ZAMBRANO, ET. AL V.

PHILIPPINE MARKET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION bona fide in character; and (c) payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to
one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.
G.R. NO. 224099
In this case, the LA's findings that Phil Carpet suffered from serious business losses which
June 21, 2017 resulted in its closure were affirmed in toto by the NLRC, and subsequently by the CA. It is a
rule that absent any showing that the findings of fact of the labor tribunals and the appellate
Mendoza, J.
court are not supported by evidence on record or the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, the Court shall not examine anew the evidence submitted by the
FACTS:
parties.
Petitioners were terminated on the ground of cessation of operation due to serious business
2. NO. The dismissal did not amount to unfair labor practice.
losses. They allege that their dismissal was without just cause and in violation of due process
because the closure of Phil Carpet was a mere pretense to transfer its operations to Pacific
Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.
Carpet. They claimed that the job orders of some regular clients of Phil Carpet was
transferred to Pacific Carpet and that several machines were moved from Phil Carpet to The petitioners miserably failed to discharge the duty imposed upon them. They did not
Pacific Carpet. Petitioners also alleged that their dismissal was constituted with unfair labor identify the acts of Phil Carpet which, they claimed, constituted unfair labor practice. They
practice as it involved mass dismissal of its union officers and members. did not even point out the specific provisions which Phil Carpet violated. Thus, they would
have the Court pronounce that Phil Carpet committed unfair labor practice on the ground
Respondent countered that it permanently closed and totally ceased its operations because
that they were dismissed from employment simply because they were union officers and
there had been a steady decline in the demand for its products due to global recession,
members. The constitutional commitment to the policy of social justice, however, cannot be
stiffer competition and the effects of a changing market. Respondent also faithfully complied
understood to mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor.
with the requisites for closure and cessation of business under the Labor Code.
In this case, as far as the pieces of evidence offered by the petitioners are concerned, there is
LA dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. NLRC affirmed LA’s
no showing that the closure of the company was an attempt at union-busting. Hence, the
ruling. CA ruled that the total cessation of Phil Carpet’s manufacturing operations was not
charge that Phil Carpet is guilty of unfair labor practice must fail for lack of merit.
made in bad faith because the same was clearly due to economic necessity.
3. NO. Pacific Carpet is not liable for Phil Carpet’s obligations.
ISSUES:
This Court has declared that "mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another
1. Whether the petitioners were dismissed from employment for a lawful cause
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself sufficient
ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality." It has likewise ruled that the
2. Whether the petitioners’ termination from employment constitutes unfair labor
"existence of interlocking directors, corporate officers and shareholders is not enough
practice
justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction in the absence of fraud or other public
3. Whether Pacific Carpet may be held liable for Phil Carpet’s obligations policy considerations."

4. Whether the quitclaims signed by the petitioners are valid and binding The petitioners failed to present substantial evidence to prove their allegation that Pacific
Carpet is a mere alter ego of Phil Carpet.
RULING:
4. YES. The quitclaims were valid and binding upon the petitioners.
1. YES. Petitioners were terminated for an authorized cause.
The contents of the quitclaims, which were in Filipino, were clear and simple, such that it was
Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, three requirements are necessary for a valid cessation unlikely that the petitioners did not understand what they were signing.
of business operations: (a) service of a written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at
least one month before the intended date thereof; (b) the cessation of business must be
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO. INC., v. MANGGAGAWA NG downsizing/reorganization and closure of exchanges. Such refusal violates its duty to

KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS and the COURT OF APPEALS, bargain collectively with MKP in good faith.

G.R. No. 162783/ July 14, 2005

FACTS: 3.

Petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. (PLDT) is a domestic PLDT’s continued hiring of “contractual”, “temporary”, “project” and “casual”

corporation engaged in the telecommunications business. employees for regular jobs performed by union members, resulting in the decimation of

Private respondent the union membership and in the denial of the right to self-organization to the concerned

Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP) is a labor union of rank and file employees.

employees in PLDT.

4.

