CASE 1

PEOPLE vs CHUI
FACTS:
Sometime in September 1998, the Central Police District Criminal Investigation Unit,
conducted surveillance operations on a suspected shabu dealer, Daniel Henares. Henares was
apprehended for the sale of shabu in a test-buy operation.
During the tactical interrogation conducted by the policemen, Henares admitted that he
acquired the illegal drugs from appellant Robert Chiu, a resident of No. 29 North Road,
Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao, Q.C. Fernandez and other police officers of the Special
Operations Group conducted surveillance operations at the appellant’s residence. They learned
that Molinas’ father owned the house that the appellant was renting. The police officers then
decided to conduct a test-buy operation against the appellant. Fernandez and Salazar were
designated as the poseur-buyers. A female informant, who also happened to be a close friend
of the appellant, would then introduce them to the latter.
On October 26, 1998, Fernandez filed with the RTC of Pasay City an application for a
search warrant for the search of the house at No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan
(Crame), Cubao, Quezon City, entitled and docketed as People vs. Robert Chiu, Search
Warrant No. 98-0059.[ Attached to the application were the following: (a) Fernandez affidavit
showing that the house subject of the search was occupied by the appellant; (b) the deposition
of Salazar; (c) the request for the examination of 2.19 grams of shabu earlier purchased from
the appellant; (d) the results of the forensic examination; and, (e) a sketch of the house,
prepared by Salazar.
On October 26, 1998, Executive Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the RTC of Pasay City, Branch
109, conducted an inquiry into the application. Fernandez testified that although the subject of
the search and the objects to be seized were located in Quezon City, the application for the
search warrant was filed in Pasay City because of the possibility that the regulated drug would
be removed therefrom by the appellant. Moreover, there was a need for confidentiality; if the
policemen filed their application in the RTC of Quezon City, there was a possibility that the
information would reach Molina and the appellant. Salazar gave the same response when
questioned by the court. The court then issued an Order granting the application and issued
Search Warrant No. 98-0059 which commanded the search any time of the day or night of the
house at No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan (Crame), Cubao, Quezon City, and to
seize the substances, articles and objects therein described.
On November 1, 1998, Fernandez, Salazar, two other officers and the female informant,
stationed themselves at the Petron gasoline station located two blocks from the subject
premises. At about 9:00 a.m., Salazar and the lady informant proceeded to the house at No. 29
North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao, Quezon City. The security guard opened the
gate and led the two inside. Salazar informed the appellant that he wanted to buy shabu
worth P1,000.00 because he had a prospective buyer. The appellant asked Molina to get the
shabu from the room upstairs. The latter did as he was told and when he returned, handed over
to the appellant a plastic sachet containing approximately 1.13 grams of the white crystalline
substance which, in turn, was handed over to Salazar. Salazar later reported to Fernandez that
the appellant was in the house. Armed with the search warrant, Fernandez, Salazar, PO1
Gerardo Granado, PO1 Corpuz and other police operatives forthwith proceeded to the house.
The appellant was just about to leave. Fernandez and the members of the team identified
themselves as police officers and told the appellant that they were in the house to execute the
search warrant issued by Judge Lopez. They showed the warrant to the appellant. After the
appellant read the same, Fernandez suggested that the appellant voluntarily surrender the
articles and substances listed therein. The appellant accompanied Salazar and Fernandez to
the second floor and pointed to his room where the shabu was kept.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant issued by Judge Lopez was defective and the
articles/objects seized on the basis thereof were inadmissible in evidence.
HELD:
The contention of the appellant is barren of merit.
Section 1, SC Circular No. 19 dated August 4, 1987, which was in force when the
application for a search warrant was filed, provides viz:

1. All applications for search warrants relating to violations of the Anti-subversion Act,
crimes against public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, illegal
possession of firearms and/or ammunitions and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, shall no longer be raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance
of and acted upon by the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is
located.

In this case, Fernandez filed the application for a search warrant with the Pasay City RTC
instead of the Quezon City RTC because of the possibility that the shabu would be removed by
the appellant from No. 29 North Road, Barangay Bagong Lipunan, Cubao, Quezon City. Indeed,
as shown by the evidence, the appellant had a residence other than No. 29 North Road where
he sold shabu. There was also the pervading concern of the police officers that if they filed the
application in Quezon City where the appellant plied his illicit activities, it may somehow come to
the knowledge of Molina and the appellant, thus, rendering the enforcement of any search
warrant issued by the court to be a useless effort. We find and so hold that Judge Lopez did not
err in taking cognizance of and granting the questioned application for a search warrant.

Additionally, the appellant did not raise, at the trial court, the issues of the validity of the
search warrant, the propriety of its enforcement in Quezon City, as well as the admissibility of
the shabu against him on the ground that it had been illegally seized. The appellants objection
to the admissibility of the search warrant was grounded merely on the lack of veracity (sic)
thereof. Such omission constituted a waiver by the appellant of the protection under Section 2,
Article II of the Constitution

CASE 2
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION V. MENDOZA
G.R. NO. 170425. APRIL 23, 2012

FACTS:

