Admin Case digests Finals batch 2
Mario Jose E. Serrano vs Committee on Trade and Related Matters
BERSAMIN, J.:
The constitutional guarantee to information does not open every door to
any and all information, but is rather confined to matters of public concern.
It is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The State's policy
of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest,
and is tempered by reasonable conditions prescribed by law.
The Case
The petitioner appeals the decision rendered on October 16, 2006 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 268, in Pasig City[1]dismissing the
petition for mandamus he had filed in his capacity as a citizen and as a
stakeholder in the Philippine petrochemical industry to compel respondent
Committee on Tariff and Related Matters (CTRM) to provide him a copy of
the minutes of its May 23, 2005 meeting; as well as to provide copies of all
official records, documents, papers and government research data used as
basis for the issuance of Executive Order No. 486.[2]
Antecedents
On May 23, 2005, the CTRM, an office under the National Economic
Development Authority (NEDA), held a meeting in which it resolved to
recommend to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the lifting of the
suspension of the tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and certain
plastic products, thereby reducing the Common Effective Preferential Tariff
(CEPT) rates on products covered by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 161 from 7%
or 10% to 5% starting July 2005.[3]
On June 9, 2005, Wilfredo A. Paras (Paras), then the Chairman of the
Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP), the
main industry association in the petrochemical sector, wrote to the CTRM
Secretariat, through its Director Brenda Mendoza (Director Mendoza), to
request a copy of the minutes of the meeting held on May 23, 2005.
Director Mendoza denied the request through her letter of June 20,
2005,[4] to wit:
With reference to your request for a copy of the minutes and resolution of
the Committee on Tariff and Related Matters (CTRM) meeting held on 23
May 2005, our Legal Staff advised that we cannot provide the minutes of
the meeting detailing the position and views of different CTRM member
agencies. We may, however, provide you with the action taken of the CTRM
as follows:
"The CTRM agreed to reduce the CEPT rates on petrochemical resins and
plastic products covered under EO 161 from 7% / 10% to 5% starting July
2005, and to revert the CEPT rates on these products to EO 161 levels once
the proposed naphtha cracker plant is in commercial operation."
The CTRM has yet to confirm the minutes including the action taken during
the said meeting since it has not met after 23 May 2005.
The CTRM, again through Director Mendoza, sent a second letter dated
August 31, 2005 as a response to the series of letter-requests from the
APMP, stating:
The CTRM during its meeting on 14 July 2005 noted that Section 3, Rule IV
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act 6713 or the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
provides that every department, office or agency shall provide official
information, records or documents to any requesting public (sic). However,
the section also provides exceptions to the rules, such as if '...(c) such
information, record or document south (sic) falls within the concepts of
established privileged or recognized exceptions as may be provided by law
or settled policy or jurisprudence...' The acknowledged limitations to
information access under Section 3 (c) include diplomatic correspondence,
closed-door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either House of
Congress, as well as internal deliberations of the Supreme Court (Chavez vs.
Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299 SCRA 744)
The CTRM is of the view that the limitation pertaining to closed-door
cabinet meetings under Section 3 (c) of the IRR applies to the minutes of the
meeting requested by APMP. In view thereof, the CTRM is constrained [not]
to provide the said minutes to the APMP.[5]
The APMP sent another letter-request dated October 27, 2005 to the CTRM
through Director Mendoza reminding about the legal implications of the
refusal to furnish copies of the minutes as in violation of the petitioner's
Constitutional right of access to information on matters of public concern.
However, the CTRM continued to refuse access to the documents sought by
the APMP.[6]
The attitude of the CTRM prompted the petitioner and the APMP to bring
the petition for mandamus in the RTC to compel the CTRM to provide the
copy of the minutes and to grant access to the minutes. The case was
docketed as SCA No. 2903.