The members of respondent union learned that a redundancy program would PLDT’s gross violation of the legal and CBA provisions on overtime work and

be implemented by the petitioner. Thereupon it filed a Notice of Strike with the compensation.

National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on 04 November 2002. The Notice

fundamentally contained the following: 5.

PLDT’s gross violation of the CBA provisions on promotions and job grade re-

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES, to wit: evaluation or reclassification.

1. On 11 November 2002, another Notice of Strike was filed by the private respondent,

PLDT’s abolition of the Provisioning Support Division, in violation of the duty to which contained the following: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES, to wit: PLDT’s alleged

bargain collectively with MKP in good faith. restructuring of its GMM Operation Services.

2. A number of conciliation meetings, conducted by the NCMB, National Capital Region,

PLDT’s unreasonable refusal to honor its commitment before this Honorable were held between the parties. However, these efforts proved futile.

Office that it will provide MKP its comprehensive plan/s with respect to personnel
On 23 December 2002, the private respondent staged a strike. On 31 December 2002, co-exists with an order for workers to return to work immediately and for

three hundred eighty three (383) union members were terminated from service pursuant employers to readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions

to PLDT’s redundancy program. prevailing before the strike or lockout.

Time and again, this Court has held that when an official bypasses the law on the

On 02 January 2003, the Secretary, Patricia Sto. Tomas, issued an Order[4] in NCMB- asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective, the same will not be maintained if the

NCR-NS-11-405-02 and NCMB-NCR-NS-11-412-02. Portions of the Order are reproduced intendment or purpose of the law would be defeated.[30]

hereunder:

One last piece. Records would show that the strike occurred on 23 December

xxx Accordingly, the strike staged by the Union is hereby enjoined. All striking workers 2002. Article 263(g) directs that the employer must readmit all workers under the

are hereby directed to return to work within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. Since the strike was held on the

Order, except those who were terminated due to redundancy. The employer is hereby aforementioned date, then the condition prevailing before it, which was the condition

enjoined to accept the striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing present on 22 December 2002, must be maintained.

prior to the strike. The parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing

any act that might worsen the situation. xxx Undoubtedly, on 22 December 2002, the members of the private respondent who

were dismissed due to alleged redundancy were still employed by the petitioner and

ISSUE: holding their respective positions. This is the status quo that must be maintained

WHETHER THE SUBJECT ORDERS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE DOLE EXCLUDING FROM THE
RETURN-TO-WORK

ORDER THE WORKERS DISMISSED DUE TO THE REDUNDANCY PROGRAM OF PETITIONER, ARE
VALID OR NOT.

RULING:

. . . Assumption of jurisdiction over a labor dispute, or as in this case the

certification of the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, always

