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SP-1107
Document ID SP-1107
Security Restricted
Discipline Electrical
Revision 4.0
Keywords: This document is the property of Petroleum Development Oman, LLC. Neither the whole nor
any part of this document may be disclosed to others or reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic recording or otherwise)
without prior written consent of the owner.
Revision: 4.0
Petroleum Development Oman LLC Effective: Oct. 16
i Document Authorisation
Authorised For Issue
ii Revision History
The following is a brief summary of the 4 most recent revisions to this document. Details of all
revisions prior to these are held on file by the issuing department.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
i Document Authorisation ...................................................................................................... 3
ii Revision History.................................................................................................................... 4
iii Related Business Processes ............................................................................................... 4
iv Related Corporate Management Frame Work (CMF) Documents ................................... 4
1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1413
1.1 SCOPE ........................................................................................................................ 1413
1.2 COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARD ............................................................................. 1413
1.3 APPLICABLE STANDARDS, SPECIFICATIONS AND CODES ................................ 1413
1.3.1 PDO Standards ......................................................................................... 1413
1.3.2 SIOP/SIEP Standards ............................................................................... 1514
1.3.3 International Standards ............................................................................. 1514
2 General Protection Requirements................................................................................. 1716
2.1 PROTECTION PHILOSOPHY .................................................................................... 1716
2.1.1 Objectives.................................................................................................. 1716
2.1.2 Application of Relays to Standard Schemes ............................................. 1817
2.1.3 132kV Substations with Breaker-and-Half Scheme .................................. 1817
2.1.4 Automatic Bus Transfer Schemes............................................................. 1918
2.1.5 Circuit Breakers for Generators, Motors and 132kV Feeders ................... 1918
2.1.6 Opening time for HV vacuum contactor or circuit breaker ........................ 1918
2.1.7 33kV Expulsion Fuse, PMR & Outdoor CB ............................................... 1918
2.1.8 Transformers in 33kV OHL system ........................................................... 2019
2.2 SYSTEM EARTHING.................................................................................................. 2019
2.3 RELAY SPECIFICATIONS ......................................................................................... 2019
2.3.1 Communication Requirements .................................................................. 2120
2.3.2 Relay setting, configuring Tool & the relay soft files ................................. 2120
2.3.3 Other Requirements .................................................................................. 2120
2.3.4 Use of Relays for Operational Interlocks etc. ............................................ 2221
2.3.5 Relay Operation Indication ........................................................................ 2221
2.4 RELAY COMMUNICATION SYSTEM ........................................................................ 2221
2.5 MULTIFUNCTION METER (MFM) ............................................................................. 2423
2.6 CURRENT TRANSFORMERS ................................................................................... 2423
2.7 VOLTAGE TRANSFORMERS .................................................................................... 2625
2.8 INSTALLATION AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS..................................................... 2726
2.8.1 General Requirements .............................................................................. 2726
2.8.2 Protection, Control & Metering schemes - Lead numbering ..................... 2826
2.8.3 Earthing ..................................................................................................... 2827
2.8.4 Current Transformer Earthing ................................................................... 2827
2.8.5 Connections for Protection Testing ........................................................... 2928
2.8.6 Power Supply to Protection Relays ........................................................... 2928
2.8.6.1 PMR Control / Protection Power Supplies ................................................ 3029
2.8.7 Labelling .................................................................................................... 3029
2.8.8 Miniature Circuit Breakers (MCBs) ........................................................... 3029
3 Specific Protection Requirements ................................................................................ 3130
3.1 OVERHEAD LINE FEEDERS – UP TO 33KV ............................................................ 3130
3.1.1 Overhead Line Feeder - 33kV Switchboard .............................................. 3130
3.1.2 Pole Mounted Reclosers (PMRs) .............................................................. 3231
ASSOCIATED DIAGRAMS
Figure No. Drawing No., Rev. Title
STD 4 6500 XXX INDEX, LEGEND ETC.
Index STD 4 6500 000 D Index Sheet /SP1107 Standard Drawings
Legend STD 4 6500 001 D Legend Sheet/Electrical Symbols
STD 4 6501 xxx 33KV OHL / CABLE
Figure 1.1 STD 4 6501 001 D Protection and Metering SLD for 33kV Overhead
Line / Cable Feeder
Figure 1.2 STD 4 6501 002 C Protection and Metering SLD for 33kV Overhead
Line / Cable (Interconnector with Bi-directional Power
Flow)
Figure 3.4 STD 4 6503 004 D Protection and Metering SLD for transformer with
132kV Primary winding
Figure 3.5 STD 4 6503 005 A Protection and Metering SLD for Distribution
Transformer with 132kV Primary winding (<500m)
Figure 3.6 STD 4 6503 006 A Protection and Metering SLD for Distribution
Transformer with 132kV Primary winding (>500m)
STD 4 6504 xxx GENERATORS
Figure 4.1 STD 4 6504 001 D Protection and Metering SLD for Generators
connected to 33kV Switchgear (Without GCB)
Figure 4.2 STD 4 6504 002 C Vacant
Figure 4.3 STD 4 6504 003 C Protection and Metering SLD for LV Generator
Figure 4.4 STD 4 6504 004 C Protection and Metering SLD for Generators
connected to 132kV Grid (With GCB)
STD 4 6505 xxx HV MOTORS
Figure 5.1 STD 4 6505 001 D Protection and Metering SLD for HV Motor
Figure 5.2 STD 4 6505 002 D Protection and Metering SLD for Unit Transformer /
Synchronous Motor Circuit – 33kV
Figure 5.3 STD 4 6505 003 D Protection and Metering SLD for Unit Transformer /
Induction Motor Circuit – 33kV
Figure 5.4 STD 4 6505 004 A Protection and Metering SLD for Unit Transformer /
Synchronous Motor Circuit (with Long Feeder on
Transformer Secondary) – 132kV
Figure 5.5 STD 4 6505 005 A Protection and Metering SLD for Unit Transformer /
Induction Motor Circuit (with Long Feeder on
Transformer Secondary) – 132kV
Figure 5.6 STD 4 6505 006 A Protection and Metering SLD for VFD / Synchronous
Motor (Transformer Primary-132kV)
STD 4 6506 xxx BUSBAR PROTECTION
Figure 6.1 STD 4 6506 001 C Protection SLD for 132kV Busbar with more than one
bus section
Figure 6.2 STD 4 6506 002 C Protection SLD for 132kV Busbar with single bus
section
Figure 6.3 STD 4 6506 003 A Vacant
1 Introduction
1.1 SCOPE
This SP specifies the electrical protection schemes and equipment that shall be
applied to all new PDO projects and is complementary to DEP 33.64.10.10-GEN and
DEP 33.64.10.17.GEN.
The scope of SP includes 132kV, 33kV, 11kV, 6.6kV and 415V Systems. In 415V
system, the scope limited up to 415V incomer circuit breakers and ACB/MCCB
outgoings. With regard to the 415V motor feeders and SFU outgoing feeders,
stipulations in DEP and relevant SP shall apply. Further, for extensions / modifications
to existing installations, RMUs etc., the SP may be applied with appropriate
modification to retain the integrity.
Numerical relays have capability for control, interlocking & monitoring of connected
feeders, in addition to protection. However, as per the current philosophy of PDO, the
SP considers use of protection functionality only and not Control and interlocking.
In case of installations with Substation Control System (SCS) or Substation
Automation & Monitoring System (SAMS) using the control, interlocking & monitoring
capabilities of the numerical protection relays, the SP can be applied with appropriate
modifications (especially the section dealing with Relay Communication System), with
prior approval of CFDH-Electrical.
The new power station 132kV substations are with breaker-and-half schemes. The
scope of the document covers these substations as well.
2.1.1 Objectives
The prime objectives of electrical protection systems are to reliably:
Identify system faults and automatically initiate action to isolate the
affected plant whilst minimising disruption to the healthy part of the
system.
Prevent, or minimise, equipment damage by early identification of fault
conditions and rapid control action.
Identify abnormal conditions that could affect personnel safety (e.g.
touch voltages of faulted equipment) and avoid these by design.
Maintain full plant availability - i.e. avoid nuisance trips.
To meet the above objectives, the main requirements of a protection system are:
Redundancy - i.e. if a single protection device or circuit fails there must
be an independent secondary method for fault identification and
isolation.
Note: Secondary protection need not have such stringent requirements for minimal
disruption as the primary protection.
The possibility of dormant, un-revealed faults in protection systems
should be minimised by design - e.g. use of trip circuit supervision, self-
checking relays etc.
Positive operation for the full range of anticipated system fault levels
Fault clearance within the critical clearing times for system stability.
No operation for short time overloads and normal system transients
such as motor starting currents; transformer magnetising inrush
currents, switching surges etc.
Fail-safe logic is widely used in C&A schemes but not in Electrical
schemes. In case there is a problem in trip circuit or in DC supply, the
same is annunciated calling for urgent action of operator and the subject
feeder is allowed to continue in service. In electrical systems, the
backup protection is expected to clear a fault in case of problem in the
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fuses. These fuses should not be typically installed up to distance of 11.0kM on the
single ELM conductor from 33kV switchboard having short circuit current as 31.5kA.
Pole Mounted Reclosers (PMRs) are available up to a fault rating of 16kA at present.
Hence, wherever, circuit isolation is required, PMRs shall be specified if the fault
currents at the location do not exceed 14kA and hence PMRs should not be typically
installed up to distance of 3.0kM on the single ELM conductor from 33kV switchboard
having short circuit current as 31.5kA. Outdoor circuit breakers (OCB) shall be
preferred only if estimated fault levels at the location exceed 14kA.
In place of PMR or OCB, possibility of installing current limiting type HRC fuses shall
be explored if there are no concerns from operation and maintenance team.
Short circuit calculation shall be carried out by the contractor / design consultant during
design stage to determine the fault current before recommending any of the above
options. Parallel operation of 33kV switchboard incomers and possible future increase
of 132kV source fault levels shall be considered while estimating the 33kV fault levels
at the load point.
All overcurrent and earth fault protection relays shall have inrush (2nd harmonic)
blocking feature.
In case of feeders with small CT ratio with respect to available fault current, it is
recommended to select the protection relays with provision of highset overcurrent
protection operation on ‘Inst’ or ‘peak’ current sensing and not on RMS current sensing
so that the protection operates before the subject CT goes into saturation.
Where protection relays in the 415V incomers form part of the local control /
monitoring / data acquisition system (for example, 415V incomers for the switchboards
in 132/33kV substation), the relays shall be IEC 61850 compliant. However, where the
415V switchboards are installed with no connection to local control / monitoring / data
acquisition system (for example, switchboards in isolated field locations), the
compliance with IEC 61850 in the 415V incomer relays is optional.
