HON. KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID vs . ZENAIDA D.

PANGANDAMAN-GANIA

Facts:
Respondent is a Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer of the Mindanao
State University (MSU). She has been holding this position after the confirmation of her
appointment by the MSU Board of Regents. Thereafter, a certain Agnes Mangondato as Acting
Director in her place in view of the alleged expiration of her term and was no longer allowed to
report for work. She verified the status of her appointment and found out that her appointment
was not submitted to the Civil Service Commission for attestation. The Civil Service
Commission declared her removal from office as illegal, exonerated her from the charge of being
on absence without official leave and ordered her reinstatement as Director II and Manila
Information and Liaisoning Officer of MSU but disallowed the payment of back salaries for the
period she was not working as a result of the illegal dismissal. MSU moved for reconsideration
of CSC Resolution, while respondent moved for its early execution. Respondent did not seek a
review of any of the resolutions of the CSC including the order denying back salaries and other
benefits for the period she was out of work. She instead pursued her prayer for reinstatement but
MSU refused to employ her back. Hence, she was compelled to file a second motion for the
execution of CSC Resolution. Eventually, respondent for the first time questioned the portion of
CSC Resolution prohibiting the payment of back wages and other benefits to her for the period
that her employment was terminated, and moved for the modification of the resolution by
granting her the relief prayed for which was denied. The Office of the Solicitor General filed the
instant petition for review allegedly in behalf of the petitioners to which respondent filed in her
own behalf a Comment claiming that the CSC cannot be a party-petitioner in a case where its
decision is the subject of review.

Issue: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is a real party-in-interest in the case at bar.

Held: No
This Court held that the situation where the CSC\s participation is beneficial and indispensable
often involves complaints for administrative offenses, such as neglect of duty, being notoriously
undesirable, inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, and the like,
where the complainant is more often than not acting merely as a witness for the government
which is the real party injured by the illicit act. In cases of this nature, a ruling of the Court of
Appeals favorable to the respondent employee is understandably adverse to the government, and
unavoidably the CSC as representative of the government may appeal the decision to this Court
to protect the integrity of the civil service system. The CSC may also seek a review of the
decisions of the Court of Appeals that are detrimental to its constitutional mandate as the central
personnel agency of the government tasked to establish a career service, adopt measures to
promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy in the civil
service, strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources development
programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive to public
accountability. Nonetheless, the right of the CSC to appeal the adverse decision does not
preclude the private complainant in appropriate cases from similarly elevating the decision for
review.

In the case of Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, this Court held that the real party-in-
interest in a case involving the non-renewal of the appointments of contractual employees would
be the person who was allegedly dismissed from work and not the CSC, for it is he who would
be benefited or injured by his reinstatement or non-reinstatement and who is present, available
and competent to bring the matter on appeal. Like a judge whose order or decision is being
assailed, the CSC should not be joined in the petition as it is not a combatant in a proceeding
where opposing parties may contend their respective positions without the active participation of
the CSC.

In the case at bar, the CSC is not the real party-in-interest as this suit confronts the Decision of
the Court of Appeals to award back wages for respondent arising from an illegitimate personnel
and non-disciplinary action of MSU, which is different from an administrative disciplinary
proceeding where the injured party is the government. This Court fail to see how the assailed
Decision can impair the effectiveness of government, damage the civil service system or weaken
the constitutional authority of the CSC so as to authorize the latter to prosecute this case. As a
rule, the material interest for this purpose belongs to MSU since it instigated the illegal dismissal
and the execution of the Decision devolves upon it.
MERAM v. EDRALIN – REYES
TOPIC: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
DOCTRINE: Appointments under the civil service law should be based on merit and fitness and should
never depend on how intimate a friend or how closely related an appointee is to the powers that be.