. Case Digest: De la Salle University, Petitioner, v. De la Salle University Employees
Association
G.R. No. 169254 : August 23, 2012
De la Salle University, Petitioner, v. De la Salle University Employees Association,
Respondent.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS:
On May 30, 2000, some of De La Salle University Employees Association (DLSUEA-NAFTEU)
members headed by Belen Aliazas (the Aliazas faction) filed a petition for the election of
union officers in the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). They alleged therein that there has
been no election for DLSUEA-NAFTEU’s officers since 1992 in supposed violation of the
union’s constitution and by-laws which provided for an election of officers every three years.
It would appear that DLSUEA-NAFTEU repeatedly voted to approve the hold-over of the
previously elected officers led by Baylon Bañez (Bañez faction).
When the matter was eventually elevated to the BLR Director, the latter ruled that the Bañez
faction’s tenure in office is valid and subsisting until their successors have been duly elected
and qualified.
Thereafter, DLSUEA-NAFTEU entered into a five-year CBA with De La Salle University (DLSU).
The Aliazas faction wrote a letter to DLSU requesting it to place in escrow the union dues and
other fees deducted from the salaries of employees pending the resolution of the intra-union
conflict. DLSUEA-NAFTEU filed a complaint for unfair labor practice in the NLRC alleging that
DLSU violated Article 248(a) and (g) of the Labor Code. DLSUEA-NAFTEU asserted that that
the creation of escrow accounts was not an act of neutrality as it was influenced by the
Aliazas factions’s letter and was an act of interference with the internal affairs of the union.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice.
Subsequently, DLSUEA-NAFTEU sent a letter to DLSU requesting for the renegotiation of the
economic terms for the fourth and fifth years of the then current CBA. DLSU denied the
request prompting DLSUEA-NAFTEU to file a notice of strike. The Secretary of Labor assumed
jurisdiction and found DLSU guilty of unfair labor practice.
Consequently, DLSUEA-NAFTEU reiterated its demand on DLSU to bargain collectively
pursuant to the aforementioned Decision of the Secretary of Labor. Again, DLSU declined the
request. Thus, DLSUEA-NAFTEU filed another notice of strike. The Secretary of Labor cited his
earlier decision and ruled that DLSU is guilty of unfair labor practice. In accordance with the
said decision, DLSU turned over to DLSUEA-NAFTEU the collected union dues and agency fees
from employees which were previously placed in escrow.
Aggrieved, DLSU appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition. When
the matter was elevated to the Supreme Court, the Court affirmed the CA. DLSU moved to
reconsider but the Court denied the same. Thus, the decision attained finality. Meanwhile,
DLSUEA-NAFTEU was ordered to file a comment, and, subsequently, this petition was given
due course.
ISSUE: Whether or not DLSU is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused to bargain
collectively with DLSUEA-NAFTEU in light of the intra-union dispute between DLSUEA-
NAFTEU two opposing factions?
HELD: The petition is denied.
Inevitably, G.R. No. 168477 and this petition seek only one relief, that is, to absolve
petitioner from respondent’s charge of committing an unfair labor practice, or specifically, a
violation of Article 248(g) in relation to Article 252 of the Labor Code. In other words, our
previous affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ finding – that petitioner erred in suspending
collective bargaining negotiations with the union and in placing the union funds in escrow
considering that the intra-union dispute between the Aliazas and Bañez factions was not a
justification therefor — is binding herein.
The law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means
that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether
correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
Neither can petitioner seek refuge in its defense that as early as November 2003 it had
already released the escrowed union dues to respondent and normalized relations with the
latter. The fact remains that from its receipt of the July 28, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of
Labor in OS-AJ-0015-2003 until its receipt of the November 17, 2003 Decision of the
Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0033-2003, petitioner failed in its duty to collectively bargain
with respondent union without valid reason.
Petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 203957; July 30, 2014 In its 13 July 2012 decision, the CA found grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC and
set aside the decisions. The CA denied USTFU’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY UNION, Petitioner,

vs. UNIVERSITY OF STO. TOMAS, Respondent.

The Issues

Whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in hearing the case and and in
The Facts giving an award not prayed for in petitioner USTFU’s complain

In a letter dated February 6, 2007, [USTFU] demanded from [UST], through its Rector, Fr.
Ernesto M. Arceo, O.P. ("Fr. Arceo"), remittance of the total amount of P65,000,000.00 plus
legal interest thereon, representing deficiency in its contribution to the medical and
hospitalization fund ("fund") of [UST’s] faculty members. [USTFU] also sent [UST] a letter
dated February 26, 2007, accompanied by a summary of its claims pursuant to their 1996-
2001 CBA.
On March 2, 2007, Fr. Arceo informed [USTFU] that the aforesaid benefits were not meant to
be given annually but rather as a one-time allocation or contribution to the fund.[USTFU]
then sent [UST] another demand letter dated June 24, 2007 reiterating its position that [UST]
is obliged to remit to the fund. Thus, on September 5, 2007 [USTFU] filed against [UST], a
complaint for unfair labor practice, as well as for moral and exemplary damages plus
attorney’s fees before the arbitration branch of the NLRC.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit. SC affirms with modification the ruling of the CA. The Labor Arbiter
has no jurisdiction over the present case. The Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators will have original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims "arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and, those arising
fromthe interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies," under Article 261.
USTFU’s claims under the 1996-2001 CBA, whether characterized as one for unfair labor
practice or for money claims from employer-employee relations, have already prescribed
when USTFU filed a complaint before the LA.

