases. When τ time elapses, the value
of P L(d0 ) changes which necessitates a new decomposition into sets because the area
covered by a sensor has changed.
If the sensors were not divided into sets, all of them will operate at the same time
and in one slot time τ all the sensors deployed will be discharged. Using the proposed
scheduling strategy, the sensors are divided into NSets,t groups that operates separately
in successive NSets,t time slots. The energy of all the sensors will decrease after NSets,t ∗τ
instead of τ . Then each division into sets extends the life time of the networks by
(NSets,t − 1) ∗ τ .
The previous presented three steps are repeated at regular time intervals separated by τ .
Those time instants represents a variation from the initial value of P L(d0 ) (at the deployment
time before any discharge of the battery power) until we reach the last value of P L(d0 ). When
P L(d0 ) reaches the value P L(d0 )T hreshold , all the Ntotal sensors are used and partitioned in a
unique set of sensors. At every level of power, the sensors are assigned to sets synchronized
using TDMA. A summary of the proposed scheduling algorithm is illustrated by algorithm 2.
• When scheduling the sensors, the active nodes must give a good and efficient quality
of coverage without having congestion due to a big number of sensors. To evaluate the
quality of coverage we measured the ALUL [3];
• The scheduling algorithm must prolong the lifetime of the network which is the first
goal of a scheduling solution.
As presented in the previous section, the sensor battery power decays in relation with time.
When the power decays, the characteristic value of path loss at a reference distance increases,
which means the coverage range of the sensor decreases. We consider that P L(d0 ) increases
after one unit slot time τ . Table 3.1 represents the variation of P L(d0 ).
3.4.
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PERFORMANCE
3. SCHEDULING
EVALUATION
SCHEMES
OF THE
FOR ENERGY
WIRELESS
BASED
SENSOR
SCHEDULING
NETWORKS
For all the cases, the number of sensors is computed using the deployment method presented
in [33]. This method considers the characteristics of radio environment such as P L(d0 ), n
and χσ .
This solution gives an excellent quality of coverage but its main demerit is that at most cases
we have an excessive number of sensors. For example in the time period [0,τ ] all the sensors
are used while only a small number of them can ensure the required coverage quality.
In addition, this solution does not provide a long lifetime of the sensor network. For this
example, the whole life time of the network is only 5 × τ , until we reach the last acceptable
value of P L(d0 ) which is equal to P L(d0 )T hreshold .
static and defined from the beginning of the network operation. The sensors are then filled
into sets and remain in them till the end of the lifetime of the network which corresponds to
complete discharge of the sensors. For the considered simulation case, the sensors are divided
into 8 sets of sensors. The result of the simulation is represented by Figure 3.2.
As shown in Figure 3.2, the value of the ALUL increases in relation to time. This is logic,
because at the first deployment, sensors are sufficient for the case where P L(d0 ) is equal to
the first value. But when the time advances, the power of the sensors decreases and relatively
the value of P L(d0 ) increases which means that the sensors’ area of coverage decreases. Due
to the fact that the number of sensors into the sets is fixed, as well as the value of P L(d0 )
becomes greater, the density of the sensors will not be sufficient to give a good quality of
coverage.
The main merit of this method is that it enhances the lifetime of the network when compared
to the lifetime of the previous case. But besides the first slot time, the values of ALUL are
very far from the accepted values which gives a very bad quality of coverage. We can consider
that the sensor network is not serviceable because having a long lifetime is not important if
the network does not ensure its first goal which is a good quality of coverage.
into disjoint sets in relation with the current value of P L(d0 ). This means that the number
of sets is not already fixed like the round robin scheduling case. As mentioned in the specifi-
cations of the scheduling scheme, the number of sensor sets are calculated for each change of
the value of P L(d0 ). This is done to conserve a good density of sensors in each step to ensure
a good quality of coverage.
Figure 3.3 represents the number of sets corresponding to each value of P L(d0 ). The eval-
uation of the ALUL value using the proposed scheduling scheme is represented by Figure
3.4.
the first simulated solution. We can conclude that the proposed solution have a balance
between the two requirements of a scheduling solution. In fact, it enhances the lifetime of the
network while giving a good quality of coverage.
• The prediction model used takes into account the historic movements of the targets to
a certain depth and then reflects the characteristics of the sensed area;
• The scheduling scheme adapts the prediction model parameters relatively to the char-
acteristics of the sensed targets behavior and the nature of the covered area in the
sense that the variation of the movement characteristics are able to inform about the
environment;
• The solution presents a scheduling dynamic repartition of the sensors to ensure a better
optimization of the sensors consumption. At a given instant, we will not try to ensure
a fully k-coverage of the area. The sub areas where the targets will be present with
high probabilities will be k-covered. The sub areas where the targets will be present
but with less probabilities will be k-covered but for a small interval. The other areas in
which no occurrence of targets is estimated will be 1-covered. Then a minimal coverage
of the area will be given to permit both the optimization of the activated sensors and
the detection of any target in any position of the monitored area.
3.5.
CHAPTER
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ON TARGET
SENSOR NETWORKS
MOBILITY
• The core layer includes nodes which are equipped with powerful sensing and transmission
capabilities. Hereinafter, these nodes will be referred to as core nodes. They are able to
acquire and exchange voluminous high-resolution data and perform management tasks
of the WSN. The scheduling task will be done by those sensors. They will in a first step
analyze the behavior of the targets and establish a probabilistic prediction of the targets
presence in the monitored area. Based on this prediction, they will be responsible of
informing the sensors to be either in active or sleep state;
• The sensing layer consists of elementary sensors, whose role is limited to the detection
of the occurred events in the monitored area. The sensing nodes are monitored and
controlled by the core nodes. The sensing nodes will be ordered by the core nodes to
be either in active or sleep status.
Remark. The sensing nodes are considered to be uniformly deployed in the monitored area
providing k-coverage. Any deployment method can be used with the proposed scheduling
scheme.
An example is depicted by Figure 3.6 and illustrates the predicted positions of the target
deduced from the detected positions of the target. The predicted positions indicate that the
sensor Si will detect a target only in the time t5 , then the core node orders the sensor to be
in sleep mode and wake up at the time t5 .
In the literature to follow or predict the movements of a target we have two major strategies
[12]. The first one is the random walk model, that supposes that the targets have not a
behavior and can follow any random direction and velocity. The second method is the Gauss
Markov Model which is more realistic because it determines the deduced movements of the
targets in a uniform manner in relation with the previous movements. In our work, we se-
lected the Gauss Markov model because the random walk model does not reflect a realistic
behavior of the targets and can give false decisions to the scheduling scheme.
We will use the Gauss Markov Mobility model in our scheduling scheme to deduce the move-
ment line of each target depending of the previous detected movements and positions. This
model relates the velocity vi (t0 + ∆t ) and the current direction θi (t0 + ∆t ) at the moment
t0 + ∆t with the previous velocity vi (t0 ) and direction θi (t0 ) at the moment t0 .
The following formula gives the new velocity vi (t0 + ∆t ) relatively to vi (t0 ).
p
vi (t0 + ∆t ) = a ∗ vi (t0 ) + (1 − a) ∗ v̄ + 1 − a2 ∗ Xv (3.2)
The following formula gives the new direction θi (t0 +∆t ) relatively to the previous direction
θi (t0 ).
p
θi (t0 + ∆t ) = θi (t0 ) + 1 − b2 ∗ Xθ , (3.3)
where:
• v̄: is the average velocity in the interval ∆t relatively to the velocity of the target;
3.5.
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MOBILITY
Then, the new positions are given by the following equations 3.4 and 3.5.
the probability that the next velocity is in one of those intervals. The result of this step is
a set of velocity intervals and a probability of each one of those intervals. The probability
is based on the previous detections. We will determine the number of previously observed
velocities for each velocity subinterval. Having the number of all the previous detections, we
will determine the probability of being in this interval.
Let us consider for example the case depicted by the Figure 3.9. The interval [V min, V max]
is divided into three subintervals. For the first interval [Vmin , Vmin +∆V ] we have 5 previously
recorded detections for which the velocity is in this interval. Given that the total number
of detections is 10, the probability that the velocity will be in this interval is 0.5. The same
calculations are done for the other two intervals. The table 3.3 represents the probability of
each sub interval.
The same analysis is done on the previous detected directions of the targets, and we will have
a set of possible intervals of directions. Each interval will have a probability of occurrence.
The Figure 3.10 and table 3.4 illustrates the calculation of the directions probabilities.
3.5.
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MOBILITY
• The subareas for which the probability is superior to the averaged probability. The core
node indicates to the sensors that cover those areas to be active in the interval [t, t + ST ]
of duration ST ;
• The subareas for which the probability is less than the averaged probability. The appari-
tion of targets in these subareas is low probable and then we propose that the sensors
that covers this kind of subareas will not be active for the entire interval [t, t + ST ].
They will be active only in the interval [t, t + S2T ]. Operating at this manner, we will
economize the power of those sensors because they will be active for a small interval.
In the case where the sensors detect a target, they will be in active sensing mode;
• Until now, we have considered only a little part of the area to be covered by the Wireless
Sensor Network. We considered the areas that are probable considering the previous
movements of the targets. But, in the monitored area, many new targets can appear at
any time. Those targets were not considered in the estimation of the next movements
because they were not previously detected. Those areas have to be considered to avoid
the presence of black areas of coverage. So, for the areas that does not belong to one
of the two previous subareas, we propose that those areas be 1-covered. If the sensor
charged of monitoring that area has detected a target, the core node will in that case
activate other sensors to ensure the required k-coverage.
Managing the sensors using this scheduling scheme ensures that the monitored area will be
covered non uniformly depending on the probability of the targets apparition in the subareas.
The areas that are high probable will be always k-covered. For the areas less probable we will
have an alternation in time between partial k-coverage and 1-coverage. And finally the areas
that are Zero probable will be only 1-covered. In case of events apparition in a subarea, more
sensors that cover this area will be ordered to shift to active state to ensure k-coverage.
• the slot time ST duration. As presented below, we will estimate the predicted positions
of the targets at the beginning of each slot time. Also, we evaluate the previous values of
direction and velocity depending on the behavior of the targets during a specific interval
equal to a slot time.
• the historic depth. As mentioned above we will predict the next movements of a target
based on the previous detections (characterized by the direction and velocity). The
historical depth means how many previous detections will be considered in the current
prediction;
• The ∆V is the size of the sub intervals of the [Vmin , Vmax ] interval;
• The ∆Θ is the size of the sub intervals of the [Θ − min, Θmax ] interval;
Having optimized results of the proposed solution is based on a good choice of the values of
these parameters. In the followings we will present the importance of choosing a good value
of the parameters. We will also indicate how the choice of these parameters values will be
done.
3.5.
CHAPTER
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MOBILITY
D̄
SlotT ime = , (3.7)
V̄
where:
• For the velocity, when looking in the previous recorded velocities, we stop when we find
a velocity equal to Zero. In fact, a null velocity means that the target was not moving,
then it began a new displacement. All the previous detections velocities will not be
considered in the estimation of the target position;
• For the direction, every target has a line of sight. When looking in the previous events,
we will stop considering the detected events when the direction is not in the same line of
sight of the other directions. The possible directions are varying in the interval [0,2*π].
Given a direction Θ, the directions in the same Line Of Sight of this direction are in
the quarter centralized around Θ. The decision of the historical depth is presented in
Algorithm 3 where CST is the current slot time.
3.5.
CHAPTER
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FOR BASED
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ON TARGET
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MOBILITY
• The sensors are deployed in area of 1000*1000 m2 . The required coverage quality is 3-
coverage. We considered the deployment solution proposed in [33]. We deployed initially
three sets of sensors. Each set will operate in a slot time and ensures 3 coverage of the
monitored area.
• We considered sensors for which the sensing Range RS = 40meters. For the targets we
considered targets for which the range is equal to 5 meters;
• The lifetime of each sensor is equal to 5 days. The value of the slot time chosen is 15
minutes;
• The targets to be detected by the sensors are deployed as events moving across the
monitored area. We considered different numbers of targets to evaluate the performances
of the proposed scheme in many operating cases.
The number of activated sensors in a slot time is less when considering the proposed protocol.
In fact, when considering the TDMA scheduling scheme, in a given slot time all the area to
be monitored is fully 3 covered. But, for our solution the density of the coverage is variable
within the whole area and depends at first on the movements of the targets.
The other deduction, is that for our solution the averaged number of the activated sensors
increases in relation with the number of the targets. In fact, as presented in the specifications
of the solution, the number of the sub areas fully covered depends on the occurrence and
presence of the targets in those areas. Then, as well as the targets are present as well as more
sensors are needed to ensure additional fully covered areas. But, for the TDMA scheduling
solution, the sensors are activated in a static predetermined manner to ensure a fully covered
area independently of the number and position of the appeared targets. For those reasons,
the averaged number of the activated sensors for the TDMA Round Robin scheme is constant.
For the proposed scheme, the biggest number of the averaged activated sensors will be reached
when considering a large number of the targets. In this worst case, we will have all the area
3.6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE TARGETS MOBILITY BASED
SCHEDULING
CHAPTER 3. SCHEDULING SCHEMES FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
fully covered because the targets are present every where. Then, in the worst case we will
have the same performances than the TDMA scheduling scheme.
To ensure those objectives we propose in this chapter a distributed and dynamic tunnel and
group key management protocol for WSNs called DynTunKey. We introduce a tunneling
approach that takes into account the characteristics of the cryptographic algorithms that are
typically used for WSNs. The most important contributions of the solution presented are the
listed in the following:
• The proposed approach adapts to heterogeneous WSNs. In other terms, instead of using
1-to-1 tunnels, we rather build many-to-many tunnels. We will have a unique tunnel
55
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.1. INTRODUCTION TO THE CHAPTER
TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
for many sensors communicating together. That is advantageous because we will ensure
several communications between multiple nodes through the same security tunnel;
• In our work, we introduced a new concept which is the CSA (Cluster Security As-
sociation). The CSA is an abstraction of the established many-to-many tunnels and
represents shared security attributes between many sensor nodes.
• In the proposed approach, the tunnel key used for the encryption of the communicated
data will not have an infinite validity time and will be changed periodically. This
characteristic is advantageous for the robustness of the security protocol and protects
against nodes compromise;
• In the proposed approach the key is not pre-deployed at the sensors, but is dynamically
generated. The communicating sensors contribute in a secure manner in this generation.
Then we avoid a full centralized management scheme;
• The proposed protocol provides for a dynamic integration of new sensor at any time
to the global architecture without compromising the security needed. A new appearing
sensor is automatically inserted into the communicating nodes without the need of
updates in the other nodes.
The proposed protocol permits to all the sensors to exchange directly secured data. This is
useful in many applications that necessitate the exchange of data between all the sensors. In
particular:
• Military target tracking application needs such communication. When using a group
key each sensor can report its gathered data using the group key to the other sensors.
