THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ISIDORO T. POLICHER, defendant-appellant.

Isidoro T. Policher was charged with, and convicted of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents in the Court of First Instance of Lanao
which sentenced him to ten years and one day of prision mayor with the corresponding accessories of the law, to pay a fine of P1,000, and to indemnify Moros
Somampot, Donato Marcos and Tindigan Dipatuan in the sums of P4, P16 and P16, respectively, with costs.

The information which gave rise to the action against said accused reads as follows:

That on or about and during the period intervening from may 20, 1928, to May 29, 1930, in the municipal district of Kolambugan, Province of Lanao,
Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, said accused, the then duly appointed treasurer of said municipal district and as such was in
charge and responsible, among other official duties, for the issuance of cedula certificates in said municipal district of Kolambugan, voluntarily, unlawfully
and feloniously, and with grave abuse of his official position and with intent to gain and of prejudicing and defrauding Moros Somampot, Donato Marcos
and Tindigan Dipatuan, falsified cedula certificates G-Nos. 3844057, 3222523, 6843641, 3843629, 3844005, 3221650, 3221649, 3221752 and 3221753, by
erasing the names written thereon of persons to whom said cedula certificates had originally been issued so as to reissue them, and in fact he reissued them,
in order to appropriate for himself, and in fact he voluntarily, unlawfully and feloniously appropriated for his own use and benefit, the proceeds of this
reissuance of the cedula certificates in question, amounting to P36, to the damage of said Moros Somampot, Tindigan Dipatuan, and Donato Marcos in the
sums of P4, P16 and P16, respectively. Contrary to law.

The accused appealed from the judgment rendered against him, assigning in his brief three alleged errors as committed by the trial court, to wit:

1. The lower court erred in not holding that all the webs of circumstances leading to the prosecution of crime were deliberately planned and ingeniously
manipulated by the enemies of the accused to satisfy their lust of vengeance.

2. The lower court erred in giving credit to the self-contradicting and perverted testimony of the three more witnesses for the prosecution.

3. The lower court erred in convicting the defendant- appellant of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents beyond reasonable doubt and in
not absolving him from all criminal responsibilities.

The evidence shows that the appellant was the municipal treasurer of the municipal district of Kolambugan, of February 27, 1927, the date on which the witness for the
prosecution, Felix Jalasan, entered the service as clerk under said appellant. Prior to the date above stated, he had acted as municipal treasurer of other municipalities,
and in 1933, when this case was tried, he had already been in the Government service as municipal treasurer for about eleven years.

In May, 1928, the appellant, in his own handwriting, issued cedulas Nos. 3221649 (Exhibit F-1), 3221650 (Exhibit G-1), 3221752 (Exhibit H-1) and 3221753 (Exhibit
I-1), stated in the information, the first two in favor of Mamoncar Bomantay and the last two in favor of Macaraub Bangor. In 1929 said appellant's office issued
cedulas Nos. 3844057 (Exhibit A-1), 3222523 (Exhibit B-1), 3843641 (Exhibit C-1), 3843629 (Exhibit D-1) and 3844005 (Exhibit E-1), also stated in the information,
in favor Daniel Calumba, Ditual, Balinting Alongan, Ditual Macaagan and Salangan, respectively.

All the blanks of said first four cedulas (F-1, G-1, H-1, and I-1) were filled in by the appellant himself in his own handwriting, and those of the last five (A-1, B-1, C-1,
D-1 and E-1), intended for entry of the personal record of the taxpayers, all with respect to Exhibit A-1 and partially with respect to the rest, or B-1, C-1, D-1 and E-1,
were filled in by Felix Jalasan, according to the stub of the first, Exhibit A-1, and the duplicates of the others, Exhibits B-1, C-1, D-1 and E-1. The only spaces of these
cedulas which could be filled in then were those intended for the names, said witness Jalasan having written therein those of Ditual, Balingting Alongan, Ditual
Macaagan and Salangan, respectively, because they were the only data then available.

Instead of delivering the nine cedulas in question to the taxpayers who had paid for them, they were retained in the appellant's office on the ground that the interested
parties had not furnished all the necessary data relative to their personal circumstances. While waiting for said data, the cedulas in question together with others were
in the custody of clerk Felix Jalasan. At this juncture, the appellant summoned Moros Somampot, Tindigan Dipatuan and Donato Marcos to appear before him in order
to demand of them the payment of their back cedulas. As soon as said three Moros had arrived at the appellant's office, he bade them enter and forthwith asked his
clerk to deliver to him the cedulas in question, that is, Exhibits A-1 to I-1 which was stated, were already partially filled out with the date appearing on their respective
stubs and duplicates, Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H and I, and which were theretofore in the custody of said clerk. In compliance with the appellant's requirement said
Moros then delivered to him, the first P4, the second P8 and the third P24, to complete the sums which they had paid him for their cedulas on former occasions. The
various sums of P4 stated in cedulas Exhibits A-1 to I-1, amounting to P36, and which were paid by the persons in whose favor said cedulas had originally been issued,
were duly deposited in the safe and entered in the official records of the appellant (Exhibits A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2, E-2, F-2, G-2, H-2 and I-2); but those paid to him by
Moros Somampot, Tindigan Dipatuan and Donato Marcos when he delivered to them the certificates which were already altered as they are at present, were not
deposited in the safe and do not appear to have been entered by the appellant in any of his records, thus leading to the logical conclusion that he misappropriated them.