The APMP, through Paras and Concepcion I. Tanglao, respectively its
Chairman and President at the time, sent letters dated December 12,
2005[7] and January 10, 2006[8] to the Office of the President (OP), stating
the reasons why the recommendation of the CTRM should be rejected, but
the OP did not respond to the letters.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction dated January 3, 2006, to which the
respondent filed its Opposition dated January 26, 2006 and Motion to
Dismiss dated February 16, 2006.[9]
Meanwhile, President Arroyo signed Executive Order No. 486,[10] dated
January 12, 2006, to lift the suspension of the tariff reduction on
petrochemical resins and other plastic products under the ASEAN Free
Trade Area - Common Effective Preferential Tariff (AFTA-CEPT) Scheme. The
relevant portions of E.O. No. 486 read:
WHEREAS, Executive Order 234 dated 27 April 2000, which implemented
the 2000-2003 Philippine schedule of tariff reduction of products
transferred from the Temporary Exclusion List and the Sensitive List to the
Inclusion List of the accelerated CEPT Scheme for the AFTA, provided that
the CEPT rates on petrochemicals and certain plastic products will be
reduced to 5% on 01 January 2003;
WHEREAS, Executive Order 161 issued on 9 January 2003 provides for the
suspension of the application of the tariff reduction schedule on
petrochemicals and certain products in 2003 and 2004 only;
WHEREAS, the government recognizes the need to provide an enabling
environment for the naphtha cracker plant to attain international
competitiveness;
WHEREAS, the NEDA Board approved the lifting of the suspension of the
aforesaid tariff reduction schedule on petrochemicals and certain plastic
products and the reversion of the CEPT rates on these products to EO 161
(s.2003) levels once the naphtha cracker plant is in commercial operation;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the powers vested in me under
Section 402 of the Tariff and Customs Code of 1978 (Presidential Decree No.
1464), as amended, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. The articles specifically listed in Annex "A" (Articles Granted
Concession under the CEPT Scheme for the AFT A) hereof, as classified
under Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code of 1978, as amended shall
be subject to the ASEAN CEPT rates in accordance with the schedule
indicated in Column 4 of Annex "A". The ASEAN CEPT rates so indicated shall
be accorded to imports coming from ASEAN Member States applying CEPT
concession to the same product pursuant to Article 4 of the CEPT
Agreement and its Interpretative Notes.
In its order of May 9, 2006, the RTC denied the Urgent Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction but directed the
parties to file their respective memorandums after noting that the
controversy involved a pure question of law.[11]
Subsequently, the RTC rendered its assailed decision on October 16,
2006[12] dismissing the petition for mandamus for lack of merit. It relied on
the relevant portions of Section 3 of Rule IV of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees), to wit:
Sec 3. Every department, office or agency shall provide official information,
records and documents to any requesting public except if:
xxxx
(c) the information, record or document sought falls within the concepts of
established privilege or recognized exceptions as may be provided by law or
settled policy or jurisprudence;
(d) such information, record or document comprises drafts or decisions,
orders, rulings, policies, memoranda, etc.
and relevant portions of Section 7 (c) of the same law, viz.:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared unlawful:
xxxx
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information - Public officials and
employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information
officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to
the public either:
xxxx
(2) To the prejudice of public interest.[13]
The RTC declared that the "CTRM is an advisory body composed of various
department heads or secretaries and is classified as cabinet meetings and
inter-agency communications;"[14] and that the record of the
communications of such body "falls under the category of privileged
information because of the sensitive subject matter which could seriously
affect public interest."[15]
Hence, this appeal directly to the Court on questions of law.[16]
Issues
The petitioner submits the following issues for resolution, namely:
Are meetings of the CTRM and the minutes thereof exempt from the
Constitutional right of access to information?
Assuming arguendo that the minutes of CTRM meetings are privileged or
confidential, is such privilege or confidentiality absolute?
Can privilege or confidentiality be invoked to evade public accountability, or
worse, to cover up incompetence and malice?[17]
In short, the issue is whether or not the CTRM may be compelled
by mandamus to furnish the petitioner with a copy of the minutes of the
May 23, 2005 meeting based on the constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern and the State's policy of full public disclosure. The
request for information was motivated by his desire to understand the basis
for the CTRM's recommendation that allegedly caused tremendous losses to
the petrochemical industry through the issuance of E.O. No. 486.