This is advantageous and permits collaboration between the sensors without the need
of central node;
• Firefighting applications. In this case the sensors are deployed with the firefighter. If
all the sensors have the same shared key, any one of the sensors can directly send data
to other sensors. And then the collaboration between the members of the team will be
easier by having an efficient dialog between the sensors that represent the firefighter.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 4.2, we will present some of
the most important security solutions and key distribution schemes used for Wireless Sensor
Networks. Section 4.3 describes the global security architecture that will be used to protect
heterogeneous WSNs. The tunnel initialization phase is addressed in Section 4.4. A protocol
for distributed negotiation and management of the Cluster Security Associations required to
establish the many-to-many secure tunnels is introduced in Section 4.5. In Section 4.6, we will
analyze the robustness of the proposed tunneling protocol. Section 4.7 presents the simulation
model including the deployment of the sensors and the mobility models for the targets. In the
same section, we present the results of some simulations to compare our protocol to recent key
management solutions for Wireless Sensor Networks. The same section assesses the efficiency
of the proposed protocol and compares it to the classical tunneling IPSec approach in terms
of communication and processing overhead. Finally, Section 4.8 concludes the paper.
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.2. RELATED WORKS TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
• The first problem with that solution is that n-1 keys have to be stored at each sensor
node, where n is the number of the nodes in the network. So a large memory space is
used to store all the keys. For our solution, only one key is used between a set of sensors
that belongs to the same group;
• A compromise of a node, will compromise its communication for all the network, because
this sensor node stores in its memory all the network keys. This is not the case in our
solution because the key is always renewed;
• The other major lack of this solution is that it does not permit a simple group com-
munication. In fact, if a sensor needs to send data to many sensors, it have to do this
in many messages. Many copies of the message have to be sent directly to the sensors
using the pairwise shared key with each one of the sensors. This is impractical when
the number of the sensors belonging to the group become larger. For our solution we
have only one key shared with all the sensors. According to this, a node sends the data
only one time using the shared group key;
• An other problem with this solution is the add of a new sensor to the list of the com-
municating node. In fact, in those solutions all the keys are predeployed in the sensors.
Then to add a new sensor we have to update the keys stored in all the sensors to add
the key that will be used with the new sensor. For our solution, we will show that a
new sensor is dynamically integrated in a secured communicating group.
Other probabilistic solutions were presented and used for WSNs. Those solutions are qualified
as Random Key Distribution Solutions. In the basic random key scheme [37] Eschenauer and
Gligor introduced a probabilistic key predistribution scheme for sensor networks. This solution
is based on three steps which are respectively: the key predistribution, the determination of
the shared key phase and the path key establishment. In the key predistribution phase,initially
a large pool of P keys are chosen and each sensor will be equipped with a key ring stored
in its memory. The key ring is consisted of randomly chosen keys from the set P. Then
the neighboring sensors will find which is the common key in their rings. This key will
be used to secure the data sent between the two sensors. This is done in the shared key
establishment phase. The last phase is the path-key establishment phase. In fact, this solution
is probabilistic because it is not guaranteed that all the combination of the pair nodes shares
a common key in their randomly chosen rings. Then a path-key have to be assigned for those
sensor nodes through two or more links established at the end of the second phase. This
solution when compared with the previous solutions necessitates less amount of memory in
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.2. RELATED WORKS TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
the sensors because each sensor does not store a key with all the other sensors.
Inspired by this work, additional random key predistribution schemes have been proposed
in [38–43]. The main addition of those works is to increase the resilience of the network
against node capture and ensure a smaller need for communication intermediate paths. Those
solutions also optimizes the required operation time and the number of the stored keys. But,
despite all the added techniques, it is always a probabilistic solution. The major lacks of those
solutions for our context are presented in the following.
• such as the previous kind of solutions, those ones stores a lot amount of keys in the
memory of each sensor;
• this solution does not permit direct group communication between sensors, because the
links established are 1-to-1 links. Also those links are not directly established because
it is impossible to find a shared key between all the pairs of nodes. Then if a sensor
needs to send data to a group of nodes, it has to do it in a separate manner for each
sensor.
An other category of the keys generation solutions are the centralized key management
schemes. In those schemes a central node called the KDC (Key Distribution Center) con-
trols and generates the keys used by the sensors. One of the protocol functioning at this
manner is the LKHW protocol proposed in [44]. In this scheme, the Core Node is treated as
a KDC and all keys are logically distributed in a tree rooted at the base station.
• In this solution the sensors do not contribute in the elaboration of the keys. Then a
compromise of the central node compromises all the network chain;
• An other lack in this solution is that the keys are distributed in a tree manner. Then
to have a communication between a set of nodes, we do not certainly have a direct
secure link between them. Then a group communication is difficult to be proceeded
in this schemes because it will be done as many separate secured connections in a tree
communication manner;
• Having keys distributed in a tree manner does not facilitate the regeneration of the keys
and the integration of a new sensor node in the communicating trusted group of sensors.
In PIKE [45], Chan and Perrig propose a solution that is not a fully centralized solution. The
basic idea in PIKE is to use sensor nodes as trusted intermediaries to establish shared keys
between nodes. In this solution, they proposed that the key will be established between two
sensors through a common trusted third node somewhere within the sensor network. For this
solution initial keys are distributed such as for any two nodes A and B, there is a node C that
shares a key with both A and B. Therefore, the key establishment protocol between A and
B can be securely routed through C. In this solution, the establishment of the key is secured
and the number of initially deployed keys at the sensor is less than the previous solutions.
But, it is not suitable for group communication, because its lower probable that all the nodes
of the same group have a common trusted node. The same lacks of the previous categories of
solutions are present with this kind of solution.
The LEAP protocol described by Zhu et al. [46] takes an approach that utilizes multiple keying
mechanisms. In this scheme four kinds of messages are established between the different types
of sensors.
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.2. RELATED WORKS TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
• A group key that is shared by all the nodes in the network (predistributed);
LEAP protocol permits several kinds of communications depending on the needed commu-
nicating nodes. This solution provides a many-to-many tunnel protocol like our proposed
solution. But when compared with our solution, it has some lacks:
• The number of the deployed keys at the sensors is large since every pair of sensor nodes
needs a key;
• The keys used for several kinds of communication are predeployed into the sensors. This
solution uses a static key and does not propose a dynamic generation of the key. For
the solution we proposed, the key is renewed after a validity interval;
• In this solution the keys used for cluster communication are predefined. Then this
solution does not permit a dynamic belonging to the groups. When a sensor needs to
change from a group, the key stored in its memory have to be updated and replaced
by the cluster key of the new group. That solution is not practical because it needs
direct static intervention with each group change. For the proposed solution, the group
key is regenerated automatically at periodic times. Then if a sensor changes from a
group it is automatically integrated in the secured new group when it contributes to the
elaboration of the group key.
The protocol NSKM presented in [47], is a protocol that manages different kinds of keys such
as the LEAP protocol [46]. The difference is that the cluster keys are calculated by every
node within particular cluster. Despite this change, the main lacks of the LEAP protocol are
the lacks of this protocol, in particular the absence of a rekeying solution.
In [48], the authors propose a solution called RDKM(Real-Time Dynamic key Management).
The main feature of this solution is that it establishes a real-time rekey mechanism based
on the search-triggered splay tree architecture. It designs and realizes the rekey mechanism
based on the splay tree, which can provide random function to generate new keys and make
the dynamic key management feasible. In this solution, the cluster heads organize the keys
of their members into a splay tree-architecture key pool. The cluster head shares with each
one of the member nodes belonging to its cluster a pairwise key. Those keys are established
through messages shared between the sensors and the corresponding cluster heads. This so-
lution presents an efficient storage and rekeying solution, but it does not ensure direct group
communication between several sensors because the sensors do not share a unique cluster key.
The Table 4.1 illustrates the comparison between the proposed solution and the previously
cited solutions.
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.2. RELATED WORKS TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
• For the proposed security protocol DynTunKey, in addition to its general functionalities,
the core node will be responsible of the management and the establishment of the group
key and tunnels;
• In addition to their sensing and reporting rules, the sensing nodes will contribute in the
construction of the tunnels and the group key.
In hostile scenarios, relaying of critical data must be secure. Since data would be relayed
through many nodes, care must be taken to ensure that the data aggregated at intermediate
node is not corrupted. When receiving an alert message, the core node should also accurately
verify the identity of the originating sensor node. In fact, the adversary can deploy sensor
nodes that can deliver false information to the analysis center. Moreover, the legitimate sensor
nodes are prone to be corrupted, because of weak physical protection, so as to be under the
control of the enemy. Therefore, it appears that authentication and confidentiality are among
the most crucial security properties that should be fulfilled when implementing an hierarchical
infrastructure. Encrypted tunnels constitute a promising alternative to address these needs
since they have been widely used in many contexts in traditional networks.
2. The proposed key generation method includes multiple phases that can be organized
according to the context in which the WSN is implemented. To implement this func-
tionality, we consider the group Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol introduced in
[50];
3. We will no longer use asymmetric encryption because the exchanged tunnel group key
is a symmetric key. This is advantageous because the use of the symmetric encryption
needs less resources than asymmetric encryption. It is then well adapted to the context
of the Wireless Sensor Networks;
The basic steps of the proposed security scheme are given below:
1. The core node periodically sends messages to the sensor nodes asking for new informa-
tion. The sensors that have gathered new information will send reply messages;
2. The core node builds sensor clusters based on the location of the detected events, in the
sense that a cluster will include the sensor nodes that have detected the same event;
3. The CSA is set up for every cluster. The tunnel establishment process is authenticated
using threshold public key cryptography. The nodes of the cluster share the same
symmetric group key using group Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
In the following sections, we describe the protocols that we have designed to support the
implementation of the aforementioned security process.
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.4. INITIAL AND AUTHENTICATION
TUNNELING
EXCHANGES
MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
• Step 1: At this step, the first message INIT is sent by the Core Node to all the
nodes in its coverage area to announce the beginning of an initial exchange phase. This
message is sent periodically. By the nature of the Wireless sensor Network, the message
is broadcasted to all the senor nodes.
{Type of message , INIT}
Moreover, the Core Node picks a random natural number Rc. This number is the con-
tribution of the Core Node in the group key generated.
• Step 2: The sensing nodes will participate to the construction of the CSA. When
receiving the INIT message, every sensor node Si picks a random integer Ri. Then,
the sensor node calculates g S∗Ri , joins its Identifier to this value and sends the whole
message to the Core Node. In this message, the sensor also sends its digital signature.
The field AUTH is a digest of the message and is signed by the sensor using its private
key KSi. This ensures the integrity and the authentication of the sensor node.
• Step 3: At this step, the Core Node has received the contribution of all the sensors.
For each message, it verifies the integrity and the authenticity of the originating sensor
node using the common public key π. When verifying the identity of the sensor nodes,
only the trusted sensors will contribute to the elaboration of the Group Key. If an in-
truder tries to send a contribution, it will not be authenticated and then its contribution
will not be considered and will be rejected from the group.
Based on the identifiers of the sensors and relatively to their deployment locations, the
Core Node will organize the sensors into groups. Each group is the set of the sensors
that detect the same event in the same zone. For each group, a common tunnel and a
group key will be calculated.
• Step 4: At this step, the core node has received the contribution of all the sensors
and classified them into groups. If the Core Node classified the sensors into N groups,
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.4. INITIAL AND AUTHENTICATION
TUNNELING
EXCHANGES
MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
then the core node will perform the following tasks for each group in a separated manner.
For each value received g S∗Ri , the Core Node computes the resulting value (g S∗Ri )Rc =
g S∗Ri∗Rc . The core node has picked the number Rc in the first step. Then, the Core
Node sends to all the sensors belonging to the same group those values with the identi-
fiers of the sensors. The message sent is represented below.
The payload AUTH is the digest of the message. This digest is encrypted using the
private key of the Core Node KCN. The payload AUTH and the signature ensure both
integrity of the message and authentication of the core node.
• Step 5: At this step of the exchanges, each sensor can calculate the Group Key for
the cluster to which it belongs. When receiving the previous presented message, each
sensor verifies the authentication to check if the message is sent by the Core Node or by
an intruder, this is done using the public key of the core node. The sensor checks also
the integrity of the message to be sure that it has not been modified. After those checks,
every sensor node looks for its identifier and extracts the calculated value corresponding
to it. For example, the sensor Si will consider the value g S∗Ri∗Rc and removes its secret
value Ri from it to obtain g S∗Rc . Then it calculates the Group Key which is done by
the following equation.
This operation is performed by every sensor and then all the sensors have the same
shared key. The Core Node also calculates the group key GKDH which will be the
session key for that Group of the sensors.
Now, the initial exchange has finished. At the end of those exchanges, we have two major
results. First, those messages authenticate the Core Node and the sensors and then only the
trust nodes will participate in the establishment of the secure channels. Secondly, after those
exchanges the nodes have shared a secret Group key that will be used in further communica-
tions and sessions.
Those initial exchanges are illustrated by Figure 4.2. In this figure, the sensors S1, S2 and S3
have detected the same events but the sensor S4 does not detect any event. When receiving
the Init message, the sensor S4 does not send a response but the other sensors exchange all
the messages and complete all the steps from step 1 to step 5 to establish the Group Key.
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.5. CLUSTER SA NEGOTIATION EXCHANGES
TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
Type of message indicates the type of the sent message. For this case, the node
who receives the messages detects that it is request to choose a cryptographic suite.
Mid is the message identifier.
SAi states the cryptographic algorithms supported by the Core Node for encryption
and signature.
– The previous two payloads are encrypted using the previously negotiated Key
GKDH. This ensures the confidentiality of the transmitted data.
digest is a digest of the global message and is encrypted using the negotiated key
GKDH.
– This payload ensures the integrity and authentication of the sent data.
• Step 2: At this time, all the sensors have received the supported algorithms sent by the
Core Node. Each sensor decrypts the received message using the symmetric Key GKDH,
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.5. CLUSTER SA NEGOTIATION EXCHANGES
TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
and then verifies the integrity of the message using the same key. Every sensor chooses
its preferences of cryptographic suites and responds by sending a message in this format.
Mid is the message identifier sent by the core node in the previous message.
ID sensor is the identifier of the sensor which sends the response.
SAr states the cryptographic suite chosen from the offered choices sent in the payload
SAi.
– These three payloads are encrypted using the Group Key GKDH.
digest is a digest calculated and encrypted using the key GKDH.
• Step 3: At this step, the Core Node has received all the responses from the sensors
and performs some tasks:
– it decrypts the message using the symmetric group key GKDH;
– it calculates the digest of the sent payload;
– it decrypts the payload {digest}GKDH using the key GKDH;
– it compares the calculated digest and the received one to verify the integrity of the
message.