2.3.2 Relay setting, configuring Tool & the relay soft files
Further, the scope shall include supply of software with at least three licences for
using in PDO / Consultants’ offices for setting / configuration studies / disturbance,
event, fault record viewing.
Before equipment is ordered, sufficient studies shall be performed for providing tie-in
with the existing local \ remote PC system. Studies shall also be carried out to
determine the protection requirements and to ensure that appropriate relay protection
functions and setting ranges with required sensitivities are chosen. The logic schemes
for individual relays shall be configured in respective relays in accordance with the
approved scheme drawings and tested before despatch of the relay panels. The soft
copy of the scheme logic also shall be sent in a CD (in duplicate), for verification
during relay setting studies / commissioning.
For the protections based on high impedance principle (e.g. busbar protection or
Restricted Earth fault protection for transformer windings), the relays can be electro-
mechanical or static type. For all other protection functions, the relays shall be
numerical type and shall include self supervision, fault/event/disturbance record
capability as well as communication capability, as a minimum.
Time dependent overcurrent and earth fault protection relays should incorporate
definite time characteristic and a selection of standard inverse, very inverse,
extremely inverse and long-time inverse operating characteristics to IEC 60255.
Highset element shall have adjustable time delay and inhibiting facility.
Dropout to pickup ratio for all current operating protection elements shall not be less
than 70% even at the lowest protection setting.
PDO electrical system doesn’t have high resistive earthing except for generators and
unit transformer connected motors. Hence, earth fault protection element provided in
the relays shall not saturate up to expected earth fault currents.
Relay coils operating on DC shall be designed so that any coils energised from the
positive pole of the battery are via normally open contacts. This is to minimise the
effects of electrolysis.
The communication to the remote system (i.e. virtual computer) shall be through PDO
WAN. The virtual computer can be any individual computer in any of the PDO offices
which can access local / station computer through Citrix.
The local / station computer along with main Ethernet switch shall be rack mounted in
a vertical cabinet. Wherever possible, this vertical cabinet shall be placed in central
location and opposite to C&R panels/switchboards for better view. Vertical cabinet
shall also contain SNTP GPS time server required for time synchronisation, with
antenna mounted on the roof of the building. Time resolution shall be 1ms or better.
Power supply to local/station computer shall be 110V DC. If is not possible to provide
local/station computer suitable for 110V DC, power supply to local/station computer
can be 240V AC. This 240V AC power supply shall be derived from station 110V DC
supply by 110V DC to 240V AC inverter. This inverter shall be industrial type. If 240V
AC UPS power supply is available in the station, it can be connected to local/station
computer and in such case 110V DC to 240V AC inverter is not required.
Auxiliary power supplies to all other hardware (e.g. Ethernet switches etc.) supplied as
part of the Relay Communication System shall be derived from the 110V DC auxiliary
power supplies available in the relay panels/switchboards.
The following minimum functionality shall be made available at the local/station
computer as well as virtual computer, for which the scope shall include any additional
hardware/software required for:
Display of the quantities measured by relay such as currents and
voltages.
Retrieval of disturbance records stored in relay buffer.
Retrieval of event records stored in relay buffer.
Setting and configuring the relays
Switching of setting groups, wherever applicable
Review of programmable logic / binary coded settings
Time synchronisation of all the devices in the station including
local/station computer.
Further, the system shall enable access to,
Local/station computer (in turn to individual numerical relay in the
station) from virtual computer located anywhere in the PDO network
through appropriate authorisation.
Access controls to the system having various privileges access level, at
least three levels are required. The Contractor shall propose and
configure each level with appropriate privileges according to the
Company requirement and approval.
The specification for the local/station computer, Ethernet switches, GPS clock system
etc. shall be agreed with PDO IT before purchase. Once installed, the system shall be
registered with PDO IT for the purpose of monitoring/trouble shooting, software
upgrades, maintenance etc.
The required Storage capacity (Hard disk) in the local/station computer shall depend
on the no. of total relays in the substation to be connected to the computer with its
associated data.
a. Real time viewing of voltage, current, real power, reactive power, power factor and
maximum demand with auto scrolling facility.
b. Accumulated energy
c. Total Harmonic Distortion with spectrum analysis and waveform scopes for both
voltage and current
d. MFM shall capture maximum demand data at the interval of every 15 minutes as
minimum and store this data in the internal memory for at least 50 weeks and
provide reports as required.
e. MFM shall store the measurements of the main voltage characteristics in the
internal memory. The reports are made on the basis of this stored data. Data for
the last 50 weeks as minimum and variations of the measured quantities (Voltage
sag/swell/interruptions) from the standard values are stored in the report, which
enables detection of anomalies in the network.
f. MFM shall have waveform recording capability, which can be triggered by limits
set internally for the measured parameters or from external inputs. MFM shall be
capable of storing 10 waveform records as minimum. Each record shall be of
duration not less than 10 seconds with resolution of 10ms or better.
g. All the data shall be time stamped and MFM shall have time synchronization
facility through communication network.
h. MFM shall have self-monitoring functionality and provide an output contact for
alarm.
i. MFM shall have large LCD display screen with back light for easy viewing and
scrolling of measured parameters.
j. For communication with SCADA / DCS / Other Control System, MFM shall have a
rear RS485 port with protocol as confirmed by supplier of SCADA / DCS / Other
Control System. MFM shall also have a front port for connecting to a laptop for
configuring/viewing/downloading.
k. All required measurements, weekly reports and alarms can also be stored locally
in the internal memory. Stored data can then be transferred to a memory card or
accessed through communication for post analysis. The limits and the required
quality in a monitored period can be defined for each monitored characteristic.
The make and model number of the MFM shall be specified by the vendor in the offer
which shall be subjected to review and approval by the Company. All required
software with license and cords/cables required for settings and viewing of data shall
be included in the offer.
and accuracy limiting factor (ALF). The CT sizing shall ensure proper working of
protective devices for all short circuit currents up to the rated value of switchgear. The
132kV bays shall have five core CTs.
High impedance Motor/Generator differential / Transformer restricted earth fault /
Busbar differential protection shall have dedicated CTs (not shared by any other
protections/meters). The CT sizing shall ensure speed of operation better than 40ms
(@5xIs typically). All CTs connected to any high impedance differential or restricted
earth fault protection scheme shall have identical parameters.
Current transformer primaries shall be of low reactance bar primary type wherever
possible. Split core type current transformers shall not be accepted.
Current transformers shall have a thermal rating at least equal to circuit requirements
and a short time (through-fault) rating at least equal to that of the associated
switchgear.
Current transformers shall have an output rating adequate to cater for the burden (CT
leads, relay, etc) connected to them. They shall have sufficient rating, terminal voltage
and overcurrent performance, where applicable, for the satisfactory operation of their
associated equipment.
Accuracy class of protective current transformers shall be selected dependent upon
the particular application. The Accuracy Limit Factor (ALF) shall be selected with
consideration to the maximum value of primary current up to which maintenance of
accuracy is required. In case of feeders with small CT ratio with respect to available
fault current, it shall be ensured that CT doesn’t saturate up to two times of estimated
highset instantaneous setting as minimum.
For the transformer / generator / motor differential, distance / line differential, restricted
earth fault and busbar differential protections, CTs should be Class PX type. The
specification for Class PX CTs shall include:
Compliance with IEC 61869
Rated primary current, turns ratio, rated knee-point e.m.f. at maximum
secondary turns
Maximum exciting current at the rated knee-point e.m.f. or at a stated
percentage thereof
Maximum resistance of the secondary winding (at a stated temperature)
The applicable X/R value of the system for the CT sizing calculations shall be obtained
from PDO.
Preliminary calculations regarding both stability and sensitivity of the high impedance
differential schemes shall be performed and submitted for PDO’s approval before
ordering of the CTs (switchboards / transformers). This is to enable determination of
CT characteristics and the setting ranges of relays. The basis for the calculations shall
be the relay manufacturer’s guidelines.
The specified CT parameters shall be reviewed and confirmed once the
Switchboards/C&R panels are ordered / relay types are decided.
The CT sizing calculation shall consider rated short circuit current of the switchgear /
busbar and not the estimated one. References of formulas from the relay manuals for
CT sizing, relay manufacturer’s guidelines and all other inputs required for CT sizing
shall be part of the CT sizing calculation document.
All CT sizing calculations are subject to PDO approval.
Earth fault relays fed from residually connected CTs can be susceptible to spurious
trips due to the tolerances of CTs, particularly during transient conditions which can
include large differences in phase voltages. Therefore, 6.6kV and 11kV earth fault
relays should be connected to a core balance CT. The ratio of CBCT shall be selected
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to detect 5A of primary fault current at the lowest relay setting and shall be protection
class. Typical ratio of CBCT shall be 50/1A. CBCT shall also be provided for 33kV
OHL feeders.
If more than one three phase cables are used in parallel, separate CBCT shall be
installed for each cable and these CBCTs shall be connected in parallel across a
common relay.
Whenever CBCTs are installed over the rectangular busbars (or cables in flat
formation) before the cable compartment terminals, they shall be rectangular type
(with compensation coils for flux imbalance, built-in). Three core cables (or single core
cable in trefoil) shall be centred in the CBCT window while installation. This is
important to minimise the flux imbalance and resultant spill current in the CBCT
secondary wires.
In case of 415V feeders with 4-wire distribution, neutral wire also shall pass through
CBCT.
The transformer neutral CT ratio for standby earth fault protection shall be 50% of the
transformer rated current for solidly earthed system and 100% of the NER Current
rating for low resistance / high resistance earthed systems (transformers with 11 or
6.6kV secondary).
The transformer neutral CT ratio for restricted earth fault protection shall be same as
the ratio of phase CTs for this protection.
For the 33kV system and below, whenever it is required to locate CTs with
transformer, these CTs shall be standalone type and bushing CTs are not acceptable.
However, for the system voltage of 132kV and above, bushing CTs can be provided.
Measurement CT sizing shall ensure that CT saturates before short time withstand
capability of meters and effective Instrument Security Factor of the CT at connected
burden is below withstand capability of meters.
The VT secondary MCB in the protection circuits shall be fast acting (typically < 5ms)
type so that the auxiliary contact of VT MCBs can be used for blocking the respective
voltage dependent relays (in the event of opening of MCB).
Further, certain lead numbers are standardised as follows and should be compulsorily
adopted with ferrules at termination of leads.
J1 – DC Positive
J2 – DC Negative
Control & Alarms
Remote Close: K15R
Local Close: K15L
Remote trip: K5R
Local Trip: K5L
2.8.3 Earthing
Each control and relay panel shall be provided with a copper earth bar of not less than
70 sq. mm cross-section and arranged so that the bars of adjacent panels can be
joined together to form a common bus. All metallic relay, instrument and metering
cases shall be connected to the earth bar by means of cable of not less than 2.5 sq.
mm cross-section. The physical contact of case to panel does not suffice.