[UST] sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It contended
that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitratoror panel of
voluntary arbitrators because it involves the interpretation and implementation of the
provisions of the CBA; and the conflict between the herein parties must be resolved as
grievance under the CBA and not as unfair labor practice.
The 1996-2001 CBA established the fund, with an initial remittance of P2, 000, 000. 00 for
school year 1996-1997. UST bound itself to augment the fund by contributing P1,000,000.00
per year for school years 1997-1998 and 1998-1999. The 1999 Memorandum of Agreement
merely stated that UST will deposit P4,000,000.00 to the fund. UST faithfully followed the
clear provisions of the agreements.

In 24 September 2010, the LA ordered the (UST) to remit P18,000,000.00 to the

hospitalization and medical benefits fund. The other claims were dismissed for lack of merit.
In 8 June 2011, the NLRC ordered UST to remit to the University of Santo Tomas Faculty
Union (USTFU) the amounts of P80,000,000.00 for the fund pursuant to the CBA. The NLRC
denied UST’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Sonedco Workers Free Labor Union (SWOFLU) / Renato Yude, et al. Vs. Universal Robina SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00; and
Corporation, Sugar Division-Southern Negros Development Corporation (SONEDCO) exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00.

G.R. No. 220383. October 5, 2016

Doctrine

On May 6, 2002, Universal Robina Corporation Sugar Division - Southern Negros An employer who refuses to bargain with the union and tries to restrict its bargaining power
Development Corporation (URC-SONEDCO) and Philippine Agricultural Commercial and is guilty of unfair labor practice. In determining whether an employer has not bargained in
Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU-TUCP), then the exclusive bargaining representative of good faith, the totality of all the acts of the employer at the time of negotiations must be
URC-SONEDCO's rank-and-file employees, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement taken into account.
(2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement) effective January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2006.5
Under the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement, rank-and-file employees were entitled to a
wage increase of P14.00/day for 2002 and P12.00/day for the succeeding years until 2006.

On May 17, 2002, days after the 2002 Collective Bargaining Agreement was signed, a
certification election was conducted. SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union won and replaced
PACIWU-TUCP as the exclusive bargaining representative.

On August 28, 2007, with no collective bargaining agreement in effect, URC-SONEDCO

informed the rank-and-file employees that they would be granted the following economic
benefits

URC-SONEDCO asked the employees who wished to avail themselves of these-benefits to

sign an acknowledgment receipt/waiver (2007 waiver), which stated that "[i]n the event that
a subsequent [collective bargaining agreement] is negotiated between Management and
Union, the new [Collective Bargaining Agreement] shall only be effective January 1, 2008.

Lower Courts however erred in ruling that respondent did not commit unfair labor practice,
the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals failed to consider the
totality of respondent's acts, which showed that it violated its duty to bargain collectively.
This constitutes unfair labor practice under Article 259(g) of the Labor Code.

The wording of the waivers shows a clear attempt to limit petitioners' bargaining power by
making them waive the negotiations for 2007 and 2008. In stipulating that the collective
bargaining agreement that would be entered into would only be effective the year following
the 2008 waiver, respondent limited when the collective bargaining agreement could be
deemed effective. In other words, respondent asked petitioners to forego any benefits they
might have received under a collective bargaining agreement in exchange for the company-
granted benefits.

The Supreme Court finds respondent Universal Robina Corporation. Sugar Division - Southern
Negros Development Corporation is GUILTY of unfair labor practice and is ORDERED to pay
each of the petitioners the wage increase of P16.00 for the years 2007 and 2008; and to pay
MINETTE BAPTISTA vs.ROSARIO VILLANUEVA,et. al G.R. No. 194709, 31 July 2013

