International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy

Welfare schemes in India: decentralization dynamics and stakeholder influences

Anjula Gurtoo Udayaadithya A.
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IJSSP
34,3/4
Welfare schemes in India:
decentralization dynamics
and stakeholder influences
154 Anjula Gurtoo
Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, India, and
Udayaadithya A.
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Cognizant Technologies, Bangalore, India

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide a background to the special issue on welfare
schemes in India. After 25 years of decentralization of governance and structural adjustments
implemented in the 1980s and 1990s, have welfare schemes implementation and execution become
more accountable and efficient? This paper seeks a critical look at the welfare schemes and its
relationship with decentralization and stakeholders’ dynamics.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper is based on a review of studies post 1990s.
Papers representing all main stakeholders are reviewed, namely, politicians and political parties,
bureaucrats, beneficiary, and civil society organizations. The inclusion/exclusion decision for the
papers was taken on two criteria: the paper/document had to explicitly investigate decentralization,
and had to include welfare scheme as the overall theme under which decentralization was
investigated.
Findings – The paper summarizes the new complexities in the system. Stakeholder behaviour is
driven by several factors external to the traditional social and economic diversities that signify the
Indian sub continent. For example, the authors see the lobbying process shifting to the local level,
increasing importance of the local politician and the significance of forming local coalitions and
partnerships for better resource allocation.
Originality/value – The paper attempts to provide an overview by going beyond a critique of
development to focus on the perils of operating within a socio-economically complex society.
Keywords India, Stakeholders, Decentralization, Welfare schemes
Paper type Conceptual paper

International Journal of Sociology
and Social Policy
Vol. 34 No. 3/4, 2014
pp. 154-165
r Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0144-333X
DOI 10.1108/IJSSP-02-2014-0017
1. Introduction
Over the last five decades India has made systematic efforts at removing poverty and
increasing the well-being of its citizens through targeted welfare programs (Appendix).
Table I gives the budget allocations and expenditure of the welfare schemes run by the
central government, as an indicative of the nature of expenditure on welfare schemes in
India. Subbarao’s (1997) estimation of the marginal odds of participation in India using
three poverty alleviation program interventions (the public food distribution system,
the public works programme and the rural development) found them to be most effective
for those living at the poverty line (roughly the 40th percentile). This lends support for the
contention that welfare programs often gainfully redistribute employment within
underprivileged groups.
However, with poverty levels still at 32.7 percent (World Bank, 2012), research has paid
increased attention to issues of access and accountability in the welfare schemes. Inefficient
practices and systems undermine access to public schemes, and lead to wasted resources
(DeSouza, 2000; Crook and Manor, 1995; Fisman and Gatti, 2002). In the modern era of
changed demographic trends, international advocacy for transparency and accountability,
 and high economic growth scenarios, can we expect better and more efficient welfare Welfare schemes
systems as well? in India
This question becomes more significant with the passing of the 73rd and 74th
amendment to the constitution in April 1993. These Amendments made it mandatory
for each state to constitute local self-government institutions (called Panchayat
Raj Institutions, in rural areas) at the village, intermediate and district levels.
They represent a significant change from a two-tier centralized system of governance, 155
to a decentralized, local empowerment oriented governance system, where locally elected
representatives take most decisions for their areas. The local elected representatives
further select a chairperson who becomes a member of all government Davits and
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Advises. This significantly reduces the power of the bureaucracy and the state politicians.
The role of the bureaucracy, consequently, becomes more of assistance to the elected
representatives, than the primary decision makers. The state politicians share resources
with the local elected representative, reducing their powers to take financial and planning
decisions on development, including running of the welfare schemes.
Twenty-five years into this change, has welfare scheme implementation and execution
become less socially and culturally embedded, and more transparent and efficient? While
decentralization has led to significant support to the socio-economically marginalized,
a high level of socio-economic influence on the system can undermine the efficiency and
effectiveness of welfare implementation and allocation (Blair, 2000; Meenakshisundaram,
1999; Subbarao, 1997). For example, on one side decentralization of welfare schemes
provides people with a platform to voice their needs and design their own support
systems (Marsden and Oakley, 1990; Meenakshisundaram, 1999; Moris, 1991), on the flip
side it shifts the politics to the local micro level making the dynamics murkier
(Udayaadithya and Gurtoo, 2010; Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Moe, 1990). Moreover,
recent studies on social and economic outcomes establish a weak correlation between
democratic decentralization and poverty reduction (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Gopal,
2005; Heller et al., 2007; World Bank, 2012).
This paper seeks a critical look at the decentralization dynamics and its relationship
with various stakeholders, with reference to welfare schemes in India. We review the
stakeholder responses to decentralization specifically with two goals in mind. First,
we believe the informal social and political system dynamics are different when
interacting with decentralization, and hence require perspective consolidation.
Thus, we seek to present a comprehensive review of this interaction. Our second
goal is to relate the results to maximise understanding of the current diversity
dynamics in India. We aim to provide an overview by going beyond a critique of
development to focus on the perils of operating within a multi socio-political society.