On March 26, 2001, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) applied with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, for the issuance of a search warrant covering documents and
articles found at the offices of Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad. The NBI alleged that these
documents and articles were being used to (a) violate the Securities Regulation Code (SRC),
and (b) commit estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The Makati RTC granted
the application. Acting on the search warrant, NBI and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
agents searched the offices mentioned and seized the described documents and articles from
them. Shortly after, the SEC filed a criminal complaint with the Department of Justice (DOJ)
against Rizza Mendoza, Carlito Lee, Ma. Greshiela Compendio, Raul Rivera, Rey Beltran, Rex
Almojuela, Linda Capalungan, Hilda Ronquillo, Ma. Loda Calma, and Teresita Almojuela
(Mendoza, et al.) for violation of Sections 24.1 (b) (iii), 26, and 28 of the SRC.On July 11, 2001,
Mendoza, et al. filed a petition for prohibition and injunction with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against the NBI and the SEC before a
Muntinlupa RTC. They alleged that, three months after the search and seizure, the NBI and the
SEC had not turned over the seized articles to the Makati RTC that issued the search warrant.
This omission, they said, violated Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
which required the officers who conducted the seizure to immediately turn over the seized items
to the issuing court. Essentially, the petition sought to prevent the SEC and the NBI from using
the seized articles in prosecuting Mendoza, et al. and the DOJ from proceeding with the
preliminary investigation of their case, using the same. Simultaneous with this action, Pastrana
and Abad, filed with the Makati RTC a motion to quash the subject search warrant for having
been issued in connection with several offenses when the Rules of Criminal Procedure require
its issuance for only one specific offense.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Muntinlupa RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Mendoza, et al.’s action
for the suppression of evidence whose seizure had become illegal for failure of the SEC and
NBI to turn them over to the issuing court, the Makati RTC?

HELD:

No. Section 14 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court is clear. Questions concerning both (1)
the issuance of the search warrant and (2) the suppression of evidence seized under it are
matters that can be raised only with the issuing court if, as in the present case, no criminal
action has in the meantime been filed in court. The rules do not require Mendoza, et al. to be
parties to the search warrant proceeding for them to be able to file a motion to suppress. It is not
correct to say that only the parties to the application for search warrant can question its
issuance or seek suppression of evidence seized under it. The proceeding for the issuance of a
search warrant does not partake of an action where a party complains of a violation of his right
by another. Clearly, although the search warrant in this case did not target the residence or
offices of Mendoza, et al., they were entitled to file with the Makati RTC a motion to suppress
the use of the seized items as evidence against them for failure of the SEC and the NBI to
immediately turn these over to the issuing court, the Makati RTC. The Makati RTC is the right
forum for such motion given that no criminal action had as yet been filed against Mendoza, et al.
in some other court.
CASE 3

LIM vs. PONCE DE EON

FACTS:

Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL".
A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor
launch from him.

Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in
Balabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the
detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch.

On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial
Commander to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party,
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. So, on
July 6, 1962 upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela,
Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.

Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha filed a case against Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and
Orlando Maddela, alleging that Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim without a
search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without his consent;
that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully well that his
office was not vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property; that said motor
launch was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha in consideration of P3,000.00, P2,000.00 of
which has been given to Jikil Taha as advance payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful
seizure of the motor launch, its sale did not materialize; and that since July 6, 1962, the said
motor launch had been moored at the Balabac Bay, Palawan and because of exposure to the
elements it had become worthless and beyond repair.

In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material allegations of the complaint

and as affirmative defenses alleged that the motor launch in question which was sold by Jikil
Taha to Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was sometime in April 1962, forcibly taken with
violence upon persons and with intent to gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya without
the latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filing of a criminal charge of robbery
against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to seize and impound the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL", for
being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Orlando Maddela merely obeyed the orders of
his superior officer to impound said launch. By way of counterclaim, defendants-appellees
alleged that because of the malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by plaintiffs-
appellants, they were constrained to engage the services of lawyers, each of them paying
P500.00 as attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00
each and actual damages in the amount of P500.00 each. They also prayed that each of them
awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000.00.

ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure of
the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was
admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime.

HELD:

No. The power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate and in no
other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant. Since in the
present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have
violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure.

Under the old Constitution the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or
magistrate and in no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper
warrant. At the time the act complained of was committed, there was no law or rule that
recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant. In his vain attempt to
justify the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce de Leon
invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 732, which amended Sections 1674 and 1687 of the
Revised Administrative Code. But there is nothing in said law which confers upon the provincial
fiscal; the authority to issue warrants, much less to order without warrant the seizure of a
personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime. True, Republic Act No. 732 has
broadened the power of provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations, but said law did
not divest the judge or magistrate of its power to determine, before issuing the corresponding
warrant, whether or not probable cause exists therefor.

CASE 4

DEL ROSARIO y NICOLAS vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 142295

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was found guilty of violation of P. D. No. 1866 of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos. Allegedly, sometime in May 1996, the police received a
report that accused-appellant Vicente del Rosario was in possession of certain firearms without
the necessary licenses. Acting upon the report, the PNP Criminal Investigation Group inquired
from the PNP Firearms and Explosive Division whether or not the report was true. The PNP
Firearms and Explosives Division issued a certification stating that per records in his office, the
appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Armed with the said
certificationthe police applied for a search warrant to enable them to search the house of
appellant. Upon the issuance of the warrant, a team led by P/Sr. Insp. Adique went to
Norzagaray to serve the warrant. Before proceeding to the residence of the appellant, the police
officers requested Barangay Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay Councilman Aurelio
Panteleon to accompany them in the implementation of the warrant.

Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police officers introduced themselves to the
wife of appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr. Insp. Adique informed him that they had a
search warrant and that they were authorized to search his house. After appellant gave his
permission, the police officers conducted a search of the house. The search yielded the
following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of caliber
found at the master's bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-16 rifle and two radios found in
the room of appellant's daughter; and (c) a caliber .22 revolver containing 8 pieces of live
ammunition found in the kitchen of the house. When asked about his license to possess the
firearms, the appellant failed to produce any. This prompted the police officers to seize the
subject firearms.