FACTS:

1. Respondent Filipina Edralin, training officer of the Bureau of Forest development [BFD], was
proposed for appointment to the position of Administrative Officer V, R-73 in the Administrative
Division of BFD.
2. Herein Petitioner, administrative officer III R-70, and Mr. Agravio Supply Officer V, R-70 filed their
protests against the proposal.
3. Director of BFD sent a memorandum to the respondent minister stating that there are 4 BFD
personnel in the central office who are considered “next-in-rank” to the vacant position [including
petitioner and Agravio]. It was also found out that Edralin’s current position was not next-in-rank.
4. CSC forwarded to the respondent minister the protests. Subsequently [2 days after] respondent
Minister forwarded the permanent appointment of Edralin as administrative Officer V to the
Commission for appropriate action.
5. Appointment approved by the Commission subject to the outcome of the protests of the
petitioner and Mr. Agravio. Respondent minister dismissed the protests.
6. Petitioner and Agravio appealed to the Merit Systems Board. MSB decided in favor of Agravio.
However, MSB modified its decision revoking Agravio’s appointment on the ground that he had
been ineffective in the said position. Petitioner was appointed in the vacant position.
7. Respondent appealed to the CSC. Denied. Respondent filed a letter-petition with the Office of the
President invoking Section 19(6) of P.D. No. 807. She averred that the MSB and CSC had no
jurisdiction on petitioner’s appeal.
a. Jurisdiction in promotional contests is lodged with the Ministry head and appeal by the
aggrieved party from decisions of said Ministry head should be taken to the Office of the
President.
8. President sent a letter to Justice Lazaro [Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs] to tell Director of
BFD to suspend everything pending study by the OP.
9. Director of BFD issued a memorandum informing Lazaro that the implementation oh his
compliance had become legally untenable, nonetheless, Lazaro rendered a decision dismissing
the protest of the petitioner and Agravio and their appeals are dismissed.

ISSUE/S: WON the Office of the President acted correctly in taking cognizance of respondent's letter-
petition, and passing upon the same, and thereafter, setting aside the decisions of the Merit Systems
Board and the Civil Service Commission.

RATIO:
1. There is nothing PD 807 Sec. 19[6], which connotes exclusivity of jurisdiction in the Office of the
President to take cognizance of the case. Furthermore, even if it were so, with the promulgation
 of P.D. No.1409, this power of review by the Office of the President was not only divested of its
exclusivity but was, in fact, repealed altogether.
a. Petitioner, correctly filed her protest with the MSB in accordance with P.D. No. 1409.
b. Moreover, Edralin is now estopped from questioning the orders of the MSB and the
Commission since she submitted to the jurisdiction of these two bodies by filing for
reconsideration with the MSB and upon denial of the same, by appealing to the
Commission.
2. Civil service laws are not enacted to penalize anyone.
a. Designed to eradicate the system of appointment to public office based on political
considerations and to eliminate as far as practicable the element of partisanship and
personal favoritism in making appointments.
b. These laws intend to establish a merit system of fitness and efficiency as the basis of
appointment; to secure more competent employees, and thereby promote better
government.
3. BFD personnel who are considered next-in-rank to the vacated position were Identified.
Respondent Edralin was not one of them. [9 or 10 salary rang below the next-in-rank]
4. The foremost consideration why respondent's appointment was ordered by the Office of the
President notwithstanding the fact that petitioner was more qualified and that she was next-in-
rank was because of her petition to the President in the form of a letter rather than an appeal.
a. Clear intent of her letter-petition was not to appeal in accordance with P.D. No. 807 but
to elicit some kind of favorable response from the President based on considerations of
blood ties, influence, or ethnic and regional affiliations.
5. Appointments under the civil service law should be based on merit and fitness and should never
depend on how intimate a friend or how closely related an appointee is to the powers that be.
6. Granting that the respondent possesses the qualifications required for the contested position, it
cannot be denied that the petitioner equally possesses the same qualifications, if not in greater
degree, and more important, she is next-in-rank to the vacated position. Therefore, she deserves
to be appointed to the disputed item.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition Granted

Luego vs CSC, 143 SCRA 327
(Public Officer, Appointments, CSC)
Facts: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon.
The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,” subject to the
final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the
contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the
petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the
position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.

The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the
respondent’s appointment.

Issue: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another
person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement.

Held: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore
protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right
to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.

Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the
power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service…
….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required
qualifications.”

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the
appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of
the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements
are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC
Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better
qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
BRAULIO DE VENECIA, accused-appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Viray and Pagkanlungan for accused-appellee.