2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012

No. of schemes 99 133 138 139 147

Budget allotted* 84,105.00 101,824.07 137,137.00 157,051.00 180,389.33
Expenditure* 81,616.53 131,762.43 129,389.01 167,361.00 188,572.87
% of the total annual Table I.
budget for all welfare Budget allocation
schemes 41.01 41.84 42.18 42.09 40.85 and performance
of the centrally
Note: *In INR crores sponsored schemes
 IJSSP Typically welfare studies look at the ability of decentralized systems to provide
34,3/4 “voice” to the vulnerable, the key concept being “empowerment,” both psychological
and material. It is argued that the only way to break through the barriers of
participation is through long-term empowerment of the traditionally disadvantaged
due to social hierarchies and economic divisions (Marsden and Oakley, 1990;
Meenakshisundaram, 1999; Mukhopadhyay and Rajaraman, 2007). These studies
156 focus on the nature of functions and resources that have devolved to the local level,
the number of people who participate, evaluating scope participation as indirect
measures of responsiveness and legitimacy of the institution (Crook and Manor, 1998;
Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; Tendler and Freedheim, 1994). The focus till now has
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not been so much on the ability of the institutions (the “decentralized system”)
to impact the decision making of the vulnerable (Savale, 2006; Crook and Manor, 1998).
The most common argument being, that decentralization, by definition leads people to
become more knowledgeable and thereby system gets more responsive (Crook and
Manor, 1998). However, direct participation though public meetings or similar channels
does not ensure empowerment and need not necessarily facilitates further “democratic”
processes to be followed (Rigg, 1991; Evans, 1996). Hence, further investigation into the
socio-economic dynamics of decentralization per se is required.
We found around four authors who have investigated this in India in detail.
The most comprehensive studies have been by Crook and Manor (1995, 1998, 2004).
The authors have investigated decentralization in developing countries of Asia and
Africa to highlight a gamut of transparency and accountability issues including
bureaucratic and political complexities. Their focus has also been on institutional
performance. Studies by J. Echeverri-Gent (1988, 1992, 1993) look at poverty alleviation
through decentralization. These studies investigate issues like political influence,
public participation and empowerment. Drèze and Sen’s (1996, 1997, 1999, 2002)
studies take a macro developmental perspective. Issues like employment, economic
development and inequality has been their focus. H.W. Blair (1981, 1996, 2000) looks at
the political economy of participation in developing countries of Asia.
Drawing from these studies the paper proceeds as follows: the next section outlines
the methodology. This is followed by a summary of the debates and challenges found
with (and for) the various stakeholders. The last section discusses these debates and
challenges and concludes the paper.

2. The methodology
Outlining of an optimal strategy was imperative for developing this conceptual paper.
Several studies investigate stakeholder dynamics from various perspectives. Earlier
sociological studies focus on beneficiary demographics and social divisions (Srinivas,
1976, 1980; Sangave, 1980). Economists investigate welfare scheme performance and
poverty impacts (Herring and Edwards, 1983; Ravallion, 1995; Gaiha, 1993). Political
science and economics also looks at political influence (Esping-Andersen, 1989; Rose,
1984). A shift towards complex conceptualizations and capture is seen in the studies
after 1990s. Post 1990s studies after 1990s capture dynamics like elite capture,
bureaucracy-political tensions and negotiated dynamics between social classes, and
are the focus for this paper. Papers representing all main stakeholders are reviewed,
namely, politicians, bureaucrats, beneficiary and civil society organizations.
Political party dynamics are captured as well. Political parties operate at the macro
level while decentralization has put politics at the micro level, making the individual
politician more significant in the scheme of things. We wanted to look at this interplay.
 The inclusion/exclusion decision for the papers was taken on two criteria: the Welfare schemes
paper/document had to explicitly investigate decentralization, and had to include in India
welfare scheme as the overall theme under which decentralization was investigated.