For his defense, appellant contends that he had a license for the caliber .45 pistol
recovered in his bedroom and that the other items seized during the search including the caliber
.22 revolver, were merely planted by the police officers. Appellant likewise assails the manner in
which the search was carried out, claiming that the police officers just barged into his house
without asking permission. Furthermore, he claimed that the Brgy. Officials arrived only after the
police already had finished the search. However, after trial the trial court rendered a judgment of
conviction which decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizure of items not mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.

HELD:

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and acquitted
the petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of violation of P. D. No. 1866. Seizure
is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant. Searching officers are
without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of
such an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and excluded for being the proverbial "fruit
of a poisonous tree." In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently
and in plain view. It was found as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner's
house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Thus, the seizure
is illegal. True that as an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally possessed
firearm or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently found in plain view. However, "[t]he
seizure of evidence in 'plain view' applies only where the police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object." Specifically, seizure of evidence in "plain view" is justified when there is: (a) a prior valid
intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
had the right to be where they are. (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d)
"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

CASE 5

BORLONGAN, JR vs. PEÑA

FACTS:
Respondent Pena instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and
expenses, damages and attorney’s fees against Urban Bank and petitioners before the RTC.
Petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss, including several documents as evidence. Atty. Pena
claims that the documents were falsified. He subsequently filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the
City Prosecutor. The prosecutor found probable cause and the information was filed before
MTCC. Warrants of arrest were issued for the petitioners / accused. Upon the issuance of the
warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment,
being then officers of Urban Ban. On the scheduled date for the arraignment, despite the
petitioner’s refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them. The
accused questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest. However, the trial court ruled that
posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

ISSUE:

Can the petitioners still question the validity of the warrant of arrest despite posting bail?

HELD:

Yes. The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any
irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, has already been superseded by Section 26,
Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded
from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters
his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections there to.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail bond, it
cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to
assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent judge. There must be clear
and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question
the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does,
his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and
unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible.
Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly
contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their
arrest. On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the fact
that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the court a
quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude
them from raising the same with the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond
was a matter of imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a
waiver of their right to assail their arrest.

CASE 6
SOLIVEN vs. MAKASIAR

FACTS:

Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was charged for
libel by the president. In the petition Beltran, called for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The petitioner assailed that his constitutional
right was violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.
Beltran's interpretation of the words "determined personally" convinced him that the
judge is solely responsible to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC
judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.

HELD:

No. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed
procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.

Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.

Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. The petition was dismissed.

CASE 7
LIM, SR. VS. FELIX

FACTS:

The petitioners were investigated upon a killing incident that took place in the Masbate
Domestic Airport. After the incident, the designated investigator, for the purpose of preliminary
investigation, filed a complaint against them and others. After conducting the PI, the court
issued an order stating that probable cause has been established for the issuance of warrant of
arrest of the accused. Petitioners filed with the respondent court several motions and
manifestations which in substance prayed that an order be issued requiring the transmittal of
initial records of the PI for the best enlightenment of the existence of guilt. In another
manifestation, the Lim’s reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really
exists a prima facie case against them in the light of the documents which are recantations of
some witnesses in the PI. But the respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit for
the motions and manifestations and issued Warrant of Arrest against the accused, which the
judge wrote .œIn the instant cases, the PI was conducted by MTC Masbate which found the
existence of PC which was affirmed upon review by Provincial Prosecutor. Considering that
both 2 competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence
of PC, each Information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its
face, the Court finds its just and proper to rely on the Prosecutor’s Certification in each
information. Petitioners questioned the judgment.

ISSUE:

WON a judge may issue a Warrant of Arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution’s
certification and recommendation that Probable Cause exists.

HELD:

No. The Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires
"probable cause to be personally determined by the judge", not by any other officer or person.

If a judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case were all the
records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined PC. The
determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not
been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of

Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent
Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the
respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He
could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification.
Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners’ motion for the transmittal of the
records on the ground that the mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal
that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

The court reiterated that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not
precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of
the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound
discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he
issues a warrant of arrest.

Indubitably, respondent Judge committed grave error when he relied solely on the
Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned order without having before him any other
basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause.

CASE 8
SANTOS VS. PRYCE GASES, INC.
FACTS:

This is a petition for review on the decision of Court of Appeals to reversed the twin
orders of RTC Iloilo City quashing the warrant it issued and ordering the return of LPG cylinders
seized from petitioner. Pryce is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and
distributing industrial gases and LPG products. In 2002, Pryce noticed the decline of return of
LPG cylinders for refilling. Pryce employees suspected that LPG cylinders had been removed
from market circulation and refilled by their competitors, one of whom is Sun Gas and Santos as
the manager.

Figueroa, Pryce's sales manager for Panay sought the assistance of CIDG to recover
LPG cylinders allegedly in possession of Sun Gas. Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) conducted surveillance on the warehouse of Sun Gas then later requested the Bureau
of Fire Protection (BFP) to conduct a routine fire inspection at Sun Gas. CIDG operatives
entered the warehouse and were able to take photographs of LPG cylinders.

Demandara applied before RTC Iloilo for a warrant to search the premises with the
allegation that Pryce LPG cylinders were tampered and replaced with Sun Gas marking,
averred also that Sun Gas is distributing Pryce LPG products without the consent of Pryce. RTC
issued the search warrant with the authority to seize the following items:

1. Assorted sizes of PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS CYLINDERS in different kilograms.

2. Suspected LPG gas tanks cylinders with printed/mark SUN GAS INC., trademark and
embossed Pryce Gas Trademark scrapped off.