In seeking the nullification of the assailed decision of the RTC, and the
consequent release of the minutes and the disclosure of all official records,
documents, papers and government research data used as the basis for the
issuance of E.O. No. 486, the petitioner invokes the following provisions of
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6713, thusly:
Section 28 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 1 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 6713:
Section 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. - In the performance of
their duties, all public officials and employees are under obligation to:
xxxx
(e) Make documents accessible to the public. - All public documents must
be made accessible to, and readily available for inspection by, the public
within reasonable working hours.
Ruling of the Court
The dismissal of the petition for mandamus by the RTC is affirmed.
The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of
public concern enunciated in Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
complements the State's policy of full public disclosure in all transactions
involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of the 1987
Constitution. These provisions are aimed at ensuring transparency in policy-
making as well as in the operations of the Government, and at safeguarding
the exercise by the people of the freedom of expression. In a democratic
society like ours, the free exchange of information is necessary, and can be
possible only if the people are provided the proper information on matters
that affect them. But the people's right to information is not absolute.
According to Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,[18] the constitutional
guarantee to information "does not open every door to any and all
information."[19] It is limited to matters of public concern, and is subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.[20] Likewise, the State's policy
of full public disclosure is restricted to transactions involving public interest,
and is further subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law.[21]
Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be
compelled by writ of mandamus. Firstly, the information sought must be in
relation to matters of public concern or public interest. And, secondly, it
must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee.
As to the first requisite, there is no rigid test in determining whether or not
a particular information is of public concern or public interest.[22] Both
terms cover a wide-range of issues that the public may want to be familiar
with either because the issues have a direct effect on them or because the
issues "naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen."[23] As such,
whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern
is left to the proper determination of the courts on a case to case basis.
In his capacity as a citizen and as the Executive Director of the APMP, the
petitioner has sought to obtain official information dealing with the policy
recommendation of the CTRM with respect to the reduction of tariffs on
petrochemical resins and plastic products. He has asserted that the
recommendation, which would be effected through E.O. No. 486, not only
brought significant losses to the petrochemical industry that undermined
the industry's long-term viability and survival, but also conflicted with
official government pronouncements, policy directives, and enactments
designed to support and develop an integrated petrochemical industry. He
has claimed that the implementation of E.O. No. 486 effectively deprived
the industry of tariff support and market share, thereby jeopardizing large
investments without due process of law.[24]
The Philippine petrochemical industry centers on the manufacture of plastic
and other related materials, and provides essential input requirements for
the agricultural and industrial sectors of the country. Thus, the position of
the petrochemical industry as an essential contributor to the overall growth
of our country's economy easily makes the information sought a matter of
public concern or interest.
The second requisite is that the information requested must not be
excluded by law from the constitutional guarantee. In that regard, the Court
has already declared that the constitutional guarantee of the people's right
to information does not cover national security matters and intelligence
information, trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal
matters.[25] Equally excluded from coverage of the constitutional
guarantee are diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting and
executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well as the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court.[26] In Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority,[27] the Court has ruled that the right to information does not
extend to matters acknowledged as "privileged information under the
separation of powers," which include "Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings."[28] Likewise exempted from the right to information are
"information on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting
national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused."[29]
The respondents claim exemption on the ground that the May 23, 2005
meeting was classified as a closed-door Cabinet meeting by virtue of the
committee's composition and the nature of its mandate dealing with
matters of foreign affairs, trade and policy-making. They assert that the
information withheld was within the scope of the exemption from
disclosure because the CTRM meetings were directly related to the exercise
of the sovereign prerogative of the President as the Head of State in the
conduct of foreign affairs and the regulation of trade, as provided in Section
3 (a) of Rule IV of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713.[30]
The authority of the CTRM as the advisory body of the President and the
NEDA is set forth in E.O. No. 230, series of 1987 (Reorganization Act of the
National Economic and Development Authority), to wit:
SECTION 6. National Economic and Development Authority Inter-agency
Committees. - To assist the NEDA Board in the performance ol its functions,
there are hereby created the following committees which shall nereafter be
under the direct control of the NEDA Board and shall submit all their
recommendations to the President for approval on matters involving their
respective concerns. The Chairman of these committees shall be designated
by the President. The NEDA Board shall likewise determine where the
technical staff of the said committees shall be based.