If those tests are positive, the sensor is then authenticated and can participate to the
Cluster Security Association CSA.
• the key of the session GKDH already established in the initial exchanges;
The characteristics of the CSA (despite the key) are then sent to all the sensors and are
encrypted using the previous Group Key GKDH. The payload {digest}GKDH ensures the
integrity and authenticity of the Core Node. The message sent is represented below.
At this final step of exchanges, each sensor node has the cryptographic suite, the list of trusted
sensors and the session key. An illustration of the CSA establishment protocol is represented
in Figure 4.3.
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.6. ROBUSTNESS OF THE ALGORITHM
TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
This message is sent by each sensor to the core node to present its contribution in the
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.6. ROBUSTNESS OF THE ALGORITHM
TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
group key.
– The authentication is verified because the field AUTH is encrypted using the private
key of the sensor KSi;
– The integrity is done by the field AUTH which is a digest of the original message.
This part cannot be modified by an intruder because it necessitates the use of the
private key;
– Either the original data is sent in clear mode but the confidentiality is ensured.
An intruder cannot use this information. The important information sent is the
contribution of the sensor which is gS∗Ri . But the values of S and g are secret
values and are deployed in trusted nodes and are unknown for the intruder. Then
it cannot separate the value gS∗Ri into separate correct values of S and Ri.
• The message: {[Identifier of S1, gS∗R1∗Rc ],..., [Identifier of Si, gS∗Ri∗Rc ],...,
[Identifier of Sn, gS∗Rn∗Rc ]} , {AUTH}KCN
This message is the message in which the Core Node sends all the contributions of the
sensors to all the nodes. Those values will be used to calculate the group key.
– The authentication is verified because the field AUTH is encrypted using the private
key of the Core Node KCN. Then an intruder cannot sign the message using this
key;
– The integrity is done by the field AUTH which is a digest of the original message.
This part cannot be modified by an intruder because it necessitates the use of the
private key of the Core Node;
– Either the original data is sent in clear mode but the confidentiality is ensured.
An intruder cannot use this information. The important information sent is the
contributions of the sensors which are the sets of gS∗Ri∗Rc . But the values of S
and g are secret values and are deployed in trusted nodes and are unknown for the
intruder. Then the latter cannot separate the value gS∗Ri∗Rc into separate correct
values of S, Ri and Rc.
• The messages:
– {Mid, SAi}GKDH {digest}GKDH
– {list of sensors , cryptographic suite}GKDH , {digest}GKDH
– {Mid,ID Sensor,SAr}GKDH }, {digest}GKDH
In those messages, the Core Node and the sensors establish the preferences for the CSA.
Those three messages use the same techniques to ensure the security requirements.
– The authentication is verified because the field digest is encrypted using the group
key. This key is only known by the trusted sensors;
– The integrity is ensured by the field digest which is a digest of the original message.
This part cannot be modified by an intruder because it necessitates the use of the
group key;
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.6. ROBUSTNESS OF THE ALGORITHM
TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
– The message sent is encrypted using the group key. An intruder cannot decrypt
the data because the group key has been distributed in a secure manner.
For the first compromise method the attacker will destroy the sensor to be in a denial of
service. For the process of the group key establishment, if a node is not operating the group
key and the CSA will be correctly established. In fact, the list of the sensors that should
collaborate to establish the group key is not predetermined and any trusted nodes can par-
ticipate in the establishment of the key in a secured manner. Then, if a node is destroyed the
proposed key establishment process is not affected.
The second type of a node compromise is a trial of the sensors content reading. The aim of
this compromise is to use the node ID and the keys stored in the sensor node. If this is done,
the intruder will be able to participate in the key establishment process. To prevent this kind
of compromise, we propose two preventive mechanisms:
• For the first protection solution, the memory contents stored in the sensors should be
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
encrypted. In that case if an intruder tries to access the content it should decrypt it. If
we use a strong cryptographic scheme, the attacker will not be able to read in clear the
ciphered content;
• For the second protection solution, we propose a physical protection of the nodes by
the use of self destructive sensors. This kind of sensors is automatically destructed at
any attempt of an external sensor manipulation or attempt of content reading. In that
case, if any intruder tries to read the content the node will be automatically destructed
and then the memory that contains the cryptographic keys and security information is
flushed.
By the mean of these two protection mechanisms, the intruder will not be able to use the
content of the sensor either for sending data or participating in the group establishment
process because the information stored in the sensor will not be available.
Starting from the initial distribution of the targets at time t0 , we assume that each
target performs a 2-D random walk movement. With this mobility model, each target
Ti travels from its current location to a new location by randomly choosing a direction
θ ∈ [0..2∗π] and a distance di ∈ [dmin ..dmax ] in a prefixed time interval ∆t . For our case,
each target will have its own distance and direction in each time interval. Considering
the initial positions Xi (t0 ) and Yi (t0 ) of a particular target at time t0 , the formulas 4.1
and 4.2 give the new position of a target Ti after the random movement.
where di (t0 + ∆t ) and θi (t0 + ∆t ) are random variables and represent respectively the
distance and direction of displacement that occurs in the period between t0 and t0 + ∆t .
This mobility is done in every time interval ∆t and for every target Ti .
The Random Walk model is a pure random model. In fact, for this model there is not
a logic moving of the targets. The Gauss Markov model is considered to be a more
realistic mobility model. In fact, it relates the current displacement distance di (t0 + ∆t )
and the current direction θi (t0 + ∆t ) with its previous displacement di (t0 ) and direction
θi (t0 ). So this model takes into account the previous movements of each target and then
we will have a more realistic mobility path either in direction or speed.
The formula 4.3 gives the new displacement di (t0 + ∆t ) relatively to di (t0 )
p
di (t0 + ∆t ) = a ∗ di (t0 ) + (1 − a) ∗ d¯ + 1 − a 2 ∗ Xd , (4.3)
where:
– a: is the tuning parameter ∈ [0..1];
¯ is the average displacement distance in the interval ∆t relatively to the speed
– d:
of the target;
– Xd : is a random variable of the Gaussian distribution.
The formula 4.4 gives the new direction θi (t0 + ∆t ) relatively to the previous direction
θi (t0 )
p
θi (t0 + ∆t ) = θi (t0 ) + 1 − b2 ∗ Xθ , (4.4)
where:
– b: is the tuning parameter ∈ [0..1];
– Xθ : is a random variable of the Gaussian distribution.
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
Then, the new positions are given using equations 4.5 and 4.6.
• we deployed targets in the covered area. The targets are periodically moving using the
random walk and the gauss markov mobility protocols‘;
• As used in the simulation of the previous works, the size of each key is 20 bytes.
For each one of the security protocols, we evaluated the storage space required for the network
keys used. We have considered two scenarios corresponding to the mobility models.
Figure 4.4 represents the evaluation of the security protocols when the targets moves using
the Random Walk Model. This figure illustrates an evaluation of the key storage space for
DynTunKey and the protocols MAKM [54], NSKM [47] and RDKM [48].
Figure 4.5 represents the evaluation of the key storage space when the deployed targets moves
using the Gauss Markov Model. Such as the case for the random walk simulations,we evalu-
ated the key storage space for all the keys needed for DynTunKey and the protocols MAKM
[54], NSKM [47] and RDKM [48].
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
- The first deduction in those simulations, is that the proposed protocol DynTunKey out-
performs all the other solutions regarding to the Key Storage Space metric. The proposed
protocol gives good performances either considering the Gauss Markov mobility or the Ran-
dom Walk mobility. This result is logic, because for DynTunKey the number of the keys
needed and stored in the nodes of the network does not depend only of the number of the
sensors but depends directly of the behavior and occurrence of the targets in the monitored
area. In fact, all the mentioned solutions establish keys for all the network nodes despite
the reporting necessity meaning that the key storage space is always maximal. Then, as a
consequence the performances of DynTunKey will be better or at least will give the same
performances of the other protocols when all the sensors establish keys with the Core Node.
- An other remark is that as well as the sensors density is greater as well as the shift between
the Storage space for our solution and the other ones become greater. For example, when
considering the 1-coverage and 2-coverage densities, the key storage space for DynTunKey is
closer to the values of the other protocols. But, when the value of k becomes greater, the
key storage space is larger. In fact, as said previously the number of created and stored keys
in DynTunKey is dynamic and depends not only of the number of the sensors but also is
established only for the sensors that have to report their detections. And then, the number of
the keys is adapted to the number of the events that occurs in the monitored area. But, for
the other solutions, the number of the stored keys depends only of the number of the sensors
and then the relation between the number of the sensors and the number of the keys is direct.
As a general conclusion, DynTunKey gives good performances when compared to the other
protocols in all the sensors density cases and targets behavior.
Figure 4.6.: The Number of tunnels for the Random Walk Model
Figure 4.6 represents the variation of the created tunnels for each one of the protocols con-
sidering the Random Walk mobility model.
Figure 4.7.: The Number of tunnels for the Gauss Markov Model
Figure 4.7 represents the variation of the created tunnels for each one of the protocols con-
sidering the Gauss Markov mobility model.
The two Figures 4.6 and 4.7 shows that the number of the created tunnels for DynTunKey
are less than those created for IPSec.
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
In fact, when considering the IPSec protocol, each event will be reported in a separate man-
ner. And then, the number of tunnels is equal to the number of the detected and reported
events. But for our protocol, the events are gathered and reported at the end of each reporting
period. Also, all the sensors that belong to the same zone establish a unique tunnel. And
then, for DynTunKey, a set of sensors (belonging to the same zone) and a set of events (that
occur in the same period of key validity) share the same tunnel.
- Considering those facts, it is logical that the number of tunnels for IPSec is very greater
than those for the proposed protocol DynTunKey. As a conclusion, this part of simulations
shows that despite the model of mobility and behavior of targets, the proposed protocol gives
a better performance than IPSec when considering the number of created tunnels.
- It comes also from those simulations that the number of tunnels decreases according to the
period. In fact, we considered the same events with the same mobility, and when the value
of period is greater a more number of events are reported using the same Shared Group Key.
So as well as the value of the period is greater as well as we have less number of tunnels.
But, we have to remember that a great value of key validity period means that the Group
Key will be used for a longer time which is not suitable for the security protocol robustness.
So we have to choose a median value of the period to ensure both a small number of tunnels
and an accepted value of Group Key periodicity regeneration.
The table 4.2 represents the standard deviation of the number of tunnels. We measured the
standard deviation of the tunnels number for the small values of the period and the big ones.
In this table we can observe that for the two models of mobility, the variation of the tun-
nels number is great when considering the small values of the period (ranging from 1 to 6
slots). But for the big values of the period, the difference between two successive periods
is not big when compared with variation between the small values of the period. In fact,
when considering the smallest values of the period between 1 and 6 slots times we will have a
standard deviation equal to 1860 for Random Walk and equal to 1167 for the Gauss Markov
model. But for the biggest values of the period in the interval from 7 to 14 slot times, the stan-
dard deviation is equal to 160 for the random walk model and 106 for the gauss markov model.
So from the experiments and results, we can determine the best value of the period. For the
simulated case, we can select the value of the period in the first interval [1..6] that minimizes
the value of the number of tunnels when compared with the previous period. Also the most
adequate period is the one from which we will not have big variance with the tunnels number of
the next periods. When considering this value, we can ensure two major proposed advantages
of DynTunKey which are respectively the smallest value of the key period validity (to decrease
the risk of an attack) and almost the minimal value of number of tunnels that can be reached
which is one of the principal goals of DynTunKey.
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
Figure 4.8.: The Number of messages for the Random Walk Model
The variation of the number of exchanged messages when considering the Gauss Markov mo-
bility model is represented by the following Figure.
Figure 4.9.: The Number of messages for the Gauss Markov Model
It comes from Figures 4.8 and 4.9 that the number of messages decreases according to the
period. For the two mobility models, when comparing DynTunKey protocol and IPSec, the
number of messages exchanged to establish all the tunnels for DynTunKey is less than those
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.7. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
This is a logical result because for IPSec every event is reported at a separated manner and
then messages are exchanged for every event detected to establish a dedicated tunnel. But
for DynTunKey, many events detected by a sensor node are reported on a same tunnel. So,
there is only one exchange of tunnel establishment messages for the proposed protocol. This
establishment is performed at the beginning of the key validity interval. Hence, we can deduce
that the proposed protocol outperforms IPSec when considering the communication overhead
resulting from the establishment of the encrypted tunnels.
As well as for the number of established tunnels, we represent in table 4.3 the standard
deviation of the number of messages. We represent the standard deviation for small and
big period values, when considering the two mobility models. The same conclusions can be
deduced. For the small values of period we have a big variance between the successive values,
but for the big values of the periods the deviation is less than the one for the small values.
Then, the chosen value have to be in the small values of period. This value will verify the two
criterions. At a first point it is smaller enough to reduce the key validity interval and it gives
also a remarkable variance of the number of messages when compared with the next values.
Figure 4.10.: The Latency time for the Random Walk Model
We developed two programs, the first one implements the exchange of messages as described
in the specifications of DynTunKey. The second program implements the exchange of the
messages to establish an IPSec tunnel. The same list of events is used for both protocols
CHAPTER 4. DYNTUNKEY: A DYNAMIC DISTRIBUTED GROUP KEY
4.8. CONCLUSION OF THE CHAPTER
TUNNELING MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
and we considered such as the two previous simulations the Randow Walk and Gauss Markov
mobility models. The two programs were executed on the same laptop and we measured the
total time of execution of each program. The results of this simulation are represented in
Figures 4.10 and Figure 4.11.
Figure 4.11.: The Latency time for the Gauss Markov Model
Despite the mobility model, the time required to establish the tunnels for DynTunKey is less
than the time required for IPSec. This is a logical result because when considering IPSec,
the tunnel are created in separate manner because each sensor exchanges its specific messages
with the core node. But for the proposed protocol DynTunKey, only at the end of each period
many sensors exchange simultaneously messages with the core node to establish a common
tunnel or CSA. Also, the number of tunnels in DynTunKey protocol are less than those for
IPSec and then the time of creation of tunnels will be certainly lower.
Table 4.4 represents the standard deviation of the Latency time. And for the same reasons,
the best chosen period have to be in the small values. Then, a median value of the regeneration
period will guarantee a small key validity interval, an optimal value of the tunnels number,
an optimal number of messages and reduced establishment latency.
resources than an asymmetric solution. In addition to the inputs in terms of security, the
proposed protocol is useful in many applications that necessitate a secure communication
between all the nodes such as military target tracking or firefighting collaborating team. We
conducted some simulations to evaluate the performance of the proposed protocol and we have
shown that the proposed approach considerably reduces the key storage space, the processing
and communication overhead. In those simulations, we considered two mobility models of the
targets to show that the DynTunKey gives good results in all the cases.
