Thucydides on Sea Power

Author(s): Chester G. Starr

Source: Mnemosyne, Fourth Series, Vol. 31, Fasc. 4 (1978), pp. 343-350
Published by: Brill
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4430819
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 Mnemosyne, Vol. XXXI, Fase. 4

THUCYDIDES ON SEA POWER

BY

CHESTER G. STARR

From the days of Themistocles Athenian power was consciou

based upon naval strength: "he first dared to say that they m
make the sea their domain" 1). Historically the great sea bat
during the Persian invasions served as exemplars and justifica
for such attention to the sea 2) ; the profit to Athens arising fr
its control of the Aegean was tangible in the tribute lists and
bustle of the Piraeus. We might well expect Thucydides, who cho
as his subject the war in which that sea-based empire fell, to
sider in some detail the utility and limitations of sea power as w
as its effects on Athenian politics and culture.
Before seeking to discover whether in actuality he does so, let
establish briefly the fact that Athenians of his generation
indeed meditate on the nature of sea power. It has been obse
that "in Athens facts had a way of becoming spiritual proble
and Athenian thalassocracy itself underwent searching anal
both in its presuppositions and its effects" 8). One could scar
support this dictum from Aristophanes, who gives only cas
comments, or the work of Stesimbrotus, lost to us 4) ; as Momigl
?) Th. I 93 (hereafter I shall cite Thucydides only by book and cha
in the text and seek to give the major illustrative passages). It is, howe
interesting that Hippias thought of fortifying Munychia (Axistotle, A
Pol. 19), and there are some signs of increasing Athenian interest in th
before Themistocles. The effort, however, to derive useful evidence from
Dipylon vases is ill-judged; see G. Ahlberg, Fighting on Land and Se
Greek Geometric Art (Skrifter utgivna av Svenska institutet Athens 4.
1971).
2) I have collected relevant passages in Why Did the Greeks Defeat the
Persians ?, Parola del Passato 17 (1962), 321-32.
3) A. Momigliano, Sea-Power in Greek Thought, CR 58 (1944), 1-7 =
Secondo Contributo, 58.
4) Aristophanes, Ach. 648, Frogs 698, 1465, Knights 554 ff., 1300 ff.,
Wasps io9iff.; as R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford 1972), 392,
observes on the Athenian arche as a whole, Aristophanes "takes [it] for
granted".
23

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344 THUCYDIDES ON SEA POWER

points out, Pericles suggests that he himself had

sea power to any degree in his speeches (II62). Yet the
critic of Athenian democracy who is now often c
Oligarch (or pseudo-Xenophon) is of great value fo
purposes 6).
In several passages the Old Oligarch comments on
an Athenian context; to facilitate comparison with
shall itemize his major points in the order in which t
his text: 1) democracy of a radical nature and
intimately connected; "it is only just that the poo
the common people of Athens should be better off th
birth and wealth, seeing that it is the people who
and have brought the city her power". 2) In a sta
naval strength slaves have greater independence "in
may get in our slave rents". 3) Athenians are deep
in rowing skills inasmuch as they have practised al
Control of the sea gives Athens many strategic an
vantages, viz., a) islands cannot unite against a na
a naval state can pick the individual points which
ravage, over as great a distance as it desires; c) a m
controls imports and exports, which are vital even
states; in particular no one state has all the items
building ships?timber, iron, bronze, yarn, wax?b
gain these materials by sea; d) more generally "the
of all the Mediterranean "are all swept, as it w
centre, and all owing, as I say, to their maritime
consequence, Athens itself has become cosmopolita
Old Oligarch concludes his extensive discussion of
sea power, Athens itself were an island e).
Thucydides* history begins promisingly, for in
early development of Hellas he sets control of the

5) Dating the pseudo-Xenophontic Athenaion Politeia

Teubner 1961 reprint) is still an open question. H. Frisch, Th
the Athenians (Copenhagen 1942), 47-62, set the 43o's; G
HSCP 71 (1966), 33-38, prefers c. 443 (as also H. Volkman, P
schrift, June 1940, col. 312).
6) Note that in Th. I 143 Pericles advises the Athenians to
were an island and to give up the land outside their walls.

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 THUCYDIDES ON SEA POWER 345

important factor. In this survey Minos was the fir

a thalassocracy, which he utilized to colonize most o
and to reduce piracy "from a natural desire to protect
revenues". Thereafter communications by sea became m
and enriched some of the dwellers on the sea coasts
then describes briefly the naval strength of the A
Troy, identifies the first builder of triremes as A
Corinth about 700, cites the first naval battle (be
and Corcyra) about 40 years later, and sums up na
ments to the time of the Persian wars as providing
revenues and extension of domains to naval powers 8).
land, no conflict of any kind which brought increase
occurred; what wars they had were mere border f
skeptical modern historian may well doubt this conclu
cent of Mahan's misreading of modern European his
scarcely consonant with the expansion of Spartan
strength of Syracuse (stressed by Nicias VI 20-
matter, Thucydides has made abundantly clear his
power is what counts: ???a ?a? t? t?? ?a??ss?? ???t
later passages he comes back to its significance
invasion (I 73-74) and the forethought of Themisto
physical base for the Athenian navy (I 93) ; Alcibiad

