Armovit v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

154559 (October 5, 2011)

FACTS:
On August 20, 1965 and November 23, 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (BCBI) obtained loans from the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) in the total amount of P4,250,000.00, secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. When
BCBI defaulted in the payment of the amortizations, GSIS extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties and sold them at
public auction where it emerged as the highest bidder.

With the Armovit Law Firm as its counsel, BCBI filed an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure on June 23, 1977 with the
then Court of First Instance (CFI) of La Union. The action was docketed as Civil Case No. 2794. After trial, the CFI, by then
renamed Regional Trial Court, rendered a Decision: (1) nullifying the foreclosure of BCBI’s mortgaged properties; (2) ordering
the cancellation of the titles issued to GSIS and the issuance of new ones in the name of BCBI; (3) ordering BCBI to pay
GSISP900,000.00 for the debenture bonds; and (4) directing GSIS to (a) restore to BCBI full possession of the foreclosed
properties, (b) restructure the P4.25 Million worth of loans at the legal rate of interest from the finality of the judgment, (c) pay
BCBI P1.9 Million representing accrued monthly rentals and P20,000.00 rental monthly until the properties are restored to
BCBI’s possession, and (d) pay the costs.

GSIS appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 09361. It appears that the Armovit Law Firm
ceased to be the counsel of BCBI sometime before the appeal of GSIS. The said law firm and BCBI dispute the legality of the
replacement, with BCBI claiming that the Armovit Law Firm had been remiss in its duties as BCBI’s counsel.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory on February 10, 1988 and the records were remanded to the
court a quo on March 14, 1988. The GSIS did not file a Motion for Reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.

Neither party filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Decision of this Court. Thus, the Decision became final and executory
on December 17, 1991.

The Armovit Law Firm filed in Civil Case No. 2794 an Omnibus Motion praying, among other things, that a final assessment of its
attorney’s fees be computed at 20% on the value of all the properties recovered by BCBI, deducting the amount already paid
which is 20% of the money judgment for P1,900,00.00; and that a writ of execution for the full payment of the balance of its
attorney’s fees be issued.

The RTC issued the first assailed Order denying the Armovit Law Firm’s Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the issue regarding
attorney’s fees had already been resolved by this Court in G.R. No. 90983, whereby this Court ordered BCBI to pay the Armovit
Law Firm the sum of P252,000.00, in addition to theP300,000.00 already paid. The RTC noted that the Decision of this Court had
long become final and executory and in fact, was already executed upon the payment of the sum of P252,000.00. The RTC also
stressed that the Armovit Law Firm had no more participation in the prosecution of the case before the appellate court, as BCBI
was, by then, already represented by another counsel. Thus, according to the RTC, it would constitute unjust enrichment to
grant the Armovit Law Firm attorney’s fees despite having no more participation in the case.

The Armovit Law Firm filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC. The Armovit Law Firm appealed the
Orders of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE APPELLATE AND TRIAL COURTS ERRED IN DEFYING THE SUPREME COURT IN ITS FINAL AND
EXECUTORY DECISION AWARDING PETITIONER A CONTINGENT FEE OF “TWENTY PERCENT OF ALL RECOVERIES.

HELD:
As can be readily observed, the Court ordered the payment of the sum of P252,000.00, nothing more, nothing less. While the
body of the Decision quoted the agreement of the parties stating the compensation as “20% contingent fee computed on the
value to be recovered by favorable judgment on the cases,” this Court specifically ordered BCBI to pay the Armovit Law Firm the
aforementioned sum only, in addition to the P300,000.00 already paid. BCBI was therefore held to be liable for the total
amount ofP552,000.00, representing 20% of the P2,760,000.00 received by BCBI as rental payments from GSIS. Significantly,
the order upon GSIS to reimburse BCBI for rental payments constitutes the only monetary award in favor of BCBI in the final and
executory Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 09361.

The Armovit Law Firm did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision in G.R. No. 90983 to protest the exclusion in the
dispositive portion of several items it specifically prayed for in its pleadings. The Decision thus became final and executory on
December 17, 1991. The Armovit Law Firm cannot now ask the trial court, or this Court, to execute the Decision in G.R. No.
90983 as if these items prayed for were actually granted.