Border Surveillance using
sensor based thick-lines
5
5.1. Introduction to the chapter
In this chapter we will propose a border surveillance system based on WSNs. The WSNs are
used in many applications covering both military and civilian domains. The first goal of the
use of a WSN-based solution is to monitor a particular event in a sensed area. In particular,
a surveillance application monitors either an area or a borderline. One of the most recent
surveillance applications of WSNs is the border surveillance application. This kind of appli-
cations is becoming critical due to the increase of the risks of intrusion on borders. Due to the
global risks near their borders, governments are frightened of the appearance of intruders on
their borders, either for unauthorized importation of goods or for terrorism actions. Then all
governments have demonstrated a need of a good and efficient surveillance system to control
suspect activities on borders.
Typically, WSNs within these applications are based on small devices connected through ra-
dio links and are able to detect the presence of intruders in the monitored area. However,
a good monitoring necessitates certain coverage requirement to avoid shadowing areas and
missing measurements. Based on these facts, the sensors have to be efficiently deployed to
provide a good quality of coverage. An efficient deployment of sensors has to satisfy many
requirements including the degree of coverage, network connectivity, and network maintain-
ability. For these reasons one of the most important tasks in implementing a WSN for Border
Surveillance is the deployment phase.
• a global network architecture for border surveillance based on three types of components
deployed on a thick line architecture set up along the border;
• a deployment strategy to comply with many constraints on the network operation, in-
cluding coverage maintenance, connectivity preservation, and routing quality of service;
80
5.2. RELATED
CHAPTER 5. BORDER
WORKS SURVEILLANCE USING SENSOR BASED THICK-LINES
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 will be presented works that
treats the border surveillance applications and the routing protocols adapted for adhoc net-
works. The architecture of the network and the different node features are introduced in
Section 5.3. Section 5.4 describes the detailed steps of the deployment strategy proposed.
In Section 5.5, we present a routing scheme to be used in our framework to permit efficient
communication between the several deployed nodes. Section 5.6 assesses the efficiency of
the proposed deployment and routing protocol through some conducted simulations. Finally,
Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
deployment is useful in theoretical analysis but remains unrealistic in the real deployment
where a non-uniform placement is obtained do to several environmental factors. Saipulla et
al. [56] assessed that barrier coverage could be obtained under line based deployment and
outperforms that of Poisson model. K-barrier coverage has been the focus of [60], S. Kumar et
al. proposed an algorithm to determine whether a belt region is k-barrier coverage or not and
introduced the notions of weak and strong barrier coverage. Weak barrier coverage detects
intrusion attempts when trespassers go over a barrier of stealthy sensors, however, strong
barrier coverage detects intrusion when even sensors are not stealthy.
Most of the proposed frameworks for border surveillance assumed a line-based network where
barrier or k-barrier coverage is ensured. Under this assumption, we drastically reduce the
number of needed sensors to monitor a given border, this amelioration is obtained at the
expense of the performance of the network. In other words, line-based deployment at best
ensures the detection of all intrusion attempts, but will not allow to take an internal deci-
sion about tracking the intruders. Furthermore, the sensor nodes placement which follows a
uniform distribution [61, 62] is not realistic due to environmental factors and sensor nodes
deployment process (air-dropping, throwing from aircraft).
Another limitation of the proposed models is the silence about the connectivity issue which is
closely related to coverage issue. To enhance the performances of border surveillance WSN, it
is recommended to deal with connected-coverage. In the presented deployment solution, we
will deal with connected coverage in border surveillance WSN under the full coverage model
and we will also treat the routing process which has not been addressed in the presented
works.
The reactive protocols: this kind of protocols establishes and updates the routes of the
network on demand (when needed). The most known reactive protocols are presented in the
followings.
• AODV (Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector)[64]: When a source node requires a route,
it creates routes on the fly and maintained as long as the source is needed. For multicast
groups AODV builds a tree. The wireless nodes store an entry route to each node of the
network. When the network is very dense these tables will be very voluminous. AODV
requires little energy consumption and does not require high computing power, so it is
suitable for use with WSNs.
• DSR (Dynamic Source Routing)[65]: DSR is similar to AODV given that the routes
are established on a demand when a node have data to be transmitted. However, it
uses source routing instead of relying on the routing table of each intermediate router,
meaning that the source node should have an indication on all the nodes that will be
crossed to reach a destination. The DSR protocol is not very efficient in large networks
because each source must have the vision of all the network. The cost of maintenance
of routing tables is important. But it is suitable for small and medium networks.
5.2. RELATED
CHAPTER 5. BORDER
WORKS SURVEILLANCE USING SENSOR BASED THICK-LINES
The proactive protocols: this routing protocol establishes and maintains continuously routes
in advance without the wait for an event occurrence. The most known proactive protocol is
DSDV (Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector routing)[66]. The DSDV protocol guarantees
loop-free routes. At every node are stored route entries to all the nodes of the network. The
path to a destination is determined using the distance vector shortest path routing protocol.
DSDV introduces a heavy load on the network due to the periodic update messages. The
protocol is not suitable for large scale networks because the bandwidth is used in the updating
messages. In the particular case of the WSNs, the DSDV is not suitable because it consumes
a lot of energy for routing tasks.
The characteristics of the routing solution we proposed are listed in the followings:
• the method presented is an hybrid method: at the initiation of the network, the proposed
method establishes all the routes of all the network like the proactive protocols. After
that, no periodic update is done. The routes are only updated if a node detects that the
routes are no longer valid like the reactive protocols. Therefore, the proposed protocol
permits an efficient routing and requires a little energy consumption for routing tasks;
• The routes established in the proposed method are the lightest ones that can be done
because they are composed of only one entry at each node. Each sensing node can send
its gathered data to the routing node through other nodes. We also gave a solution
that permits unicast communications between any two nodes using the same reduced
routing table.
• The Thin LSNs: The most basic LSN is the one where the nodes deployed are orga-
nized in a unique dimensional linear form. We can distinguish one-level thin LSNs for
which the network is composed on a unique type of nodes having the mission of sensing
events. The thin LSNs can be multi-level in the case where more than one kind of nodes
are deployed. In the latter case, some nodes are used for sensing and the others for
communication and routing tasks. Regardless to their hierarchical level, the nodes are
deployed on the same line.
• The Thick LSNs: In this topology the linearity does not exist at all the nodes levels.
Only the nodes constituting the upper levels are organized in linear infrastructure. The
sensing nodes are scattered in an area delimited by two lines. They monitor the presence
of intruders and send the data collected to the nodes deployed on the central line. As
the thin LSNs, a thick LSN can be one-level or multi-level depending on the kinds of
the sensors deployed.
• The Very thick LSNs: For this architecture all the nodes are placed in an area
delimited by two parallel lines. The very thick LSNs may be one-level or multi-level.
An efficient DRNs deployment should ensure the linear connectivity. As represented in Figure
5.4 , when considering the segment lines S1 , S2 and S3 of width RCDRN 2 and deploy a BSN
in each segment, we will have a full connected DRN line. In fact, the maximum distance
between any couple of points P1 in S1 and P2 in S2 will be less than RCDRN . The distance
between any couple of points P2 in S2 and P3 in S3 will be less than RCDRN . Then, having
a DRN in each segment of width RCDRN 2 will ensure that each DRN is connected to a left and
right neighbor. Generalizing this result to all the segments of width RCDRN
2 will ensure a full
5.4. THE DEPLOYMENT
CHAPTER 5. BORDER SURVEILLANCE
STRATEGY USING SENSOR BASED THICK-LINES
connectivity of the DRN line. When having two connected neighbors in the two directions,
each DRN will have a path (through multiple hops) to all the other DRNs of the network.
Given that the border is generally vast, we cannot perform a deterministic deployment and
in the general cases the sensors deployed are thrown from air. Then, we cannot determine an
exact position of the DRN but only have an approximative control on the portion of area in
which will a sensor land. Thus, a good deployment should ensure the presence of at least one
DRN in each segment of width RCDRN 2 .
Based on these constraints, we can determine the number of the needed DRNs. Let us denote
by LLine the length of the line on which the DRNs will be deployed. The number NDRN of
needed DRNs to have a linear connectivity is given by the following equation.
LLine 2 LLine
NDRN = = (5.1)
RCDRN /2 RCDRN
The deployment of the NDRN nodes will not be done in a deterministic manner but as shown
previously, the random deployment performed should ensure that each segment of width
RCDRN
2 will contain one DRN.
• The first constraint states that any deployed BSN should be reachable in one hop by at
least one DRN. As stated in the architectural issues, the DRNs will be responsible of
communicating management tasks to the BSNs. Our choice is that this communication
should be done in one hop to make the communication easier and avoid a possible
lateness of transmission.
• The first constraint is related to the connectivity needs but the major task of the BSNs
is to ensure an efficient sensing of the monitored area. The second constraint to be
satisfied states that the number and the BSNs repartition should ensure an efficient
monitoring.
The proposed deployment scheme that satisfies these two constraints is detailed in the follow-
ing subsections.
5.4. THE DEPLOYMENT
CHAPTER 5. BORDER SURVEILLANCE
STRATEGY USING SENSOR BASED THICK-LINES
To satisfy the first deployment constraint, we can easily deduce that the width of the strip
should verify the following relation.
√
WStrip = 3 RCDRN (5.2)
Remark. If the designer needs a larger√ surveillance area, he can choose a width of the strip
larger than the recommended value 3 RCDRN . All the details of the √ proposed solution
are valid regardless to the value chosen. If the width of the strip is > 3 RCDRN , a BSN
located on the border of the strip may be far from all the deployed DRNs by a distance
> RCDRN . Therefore, it is not connected directly to any DRN. We notice that when a DRN
sends data to a BSN (or a broadcast message to all the BSNs), it can be sent in multi hop
through intermediate BSNs. It is evident that √
a multi hop relay process necessitates additional
treatments than one hop relay. The choice of 3 RCDRN is not rigorous but it is the optimal
value that provides the largest width of the strip and the simplest communication process
from DRNs to BSNs done in all the cases in one hop.
To have k-coverage of the strip, it has been demonstrated that the density of the BSNs
repartition should be
k
ρS = . (5.4)
Sc
The total number of needed BSNs is given by the following formula.
Remark. The designer of the network can use any other method to determine the number
of required BSNs to cover the strip. For example, the deployment method based on energy
consumption [68], the method based on geographical patterns [69] or any other deployment
method presented in the literature can be used.
NDRN
NDDN = (5.6)
NDRN perDDN
To be sure that the DDNs are√in the communication range of the DRNs, they will be deployed
in a strip of width equal to 3 RCDRN and centered around the DRN line. The DDNs will
be randomly and uniformly deployed in the strip. We do not need really rigorous positions of
the DDNs because in all the cases these nodes will receive data routed through many DRNs.
To avoid the flooding, a packet sent by a BSN should indicate the next hop that will be in
charge of relaying it to another hop in direction to the requested DRN node. In that case,
when a BSN sends a packet, it is received by all its neighbors due to the constraints of the
physical transmission channel. But when receiving the packet, the neighbors will read the
field that indicates the next hop and only the BSN indicated as the next hop will relay the
packet. The non concerned BSNs will drop it. We will always have a unique copy of each
packet until it reaches the DRN destination. Then, we are sure that no broadcast storm
occurs and by consequence a fewer number of nodes will be used in the relay process and
the energy consumption for many BSNs will be economized. The DRNs will receive a unique
copy of the packet and there is no longer a need of duplicated packets detection.
In practice, this is done by the mean of routing tables. The routing tables will logically
arrange the BSNs and DRNs in a spanning tree to eliminate the physical loops. Each BSN
is assumed to have a routing table that indicates the route to the corresponding DRN. Each
line of the routing table contains the following information:
First Step: Periodically, each DRN sends a beacon message that indicates its presence. This
message is a multicast message because it can be used by any BSN. At the end of this step, the
BSNs that can send directly data (in one hop) to a DRN will detect the presence of the DRN.
The transmission range used when sending the beacon message has to be RCBSN instead of
RCDRN . In fact, if the beacon message is sent using RCDRN communication range it will
reach BSNs that are distanced from the DRN of more than RCBSN . Thus, they will suppose
having a DRN directly reachable but, in fact, it is not in their communication range and the
routing information will be false. At the end of the first step, a BSN that can directly reach
a DRN will add a direct route to a DRN in their routing table. The device identifier of the
DRN is sent in the beacon message having the following format.
Second step: Each BSN will send its routing table to its neighbors. When receiving the
routes declarations from a neighbor, each BSN will update its routing table if necessary. The
update is done if the received route indicates fewer hops to reach a DRN than the available
5.5. THE ROUTING
CHAPTER 5. BORDER
TECHNIQUE
SURVEILLANCE USING SENSOR BASED THICK-LINES
route. If the routes of a BSN changes, it sends immediately its local routing table to inform
the neighbors of the new established route. This message has the following format.
• Source Device Identifier indicates the device identifier (or the Mac address) of the
BSN that have sent the route update. This field is necessary because the BSNs that will
register the routing entry in their routing tables should indicate this device identifier as
the next hop;
• DRN Device Identifier indicates the DRN corresponding to the routing entry. This
information is necessary in the data packets, because the BSN should indicate the DRN
to which the data should be delivered;
• number of hops indicates the number of hops that will be crossed to reach the DRN.
When a BSN receives a route update, it increments the number of hops received and compares
it to the number of hops indicated in its routing table. If the received route indicates a fewer
number of hops, it updates the routing entry using the received one, else the routing entry
does not change. After some exchange rounds between the BSNs, all the routing tables will
be filled in and every BSN will have an indication of a route (e.g. the next hop) in direction
of the nearest DRN. The number of the rounds
√ needed to have a converged network is relative
to RCBSN and to the width of the strip 3 RCDRN . The routing protocol should also ensure
that the routing entries reflects the infrastructure of the network and is up to date. With the
proposed establishment solution of routes, the routing tables will be updated automatically
if the network changes because the BSNs send immediately their routing tables in case of
change. A network change consists at a modification of the DRNs number or positions, which
will cause the change of the routing entries of the closest BSNs. This modification will be
diffused to all the other BSNs.
The proposed routes establishment process provides an efficient update of the routes only if
all the BSNs are in operation, meaning that it does not give solutions in case of a BSN failure
or a deployment of a new BSN. In case of a node failure, all the routes are still valid even
if the routes are interrupted. For example, let consider a BSN B1 having its neighbor B2
as a next hop. Despite the reason, the node B2 can be out of service (breakdown or energy
expiration) and then the indicated route will no longer be valid. In the case of non change of
the network infrastructure (e.g. the line of DRNs is not modified), no BSN is going to send
route updates. Then, the BSN B1 will not receive any route update and the route remains
registered while being not valid. In case of a new node deployment, if the architecture of the
network does not change, no route update will be sent and then the new node will not receive
any route announcement. In the following we propose respectively methods to update the
routing entries in the case of a BSN failure or the add of a new BSN.