3. Main stakeholders in a decentralized welfare system

Although great optimism exists about the democratizing capacity of the Panchayats
(at multiple levels), literature highlights three interesting aspects where local 157
socio-economics and politics intervenes in the effectiveness of the welfare schemes,
namely when dealing with decision making during policy implementation, when
dealing with the process of resource redistribution, and the indirect influence of
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politics through the bureaucracy.

3.1 The beneficiaries

Several authors like Crook and Manor (1998), Crook and Sverrisson (2001), Drèze
and Sen (1996), and Echeverri-Gent (1992) have investigated the capability of
decentralization institutions as a platform to voice the preferences and priorities
of the marginal populations. Exploring, then, on what matters, shows democratizing
capacity of an institution severely hampered in instances where the elected
representatives and elected bodies are fractured by pre-existing structures of caste,
faction, gender and class (DeSouza, 2000; Narayana, 2005). Echeverri-Gent’s (1992) study
of rural India explains the phenomenon of non-participation of the socio-economically
marginalized in the decision-making process through the “paradox of participation,”
The paradox of participation highlights the traditional patron-client relationships
(along with informal debt relationships) resulting in the existence of powerful local
elite and this impedes the participation of the beneficiary (poor and marginalized)
in the policy decisions. Where the state is unable to establish and maintain
a reasonable amount of autonomy from powerful social actors and forces, the
fragmentation and corruption of public policy become highly probable (Gopal, 2005;
Migdal, 1988).
Low awareness levels, and low literacy rates make the dynamics more complex
(Crook and Manor, 1998; Dasgupta et al., 2007). Non-availability of alternative job
opportunities and dependency on un-skilled labor is another impediment for the
successful policy implementation (Udayaadithya and Gurtoo, 2013; Crook and
Sverrisson, 2001). Changing livelihood options in terms of non-farm activities, rising
literacy rates, reducing caste-based hierarchies in the rural Indian society, and good
connectivity to urban centres is expected to have positive impact on the successful
policy implementation through decentralized systems (Blair, 2000; Drèze and
Sen, 1996).
In cases of policy-specific resource allocations, the stakes are huge for a few
beneficiaries. This is likely to get reflected in the asymmetry of distribution
preferences, and in beneficiaries becoming politically active by organizing themselves
(Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Policy-specific redistributive politics comprises of many
sub-processes, lobbying being a significant one (Drazen and Limao, 2003). Bardhan
and Mookherjee (2005) and Beteille (1991) found better organized groups have higher
resources allocation for them. The authors highlight that where the allocation is
inefficient, the organized groups get more than social optimum and the unorganized
get relatively less. The authors also found the level of group organization being
dependent on their awareness, which in turn depended on their socio-cultural factors.
More homogeneous the groups were, the better was the organization.
 IJSSP 3.2 The bureaucracy
34,3/4 Decentralization has shifted decision making from the bureaucracy to the local
elected representatives, consequently impacting power dynamics. Investigations on
responsiveness of bureaucracy and government institutions, therefore, became very
significant. Bad governance and poor accountability can severely undermine the
interest of the poor and the socially vulnerable (Blair, 2000; Crook and Manor, 1998; Drèze
158 and Sen, 1996, 1997). Literature on administrative responsiveness, i.e. congruence
between public policy and community preferences, however, is limited.
Tensions between the bureaucracy and elected representatives are evident. They are
seen to align with political forces (political clientelism) causing misallocation of funds
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at the executive level (Migdal, 1988; Udayaadithya and Gurtoo, 2011). The social
capital literature argues for development of social capital (trust and group
cohesiveness) of a region for ensuring efficiency of the bureaucratic system and
reduction in political-bureaucracy alignment. The argument is that higher social
capital reduces cost of monitoring and shrinks principal-agent relationship thereby
leading to better government performance (Moe, 1989, 1990). Dasgupta et al. (2007)
highlights that good leadership (social capital), along with procedural restrictions
(scheme rules), can significantly influence government efficiency.
The higher authorities in bureaucracy also play a major role in successfully
countering elite capture. They act as counter-elite to local elite, thereby encouraging
civic participation (Echeverri-Gent, 1992; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005).
Furthermore, state’s willingness to devolve powers and resources coupled with
a well-developed civil society are identified as enabling conditions for effective
participatory governance (Heller et al., 2007; Sabatier, 1988). Where the state is able to
establish and maintain a reasonable amount of autonomy from powerful social actors
and forces, the effectiveness of welfare schemes increased (Ghatak and Ghatak, 2002;
Migdal, 1988). More poor and the vulnerable participate, positively influenced by this
autonomy (Crook and Manor, 1998; Blair, 2000; Heller et al., 2007). Sabatier (1988)
has expressed the importance of strong advocacies and civil society support for the
targeted groups. The author highlights social capital of the community and strong
social networks as determinants of formation of advocacies and pressure groups,
which, in turn, can result in participation in decision making.