7) Herodotus III 122, interestingly, considers the Minoa

a myth; see my essay The Myth of the Minoan Thalassoc
(1955), 282-91; contra R. J. Buck, Historia 11 (1962), 129-37
8) Thucydides' date for the first triremes is upheld by J. S
R. T. Williams, Greek Oared Ships ?oo-322 B.C. (Cambrid
L. Casson, Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World (P
81; and A.B.Lloyd, Were Necho's Triremes Phoenician},
45-61; but I am more than doubtful (cf. J. A. Davison, T
Triremes, CQ 41 [1947], 18-24). It should also be noted th
Thucydides' report of a battle between Corinth and Corcyr
vs. Carthage (I 13), certainly attested naval battles do n
Alalia in 535 and were very few until after 500. Even Syrac
the advice of Hermocrates (VI 34) to oppose the Athenian ex
sea. Note the cautious discussion by A. W. Gomme, A Histor
tary on Thucydides, I (Oxford 1945), 122-25.
9) Gomme, Commentary, I, 126, notes also the tempor
Pheidon. Against Mahan's thesis Haiford Mackinder, Democr
Reality (London 1919), is still useful; see recently P. M
Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London 1976).

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346 THUCYDIDES ON SEA POWER

as asserting that by its navy alone Athens acquired its emp

(VI 17; cf. VI 82-83, VII 66).
This extensive, if generalized, stress on the place of naval pow
in Greek history is so obvious that students of Thucydides
monly assert the historian fully appreciated sea power. In re
however, there is a very limited specific analysis of its values a
limitations in the bulk of his narrative10). Naval battles
operations, indeed, are adequately described. We can foll
Phormio in his remarkable victories off Naupactus, among
few naval battles in history where skill in maneuver was t
decisive factor u) ; we can agonize with the Athenians in their f
defeat in the Great Harbor of Syracuse, an account imitate
Dio Cassius and other later Greek historians; but for more pr
comment we must turn to very scattered remarks mainly in
speeches.
An analysis of these statements may suggest significant judg-
ments on Thucydides* historical approach; but first it will be useful
to pull together his remarks. In doing so I shall follow the order
already established for the Old Oligarch's discussion.
On the first topic, the inherent connection of radical democracy
and sea power, Thucydides says not a word. In his extensive dis-
cussion of the oligarchic revolution of 411 the only relevant remark
is his brief comment (VIII 72) that the ?a?t???? d???? was against
oligarchy; why it should be so disposed he does not say. As far as I
am aware, the one other passage which might at all be considered
relevant is his statement, in discussing the reasons for the Athenian
vote to launch an expedition against Syracuse, that the troops
desired pay (VI 24). A point, in other words, which the Old Oli-

io) Gomme, Commentary, I, 19, acutely observed that on the advantages

of sea power and kindred topics, "Thucydides gives no systematic account,
though he mentions much by the way"; otherwise the point has not been
much noted. Frisch, 79-85, gives parallel quotations from the Old Oligarch
and two Periclean speeches in Thucydides, a procedure which does not
clarify fully the themes set forth in my text. J. de Romilly, Le Pseudo-
X?nophon et Thucydide, Revue de philologie 36 (1962), 225-41, discusses the
intellectual differences between the two; her detailed analysis of some
passages cited in my text is of great value, though her objective is different.
11) W. L. Rodgers, Greek and Roman Naval Warfare (Annapolis 1937),
129 ff., stresses the uniqueness of Phormio's successes.

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 THUCYDIDES ON SEA POWER 347

garch places first in his tract really does not appear i

This silence is the more amazing when one recalls h
that Athens lost the war through the internal deterio
citizenry and its leaders, which led to ill-judged
military decisions (II 65).
On the second point in the Old Oligarch, which i
puzzling comment (the independence of slaves),
also silent12) ; but for the third?Athenian skill on the
the inexperience of its enemies?he provides contr
the warning of Archidamus (I 80-81) and the retort
thians that by higher pay the Athenian mercenarie
away and that practice will make the allies skilled
later views are in turn countered by Pericles in his st
(I 141-142).
For the fourth topic, the values of sea power, the references in
Thucydidean speeches are the most extensive and go beyond the
analysis of the Old Oligarch in one significant, though obvious,
area. Pericles points out the strength of Athens in the islands and on
the continent (I 143) and asserts that sea power can be exercised
widely (II 62) ; in his Funeral Oration he observes more generally
that every land and sea is open to Athenian valor (II 41) 1S). In
this famous speech, however, Pericles nowhere comments as
directly on sea power as we might expect in light of the Thucydidean
emphasis on the factor in early Greek history 14). The difficulty
which islanders faced in opposing Athenian naval command is
stressed in the Melian debate, though here one finds the interesting,
and reasonable, assertion by the Melians that Spartan aid might
be able to avoid the Athenian navy in the vast reaches of the
12) B. Jordan, The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period (Berkeley 1975),
252, 261, is certainly wrong in concluding that the slaves were rented out to
serve as rowers, as more generally in his effort to resuscitate the view that
slaves were commonly to be found on the benches of triremes. See R. L.
Sargent, CP 22 (1927), 264-79; M. Amit, Athens and the Sea (Brussels 1965),
31 ff-
13) See also IV 120-21, V 56.
14) In dealing with the Funeral Oration scholars will henceforth have to
cope with Philip Stadter's demonstration (The Speeches in Thucydides
[Chapel Hill 1973], 117-21) that Plutarch, though he knew the speech,
deliberately did not use it to illustrate Pericles' views.