The solution to the problem of a BSN failure: In the case of node failure, some routes will
not be valid. As a solution, many routing protocols classified as proactive protocols propose
5.5. THE ROUTING
CHAPTER 5. BORDER
TECHNIQUE
SURVEILLANCE USING SENSOR BASED THICK-LINES
that the wireless nodes send periodically their routing tables (despite an event or modification
of the routing table) to ensure that a periodic update of the routing tables of all the BSNs is
done. This solution efficiently resolves the problem but the nodes will uselessly and rapidly
consume their energy by sending the routes update.
As a reaction to a node failure, we propose that the update is done on demand to avoid the
consumption of energy in tasks that may be unnecessary. When a BSN has gathered data, it
will send this data to the DRN through the next hop indicated in its routing entry either of
being still valid or invalid. When receiving the data from a BSN, the DRN is asked to send an
acknowledgment unicast message to the originating BSN as a response. If a DRN response is
received, the BSN can implicitly be sure that the data has been delivered and that the route
is valid and no action is needed. But if no DRN response has been received, the BSN deduces
that the route through the next hop is no longer valid. Upon the occurrence of this event,
the BSN will send a message {Route Failure Notification} to indicate that the route is
no longer valid. This message will be received by all the neighbors of the BSN, which will
also diffuse it until it reaches the DRN. When the DRN receives a message {Route Failure
Notification}, it deduces that there is a problem of routing entries validity. In the next step,
the DRN will send a message {Flush Routing entries} in diffusion to order all the BSNs in
its communication range to delete all their routing tables. Now, when all the tables of BSNs
in the area of this DRN are flushed, the previously detailed steps 1 and 2 will be done and
all the tables of the BSNs will be newly filled in and by consequence valid. The presented
method gives a solution to the nodes failures avoiding the classical periodic updates solutions
which consumes a lot of energy. Figure 5.8 illustrates an example of this process.
The solution to a new deployed BSN: When a new BSN is deployed it is not sure that the
existing BSNs are sending route updates. Then, the new BSN will not receive route updates.
The method we propose to integrate and set up a valid routing table of the deployed BSN is
5.5. THE ROUTING
CHAPTER 5. BORDER
TECHNIQUE
SURVEILLANCE USING SENSOR BASED THICK-LINES
initiated by the latter. When deployed, the BSN sends a message {Request of Route} to
all its neighbors. When receiving this message, the neighbors of the new BSN will respond
in a unicast message. This message is a route update message containing the available route
at the neighbor. The new deployed BSN will receive many routes, it will select the best one
(the fewer number of hops) and stores it as a valid route entry.
A recapitulation of the messages needed in all the steps of routes establishment and alternative
scenarios is illustrated by Table 5.2.
a unicast message to the BSN and sends this message. Given that all the BSNs are in the
communication range of the DRN, the message will certainly reach the BSN. Sending data
from DRNs to BSNs does not require a routing management process.
For the case where a BSN will send data to another BSN, we propose that the BSN con-
structs a data payload to which it sticks the BSN destination address. It indicates on the
payload that the message will be relayed to another BSN. The all is sent to a DRN using the
classical routing from a BSN to a DRN. The message sent by the BSN has the following format.
When receiving a message marked to be relayed to another BSN, the DRN will send the re-
ceived message as a unicast message and indicates the address joint by the source BSN as the
destination address. Given, that all the BSNs are in the communication range of the DRN,
the message will reach the BSN.
Operating at this manner, we will not have necessity of maintaining routing management be-
tween the BSNs. Most of the existing routing protocols for adhoc networks establish dynamic
routes between all the wireless nodes. This treatment necessitates continuous updates and
a large amount of exchanged data in the routing tables that becomes enormous when the
number of deployed nodes is greater. The main contribution of our solution is to avoid the
complex process of the routes establishment and the use of complex routing tables.
• We will consider in the simulation many values for the k-coverage quality varying form
k=1 to k=9;
• We also considered many sensing and communication ranges for the BSNs to study their
impact on the quality of the deployment.
• In the first simulation, we study the impact of the k-coverage parameter on the routing
technique and the number of the hops needed to reach the DRN line.
5.6. PERFORMANCE
CHAPTER 5. BORDER
EVALUATION
SURVEILLANCE USING SENSOR BASED THICK-LINES
• In the second simulation, we varied the BSNs communication range and studied the
impact of this parameter on the number of non-connected BSNs. A non-connected
BSNs is a node that does not have a path to the DRN line.
We can observe in this simulation, that the worst mean value for the number of hops is
equal to 3 intermediate nodes, which is an acceptable value. Also, when considering the worst
case of all the conducted simulations, the maximum number of hops detected for all the BSNs
is equal to 9 intermediate sensors. Then, we can deduce that the proposed deployment and
routing techniques, gives good performances when evaluating the number of hops needed to
reach the DRN line.
Figure 5.10 represents the percentage of non-connected sensors for 1-coverage. We remark
that the deployment and routing solution gives a small number of sensors non-connected.
In the second part of this simulation, we conducted the same simulation as the previous case
but for 2-coverage deployment. The table 5.4 represents for different values of the Communi-
cation range, the total number of deployed nodes and the number of the nodes that have not
a route to a DRN node. Figure 5.11 represents the percentage of non-connected sensors for
5.6. PERFORMANCE
CHAPTER 5. BORDER
EVALUATION
SURVEILLANCE USING SENSOR BASED THICK-LINES
2-coverage.
We notice on table 5.4 that the number of the non-covered sensors in 2-coverage is less than
those for the case of 1-coverage. In fact, for 2-coverage, we have more sensors deployed than
in the case of 1-coverage; and thus we have more possibilities of finding routes. Therefore,
when having a larger value for k (which is the general case in most deployments), we may
have a little percentage of not connected nodes. For example, for this simulation, the mean
value of the percentage of non connectivity for 2-coverage is 0.36% and for 1-coverage it is
5.5%.
In the general cases despite of the coverage degree needed, we remark that the percentage
of non connected BSNs has a maximal value equal to 7% for one coverage and 0.6% for 2-
coverage which is an acceptable value. This lack of connectivity is inevitable because we are
in the case of a random deployment strategy. But, we notice that the percentage of the non
connected nodes is not enormous when compared with the total number of deployed nodes. If
we want a total covered network (like deterministic solutions), this lack can be overcome by
two possible means. The first one is using mobility where the non connected BSNs perform
small distance movements to reach a connectivity area of another BSN. Another solution is to
deploy additional BSNs in an incremental process to cover the small black areas and therefore
provide a 100% connectivity of the deployed network.
• We built a WSN based surveillance system called DWBS that is able to provide a control-
lable surveillance of infiltration within a large area neighboring the border. Techniques
are developed to plan and dimension the deployed network. They use two types of sen-
sors, DRNs and BSNs, responsible respectively for building a communication network
and sensing coverage within the monitored area;
• The second contribution is the setup of a deployment model taking in consideration real
deployment conditions. The deployment method consists at paving the monitored area
with paving patterns of predetermined shapes translating the environment conditions;
• Using the paving deployment technique, we proposed two deployment strategies for
DWBS. The first one is a deterministic deployment method and the second is more
generalized and provides a controlled random deployment method.
In the present chapter, we introduce the DWBS architecture and define the paving deployment
technique. We consider in this chapter the deterministic deployment case for DWBS. The rest
of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 will be presented works that treats the
99
CHAPTER 6. DWBS: A DISTRIBUTED WIRELESS BORDER SURVEILLANCE
6.2. RELATED WORKS SYSTEM
For the static nodes placement with controlled deployment scheme [55, 57, 60, 62, 63, 71–
75], the sensors are placed in positions chosen to ensure full coverage of the monitored area.
These sensors are static and never change their positions. This solution gives an optimal
and guaranteed quality of coverage; but, positioning the static sensor nodes at specific places
necessitates easy, direct and full control of the monitored area. Unfortunately, this is not al-
ways guaranteed on frontiers and large monitored areas because of geographical irregularities
nature. For this reason, this deployment strategy is not suitable for large scale applications
and border surveillance.
In the static nodes placement with random deployment scheme [76–79], the sensors are static,
but are not placed in deterministic positions. In fact, this deployment scheme is used when
placing the sensors at deterministic positions is risky or infeasible. In that case, the sensors
are dropped, from air, which leads to randomly spreading them in the monitored area and
will not ensure the total coverage or connectivity of the monitored area because the sensors’
distribution may be non uniform. Based on this, many research works have proposed a ran-
dom deployment of large populations of nodes to overcome uncertainty. In that case, having
a large number of sensors can give a greater density and may permit a good coverage of the
monitored area. This deployment technique can be used in all kinds of monitored areas and
many types of applications. However, it shows a major drawback related to the high cost it
generates.
For the dynamic nodes placement with random deployment [19, 56, 61, 80–87], the sensors are
able to move within the monitored area. In a first step of the scheme, the sensors are randomly
spread in the sensed area. Similarly to the previous class, the sensors will not ensure good
coverage of the area of interest. To deal with this lack of coverage, a second step assumes that
the sensor nodes will be able to move after deployment by changing their positions to ensure
the required quality of coverage. This method can be used in large scale applications because
initially the sensors are placed randomly in the monitored area. Also, given that the sensors
can move to ensure the required coverage, an excess of nodes redundancy is not needed. This
solution has two drawbacks: first, the motion may cost a lot of energy and second the sensor
motion cannot be handled properly because of nature irregularities.
CHAPTER 6. DWBS: A DISTRIBUTED WIRELESS BORDER SURVEILLANCE
6.3. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PAVING PATTERNS SYSTEM
The main advantages of the DWBS network architecture and deployment scheme is that we
used hierarchical networks to ensure both coverage and connectivity. For the deployment
process, we used controlled random deployment avoiding the cost of the deterministic deploy-
ment. Having a controlled random deployment, the positions of the sensors are controlled
using a mathematical model that gives the expected positions of the sensors. For the size of
the network, the solution we proposed is scalable and can be used either for large network,
small networks or scalable networks.
Table 6.1 illustrates a comparison of those deployment techniques and the method we proposed
in this paper within some metrics and factors.
• V0 : is the real number representing the velocity of the airplane on the Ox axis when the
sensor is thrown on the x axis;
Using the above forces, we determine the landing position of the sensor. To have this, we
should evaluate the position coordinates of landing on the Ox and Oy axes.
The forces applied to a sensor when thrown on the three axes, are given by the following
CHAPTER 6. DWBS: A DISTRIBUTED WIRELESS BORDER SURVEILLANCE
6.3. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PAVING PATTERNS SYSTEM
equation.
Zt Zt
FWx (u) FWy (u)
V ~(t) = ( du + V0 , du, gt) (6.3)
m m
0 0
The landing positions LP on the three axes are given by equation (6.4) knowing that at t=0
the sensor is located on the airplane (origin). The landing motion and the forces applied on
the sensors when landing are represented by Figure 6.1.
Zt Zu Zt Zu
FWx (v) FWy (v) 1
LP~(t) = ( dv du + V0 t, dv du, gt2 ) (6.4)
m m 2
0 0 0 0
If we assume that during sensor fall down, the wind direction and intensity are constant; then
FWx and FWy are constant, and equation (6.4) can be written as
FW FWy 2 1 2
LP~(t) = ( x t2 + V0 t, t , gt ). (6.5)
2m 2m 2
We notice that if the airplane altitude is q
denoted by h at the start of the sensor fall down,
2h
then the sensor will reach land at tL = g . One can easily determine in that case that
CHAPTER 6. DWBS: A DISTRIBUTED WIRELESS BORDER SURVEILLANCE
6.3. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PAVING PATTERNS SYSTEM
2h FWy h
q
Wx F h
the coordinates of the landing point are given by ( mg + V0 g , mg , h). The Landing
positions are given by the following system of equations 6.6.
q
FWx h 2h
LP x = mg + V 0 g
(6.6)
LP =
FW y h
y mg
The previously presented values correspond to a precise value of FWx , FWy and V0 . To char-
acterize the form of the paving pattern resulting of these coordinates, we should consider the
different possible values of FWx , FWy and V0 and study the form of the area drawn by LPx
and LPy given by the system of equations 6.6.
Given that FWx , FWy are the forces of wind respectively on Ox and Oy axes, the relation
between them is given in accordance to a wind model that describes the behavior of the wind
in direction and velocity.
In the followings, we consider several wind models and determine the resulting possible land-
ing position of the sensor when considering each model. One can distinguish three generic
deployment scenarios depending on the characteristics of the wind parameters.
2 FW2
FW x
+ 2y ≤ 1 (6.8)
a2 b
This inequation can also be written in the form.
2 t4L 2 t4L
FW x 4m2
FW y 4m2
t4
+ t4
≤1 (6.9)
a2 4mL2 b2 4mL2
From Equations (6.6) and (6.9) we deduce the relation between LPx and LPy by the following
inequation.
(LPx − V0 tL )2 LPy2
a t2L
+ b t2L 2
≤1 (6.10)
( 2
2m ) ( 2m )
This inequation gives an elliptic relation between LPx and LPy . The resulting elliptic disc
ES representing the set of the positions in which a sensor S can land is centered on CE =
CHAPTER 6. DWBS: A DISTRIBUTED WIRELESS BORDER SURVEILLANCE
6.3. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PAVING PATTERNS SYSTEM
a t2L
(V0 tL , 0, 0), the major semi axis of ES is equal to 2m and the minor semi axis is equal to
b t2L
2m . The paving pattern corresponding to the elliptic wind model is depicted by Figure 6.2.
• The value of the airplane velocity when the sensor is thrown is controllable and equal
to a precise and fixed value.
In this case, the values of the wind forces FWx and FWy on the Ox and Oy axes are given by
the following equations.
~
F Wx =
F
cos(α)
F W =
~
F
sin(α) (6.11)
y
, with α in [0, 2π].
Then relatively to the circular wind model, the landing positions are given by the set of
equations 6.12.
kF~ kcos(α) h
q
LPx =
mg + V0 2h
g
(6.12)
~
kF ksin(α) h
LPy =
mg
We denote by
CHAPTER 6. DWBS: A DISTRIBUTED WIRELESS BORDER SURVEILLANCE
6.3. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PAVING PATTERNS SYSTEM
~
s
~
F
h 2h
β(
F
) = and w = V0
mg g
The relation between LPx and LPy is then given by Equation 6.13.
2 2
LPx − w LPy
+ =1 (6.13)
β(F ) β(F )
Based
on the deduced relation, the expected landing
area
for a given value of the wind force
~
~
F
is a circle C of center CC (w, 0, 0) and radius β(
F
).
The whole possible landing area of a sensor
is then the union of all the
circles
for all the
~
~
possible values of the wind forces norm
F
varying in the interval [0,
F
]. Then the
max
kF~ kmax h
landing area (e.g. the paving pattern) will be a disk of radius R = mg and centered
q
2h
on CDisc = (V0 g , 0, 0). The paving pattern corresponding to the circular wind model is
represented by Figure 6.3.