3.3 The politicians and political parties

Political parties are an important sub-system of a democracy, and party ideological
preferences impact welfare performance. Literature on inter-governmental transfers
indicates that state governments politically affiliated with the federal government
received significantly greater plan grants and loans (Ghatak and Ghatak, 2002).
Chakrobarty (2007) found federal governments allocating more grants to the states
with less representation for maximizing future benefits. Narayana (2005) and
Srivastava et al. (2007) have also corroborated this evidence. Their research shows
politics has significant impact on distribution of resources. Bureaucrats and politicians
are seen to conduct discretionary transfers in centrally sponsored schemes.
Arulampalam et al. (2009) econometrically identified the political determinants of
these transfers in India. Significant issues identified were government stabilization and
winning maximum number of seats. However, the election process and re-election
strategies alone may not decide the allocation process. The re-election strategies
interact with lobbying groups to decide on the outcome (Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
At the local level, Narayana (2005) found overprovision to the organized lobbying
 groups when governments valued the groups’ contributions and the preferences Welfare schemes
expressed by these groups. Additionally, two more factors appear significant, namely, in India
resources are allocated to the interest group which affects the stability of the
government (Arulampalam et al., 2009) and the provision is larger if the fraction within
the organized groups is less, reducing social marginal costs (Narayana, 2005).
At the individual politician level, the behaviour of legislators can be understood
at both the policy making as well as implementation levels. Frequent checks 159
by local political leaders can induce institutional effectiveness and improved
coordination among civil servants (Udayaadithya and Gurtoo, 2011; Fisman and
Gatti, 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005). However, political intervention apart,
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the success of local governance is highly dependent on engagement and the capacity
of local actors to hold individual politicians accountable (Heller et al., 2007).
Within the local political scenario, asymmetry of bargaining powers among the
legislators can lead to misallocation of resources (Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
The agenda-setter’s district usually gets more allocation than the social optimum
(Crook and Manor, 1998).

3.4 The non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

The concept of NGOs can be viewed as “delegation of authority outside the official
hierarchy” (Lewis, 1998). These organizations provide checks and balances outside the
apparatus of the government. The discussion on NGOs has a collective action focus,
discussed at the local level. When local governance is weak, the voluntary collective
action support provided by NGOs is observed to be heightened (Lewis, 1998).
Especially in case of Indian agrarian societies, where local organization and collective
action are ineffective due to the existence of elite-capture, existence of external
source of influence in the form of civil society organizations supports downward
accountability and responsiveness (Blair, 2000; Evans, 1996).
Some of the NGO actions that support accountability improvements are scheme
information dissemination among stakeholders (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Drèze
and Sen, 1996), public disclosure (Blair, 2000), sharing information about their rights
and political opportunities (Evans, 1996) and encouraging collective action (Harris,
2001). Earlier studies (e.g. Mayo, 1960; Srinivas, 1976) have demonstrated inextricable
link between development of democratic politics and a strong and vibrant “civil society.”
We find case examples of an NGO taking the judicial route to encourage transparency
in decentralization. One such example illustrated by Joshi (2010) highlights the multi
pronged strategies used by these organizations for empowering the locals. Apart from
mobilising the rural poor, awareness campaigns, training people in semi skilled work, and
mass mobilization rallies to generate a momentum, legal action against the government
for mismanagement and accountability was actively pursued. Significantly, this was with
active support of the local politician.