The names on the cedulas in question showing that they were issued in favor of said Moros Somampot, Tindigan Dipatuan and Donato Marcos, and not to Daniel
Calumba, Ditual, Balinting Alongan, Ditual Macaagan and Salangan, are in the appellant's handwriting, if credit is to be given to the testimony of Miguel Burdeos,
chief clerk of the provincial auditor, who examined the accounts and investigated the appellant, and that of Felix Jalasan, confidential clerk of said appellant. Both
witnesses who are familiar with the appellant's penmanship by reason of their long association with him, categorically affirmed that the alterations appearing on the
cedulas in question are in the appellant's handwriting. The testimony of said two witnesses and that of said three Moros, who claimed to have delivered to the appellant
the sums required of them and received said cedulas from said appellant's own hands, jointly prove that it was the appellant and no other person who made the
alterations in the cedula certificates in question.

However, the appellant contends that it was not he who committed the falsification or received the money which the three Moros claimed to have delivered to him. In
support of his contention, he insinuates in his brief that Felix Jalasan might have made the alterations imputed to him and that said witness did so serving as a tool for
the vengeance of chief of police Salvador C. Rabaya who harbored a grudge against him because he had once deducted from Rabaya's salary the payment of a certain
municipal tax due from the latter's barber shop in Kolambugan, Lanao. His testimony, however, is insufficient to destroy that of the five witnesses for the prosecution
particularly when the motive attributed by him to said chief of police Salvador C. Rabaya is not of such nature that it may be considered sufficient to have induced
Rabaya to plot against him in connivance with the witnesses for the prosecution named Somampot, Tindigan Dipatuan, Donato Marcos, Felix Jalasan and Miguel
Burdeos. Furthermore, there is absolutely nothing of record to show that there had actually been a plot against him.

Another argument used by the appellant in support of his contention that Felix Jalasan might have been the author of the falsification is that the handwriting on said
cedulas is similar to his own handwriting and also to that of Jalasan. Acting under this supposition, the appellant, after the prosecution had presented its evidence,
asked the lower court to postpone the continuation of the trial at least until the following session of said court in order to have the opportunity to engage the services of
a handwriting expert from Manila, who might be able to determine the truth of his contention. The lower court justly denied his petition, first, because he did not then
assure that if the handwriting expert were to testify he would declare that the alterations appearing on the cedulas in question were made by Jalasan; second, because
when he entered the trial, he failed to reserve the right later to present a handwriting expert to prove that the alterations on the cedulas in question were not in his own
handwriting; and third, because although he then knew that the crime with which he was charged was falsification of the cedulas stated in the information, from
October 5, 1932, when the information was filed, or nearly one year prior to the holding of the trial, he neither made any effort to look for a handwriting expert nor
thought of setting up the defense alleged by him later in his brief. Therefore, the belief that the appellant's purpose in asking for the suspension of the trial until the
following session of the court was merely to delay the action, as stated by the fiscal at the trial, is not unfounded.

On the other hand, there is absolutely no reason to believe that Felix Jalasan has distorted the facts in his testimony inasmuch as he felt nothing but gratitude towards
the appellant because the latter not only gave him the job, as the appellant himself stated at the trial, but also allowed him to continue in the service notwithstanding his
lack of efficiency during his first years of service until he (the appellant) became pleased to retain him upon observing his progress and diligence. Furthermore, it is not
Felix Jalasan's testimony or that of Miguel Burdeos alone that points to the appellant as the author of the falsification, but also that of the three Moros aforestated. It is
the testimony of said five witnesses, corroborated as it is by the aforesaid documentary evidence of record, that denounces him and proves his direct participation in
the commission of the crime of falsification.

After it has been proven that the appellant is guilty of falsification and inasmuch as only one information had been filed against him, (1) for how many crimes of said
nature may he be held liable? (2) Should he also be held liable for the crime of estafa or that of malversation, having appropriated his collection from said three Moros
instead of depositing it in the Government coffers?

These are questions which necessarily arise after knowing the facts just stated.

In the opinion of this court, it is not the said three Moros (Somampot, Tindigan Dipatuan and Donato Marcos) who suffered the damage resulting from the falsification
and the appropriation by the appellant of the money collected from them, but the Government itself because inasmuch as said Moros knew that the appellant was the
public official designated by law and by the constituted authorities to collect cedula taxes, having done so for a long time, and furthermore, inasmuch as they knew that
they were obliged to pay said taxes, it should be stated that they were only acting with absolute propriety when they delivered to said appellant the sums which he
demanded of them in payment of their respective cedulas corresponding to former years. For the same reason that they had no intervention in the administration of the
appellant's office, it was not and it is not just to require that they should have made sure that their money paid for said concept has been deposited in the safe by the
appellant and furthermore entered by him in his corresponding records. When a public official, whose official duty is to collect taxes, receives a payment in said
concept, he makes himself directly accountable to the Government for the money so collected and received inasmuch as thereafter said money acquires the character or
forms part of the public funds and the tax on account of which said payment was made should also thenceforth be considered paid by the taxpayer without further
responsibility on his part. To hold the taxpayer responsible for the misappropriation of the money collected for taxes due, by the public official who has collected and
received payment, would be not only unreasonable but also highly unjust. Therefore, the crime committed by the appellant is not the complex crime of estafa through
falsification but nine falsifications of official or public documents, as are the cedulas, and malversation.

It is true that only one action was instituted and only one information filed against the appellant but it is none the less true that in said information he was expressly
charged with nine acts of falsification of public documents by reason of the issuance of nine different cedulas. In the case of United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil., 260),
this court held that there is nothing to prevent the imposition upon the accused of as many penalties as there are offenses imputed to him and proven at the trial, if, as
in this case, it satisfactorily appears that he has consented to the action wherein said crimes were imputed to him by failing to interpose on time, although he could
have done so, a demurrer on the ground that the information charged him with more than one offense. The right to be charged with not more than one offense in an
information may be waived, the only exceptions to this rule being the cases where one of the offenses charged has been a necessary means for committing the other
and where both have been the result of a single act, (Article 89 of the old Penal Code; article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.)