The Armovit Law Firm, in insisting on its claim, pins its entire case on the statement in the body of the Decision that “we do not
find Atty. Armovit’s claim for ‘twenty percent of all recoveries’ to be unreasonable.” In this regard, our ruling in Grageda v.
Gomez is enlightening:

It is basic that when there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a Decision and the
opinion of the court contained in the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An
order of execution is based on the disposition, not on the body, of the Decision. This rule rests on the theory
that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement ordering nothing.

Indeed, the foregoing rule is not without an exception. We have held that where the inevitable
conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive
portion, the body of the decision will prevail. x x x.

Applying this ruling to the case at bar, it is clear that the statement in the body of our 1991 Decision (that “we do not
find Atty. Armovit’s claim for ‘twenty percent of all recoveries’ to be unreasonable”) is not an order which can be the
subject of execution. Neither can we ascertain from the body of the Decision an inevitable conclusion clearly showing a
mistake in the dispositive portion.

The confusion created in the case at bar shows yet another reason why mere pronouncements in bodies of Decisions
may not be the subject of execution: random statements can easily be taken out of context and are susceptible to different
interpretations. When not enshrined in a clear and definite order, random statements in bodies of Decisions can still be the
subject of another legal debate, which is inappropriate and should not be allowed in the execution stage of litigation.

Consequently, the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the
execution of the statement in the body of our 1991 Decision that “we do not find Atty. Armovit’s claim for ‘twenty percent of all
recoveries’ to be unreasonable.” All things considered, it was the interpretation of petitioner Armovit Law Firm, not that of the
trial court, which had the effect of varying the final and executory Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 90983. The instant Petition
for Certiorari should therefore fail.

Cadalin vs. POEA, G.R. No. L-104776 (Dec. 5, 1994)

GENERAL RULE: A foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
EXCEPTION: When the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute," the country of the forum will apply the foreign statute
of limitations.
EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: The court of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public
policy.

FACTS:
Cadalin et al. are overseas contract workers recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown &
Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. As such, they were all deployed at various projects in several countries in the Middle
East as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia. The case arose when their overseas employment contracts were
terminated even before their expiration. Under Bahrain law, where some of the complainants were deployed, the prescriptive
period for claims arising out of a contract of employment is one year.

ISSUE:
Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on
prescription that shall be the governing law

HELD:
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process,
joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by teh laws of the forum. This is true even if the
action is based upon a foreign substantive law.

A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or
substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.

However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the
forum has a “borrowing statute.” Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
substance. A “borrowing statute” directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims
based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form provides that an action barred by the
laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it.
Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:

“If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine
Islands.”

In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex propio vigore insofar as it ordains the
application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.

The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claims obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. To enforce the one-year
prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on
the protection to labor.
A.C. No. 3910, June 28, 2001
JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO DUCUSIN, respondents

FACTS:
Villalon is the family lawyer of the Ducats. The original title of Ducat, Sr. was handed to Villalon. The handing over has two
contradictory versions of reason. First because it is given as part of process to convey the land because of the good services of
Villalon as Villalon claimed. On the other hand, allegedly because the latter reasoned that he shall check the measurements of
the land subject of title as alleged by Ducat, Jr.

Ducat, Sr. allegedly because of his want to give the land to Villalon executed a deed of sale of the land in favor of the latter. But
because it was discovered that the land is registered in the name of Ducat, Jr., a deed of sale was forged to make it appear that
there was one. Ducusin was the notary public in this case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Villalon is guilty of misconduct.

HELD:
Yes. Villalon is guilty of gross misconduct for being involved in fraudulent notarization and forgery of signature.
PETRA M. SEVILLA, complainant
vs.
JUDGE ISMAEL L. SALUBRE, respondent
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1336 (December 19, 2000)

FACTS:
Prior to his appointment as MTC Judge, Atty. Salubre acted as counsel for Sevilla for a civil case, wherein the latter
turned over to the former cash amounting to P45, 000.00 as repurchase money to be discharge for litigation purposes.
Allegedly, respondent deposited the money to his account and misappropriated said funds for his own personal consumption.

Through aid of counsel, Sevilla referred the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), who in turn
conducted an investigation and opined that respondent should be subjected to disciplinary action, such that:
1. Respondent’s contention lacks merit and is belied by evidence;
2. His act constitutes a violation of Canon 16, specifically Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibilities.

Also, OCA recommended the complaint to be re-docketed as an administrative matter.