4. Discussion
Diversified interests and preferences of stakeholders decide their individual course of
actions. Within decentralization, we observe stakeholder behavior being driven by
several factors external to the traditional social and economic diversities that signifies
the Indian sub continent. Studies on the dynamics of decentralization, therefore, look at
loss and gain from a particular set of institutional opportunities, in relation to the
purpose of the decentralized scheme. For instance, studies show active lobbying at
the local level. Similarly, decentralization drives resource allocation to be driven by the
 IJSSP local elite and powerful. Several studies establish how the poor and the disadvantaged
34,3/4 get limited benefits of participation due to powerful local elite or traditional
socio-economic situation of the agrarian societies (Echeverri-Gent, 1992; Heller et al.,
2007; Tendler and Freedheim, 1994).
So, can the negative impacts of elite capture be nullified? The degree of elite control
was observed to be significantly dependent on the existence of mass participation
160 at the local level (Meenakshisundaram, 1999; Udayaadithya and Gurtoo, 2013).
Rising education, intensified political competition, availability of other job
opportunities, technological support in agriculture, and group mobilization are other
factors that were observed to impact elite capture (Dasgupta et al., 2007; Robinson,
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1988; Karuna and Sowmya, 2007). In literature, as we have seen earlier, the government
is seen to play a significant role as counter-elite to these local elites, encouraging civic
participation (Echeverri-Gent, 1992; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005). However, the
power struggle between the two still remains (Shahrawat and Rao, 2012).
Separating the socio-economic variables demonstrates the importance of administrative
variables. While overall socio-economic dynamics are still significant, administrative and
institutional variables became more important in several contexts. For instance,
political environment influences scheme performance. Where the large groups are
politically organized, political affiliations of the region become the significant entrants in
the decentralization dynamics. This is seen through literature on political forces,
and bureaucratic forces as well. Local groups’ affiliations (alliances with bureaucrats and
politicians) led to better resource allocation (Karuna and Sowmya, 2007).
Looking for an explanation to draw a reliable scenario of decentralization dynamics
we found research that provides explanations where administrative premises were
seen to contradict normative explanations (see Lloyd et al., 1980; Holden, 1966;
Kaufman, 1969; Moe, 1989, 1990). Searching for explanations led to an understanding
of the politics of institutional choice, that is, decision making through one set of rules
that is part of a system also depends on which other rules are in effect. This configural
nature of decision making drives larger group choices. Called “institutional” rules,
they refer to shared concepts organized by norms, and strategies (Ostrom, 1999).
Analyzing decisions under institutional rules, the concept of rules-in-use is stressed
rather than rules-in-form. Depending on the active status of shared beliefs and
understandings, the rules-in-use are identified and decisions taken accordingly.
These institutional choice rules can be observed from the review of decentralization
dynamics. When a decentralized welfare scheme is launched, the beneficiaries
(actors in the system) make assumptions or evaluations of the resources and the
situations. These assumptions then act on the selection of a particular course of action
(Ostrom, 1999). For instance significance of the local variables leads them to form
collectives for better bargaining and start lobbying on one hand and form bureaucratic
and political affiliations on the other hand. These decisions together lead to normative
and economic equilibrium. Another example can be seen in the behaviour of the
bureaucrats. As they are no longer the main decision makers, resource allocation
dynamics and political alignments take precedence in order to preserve their power.

