Timoteo Garcia vs Sandiganbayan G.R. No.

155574 November 20, 2006

Facts: TIMOTEO A. GARCIA, GILBERT G. NABO, being then public officers or employees of
the LTO, borrow units Asian Automotive
Center’s Service Vehicle knowing that said corporation regularly transacts with the accused’s LTO
Office for the registration of its motor vehicles, in the reporting of its engine and chassis numbers
as well as the submission of its vehicle dealer’s report and other similar transactions which require
the prior approval and/or intervention of the said accused Regional Director and employee.
Ma. Lourdes Miranda, the complainant, whose child was run over an killed in a vehicular
accident; the driver of the ill-fated motor vehicle was accused Nabo, subordinate of Garcia.
Miranda successfully traced the said vehicle and eventually discovered the existence of numerous
delivery receipts in the files and possession of the Company own by certain Aurora Chiong; and
that said discovery led to the institution of the subject criminal cases against herein accused. Mrs
Chiong recounted that accused Garcia has a farm, and he would need a vehicle to transport water
thereto. For this purpose, he would, on a weekly basis, borrow from the Company a motor vehicle,
either by asking from her directly through telephone calls or through Yungao, her Liaison Officer.
Every time accused Garcia would borrow a motor vehicle, the Company would issue a delivery
receipt for such purpose, which has to be signed by the person whom accused Garcia would send
to pick up the motor vehicle.
Yungao testified that the names and signatures of the persons who actually received the
Company’s
vehicles were reflected on the faces of the delivery receipts. The Sandiganbayan promulgated the
assailed decision convicting petitioner of fifty-six counts of violation of Section 3(b) of Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner be convicted of any other crime (

i.e. Direct Bribery or Indirect Bribery) charged in the informations?

Held: The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes
the following acts: (1) by agreeing to perform, or by performing, in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his
official duties; (2) by accepting a gift in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime, in connection with the performance of his official duty; or (3) by agreeing to
refrain, or by refraining, from doing something which is his official duty to do, in consideration of
any gift or promise. In the case under consideration, there is utter lack of evidence adduced by the
prosecution showing that petitioner committed any of the three acts constituting direct bribery.
The two prosecution witnesses did not mention anything about petitioner asking for something in
exchange for his performance of, or abstaining to perform, an act in connection with his official
duty. In fact, Atty. Aurora Chiong, Vice-President and General Manager of the Company, testified
that the Company complied with all the requirements of the LTO without asking for any
intervention from petitioner or from anybody else from said office. From the evidence on record,
petitioner cannot likewise be convicted of Direct Bribery. Indirect bribery is committed by a
public officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason of his office. The essential ingredient
of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer
concerned must have accepted the gift or material consideration. The alleged borrowing of a
vehicle by petitioner from the Company can be considered as the gift in contemplation of the law.
To prove that petitioner borrowed a vehicle from the Company for 56 times, the prosecution
adduced in evidence 56 delivery receipts
allegedly signed by petitioner’s representative whom the latter would
send to pick up the vehicle. We, however, find that the delivery receipts do not sufficiently prove
that petitioner received the vehicles considering that his signatures do not appear therein. In
addition, the prosecution failed to establish that it was
petitioner’s representatives who picked up the vehicles. If the identity of the person who allegedly
picked
up the vehicle on behalf of the petitioner is uncertain, there can also be no certainty that it was
petitioner who received the vehicles in the end.

[ GR No. L-61776 to No. L-61861, Mar 23, 1984 ]

REYNALDO R. BAYOT v. SANDIGANBAYAN +

DECISION

213 Phil. 344

RELOVA, J.:

Petitioner Reynaldo R. Bayot is one of the several persons accused in more than one hundred
(100) counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents before the Sandiganbayan. The
charges stemmed from his alleged involvement, as a government auditor of the COA assigned to
the Ministry of Education and Culture, in the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA
checks for non-existent obligations of the Teachers' Camp resulting in damage to the government
of several million pesos. The first thirty-two (32) cases were filed on July 25, 1976.
In the meantime, petitioner ran for the post of municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite where he was
elected. Then, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting herein petitioner and some of
his co-accused in the thirty-two (32) cases filed against them. On appeal, Batas Pambansa Blg.
195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
Thereafter, in other cases pending before the respondent court in which herein petitioner is one of
the accused, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all the accused-public officers pendente lite
whre respondent court issued an order directing the suspension of all the accused including herein
petitioner "from their public positions or from any other public office.
Herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but The motion was denied.Hence, this
petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N SEC 13 OF RA 3019 as amended by BP 195 is applicable in this case.

HELD: YES. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any
offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as
a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by the use of the word "office" the same applies to
any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under
which he was charged.
The instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

[ GR Nos. 86899-903, May 15, 1989 ]

GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO v. SANDIGANBAYAN +

DECISION

255 Phil. 401

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales While he occupied the position of
mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a letter complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him of
having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) in relation to the
award of licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal waters of Botolan, Zambales and the
issuance of five (5) tractors of the municipality to certain individuals allegedly without any
agreement as to the payment of rentals.