IEEE Std C57.13.3 shall be referred for further guidance on the subject.
The earth connection shall be made through a removable bolted link.
Current transformers for indication and metering shall have their secondaries earthed
local to the position of installation. It is required for personnel protection.
External test points are not required for relays having integral test facilities accessible
with test plugs to all input and output circuits.
Numerical relays with programmable logic shall have a facility to individually switch on
or off all the output relays through software interface. This shall be possible without
disturbing programmed protection/control logic. This facility is required for
commissioning of SCADA alarms and signalling.
Links shall be provided for isolation of the trip circuits of each protection relay and the
common trip circuit to each circuit breaker trip coil. The isolation facility for testing shall
ensure that any alarms generated, as a result of testing, are not transmitted to SCADA
as normal alarms.
All such supplies shall be connected phase-to-phase and not phase-to-earth. These
supplies shall have auto changeover scheme so that healthy supplies are available
even during abnormal conditions (like one incomer not available or a fault in the
outgoing feeders).
2.8.7 Labelling
All relays and links shall be provided with clearly inscribed labels describing their
application in an unambiguous manner, which shall be consistent with the description
given on the schematic and wiring diagrams.
3.3.1.6 Self-Monitoring
Comprehensive self-monitoring features specified in the clause 2.1.2 shall be
provided.
3.3.2.6 132kV RIMA, RUNIB, NIM(W), NIM(E), AMAL & MAR Substations – VT Secondary
circuits
The existing 132kV schemes in RIMA, RUNIB, NIMR(W), NIMR(E), AMAL and
MARMUL substations have y-phase terminal of the VT secondaries earthed instead of
usual star point.
These substations are old and it is important to verify the schemes whenever new
feeders are planned in the said substations and ensure the compatibility. This applies
to protection, voltage selection and metering as well as synchronising schemes.
slowdown of relay operation under heavy internal fault conditions e.g. faults at
transformer terminals.
The operating characteristic of the bias protection shall ensure stability on any
transformer tap position under maximum through-fault conditions.
Paralleling of current transformers (e.g. for the transformer supplied from switchyard
with one and half breaker scheme, etc.) is not allowed in biased differential protection
schemes and in order to meet this requirement, relays with adequate analogue inputs
shall be selected.
Whenever transformer restricted earth fault protection is based on high impedance
principle, it shall include either internally, or for connection externally, the appropriate
stabilising resistors and voltage limiting devices.
For the resistance earthed system, restricted earth fault protection shall be based on
the low impedance principle.
Restricted earth fault relays shall be installed on transformer star windings to increase
winding coverage since these relays provide virtually complete cover for earth faults.
For the REF protection based on the low impedance principle, phase CTs need not be
distinct and separate from those for transformer differential protection. For the REF
protection based on the high impedance principle, phase CTs shall be distinct and
separate from those for transformer differential protection, unless there is confirmation
from vendor as to the reliable, proven performance of the scheme to that effect.
Cables and connections between the transformer and the switchgear should be in the
protected zones of the biased differential and restricted earth fault relays.
3.4.1.2 Directional and Non Directional Overcurrent & Earth fault Protection
The IDMTL overcurrent, earth fault and highset overcurrent, earth fault protection for
distribution transformers shall be as per clause 3.1.1.
Highset overcurrent and earth fault elements shall be of the low transient overreach
type
Both overcurrent and earth fault protections shall have inrush (2nd harmonic) blocking
feature.
The use of numerical relays with multiple IDMTL and high set elements along with
directional elements are preferred rather than discrete directional and non- directional
relays.
The partial differential relay shall be one per bus section and on operation, shall trip all
the incomers to the respective bus section as well as the bus section breaker.
The partial differential protection needs to be in service even when one of the
incomers is under maintenance shutdown. Hence, each section Partial differential
OC/EF protection shall be located in the Bus Section / Extension panels (total 2nos
relays in BS panel) with DC supplies as well as trip/lockout relays separate from that of
incomer panels. Each relay shall have its own Trip/Lockout relay that would trip (&
close block) the respective bus section incomer and the bus section breaker.
Directional Overcurrent & Earth fault relay and Standby Earth fault (SBEF) relay in the
incomers will be wired to 132kV lockout relay and thus there is no need to have
separate lockout relays in the incomers.
The CTs in bus section shall overlap to ensure fast clearance of bus section faults.
All the transformer / generator incomers, bus section breakers as well as tie feeders
from other switchboards shall be wired in to the scheme. This scheme is also
applicable for HV switchboards, which are supplied from tie feeders from other HV
switchboard with bus section breaker closed and having no transformer / generator
incomers.
With more sources connected to each bus section of the switchboard there is a
possibility that the summed-up current to the relay exceeds nominal relay input rating
of 1A, even during normal load conditions. This shall be evaluated on case-to-case
basis, so as not to subject the relay to continuous overload.
All such source feeders shall include directional overcurrent & earth fault relays, set to
look away from the busbars, to act as backup to the transformer / feeder differential
protection. In addition to directional overcurrent & earth fault protection, this relay shall
also have non-directional overcurrent and earth fault protection.
Standby earth fault protection shall have two stages at least. The first stage shall
coordinate with the partial differential earth fault protection and the second stage shall
be set sensitive to detect transformer winding faults. Both stages shall trip the
transformer primary breaker & master trip / lockout relay and 33kV incomer breaker.
In addition to 33kV switchgear, if any other switchgear is operated with incomers in
parallel in line with the project requirement, protections shall be provided in line with
this clause.
3.4.2.2 Transformers with HV (6.6kV or 11kV or 33kV) primary and 415V secondary
winding
Fig. 3.1 shows the protection that shall be used for transformers with 415V secondary.
Typical trip matrix is attached as Appendix-D.
Transformer differential protection and restricted earth fault protection are not required
for transformers with 415V secondary.
Standby earth fault protection connected to a CT in the neutral connection shall be
used to provide protection against LV earth faults. This protection can be provided on
the 415V switchgear. However, standby earth fault protection in HV switchgear / relay
panel is recommended, if HV panel is within 300m from transformer.
If possible, the standby earth fault protection can also be provided in the LSIG
protection release of 415V incomer circuit breaker and in such case discrete standby
earth fault protection relay is not required. This neutral CT which is to be connected to
LSIG protection release and located at the transformer terminal box shall be selected
and supplied as per recommendation of manufacturer of the LSIG protection release.
On the secondary side of the transformers, incomer feeders to the 415V switchboards
shall be provided with circuit breakers. For overcurrent and earth fault protection,
LSIG protection release shall be provided. To enable co-ordination with downstream
protection devices, these shall have adjustable time and current settings.
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In case, switchboard outgoing feeders include harmonic producing loads (e.g. thyristor
controlled heaters etc.), the suitability of earth fault protection release (against any
spurious trips due to harmonics) for switchboard incomers as well as corresponding
outgoing feeders, shall be verified with the manufacturer.
If necessary, numerical relays for overcurrent & earth fault protection can be provided
instead of electronic protection release. In such case, separate neutral CT shall be
provided and connected in parallel with phase CTs for the earth fault protection. It is
required to ensure that earth fault protection doesn’t operate for load unbalance
current.
In remote isolated locations, it is preferred to have built-in all the required protections
in the ACB/MCCB releases and have no standalone protection relays / lockout relay.
This is for the reason that these stations are without access to any DC UPS. In case
protection relays are provided, the trip output contacts from the relays shall be latched
and reset push-button provided on the panel (and its contacts wired to the inputs of the
relays) for resetting the protection trips once trouble shooting is completed.
In case of switchboards with automatic bus transfer schemes, the incomers shall
include trip/lockout relay (86). The incomer overcurrent and earth fault protections
shall be wired to the lockout relay (86). The lockout relay contact output shall be wired
to inhibit the automatic bus transfer scheme in case the incomer trip is caused by bus
fault or uncleared downstream fault (back up protection operation).
The rating of any fuse protected LV circuit which derives power supply from the 415V
switchboard should not exceed 25% of the rating of the transformer incomer to the
switchboard or 100A, whichever is lower.
Similarly, the rating of any fuse-protected LV-circuit which derives power supply from a
415V DB should not exceed 50% of the rating of the fuse protected 415V incomers to
the distribution board.
Where the rating of the LV circuit (excluding motor feeders) is 100A and above, in
order to ensure proper protection coordination, current limiting type MCCB with LSIG
protection release shall be provided. Protection coordination with upstream MCCB /
ACB and downstream MCCB / fuse shall be ensured.
SP-1121, DEP33.64.10.10 and IEEE Std 242 may be consulted for further guidance.
415V Circuit breakers are supplied with built-in no-volt/undervoltage releases as
standard accessory by some vendors. The same shall be verified during scheme
checking and the releases removed as these can cause avoidable supply failures at
415V switchboards when there is voltage dip due to faults elsewhere in the system.
Protection against failure of the HV fuse on the primary side of transformer shall
be provided. It is recommended to provide this protection by enabling voltage
unbalance protection in the LSIG protection release of 415V incomer circuit
breaker so that discrete voltage based protection (27U) relay for HV fuse failure
detection is avoided.
3.4.2.3 Transformers with HV primary (33kV and below) and HV secondary windings
Fig. 3.2 show the protection scheme that shall be applied to HV/HV transformers with
primary connections less than or equal to 500 metres in length. Typical trip matrix is
attached as Appendix-D.
Time dependent overcurrent and earth fault and highset overcurrent and earth fault
protection incorporated into a multifunction numerical relay shall be used on the
primary winding of the transformer.
Differential protection for transformer rated 5.0MVA & above and restricted earth fault
protection shall be provided as per clause 3.4.1.1.
Time dependent standby earth fault protection shall be used on the neutral connection
of the transformer.
Fig. 3.3 shows the protection scheme that shall be used on transformers where
primary connections are longer than 500 metres. In this case, the line differential
protection (87L) shall be provided on 33kV connections in line with clause 3.2.1. The
inter-tripping (Direct Intertripping-DIT) facility of line differential protection relay shall
be used to communicate trip signals between LV and HV panels through the protection
communication channels.
3.4.2.4 Transformers with 132kV primary and 33kV, 11kV or 6.6kV secondary windings
Figs. 3.4, 3.5 & 3.6 show the protection schemes that shall be used for transformers
with 132kV primary voltage. Typical trip matrix is attached as Appendix-D.
Time dependent overcurrent and earth fault and highset overcurrent and earth fault
protection incorporated into a multifunction numerical relay shall be used on the
primary winding of the transformer.
Differential protection and restricted earth fault protection shall be provided as per
clause 3.4.1.1.
Time dependent standby earth fault protection shall be used on the neutral connection
of the transformer.