As to the second question, this court is of the opinion that the appellant cannot be declared guilty of estafa because the proven facts show, for the reasons already
stated, that the crime committed was not estafa but malversation, which is a crime entirely different from the former and for the existence of which some elements not
belonging to estafa are necessary. The appellant, upon entering trial, was undoubtedly unprepared to defend himself from the charges for malversation and falsification
except only from falsification and estafa, and it would be taking him by surprise if he were to be sentenced also for malversation. It has been stated during the
consideration of this case that under the allegations contained in the information, the appellant may also be declared guilty of malversation inasmuch as it has been
proven that he appropriated his collection from the aforesaid three Moros instead of depositing it in the safe. In the information, however, there is no allegation to
justify the inference, without resorting to the proven facts, that it is the Government that sustained the injury resulting from the appellant's crime. What the information
clearly expresses and states is that it was the three Moros in question who sustained the injury. Therefore the various acts of malversation committed by the appellant
should not be taken into consideration in this case because he was not charged therewith.

Inasmuch as the falsifications proven at the trial took place long before the Revised Penal Code went into effect, the law applicable to the case is undoubtedly the old
Penal Code. Under the provisions of article 88 of said Code, a penalty in excess of three-fold the most severe penalty which the appellant deserves for one of said
crimes cannot be imposed upon him for said nine crimes of falsification of public documents. According to said Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, each of said acts
of falsification is punishable with prision mayor and a fine of from 250 to 12,500pesetas. In view whereof, and taking into consideration the fact that no modifying
circumstance of any kind has been proven, the penalty which should be imposed for one of said crimes is eight years and one day of prision mayor which is the
minimum of the medium period of prision mayor plus a fine of 250 pesetas.

Wherefore, by amending the appealed judgment, the appellant is hereby sentenced, for the nine crimes with which he was charged and convicted, to twenty-four years
and three days of prision, which is threefold eight years and one day of prision mayor, and to pay a fine of P150, with costs. In view, however, of the provisions of Act
No. 4103, the minimum of said penalty of twenty-four years and three days of prision is fixed at six years. So ordered.

BENJAMIN PANGAN y RIVERA, petitioner, vs. HON. LOURDES F. GATBALITE, as the Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56, and COL.
JAMES D. LABORDO, as the City Jail Warden of Angeles City, respondents.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles
City, Branch 56, rendered on January 31, 2000.[1]

The facts of this case are undisputed. The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in Criminal Case No. 85-816, at the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City,
Branch 3.

During the trial of the case, Atty. Eduardo Pineda, counsel for petitioner, submitted the case for decision without offering any evidence, due to the petitioners constant
absence at hearings.

On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the Municipal Trial Court.

On August 9, 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the decision in the court of origin. Despite due notice, counsel for the petitioner did not appear. Notice to
petitioner was returned unserved with the notation that he no longer resided at the given address. As a consequence, he also failed to appear at the scheduled
promulgation. The court of origin issued an order directing the recording of the decision in the criminal docket of the court and an order of arrest against the petitioner.
[2]

Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. On January 24, 2000, petitioner
filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. He impleaded as respondent the Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat,
Pampanga.[3] Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds that:

(a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and

(b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminal liability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6,
Article 89 [of the] Revised Penal Code.[4]

After his transfer to the City Jail of Angeles City on January 25, 2000, petitioner filed an Amended Petition with the Regional Trial Court, impleading herein
respondent Col. James D. Labordo, the Jail Warden of Angeles City, as respondent.[5]

In response, the Jail Warden alleged that petitioners detention was pursuant to the order of commitment (mittimus), issued by Marlon P. Roque, Clerk of Court III of
the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 3, dated January 25, 2000.[6]

On January 31, 2000, respondent Judge rendered the decision, which is the subject of this present appeal, which pronounced:

The Court cannot subscribe to the contention of the petitioner that the penalty imposed on him in the decision adverted to above had already prescribed, hence, his
detention is illegal for under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code:

The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of sentence, and it shall be interrupted if the
defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government has no extradition treaty, or should commit another
crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.

The elements of prescription are:

1. That the penalty is imposed by final judgment;

 2. That convict evaded the service of the sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence;

3. That the convict who had escaped from prison has not given himself up, or been captured, or gone to a foreign country with which we have no
extradition treaty, or committed another crime;

4. The penalty has prescribed, because of the lapse of time from the date of the evasion of the service of the sentence by the convict.

In this case, the essential element of prescription which is the evasion of the service of sentence is absent. Admittedly, the petitioner herein has not served the penalty
imposed on him in prison and that during the service of the sentence, he escaped therefrom. Notably, at the trial of Crim. Case No. 85-816 in the Municipal Trial Court,
Branch III, Angeles City and on the date set for the promulgation of the affirmed decision, the petitioner failed to appear and remained at large.

There was no evasion of the service of the sentence in this case, because such evasion presupposes escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation
of liberty. (Infante vs. Warden, 48 O.G. No. 122) (92 Phil. 310).

Corollarily, the detention of the petitioner in Angeles City Jail in compliance with the Order of Commitment (Exhibit E) is not illegal for

A commitment in due form, based on a final judgment, convicting and sentencing the defendant in a criminal case, is conclusive evidence of the legality of his
detention, unless it appears that the court which pronounced the judgment was without jurisdiction or exceeded it. (U.S. vs. Jayne, 24 Phil 90, 24 J.F. 94, Phil. Digest,
Vol. 2, 1398).