xxxx
(e) Committee on Tariff and Related Matters (TRM) - The TRM to be
composed of the Director-General of the National Economic and
Development Authority Secretariat, the Executive Secretary, the Secretaries
of Trade and Industry, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Environment and Natural
Resources and of Budget and Management, the Governor of the Central
Bank and the Chairman of the Tariff Commission shall have the following
functions:
(i) Advise the President and the NEDA Board on tariff and related matters,
and on the effects on the country of various international developments;
(ii) Coordinate agency positions and recommend national positions for
international economic negotiations;
(iii) Recommend to the President a continuous rationalization program for
the country's tariff structure. (underlining supplied)
The respondents are correct. It is always necessary, given the highly
important and complex powers to fix tariff rates vested in the
President,[31] that the recommendations submitted for the President's
consideration be well-thought out and well-deliberated. The Court has
expressly recognized in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority[32] that "a frank
exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of
publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the
independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential,
Legislative and Judicial power." In Almonte v. Vasquez[33] the Court has
stressed the need for confidentiality and privacy, stating thusly: "A
President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in
the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
many would be unwilling to express except privately."[34] Without doubt,
therefore, ensuring and promoting the free exchange of ideas among the
members of the committee tasked to give tariff recommendations to the
President were truly imperative.
Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right constitutionally
granted to the people, is liberally construed in favor of disclosure and
strictly against the claim of confidentiality. However, the claim of privilege
as a cause for exemption from the obligation to disclose information must
be clearly asserted by specifying the grounds for the exemption.[35] In case
of denial of access to the information, it is the government agency
concerned that has the burden of showing that the information sought to
be obtained is not a matter of public concern, or that the same is exempted
from the coverage of the constitutional guarantee.[36] We reiterate,
therefore, that the burden has been well discharged herein.
The respondents further assert that the information sought fell within the
concept of established privilege provided by jurisprudence under Section 3
(c) of Rule IV of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713, the May 23, 2005
meeting being regarded as a closed-door Cabinet meeting.[37] The
petitioner, disagreeing, posits that R.A. No. 6713, by itself, neither provides
exceptions to the constitutional right to information nor specifies limitations
on the State policy of full public disclosure; that the Implementing Rules and
Regulations went beyond the scope of R.A. No. 6713 in providing exceptions
not covered by the law; that the alleged closed-door Cabinet meeting
exception, so as to fall within the ambit of Section 3(c) of the Rules
Implementing R.A. No. 6713, was not established under settled policy or
jurisprudence; that the reliance on the rulings in Chavez v. PCGG and Chavez
v. PEA-Amari that declared the closed-door Cabinet meeting as an exception
to the right to information was misplaced considering that the exception
was not squarely in issue in those cases; that the pronouncement could only
be regarded as obiter dicta; that the closed-door Cabinet meeting
exception, assuming though not admitting the same to have been
established by law or settled jurisprudence, could not be automatically
applied to all the CTRM meetings because the CTRM was different from the
Cabinet inasmuch as two of its members, namely, the Governor of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Chairman of the Tariff Commission,
were not members of the President's Cabinet; and that the deliberations of
the CTRM as a body merely akin to the Cabinet could not be given the
privilege and confidentiality not expressly provided for by law or
jurisprudence, most especially considering that only by legislative
enactment could the constitutional guarantee to the right to information be
restricted.
We cannot side with the petitioner.
In Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita,[38] we have said that executive
privilege is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information,
not to categories of persons. As such, the fact that some members of the
committee were not part of the President's Cabinet was of no moment.
What should determine whether or not information was within the ambit of
the exception from the people's right to access to information was not the
composition of the body, but the nature of the information sought to be
accessed. A different holding would only result to the unwanted situation
wherein any concerned citizen, like the petitioner, invoking the right to
information on a matter of public concern and the State's policy of full
public disclosure, could demand information from any government agency
under all conditions whenever he felt aggrieved by the decision or
recommendation of the latter.