3. Other materials used in tampering the PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS cylinders. The authorities
have seize a number of Pryce LPG tanks.

Santos then filed for motion to quash the search warrant on the grounds of lack of
probable cause as well as deception and fraud in obtaining evidence in support of the
application, violating article 3, section 2 of constitution and Rule 126 of rules of court. On the
same day, CIDG filed a criminal complaint before the office of City Prosecutor of Iloilo against
Santos, charging him with violation of RA No. 632.

After hearing, RTC granted the motion to quash , stating that the probable cause as
found by it at the time of the application for search warrant fell short of the requisite probable
cause necessary to sustain the validity of the search warrant.

Respondent filed a manifestation and motion to hold in abeyance the release of the
seized items. It also filed a motion for reconsideration of the 16 July 2002 Order but was denied
in an Order dated 9 August 2002.

Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for
certiorari, arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the search
warrant. The petition essentially questioned the quashal of the search warrant despite a prior
finding of probable cause and the failure of petitioner to prove that he bought the seized items
from respondent. It also challenged petitioner’s personality to file the motion to quash.

On 16 January 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, which set
aside the two orders of the trial court. The appellate court also ordered the return of the seized
items to respondent. Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied in an order dated 16 July
2004.
ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not petitioner has authority to seek the quashal of the search warrant.

(2) Who has proper custody of the seized items.

(3) Whether or not respondent correctly availed of the special civil action for certiorari to assail
the quashal of the search warrant.

HELD:

1. The Court of Appeals ruled against petitioner and reversed the trial court’s quashal of
the search warrant solely on the ground that petitioner, being a mere manager of Sun Gas, Inc.,
failed to show his authority to act on behalf of the corporation and, therefore, had no legal
personality to question the validity of the search warrant. Thus, it concluded that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining and subsequently granting petitioner’s
motion to quash.

Well-settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

2. In quashing the search warrant, it would appear that the trial court had raised the
standard of probable cause to whether there was sufficient cause to hold petitioner for trial. In
so doing, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion.

Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable
cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction.

3. The Court of Appeals, however, erred in ordering the return of the seized items to
respondent. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Criminal Procedure expressly mandates the
delivery of the seized items to the judge who issued the search warrant to be kept in custodia
legis in anticipation of the criminal proceedings against petitioner. The delivery of the items
seized to the court which issued the warrant together with a true and accurate inventory thereof,
duly verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of said items by
interested parties. The judge who issued the search warrant is mandated to ensure compliance
with the requirements for (1) the issuance of a detailed receipt for the property received, (2)
delivery of the seized property to the court, together with (3) a verified true inventory of the items
seized. Any violation of the foregoing constitutes contempt of court.

The seized items should remain in the custody of the trial court which issued the search
warrant pending the institution of criminal action against petitioner. Petition denied.
CASE 9

NOLASCO, ET AL VS. PAÑO

FACTS:

The present case was subject for resolution.

Supreme Court held in a criminal case that the arrest of the petitioners was illegal,
annulling the decision of respondent Judge Paño, and that the seizure of the items by virtue of
the warrant by the same respondent judge are inadmissible as evidence in the Subversive
Documents case. However the Court held that the items were to be retained in case it would be
used as evidence in a separate criminal case pending before the Special Military Commission
No.1, returning the rest which are determined irrelevant by petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the portion of the decision regarding the retention of the
properties seized. One of the petitioners also assailed the respondent’s claim that the search
was incidental to her arrest for the crime of rebellion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not some of the properties seized may be introduced as evidence in a separate
criminal case.

HELD:

The Court ruled the propriety of the declaration of the arrest and search as null and void.
It was held that the warrant was one of a general warrant issued in gross violation of the
constitutional mandate against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Bill of rights also
orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: “Any evidence obtained in
violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding” (Sec. 4[2]).

All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and
cannot be used against any of the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case
of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985).

Since the search was not an incident of an arrest as it was in fact made under a void
general warrant, the seizure of documents could not be justified as an incident of an arrest

The Court ordered the return of all seized items to petitioners.

CASE 10
G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO

FACTS:

A search warrant was shown to the accused-appellant and the police operatives started
searching the house. They found heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white
crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two
bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana. A receipt of the items seized was
prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko
for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal
Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358, respectively) were filed, and after hearing, the trial court
convicted him in Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8,
respectively.

The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against him was inadmissible because the
warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.

ISSUES:

Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support the seizure of “drug
paraphernalia”, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the “plain
view doctrine.”

HELD:

Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of “undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia.” Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to
support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion
that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact
seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at
all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which
evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the
seizure of shabu from Salanguit’s residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such
warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or
affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. With respect to, and in light of the “plain view doctrine,” the police failed to
allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with,
the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguit’s person or in an
area within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search
conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua
in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-
64357 only.

CASE 11
PEOPLE VS. DEL CASTILLO G.R. 153254, SEPT. 30, 2004
FACTS:

A search warrant was issued by Judge Dicdican authorizing the search and seizure
ofshabuand drugparaphernalia in appellant’s house. The police officers entered the house, saw
appellant and served the warrant on her. Appellant was with her grandmother, the registered
owner of the house, and her brother, in the living room. The police officers "pressed" them by
telling them not to move and they were asked to just sit-down while the search was on-going.
Upon finding some packed crystalline substance, appellant was arrested and informed of her
constitutional rights, specifically, the right to counsel to which she replied that she has lawyer
who will represent her. PO3 Petallar prepared an inventory of the seized articles and appellant
was made to sign the same. PO3 Bauzon and PO3 Petallar explained that the inventory receipt
was dated July 24,2000 although the raid was conducted on July 31 because their office had
earlier prepared the blank form. The RTC rendered its assailed decision finding appellant guilty.