However, respondent interposed that complainant has also withdrawn a pending Estafa charge against him on the
basis of reconciling differences as evidenced by an Affidavit of Desistance duly signed by complainant. This, he contends divests
the court of their power to impose administrative sanctions.

ISSUES:
1. WON respondent violated Canon 16, Rule 16.03 of the CPR.
2. WON desistance by complainant can absolve respondent from administrative sanctions.

HELD:
1. YES. SC affirmed the recommendation, with modification increasing the amount of penalty fine. Thus, Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into
his possession. Furthermore, Rule 16.01 of the Code also states that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client. The Canons of Professional Ethics is even more explicit:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the
confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported
and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.

2. NO. The Affidavit of Desistance did not divest the Court of its jurisdiction to impose administrative sanctions upon respondent
Judge. In like manner, while it may be true that the complaint for Estafa had been dismissed, the dismissal was on account of
the complainant’s voluntary desistance and not upon a finding of innocence of the respondent. It neither confirms nor denies
the respondents non-culpability. Hence, administrative cases against lawyers can still proceed despite the dismissal of civil
and/or criminal cases against them.

Santiago v Fojas AC 4103

FACTS:
An expulsion case was faced by the complainants contending that they have illegally removed from the union (FEUFA)
membership Mr. Paulino Salvador. The lower court resolved in favor of Salvador and ordered the complainants to pay, jointly
and severally, Mr. Salvador. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals. The complainants lost in their petition at the
Court of Appeals due to abandonment, failure to act accordingly, or serious neglect of their counsel, Atty. Fojas to answer the
civil complaint on an expulsion case. Atty. Fojas assured them that everything was in order and he had already answered the
complaint. However, the appellants soon discovered that he never answered it after all because, according to him, he was a very
busy man. Atty. Fojas admitted his “mistake” in failing to file an answer for the expulsion case, but he alleges that it was cured
by his filing of a motion for reconsideration. However, such motion for reconsideration was denied. Atty. Fojas defended his
negligence with the reason that the case was a losing cause after all. Atty. Fojas also asserts that he was about to appeal the
said decision to this Court, but his services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and unilaterally
terminated by complainant. Complainants then filed for a disbarment case.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent committed culpable negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the
complainants an answer.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a
client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. This means
that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the
respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume
and pressure of legal work, while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due to his
overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court. Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains
that the respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer.

Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondent’s inability to exercise due diligence in the
performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill, and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. Furthermore, a breach of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with diligence and,
more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: “A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.”

Atty. Fojas’s negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a “losing cause”. The Supreme Court
held that he should have seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility expressly provides: A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of the client’s case, neither overstating nor understanding the prospects of the case.

REPRIMANDED AND ADMONISHED

Bautista vs Gonzales [A.M. No. 1625 (February 12, 1990)

FACTS:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross
misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed a motion
for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a
resolution the Court granted respondent’s motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. Complainant
submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts:

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado
[hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%)
of the value of the property in litigation.

xxx

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development
into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired
fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney’s fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was
already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of
Deeds of Iligan City;

xxx

Pertinent to No. 4 above, the contract, in No. 1 above, reads:

We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the
suit, including court fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct involving a champertous contract.

HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for six (6) months. The Court finds that the agreement between the
respondent and the Fortunados contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not
properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The
agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation
expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights
is champertous [citation omitted]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has
agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [citation
omitted]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the
former must incur administrative sanctions.

Lorenzana Food Corp., et al. vs. Francisco L. Daria, A.C. No. 2736 (May 27, 1991)

FACTS:
Atty. Daria was hired by Lorenzana Food Corporation as its legal counsel and was eventually designated as its personal manager.
In the course of his employment with the corp he was involved in two labor cases:

Hanopol case - A certain Veronica Hanopol who was allegedly illegally dismissed, filed a case against him. During the initial
hearing, Daria and Hanopol agreed to an amicable settlement and set a date for the next meeting.

This was reset after Hanopol did not show up and the Labor Arbiter reset the date further to June 20, 1983. On that date, Daria
was in another hearing and he moved to postpone the Hanopol hearing through a phone message but the Labor Arbiter did not
receive it, hence he considers the case as submitted for decision based on Hanopol’s complaint and affidavit.