In case of conflict, there is a need to strike a balance between the right of
the people and the interest of the Government to be protected. Here, the
need to ensure the protection of the privilege of non-disclosure is necessary
to allow the free exchange of ideas among Government officials as well as
to guarantee the well-considered recommendation free from interference
of the inquisitive public.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari;
and AFFIRMS the decision of the Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Action
No. 2903, without pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-De Castro, (Acting Chairman), Peralta,* Perlas-Bernabe,
and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Radio Communication of the Philippines vs Santiago 58
SCRA 493
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs Francisco Santiago and Medina, 58
SCRA 493
Facts:
 Involves 2 petitions for review, to be decided jointly.
 Radio Communications of the Phils. vs. Santiago and Medina
 Radio Communications of the Phils. vs. Jaugan and Medina
 In the first case: July 12, 1996-Francisco Santiago filed a telegram with
Radio Communications (RCPI) and the amount of P1.50 was paid for the
transmission of said telegram to Zamboanga City. The telegram, however,
was never transmitted, and RCPI not only did not give any valid
explanation, but did not present any evidence to explain why the said
telegram was not forwarded to the addressee.
 In the second case: August 1, 1967-Constancio Jaugan filed a telegram at
the branch office of respondent in Dumaguete City addressed to
Commissioner Enrique Medina, Public Service Commission, Manila. The
telegram was received by an employee of RCPI and the sum of P2.64 was
collected in payment of said telegram. The telegram advised Commissioner
Medina that the Land Registration Case where he was cited by subpoena
to testify was transferred and, therefore, there was no necessity for the
said Commissioner to proceed to Negros Oriental. The telegram was
transmitted to Manila, but was never delivered to the addressee. When
Commissioner Medina appeared before the Dumaguete Court, he was
advised that the case was postponed since August 1, and of the fact that a
telegram was sent to him. Inquiries were made, why the telegram was not
received by the Commissioner in Manila, and it was only on August 15,
1967 that the telegram was relayed to the Public Service Commission and
was received by one of the employees of the Commission.
 Upon the complaints of Santiago, Jaugan and Medina, The Public Service
Commission (PSC) imposed upon RCPI a fine as a penalty.
 RCPI elevated the case to the SC in a petition for review, alleging that the
PSC was devoid of such competence based on the express limitation found
 in the Public Service Act expressly exempting radio companies from the
jurisdiction, supervision and control of such body "except with respect to
the fixing of rates."
Issue:
 Whether the Public Service Commission - no longer in existence by virtue
of the Presidential Decree reorganizing the executive branch of the
national government - had the jurisdiction to act on complaints by
dissatisfied customers of Radio Communications of the Phil., Inc. and
penalize it with a fine.
Ruling:
 No. SC reversed and set aside the decision of the PSC.
 The first paragraph of Section 13(a) of the Public Service Act reads in part:
"The Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision and control over all
public services and their franchises, equipment, and other properties, and
in the exercise of its authority, it shall have the necessary powers and the
aid of the public force: ... ." Section 14 of the same Act insofar as it refers to
radio companies reads as follows: "The following are exempted from the
provisions of the preceding section: (e) Radio companies except with
respect to the fixing of rates; ...”
 There can be no justification for the Public Service Commission imposing
the fines in these two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer. The only
power it possessed over radio companies, as noted was the fix rates. It
could not take to task a radio company for any negligence or misfeasance.
It was bereft of such competence. It was not vested with such authority.
 In the language of Chief Justice Hughes: 'It must be conceded that
departmental zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred
by statute.' Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of
the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law
becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid."
 Except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act to
the fundamental law itself, a public official must locate in the statute relied
upon a grant of power before he can exercise it. It need not be express. It
may be implied from the wording of the law. Absent such a requisite,
however, no warrant exists for the assumption of authority. The act
performed, if properly challenged, cannot meet the test of validity. It must
be set aside.