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348 THUCYDIDES ON SEA POWER

Cretan sea (V no) ; once again, however, we miss any dire

lysis of sea power1d).
The economic advantages of naval control are also no
various points. In the Funeral Oration Pericles observes th
fruits of the whole earth flow to Athens (II 38), though
stated in very general terms, unlike the Old Oligarch's em
on naval stores 1?). The Corinthians stress to the Sparta
imports and exports of inland as well as coastal states
controlled by the Athenians (I 120)17). Repeatedly?and
the point which the Old Oligarch puzzlingly omits?the t
revenues of Athenian empire and the resulting Athenian f
reserves are stressed as against the limited financial resou
the Spartans (I 80-81, 121, 141; II13; VI 91; VIII 76). The A
nians seem to have built and manned their fleet out of internal
revenues down to the 450's, but as Thucydides (I 99) succinctly
put it the allies came to contribute money rather than ships "where-
by the Athenian navy was proportionately increased" 18). The
tremendous difficulties and unsavory expedients required in the
fourth century to keep up the Athenian navy suggest how important
was the regular phoros revenue of the mid-fifth century, ample
enough even to permit Athens to build up those reserves which
Pericles itemized at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. On
the technological side as well modern accounts of Athenian history
usually fail to stress how remarkable a creation was its naval
power, based as it was on fragile fleets of wooden triremes.
The fifth point in the analysis by the Old Oligarch, the cosmo-
politanism of Athens which resulted from its naval emphasis, is as
lacking in Thucydides as the first topic, the political effects of sea

15) For the sake of completeness the Corcyrean references to the utility
of sea power (I 33-36) may be listed here.
16) Gomme, Commentary, I, 21, also notes Thucydides' silence on food
and other materials. The rise of the Piraeus is well documented in A. French,
The Growth of the Athenian Economy (London 1964), cc. 7-9.
17) On the Megarian decree as an example see the brilliant but uncon-
vincing analysis by G. E. M. de Ste Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian
War (London 1972), 251-89; and R. P. Legon, The Megarian Decree and
the Balance of Greek Naval Power, CP 68 (1973), 161-71.
18) In Athenian Coinage 480-449 B.C. (Oxford 1970) I suggested that this
stress needed to be kept in mind ; cf. Plutarch, Cimon 11.

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 THUCYDIDES ON SEA POWER 349

power. In the next century and thereafter the evil e

time connections were to be much discussed by P
and others ; the topic clearly was in the air, but Thu
see fit to bring it into his account19).
We cannot hope to guess how Thucydides would
history had he lived to complete the dreary tale o
lapse. He saw the end of the war, and makes clear
Athens lost because it overextended its naval ope
the advice of Pericles (I 144; II 65); but a summat
glances and brief remarks on naval power in his h
in the speeches, scarcely leads one to conclude
have analyzed the nature of sea power and its effect
nians as directly as the Old Oligarch did or even
(VII 139) more briefly stressed.
No historian of antiquity can properly be expected
with information on a great range of problems w
today 22) ; but we are entitled to make a judgment
such an historian?and his view of history?by
leaves out as well as by those which he includes. O
this essay we may fairly note two obvious facts: fir
dides himself stressed naval power in his exploration
early Greece; and second that the Old Oligarch h
forth interesting ideas as to the intimate connect
and radical democracy/cosmopolitanism 21).
If in the body of his work Thucydides gives on
incomplete comments on sea power?and especially
cepts just cited from the Old Oligarch?we may dr
conclusions about the objectives and especially th
historical analysis of the destruction of Athenia
should we follow the occasional modern tenden

19) Momigliano's essay on sea power in Greek thought is

this topic; see also Gomme, Commentary, I, 266-67.
20) Cf. Gomme, Commentary, I, 1 ff., on the areas w
took for granted.
21) The connection of radical democracy and sea pow
comment in Isocrates 8, 64; 12, 114 ff.; Lysias 13, 16; And
These references I owe to a thoughtful seminar paper b
views of sea power in the fourth-century orators.

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350 THUCYDIDES ON SEA POWER

Thucydides more a political moralist than a narrat

then it must be said that he failed to consider the pos
sea power had moral effects on the Athenian popu
Romilly has justified his silence on the ground that he
rien d'une guerre, et peu soucieux de luttes int?rieures
interpretation is correct, it does not add to his status
analyst. Indeed, if we did not have the satirical tra
Oligarch we would lack knowledge of important them
the fall of the Athenian empire, which at least ou
Thucydides* principal topic.

Ann Arbor (Michigan), University of Michigan

22) Revue de philologie 36 (1962), 227.

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