5. Conclusion
Social and economic disparities were extremely high till the 1980s. Caste hierarchies,
authority of the elders and landed class defined the structures of control and their
decisions had passive acceptance. However, 25 years back, the government and
para-statal institutions started taking several significant steps to meet the disparity in
 favour of backward regions, socially vulnerable communities and the poor. Institutions Welfare schemes
of local self governance like Panchayati Raj, and employment schemes like Jawahar in India
Rozgar Yojna were concentrated initiatives in this direction. Coupled with high degree
of economic liberalization and privatization, public awareness due to the information
technology and telecommunication revolution, and promotion of community based
projects by the government in the past decade, the traditional societies have moved
towards a social change, i.e. empowerment. Decentralization was meant to promote 161
equality and give voice to all classes of people, by challenging the traditional social
structure of control that emphasizes submission to social divisions. However, it has
created its own socio-political dynamics.
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Our review illustrates that empowerment has its own dynamics. While being
dependent of the social structures, they are independent of them as well. The actor
(an individual or a collective) is seen to make assumptions about resources, situation,
value assigned to the resources and the situation, use of knowledge and information.
These assumptions lead to the rules used to define relationships, understand attributes of
the world, and attributes of the community within which the decision occurs. And these
rules in turn act on the selection of a particular course of action through the social space
where individuals interact. Participants are motivated to select particular strategies or
chains of actions that jointly lead to stable equilibriums. The review reflects the new
dynamics which follow democratic initiatives. Particular configuration of globalization and
empowerment initiatives seems to have produced new kinds of decentralization scenarios.
It is our hope that the special issue will further this dialogue of these dynamics in
implementation of welfare schemes in India. The studies in this special issue look at
various schemes, in their performance, impact and efficiency, providing a way forward
in social policy points to approaches more embedded with the strategic changes in the
Indian society. The contributors of the special issue pose some challenges questions for
a relook at the old order of thinking which governs welfare scheme implementation,
and provide directions for future research.

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Appendix

Beneficiary Schemes Schemes Schemes Schemes

Child and Infants: Anganwadi Integrated Child Integrated Child Mid Day Meals
women Scheme; National Development Protection Scheme Scheme
Creche Fund Scheme
Gild child: Balika Women: Child Birth: Reproductive Juvenile Justice
Samriddhi Yojna; Development of and Scheme
Non-Formal Education Women and Child Health Program;
Centers; Kishori Shakti Children in Rural National Maternity
Yojana Areas Benefits
Family Counselling Janani Suraksha Awareness Generation Rashtriya
Centre Yojana Projects for Rural and Mahila Kosh
Poor Women
Condensed Course of Swayamsidha Vocational Rehabilitation Science and
Education for Adult Scheme; of Women with Technology for
Women Disabilities Women
Training and Rashtriya Mahila National Maternity NORAD Scheme
Employment for Women Kosh Benefits Scheme
Distance Education for Education Work Development of Swa Shakti
Women Development for Prevention of Women and Children Project
and Empowerment Atrocities on in Rural Areas
Table AI. Women
Some significant welfare
programs running in India (continued)
 Beneficiary Schemes Schemes Schemes Schemes Welfare schemes
in India
Labourer and Employment Labour Welfare Food for Work Self Help Groups
unemployed Assurance Scheme Fund Program
poor
Employment Schemes: Jawahar Rozgar Yojana; Schemes for Training of
Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana; Rehabilitation of Bonded Rural Youth
Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana; Rural Labourers for Self-
165
Employment Gaurantee Scheme; Rural Employment
Employment Generation Program (REGP)
Rural areas Infrastructure Rural Water Supply Non-Lapsable Central Food for Work
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(development Development Fund; Water Program Pool of Resources Program

schemes) Program
Integrated Rural Agricultural and Integrated Wastelands Indira Awaas
Development Program Rural Debt Relief Development Accelerated Yojana
Scheme Program
Scheme for Land Swajaldhara Rural Desert Development Credit-cum-
Development Drinking Water Program Subsidy Scheme
Scheme
Poor, old and Prohibition and Drug Integrated Program Liberation and Food:
marginalized Abuse Prevention for Older Persons Rehabilitation Scheme Annapurna
(social Scheme Scheme
schemes)
National Social National Old Age Members of Parliament National Family
Assistance Program Pension Scheme Local Area Development Benefit
Scheme
Social Defence Scheme Socio-Economic Short Stay Homes
Program
Indigenous Tribal Cooperative Central Sector Special Component Plan Educational
tribes Marketing Development Scheme Schemes for
Federation Tribals
Tribal Sub-Plan Vocational Training Centrally Sponsored
Centres Scheme Table AI.

Corresponding author
Dr Anjula Gurtoo can be contacted at: anjula@mgmt.iisc.ernet.in

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