Whenever primary connections are longer than 500 metres, one line differential
protection relay shall be provided on 132kV overhead line / cable feeder , which shall
be same as main-1 and main-2 relays in line with clause 3.3 of this document. The
inter-tripping (Direct Intertripping-DIT) facility of this protection relay shall be used to
communicate trip signals between LV and HV panels through the protection
communication channels.
In case the secondary feeder length is more than 500meters, line differential protection
(87L) shall be provided for secondary connection in line with clause 3.2.1. The inter-
tripping (Direct Intertripping-DIT) facility of line protection relay shall be used to
communicate trip signals between LV and HV panels through the protection
communication channels.
3.5.1 General
The generator protection system and trip logic shall broadly be in line with IEEE
guidelines (IEEE C37.102 / C37.101).
Fig. 4.1 indicates the protection scheme that shall be used for generators connected
to the 33kV system through generator transformers without generator circuit breaker
(GCB).
Fig. 4.4 indicates the protection scheme that shall be used for generators connected
to the 132kV grid through generator transformers with generator circuit breaker
(GCB).
The trip matrix indicated at Appendix-C is typical and shall be applied to all the grid
connected generators with suitable changes to suit the configuration.
The arrangement shown shall be regarded as the minimum acceptable in terms of the
number of protection functions and degree of redundancy. Other arrangements of
multifunction and separate relays providing a greater number of functions and/or
greater levels of redundancy will also be considered.
In view of the complexity and various types of protective functions involved, it is
essential to provide separate trip relays, one for each generator circuit breaker, field
circuit breaker, turbine etc.
The classification of tripping for different types of fault i.e. faults, which should issue
trip commands to generator circuit breaker (GCB), Field CB and turbine shall be as
per the trip matrix given at Appendix-C. The logic shown here shall be considered as a
minimum. The trip logic / classification proposed by contractor shall include any other
protection deemed necessary. Such classification shall include other abnormal
conditions such as failure of prime over, drop on steam / gas pressure, excessive
vibration, differential expansion of rotary parts etc.
Multifunction numerical microprocessor relays shall be used for the main generator
and generator transformer protection functions.
Depending on the limitations of the number of analogue inputs (CT and PT inputs) it
may not be possible for single relays to meet all the protection requirements of
generator and generator transformer. When finalising the number of numerical relays
needed to cover complete protection requirements attention must be shown to allocate
the protection functions in such a way that different relays are functionally
complementary to each other.
For the generators with generator circuit breaker, redundant multifunction protection
relays (i.e. Main-1 and Main-2) shall be provided. Main-1 and Main-2 should be of
different manufacturer. Both relays from same manufacturer are acceptable only when
they are on different algorithm and platform (i.e. entirely different hardware and
software).
Duplicate trip coils shall be provided for the HV generator circuit breaker and
generator transformer circuit breaker.
The protection trip relays shall trip both coils and shall initiate operation of respective
lockout relays.
3.5.2.2 Overall generator and generator transformer differential and REF (87GT,
87N(HV))
The multifunction numerical microprocessor overall generator-transformer biased
differential protection relay shall be as per specification clause 3.4.1.1. This shall act
as back-up to faults in generator, the bus duct in addition to the generator transformer.
5th harmonic blocking for generator transformer differential protection shall be enabled
as separate overfluxing protection is always available for the generator transformers.
3.7.1 General
33kV Switchboards connected to generators and all the 132kV busbars shall be
provided with Busbar protection. In PDO, Busbar protection is not envisaged for other
33kV switchboards and all the switchgears below 33kV.
This also shall lead to lockout of remote ends, due to the fact that the busbar trip could
be due to a fault between the breaker and CT of a particular bay or due to BF
protection trip (Breaker-and-half scheme).
Busbar protection shall also trip both the primary and secondary circuit breakers of
any 132kV bus connected transformers and shutdown any connected generators.
In case of breaker-and-half schemes, refer 2.1.3 above.
Secondary circuit of a CT shall be continuously monitored, so that in the event of an
open circuit an alarm shall be given, the secondary circuit shorted and the tripping
rendered inoperative by means of an electrically operated relay. Switches shall also
be provided to take each zone out of service.
The trip relays for bus zone protection shall be located in the busbar protection panel
and shall be wired directly to the switchgear for tripping.
3.7.3 Schemes
Busbar protection shall be used at all 132kV substations. Two sets of CTs shall be
provided, one on either side of bus section breaker / bus coupler breaker for zone
overlap for busbar with two or more bus sections and for double busbar
configurations.
Isolator Contacts
All the auxiliary contacts used in CT switching scheme shall be silver-plated. In
case of Normally Open contacts two contacts in parallel shall be used in CT
circuits.
Auxiliary contacts used in busbar protection scheme shall meet the following
requirements
While closing of Isolator, Auxiliary Contacts shall close before Pre-arcing of
Primary contacts.
While opening of Isolator, Auxiliary Contacts shall open after Primary contacts
open.
a) CT Switching
Switching the line CT inputs to corresponding bus Zone relay shall be carried
out by bi-stable relays, imaging the position of bus isolators. It shall be ensured
that CT circuits do not become open under any operating / switching sequences.
Use of auxiliary CTs is possible with low impedance busbar differential
protection and ensures continuity of main CT circuit. Main CTs shall be suitably
sized for the burden of auxiliary CTs.
b) Isolator Contacts
Operation of imaging relays shall be monitored continuously to generate alarm
on detecting malfunction. Auxiliary contacts of Bus isolators should be used to
drive these bi-stable relays. Type of isolator contacts should be as specified in
fig 6.4.
All the auxiliary contacts used in CT switching scheme shall be silver-plated. In
case of Normally Open contacts two contacts in parallel shall be used in CT
circuits.
Auxiliary contacts used in busbar protection scheme shall meet the following
requirements
While closing of Isolator, Auxiliary Contacts shall close before Pre-arcing of
Primary contacts.
While opening of Isolator, Auxiliary Contacts shall open after Primary contacts
open.
NO and NC auxiliary contacts shall not have overlap to prevent hunting of CT
switching relays during travel of isolator contacts from fully open to fully closed
condition.
If isolator auxiliary contacts are derived from multiplication relay, then it shall be
ensured that relay is switched to ON position as soon as isolator blades move
from OFF position. DC supply for operation of imaging relays shall be derived
from the same source as operating supply for respective isolators.
3.8.1 General
General protection requirements for motors installed in hazardous and non-hazardous
areas are specified in DEP 33.64.10.10-Gen.
3.8.2 LV Motors
Protection requirements for LV motors shall be as per SP-1121, DEP 33.64.10.10-Gen
and DEP 33.67.01.31-Gen.
3.8.3 HV Motors
longer than the safe stall time at 100% voltage can be allowed knowing that motor
terminals are never going to be subjected with 100% voltage during starting. Discretion
may be applied to the requirement of a speed-sensing switch for such motors.
Protections shall comply with IEEE C37.96, DEP 33.66.05.33-Gen and DEP drawing
S67.057.
OLTC may not be provided in case of VSD-motors if the starting and running
requirements as per DEP/SP can be met without OLTC for Unit Transformer.
The requirement of synchronous motor as well as the requirement of bi-directional
power flow capability of the drive (for VAR export or regenerative braking etc.) shall be
discussed during tender stage on case-to-case basis and requirement of OLTC should
be considered.
Differential and other motor protection elements should be capable of operating at
frequencies other than 50Hz as per the allowable speed variation of the drive
specification. The design basis report shall capture this aspect and the impact of
harmonic rich environment that is prevalent in the drive system while selecting the
relays / protection for VSD transformer, Harmonic filters and the motor.
In case of ungrounded power system, earth fault protection shall be based on broken
delta voltage detection and shall cover complete system, Converter input side, output
to motor, harmonic filter banks etc. The earth fault protection on the input side of the
converter shall be effective under all conditions, while the converter is ‘on’ as well as
‘off’.
Further, 132kV connected Unit Transformer-Motors shall include a circuit breaker at
the input terminals of VSD for process control / trips. Alternate to circuit breaker at
VSD input terminals, two 132kV circuit breakers can be provided.
3.9.1 General
Capacitor units shall be with integral fuse protection as stipulated in DEP. All the
capacitor banks greater than 1000kVAr rating shall be connected in Double-Star
configuration and shall be provided with unbalance protection to detect failed capacitor
units and annunciate / isolate the feeder. This is in line with DEP 33.64.10.10-Gen.
Protection (including settings) of capacitor banks shall, in general, be as per IEC
60871 / IEEE C37.99 / the manufacturer standard. Capacitor bank protection relays
need not be IEC61850 compliant.
For the typical protection settings of capacitor banks, appendix-Q shall be referred.
3.12 SYNCHRONISING
Overview of Synchronising Selection Scheme for a typical HV system is indicated in
Fig. 7.4.
Synchronising check relay shall be provided to prevent inadvertent closing of the
breaker under ‘out of phase condition.
Synchronising check relay shall be provided for all 132kV overhead line breakers,
132kV bus section breakers, 132kV bus coupler breakers, 132/33kV and 132/11kV
transformer feeders where generation (or alternative source) may be connected to the
LV side. This facility shall also be provided to 33kV feeders, which are used for
interconnection of two stations.
Synchronising facility which can be common for one substation shall comprise of
double voltmeter, double frequency meter, synchroscope for incoming and running
voltages, Synchronisation Auto / Manual selection switch and lockable Synchro-check
IN / BYPASS selector switch. All these equipment shall be mounted on hinged
synchronising panel that can be easily viewed from either end of the (switchgear)
control panel.
Use of common synchronising check relay is not recommended in 132kV substations
and hence separate synchronising check relay shall be provided for each 132kV
feeder.
The generator synchronising scheme (manual as well as automatic) shall facilitate use
of both generator voltage CB (or 52G-LV, if available) and the 132kV grid voltage CB
(52G-HV).
The generator synchronising is normally through turbine control system. In addition,
manual synchronising facility shall be provided in generator control panel.
Further, Generator synchronising, at either 52G-LV or 52G-HV, can be initiated from
SCADA (to be executed by Turbine control system). Generator synchronising at 52G-
HV can also be initiated from 132kV CRP. In addition, it shall be possible to close 52G-
HV from CRP or SCADA in override mode to back energise the generator transformer
(with 52G-LV open).
Use of synchronising check element in the protection relays is acceptable provided it
meets the technical requirements. These elements require external triggering and the
same shall be addressed in the C&R panel schemes by wiring the Synchronising
selector switch / SCADA synch selection signal to the relay as a binary input and
programming appropriately.
All other switchboards including 415V ones shall be interlocked with the respective
upstream switchboards to keep the schemes simple and economical, yet reliable. In
these switchboards, synchronising check relay is optional and shall be preferred only
in case of practical difficulty in interlocking with the upstream switchboard.
Switchboards supplied from 132kV breaker-and-half substations, 33kV Switchracks
and 11kV RMUs are some of the cases which may require synchronising check relay
for paralleling.
The synchronising check relays need not be IEC61850 compliant.