RULING: No. It is well-settled that workers’ and employers’ organizations shall have the right
to draw up their constitutions and rules to elect their representatives in full freedom, to
FACTS: organize their administration and activities and to formulate their programs. In this case,
RPNEU’s Constitution and By-Laws expressly mandate that before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
internal remedies within the organization. Petitioners were found to have violated the
Petitioners and other members of the union filed impeachment complaint against all the
provisions of the union’s Constitution and By-Laws when they filed petitions for
union officers and members of RPNEU and audit before the DOLE for suspicion of union
impeachment against their union officers and for audit before the DOLE without first
mismanagement. Thereafter, complaints, were filed against petitioners and several others
exhausting all internal remedies available within their organization. This act is a ground for
for alleged violation of the union’s Constitution and By-Laws and violation of Section 2.5 of
expulsion from union membership. Thus, petitioners’ expulsion from the union was not a
Article IX for urging or advocating that a member start an action in any court of justice or
deliberate attempt to curtail or restrict their right to organize, but was triggered by the
external investigative body against the Union or its officer without first exhausting all internal
commission of an act, expressly sanctioned by the union’s Constitution and By-Laws.
remedies open to him or available in accordance with the CBL. Petitioners and their group
denied the charges imputed against them and contested the procedure adopted by the
Committee in its investigation.
Unfortunately, petitioners failed to discharge the burden required to prove the charge of ULP
against the respondents. Aside from their self-serving allegations, petitioners were not able
to establish how they were restrained or coerced by their union in a way that curtailed their
The Committee submitted their recommendation of expulsion from the union to RPNEU’s
right to self-organization. The records likewise failed to sufficiently show that the
Board of Directors which the latter affirmed and they were served expulsion notice. And their
respondents unduly persuaded management into discriminating against petitioners. other
employment was terminated in compliance with their CBA’s union security clause.
than to bring to its attention their expulsion from the union, which in turn, resulted in the
implementation of their CBA’ s union security clause. As earlier stated, petitioners had the
burden of adducing substantial evidence to support its allegations of ULP, which burden they
Petitioners filed complaints for ULP against the respondents questioning legality of their failed to discharge. In fact, both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioners were unable to
expulsion from the union and their subsequent termination from employment. LA ruled in prove their charge of ULP against the respondents.
favor of the petitioners and adjudged the respondents guilty of ULP pursuant to Article 249
(a) and (b) of the Labor Code. NLRC, on appeal, dismissed the case for lack of merit. CA
sustained the NLRC Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the labor organization is guilty of unfair labor practice when it expels
members pursuant to the Union’s CBL.
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. BPI Employees Union Davao Chapter – Federation of Unions
in BPI Unibank, G.R. No. 164301, August 10, 2010.
29
APR
[LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.]
FACTS
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas approved the Articles of Merger executed by and between BPI,
herein petitioner, and Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) and was approved by the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The Articles of Merger and Plan of Merger did not
contain any specific stipulation with respect to the employment contracts of existing
personnel of the non-surviving entity which is FEBTC. Pursuant to the said Article and Plan of
Merger, all the assets and liabilities of FEBTC were transferred to and absorbed by BPI as the
surviving corporation. FEBTC employees, including those in its different branches across the
country, were hired by petitioner as its own employees, with their status and tenure
recognized and salaries and benefits maintained.
ISSUE
Whether or not employees are ipso jure absorbed in a merger of the two corporations.
RULING
NO. [H]uman beings are never embraced in the term “assets and liabilities.”Moreover, BPI’s
absorption of former FEBTC employees was neither by operation of law nor by legal
consequence of contract. There was no government regulation or law that compelled the
merger of the two banks or the absorption of the employees of the dissolved corporation by
the surviving corporation. Had there been such law or regulation, the absorption of
employees of the non-surviving entities of the merger would have been mandatory on the
surviving corporation. In the present case, the merger was voluntarily entered into by both
banks presumably for some mutually acceptable consideration. In fact, the Corporation Code
does not also mandate the absorption of the employees of the non-surviving corporation by
the surviving corporation in the case of a merger.
[The] Court cannot uphold the reasoning that the general stipulation regarding transfer of
FEBTC assets and liabilities to BPI as set forth in the Articles of Merger necessarily includes
the transfer of all FEBTC employees into the employ of BPI and neither BPI nor the FEBTC
employees allegedly could do anything about it. Even if it is so, it does not follow that the
absorbed employees should not be subject to the terms and conditions of employment
obtaining in the surviving corporation.
Furthermore, [the] Court believes that it is contrary to public policy to declare the former
FEBTC employees as forming part of the assets or liabilities of FEBTC that were transferred
and absorbed by BPI in the Articles of Merger. Assets and liabilities, in this instance, should
be deemed to refer only to property rights and obligations of FEBTC and do not include the
employment contracts of its personnel. A corporation cannot unilaterally transfer its
employees to another employer like chattel. Certainly, if BPI as an employer had the right to
choose who to retain among FEBTC’s employees, FEBTC employees had the concomitant
right to choose not to be absorbed by BPI. Even though FEBTC employees had no choice or
control over the merger of their employer with BPI, they had a choice whether or not they
would allow themselves to be absorbed by BPI. Certainly nothing prevented the FEBTC’s
employees from resigning or retiring and seeking employment elsewhere instead of going
along with the proposed absorption.
Employment is a personal consensual contract and absorption by BPI of a former FEBTC
employee without the consent of the employee is in violation of an individual’s freedom to
contract. It would have been a different matter if there was an express provision in the
articles of merger that as a condition for the merger, BPI was being required to assume all
the employment contracts of all existing FEBTC employees with the conformity of the
employees. In the absence of such a provision in the articles of merger, then BPI clearly had
the business management decision as to whether or not employ FEBTC’s employees. FEBTC
employees likewise retained the prerogative to allow themselves to be absorbed or not;
otherwise, that would be tantamount to involuntary servitude.
UNITED POLYRESINS v. MARCELINO PINUELA [ GR No. 209555, Jul 31, 2017 ] RULING