 From Villegas v. Subido: "Nothing is better settled in the law than that a
public official exercises power, not rights. The government itself is merely
an agency through which the will of the state is expressed and enforced. Its
officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of
discharging its functions. As such there is no presumption that they are
empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either
express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of
power. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity.
 Note: Presidential Decree No. 1-Re organizing the Executive Branch of the
Nat’l Government (September 24, 1972) and Letter of Implementation No.
1 activated the Board of Transportation to take the place of the abolished
Public Service Commission (September 24, 1972).
Aldovino VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office
for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In
September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan
issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation
to a criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted
by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of
his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in
2007. His disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the
ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive
terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE:
WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule
of COMELEC?
RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt
their term for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth
term in the 2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term limit
rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was
not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC
granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and
Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification.
“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective
interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a
reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that
preventive suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the
voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade
the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an
easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after
a preventive suspension has been imposed.
Ramir R. Pablico vs Alejandro Villapanto GR No.
147870
Facts:
An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan against then Mayor Alejandro Villapando of San Vicente, Palawan
for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution for entering
into a consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape, a defeated mayoralty
candidate. Complainants argue that this amounted to appointment to a
government position within the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B,
Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
In his answer, Villapando invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the
Department of Justice dated August 21, 1992, stating that the appointment of
a defeated candidate within one year from the election as a consultant does
not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as prohibited
by the Constitution.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found respondent guilty and imposed on him
the penalty of dismissal from service. The Office of the President affirmed the
decision. Vice-mayor Pablico took his oath as municipal mayor in place of
Villapando.
The Court of Appeals declared the decisions of the SP and OP void, and
ordered Pablico to vacate the office.
grounds:
xxx xx
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated above by order of the proper court.
It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty
of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be
decreed only by a court of law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al.,
we held that “[t]he Office of the President is without any power to remove
elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the proper courts
as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the aforequoted Section
60.”
Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code, however, adds that – “(b) An elective local official
may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of
this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code
of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever
first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.” The disciplining
authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.
As held in Salalima, this grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power to
remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight
Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation
may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local
Government Code. Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the
law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out
of harmony with the statute is a nullity. (Pablico vs. Villapando, G.R. No.
147870. July 31, 2002)

Issue:
The Provincial Governmenr of Camarines Norte vs Beatriz
May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President validly impose O. Gonzales GR No. 185740
the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials? CASE TITLE: THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE vs.
BEATRIZ O. GONZALES
Held: G.R. No. 185740
DATE: July 23, 2013
J. Brion
Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
DIGEST BY: John Michael Vida

TOPIC:THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION – SECURITY OF TENURE – Both career

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. – An elective local official may and non-career service employees have a right to security of tenure – they cannot be removed
from office except for cause provided by law and after procedural due process. The concept of
be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following
security of tenure, however, operates under a different rule for primarily confidential
employees due to the nature of a “primarily confidential” position.
Furthermore, security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee
shall not be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due
process. It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the nature
of the office held.
FACTS:
Gonzales was appointed as provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by
then-Governor Roy Padilla on April 1991, with her appointment on a permanent capacity.
After almost 8 years, on March 1999, the then-Governor Jess Pimentel sent Gonzales a
memorandum to explain why administrative charges should not be filed against her for “gross
insubordination/discourtesy in the course of official duties” and “conduct grossly prejudicial
to the best interest of the service”. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc
Investigation Committee found her guilty of the charges against her. Therefore, on September
1999, Gov. Pimentel dismissed Gonzales.
This decision of Gov. Pimentel was subsequently appealed to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC), which issued a Resolution, which modified the earlier decision, found Gonzales guilty
of insubordination and suspended Gonzales for 6 months. A subsequent appeal from Gov.
Pimentel was denied by the CSC. Upon motion for execution, CSC through a Resolution
directed the reinstatement of Gonzales upon clarification of service of the 6-month suspension.