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For 33kV Switchracks, Field Ring mains and 11kV RMUs, the check (at present) is
through switching programs and the same practice shall continue.
relays shall be self reset type with hand reset flag. These relays shall be suitable for
continuous energisation, in addition to being high burden type.
4.1 GENERAL
TA-1 (CFDH-E) is the approval authority for protection settings. Approval must be
obtained before new equipment is commissioned or existing settings are revised.
Protection studies and setting recommendations shall only be undertaken by PDO
consultants approved specifically for such studies.
provided the protection operating time at the source end is not exceeding 1s. In case
of bus section breaker, grading need not be provided if the normal operation is with
bus section breaker in open position.
This time interval shall be maintained at the maximum short circuit current that can
flow through both the protections simultaneously or at the instantaneous setting of the
relay nearest to the fault, whichever is the lower value of current. For example, while
verifying coordination at the bus level, between outgoing and incoming feeders, the
scenario “Bus section(s) open” or/and only one source On (if more than one source
connected to the same bus)” shall be considered.
A lower grading margin should be considered only in case the above grading margin
results in tripping times higher than the equipment withstand ratings in the station and
shall be based on the formula:
T’ = 0.2t + tcb + 0.08 seconds.
Where T’ = minimum grading time interval
t = nominal operating time of relay nearest to fault(s)
tcb = circuit breaker interrupting time(s)
IDMT protection elements in numerical relays shall be set to reset instantaneously (on
current coming down below the pickup setting) unless the relay needs to coordinate
with an electro-mechanical relay downstream. With the IDMT overcurrent protection
set to reset instantaneously (on opening of breaker), it is adequate to coordinate for
one start of the motor (the largest motor with all the other feeders in service).
In case the relay reset is not instantaneous and for electromechanical type relays, the
protection stability during motor starting shall be verified as follows:
In case of HV incomers to the switchboard with motor outgoing feeders, the
overcurrent coordination at the incomer level should take into account two successive
hot starts that are permitted for the HV motors. This also applies to the overcurrent
protection on the primary of unit transformers, in case of unit transformer-motor
feeders. The no. of permissible successive hot starts in case of LV motors is three.
Directional overcurrent relays (at receiving ends) set to look towards the source need
not be coordinated and can have sensitive settings.
For grading between relays and downstream fuses the margin shall generally be no
less than 0.2s. The total clearing time of the fuse shall be used for coordination
purposes. In circumstances where a closer margin between the relay and the fuse
characteristics may be advantageous, the minimum grading time interval shall be
based on the formula:
T’ = 0.4t + 0.15
Where T’ = minimum grading time interval
t = total clearing time of the fuse at fault current considered
Discrimination between fuses is required in the high fault current region (i.e. currents
which operate the fuse in less than 0.01s) and if discrimination is achieved in this area,
then it is assured at all lower current levels. If the pre-arcing I2t value is not exceeded,
there will be no deterioration in the fuse characteristic. Therefore, if the total I2t value of
the smaller fuse doesn’t exceed the pre-arcing value of the larger fuse then
discrimination between the two fuses will be satisfactory. A margin should be allowed
however, for fuse tolerances. Generally, the pre-arcing I2t of the major fuse shall
exceed the total operating I2t of the minor fuse by a margin of approximately 40%.
5.1.1 HV Fuses
Discrimination between fuses is required in the high fault current region (i.e. currents
which blow a fuse in less than 0.01s). If discrimination is achieved in this region then it
is assured at all lower current levels.
If the pre-arcing I²t value is not exceeded then there will be no deterioration of the fuse
characteristic. Therefore, if the total I²t value of the smaller fuse does not exceed the
pre-arcing I²t value of the larger fuse then discrimination between the two fuses will be
satisfactory. A margin should be allowed however, for fuse tolerances. Generally, the
pre-arcing I²t of the major fuse shall exceed the total operating I²t of the minor fuse by
a margin of approximately 40%.
As a general guideline for satisfactory grading between two fuses the rating of the
upstream fuse shall be at least twice the rating of the largest downstream fuse.
When fuses are selected according to the fuse manufacturer’s application guideline, a
copy of the guideline shall be provided.
Installation of HV fuses shall be done in line with clause 2.1.7 and HV fuses for
transformers are discussed at clause 5.4.1.
The operating time of this element shall be less than the operating time of the non-
directional element on the feeder parallel to it by an adequate grading margin. This
should be achieved by selecting a lower current as well as time settings.
The fault angle, the lagging angle between the expected fault current and the voltage
is depending on the fault impedance. Generally it will range from 45° to 60° for phase
faults with the higher value applicable for overhead lines and the lower value
applicable for transformer feeders.
Hence the relay angle chosen (with quadrature line voltage input employed for
polarisation, called cross polarisation) should be +30° (i.e. 90°-60°) for overhead line
feeders. The + sign indicates that the relay will operate when current is flowing away
from the bus.
Typically, the Relay Characteristic Angle (RCA) settings for cross-polarised
Directional overcurrent protection shall be,
Plain feeders (with Zero Sequence source behind the relay location) +30°
Transformer feeders (with Zero Sequence source in front of the relay location) +45°
If operation is needed for the currents flowing towards the bus, then the setting of +30°
shall be corrected with 180° to a value of –150° (i.e. 30°-180°).
It shall be noted that the above guidelines are general and if more precise information
is available about fault angles then this should be considered when specifying the
angle settings.
Residual voltage polarisation is adopted for Earth fault protection, in general. For earth
faults the characteristic angle should be typically between 0° to –60°. However the
actual setting shall be decided based on the type of polarisation used, system earthing
and relay manufacturer’s guidelines.
Typically, the Relay Characteristic Angle settings for Residual voltage polarised
Directional Earth fault protection shall be,
Resistance Earthed Systems 0°
Distribution Systems (Solidly earthed), 33kV (-)45°
Transmission Systems (Solidly earthed), 132kV (-)60°
The directional elements shall be set to block on detection of “VT fuse fail” and issue
alarm.
The broken conductor detection based on I2/I1 threshold shall have typical settings of
20% pickup & 60s time delay of. The broken conductor condition shall be annunciated
in the SCADA. No trip is envisaged.
5.1.6.1 Overcurrent & Earth fault Protection Settings for End PMRs
As far as possible, it is recommended to clear the faults on the 33kV overhead lines
within 0.1s so that voltage dips on the healthy circuits doesn’t exist for longer time.
Hence, typical overcurrent and earth fault protection settings for the remotest end PMR
(i.e. PMR which has no other PMR in its downstream circuit) are as follows:
Overcurrent protection: Current Pickup: 120A, Characteristics: Standard Inverse and
TMS: 0.05.
Earth fault protection: Current Pickup: 40A, Characteristics: Standard Inverse and
TMS: 0.05.
SEF protection: Current Pickup: 5A, Delay: 5s
5.1.6.2 Overcurrent & Earth fault Protection Settings for Upstream PMRs
PMRs which are installed in the upstream of end PMRs shall be coordinated with all
the PMRs in the downstream circuit.
For overcurrent protection and earth fault protection, as far as possible current pickup
and characteristics should be set same as for the end PMR. TMS shall be modified as
necessary for coordination with downstream PMRs. However it should be ensured that
current pickup for overcurrent protection is not less than 125% of the total load current.
If three phase fault and earth fault levels at upstream PMR are higher than 1.3 times of
corresponding fault levels at downstream PMR, upstream PMR shall be provided
instantaneous overcurrent and earth fault protection and set at 1.3 times of
corresponding downstream fault level. Whenever, instantaneous protection is enabled,
inrush blocking function shall also be enabled.
Recommended SEF protection: Current Pickup: 8A, Delay: 1s more than time delay for
downstream PMR.
20% should be considered for transformer impedance while verifying that zone-2
doesn’t reach beyond the transformer winding.
In case zone-2 setting reaches beyond 50% of the shortest line from remote
substation, it should be limited up to 50% of the shortest line from remote substation.
OHLs with line differential protection or OHL parallel to protected line (if any) shall
not be considered for shortest line from remote substation.
Similarly, if zone-2 setting reaches beyond the 80% of the transformer (operating in
parallel) at the remote substation, it should be limited up to 80% of the transformers
(operating in parallel) at the remote substation,
One end of the overhead line, which has lower fault level, shall be provided auto-
reclose with dead line closing. Other end of the overhead line, which has higher fault
level, shall be provided auto-reclose with synchronising check closing.
Auto-reclose dead time for dead line closing shall be set at 5s and for synchronising
check closing, dead time shall be set at 10s.
Reclaim time shall be set at 15s.
5.3.2.5 VT Supervision
VTS operation shall initiate an alarm and shall inhibit the all voltage based functions (e.g.
synchronising check, undervoltage etc.). VT supervision shall be auto-reset.
The melting data of the type-T expulsion fuses is given at Appendix-D for ready
reference. HV fuse ratings for 33kV connected transformers shall be in line with STD 4
1554 001.3.
Also, refer clause 5.1.1 above for general guidelines for fuse selection.
5.4.2.4 Primary Overcurrent Protection Coordination for ph-ph faults on secondary (Dy)
When grading through a Delta/Star transformer a phase-to-phase fault condition on the
low voltage (Star) side (0.866 of the three phase fault value) produces the same
magnitude of fault current in one phase on the high voltage (Delta) side (2-1-1 current
distribution) as would a three phase low voltage fault condition. Hence, the settings
calculated should
ensure discrimination between the LV relays at 0.866 x LV three-phase
fault current and HV relay at LV three-phase fault current.
5.4.2.5 Transformer Primary Overcurrent protection and Standby Earth fault protection
on Secondary
Standby Earth fault Protection should grade with the overcurrent protection on the
primary (Delta) side of a transformer, because an earth fault on the secondary (Star)
side would appear on the primary side as 1/3 p.u. fault current in two phases.
5.4.6 OLTC-AVR
OLTC-AVR for transformers shall be set as per the recommendation of the
manufacturer.
OLTC-AVR if provided for generator transformer shall be set taking care not to
interfere with the Generator excitation AVR functioning.
As a general rule, OLTC-AVR response shall be delayed so as not to respond on
transient voltage dips. Dead band shall be set to prevent too frequent operations /
hunting.
Refer appendix-P for Typical settings of OLTC-AVR.
5.5.5 Overfluxing
In general the protective curve of the relay should be below the generator transformer
/ unit auxiliary transformer overfluxing capability curve. The setting should be able to
detect at least 5% change in the nominal voltage to frequency ratio. The operating
time may vary from 0.2s to several seconds depending on the design philosophy and
AVR control, which shall be finalised in consultation with the generator/generator
transformer supplier. In any case, the setting shall not be too sensitive to cause
undesirable operation of the protection.