1. No. Pinuela's expulsion is grounded on the provisions of the union's Constitution.

FACTS 2. Yes. Such a contribution by petitioners to PORFA constitutes ULP.

Pinuela was the President of Polyresins Rank and File Association (PORFA). Petitioners gave
300k loan to the union. The CBA contained a union security clause wherein employees who
cease to be PORFA members shall not be retained in the employ of UPI. Petitioners told OPINION
respondent that until the P300k is returned, it will not discuss a new CBA. Pinuela filed a
Pinuela's expulsion is grounded on the provisions of the union's Constitution. But these
complaint in (NCMB), claiming that petitioners refused to bargain. Union members accused
provisions refer to impeachment and recall of union officers, and not expulsion from union
Pinuela of mismanagement. Special elections were held, and a new President Was elected.
membership, hence not a just cause.
The union expelled Pinuela. Petitioners issued a letter of termination to take effect
immediately.

The officers held that these violations constituted an infringement of the union's Constitution
which specifically prohibit the misappropriation of union funds and property and give ground
for the impeachment and recall of union officers.
ISSUE
1. Was the basis/ ground to expel him from the union proper?
2. Did the grant of loan constitute ULP?
LAW
It was therefore error on the part of PORFA and petitioners to terminate respondent's
employment. Such a ground does not constitute just cause for termination.Thus, for what he
is charged with, respondent may not be penalized with expulsion from the union, since this is
not authorized and provided for under PORFA's Constitution. This could be an opportune
time for the union to consider amending its Constitution in order to provide for specific rules
on the discipline of its members, not just its officers. After all, it is given the right under the
Labor Code, "to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership." But it may not insist on expelling respondent from PORFA and assist in his
dismissal from UPI without just cause, since it is an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization to "cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee,
including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such
organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the
usual terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is made
available to other members."

1. Article 250 (Employer’s ULP) - (d) To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with
The matter of Pinuela's alleged failure to return petitioners' P300K which was lent to PORFA
the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or
is immaterial as well. It may not be used as a ground to terminate his employment; such a
other support to it or its organizers or supporters;
contribution by petitioners to PORFA constitutes ULP.

CASE HISTORY

LA said that Pinuela was not illegally terminated. This was affirmed by NLRC. But the CA
reversed the NLRC.