Daria appealed to the NLRC and the case was remanded to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. Attempts to have an
amicable settlement proved futile. By the time the final hearing was set, Daria had already resigned from the company and no
one appeared for the corp during the Hanopol hearing. Labor arbiter revived his earlier decision awarding Hanopol with sum of
P6,469.80 in labor benefits. New counsel for the corp appealed to the judgment and this was remanded for further
proceedings.

San Juan case - Roberto San Juan is an employee of the corp who was accused of double liquidation and unliquidated cash
advances. He was asked to submit a written explanation and was placed on preventive suspension. He was required to restitute
said amount to the company but upon failure to do so, a complaint of estafa was filed against him. San Juan resigned and
sought the assistance of Daria in preparing his counteraffidavit.

Because of these incidents, LFC files an administrative charge against Daria for negligence and betrayal of former client’s
confidences.

ISSUE:
Do the acts of Atty. Daria constitute negligence and betrayal of his former client’s confidence?

HELD:
Court says Yes, Daria violated Code of Professional Responsibility and betrayed the confidences of his former client. He is
suspended from the practice of law for 6 months.

Canon 18 provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence; Rule 18.03 provides that a lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Because Daria had a responsibility to attend the two scheduled hearings he missed and had he filed the required position paper
for the corporation then at least there would have been no delay in the resolution of the case which the court states could have
been in favor of the corporation. The delay was prejudicial to LFC because it deprived successor counsel of the time which he
should be devoting to other cases of LFC instead of the work left by Daria. The respondent’s claim that he was able to persuade
NLRC on appeal to set aside the first decision is no matter. Negligence is apparent in the conduct of Daria.

As for preparing the counter-affidavit of San Juan, the court is not convinced with his denial of his participation in the
preparation. His signature was placed on the document and it is clear that the contention of Daria is a mere afterthought.

An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also for the relation of attorney
and client has terminated. It is not good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his
former client under the pretext that the case is distinct and independent of the former case.

G.R. No. L-31630 June 23, 1988

CATALINO BLAZA and DOMINGO GERUELA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioners’ appeal was dismissed due to failure of their counsel to file the required brief. Counsel vied that said inaction resulted
from CA’s grave abuse of discretion in not granting them the privilege to obtain a copy of the stenographic notes containing the
prosecution witnesses’ testimony. Counsel prior requested that said copies be sent to the RTC, yet this plea was disregarded by
the CA. Petitioner alleged therefore, the wanton violation of Section 8, Rule 122—which requires that a copy of the transcripts
be made available in the Lower Court, and ignored, too, the petitioners' sad plight who, being too poor to buy a copy of the
transcripts or to send their counsel to Manila to read the same, had been thus deprived of the opportunity to ventilate their
meritorious defense before the Appellate Court. They pray for annulment of the resolution dismissing their appeal, and that
denying reconsideration of that dismissal.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, the cause for filing of certiorari and prayer for relief.

ISSUE:
1. WON petitioners be granted relief.
2. WON CA is bound by law to provide copy of stenographc notes in the lower court.

HELD:
1. No. The petitioners are not entitled to relief. They are bound by their counsel's acts and, unfortunately for them, the record
adequately establishes that the failure of their counsel de parte to file brief in their behalf is inexcusable. He did not adopt "the
norm of practice expected of men of good intentions.
2. No. In the first place, Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1964 Rules, invoked by the petitioners, does not justify their counsel's request
that a copy of the transcript be sent down to the lower court. The section states 10 among other things that —

... The original and three copies of the transcript of stenographic notes shall ... be transmitted to the clerk of the appellate court
together with the record... . The other copy of the transcript shall remain in the lower court.

There is no satisfactory showing that no such copy of the transcript had in truth been retained in the lower court, as thus
required by the Rules. The presumption of course is that "official duty has been regularly performed." 11 and nothing in the
record appears to warrant its overthrow or negation.

The fact is that petitioners' counsel had been given more than sufficient time within which to file brief. He had been accorded no
less than ninety (90) days for this purpose: the original thirty (30) days provided by Section 3 of Rule 124, and the sixty (60) days'
extension prayed for in their three (3) motions. The last resolution of the Court should have put him on notice. The resolution
disregarded his proposal that a copy of the transcript of the stenographic notes of the testimony of the named witnesses be
transmitted to the Trial Court for his perusal; it merely granted him an extension of 30 days. He did nothing. He neither moved
for reconsideration nor invited attention to his clients' supposedly sad plight, as he now does before this Court.