WHEREFORE, for not being meritorious and well-founded, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

Angeles City, January 31, 2000.[7]

From the above quoted decision, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on a question purely of law and raised the following issue:

HOW SHOULD THE PHRASE SHALL COMMENCE TO RUN FROM THE DATE WHEN THE CULPRIT SHOULD EVADE THE SERVICE OF SENTENCE IN
ARTICLE 93 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES BE CONSTRUED? PUT A LITTLE
DIFFERENTLY, WHEN DOES THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF PENALTIES BEGIN TO RUN?[8]

Petitioner claims that:

xxx the period for the computation of penalties under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code begins to run from the moment the judgment of conviction becomes final
and the convict successfully evades, eludes, and dodges arrest for him to serve sentence.[9]

Petitioner supports his claim in the following manner:

The Decision subject of this appeal, which was based on the 1952 ruling rendered in Infante vs. Warden, 48 O.G. No. 122, 92 Phil. 310, is, petitioner most respectfully
submits, not good case law. It imposes upon the convict a condition not stated in the law. It is contrary to the spirit, nature or essence of prescription of penalties,
creates an ambiguity in the law and opens the law to abuse by government.

THE INFANTE RULING IMPOSES A

CONDITION NOT STATED IN THE LAW.

It appears that the Infante ruling imposes that, as an essential element, the convict must serve at least a few seconds, minutes, days, weeks or years of his jail sentence
and then escapes before the computation of prescription of penalties begins to run. This, petitioner respectfully submits is not a condition stated in Article 93, which
states that, the prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of sentence.

There is no dispute that the duty of government to compel the service of sentence sets in when the judgment of conviction becomes final.

The dispute, however, is in the construction of the phrase should evade the service of sentence. When does the period of prescription of penalties begin to run? The
Infante ruling construes this to mean that the convict must escape from jail because such evasion presupposes escaping during the service of the sentence consisting in
deprivation of liberty.

Petitioner, with due respect, disagrees because if that were the intention of the law, then the phrase should evade the service of sentence in Article 93 would have read:
should escape during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty. The legislature could have very easily written Article 93 to read this way

The period of prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should escape during the service of the sentence consisting in
deprivation of liberty, and it shall be interrupted if the defendant should give himself up, be captured, should go to some foreign country with which this Government
has no extradition treaty, or should commit another crime before the expiration of the period of prescription.

But they did not.

The legislature wrote should evade the service of sentence to cover or include convicts like him who, although convicted by final judgment, were never arrested or
apprehended by government for the service of their sentence. With all the powers of government at its disposal, petitioner was able to successfully evade service of his
2 months and 1 day jail sentence for at least nine (9) years, from August 9, 1991 to January 20, 2000. This is approximately 3 years and 5 months longer than the 5-
year prescriptive period of the penalty imposed on him.

That, as the respondent RTC Judge noted, petitioner did not attend the trial at the Municipal Trial Court and the promulgation of his judgment of conviction in August
9, 1991 is of no moment. His bond for provisional release was surely cancelled and an order of arrest was surely issued against petitioner. The undisputed fact is that
on August 9, 1991 the judgment of conviction was promulgated in absentia and an order for petitioners arrest was issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City,
Branch III.

The duty of government, therefore, to arrest petitioner and compel him to serve his sentence began on August 9, 1991. The 5-year prescriptive period of his arresto
mayor penalty also began to run on that day considering that no relief was taken therefrom. Since petitioner never gave himself up [n]or was [he], until January 20,
2000, ever captured, for the service of his sentence nor did he flee to some foreign country with which [our] government has no extradition treaty, that 5-year
prescriptive period of his penalty ran continuously from August 9, 1991 when his judgment of conviction was promulgated in absentia and was never interrupted.

For reasons known only to it, however, government failed or neglected, for almost nine (9) years, to arrest petitioner for the service of his arresto mayor sentence
[which] should not be taken against petitioner. He was able to successfully evade service of his sentence for a period longer than the 5-year prescriptive period of his
penalty and, as such, is entitled to total extinction of his criminal liability.
To say, as was said in Infante, that the prescriptive period of the penalty never began to run in favor of petitioner because he never escaped from jail during the service
of his sentence imposes a condition not written in the law. It also violates the basic principle that the criminal statutes are construed liberally in favor of the accused
and/or convict and is contrary to the spirit behind or essence of statutes of limitations [and] prescription, in criminal cases.[10]

The Regional Trial Court based its decision on the case of Infante v. Warden[11]. In said case, Infante, the petitioner, was convicted of murder and was sentenced to
seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal. After serving fifteen years, seven months and eleven days, he was granted a conditional pardon. The
condition was that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. Ten years after his release on conditional pardon, Infante was found guilty by a
Municipal Court for driving without a license. Infante was immediately ordered rearrested for breach of the condition of his pardon. One of the issues raised by Infante
in his petition,

xxx was that the remitted penalty for which the petitioner had been recommitted to jail one year and 11 days had prescribed. xxx [12]

The Court disagreed and reasoned out thus:

The contention is not well taken. According to article 93 of the Revised Penal Code the period of prescription of penalties commences to run from the date when the
culprit should evade the service of his sentence. It is evident from this provision that evasion of the sentence is an essential element of prescription. There has been no
such evasion in this case. Even if there had been one and prescription were to be applied, its basis would have to be the evasion of the unserved sentence, and
computation could not have started earlier than the date of the order for the prisoner's rearrest.[13]

A perusal of the facts in Infante v. Warden reveals that it is not on all fours with the present case. In Infante, the convict was on conditional pardon when he was re-
arrested. Hence, he had started serving sentence but the State released him. In the present case, the convict evaded service of sentence from the start, and was arrested
eight years later.

The RTC decision, however, must stand, since it is in accord with applicable decisions of this Court. The issue raised by petitioner is not novel. Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code[14] has been interpreted several times by the Court.