BENGZON, C.J.:

In the Pangasinan court of first instance, Braulio de Venecia was prosecuted for electioneering,
because according to the information:

he did ... wilfully ... induce, influence, sway and make the electors vote in favor of candidates
for public office in the November 10, 1959 election, namely, Felipe Oda, NP candidate f or
Municipal Mayor of Binalonan ... by, then and there, distributing and or causing to be
distributed election handbills, a sample of which is attached hereto as Annex "A" and made
integral part hereof, which leaflets were distributed and/or caused to be distributed by the
accused to win votes for NP candidates Felipe Oda ... .

Upon a motion to quash, the court dismissed the case, holding that sec. 54 of the Revised Election
Code (upon which the prosecution rested) had been repealed by sec. 29 of Republic Act 2260.
Hence, this appeal, the Government insisting that sec. 54 has not been repealed, and that De
Venecia's conduct violated it.

For convenience, the two legal provisions are herewith reproduced.

SEC. 54. Active intervention of public officers and employees. — No justice, judge, fiscal,
treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the
national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and no classified civil service officer
employee shall aid any candidate, or exert influence in any manner in any election or take
part herein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer. (CA 357-48)

SEC. 29. Political Activity. — Officers and employees in the civil service, whether in the
competitive or classified, or non-competitive or unclassified service, shall not engage directly
or indirectly in partisan political activities or take part in any election except to vote. Nothing
herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee from expressing his
views on current political problems or issue, or from mentioning the names of candidates for
public office whom he supports.

The only issue is whether the latter repealed the former. It is at once apparent that sec. 29 is
administrative in nature, whereas sec. 54 is a penal statute. The first contains prohibitions of
administrative character, even as it grants or reserves some privileges to civil public servants. Of
course, logically, restrictions contained in sec. 29 that are not contained in sec. 54 could not be
criminally punished — e.g. unclassified civil service employees are not punishable under sec. 54.
But a realistic view would hold that activities permitted in sec. 29 — though it is a mere
administrative measure — should not be criminally dealt with under sec. 54.

The result is that although sec. 54 prohibits a classified civil service employee from aiding any
candidate, sec. 29 allows such classified employee to express his views on current political
problems or issues, or to mention the name of his candidate for public office, even if such expression
of views or mention of names may result in aiding one particular candidate. In other words, the last
sentence of sec. 29 is an exception to sec. 54; 1 at most, an amendment to sec. 54.

On the other hand, an employee (classified Civil service) who contributes money for election
purposes to a candidate violates sec. 54 (and is punishable with imprisonment) because he "aided a
candidate" and may not invoke the privilege reserved to him by sec. 29.

Applying these considerations to the case of De Venecia, we find that the leaflets he distributed
(Annex A) bore the symbol of the Nacionalista Party, and read as follows:

To all party-men of Binalonan.

You should vote for Mayor Felipe Oda for the office of Mayor because he is our party's
official candidate. I want him to win so that we will succeed in our undertakings.

If you are true party-men do not vote for independent candidate Atty. Roque
Tonrelda because he is destroying our party. Write the Straight Nacionalista Ticket.

Mabuhay Nacionalista

Conrado F. Estrella

Distributing handbills like the above is undoubtedly "aiding" candidate Felipe Oda. It is not merely
mentioning the candidate whom De Venecia supported, nor mere expression of his opinion on
current political problems. It is solicitation of the elector's vote in favor of Oda. It is an indorsement of
the request for his support by gubernatorial candidate Conrado F. Estrella.

To repeat, by the act charged in the information, i.e., distributing and causing the distribution of the
leaflets like Exh. A, defendant "aided" candidate Oda and/or exerted influence in the election/or to ok
part therein, contrary, to the prohibitions contained in sec. 54.

It is our opinion that in dismissing the information the trial court erred. Consequently, the appealed
order is hereby reversed and the record remanded to the Pangasinan court for further proceedings.
RAUL R. INGLES, ROALDO G. ADVIENTO, ISABEL C. CORPUS, CONSUELO M. VILLANUEVA and
ESPERANZA M. GUTIERREZ, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
AMELITO R. MUTUC and BALDOMERO DAVOCOL, defendants-appellees.

Jose S. Zafra and Enrique D. Tayag for plaintiffs-appellants.

Office of the Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for defendants-
appellees.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Direct appeal by the plaintiffs from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing their
complaint herein, with costs against them.