ISSUE:

Whether the appellant’s constitutional right was violated

RULING:

Yes. Appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of counsel. It was established
that at the timeshe signed the receipt, she was already under custodial investigation. The
testimony of PO3 Petallar revealssuch fact. While PO3 Petallar testified that appellant was read
her constitutional right, it was not clearlyshown that she was informed of her right not to sign the
receipt and that it can be used as an evidence againsther. If appellant was indeed informed of
her constitutional right, it is unusual for her to sign the receiptacknowledging ownership of the
seized items without the assistance of counsel considering that she wantedto get a lawyer.The
appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make her sign these alleged receipts which in
effectare extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense. It is unusual for appellant
to be made to signreceipts for what were taken from her. It is the police officers who should
have signed such receipts. This is aviolation of the constitutional right of the appellant to remain
silent whereby she was made to admit thecommission of the offense without informing her of his
right. The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is notonly inadmissible for being violative of
appellant’s custodial right to remain silent, it is also anindiciumof theirregularity in the manner by
which the raiding team conducted the search of appellant’s residence.

CASE 12
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENNY GO

FACTS:

A raiding team armed with a warrant entered the home of appelant Benny Go in search of
evidence for the violation of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), otherwise know as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 . Upon their entry, they met Jack Go, son of the
Go and restrained him. As the former was the only one present at the time they then called on
two barangay kagawad to act as witnesses on the said search. They then seized properties and
objects even those which were not included in the warrant. When they were almost finished with
their search Go arrived and immediately together with the two witnesses was made to sign the
inventory receipt. Based on the evidence taken from the search Go was charged for violation of
R.A. 6425. Upon hearing, testimonies as well as evidences were presented by the prosecution
against Go. However, the two witnesses questioned the validity of some of the evidence
presented such as the inventory receipt as well as the illegal drugs said to have been seized
from the search. The Regional Trial Court of Manila convicted Go for violation of the offense
charged. On appeal, Go assails the decision of the RTC as well the validity of the search
performed by the raiding team and the admissibility of the evidence taken therefrom. Go also
asks for the return of the properties seized that were not included in the search warrant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the properties not included in the search warrant may be returned to go.

HELD:

It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be
seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant – to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they should seize. At the same time, the raiding team
characterized the seizure of the assorted documents, passports, bankbooks, checks, check
writer, typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads as ―seizure of evidence in plain view. Under the
plain view doctrine, objects falling in the ―plain view‖ of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. To be sure,
the policemen also filed a complaint against Go for alleged possession of instruments or
implements intended for the commission of falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 176 of the
Revised Penal Code on the basis of dry seals and rubber stamps also found in appellant‘s
residence. The counterfeit nature of the seals and stamps was in fact not established until after
they had been turned over to the Chinese embassy and Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
for verification. It is, therefore, incredible that SPO1 Fernandez could make such determination
from a ―plain view of the items from his vantage point in the sala. In sum, the circumstances
attendant to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the ―plain view doctrine to justify
the seizure and retention of the questioned seized items. The things belonging to appellant not
specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly described, must thus be
ordered returned to him. Be that as it may, considering that the two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of
the rubber stamps have been certified to be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, they may not be returned and are hereby declared confiscated in favor of the State
to be disposed of according to law. Moreover, the various bankbooks and passports not
belonging to appellant may not be ordered returned in the instant proceedings. The legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the
objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.

CASE 13

PEOPLE vs. AMBROSIO

G.R. NO. 135378. April 14, 2004

427 SCRA 312

FACTS:

Ambrosio, Ozaeta (accomplices) and Que (principal) were arrested and found guilty for
violation of R. A. No. 6425, as amended by R. A. No. 7659 (Dangerous Drugs Law). Que was
penalized with reclusion perpetua and a fine of P2m. Ambrosio and Ozaeta was to suffer prision
mayor minimum to reclusion temporal and a fine of P1m each. (RTC decision)

Prosecution’s version of events:

Together with an undercover agent named Venus, NBI Agent Soriano met with herein
appellants Ozaeta and Ambrosio for a supposed purchase of shabu. The agents entered a
vehicle and were requested to reveal the money. After ocular verification, they were driven to
the residence of Que. Special Investigator (SI) Palencia and Santiago, also from NBI, followed
them from a distance.

Upon arrival, Ambrosio and Venus alighted the car and went for the house of Que were
the alleged transaction occurred. Then the arrest was effected.

The appellants denied the existence of a buy-bust operation, and in lieu thereof, alleged
that they were framed and forced into incriminating themselves.

More importantly, they averred that the lower court erred in finding them guilty of the
crime charged by mere reliance on the presumption that the officers were in the regular
performance of their duty. Thus, the appellants concluded, that the lower court gave the
presumption more credence and disregarded the need to appraise the necessary facts so as to
constitute guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:

1. Did the lower court err in appreciating the facts that lead to its decision?

2. Did the lower court give undue credence to the presumption of regularity?

3. Were the appellants liable for the crime charged?

HELD:

1. No. In People v. Mala, et al., the Court enunciated that it will not interfere with the trial
courts’ assessment of the credibility of witnesses except when there appears on record some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which the trial court has overlooked,
misapprehended, or misinterpreted. The reason for this rule is that the trial court is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.