5.5.6 Overvoltage
The voltage setting shall be adjustable between 100% and 120% of the phase-to-
phase nominal voltage with a time delay adjustable between 1 and 3s, in order to
avoid tripping due to transient overvoltages.
Instantaneous overvoltage protection for voltages beyond above limits (say set at
150%) shall be as per manufacturer’s recommendations.
5.6 LV GENERATORS
For the larger generators fitted with fast acting automatic voltage regulators voltage is
generally held to an acceptable level under the conditions of an external fault. This
enables operation of normal overcurrent relays. However it is not valid for all LV
generators. Hence voltage controlled element is used to switch the relay operating
characteristic when the generator voltage drops due to a heavy external fault. The
setting chosen shall be such that the switched characteristic provides proper sensitivity
and grading under reduced voltage condition.
Busbar protection trip logic shall include busbar trip in case of generator transformer
feeder BF protection operation.
In case of breaker-and-half scheme substations, the busbar trip scheme shall include
BF protection of main bay breakers connected to the respective busbars. Intertrips
related to BF protection shall lockout the remote breakers too.
In case of busbar trip, the remote ends also shall be locked out, considering the
busbar protection operation could be due to a fault between breaker and CT or due to
BF protection operation (breaker-and-half scheme).
either with inverse characteristic to coordinate with the motor negative sequence
characteristic or with higher definite time delay at low pickup setting.
The current for any fault downstream of VSD is limited by the VSD
generally. Hence, it is adequate if the feeder protection is set to protect
for faults in the cable feeder.
Protection of the cable feeder shall be set meeting the recommendation
of the VSD vendor.
Typical protection scheme for 25MW rated VSD-Motor feeder is indicated at Fig. 5.6.
5.10 SYNCHRONISING
The requirements for settings of synchronising check relay (25CH) shall be as follows.
The acceptable frequency difference (f) which should range from
0.01Hz to 0.2Hz
The acceptable phase angle difference () which may range from 5° –
15° (higher in case of 132kV OHLs)
The acceptable voltage difference (v), which should be between 0.5%
– 10%.
The time for which the voltage locus of both systems should remain within the set
points may be set between 0.5s and 5s typically.
should be 10°,
V should be 5%.
The operation of the relay shall be enabled only under live line and live bus condition.
The relay shall not give permissive signal under dead bus or dead line conditions.
In addition to above settings, exact breaker operating time shall also be provided to
match the instant of closing.
frequency from the nominal value. The disturbance record may typically be set for 5s
duration or as long as possible in a given relay model.
The Alarm stage-1 and stage-2 settings for Oil Temperature shall be
90/100°C.
Pre-fault – 0.5s,
Post-fault – 1.5s,
Whenever multiple setting groups are used during the relay setting exercise, the
settings of both groups shall be clearly represented in the relay setting documents
along with the conditions of switchovers.
Wherever alternate group settings are not used, the unused groups shall be
specifically disabled or if cannot be disabled, a note shall be included to say that all
groups to be set identical to the selected protection group.
If needed for activation of setting group any internal or external logic shall be clearly
marked along with the relay setting document. Such logic shall be incorporated at site
during commissioning and shall be transferred to the relay and control panel drawing
as a part of the as-built drawing.
The schedules shall also include menu/configuration settings, I/O mapping details,
Programmable Logic diagrams / details (such as PSL, CFC) etc. for the numerical
relays. Relay vendors, in general, recommend to use default logic (PSL logic or CFC
logic or other relay manufacturer’s logic) provided with the relays. This shall be kept in
mind while modifying the default logic for a specific project.
The vendor-sent soft copies of the relay setting/configuration files for the project shall
be received by the protection consultant from PDO and updated once the protection
study is approved. The updated soft files of the relays shall also be submitted to PDO
(in addition to the studies / schedules) for storage in Electrical Protection System
Database.
The as-built relay setting schedules and the relay setting/configuration/logic files shall
be sent by Site team to PDO after the feeder is commissioned, for updating Electrical
Protection System Database.
8 Indicating lamps
Indicating lamps shall be supplied from the substation battery.
At unattended substations a switch shall be provided on the bus section control/relay
panel, so that all indicating lamps can be switched off, if so desired.
Lamp fittings shall allow for adequate ventilation, and in the event of a failure, allow for
easy removal and replacement of the lamp without the use of special tools.
Lamp test facilities shall be provided so that all lamps on one panel can be tested
simultaneously by operation of a common switch.
9 Alarm schemes
The alarms being provided by the contractor shall be indicated in the protection and
control logic diagram specified in clause 6.
Alarms shall operate a common buzzer.
The alarm scheme shall operate from the station battery.
Means shall be provided for silencing audible alarms whilst leaving the buzzer free to
sound if any other alarm circuit is energised.
Alarm indicating lamps shall remain on until cancelled by resetting the devices
initiating the alarms and the operation of a separate cancellation key.
A common facia for each circuit shall be provided and mounted on the associated
panel. Common alarm facia shall be of the multi-window type (preferably with
individually replaceable windows) with individual alarms operated from self seal-in
relays and indicated by flashing illumination of an inscribed transparent window.
Operation of the common accept-key shall cause the light to become steady and
silence the audible alarm.
A lamp test push button shall be provided for each facia. Each facia shall include at
least two spare windows for possible future use.
A selector switch shall be provided on the bus-section control/relay panel labelled
Attended / Unattended. With the switch selected to Unattended, the alarm indications
and buzzer shall be de-energised such that there will be no drain on the substation
battery. Operation of the switch shall not affect the sending of the alarm to the Control
Centre.
Where applicable, contractors shall provide potential-free auxiliary switches, contacts
or auxiliary relays on equipment to initiate alarm signals for transmission by SCADA to
the Control Centre. Some of these alarm contacts will be paralleled in the SCADA
marshalling cubicle to transmit only a common alarm to the SCADA equipment from a
group of alarm contacts, others will be connected to the SCADA equipment
independently. Details of the alarms to be initiated and transmitted are listed on the
SCADA Input/Output Schedules for each substation.
Means shall be provided to delay the receipt of nuisance alarms both at the alarm facia
and over the SCADA system, e.g., alarms, which would otherwise be received for a
transient dip in system voltage.
10 Definitions
10.1 GENERAL
For the purposes of this SP the following definitions shall be used.
Shall - The word 'shall' is to be understood as mandatory.
Should - The word 'should' is to be understood as strongly recommended.
May - The word 'may' is to be understood as indicating a possible course of action.
The Company - Petroleum Development of Oman LLC of Muscat, Sultanate of Oman.
User - A specialist engineer, Consultant or Contractor who applies this Standard.
Consultant - A party to a Contract with the Company who is responsible for providing
design, engineering and other related consultancy services under a Contract.
Contractor - A party to a Contract with the Company who is responsible for
construction and other related Works specified in a Contract. On occasion, for example
in 'turnkey' contracts, a Contractor may be responsible for the duties of both Consultant
and Contractor.
Manufacturer - A party responsible for the manufacture of equipment or material to
perform the duties specified by the Company.
Vendor/Supplier - A party responsible for the supply of equipment, materials or
product-related services in accordance with a Purchase Order issued by PDO or its
nominated Purchasing Office.
10.2 TECHNICAL
Teleprotection - A means whereby a protection command is transmitted to a remote
location.
Buchholz Relay - A device for detecting accumulation of gas or sudden oil surges
within an oil-immersed transformer or reactor tank.
Restricted Earth Fault - A protection scheme for detection of earth faults on a specific
item of plant.
Discriminating Zone - A protection scheme for detection of faults within a defined
area of plant (usually busbars).
Numerical Protection Relay - A relay in where the analogue input signals are
converted to digital form and sampled before being proceeded by the micro-processor.
10.3 ABBREVIATIONS
A - Ampere
AC - Alternating Current
ARC – Automatic Recloser
AVC - Automatic Voltage Controller
AVR - Automatic Voltage Regulator
BF Protection – Breaker Fail Protection
CB – Circuit Breaker
CBCT – Core Balance Current Transformer
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CT DATA
Ratio, Accuracy Class, Rated Output, Accuracy Limit Factor
Magnetisation Curve
CT secondary winding resistance
CT secondary lead length, conductor size
VT DATA
VT Ratio, VT Accuracy Class, VT Rated Output
MOTOR DATA
Rated Voltage, Full Load Current, and kW, Efficiency, Power Factor, No-load
current
Locked Rotor Current and withstand time motor "hot". (Both at 80% and 100%
volts for switchboard connected motors and at design terminal voltage for unit
transformer connected motors)
Starting time (at 80% and 100% volts for switchboard connected motors and at
design terminal voltage for unit transformer connected motors)
Starting current, motor terminal voltage and time in case of reactor start (or any
other assisted start) motors
Allowed number of starts/hour from both hot and cold
Thermal Damage Curve, Heating and Cooling Time constants
Negative phase sequence current withstand characteristic
Undervoltage vs Stability characteristic (Synchronous motors)
Recommendation for ‘Loss of load’ protection (Submerged pump drives)
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Speed switch /sensor provided or not. Details including settings of the sensor
shall be provided.
Excitation panel details including settings for various protection modules in
excitation panel such as rotor earth fault protection, diode failure protection
(Synchronous motors)
NET/NER calculation (Unit Transformer motors)
Motor-Capacitor sizing calculation (for induction motors, if provided)
TRANSFORMER DATA
Voltage Ratio, MVA Rating, Vector Group, Impedance volts, X/R value (or
Resistance and Reactance)
Tapping Range, step; AVR – setting recommendation
Through-Fault Current Withstand
Zero sequence impedance (in case of Earthing (Zig zag) auxiliary transformers,
additionally zero sequence impedance of zigzag winding for faults in the EAT
primary side and zero sequence impedance of EAT for faults in EAT secondary
side)
Transformer inrush current
Transformer winding capacitance
NER details (for transformer with 6.6kV or 11kV secondary)
Neutral as well as Phase CT details
Primary fuse sizing calculation / rating details
Overfluxing withstand capability curve (for Generator / Unit auxiliary
transformer)
GENERATOR DATA
MW / MVAR Capability chart showing base and peak load operation.
Voltage Rating
Reactance (Xd, Xd', Xd'')
Time Constants (T'do, T''do)
Negative sequence current / voltage withstand curve
Generator fault current decrement curve
Generator 3rd harmonic voltage vs speed curve
Generator winding capacitance
NET/NER sizing calculation and details
SWITCHGEAR DATA
Voltage Rating, Maximum Continuous Current Rating, Short Circuit Rating and
Time, CT/VT details as listed above
Short Circuit Breaking Capacity of Contactors and back-up fuse rating/basis
Fault Making Capacity
Operating (Close / Open) Time of Switchgear
Protection modules type, with literature and software copy (OHL PMRs / outdoor
CBs)
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The IEEE/ANSI C37.2 uses numbering system for various functions, supplemented by letters
where amplification of the subject function is required. IEC 60617 uses graphical symbols. The
table below lists frequently used ANSI device numbers and the equivalent graphical symbols
vide IEC.
