San Beda College

College of Law

Legal Research I
Dean Ulan Sarmiento

Submitted By: Ann Rosselle S. Cortes, I-B

Case: Morris had been drinking when he entered the Bank of the Philippine Island
Branch located in Mendiola, “I have a 9mm handgun in my pocket,” he said to the
teller “and I want all your money.” The teller set off a silent alarm but when she
handed Morris the cash, he said he had been joking all along. He left the bank empty
handed, but upon stepping out of the bank door, he was arrested by the Police.

Morris was charged in the court of attempted robbery.

At the case at bar, the given circumstances are as follows:

• Morris is drunk (Aggravating/Mitigating depending on the
habituality/intention)
• He went inside the bank as a prankster and imposed grave threats upon the
banker (Grave Threats)
• He did not intend to rob because he was practically acting like a prankster
(Attempted Robbery)
• He was arrested and charged of attempted robbery

Let us further dissect the case by defining the terms and circumstances
mentioned.

Robbery is contemplated in Article 293 as follows:

293. Who are guilty of robbery. — Any person who, with

intent to gain, shall take any personal property
belonging to another, by means of violence or
intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything
shall be guilty of robbery.

Such requisites need be satisfied in order for the crime to

consummate:

(a) that there be personal property belonging to

another;
(b) that there is unlawful taking of that property;
(c) that the taking is with intent to gain or animus
lucrandi; and (d) that there is violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.

In the case at bar, the following requisites are satisfied:

(a)that there be personal property belonging to another;

The Money from the Bank, at the hands of the bank teller.

(b) that there is unlawful taking of that property;

This requisite is not satisfied since there is no unlawful taking that took place.

The landmark case of Valenzuela vs. People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 160188, 21 June 2007 defines what unlawful taking means:

“In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded with

apoderamiento, or “unlawful taking,” to characterize
theft. Justice Regalado notes that the concept of
apoderamiento once had a controversial interpretation
and application. Spanish law had already discounted the
belief that mere physical taking was constitutive of
 apoderamiento, finding that it had to be coupled with
“the intent to
appropriate the object in order to constitute
apoderamiento; and to appropriate means to deprive the
lawful owner of the thing.”
However, a conflicting line of cases decided by the Court
of Appeals ruled, alternatively, that there must be
permanency in the taking or an intent to permanently
deprive the owner of the stolen property; or that
there was no need for permanency in the taking or in its
intent, as the mere temporary possession by the
offender or disturbance of the proprietary rights of the
owner already constituted apoderamiento. Ultimately, as
Justice Regalado notes, the Court adopted the latter
thought that there was no need of an intent to
permanently deprive the
owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking.”

(c) that the taking is with intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and
 There is a conflicting scenario at the case at bar.

The long-standing Latin maxim “actus non facit reum,

nisi
mens sit rea” supplies an important characteristic of a
crime, that “ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an
unlawful act for there to be a crime,” and accordingly,
there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting. Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in
crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as
“a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal
intent,” and “essential for criminal liability.” It follows
that the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes
must be able to supply what the mens rea of the crime
is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has comfortably
held that “a criminal law that contains no mens rea
requirement infringes on constitutionally protected
rights.” The criminal statute must also provide for the
overt acts that constitute
the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not
enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an
actus reus.

He is criminally liable for robbery as contemplated in the 3rd requisite though

it be different from that which he intended, the revised penal code contemplates
that:

Article 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:

By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

It is contemplated in this provision that "if a man creates in another man's mind an
immediate sense of danger which causes such person to do so and creates an injury,
the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which
result" (People v. Page, 77 SCRA 348, citing People v. Toling, L-27097, Jan. 17, 1975,
62 SCRA 17, 33)

(d) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
At the case at bar, this requisite is very much evident.

In a similar case of Fortuna vs. People G.R. No. 135784. December 15, 2000,
Diosdada gave all her money to the offenders in fear of his brother being
apprehended and admitted to the police detention cells also implying the idea that
his brother would be beaten by the convicts, harassed by the media and with other
evil things to come. It was ruled that the offenders were found guilty of having
conspired in committing the crime with intimidation of persons.

There is a missing requisite being charged of an attempted felony. Thus, Article 6

says that:

Article 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted

felonies. Consummated felonies as well as those which
are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements
necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs
all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of
the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance.

The attempted stage

"the accused commences the commission of a felonious act directly by overt
acts but does not perform all the acts of execution due to some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance”

A). (1). The attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a
connection to a particular, concrete offense, that which is the beginning of the
execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to
the its realization and commission (2) The act must not be equivocal but
indicates a clear intention to commit a particular and specific felony. Thus the
act of a notorious criminal in following a woman can not be the attempted
stage of any felony.

B). Overt or external act is some physical deed or activity, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or
preparation, which if carried out to is complete termination following its
natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen
into a concrete offense

Examples of which are as follows:

 The accused pressed a chemically -soaked cloth on the
mouth of the woman to induce her to sleep, while he lay
on top of her and pressed his body to her. The act is not
the overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into
rape. They constitute unjust vexation. ( Note: it would
be attempted rape if he tried to undress the victim or
touch her private parts) ( Balleros vs. People, Feb, 22,
2006).

The accused has not yet passed the subjective phase or that phase
encompassed from the time an act is executed which begins the commission of the
crime until the time of the performance of the last act necessary to produce the
crime, but where the accused has still control over his actions and their results.

There is an attempt to take the money from the bank but due to the provision
on spontaneous desistance, Morris is justified from the act. Where if the offender
does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of his own spontaneous
desistance, there is no attempted felony. Desistance is defined as an absolutory
cause which negates criminal liability because the law encourages a person to desist
from committing a crime. (Viada, Cod. Pen.,35-36) That this spontaneous desistance
as cited in People vs. Pambaya, 60 Phil. 1022, may be out of fear, or in Morris’ case
at bar is due to alcoholic influence. It is not necessary that it be justified by no intent.

Therefore, Morris is liable of a different crime which is contemplated in Article

282 of the RPC which says that:

Art. 282. Grave threats. — Any person who shall

threaten another with the infliction upon the person,
honor or property of the latter or of his family of any
wrong amounting to a crime.

The following elements of grave threat is also satisfied

by Morris’ acts where the elements of grave threat are
the following:

(1) that the offender threatened another person with the

infliction upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to
a crime; and (3) that the threat was not subject to a condition. Hence,
petitioner could have been convicted there under.

Any person who creates in the mind of another person’s mind an immediate
sense of danger is considered grave threat. Therefore the act of Morris’ saying, “I
have a 9mm handgun in my pocket,” he said to the teller “and I want all your
money”, that would amount to a robbery, and the threat was not subject to any other
options or condition that the teller may take for the safety of her life, which led her to
press the silent alarm in call of rescue.

DECISION
 Thus, Morris is guilty of Grave threats with the aggravating/mitigating
circumstance of intoxication depending on the habituality and intention but still to
be proven before the court.