2. No. The prosecution alleged that the appellants were apprehended thru a buy-bust
operation. This was supported by consistent testimonies of various prosecution witnesses
(which were mainly the arresting officers), including material evidences such as positive contact
with marked money as shown by the presence of fluorescent powder under ultra-violet testing.
 Furthermore, the Court held that the non-presentation of Venus was not a fatal blow to
the prosecution’s case such that in People v. Boco –

Intelligence agents, due to the nature of their work, are often not called to testify in court
so as not to reveal their identities publicly. Once known, they could no longer be used again
and, worse, may be the object of revenge by the criminals they implicate. The prevailing
doctrine is that their testimonies are not essential for conviction, nor are they indispensable to a
successful prosecution. With the testimonies of the arresting officers, they would be, after all,
merely corroborative and cumulative.

Finally, in People v. Mala, the Court held that what is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money
consummated the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused.

Anent the buy-bust money, the prosecution merely presented photocopies of the marked
money used in the buy-bust operation. The trial court is correct in not considering the non-
presentation of the entire amount thereof as a mortal blow to the prosecution’s case. It was held
in People v. Eugenio, presentation of buy-bust money is not indispensable to the prosecution of
a drug case.

3. Yes. Not only were the evidences strong, but the statements of the appellants were at
best, specious, and filled with defects and inconsistencies.

However, the Court held that Ozaeta must be acquitted for lack of evidence to show his
involvement in the crime. As held in People v. Geron, the mere presence of the accused at the
locus criminis cannot be solely interpreted to mean that he committed the crime charged. In this
case, the prosecution evidence which merely showed that Ozaeta was in the company of
Ambrosio when they met with agent Soriano at Greenhills and in the car when Ambrosio
brought agent Soriano to the front of the house of appellant Que, is not sufficient to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Ozaeta was indeed involved in any way in the illegal
sale of shabu. Therefore, appellant Ozaeta must be absolved from criminal liability.

CASE 14
PEOPLE VS. MUSA [217 SCRA 597; G.R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN 1993]

FACTS:

A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt.
Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to
Musa’s house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped
dried marijuana for P10.00.

The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully
buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned
themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going
on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more
marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came
back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected
it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in
and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the
marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the
kitchen and found a ‘cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.’
They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found
dried marijuanaleaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and themarijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence,
inadmissible as evidence.

HELD:

Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as
evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The ‘plain view’
doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify
the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the
‘plain view’ of the object.

In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the police. They arrested
the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where
they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said object.

Therefore, the ‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and
cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.

CASE 15
PEOPLE VS NUEVAS

FACTS:

Two policemen (Cabling and Fami) conducted morning surveillance and a monitoring of
illegal drug trafficking along a certain street in Olongapo City. They had received information
that a certain male person, more or less 5’4" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on
the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of
marijuana dried leaves.

They saw a man (Nuevas) that matched the description exactly alight a motorcycle.
They then approached Nuevas informed him of who they were and asked Nuevas where he
was going.

Nuevas then informed Fami that there were other stuff in the possession of a certain
Vangie, an associate, and two other male persons. Later on, Nuevas voluntarily pointed to the
officers a plastic bag which, when opened, contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks
wrapped in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape charges, Nuevas disclosed where the two
(2) other male persons would make the delivery of marijuana. They then went to the place
where Nuevas said his companions, Din and Inocencio, were.

Din was carrying a blue plastic bag and when asked, disclosed that it was Nuevas’.
Upon inspection, Fami found inside it "marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein."

.On cross-examination, Cabling testified that the arrest of Nuevas was the result of a tip
from Fami’s informant, conceding though that the name of Nuevas was not included in the list of
persons under surveillance. Cabling restated that Nuevas had voluntarily submitted the plastic
bag he was holding and that after Nuevas had been informed of the violation of law attributed to
him, he admitted his willingness to cooperate and point to his other cohorts. When Fami and
Cabling proceeded to the identified location of Nuevas’s cohorts, they chanced upon Din and
Inocencio along the road. Din was holding a bag while Inocencio was looking into its contents.
Cabling averred that Din voluntarily handed the plastic bag he was holding to the police officers.

ISSUE:

Whether the warrantless search and seizure was valid.

HELD:

The Court holds that the searches and seizures conducted do not fall under the first
exception, warrantless searches incidental to lawful arrests. A search incidental to a lawful
arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must
precede the search; the process cannot be reversed as in this case where the search preceded
the arrest. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede
the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.

In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio were not committing a crime in the presence of
the police officers. Moreover, police officers Fami and Cabling did not have personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that the persons to be arrested had committed an offense. The searches
conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest.
Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a),
Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."

Neither could the searches be justified under the plain view doctrine. An object is in plain
view if it is plainly exposed to sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the
object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if
the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or
if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be
seized. In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It
must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of
a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

Records show that the dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags that Nuevas
and Din were carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police officers. In
Nuevas’s case, the dried marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag were wrapped inside a
blue cloth. In Din’s case, the marijuana found upon inspection of the plastic bag was "packed in
newspaper and wrapped therein."44 It cannot be therefore said the items were in plain view
which could have justified mere seizure of the articles without further search.
 On the other hand, the Court finds that the search conducted in Nuevas’s case was
made with his consent. In Din’s case, there was none.

CASE 16

G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 2010

PEOPLE VS JACK RACHO y RAQUERO

FACTS:

A confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the
purchase of shabu. Appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora. Having alighted from the bus, appellant was
about to board a tricycle when the team of police authorities approached him and invited him to
the police station. As he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped
therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.5

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of
R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for
possessing, dangerous drugs.

ISSUE: (1) WON the warrant of arrest was violated.

(2) WON the evidence was admissible in evidence.

RULING:

(1) No. “Reliable information” alone is not sufficient probable cause to effect a valid
warrantless arrest. The SC required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal
design.