The case of Tanega v. Masakayan[15] falls squarely within the issues of the present case. In that case, petitioner Adelaida Tanega failed to appear on the day of the
execution of her sentence. On the same day, respondent judge issued a warrant for her arrest. She was never arrested. More than a year later, petitioner through counsel
moved to quash the warrant of arrest, on the ground that the penalty had prescribed. Petitioner claimed that she was convicted for a light offense and since light
offenses prescribe in one year, her penalty had already prescribed. The Court disagreed, thus:

xxx The period of prescription of penalties the succeeding Article 93 provides "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the service of his
sentence". What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence? Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready answer. Says Article 157:

"ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall
evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. xxx"

Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty";
and (3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. This must be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades "service of
his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by
the provisions of the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry,
by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with
other convicts or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."

xxx

We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment.

Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment was thereafter never placed in confinement. Prescription
of penalty, then, does not run in her favor.[16]

In Del Castillo v. Torrecampo[17], the Court cited and reiterated Tanega. Petitioner, Del Castillo, was charged for violation of Section 178 (nn) of the 1978 Election
Code. The trial court found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of 1 year as minimum
to 3 years as maximum. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. During the execution of judgment on October 14, 1987,
petitioner was not present. The presiding Judge issued an order of arrest and the confiscation of his bond. Petitioner was never apprehended. Ten years later, petitioner
filed a motion to quash the warrant of arrest on the ground that the penalty imposed upon him had already prescribed. The motion was denied by the trial court. Del
Castillo, on a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, questioned the denial by the trial court. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Del Castillo raised the matter to this Court. The Court decided against Del Castillo and after quoting the ratio
decidendi of the Court of Appeals in full, it ratiocinated, thus:

The foregoing conclusion of the Court of Appeals is consistent with the ruling of this Court in Tanega vs. Masakayan, et al., where we declared that, for prescription of
penalty imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such imprisonment.

The Court is unable to find and, in fact, does not perceive any compelling reason to deviate from our earlier pronouncement clearly exemplified in the Tanega case.

Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date
the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been
convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner
from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now
petitioner begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his
sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is based on settled jurisprudence and applicable laws. It did not engage in judicial legislation but correctly interpreted the
pertinent laws. Because petitioner was never placed in confinement, prescription never started to run in his favor.[18]

Consistent with the two cases cited above, this Court pronounces that the prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies only to those
who are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for prescription of penalties begins only when the
convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20,
2000 and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of his service, the period for prescription never began.

Petitioner, however, has by this time fully served his sentence of two months and one day of arresto mayor and should forthwith be released unless he is being detained
for another offense or charge.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 56 is AFFIRMED, but petitioner is ordered released effective immediately for
having fully served his sentence unless he is detained for another offense or charge.

People vs Layson 140 Phil. 491

PER CURIAM:

This is an automatic review of the decision dated September 25, 1965 of the Court of First Instance of Davao in criminal case 8495 imposing the death penalty on
Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces.

On January 17, 1964 when these four accused stabbed Regino Gasang to death, they were inmates of the Davao Penal Colony serving sentences of conviction for the
following crimes:

"Nicolas Layson - kidnapping with robbery, homicide, homicide and theft;

"Cezar Ragub - frustrated murder and homicide;

"Cezar Fugoso - robbery in an inhabited house and theft;

"Joventino Garces - robbery hold-up and robbery in an uninhabited house."

In the early morning of that hapless day, at about 4:45 o'clock, the four accused, armed with bladed weapons, entered the cell where the unsuspecting victim, prisoner
Regino Gasang, was. Layson locked the door of the room. Without warning and acting in concert they then swiftly took turns in stabbing Gasang. They thereafter
barricaded themselves, refusing to surrender to the trustees who had come to the scene of the crime, agreeing to surrender only to Vicente Afurong, the supervising
prison guard. Afurong arrived, identified himself, and assured them of their safety, whereupon they handed their weapons through the hole of the barricaded door and
surrendered themselves.

Gasang died shortly after being brought to the prison hospital. Death was caused by severe internal and external hemorrhage and shock, all secondary to multiple stab
wounds.

Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that they killed Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups a number of times. Garces stated that he killed Gasang
because the latter spat on him a week before. The four plotted to kill Gasang a few days prior to the actual slaying.

On March 25, 1964 all the accused were indicted for the crime of murder. The information recites:

"The undersigned accuses Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces of the crime of Murder, under Art. 248, in rela tion to
Art. 160, of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

"That on or about January 17, 1964, in the Davao Penal Colony, Municipality of Panabo, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Court, the above-mentioned accused, while then being convicts serving in the said Davao Penal Colony their corresponding sentences of con -
viction by reason of final judgment imposed upon them, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, armed with sharp-pointed
instruments, with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with said weapons Regino Gasang, their co-inmate in the said Colony, thereby inflicting upon him serious injuries
which caused his death; with the aggravating circumstances of (1) recidivism with respect to the accused Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub, and (2)
all of them with two or more prior convictions."

Upon arraignment, all the four accused, assisted by counsel de oficio, freely and spontaneously pleaded guilty. Notwithstanding the plea of guilty, the court a quo
proceeded to receive testimony because of the gravity of the offense. On September 30, 1965 the court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Arti -
cle 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty in favor of all of them and the aggravating circumstances of
recidivism and having been previously punished for two or more crimes to which the law attaches a lighter pe nalty with respect to the accused
Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub, the aggravating circumstance of having been punished with two or more offenses to which the law attaches a
lighter penalty with respect to the accused Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces and the aggravating circumstances consisting of any two of the
qualifying circumstances alleged in the information which are treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength for one is sufficient to
qualify the crime to murder and the special aggravating circumstance of having committed the crime charged while serving the pe nalty imposed upon
them for previous offenses as regards all the accused and conformably with Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences all of them to
DEATH, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased Regino Gasang in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency by reason of the penalty imposed and to pay the costs proportionately."