Gov. Pimentel reinstated Gonzales, however she was dismissed the next day for “lack of
confidence”. Gov. Pimentel then wrote to the CSC of his compliance to the CSC’s order and
Gonzales’ subsequent dismissal as a confidential employee, citing an earlier CSC Resolution
where the CSC held that the position of provincial administrator was highly confidential and
coterminous in nature.
The CSC responded with another Resolution which directed Gonzales’ reinstatement, stating
that while the LGC (RA 7160) made the position of provincial administrator coterminous and
highly confidential in nature, the conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who were
already issued permanent appointments as administrators prior to the effectivity of the LGC.
Gonzales had acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment and is entitled to continue
holding the office despite its subsequent classification. The conversion should not jeopardize
Gonzales’ security of tenure guaranteed to her by the Constitution. Therefore, as a permanent
appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after due notice and hearing. Loss of
trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent appointee’s dismissal or
discipline under existing laws.
However, in a letter dated February 2005, Gonzales wrote to the CSC alleging that the then
incumbent Governor, Jesus Typoco, Jr., refused to reinstate her. Hence, the CSC made another
Resolution which ordered Gonzales’ reinstatement to the provincial administrator position, or
to an equivalent position.
As a result, the Province, through Gov. Typoco, filed a petition for review with the CA.
However, the CA sided with CSC and Gonzales, citing Aquino v. Civil Service Commission,
which stated that an appointee acquires a legal right to his position once he assumes a position
in the civil service under a completed appointment. This legal right is protected both by statute
and the Constitution, and he cannot be removed from office without cause and previous notice
and hearing. Appointees cannot be removed at the mere will of those vested with the power of
removal, or without any cause. The CA then enumerated the list of valid causes for a public
officer’s removal under Section 46, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the Revised Administrative
Code, and noted that lack of confidence was not in the list. The CA concluded that Gonzales’
dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence violated her security of tenure, and that she has
the right to be reinstated with payment of backwages. Hence, the petition for review on
certiorari to the SC.
ISSUE/S:
WON Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of
Camarines Norte.
HELD:
NO. Decision of the CA reversed and set aside.
RATIO:
A. The Court supported the CA’s conclusion that the position of provincial administrator has
been re-classified into a primarily confidential, non-career position upon the passage of RA
7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) which took effect in January 1992. In making
the position mandatory for all provinces, the LGC also amended the qualifications for the
position. Further to this, the LGC made the provincial administrator position co-terminous
with its appointing authority, reclassifying it as a non-career service position that is
primarily confidential.Upon this, the Court took note of the argument that Gonzales has
acquired a vested legal right over the position of provincial administrator the moment she
assumed her duties in April 1991, hence the argument that she cannot be removed from office
except for cause and after due hearing.
According to the SC, the arguments reflect a conceptual confusion between the nature of the
position and an employee’s right to hold a position. The nature of a position may change by
law according to the dictates of Congress. The right to hold a position, on the other hand, is a
right that enjoys constitutional and statutory guarantee, but may itself change according to the
nature of the position. Congress has the power and prerogative to introduce substantial
changes in the provincial administrator position and to reclassify it as a primarily confidential,
non-career service position. When done in good faith, these acts would not violate a public
officer’s security of tenure, even if they result in his removal from office or the shortening of
his term. Modifications in public office, such as changes in qualifications or shortening of its
tenure, are made in good faith so long as they are aimed at the office and not at the incumbent.
B. The Court also pointed out that Gonzales’ reliance on the case of Gabriel v. Domingo’s
dissenting opinion (which stated that a permanent employee remains a permanent employee
unless he is validly terminated) was misplaced. First of all, the factual differences were
pointed out to be dissimilar to the case of Gonzales, and even granting that they were the
same, the cited case (in Gabriel) of Civil Service Commission v. Javier actually proposes that
corporate secretaries in GOCCs cannot expect protection for their tenure and appointments
upon the reclassification of their position to a primarily confidential position. These officers
cannot rely on the statutes providing for their permanent appointments, if and when the Court
determines these to be primarily confidential.