Although most of the allegations in said complaint had been denied in defendants' answer, the basic
facts were admitted in the memoranda filed by both parties with the lower court and seemingly in the
course of their oral argument therein. Hence, the case was deemed submitted to said court and the
same rendered its appealed decision, without receiving any evidence, with an opening statement to the
effect that "the facts of this case are undisputed."

Indeed, it is conceded that plaintiffs herein are civil service eligibles, holding positions, in the budget for
the fiscal year 1961-1962, under the Office of the President. Plaintiff Raul R. Ingles has a first-grade civil
service eligibility, holding a WAPCO-classified position of Senior Executive Assistant II, with a
compensation of P6,888.00 a year, and eight (8) years of service in the Government. Plaintiff Roaldo G.
Adviento is, in turn, a second-grade civil service eligible, holding a WAPCO-classified position of Clerk I,
with a compensation of P1,800.00 a year, and four (4) years of service in the Government, whereas
plaintiff Isabel C. Corpus is a third-grade civil service eligible, holding a WAPCO-classified position of
Supervising Clerk I, with a compensation of P2,544.00 a year, and eight (8) years of service in the
Government. Plaintiff Consuelo M. Villanueva is another third-grade civil service eligible, holding a
WAPCO-classified position of Clerk I, with a compensation of P1,800.00 a year, and ten (10) years of
service in the Government. Upon the other hand, plaintiff Esperanza M. Gutierrez is a third-grade civil
service eligible, holding a WAPCO-classified position of Stenographer, with a compensation of P1,980.00
a year, and eight (8) years of service in the Government.

About the second week of January, 1962, plaintiffs received a communication of the then Executive
Secretary, Amelito R. Mutuc, advising them that their services in the Government were terminated as of
January 1, 1962. Plaintiffs appealed from this action to the President, on or about January 26, 1962. A
month later, or on February 27, 1962, they received a letter of Mr. Mutuc, acting "by authority of the
President," denying the reconsideration prayed for.

Soon thereafter, or on March 24, 1962. plaintiffs commenced the present action, in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, against said Executive Secretary and the Cash Disbursing Officer in the Office of the
President, alleging that they (plaintiffs) had been removed from office without cause and without due
process, and praying, accordingly, that judgment be rendered ordering:
(1) Defendant Executive Secretary Amelito R. Mutuc to certify the names of the petitioners in the
payrolls of the Office of the President, to be retroactive as of January 1, 1962, the effective date of
petitioners' illegal termination from employment;

(2) Defendant Baldomero Davocol to pay the emoluments and/or salaries to which plaintiffs are entitled,
effective as of January 1, 1962, the date of their illegal termination from service;
(3) Defendants to perform their duties as aforesaid and to continue paying plaintiffs their emoluments
and/or salaries to which said plaintiffs are entitled to in accordance with law;

(4) Defendants to allow plaintiffs to continue in the performance of their respective duties.1

Soon thereafter, Salvador L. Marino was substituted in lieu of Amelito R. Mutuc as one of the
defendants herein, the former having meanwhile assumed the office of Executive Secretary, which the
latter vacated upon his appointment as Ambassador of the Philippines to the United States.

Defendants maintained that the principal issue in this case "is whether or not the plaintiffs are
occupying positions which are primarily confidential and, therefore, are subject to removal at the
pleasure of the appointing power," and that this issue should be resolved in the affirmative. The trial
court did so, with the result already adverted to.

Defendants-appellees thus assume that all officer holding a position which is primarily confidential in
nature is "subject to removal at the pleasure of the appointing power." This assumption is inaccurate. It
is evidently based upon a statement in De los Santos vs. Mallare2 to the effect that "three specified
cases of positions — policy — determining, primarily confidential and highly technical are excluded from
the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the
Constitution."3 This was, however, a mere obiter, because the office involved in said case — that of City
Engineer of Baguio — did not belong to any of the excepted classes, and, hence, it was not necessary to
determine whether its incumbents were removable or not at the pleasure of the appointing power.
What is more, said obiter, if detached from the context of the decision of which it forms part, would be
inconsistent with the constitutional command to the effect that "no officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law," 4 and it is conceded that
one holding in the Government a primarily confidential position is "in the Civil Service." In fact, in the De
los Santos case, this Court cited with approval the view, expressed in Lacson vs. Romero 5 to the effect
"that officers or employees in the unclassified" to which plaintiffs herein admittedly belong — "as well
as those in the classified service are protected by the above cited provision of the organic law."