For the purposes of this review, suffice it to consider, on the one hand, the aggravating circumstances of evident premedita tion and treachery and the special
aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, and, on the other, the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty.

We reject the recommendation of the Solicitor General that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation be consi dered in favor of all the accused. For this
circumstance to exist, it is necessary that the act which gave rise to the obfuscation be not removed from the commission of the offense by a considerable length of
time, during which period the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.[1]
Three of the accused admitted that they harbored ill-feeling against Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups se veral times, all these taking place at least
ten days before the actual slaying. Gasang spat on Garces a week before the day of the killing. All of the accused plotted to kill Gasang a few days before January 17,
1964. In the light of these circumstances, it is evident that sufficient time had elapsed during which the accused regained their equanimity. They moved their evil
scheme forward to consummation after obtaining weapons from their fellow inmates whose aid they had solicited. The aforenarrated circumstances negate the
presence of passion and obfuscation; upon the contrary, they prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.

Treachery attended the commission of the crime. The necropsy report (exh. I) and the diagram (exh. J), plus the testimony of Dr. Guillermo de Guzman, conclusively
prove that the victim was killed in a manner insuring utter suddenness and complete surprise in the execution of the offense, with resultant incapability of the victim to
offer resistance. That there was abuse of superior strength would suffice to qualify the crime to murder, but this cir cumstance must be considered as absorbed in
treachery.[2]

Treachery qualifies the killing to murder;[3] evident premeditation becomes a mere generic aggravating circumstance[4] which is offset by the mitigating circumstance
of plea of guilty. A qualifying circumstance not only gives the crime its proper and exclusive name but also places the author thereof in such a situation as to deserve
no other penalty than that specially prescribed for said crime.[5]

The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (art. 160, Rev. Penal Code) was correctly considered against all the accused, who, at the time of the
commission of the offense, were undoubtedly serving their respective sentences for previous convictions. Quasi-recidivism has for its effect the punishment of the
accused with the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony, and cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.[6]

When they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, all the accused admitted all the material facts and circumstances alleged in the information. The crime of murder is
punished with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Because of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, this Court is
left with no alternative to affirming the death penalty imposed by the court a quo.

It was error for the trial judge to consider against the accused the aggravating circumstance of having been previously punished for two or more crimes to which the
law attaches lighter penalties because the said aggravating circumstance of "reiteracion" requires that the offender against whom it is considered shall have served out
his sentences for the prior offenses. Here all the accused were yet serving their respective sentences at the time of the commission of the murder.

Concurrence in the grim view that we take of this case is given by Attorney Potenciano Villegas, Jr., counsel de oficio for the four accused, who unqualifiedly
recommends affirmance of the judgment a quo.

It is indeed a lethal hand that pens affirmance of a death sentence, but ours is the inescapable duty to enforce the inexorable mandate of the law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo imposing the death penalty on Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces, is affirmed. The
indemnification to the heirs of the victim, Regino, Gasang, is hereby increased to P12,000,[7] to be paid jointly and severally by the four accused. Costs de oficio.

Clemente vs People

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the March 29, 2010 Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) which denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed the November 3, 2008 Judgment [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 7,
convicting petitioner of illegal possession and use of false bank notes under Article 168[3] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. Also assailed is the CA
Resolution dated [4] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Article 168 of the RPC under an Information[5] which reads:

That on or about August 5, the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to use, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly
have in his possession and under his custody and control twenty[-]four (24) pcs. [of] P500.00 bill with Markings [] IIB- to IIB-, respectively and specifically
enumerated, to wit:

SERIAL NO. PCS. AMOUNT SERIAL NO. PCS. AMOUNT

PX626388 1 P500.00 CC077337 1 P500.00

CC077337 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00

CC077337 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00

BR666774 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00

CC077337 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00

BB020523 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00

PX626388 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00

BR666774 1 500.00 WW164152 1 500.00

PX626388 1 500.00 WW164152 1 500.00

BR666774 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00

UU710062 1 500.00 PX626388 1 500.00

CC077337 1 500.00 PX626388 1 500.00

Which are false and falsified.

Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.

The version of the prosecution and the defense, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:[6]

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: Jail Officer 1 (JO1) Michael Michelle Passilan, the Investigator of the Manila City Jail; JO1
Domingo David, Jr.; and Loida Marcega Cruz, the Assistant Manager of the Cash Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

[Their testimonies established the following:]

Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. On , at around , an informant in the person of inmate Francis dela Cruz approached JO1s Domingo
David, Jr. and Michael Passilan. The informant narrated that he received a counterfeit P500.00 bill from appellant with orders to buy a bottle of soft
drink from the Manila City Jail Bakery. The bakery employee, however, recognized the bill as a fake and refused to accept the same. Consequently,
JO1s David and Passilan, along with the informant, proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise inspection. Pursuant to their agreement, the informant
entered the cubicle first and found appellant therein, lying in bed. The informant returned to appellant the latter's P500.00 bill. The jail guards then
entered the cell and announced a surprise inspection. JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a black wallet from his back pocket. Inside the
wallet were twenty-three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of which were suspected to be counterfeit. They confiscated the same and marked them
sequentially with IIB- to II-B24. They likewise marked the P500.00 bill that was returned by informant to appellant with IIB-. Appellant was
consequently arrested and brought out of his cell into the office of the Intelligence and Investigation Branch (IIB) of the jail for interrogation.