(2) No. This is an instance of seizure of the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence.

NO. 17

The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.Said proscription, however, admits of
exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"

 3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

CASE 18

PEOPLE vs. ARMANDO COMPACION y SURPOSA

G.R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001

FACTS:
Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that Armando Compacio y
Surposa was growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio
Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the
Bacolod City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the residence of Compacion who was
then the barangay captain of Brgy.Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on 9 July
1995. During the said surveillance, they saw 2 tall plants in the backyard of Compacion which
they suspected to be marijuana plants to which they reported the result of their surveillance to
SPO4 Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr., Chief of NARCOM, Bacolod City, who immediately formed a
composite team. On 12 July 1995, the team applied for a search warrant with the office of
Executive Judge Bernardo Ponferrada in Bacolod City. However, Judge Ponferrada informed
them that he did not have territorial jurisdiction over the matter. The team then left Bacolod City
for San Carlos City, then went to the house of Executive Judge Roberto S. Javellana to secure
a search warrant. They were told by the judge to go back in the morning since office hours are
obviously over. Nonetheless, the team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the
residence of Compacion in the early morning of 13 July 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at the
gate and called out for Compacion.

The prosecution contends that Compacion opened the gate and permitted them to come
in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected marijuana plants and he
admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was suffering from
migraine. SPO4 Villamor then told him that he would be charged for violation of Section 9 of RA
6425 and informed him of his constitutional rights. The operatives then uprooted the suspected
marijuana plants. SPO1 Linda conducted an initial field test of the plants by using the Narcotics
Drug Identification Kit.The test yielded a positive result. On 15 July 1995, the plants were turned
over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Bacolod City Police Command,
particularly to Senior InspectorReahAbastillas Villavicencio. Senior Inspector Villavicencio
weighed and measured the plants, one was 125 inches and weighed 700 grams while the other
was 130 inches and weighed 900 grams. Three (3) qualitative examinations were conducted,
namely: the microscopic test, the chemical test, and the thin layer chromatographic test. All
yielded positive results.
 On his part, Compacion maintains that around 1:30 a.m. on 13 July 1995 while he and
his family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. He went down
bringing with him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, 4 persons who he thought were
members of the military, entered the premises then went inside the house. One of the four men
told him to sit in the living room. Some of the men went upstairs while the others went around
the house. None of them asked for his permission to search his house and the premises. After
about 20 minutes of searching, the men called him outside and brought him to the backyard.
One of the military men said: "Captain, you have a marijuana here at your backyard" to which
Compacion replied: "I do not know that they were marijuana plants but what I know is that they
are medicinal plants for my wife" who was suffering from migraine. After he was informed that
the plants in his backyard were marijuana, the men took pictures of him and themselves.

Thereafter, he was brought inside the house where he and the military men spent the
night. At around 10:00 a.m., Compacionwas brought to the City Hall where he saw that one of
the 2 service vehicles was fully loaded with plants. He was later told by the military men that
said plants were marijuana. Upon arrival, the men met with the mayor and unloaded the alleged
marijuana plants, then a picture of him together with the arresting team was taken with the
alleged marijuana as back drop. Soon thereafter, he was taken to Hda. Socorro at the SAF
Headquarters.

A criminal complaint for violation of Section 9 of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659 was

filed against Compacion. On 2 January 1996, the trial court convicted Compacion of the crime
charged, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Compacion's right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated.

HELD:
Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution are safeguards against reckless,
malicious and unreasonable invasion of privacy and liberty. A search and seizure, therefore,
must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure
becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Evidence secured
thereby, i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure, will be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding." The requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper
judicial authority prior to the conduct of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There
are several instances when the law recognizes exceptions. Herein, the search and seizure
conducted by the composite team in the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a
search warrant, It does not appear either that the situation falls under any of the cases to validly
conduct warrantless search. Consequently, Compacion's right against unreasonable search and
seizure was clearly violated.

As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object. Thus, the following elements must be present before the
doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence
must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence without
further search. Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into
Compacion's premises without the latter's consent. It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents
conducted a surveillance of the residence of Compacion on 9 July 1995 on the suspicion that he
was growing and cultivating marijuana when they allegedly came in "plain view" of the
marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises on 13 July 1995, their intention was to
seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but
could not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come
across the marijuana plants inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged into
Compacion's residence. Hence, Compacion is acquitted of the crime to which he was charged.

CASE 19

PEOPLE v. ELSIE BAGISTA y BANGCO

GR No. 86218/ 214 SCRA 63, September 18, 1992

FACTS:
On July 4, 1988, at around 8:00 o’clock in the morning, the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) Detachment Office located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road, Baguio City,
received information from one of its regular informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age,
with naturally curly hair, and with a height of 5’2" or 5’3", would be transporting marijuana from
up north. Acting upon this piece of information, they established a checkpoint and flagged down
all vehicles, both private and public, coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles
were carrying marijuana leaves on board. After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents
stopped a DangwaTranco bus with Plate No. AVD 938 and body number 428, which came from
Lepanto, Benguet. Sgts. Parajas and Fider boarded the bus and thereupon Sgt. Parajas
announced to the passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that they were going to
search their baggages. At the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the
right side (as one is facing the driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with black
and orange stripes on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and discovered three (3) bundles
of marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The bag and the contents thereof were
confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought to the NARCOM office in Baguio
City where she was booked and investigated.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not probable cause is present in the conduct of the warrantless search?
2. Whether or not the warrantless search is valid?