• The maximal value of the wind force on Ox axis FWx is equal to FWx,max . Given that
the wind force can be in the same direction or the opposite direction of the airplane,
then FWx varies in the interval [−FWx,max , FWx,max ];
• The maximal value of the lateral wind force on the Oy axis FWy is equal to FWy,max .
Given that the wind force can be in the left or the right side of the airplane, then FWy
varies in the interval [−FWy,max , FWy,max ];
CHAPTER 6. DWBS: A DISTRIBUTED WIRELESS BORDER SURVEILLANCE
6.3. THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PAVING PATTERNS SYSTEM
• The value of the airplane velocity when the sensor is thrown, is controllable and is equal
to a precise value.
Based on these characteristics and using the equation of LPx and LPx given by Equation 6.6,
the landing positions for the free wind model are described in the followings:
FWy,max h FWy,max h
• The position of landing LPy on the Oy axis can be in the interval [− m g , m g ].
FWy,max 2h
LPy then varies on a segment centered on Cy = 0 and of width = m g ;
Considering the possible landing values on the Ox and Oy axes and given that the LPx and
LPy are independent variables, then all the combinations of LPx positions and LPy positions
are possible. Based on q
this, the paving pattern is simply a rectangle centered on the center
2h FWx,max 2h
of fall down CR = (V0 g , 0, 0) having a width equal to m g and a length equal to
FWy,max 2h
m g . The paving pattern for the free wind model is illustrated by Figure 6.4.
Remark. In the next parts of this work, we will consider the elliptic model in our calculations
and analysis since the circular case is a particular case of it (achieved when a=b) and that
the rectangular model is very easy to analyze.
and FWy,maxn .
We denote by P wi , where i=1...n, the probability that FWx is in [0, FWx,maxi ] and FWy in
[0, FWy,maxi ]. We suppose that the statistics of the wind forces verifies the following system
of inequalities.
We suppose that the relation between FWx,maxi and FWy,maxi is led by the following formula.
2
FW 2
FW
x,max i y,max i
+ =1 (6.16)
a2i b2i
Using Equation (6.10), the landing area of a sensor for the ith scenario is an elliptic disc
i L a t2 b t2
denoted by Ei of a major semiaxis equal to 2m and a minor semiaxis equal to i2mL . En
is the maximal elliptic disc in which the sensor can land and corresponds to the nth wind
scenario.
Knowing the inequalities depicted by the relation (6.15), we deduce that the relation between
the different constructed elliptic discs is given by the following expression.
Now, we partition the set of possible landing positions En to disjoint sub areas that does not
intersect. We denote by Eni (where i=1,...,n), the disjoint sub areas to which will be divided
the ellipse En . Those sub areas are represented by the following system of equations.
1
En = E1
(6.18)
i
En = Ei \Ei−1 , i = 2..n
This decomposition is depicted by Figure 6.5.
We denote by PEni the probability that the sensor lands in the subarea Eni . The wind forces and
probabilities depicted by the system of equations (6.14) are useful to generate the probability
that the sensor lands in the sub-elliptic areas. It is easy to show that these probabilities are
given by:
6.4.
CHAPTER
DWBS: PAVING
6. DWBS:
BASED
A DISTRIBUTED
DEPLOYMENTWIRELESS
TECHNIQUE
BORDER
ANDSURVEILLANCE
ARCHITECTURE SYSTEM
PEn1 = P w1
(6.19)
PEni = P wi − P wi−1 , i = 2, ..., n
Given that the intensity of the wind force components cannot exceed the values FWx,maxn and
FWy,maxn , then the probabilities of the sub elliptic areas Eni verifies the following equation.
n
X
PEni = P wn = 1 (6.20)
i=1
One special case can be distinguished when the monitored area is a strip. Two solutions can
be distinguished as depicted by Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7.
In the first solution, the paving patterns are overlapped and arranged as presented by Figure
6.6. Such a paving will not cover totally the strip but will ensure the coverage of a maximal
part of it. The width of the strip WStrip and the distance δ between two successive paving
patterns are depicted by the following equations in relation to the minor semi axis M inAxis
and major semi axis M ajAxis.
WStrip = 2M inAxis
(6.21)
2M ajAxis − δ > 0
To minimize the Area A non covered by the paving patterns, we should bring closer the
centers of the paving patterns (e.g. Area A closer to 0 and δ closer to 0).
In the second solution, the paving patterns are overlapping in such a way that their intersection
belong to the frontier of the strip. In that case, we have a full coverage of the strip as depicted
by Figure 6.7.
6.4.
CHAPTER
DWBS: PAVING
6. DWBS:
BASED
A DISTRIBUTED
DEPLOYMENTWIRELESS
TECHNIQUE
BORDER
ANDSURVEILLANCE
ARCHITECTURE SYSTEM
The calculations shows that the optimal value of the distance between two successive paving
patterns δ is given by the following equation.
v
u 2 !
W Strip
(M ajAxis)2
u
δ = 2t 1 − (6.22)
2M inAxis
Proof. To have the optimal distance δ between two paving patterns, we should determine
the intersection between the ellipse representing the paving pattern and the horizontal border
of the strip. The horizontal border corresponds to the coordinate on the Oy axes equal to
W strip/2. The equation of the paving pattern is given by the following relation.
2
x y 2
+ =1
M ajAxis M inAxis
.
Substituting the variable y with the value Wstrip/2, we deduce that the value of the coordinate
x is equal to. v
u 2 !
W Strip
(M ajAxis)2
u
x = ±t 1 −
2M inAxis
.
By consequence, the best value that can be chosen for δ is given by Equation 6.22.
Knowing that the length of the j t h strip LStripj is finite, the number of needed paving
patterns NP Ej to cover it is given by the following equation.
LStripj
NP E j = (6.23)
δ
The determined number of paving patterns is minimum; Since, if the number of paving pat-
terns of a minimum coverage is less than NP Ej , the strip will not be totally covered since the
centers of two consecutive paving patterns will have a distance higher than δ.
It can be easily seen that to cover the strip totally using the second method needs more paving
patterns than covering it partially using the first method. A solution to get a paving of a
general monitored area by paving patterns is to partition the area into strips and to cover
every strip using one of the above mentioned methods. A total coverage using the method
depicted by Figure 6.7 is depicted by Figure 6.8.
area. To ensure efficient border surveillance, the network DWBS is a three layered hierarchical
network, where layers are built on three types of nodes: BSN, DRN and DDN. The details of
the functionalities of the several nodes are given in Section 5.3.
For the network topology, we will consider a multi linear network called DWBS. The topol-
ogy of the considered network is composed of many lines. Each line is organized as a thin
linear subnetwork. On the lines are deployed BSNs and DRNs. The topology of the network
considered is represented by Figure 6.9.
We propose an aerial deployment of DWBS in such a way that the radio connectivity and
efficient coverage are ensured. An airplane will be moving and at regular intervals throws one
CHAPTER 6. DWBS: A DISTRIBUTED WIRELESS BORDER SURVEILLANCE
6.5. DWBS: THE DETERMINISTIC DEPLOYMENT CASE SYSTEM
or more sensors (DRNs or BSNs). These sensors are supposed to land on the linear form to
provide a thin linear network. The aerial deployment of the sensors is depicted by Figure 6.10.
The path followed by the sensor when landing and the shape of the area (paving pattern) in
which a sensor can land are detailed in Section 6.3.
To build a solution let us first partition the monitored area into strips of width WStrip sepa-
rated by ∆. Two successive paving patterns ED are separated by δD . We suppose that the
communication range Rc verifies the following relation stating that any DRN can communi-
cate with its neighbors and any position in the strip can be reached by a DRN.
s
WStrip 2
2
δD
Rc ≥ + (6.24)
2 2
An example of the area paving for the DRNs is represented by Figure 6.11.
We consider the simplest case in which all the DRNs land in the center of the paving patterns
which are carriers of the communication discs of the DRN. That case occurs when the lateral
wind forces FWy on y-axis is equal to 0 and the frontal wind force FWx on x axis is fixed. To
ensure connectivity, the deployment of DRNs should be made in such a way that the paving
patterns positions satisfy three constraints:
1. The first constraint states that each point in the monitored area should be at least
reachable by a DRN. To ensure this constraint, all the monitored area should be covered
by the DRNs communication discs to ensure that any position is reachable by at least
CHAPTER 6. DWBS: A DISTRIBUTED WIRELESS BORDER SURVEILLANCE
6.5. DWBS: THE DETERMINISTIC DEPLOYMENT CASE SYSTEM
one DRN. This deployment goal is resolved if the paving patterns positions verify the
following formula.
N[
PE
Each strip will be covered by the paving patterns using the method presented by Figure
6.7. Figure 6.12 shows the resulting coverage by the radio communication discs carried
by the paving patterns.
To ensure the coverage expressed by Formula 6.25, we divide the whole area into strips
separated by ∆ = 2d, with d is given by the following formula.
r
δD WStrip
d = Rc2 − ( )2 − >0 (6.26)
2 2
CHAPTER 6. DWBS: A DISTRIBUTED WIRELESS BORDER SURVEILLANCE
6.5. DWBS: THE DETERMINISTIC DEPLOYMENT CASE SYSTEM
The value of d is >0 because the communication range Rc is greater than the distance
that separates the center of the paving pattern and the intersection of the paving pat-
tern and the strip.
As illustrated by Figure 6.12, to avoid having a non covered area, the communication
discs should intersect. The resulting covered area around a strip is of width WStrip + 2d
which explains the value chosen of ∆ = 2d expressed by Equation (6.26). Then, the
minimum number NP E of DRNs needed to have a total cover of the monitored area is
given by the following expression.
NStrips
X
NP E = NP E j (6.27)
j=1
where:
- NStrips is the number of the strips;
- NP E j is the number of paving patterns in the j th strip given by Equation 6.23;
We remark that in the general cases, the communication range Rc verifies the Inequation
(6.24). We notice that in the case where Rc < W Strip
2 , the strips should intersect because
the discs of range Rc cannot cover the whole strip.
2. The second constraint is that any two neighboring nodes belonging to the same strip
should be connected. Given that the DRNs are supposed to land in the center of ED ,
then the distance between two successive paving patterns δD should verify the following
inequation.
δD ≤ Rc (6.28)
3. The third constraint is that the strips should be connected to avoid having an isolated
part of the network. At this end, the distance between two strips ∆ have to be well cho-
sen to permit inter strips communication. To ensure that the strips remain connected,
the value of ∆ should be controlled and verifies the following inequation.
∆ + WStrip ≤ Rc (6.29)
The previously cited constraints and the chosen values of δD and ∆ ensure the constraints
but are only valid for the deterministic case deployment. For the deterministic case, we
supposed that the DRN lands in the center of the paving pattern. The general case where the
DRN lands randomly in any position in the paving pattern will be deeply analyzed through
mathematical models in Chapter 7.
Figure 6.13 illustrates an example of BSNs deployment that ensures full coverage of the line.
On the same figure is shown the repartition of the paving patterns EB that carry the sensing
disks of the BSNs. To have a full coverage of the line, the distance δB between two paving
patterns EB should be ≤ 2Rs . Given that the BSNs are supposed to land in the center of
the paving pattern EB , if the distance δB is > 2Rs then the centers of the coverage discs
are distanced by more than 2Rs . By consequence there is a line of segment between the two
successive BSNs that is not covered. Knowing that the length of the j t h strip LStripj is finite
and the sensing range Rs , the number of BSNs (or paving patterns) needed to cover it is given
by the following equation.
LStripj
NBSNj = (6.30)
2Rs
Then, the minimum number of BSNs needed to have a linear coverage of NStrips belonging
to the monitored area is given by the following expression.
X
NBSN j (6.31)
j≤NStrips
In the presented deployment scenarios, the distance δB between two BSN paving patterns is
2Rs permits a coverage of a line. As well as the distance δB becomes less than 2Rs as well
as the area monitored by the BSNs becomes larger because the sensing disks will intersect.
Then, if the designer of the network needs that the area sensed is larger that a line, it should
reduce the distance δB to have the required coverage quality. An example of BSNs deployment
that ensures thick linear surveillance is depicted by Figure 6.14.
The optimal distance between two paving patterns δB that permits a total coverage of a
strip of width WStrip Senseded is given in the following formula.
s
WStrip Senseded 2
δB = 2 Rs2 − (6.32)
2
CHAPTER 6. DWBS: A DISTRIBUTED WIRELESS BORDER SURVEILLANCE
6.6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM
• a uniform random deployment. The number of sensors is equal to the number of sensors
deployed for DWBS method.
The aim of this simulation is to compare the DWBS to the random uniform deployment
strategy considering different densities of sensors. We mention that the number of deployed
sensors for DWBS is less than the number of sensors deployed for the random deployment
case. The results of the conducted simulations are illustrated in Figure 6.15.
When comparing the DWBS deployment strategy and the random uniform deployment, the
number of points connected and reached by at least one DRN is higher for the DWBS de-
ployment. In addition regardless to the communication range of the DRNs, DWBS gives a
percentage of connected points very close to 100%.
CHAPTER 6. DWBS: A DISTRIBUTED WIRELESS BORDER SURVEILLANCE
6.6. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM
• The uniform random deployment for 1-coverage: The number of BSNs is determined
using the random deployment to provide 1-coverage;
• The uniform random deployment for 2-coverage: We deployed a dense network to pro-
vide 2-coverage. The 2-coverage is only used to have a more dense network, but in the
required coverage quality each point should be covered by one BSN.
Figure 6.16 depicts the number of sensors returned by each one of the aforementioned deploy-
ment strategies.
Figure 6.17 represents the percentage of sensed points for each one of the deployment strate-
gies.
The first remark that can be deduced is that regardless to the width of the strip, the deter-
ministic case of DWBS gives a coverage percentage close to 100%. We can remark that for the
1-coverage random deployment, we have less deployed BSNs than the DWBS case. But when
observing the quality of coverage, the percentage of covered points is at max equal to 50%
which is a bad coverage quality. In addition, even if a more dense network is deployed (the
random case for 2-coverage) the quality of coverage does not reach the quality given by DWBS.
These simulations demonstrates the efficiency of the deterministic case of DWBS either for
coverage or connectivity.
CHAPTER 6. DWBS: A DISTRIBUTED WIRELESS BORDER SURVEILLANCE
6.7. CONCLUSION OF THE CHAPTER SYSTEM
• A mathematical model is built to provide a tight control on the quality of coverage for
communication of the network built on the sensors. In particular, it allows to compute
the probability of connectivity by controlling a set of parameters including dropping
point locations, number of dropped DRNs, and dropping altitude.