Again, the law alluded to in the Constitution, namely Section 32 of Republic Act No. 2260, provides:

SEC. 32. Disciplinary Action. — No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause as provided by law and after due process; Provided, That a transfer from one position
to another without reduction in rank or salary shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the
interest of public service; Provided, further, That no complaint against a civil service official or employee
shall be given due course unless the same is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the
complainant; And provided, finally, That the respondent shall be entitled to a formal investigation if he
so elects, in which case he shall have the right to appear and defend himself at said investigation in
person or by counsel, to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to have the
attendance of witnesses and production of documents in his favor by compulsory process
of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.
This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential position
holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should be noted, however, that when such
pleasure turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office — his "term"
merely "expires," in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the
fixed term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and can not be
deemed "removed" or "dismissed" therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. The main difference
between the former — the primarily confidential officer — and the latter is that the latter's term is fixed
or definite, whereas that of the former is not pre-fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or
election, and becomes fixed and determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an
end to the services of the incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not
"removed" or "dismissed" from office — his term has merely "expired".

As we had occasion to point out in Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 6"to remove an officer is to oust him from
office before the expiration of his term." Accordingly, we held therein that the abolition of Manalang's
office as Director of the Placement Bureau by a legislation drafted by him, creating the "National
Employment Service," was not a "removal" from office and did not violate the Constitution. His right to
hold said office of Director of the Placement Bureau had merely been extinguished in consequence of its
abolition, in the same manner that it could have come to an end, without removal, through
abandonment of office, retirement of the incumbent, or his reaching the statutory age limit, if any. Thus,
after making the statement relied upon by respondents herein, regarding the power to dismiss at
pleasure officers holding policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical positions, this
Court added, in the aforementioned case of De los Santos vs. Mallare,7 that "it may truly be said that the
good of the service itself demands that appointments coming under this category be terminable at the
will of the officer that makes them."

As regards the nature of the positions held by plaintiffs herein, the lower court would seem to have
been impressed by the fact that their items form part of the budget for 1961-1962 for "The President's
Private Office," under subdivision (a) thereof entitled "Private Secretaries"; that they handled
"confidential matters"; and that, "while plaintiffs perform purely clerical work, the papers handled by
them are highly confidential in nature."

In this connection, it appears that the aforementioned subdivision (a) consisted of the following items:
The President's Private Office

(a) Private Secretaries

2. One private secretary to the President ......................... P9,000.00

3. One senior executive assistant II ................................... 6,888.00

4. One social secretary ......................................................... 6,240.00

5. One senior executive assistant I ..................................... 5,112.00

6. One senior executive assistant I ..................................... 4,860.00

7. One executive assistant ................................................... 3,984.00
8. One executive assistant ................................................... 3,984.00
9. One private secretary I ..................................................... 4,188.00

10. One translator II ............................................................... 2,808.00

11. One secretary .................................................................... 2,676.00

12. One secretary .................................................................... 2,544.00

13. Two stenographers at P1,980 ......................................... 3,960.00

14. One stenographer ............................................................. 1,980.00

15. One supervising clerk I ..................................................... 2,544.00

16. One clerk II ........................................................................... 2,196.00

17. One clerk II ........................................................................... 2,424.00
18. Three clerks I at P1,800 ....................................................... 5,400.00

19. Two clerks I at P1,800 ......................................................... 3,600.00

20. Two clerical aides at P1,440 ................................................ 2,880.008

and that, presumably, Ingles held item No. 3, Gutierrez either No. 13 or No. 14, Corpus No. 15 and
Adviento and Villanueva either No. 18 or No. 19. With the exception of item No. 2, designated therein as
private secretary, there is nothing in the other items above-quoted, particularly those held by plaintiffs
herein, to indicate that their respective positions are "primarily confidential" in nature. On the contrary,
the compensation attached and the designation given thereto suggest the purely, or, at least, mainly
clerical nature of their work. The fact that they, at times, handle "confidential matters," does not suffice
to characterize their " positions" as primarily confidential. Indeed, it is admitted that plaintiffs, likewise,
handle "other routine matters," and it has not even been shown that their work is, at
least, principally confidential.