HELD:
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had
been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view. This in no
way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of
automobiles in the absence of probable cause. In the case at bar, the NARCOM officers had
probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet
in view of the confidential information they received from their regular informant that a woman
having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up
north. They likewise have probable cause to search accused-appellant’s belongings since she
fits the description given by the NARCOM informant. WHEREFORE, finding no error in the
decision appealed from, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
CASE 20

CABALLES VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
On or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the Municipality of Pangasinan, and/or
elsewhere in the Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the
above mentioned accused with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, the National Power Corporation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away about 630 kg of Aluminium cable conductors, valued at
Php 27, 450.00, belonging to and to the damage and prejudice of said owner National Power
Corporation, in the aforesaid amount.

ISSUE:
WON the warrantless search without consent is valid?

HELD:
In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right
exists; (2) that person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right, and (3) said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
In the case at bar, the evidence is lacking that the petitioner intentionally surrendered his
right against unreasonable searches.
WHEREFORE, the impugned decision is reversed and set aside, and accused Rudy
Caballes is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

CASE 21

SALVADOR V. PEOPLE
GR No. 146706 July 15, 2005

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by accused Tomas Salvador, assailing the
decision rendered by the CA, affirming the decision of RTC convicting him and his fellow co-
accused of violating the Tariff and Customs Code.
On the wee hours of June 4, 1994, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and petitioner Tomas
Salvador all aircraft mechanics employed by the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) and assigned
at NAIA and Manila Domestic Airport, were apprehended by intelligence operatives of the
Philippine Air Force (PAF) for possessing 13 packets of smuggled watches and jewelries
valuingat more than half a million pesos. The officers were conducting routine surveillance
operations atthe Airport to act on reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by PAL personnel.
They were keeping a close watch on an airplane parked inside Airport Terminal. At around
11:30 pm, the officers noticed 3 persons boarding the plane, and eventually they disembarked
with theirabdominal areas bulging, thereafter boarding an airplane tow truck. The officers
immediately followed the truck, when they were able to block it, they asked the persons to
alight, the 3 accused having packages covered by girdles, inside their shirts. This prompted the
officers toarrest the accused, bringing them to the PAFSECOM office. Upon examination of the
packages,an inventory was made of assorted watches and gold jewelries. Information was
chargedagainst the accused, but they denied committing the offense, alleging that they were
framed by the officers. Despite the defense, the RTC rendered a decision finding them guilty,
which the CAaffirmed. Only accused Salvador filed this petition assailing the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence.

HELD:
Yes. The petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted was
illegal, since theywere unaware that a crime was committed and the officers just engaged in a
fishing expedition in violation of the petitioner’s right against unlawful search and seizure. The
Court ruled that one of the exceptions in requiring a warrant before an arrest is when it amounts
to a customs search.The special mission of the officers was to conduct a surveillance, to act on
reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by PAL personnel. This is in a nature of a customs
search so a warrant may be dispensed with. In addition to that, the petitioner and his co-
accused were on board amoving aircraft tow truck, which is also one of the recognized
exceptions for a warrant to be dispensed with. It is impracticable to wait for a warrant to
be issued first before a search isconducted for moving vehicles, since they can easily be
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction were the warrant is sought. Establishing that the search
and seizure conducted was legal; the pieces of evidence obtained are admissible in court to
sustain the conviction of the petitioner.

CASE 22
PEOPLE VS. SY CHUA [396 SCRA 657; G.R. No.136066-67; 4 Feb 2003]

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal
Possession of Drugs in two separate Information.

On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening, SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2
Emmeraldo Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant
was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. On the
basis of this lead, the PNP Chief then formed a team of operatives who positioned themselves
across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel; the other group acted as
their back up.

Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived
and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car
carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag approached him and
introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small
transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. SPO2
Nulud immediately subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22
caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of
the Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud confiscated the
small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm
bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who
arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP
Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
 However, accused-appellant narrated a different version of the incident.

Accused-appellant alleged that on that night he was driving the car of his wife to follow
her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy so he decided to take the old route along McArthur
Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and
candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car.
When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun
and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later identified himself as a policeman.
During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his
car. He refused so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this
time, the police officer’s companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just
arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched
his car.

He was then brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen
minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of
reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while
pictures were being taken.

The trial court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet
convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the there is a valid warrantless arrest.

HELD:

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is
applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the
police operatives on accused-appellant.

In inflagrante delicto arrest, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is

committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of an
arresting officer. The law requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made.
Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer. These two elements are absent under the circumstances of the case. It
was held that “reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. A search and seizure should
precede the arrest. a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which permit
the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not
armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer. Mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-and-frisk”, there must be a genuine
reason in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief
that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. The foregoing circumstances do
not obtain in the case at bar.

Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted.

CASE 23
GARAYGAY VS. PEOPLE [G.R. No.135503; 2000]

FACTS:

On July 30, 1996 the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, issued
Search Warrant upon application of the Presidential Task Force on Intelligence and Counter-
Intelligence (PTFIC) authorizing a search of the house of petitioner William A. Garaygay located
in Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, a place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.
Thereafter, the PTFIC through its Regional Task Group conducted a raid on the house of
petitioner resulting in the seizure of several items of firearms, explosives, ammunition and other
prohibited paraphernalia.

Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City a motion to quash the
search warrant on the ground that it was a general warrant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the motion to quash should have been filed with the RTC of Manila which issued
the warrant.

HELD:

No. The court ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City has jurisdiction to
resolve the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and To Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence. It was
held that where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action based on the
results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, a motion to quash the warrant
(or to retrieve things there under seized) may be filed not only with the issuing Court but also in
which the criminal action is pending.