Meanwhile, the twenty-four (24) P500.00 bills confiscated from appellant were turned over to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for analysis. Pursuant
to a Certification dated August 7, 2007, Acting Assistant Manager Loida Marcega Cruz of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas examined and found the
following bills as counterfeit, viz: one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number BB020523; six (6) P500.00 bills with Serial Number BR666774; nine (9)
P500.00 bills with Serial Number CC077337; five (5) P500.00 bills with Serial Number PX626388; one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number
UU710062; and two (2) P500.00 bills with Serial Number WW164152.

For the defense, appellant was the lone witness presented on the stand.

Appellant simply raised the defense of frame-up. He testified that in the afternoon of , he was inside his room located at Dorm 1 of the Manila City
Jail. At around , JO1 Michael Passilan entered appellant's room while JO1 Domingo David, Jr. posted himself outside. Without any warning, JO1
Passilan frisked appellant and confiscated his wallet containing one (1) P1,000.00 bill. JO1s David and Passilan left immediately thereafter.
Appellant was left with no other choice but to follow them in order to get back his wallet. Appellant followed the jail officers to the Intelligence
Office of the Manila City Jail where he saw JO1 Passilan place the P500.00 bills inside the confiscated black wallet. Appellant was then told that the
P500.00 bills were counterfeit and that he was being charged with illegal possession and use thereof. Appellant also added that JO1 Passilan bore a
grudge against him. This was because appellant refused to extend a loan [to] JO1 Passilan because the latter cannot offer any collateral therefor.
Since then, JO1 Passilan treated him severely, threatening him and, at times, putting him in isolation.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The RTC gave credence to the prosecution's witnesses in finding that the
counterfeit money were discovered in petitioner's possession during a surprise inspection, and that the possibility that the counterfeit money were planted to
incriminate petitioner was almost nil considering the number of pieces involved.[7] The RTC also did not find that the jail officers were motivated by improper motive
in arresting petitioner,[8] and applied in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties considering the absence of contrary evidence. As
to petitioners defense of frame-up, the RTC held that the purported frame-up allegedly staged by JO1 Passilan would not affect the prosecution's evidence since the
testimony of JO1 David could stand by itself. The RTC likewise found that it was strange that petitioner did not remonstrate despite the fact that he was allegedly
being framed.[9]

As to the elements of the crime, the RTC held that the fact that the P500.00 bills found in petitioners possession were forgeries was confirmed by the certification
issued by the Cash Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which was testified into by Acting Assistant Manager Loida A. Cruz.[10] The RTC also ruled that
petitioner knew the bills were counterfeit as shown by his conduct during the surprise search and his possession of the bills. As to the element of intention to use the
false bank notes, the RTC ruled that the fact that petitioner intended to use the bills was confirmed by the information received by the jail officers from another inmate.
[11]

Aggrieved, petitioner sought reconsideration of the judgment. Petitioner argued that the evidence used against him was obtained in violation of his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Petitioner also argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because of the non-
presentation of the informant-inmate, Francis dela Cruz, who could have corroborated the testimonies of the jail officers.

Unconvinced, the RTC denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. The RTC, however, only ruled that there was no violation of petitioners constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures because the seizure was done pursuant to a valid arrest for violation of Article 168 of the RPC. The trial court pointed out
that prior to the search, a crime was committed and the criminal responsibility pointed to petitioner.[12]
On appeal before the CA, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Article 168 of the RPC. Petitioner
contended that one of the elements of the crime which is intent to use the counterfeit bills was not established because the informant Francis dela Cruz did not take the
witness stand.[13]

The CA, however, found the appeal unmeritorious and denied petitioners appeal.[14] The appellate court found that the fact the petitioner was caught in possession of
twenty-four (24) pieces of fake P500.00 bills already casts doubt on his allegation that he was merely framed by the jail guards. The CA agreed with the RTC that even
without the testimony of JO1 Passilan, the testimony of JO1 David was already sufficient to establish petitioners guilt since petitioner did not impute any ill motive on
the latter except to point out that JO1 David was JO1 Passilans friend.[15]

Regarding the element of intent to use, the CA found that there are several circumstances which, if taken together, lead to the logical conclusion that petitioner
intended to use the counterfeit bills in his possession. The CA pointed out that jail officers were informed by inmate Francis dela Cruz that he received a fake P500.00
bill from petitioner who told him to buy soft drinks from the jail bakery. After Francis dela Cruz identified petitioner as the person who gave him the fake money, the
jail officers conducted a surprise inspection. Said inspection yielded twenty-three (23) pieces of counterfeit P500.00 bills inside petitioner's black wallet, which was
taken from his back pocket. The CA further held that the non-presentation of Francis dela Cruz would not affect the prosecution's case because even without his
testimony, petitioners intent to use the counterfeit bills was established. The CA added that the matter of which witnesses to present is a matter best left to the
discretion of the prosecution.[16]

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the above ruling, but the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the assailed Resolution dated . [17] Hence, the present
appeal.

Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME
CHARGED, DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING THE COUNTERFEIT BILLS SINCE THEY WERE DERIVED FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH
AND SEIZURE.[18]

The petition is meritorious.

Generally, the trial courts findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court has overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The exception applies when it is established that the trial court
has ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case.[19]

Here, the Court finds that the RTC and the CA had overlooked certain substantial facts of value to warrant a reversal of its factual assessments. While petitioner's
denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credence, said defense must be given credence in this
case as the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof.

Article 168 of the RPC, under which petitioner was charged, provides:

ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit. Unless the act be one of those
coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession , with intent
to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed
in said articles. [Emphasis supplied.]