• A mathematical model that estimates the sensing coverage quality of the network is
built. The aim of this model is to present a solution that can be used to evaluate the
coverage performance of the network using light computation resources.
In the present chapter, we present the controlled random deployment case of DWBS. The rest
of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 will be presented the controlled random
deployment for the DRNs. Based on this deployment model, we present in the same section
through mathematical propositions the model impact on DRN connectivity. In Section 6.3, we
present the model impact on inter strips connectivity. Section 6.4 is devoted to the controlled
random deployment model for BSNs and its impact on the quality of coverage. In Section 6.5,
we compare the DWBS controlled random deployment to the random deployment method.
Section 6.6 assesses the efficiency of the connectivity and coverage proposed models in relation
to the model parameters through some conducted simulations. In Section 6.7, we analyze the
global performances of the DWBS network. Finally, Section 6.8 concludes the chapter.
119
7.2. CHAPTER
THE DRNS 7.CONTROLLED
DWBS: THE CONTROLLED
RANDOM DEPLOYMENT
RANDOM DEPLOYMENT
CASE CASE
Rc > 2WED
(7.1)
δD = aj+1 − aj ≤ WED
where:
• δD = aj+1 − aj is the distance between two successive throwing positions. The values
of δD is constant.
Considering the most distant possible DRN positions consists at considering the maximal
value of δD which is WED . Then, the maximal possible distance between two neighboring
DRNs is equal to 2WED . Given the relation Rc > 2WED then the most distanced DRNs are
separated by less than Rc and by consequence they can surely communicate together. Based
on this case analysis, we will have a fully connected DRN line with a probability equal to 1.
We consider in the followings, the most generic possible cases for the values of the deployment
parameters and determine in these cases the probability to have a full DRN connected line.
This case corresponds to the values of Rc and δD corresponding to equation (7.2) or equation
(7.3).
δ D ≤ Rc < W E D (7.3)
For the values considered in Equation (7.2) and Equation (7.3), we are sure that for any
position of DRNj , we will have at least one possible position of DRNj+1 that permits con-
nectivity because the distance between the two ellipses δD is less than Rc . Based on the same
equations, the furthest possible distance between DRNj and DRNj+1 is δD + WED . The
possible communication range Rc may be less than δD + WED which means that the DRNs
may be not connected. We can deduce that in this case the probability that two neighboring
DRNs are connected is non equal to 0 but is not equal to 1.
Figure 7.1 illustrates an example of this case. If the DRNj is located in an initial position,
the neighboring DRNj+1 will be connected to DRNj only if it lands in the hashed area Sj+1 .
7.2. CHAPTER
THE DRNS 7.CONTROLLED
DWBS: THE CONTROLLED
RANDOM DEPLOYMENT
RANDOM DEPLOYMENT
CASE CASE
This surface is relative to the position at which is located the sensor DRNj . Then the prob-
ability that two neighboring DRNs are connected is not equal to 1.
The DRNj can be located in any position in the ellipse ED of width WED . We consider that
the possible positions in the ellipse ED are strips of very small width ∆W . We denoted by
Sj,k,∆W the domain of the k th strip of width ∆W in which can be located DRNj . When DRNj
is in the k th strip Sj,k,∆W , we correspond a domain Sj+1 (k) in which should be DRNj+1 to
permit connectivity between the two DRNs. Figure 7.1 depicts an example of decomposition
into strips and the resulting constraints for two neighboring DRN connectivity.
Let PSj,k,∆W be the probability that DRNj is in the strip Sj,k,∆W and PSj+1 (k) be the proba-
bility that the DRNj+1 is in the surface Sj+1 (k).
Theorem 2.1
The probability PLC of having a DRN line composed of ND DRNs connected, is given by the
following relation.
NY
D −1
where P Cj,j+1 is the probability that the DRNj and DRNj+1 are connected, and it is given
by the following equation.
⌈WED /∆W ⌉
X
P Cj,j+1 = PSj,k,∆W PSj+1 (k) . (7.5)
k=1
Proof
Every line of DRNs in a strip is composed of ND DRNs. As shown in Figure 7.2, to have the
linear connectivity, every pair of neighboring nodes should be connected. Then, the probabil-
ity of line connectivity PLC is the product of the connectivity probability P Cj,j+1 for each two
neighboring nodes. The product loop on counter j is used to consider all the DRNs belonging
to the strip. The Probability of Line Connectivity PLC is then given by Equation 7.4.
7.2. CHAPTER
THE DRNS 7.CONTROLLED
DWBS: THE CONTROLLED
RANDOM DEPLOYMENT
RANDOM DEPLOYMENT
CASE CASE
The probability of connectivity between the two neighboring DRNs P Cj,j+1 is the product of
the probability PSj,k,∆W that DRNj is in the strip Sj,k,∆W and the probability PSj+1 (k) that
the DRNj+1 is in the related area Sj+1 (k). In Equation (7.5), the loop on the counter k is
used to consider all the possible strips Sj,k,∆W in which can be DRNj . Then, the probability
that DRNj and DRNj+1 are connected is given by Equation (7.5).
The value of ∆W has not an impact on the resulting value of P Cj,j+1 , because for any value of
∆W we will consider all the area in the ellipse ED and then consider all the possible positions.
In the case of a uniform probability of a DRN landing in ED , the expression of the probabil-
ities PSj+1 (k) and PSj,k,∆W are given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 The probabilities PSj+1 (k) and Pj,k,∆W are given by the following formulas.
mes(Sj+1 (k))
PSj+1 (k) = (7.6)
mes(ED )
mes(Sj,k,∆W )
PSj,k,∆W = (7.7)
mes(ED )
The probability of being in a subarea of an ellipse is equal to the division of the area of the
sub ellipse and the area of the whole ellipse. The calculation of the measure of a subellipse
surface is detailed in Appendix A.
Remarks.
1. In Equations 7.6 and 7.7, we considered the case in which the probability of the DRN
landing in ED is uniform. In Section 6.3.2, we have shown that in the general case the
landing position of a DRN in the ellipse ED is not uniform. In that case, ED is divided into n
sub areas EDi , i=1,2,...,n relatively to the probabilities of wind velocities and directions. We
An illustration of that case is depicted by Figure 7.3. The probabilities PSj+1 (k) and PSj,k,∆W
for the non uniform case are given by the following formulas.
7.3. CHAPTER
THE DRNS 7.INTER
DWBS:
STRIPS
THE CONTROLLED
CONNECTIVITY
RANDOM DEPLOYMENT CASE
n i (k))
X mes(Sj+1
PSj+1 (k) = i )
PE i (7.8)
i=1
mes(ED D
n i
X mes(Sj,k,∆W )
PSj,k,∆W = i )
PE i (7.9)
i=1
mes(ED D
2. In the particular case where Rc < δD , the probability of linear connectivity is given by
Theorem 2.1. Considering this case, many possible positions of DRNj in its paving pattern
cannot have a set of DRNs distanced of less than Rc and then cannot be connected to the
neighboring DRNj+1 .
As depicted by Figure 7.4, if DRNj node is located in the surface delimited by the positions
in the interval [aj , aj+1 − Rc[, it will have no probability to be connected to its neighbor.
Then DRNj have to be located in the surface delimited by [aj+1 − Rc , WED ]. We notice then
that for some values of the counter k, the term PSj,k,∆W PSj+1 (k) in Equation (7.5) is equal to
Zero. The probability P Cj,j+1 that DRNj and DRNj+1 are connected in that case is given
by the following formula.
⌈WED /∆W ⌉
X
P Cj,j+1 = PSj,k,∆W PSj+1 (k) (7.10)
a −Rc
k=⌈ j+1
∆W
⌉
Every neighboring strips have to be connected in the sense that two neighboring strips have
DRNs that can communicate together. In fact, for a given DRN is Stripi , we assume that
there is a DRN in the next Stripi+1 that will ensure the connectivity. Then, we propose an
7.3. CHAPTER
THE DRNS 7.INTER
DWBS:
STRIPS
THE CONTROLLED
CONNECTIVITY
RANDOM DEPLOYMENT CASE
expression that evaluates the probability that the DRN in Stripi is connected to a DRN in
Stripi+1 .
In a first step, we determine the probability that a DRN (x, y) located in the position (x, y)
is not connected to any DRN located in the adjacent strip.
Figure 7.5.: The needed intersection area for inter strips connectivity
As presented by Figure 7.5, if the DRN is located in (x,y), a DRN belonging to the next strip
have to be in the hatched area to have inter strips connectivity.
Proposition 3.1 The probability PN ISCD (x, y) that the DRN located in (x, y) is not con-
nected to any DRN of the next strip is given by the following formula.
n=N (x,y)
mes(IP En ,DRN (x,y) )
Y
PN ISCD (x, y) = 1− (7.11)
mes(P En )
n=1
where:
• N (x, y) is the number of paving patterns that intersects with the connectivity area of
DRN (x, y);
• IP En ,DRN (x,y) is the intersection surface between the nth paving pattern and the con-
nectivity area of the DRN when located in the position (x, y).
Proof
As presented by Figure 7.6, the connectivity area of the DRN intersects with one or more
paving patterns. Each paving patterns surely contains one DRN. To be not connected to
the next strip, each one of the other DRNs (belonging to the next strip) must not be in this
intersection area.
The number N (x, y) of paving patterns that intersects with the connectivity area of DRN (x, y),
can be easily computed in relation to Rc , the distance inter strips ∆ and the positions of the
DRN(x,y). In other words, N (x, y) is the number of the DRNs that can be connected to the
DRN when being in (x,y).
The counter n is used to consider all the N (x, y) paving patterns. Given that IP En ,DRN (x,y)
is the intersection surface between the nth paving pattern and the connectivity area of the
7.3. CHAPTER
THE DRNS 7.INTER
DWBS:
STRIPS
THE CONTROLLED
CONNECTIVITY
RANDOM DEPLOYMENT CASE
In the following theorem we determine the probability PISC that all the network is connected
meaning that all the strips are connected.
Theorem 3.1
1. The probability PISC that all the NStrips are connected is given by the following equation.
i=NStrips −1
Y
PISC = PISCi,i+1 , (7.12)
i=1
where PISCi,i+1 is the probability of connectivity between two successive line strips i and i + 1,
and it is given by the following equation.
3. The probability PN ISCD that a DRN located in any position in a paving pattern is not
connected to any DRN in the next strip is given by the following equation.
Z P E y=L
x=W Z PE
1
PN ISCD = PN ISCD (x, y)dxdy (7.15)
WP E .LP E
x=0 y=0
where:
Proof
1. To have a network connected, the NStrips belonging to the deployed network should be
connected meaning that any two neighboring strips i and i + 1 are connected. Then the
probability PISC is the product of the probabilities PISCi,i+1 for any two adjacent strips.
2. We have many DRNs at each strip line. The strips i and i + 1 are not connected only if
any DRN belonging to the strip i is not connected to the next strip i + 1. PN ISCi,i+1 is then
given by the formula 7.14.
3. We do not have an exact position of the DRN landing position and it can be in any position
of the paving pattern area. Then for a DRN, to have the probability that it is not connected
to the adjacent strip, we should not consider only a precise position (x, y) of the DRN but all
the possible positions of the DRN in the paving pattern. The integrals on x and y are used to
consider all the possible positions in a paving pattern. Then, PN ISCD is given by the formula
7.15.
Proposition 4.1 The probability PT N S (x) that a target T located in a position x on a seg-
ment of line of width L is not detected by any BSN is given by the following relation.
• IP En ,Disc(x,Rs ) is the intersection area between the nth paving pattern and Disc(x, Rs );
Proof
denote by IP Ej ,Disc(x,Rs ) and IP Ej+1 ,Disc(x,Rs ) respectively the intersection areas between the
disc Disc(x, Rs ) and the paving patterns P Ej and P Ej+1 .
The target T is sensed by the BSN belonging to the j th paving pattern P Ej only if it is located
in the area IP Ej ,Disc(x,Rs ) . The target T is not covered by the BSN belonging to P Ej and
P Ej+1 if they are located respectively in (EB \IP Ej ,Disc(x,Rs ) ) and (EB \ IP Ej+1 ,Disc(x,Rs ) ).
Then, we can deduce that the probability PT N S (x) is given by the Formula 7.16.
Theorem 4.1
The probability PM LC that all the line to be monitored of length Llength is covered is given
by the following formula.
Llength
PM LC = (1 − PL,N cov ) , (7.17)
L
where PL,N Cov is the probability that a line of length L is not fully covered, is given by the
following formula.
x=L
1
Z
PL,N cov = PT N S (x) dx. (7.18)
L
x=0
Proof
To have the probability PL,N cov that the line is not covered, we should consider all the possible
positions x of a target on the line and for each position compute the probability PT N S (x). A
line of width L is not covered if any point belonging to this line is not covered. In Equation
(7.18), we have considered all the possible positions x on a segment of width L and all the
probabilities PT N S (x).
Having a full line of width LLength to be covered, we should partition the monitored line to
several segments of width L. The probability that the line of width LLength is fully covered is
the probability that all the segment lines of width L are covered. Then the probability PM LC
that all the monitored line is covered is given by Equation (7.17).
7.5. THE COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED MODEL TO THE RANDOM
DEPLOYMENT
CHAPTER 7. DWBS: THE CONTROLLED RANDOM DEPLOYMENT CASE
• The first one represents the value of the DRN line connectivity PLC returned by the
proposed model illustrated by Theorem 2.1;
• For the second one, we performed random deployment of the DRNs. We deployed
many sets of DRNs in random positions in the ellipses ED and measured the number
of deployments that gives full DRN line connectivity. This case represents PLC in real
deployment cases and classical simulations.
The aim of those two simulations is to compare the results returned by the mathematical
model using the proposed arithmetical calculations and those returned by a real deployment
case. When interpreting the results represented by Figure 7.8, we remarked that despite hav-
ing the same curve progression but there is a gap between the model value and the random
deployment real strategy.
After a thorough comparison between the proposed model operating principle and the ran-
dom deployment strategy, we concluded that the main gap is due to the fact that in our model
we considered all the possible combinations of deployment positions and measured the mean
probability of connectivity. But, in the random deployment, despite the facts that we per-
formed many random iterations but we are still in random positions and we will not certainly
cover all the possible DRN positions in the ellipse ED . For that, we added another kind of
deployment scenario. In this metric, we will not consider random positions of the DRNs but
we fixed from the beginning some possible positions of the DRNs spaced by a predetermined
Step and measured the connectivity probability for all the possible combinations of those
positions. The value calculated is then a mean value between all the possible predetermined
positions. The descriptor parameter of this metric is the Step between the fixed positions.
We considered two cases, which corresponds respectively to Step=20 meters and Step=10
meters.