Indeed, physicians handle confidential matters. Judges, fiscals and court stenographers generally handle
matters of similar nature. The Presiding and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals sometimes
investigate, by designation of the Supreme Court, administrative complaints against judges of first
instance, which are confidential in nature. Officers of the Department of Justice, likewise, investigate
charges against municipal judges. Assistant Solicitors in the Office of the Solicitor General often
investigate malpractice charges against members of the Bar. All of these are "confidential" matters, but
such fact does not warrant the conclusion that the office or position of all government physicians and all
Judges, as well as the aforementioned assistant solicitors and officers of the Department of Justice
are primarily confidential in character.
Considering that plaintiffs herein are admittedly civil service eligibles, with several years of service in the
Government, and that positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential and highly technical
in nature are exceptions to the general rule governing Civil Service officers and employees, it was up to
defendants-appellees to establish that plaintiffs belong to one of these excepted classes. This,
defendants-appellees have failed, to accomplish.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby reversed, and another one shall be
entered declaring that plaintiffs' removal from office was illegal and contrary to law, and that they are,
accordingly, entitled to reinstatement to their respective offices and to the payment of their
corresponding emoluments, from January 1, 1962, up to their actual reinstatement. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo
G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001

FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that
he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose
Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the
nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada
on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The
impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA,
bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan
and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined
in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew
their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing
that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in
this election.

OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
“constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of
office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being
an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as
president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not
petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.

HELD:

The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court
said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the
people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo
government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein
only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous
president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue
is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that
struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the
Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued
regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its
legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that
petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that
petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of
the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as
a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while
a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the
president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually
holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).
 TEODULO M. PALMA, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, as Governor of Bukidnon, and THE SANGGUNIANG
PANLALAWIGAN OF BUKIDNON, respondents.
G.R. No. L-59679
January 29, 1987

This is a petition for certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for Preliminary Injunction seeking: (a)
to prohibit the respondents from continuing with the hearing and investigation of Administrative
Case No. 2 filed by respondent Governor of Bukidnon against petitioner Mayor Teodulo M. Palma
Sr. of the Municipality of Don Carlos, Province of Bukidnon and (b) to nullify Resolution No. 82-
87 passed by respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bukidnon, suspending him from office.

FACTS:

On March 30, 1981, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal Vivencio P. Estrada of Bukidnon, at the
instance of the offended parties Nelia Arandel Clerk-typist and Susan Palamine, Clerical Aide,
both of the Office of the Mayor of the Municipality of Don Carlos, Province of Bukidnon, filed
with the Court of First Instance of the same province, Criminal Cases Nos. 2795, 2796 and 2797
against petitioner Teodulo M. Palma, Sr., the duly elected and qualified Mayor of said
Municipality. By virtue of the aforesaid three (3) separate cases, said offended parties in a sworn
joint letter complaint requested respondent Provincial Governor for an immediate administrative
investigation for the purpose of suspending Mayor Palma from office pending final determination
of these cases. (Rollo, p. 6). Attached to said letter are: three (3) copies of the Information for
Acts of Lasciviousness against the Mayor (Annexes "B", "C" and "D"; Petition, Rollo, pp. 7-9);
the statements of the offended parties. The Mayor accepted his preventive suspension from office
as shown in his Office Order dated February 15, 1982.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE FILING AND PENDENCY OF THE AFORESAID THREE (3)
SEPARATE INFORMATION FOR "ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS" AGAINST AN
ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIAL WOULD CONSTITUTE "MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE"
WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 5 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5185 WHICH MAY
WARRANT THE FILING OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST HIM
AND/OR HIS SUSPENSION FROM OFFICE.
HELD:

There appears to be no controversy as to the filing of the criminal cases against the petitioner. The
principal issue centers on the filing of the administrative case and consequent preventive
suspension of petitioner based solely on the filing of the above-mentioned criminal cases.
Petitioner contends that "Acts of Lasciviousness" although how numerous, do not fall within the
category of "malfeasance and misfeasance" or "conduct in the office" contemplated in Section 5
of R.A. No. 5185, and therefore cannot be the basis of the filing of a separate administrative case
against an elective official and the preventive suspension of the latter. Respondents, alleging
otherwise, maintain that the lascivious acts of the petitioner constitute misconduct under Article
XIII, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution, re: "Accountability of Public Officers."