The trip matrix as below mainly addresses protections of Generator/GSUT/UAT island with GCB
(Standard Drawing STD 4 6504 004). This is typical and shall be applied for all grid connected
generators after making suitable changes.
Mechanical / Turbine protections also trip the generator; however, these are not included
hereunder and need to be covered as appropriate. Lockout is not indicated but is required.
Multiple trip/lockout relays as required shall be provided.
LEGEND for Class of Shutdown
A Normal shutdown type-1 : Trip GCB, Trip Excitation, GT/ST Running
Normal shutdown type-2 : Unload GT, Trip GCB, Trip Excitation, Trip GT/ST via Turbine
B
Control System ( GT/ST Shuts down)
Emergency shutdown type-1 : Trip GCB, Trip Excitation, Trip GT/ST via Turbine Control
C
System ( GT/ST Shuts down)
Emergency shutdown type-2 : Trip GCB, Trip Excitation, Trip GT/ST via Turbine Control
D
System ( GT/ST Shuts down), Trip 132kV CB(s), Trip 6.6kV incomer
E Trip 132kV Bus Circuit Breaker(s) Only
F Trip GCB only
G Trip 132kV Bus Tie Circuit Breaker(s) only
H Trip 6.6kV incomer circuit breakers only
Description
E
Device No.
87G Generator Differential Operated
Generator stator earth fault (residual
59N overvoltage) relay operated (0 to
95%)
Generator stator earth fault current
51G
relay operated (0 to 95%)
Generator rotor earth fault relay first
64R-1
stage operated (<80kohm)
Generator rotor earth fault relay
64R-2
second stage operated( <5kohm)
Generator Fire Detector temperature
26G-1
high Stage 1 ( 80deg C) - (Alarm)
Generator Fire detector temperature
26G-2 high Stage 2 ( 100deg C) - CO2
Release
Generator stator earth fault (low
64S frequency injection) protection
operated (95 to 100%)
Generator stator earth fault (third
59GN/27TH harmonic based) protection operated
(95 to 100%) – Alarm Only
Emergency stop push button
5
operated
Loss of excitation relay operated
40G together with 27/40 relay operated
and protection PT fuse healthy
40G relay operated together with
27/40
27/40 rly not operated, protection PT
G
A
H
Description
F
Device No.
fuse healthy and with time delay
Negative sequence current relay
46G-1
stage-1 operated (Alarm)
Negative sequence current relay
46G-2
stage-2 operated
Voltage dependent Overcurrent relay
51V with Inverse Characteristics for
directly connected generators
78G Pole slipping relay operated
GSUT Overfluxing protection relay
24GT-1 stage-1 operated ("Reduce
Excitation" command to AVR)
GSUT Overfluxing protection relay
24GT-2 stage-2 operated (Not to operate
lockout relay for GCB)
Inadvertent Energisation (Dead
50/27G
machine) protection operated
Undervoltage relay operated - Stage
27G-1 1 (Prompt Operator for GSUT-OLTC
operation)
Undervoltage relay operated together
27G-2 with PT fuse healthy - Stage 2 (Not to
operate lockout relay for GCB)
Underfrequency/Overfrequency relay
81U-1/81O-1 stage-1 operated (Prompt Operator
for Load Management)
Underfrequency/Overfrequency relay
81U-2/81O-2 stage-2 operated (Not to operate
lockout relay for GCB)
Generator overvoltage relay stage1
59G-1
operated (Alarm)
Generator overvoltage relay stage2
59G-2 operated (Not to operate lockout relay
for GCB)
Reverse power relay stage-1
32R-1 operated (Not to operate lockout relay
for GCB)
Reverse power relay stage-2
32R-2 operated (Not to operate lockout relay
for GCB)
Generator Circuit Breaker fail
50LBB
protection operated
Generator Backup impedance relay
21GT operated together with PT fuse
healthy ( 132kV side)
Overcurrent protection relay operated
51.1G (Prompt Operator for Load
Management)
59BN 11kV bus earth fault relay operated
AVR PT1 fuse failure (AVR Transfer
60.2G
from Auto/1 to Auto/2)
AVR PT2 fuse failure (AVR transfer
60.4G
from Auto/2 to Auto/1)
60.5G Metering PT fuse failure (Alarm)
G
A
H
Description
F
Device No.
Exciter Diode Failure (Open ckt) -
58
(Alarm)
Exciter Diode Failure (Short ckt) -
58
(Alarm)
Protection PT1 fuse failure - (Block
60.1G
voltage dependent protection)
Protection PT2 fuse failure - (Block
60.3G
voltage dependent protection)
Synchronisation PT fuse failure -
FFR
(Block Synchronisation)
Generator transformer differential
87GT
relay operated
Generator transformer HV REF
87N(GT)
protection operated
Generator transformer HV standby
51G(GT)
earth fault protection operated
Generator transformer non-directional
51/51N(GT) overcurrent and earth fault relay
operated ( 132kV side)
Generator transformer directional
67/67N(GT) overcurrent and earth fault relay
operated ( 132kV side)
Generator backup impedance
21G
protection. Operated ( 11kV Side)
132kV Bus Circuit Breaker Fail - Also
50BF1
to respective 132kV B/B trip
132kV Tie Circuit Breaker Fail - Also
50BF2
to respective main breakers trip
Generator transformer 49(OT)A-1&2,
49(WT)A-1&2, 63(B)A, 63(TCB)A,
71(LO)A (Alarm)
Generator transformer 63(B)T,
63(TCB)T, 63(PR)T
87T MVUAT diff. Protection operated
87N(LV) MVUAT LV REF Protection operated
MVUAT LV Standby Earth fault
51G(LV)
protection operated
MVUAT Non-directional overcurrent,
50, 51, 51N & earth fault protection operated
(primary side)
MVUAT 63(B)T, 63(TCB)T,
63PRV(T)
MVUAT 49(OT)A-1&2, 49(WT)A-1&2,
63(B)A, 63(TCB)A, 71(LO)A -
(Alarm)
6.6kV MVUAS switchboard incomer
86T
master trip relay operated
IPS trip
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LEGEND
A Open Transformer HV CB1
B Open Transformer LV CB
C Open LV Bus section CB
D Close Block-HV CB (Operate Lockout Relay2)
E Close Block –LV CB (Operate Lockout Relay)
F Close Block –LV Bus section CB (Operate Lockout Relay)
Description
E
F
No.
Transformer Differential Protection
87T
Operated
Transformer LV-REF Protection
87N (LV)
Operated
132kV Bus Differential Protection
87B
operated (Note4)
63(B)T, 63(TCB)T, Main Transformer mounted protection
63PRV(T)5 operated6
Transformer HV overcurrent / earth
50/50N/51/51N (HV)
fault protection operated
HV bus section CB opening (Note7)
Transformer LV Standby earth fault
51G (LV-SBEF) –
Stage1 & Stage2
protection – Stage1 & Stage2
operated8
Transformer LV incomer overcurrent /
51/51N (LV) earth fault protection operated
1In case of 132kV CB with two trip coils, each of the protections shall be wired to both the trip
coils.
2 One no. trip/lockout relay for each trip coil. However, each trip/lockout relay at 132kV shall also
operate both the trip coils of 132kV circuit breaker as well as LV CB.
3 It shall not be possible to close LVCB when HVCB is open.
4 When 87L relay is provided due to long cable/OHL, signal to trip LV CB, shall be sent through
Direct Inter Trip (DIT) over protection communication channel in the 87L and shall be without
any additional delay.
5
If micro switch is used instead of mercury switch for oil and winding temperature indicators,
stage-2 of these alarms should be connected for breaker trip as well as for lockout relay
6 Transformer mounted protections are wired to trip / lockout relays through Interposing relays.
Direct trip from the interposing relays to the CB can be wired in parallel with contact of 86 relay
so that trip coil is not opened by contacts of the interposing relays.
7 LV Bus section breaker shall open whenever HV bus section breaker opens but only after
verifying that all the three LV breakers (two incomers & bus section breaker) are in closed
position and after a time delay of 500ms.
8 Whenever LV incomer earth fault protection (or partial differential earth fault protection) is
available and coordinated with LV standby earth fault protection. In such case. LV standby earth
fault protection (both stage-1 and stage-2) need not operate lockout relay (86) in the LV incomer
or bus section feeders.
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D
Description
F
No.
Transformer LV incomer Partial Diff
51-PD/51N-PD (LV)
Partial Diff connection
connected overcurrent / earth fault
protection operated
Transformer LV Dir overcurrent &
67/67N (LV) earth fault protection operated
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LEGEND
A Open Local 132kV CB
B Open Remote 132kV CB
C Open Bus section / Buscoupler CB
D Close Block-Local 132kV CB (Operate Lockout Relay1)
E Close Block –Remote 132kV CB (Operate Lockout Relay1)
F Close Block –Bus section / Bus coupler CB (Operate Lockout Relay)
Description
E
F No.
87L, Z1, 21-AidedLine Differential Trip, Zone-1 Trip,
Trip, DEF-Aided Distance protection Aided Trip, DEF
Trip Aided trip ( Note3)
Zone-2, Zone-3, Zone-4, SOTF, TOR,
Z2, Z3, Z4, SOTF,
TOR, , 79-Lockout
, Auto-reclose Lockout protection
operated
Directional Overcurrent, Non-aided
67, 67N
Directional Earth fault (Note4)
49 Thermal Overload Protection (Note5)
87B Busbar Protection Trip Note6
Busbar Protection Trip signal from
Remote end busbar protection
87B (Remote)
(received through protection
communication channel)Note7
50BF (Main bay Main bay BF Trip (in case of Breaker-
CB) and-half scheme). Note8
Tie bay BF Trip (in case of Breaker-
50BF (Tie bay CB)
and-half scheme).(Note9)
Note: In case of Breaker-and-half scheme substations, feeder trip means trip of respective main
CB as well as the tie breaker (the only exception being in case of busbar trip).
1
One no. trip/lockout relay for each trip coil. However, each trip/lockout relay at 132kV shall
operate both the trip coils of 132kV CB
2
Tripping of remote end shall be carried out through direct inter-tripping on indicated
protections, only when remote end is identified as weak source. Protection scheme shall be
prepared accordingly during detailed engineering.
3
87L, Z1, 21-Aided Trip and DEF Aided Trip protection shall also initiate auto-reclose.
4
Only applicable for existing overhead lines where both main-1 and main-2 protection relays are
not available. They shall be disabled where both main-1 and main-2 protection relays available.
5
For overhead lines where both main-1 and main-2 protection relays are available.