The complaint with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed. As
regards the other complaint, the Tanodbayan filed five (5) separate informations, accusing the
petitioner of violation of Section 3(e), of the Anti-Graft Law with the Sandiganbayan.

A motion to quash the informations was denied by the Sandiganbayan. A motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.

The petitioner then filed a petition to annul the Sandiganbayan's resolutions denying the
petitioner's motion to quash and motion for reconsideration but was denied. The resolution became
final and executory on October 17, 1988.

The petitioner was arraigned on January 6, 1989 before the Sandiganbayan. He pleaded NOT
GUILTY to the charges against him.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor then filed a motion to suspend the petitioner pendente lite
pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
On February 10, 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution suspwnding petitioner pendente lite.
Hence the instant petition, requesting that the execution and implementation of the suspension
order be held in abeyance pending determination of the merits of the petition. The motion was
denied prompting the petitioner to ask the Court for an earlier setting of the trial of the cases
which was denied in an order dated February 22, 1989.

ISSUE: whether or not the ruling in the Garcia case where the suspension was ordered by no less
than the President of the Philippines is applicable to an elective official facing criminal charges
under the Anti-Graft Law and suspended under Section 13 thereof.

HELD: YES

The application of the Garcia injunction against preventive suspensions for an unreasonable period
of time applies with greater force to elective officials and especially to the petitioner whose term is
a relatively short one. The interests of the sovereign electorate and the province of Zambales
cannot be subordinated to the heavy case load of the Sandiganbayan and of this Court.

It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest
provincial office in their command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with
the termination of his case possibly extending beyond his entire term simply because the big
number of sequestration, ill-gotten, wealth, murder, malversation of public funds and other more
serious offenses plus incidents and resolutions that may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents
the expedited determination of his innocence or guilt.

The order dated February 10, 1989 suspending the petitioner without a definite period can not be
sanctioned. We rule that henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under
Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of
Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also appears reasonable and
appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

The petitioner also questions the applicability of Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 as amended by
Batasan Pambansa Blg. 192 to him. He opines that the suspension provision as amended which
qualifies the public officer as incumbent does not apply to him since he is now occupying the
position of governor and not mayor, the position wherein he was charged under the Anti-Graft
Law.

This argument is untenable. The issue was settled in the case of Bayot v. Sandiganbayan (128
SCRA 383 (1984), in this wise:

"x x x Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is presently
occupying a position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory
provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
whatever stage or execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office. Thus, by the use of the word 'office' the same applies to any office which the officer
charged may be holding, and not only the particular office under which he was charged."
One last point. Should the purposes behind preventive suspensions such as preventing the abuse
of the prerogatives of the office, intimidation of witnesses, etc., become manifest, the respondent
court is not bereft of remedies or sanctions. The petitioner may still be suspended but for
specifically expressed reasons and not from an automatic application of Section 13 of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

[ GR No. 129913, Sep 26, 1997 ]

DINDO C. RIOS v. SECOND DIVISION OF SANDIGANBAYAN +

RESOLUTION

345 Phil. 85

ROMERO, J.:

An information was filed against petitioner who is the incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of
San Fernando, Romblon for alleged unauthorized disposition of confiscated lumber, in violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. It was alleged
that petitioner,while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and with
evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the disposition of
confiscated, assorted and sawn tanguile lumber consisting of 1,319 pieces without proper authority
therefor, thus, causing undue injury to the Government.
On September 16, 1996, the OSP filed a "Motion to Suspend Accused (herein petitioner) Pendente
Lite," to which petitioner filed an "Opposition," reiterating the same ground stated in his motion to
quash.
The Sandiganbayan overruled the argument in its resolution . Thereupon, petitioner filed a verified
petition The Court resolved to deny the petition and upheld the decision of Sandiganbayan w/c
suspend petitioner for a period of 90 days. Petitioner filed a MR w/c was denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: W/ N PETITIONER VIOLATED RA 3019

W/N SUSPENSION OF 90 DAYS IS IN VIOLATION OF THE LOCAL GOV'T CODE

HELD: YES.
The court held that the act of disposing of confiscated lumber without prior authority from DENR
and the Sangguniang Bayan constituted a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019. [2] Therefore, there
is probable cause to hold petitioner liable for such act, for which the information was validly filed.
Although any further discussion of this issue would be unnecessary, the Sandiganbayan's ruling is
herein reiterated as a reminder to public officials of their crucial role in society and the trust
lodged upon them by the people.

The act complained of in this case is "the disposition (by petitioner) of confiscated, assorted and
sawn lumber consisting of 1,319 pieces without proper authority therefor, thus causing undue
injury to the Government."
Having ruled that the information filed against petitioner is valid, there can be no impediment to
the application of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 which states, inter alia:
"Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. - Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office."

2.) YES, The Sandiganbayan erred in imposing a 90 day suspension upon petitioner for the single
case filed against him. Under Section 63 (b) of the Local Government Code, "any single
preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days." [8]