As a general rule, dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily follow the dismissal of
a criminal case, the former requiring as it does, only preponderance of evidence while the latter
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Misconduct has been defined as "such as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and
not only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times,
it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer. " (Lacson v.
Roque, et al., 92 Phil. 456).

Now, as to whether or not, such misconduct of petitioner affects his performance of his duties as
an officer and not only his character as a private individual, has been laid to rest by the ruling of
the Supreme Court in an analogous case where it was held that while "it is true that the charges of
rape and concubinage may involve moral turpitude of which a municipal official may be proceeded
against . . . but before the provincial governor and board may act and proceed against the municipal
official, a conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by the provincial governor of the
charges and trial by the provincial board."

The replacement of petitioner Mayor by the Officer-in-Charge Fabian Gardones has rendered the
issues of removal and suspension from office, moot and academic.
Claudio v. COMELEC

Topic: Recall
Ponente: V.V. Mendoza, J.
Date: 4 May 2000

DOCTRINE: To what doctrine is the case related and how is it explained. Make sure that this is related to the topic.

QUICK FACTS: One to two liner facts.

FACTS:

LGU concerned: Pasay City

Position of person/s involved: Mayor of Pasay City

Contested Law/Ordinance:

Jovito O. Claudio (Claudio) was duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Sometime in
May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered for the purpose of convening the Preparatory
Recall Assembly (PRA) and to file a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence.

On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang
kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999 recalling Claudio as mayor for loss of
confidence. The petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999 and copies of the petition were in public areas
throughout the City.

Claudio filed an opposition against the petition alleging, among others, that the petition for recall was filed
within one year from his assumption into office and therefore prohibited. He argued that the PRA was
convened within the 1 year prohibited period as provided by Section 74 of the Local Government Code. The
COMELEC, however, granted the petition for recall ruling that recall is a process which starts with the filing
of the petition for recall and since the petition was filed exactly one year and a day after Claudio's assumption
of office, the petition was filed on time. Thereafter, COMELEC set the date of the recall elections on April 15,
2000. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WoN the petition for recall was filed within the proper period provided for by Section 74 of the
Local Government Code

HELD: Yes. SC Affirmed COMELEC

The limitations in Section 74 apply to the exercise of the power of recall (i.e. the recall election itself) which is
vested with the registered voters of the LGU. It does not apply to the preparatory processes to such exercise
of recall such as the proceedings of the PRA.

RATIO:

Recall as used in Section 74 refers to the election itself

We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or the
gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds
to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition,
the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date. However,
as used in paragraph (b) of § 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide
whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement.

Section 69 of the Local Government Code provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised by the
registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the power vested
on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the
limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other words, the term "recall"
in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition
for recall with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition
for recall.

Anything steps prior to recall election itself are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall.
The limitations in §74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the registered voters.
It is this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of
§74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of
office of an elective local official.

The proceedings of the PRA do not constitute the exercise of recall

It is the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the people. A recall
resolution "merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify
why he should be allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their sovereign judgment, the
official concerned remains in office. Thus, the preliminary proceedings of the PRA do not produce a decision
by the electorate on whether the local official concerned continues to enjoy the confidence of the people, then,
the prohibition in paragraph (b) against the holding of a recall, except one year after the official's assumption
of office, cannot apply to such proceedings.

Purpose of the one year prohibitory period against the exercise of recall

The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an elective
local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary
proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official.

Including the convening of the PRA as part of recall restricts right of speech and assembly

Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the purpose of
discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the constitutional
right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on the day of the election to
decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an informed public opinion
takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the holding of assemblies for
the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a
free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the
contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent.

The phrase regular local election does not include the campaign period

Claudio contends that the date April 15, 2000 also falls within the second prohibition under Section 74 of the
Local Government Code arguing that the phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does not only mean
"the day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election period as well. Hence,
he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be held.
The contention is untenable. First there is nothing in the law that shows the campaign period is included for
purposes of computing the prohibitory period. Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the
period during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until one
year after the assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably on June 30 following his election,
the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding
year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in
paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation
must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local government
units" more responsive and accountable."