6
Remote end CB shall be tripped and locked out through Direct Intertrip function in Main-1 &
Main-2 Relays. Tie bay CB & Remote end CB opening is not required in case of breaker-and-
half configuration switchyards
7
Received through Direct Intertrip function in Main-1 & Main-2 Relays. Not applicable, when
remote station has breaker and half configuration switchyard.
8
In case of main bay CB fail protection, trip & lockout of tie bay CB & remote CB and triggering
the respective busbar trip is required
9
In case of tie bay CB fail protection, trip & lockout of both main bay CB on either side of the
subject Tie bay CB and remote end CB is required.
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LEGEND
A Open Local 33kV CB
B Open Remote 33kV CB
C Open Bus section CB
D Close Block-Local 33kV CB (Operate Lockout Relay)
E Close Block –Remote 33kV CB (Operate Lockout Relay)
F Close Block –Bus section CB (Operate Lockout Relay)
No.
Directional / Non-directional
51/51N/51G or Overcurrent / Earth fault / CBCT
67/67N/67G connected earth fault protection
operated (as applicable)
Incomer Partial Differential connected
51-PD/51N-PD Partial
Diff connection
Overcurrent / Earth fault protection
operated (as applicable)
Line differential protection (as
87L
applicable)
21 Distance protection (as applicable)
Load shedding scheme trip (From
81U Relay in Bus section panel in case of
Switchboard connected feeders)
1
Subject to specified reclose cycles for each protection element. Refer SP1107 for Auto-
Reclose scheme (79) requirements.
2
Through respective local relay (87L)
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LEGEND
A Open Motor CB
B Open Incomer/Bus section (Upstream) CBs
C Close Block-Motor CB (Operate Lockout Relay)
D Close Block –Incomer/Bus section (Upstream) CBs (Operate Lockout Relay)
E Thermal Close Block Motor CB (Self Reset Type)
Effect / Action
Cause
item
Protection Device
A
Description
E
No.
87M Motor Differential Protection Operated (if applicable)
MPR
(50/51/51G/46/49/48/5 Motor Protection – Electrical/Non-Electrical Faults
1LR)
Motor Protection – Thermal Lockout / No. of Starts /
MPR (49/66)
Restart Inhibit
MPR(27) Motor Undervoltage Protection (if applicable)
Load shedding scheme trip (From Relay in Bus
81U section panel in case of Switchboard connected
feeders)
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LEGEND
A Open Transformer HV CB
B Open Transformer LV CB (Motor CB)
C Close Block-Transformer CB (Operate Lockout Relay1)
D Close Block –Motor CB (Operate Lockout Relay)
E Thermal Close Block Motor CB (Self Reset Type)
Effect / Action
Cause
item
Protection Device
A
Description
No.
Transformer Differential Protection Operated (as
87T
applicable)
, 63(B)T, 63(TCB)T,
Transformer mounted protections operated
63PRV(T)
Transformer HV Overcurrent / Earth fault protection
50/50N/51/51N (HV)
operated
Transformer LV Standby Earth fault protection
51G (LV-SBEF)
operated
Motor Differential Protection Operated (as
87M
applicable)
Transformer - Motor Differential Protection Operated
87T/M
(as applicable)
MPR - 50/51 Motor Protection Relay Operated – Electrical / Non-
/4648//49/51LR) Electrical Faults
Motor Protection Relay Operated – Neutral Voltage
MPR (59N)
Based Earth Fault
Motor Protection – Thermal Lockout/ No. of Starts /
MPR (49/66)
Restart Inhibit
MPR (27) Motor Undervoltage Protection Operated
87L(HV) or 87L(LV) Line differential protection Operated (as applicable)
Loss of Excitation / Rotor earth fault / Diode Failure /
MPR (40 / 64R / 58 /
Out-of-step / Overvoltage protection (For
78 / 59)
Synchronous Motors) Operated
MPR (81U) Load shedding scheme trip
1
One no. trip/lockout relay for each trip coil. However, each protection and trip/lockout relay
shall operate both the trip coils.
2
It shall not be possible to close LVCB when HVCB is open.
3
Through respective local relay (87L)
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Sl.
Item Description MVAA Relays PRIMA Relays
No
1 Continuous Voltage 120% of its max. voltage 110% of its max. voltage
Withstand rating rating continuously. rating continuously.
2 Operating Time 12-25ms depending on the 25ms for dc operated
number of contacts and relays.
relay type.
3 Maximum number of 8 4
output contacts possible
4 Standard contact type - 50W (inductive) with 30W (inductive) at 100V.
Breaking capacity maxima of 5A and 300V.
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200%
190%
180%
Allowable percentage overload
170%
160%
150%
140%
130%
120%
110%
100%
3 8 13 18
Minutes - Post fault
Page 111 SP-1107 Specification for Electrical Protection Systems Printed 19/07/0810/10/16
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Page 112 SP-1107 Specification for Electrical Protection Systems Printed 19/07/0810/10/16
The controlled version of this CMF Document resides online in Livelink®. Printed copies are UNCONTROLLED.
Revision: 4.0
Petroleum Development Oman LLC Effective: Oct. 16
Appendix P: Typical Setting for Voltage Regulator with Transformer OLTC For the settings
of Voltage Regulator with transformer’s On Load Tap Changer (OLTC), typical settings of
Voltage Regulator TAPCON 230 with MR Make OLTC, are provided as below:
Parameter Unit Value Min Max
AVR ID - 0004 - -
Activation T2 - T2 on - -
Active Desired Volt. Level - DVL 1 - -
Analog Val. Tap Pos Max % 100,0 0 100
Analog Val. Tap Pos Min % 0,0 0 100
Analog Val. Volt.Lev. Max % 100,0 0 100
Analog Val. Volt.Level Min % 0,0 0 100
App. Confirm Timeout s 5 1 60
Bandwidth % 1,50 0,5 9
Baud Rate - 9.6 kBaud - -
Baud Rate Communication - 9.6 kBaud - -
Blocking Overcurr. I> - Off - -
Blocking Overvolt. U> - Off - -
Blocking Undercurr. I< - Off - -
Blocking Undervolt. U< - On - -
Blocking lower Tap - 0 -128 128
Blocking upper Tap - 40 -128 128
CAN Address - 0 0 16
CT Terminal - Unknown - -
Characteristics T1 - T1 integral - -
Circ. Current Blocking % 20,0 0,5 40
Circ. Current Sensitivity % 0,0 0 100
Compensation Method - LDC - -
Communication Port - RS232 - -
Communication Protocol - Modbus RTU - -
Delay Parallel Failure s 10 1 99
Delay Time T1 s 180 0 600
Delay Time T2 s 10,0 1 10
Delay Time U< s 10,0 0 20
Desired Voltage Level 1 kV 33,00 14,70 42,00
Desired Voltage Level 2 kV 33,00 14,70 42,00
Desired Voltage Level 3 kV 33,00 14,70 42,00
Display % / A - % - -
Display Dimming - On - -
Display kV / V - kV - -
Foll. Tapping w/o Umeas - Off - -
Follower Tapping Direction - Standard - -
Function Monitoring - Off - -
GPI 1 - X4:13 - Off - -
GPI 2 - X4:14 - Off - -
GPI 3 - X4:15 - Off - -
GPI 4 - X4:16 - Quick Tap - -
GPI 5 - X4:17 - DVL 2 - -
GPI 6 - X4:18 - DVL 3 - -
GPI 7 - X6:1 - ParGroup1 - -
GPI 8 - X6:2 - ParGroup2 - -
GPO 1 - X4:9 - Off - -
Page 113 SP-1107 Specification for Electrical Protection Systems Printed
19/07/0810/10/16
The controlled version of this CMF Document resides online in Livelink®. Printed copies are UNCONTROLLED.
Revision: 4.0
Petroleum Development Oman LLC Effective: Oct. 16
For the protection settings of capacitor banks, typical settings of capacitor protection relay
RLC04 (Make - Strike Technologies) are provided as below:
APPENDIX R: TYPICAL SETTINGS FOR AUTOMATIC POWER FACTOR CONTROLLER (APFC) WITH
CAPACITOR BANKS
For the settings of Automatic Power Factor Controller (APFC) with capacitor banks, typical
settings of BLR-Q(U) (Make - BELUK) are provided as below:
FUNCTION SETTING RANGE STEPS SETTING
CT factor 1 - 6500 As per site
VT factor 1 – 350 As per site
Nominal Voltage (L-L) 100 – 35000V As per site
Connection measurement L-N, L-L L-L
Synchronization frequency Auto., 50Hz, 60Hz 50Hz
Phase Compensation 0-345Degree 15Degree 000 + 90 Degree
V-tolerance min 2-90% -10%
V-tolerance min 2-30% +10%
Countdown Start Al Yes / No Yes
Temperature offset -10 to 10 Degree 0Degree
CT type 1A Yes / No No
Discharge Time 0.1 – 1200s 600s
Step type Normal, fix on, fix off Normal
Fast Max. Step Value 0 – 9999.9kVAR 0kVAR
Cos phi 1 0.6i – 1 – 0.7c i.95
Cos phi 2 0.6i – 1 – 0.7c c.99
Switch interval 0.5 – 1200s 600s
Switch Interval step exchange 0.5 – 1200s 2s
Asymmetry factor -127 to +127 1
Step recognition On/Off Off
Switch Cycle Balancing Yes / No Yes
Switch Cycle Balancing % 1 – 15% 10%
Step Exchange Yes / No No
Control Sensitivity 55 – 100% 55%
Control Auto/LIFO/Progressive Auto
filterfilter
/ Combi
Q Offset -+3200kVar 0kVar
I < limit freeze steps Yes / No No
Q Cap. Steps turn off Yes / No No
Fast Meas. Delay 0 – 900 Periods 50 Periods
Alarm Control Disabled, M, DO, D M
Alarm No Current Disabled, M, DO, D Disabled
Alarm Step Fault Disabled, M, DO, D Disabled
Alarm Step Warning Disabled, M, DO, D Disabled
Alarm Power Factor Disabled, M, DO, D Disabled
Time Delay 1S – 36000S 300S
Alarm Harmonics U Disabled, M, DO, D Disabled
Alarm Harmonics I Disabled, M, DO, D Disabled
Alarm Overload P Disabled, M, DO, D Disabled
Alarm Overload Q Disabled, M, DO, D Disabled
Limit Overload Q 1 … 99999.9kVar 1kVar
Alarm P- Export Disabled, M, DO, D Disabled
Limit temperature 1 Disabled, M, DO, D Disabled
Limit temperature 2 Disabled, M, DO, D Disabled
DI Input Alarm Disabled, M, DO, D Disabled
Frequency Alarm Disabled, M, DO, D Disabled
Modbus Baudrate 1200 - 38400 9600
Modbus Parity 8E1, 8̊1, 8N2 8E1
Modbus Address 1 - 247 1
Storage Interval 0 – 720min 0min
Synchronisation DI Input On/Off Off
Setup DI Input High/Low High
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