7.5. THE COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED MODEL TO THE RANDOM
DEPLOYMENT
CHAPTER 7. DWBS: THE CONTROLLED RANDOM DEPLOYMENT CASE
Then, we have four scenarios and corresponding metric values computed which corresponds
respectively to the model value, the random deployment, random deployment with respec-
tively Step=20 meters and Step=10 meters. The results of the simulations for the four metrics
are represented by Figure 7.8.
In this simulation, we fixed the communication range Rc to 110 meters and the ellipse width
WED to 100 meters. We varied the value of δD to study the impact of this parameter on PLC .
Such as the previous simulation, we varied the considered parameter and measured respec-
tively the value of PLC corresponding to the proposed model, the random deployment, random
deployment with respectively Step=20 meters and Step=10 meters. The results of this sim-
ulation are represented by Figure 7.9.
7.5. THE COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED MODEL TO THE RANDOM
DEPLOYMENT
CHAPTER 7. DWBS: THE CONTROLLED RANDOM DEPLOYMENT CASE
- The first deduction concerns the global behavior of the curves. The progression of the curve
relative to the proposed model is the same than the curve for the random deployment and
random deployment for prefixed DRN positions. We can deduce that the connectivity proba-
bility returned by the proposed mathematical model returns the same results of the realistic
and classical conducted simulations. Given, that our model is based on light mathematical
formulations, we can then use it to substitute the classical simulations based on random de-
ployments which require higher computation resources and longer processing times;
- In the simulation results, for the random deployment with prefixed DRN positions, it is
clear that as well as the Step is less as well as the values of PLC are closer to the value
returned by our model. Also, as well as we use more precise discrete positions as well as we
are close to the model given values. We can deduce that the results of our model are closer
to the classical realistic simulation scenarios and can be used to evaluate the connectivity of
the deployed network;
7.6. CHAPTER
THE EVALUATION
7. DWBS:
OFTHE
DWBS
CONTROLLED
CONNECTIVITY
RANDOM
AND DEPLOYMENT
COVERAGE CASE
- The third deduction is relative to the behavior of PLC in relation with each one of the
aforementioned parameters.
• We remark on Figure 7.8 that the PLC values grows up when the values of the com-
munication range Rc becomes greater. In fact, when Rc is greater, two neighboring
DRNs have more probabilities to be connected and by consequence all the DRN line
connectivity is greater;
• On Figure 7.9, the value of PLC decreases when the value of δD becomes greater. It
is evident that as well as the distance between the throwing positions of the DRNs is
greater as well as the DRNs are more distanced and we have less cases the provides
connected DRNs;
• Finally, as observed on Figure 7.10, the probability of DRN line connectivity PLC de-
creases when the value of WED becomes greater. In fact when the width of the ellipse
ED grows up the possible distance between neighboring DRNs becomes greater. By
consequence, the probability of connectivity will decrease as well as the WED values
increases.
In the previous simulations, we have just observed the global behavior of the curve of PLC
and verified its homogeneity with the results returned by random deployment simulations.
In these simulations, we represent more generalized variations of PLC in relation with many
possible values of the different parameters. We also analyze the variations of PLC to both two
parameters at the same time to have more representative variations of PLC . Those simulations
can also be used in dimensioning the network and help in the choice of the different parameters
7.6. CHAPTER
THE EVALUATION
7. DWBS:
OFTHE
DWBS
CONTROLLED
CONNECTIVITY
RANDOM
AND DEPLOYMENT
COVERAGE CASE
In the third simulation scenario, we calculated the variation of PLC in relation to δD and
Rc . We fixed the parameter WED to 100 meters. We varied the value of Rc between 50 and
155 meters and δD between 5 and 120 meters. We measured the value of PLC for all the
combinations of Rc and δD values. The results of this simulation are represented by Figure
7.13.
The deductions that can be resulted from this simulation confirms the observations done on
the previous simulations. These interpretations are represented by the followings.
7.6. CHAPTER
THE EVALUATION
7. DWBS:
OFTHE
DWBS
CONTROLLED
CONNECTIVITY
RANDOM
AND DEPLOYMENT
COVERAGE CASE
• As observed on Figures 7.11 and 7.12, the probability of DRN line connectivity PLC is
better for the smallest values of WED . We observe in the two Figures, that for fixed
values of Rc and δD , the curve of PLC decreases as well as the value of WED becomes
greater. In fact when the width WED of the ellipse ED becomes larger, the distance
between neighboring DRNs is greater and by consequence the probability of connectivity
will decrease;
• We remark on Figures 7.11 and 7.13 that the PLC value is better for the largest values
of the communication range Rc . The result is logical because when having a greater
value of Rc , we have more probabilities that two neighboring nodes are connected;
• On Figures 7.12 and 7.13, the best values of PLC are observed for the smallest values of
δD . In real cases, when the paving patterns are closer, two neighboring DRNs will be
closer and we will have more possibilities for connectivity;
• Despite, the behavior of PLC in relation with the different parameters, we remark that
for some combinations of the parameters values, we never reach an acceptable value of
connectivity probability. For example, on figure 7.11 when WED is >130 and for all
the possible Rc values we never reach the value PLC = 1. The same deduction can be
realized on Figures 7.12 and 7.13. These deductions mean that the values of the model
parameters are of great importance and have to be well chosen. Then a dimensioning is
essential because for some values we will have a low probability of connectivity and the
deployed network will not satisfy one of the important goals of the network deployment
which is the connectivity.
In particular, one can notice that despite the values taken by Rc , δD and WED , the
probability of linear connectivity reaches high values of PLC provided that
Rc ≥ δD + WED .
The simulation results can be used either to evaluate the network performances or in dimen-
sioning the network. The presented figures helps the designer of the network in the process
of the several parameters choice to guarantee the connectivity performances needed by the
implemented network.
Based on the results of this simulation, we can evaluate the behavior of the Linear coverage
in relation to the different parameters.
- The results show that for a fixed value of WEB , as well as the range Rs becomes greater as
well as the linear coverage is more probable. In real cases when the sensing range Rs becomes
greater we have a higher probability of coverage.
- This simulation also shows that as well as the width of the paving pattern WEB is smaller
as well as the linear coverage probability is better. This is logical because when the size of
the ellipse EB is smaller we have more precision on the positions in which can the BSN land
and then we have higher probabilities that the proposed deployment model gives the required
quality of coverage.
- In addition to the study of the linear connectivity in relation to the several parameters,
the conducted simulations can be used in dimensioning the DWBS network. The results of
the simulation show that the best values of PM LC are reached only for some combinations
of Rs and WEB values. In fact, when WEB is fixed to 30 meters the value of Rs should be
≥ 40 meters to have a PM LC = 1. And when WEB is fixed to 70 meters the value of Rs
should be ≥ 60 meters to have a PM LC = 1.
In particular, one can notice that despite the values taken by Rs , δB and WEB the probability
of linear coverage PM LC reaches high values provided that
δ B + WE B
Rs ≥ .
2
The results of this simulations are useful in the choice of the Rs and WEB values that ensures
the required probability of coverage.
Based on this simulation, we can evaluate the behavior of the inter strips connectivity in
relation to the different parameters.
• We remark on Figure 7.15, that when the distance between two strips ∆ becomes greater,
we have less opportunities that two adjacent strips are connected if Rc has a fixed value;
• On the same figure, we remark that for a fixed value of ∆, the area in a strip covered by
a DRN in the other strip gets larger when Rc increases and by consequence the value
of PISC becomes greater;
• The results of the simulation show that the best values of PISC are reached for the low-
est values of ∆ and the largest values of Rc . In particular, one can notice that despite
the values of Rc and ∆, the probability of inter strips connectivity becomes larger when
the values of Rc and ∆ verifies Rc > ∆. As well as the value of Rc is larger than ∆ as
well as we are closer to PISC = 1. The value of PISC is very close to 1 when the value
of Rc verifies
Rc ≥ ∆ + W Strip.
The proposed model can be used in the dimensioning of the network while helping in the choice
of the parameters’ values to ensure higher values of inter strips connectivity probability.
and Rs and determine for each combination the probability PLSC that the line is connected
and sensed. We fixed the value of the paving patterns WED and WEB to respectively 100
meters and 30 meters. The distance between two DRNs or BSNs paving patterns is fixed to
50 meters. The results of this simulation are represented by the following figure.
The results of the simulation show that the best values of PLSC are reached for the largest
values of Rs and Rc . In fact, when Rs ≥ 50 and Rc ≥ 105, PLSC is > 0.8.
In particular, one can notice that despite the values taken by the model parameters the proba-
δ +W
bility of coverage and connectivity can reach high values provided that Rs is closer to B 2 EB
and Rc is closer to δD + WED . To reach a high probability PLSC equal to 1, the values of the
parameters should verify
δ B + WE B
Rs ≥ and Rc ≥ δD + WED .
2
Then the simulations conducted can give an indication about the required values of the
several model parameters to ensure that PLSC is greater than a given value.
Deployment based on radio irregularities: The first deployment strategy is based on the
radio propagation effects such as path loss and shadowing. In this method, we studied the
impact of the radio irregularities on the sensing range of a sensor. Based on this study, we
proposed a deployment technique that offers a good quality of sensing under the impact of
radio irregularities.
An energy based deployment technique: The transmission and sensing ranges of a sensor
depend on the energy. When the energy of the nodes decays, the coverage range of the sensors
becomes less and then the area covered by the node is smaller. We studied the impact of the
energy decay on the sensing performance. Therefore, we proposed a deployment technique
that takes into account this constraint and provides a good quality of sensing during all the
network lifetime regardless the decay of the energy.
137
8.2. SCHEDULING SCHEMES
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
tracking of the targets in the monitored area will be used to update the probability of targets
presence in the subareas, and by consequence the quality of sensing of the subareas. This
update can be done either with a new nodes deployment or a move of existing nodes to other
subareas.
A thick linear network for Border surveillance: We setup a framework for border surveil-
lance using a hierarchical Wireless Sensor Networks. We used a thick linear topology to permit
the tracking of the targets near the border line. We proposed a deployment technique of the
several nodes of the network to ensure sensing of the events and communication between all
nodes. We proposed a soft routing technique suitable for the proposed architecture to ensure
communication between all the nodes and a non costly update of the routing entries.
An energy based scheduling scheme: We proposed in this thesis a deployment method that
provides an efficient sensing quality when the sensors’ energy decays. This method is based on
a deployment of redundant sensors to ensure the coverage in the worst cases. Therefore, we
proposed a scheduling scheme that takes benefits of this redundancy. During the lifetime of
the network, depending on the sensors’ residual energy, only the needed sensors are activated
and the others are in sleep mode. Operating at this manner, the sensing quality is preserved
and the lifetime of the network is extended because the sensors are used only when needed.
1-covered. This method preserves the sensing of the area and extends the network lifetime
because the sensors dynamically alternate between active and sleep status.
• In general cases, the irregularity models define the sensing domain as default values
outside the sensors area of deployment. These models are only approximate after de-
ployment and generate non negligible errors. Then, the deployment model should be
adapted to the deployment context. In a future work, we will propose a novel radio
irregularity scheme to cope with the varying climate and vegetation characteristics of
the environment, where the monitoring platform is deployed. A technique based on
the neighboring sensors collaboration may enhance the irregularity perception near a
sensor.
• To extend the network lifetime, we will propose in a future work a solution based on
sensors able to change their sensing domains. The sensors reduce their sensing range to
consume less energy and extend their lifetime. The network will be composed of nodes
having different sensing ranges. We should then adapt the deployment models taking
into account the non uniformity of the sensors’ coverage domains.
• Development of node failure management system. The system developed should guar-
antee two complementary tasks. The first one is an algorithm of detecting, locating
and predicting power-deficient sensors and relay nodes. The second is an algorithm of
replacing the power-deficient sensors and relay nodes before failure. An adaptive ver-
sion of the DWBS will be developed to deploy the additional sensors to substitute the
failed nodes. This is an important feature for reliability of sensor networks by replacing
power-deficient sensors and relay nodes before failure.
• In a future work, we will propose tracking techniques to follow the movement of the
intruders in the monitored area. The sensor network used is a multi linear network like
DWBS. The first and final sensor lines of the network are always activated ensuring,in
some sense, a total coverage of the input and output edges. To extend the network
8.4. FUTURE WORKS CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
lifetime, a sensor belonging to the other lines is activated if a target will cross its sensing
domain. The first contribution of the tracking technique is the continuous tracking using
less energy consumption because the sensors are activated when needed. The second
contribution is the prediction of the target’s exit time and the output segment on the
edge.
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Computation of the mea-
sure of a sub ellipse
A
In this appendix, we will present the demonstration of the measure of the surface of a sub
ellipse.
The surface S delimited by f(x) and depicted by Figure A.2 is given by the following formula
Zy1
S= f (y)dy.
y0
To measure the area of the sub ellipse, we consider the following figure. We present in the
following the needed calculations and the final formula of the subellipse area SAA”A′ .
The equation of an ellipse is given by the following relation
x2 y 2
+ 2 = 1.
a2 b
y2
then we have x2 = a2 1 − b2
q
2
hence x = ±a 1 − yb2
148
APPENDIX A. COMPUTATION OF THE MEASURE OF A SUB ELLIPSE
⌢
We consider
q the surface delimited by the arc AB and the segments AB and A’B’. In that case
y2
f (y) = a 1− b2
.
q
x20 p
We have : y0 = b 1− a2
= ab a2 − x20
y0
having: 0 < y0 ≤ b then 0 < b ≤1
Ry0 q y2
and SABB ′ A′ = a 1− b2
dy
0
Ry0 q y2
and SABB ′′ A′′ A′ = 2a 1− b2
dy
0
or SABB ′ A0 = y0 xx0
Zy0 r
y2
SABB ′ A′ =a 1 − 2 dy.
0
y
We denote by b = sin(t) ⇒ dy = bcos(t)dt
y0
arcsin( b
) p
R
then SABB ′ A′ = ab 1 − sin2 (t)cos(t)dt
0
y0
knowing that 0 < b ≤ 1, then 0 < arcsin( yb0 ) ≤ π
2
we deduce that y y
arcsin( b 0 ) arcsin( b 0)
0 0
1+cos(2t)
cos2 tdt = ab
R R
SABB ′ A′ = ab 2 dt
0 0
APPENDIX A. COMPUTATION OF THE MEASURE OF A SUB ELLIPSE
h iarcsin( 0 y
ab sin(2t) b)
= 2 t+ 2 0
ab
arcsin( yb0 ) + 21 sin(2arcsin( yb0 ))
= 2
or
We also have,
y02
cos2 (arcsin( yb0 )) = 1 − sin2 (arcsin( yb0 )) = 1 − b2
then,
q
y02
cos(arcsin( yb0 )) = 1− b2
and then,
q
y02
sin(2arcsin( yb0 )) = 2 yb0 1− b2
and
q
y02
SAA0 A′ = ab
2 arcsin( yb0 ) + y0
b 1− b2
− y0 xx0