Further to this, said dissenting opinion in Gabriel cited EO 503, which provided safeguards
against termination of government employees affected by RA 7160’s implementation.
According to the dissenting opinion, EO 503 is an obvious indication of the executive
department’s intent to protect and uphold both the national government and the local
government employees’ security of tenure. However, the Court emphasized that EO 503,
however, does not apply to employees of the local government affected by RA 7160’s
enactment, as it only applies to National Government Agencies whose functions are to be
devolved to LGUs.
C. Finally, the Court noted that both career and non-career service employees have a right to
security of tenure. All permanent officers and employees in the civil service, regardless of
whether they belong to the career or non-career service category, are entitled to this guaranty;
they cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by law and after procedural due
process. The concept of security of tenure, however, operates under a different rule for
primarily confidential employees due to the nature of a “primarily confidential” position.
Serving at the confidence of the appointing authority, the primarily confidential employee’s
term of office expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When this
happens, the confidential employee is not “removed” or “dismissed” from office. The term
merely “expires” and the loss of trust and confidence is the “just cause” provided by law that
results in the termination of employment. In the case of Gonzales, where the trust and
confidence has been irretrievably “eroded”, Gov. Pimentel only exercisedhis discretion when
he decided that he could no longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales.
Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be
suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due process. It cannot
be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the nature of the office held.
The CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled that the petitioner violated Gonzales’
right to security of tenure when she was removed without sufficient just cause from her
position, but the situation had since then been changed. In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as
ordered, but her services were subsequently terminated under the law prevailing at the time of
the termination of her service. She was then already occupying a position that was primarily
confidential and had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of
the appointing authority. Thus, Gonzales’ termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She
could no longer be reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other
comparable position. This, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales’ entitlement to
retirement benefits, leave credits, and future employment in government service.
Francisco Lecaroz and Leslie Lecaroz vs Sandiganbayan
GR No.130872
Lecaroz vs Sandiganbayan
[G.R. No. 130872. March 25, 1999]
FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while
his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang
Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its
SanguniangBayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985
election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won the KB Chairman of Barangay
Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. However,
Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council
until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment. When Red finally received
his appointment papers, President Aquino was already in power. But still Red was not
allowed to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the approval
of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was
able to secure appointment papers from the Aquino administration after three years and
nine months from the date he received his appointment paper from President Marcos.
Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints
against the Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume
the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman
filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for estafa through falsification of
public documents against petitioners, and one (1) information for violation of Sec. 3, par.
(e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two accused guilty on all counts of
estafa. However, with respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019, The
Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion
for reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:Whether or not an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed
or chosen or has qualified.
Held: YES.
To resolve these issues, it is necessary to refer to the laws on the terms of office of KB
youth sectoral representatives to the SB and of the KB Federation Presidents. Section 7 of
BP Blg. 51 and Sec. 1 of the KB Constitution respectively provide -
Sec. 7. Term of Office. - Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials
hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence
on the first Monday of March 1980.
In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of barangay
councils and the president of the federation of kabataang barangay, their terms of office
shall be coterminous with their tenure is president of their respective association and
federation .
xxxx
Sec 1. All incumbent officers of the Kabataang Barangay shall continue to hold office until
the last Sunday of November 1985 or such time that the newly elected officers shall have
qualified and assumed office in accordance with this Constitution.
The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the
SB since he did not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers; neither did
he take a valid oath of office. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to
continue as member of the SB although in a holdover capacity since his term had already
expired. The Sandiganbayan however rejected this postulate declaring that the holdover
provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only to positions in the KB, clearly implying
that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no holdover
with respect to positions in the SB.
The Supreme Court disagree with the Sandiganbayan. The concept of holdover when
applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is
holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or
appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their
successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does
not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and
qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is
elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can
continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to
qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or
implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in
office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified.The legislative intent of
not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative
enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the
same.
Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices,and courts generally indulge in the
strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which may
result in an executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly
vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded
on obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically
intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid
a hiatus in the performance of government functions

Polala Samabarani et al vs COMELEC GR No.160427

Case digest