The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or
any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the
said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments.[20] As held in People v.
Digoro, [21] possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the
RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes.[22]

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom
petitioner supposedly gave the fake P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela
Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the jail bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that
petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill.[23] Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.[24]

This Court, of course, is not unaware of its rulings that the matter of presentation of prosecution witnesses is not for the accused or, except in a limited sense, for the
trial court to dictate. Discretion belongs to the city or provincial prosecutor as to how the prosecution should present its case.[25] However, in this case, the non-
presentation of the informant as witness weakens the prosecution's evidence since he was the only one who had knowledge of the act which manifested petitioner's
intent to use a counterfeit bill. The prosecution had every opportunity to present Francis dela Cruz as its witness, if in fact such person existed, but it did not present
him. Hence, the trial court did not have before it evidence of an essential element of the crime. The twenty-three (23) pieces of counterfeit bills allegedly seized on
petitioner is not sufficient to show intent, which is a state of mind, for there must be an overt act to manifest such intent.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 29, 2010 and Resolution dated October 14, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32365 are REVERSED and SET-ASIDE. Petitioner Mark Clemente y Martinez alias Emmanuel Dino is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of Illegal possession and use of false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

BATULANON VS PEOPLE

This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15221, affirming with modification the April 15, 1993
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627, convicting Leonila Batulanon of
estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and the July 29, 1999 Resolution [3] denying the motion for reconsideration.

Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in
charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.

During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered.[4]

Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed against Batulanon, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 3625

That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the aff[a]irs of the
cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in
the name of Erlinda Omadlao by then and there making an entry therein that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160, Philippine Currency, and by
signing on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Erlinda Omadlao showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Erlinda Omadlao was
granted a loan and received the amount of P4,160 when in truth and in fact the said person was never granted a loan, never received the same, and never signed the
cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to
herself the same and received the loan of P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused
and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of P4,160, Philippine Currency.[5]

Criminal Case No. 3626

That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the
cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in
the name of Gonafreda Oracion by then and there making an entry therein that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan of P4,000.00 and by signals on the
appropriate line thereon the signature of Gonafreda Oracion showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a
loan, received the loan of P4,000.00 when in truth and in fact said person was never granted a loan, never received the same, and never signed the Cash/Check voucher
issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and
received the amount of P4,000.00 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses
to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the aforementioned amount of P4,000, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

Criminal Case No. 3453

That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of
the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of the same and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of
one Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo had a fixed deposit of
P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of P3,500.00, thus making it appear that the said person made a fixed deposit on the aforesaid date
with, and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a deposit and was never granted loan and after the document was so
falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein the
signature of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear that the said Ferlyn Arroyo received the loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency, when in truth and in fact said Ferlyn
Arroyo never received the loan, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the
same, and received the amount of P3,500, and thereafter, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own personal use
and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned
amount of P3,500, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

Criminal Case No. 3627

That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the said accused being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI) entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of
the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of, the same and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of
one Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Dennis Batulanon had a fixed deposit of
P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the said person made fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with,
and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Dennis Batulanon never made such a deposit and was never granted loan and offer the document was so
falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis Batulanon by signing
therein the signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus making it appear that the said Dennis Batulanon received the loan of P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said Dennis
Batulanon never received the loan and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the
same and receive the loan of P5,000, and thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and
benefit the said amount, and [despite] demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of
P5,000, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627.

Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma as witnesses.

Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers[9] testified that on certain dates in 1982, Batulanon released four
Cash Vouchers representing varying amounts to four different individuals as follows: On June 2, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 30A[10] for P4,160.00 was released to
Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 237A[11] for P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda[12] Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru Cash Voucher No.
276A[13] was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and on December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to Dennis Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No. 374A.
[14]

Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible to apply for loan because they were not bona fide members of the cooperative. [15]
Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was a member of the cooperative but there was no proof that she applied for a loan with PCCI in 1982. She subsequently withdrew
her membership in 1983.[16] Medallo stated that pursuant to the cooperatives by-laws, only bona fide members who must have a fixed deposit are eligible for loans.
[17]

Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and Arroyo in their respective cash vouchers and made it appear in the records that they
were payees and recipients of the amount stated therein.[18] As to the signature of Omadlao in Cash Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the same was actually the
handwriting of appellant.[19]

Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of directors since 1979. He corroborated Medallos testimony that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion
and Dennis Batulanon are not members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is Batulanons sister-in-law while Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in
1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to minors.[20]

Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980 before becoming its Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He testified that the loans made to Oracion,
Omadlao, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon did not pass through the cooperatives Credit Committee and PCCIs Board of Directors for screening purposes. He claimed
that Oracions signature on Cash Voucher No. 237A is Batulanons handwriting.[21] Jayoma also testified that among the four loans taken, only that in Arroyos name
was settled.[22]

The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo who was presented as a hostile witness and Batulanon.

Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and was asked to bring with her the PCCI General Journal for the year 1982. After certifying that
the said document reflected all the financial transactions of the cooperative for that year, she was asked to identify the entries in the Journal with respect to the
vouchers in question. Medallo was able to identify only Cash Voucher No. 237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to identify the other vouchers because
the Journal had missing pages and she was not the one who prepared the entries.[23]

Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did not sign the vouchers in the names of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo; that the same were signed
by the loan applicants in her presence at the PCCI office after she personally released the money to them;[24] that the three were members of the cooperative as shown
by their individual deposits and the ledger; that the board of directors passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to certify to the correctness of the entries in
the vouchers; that it has become an accepted practice in the cooperative for her to release loans and dispense with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his absence; [25]
that she signed the loan application and voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon because he was a minor but she clarified that she asked Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on
the documents to avoid suspicion of irregularity;[26] that contrary to the testimony of Gopio, Jr., minors are eligible for membership in the cooperative provided they
are children of regular members.

Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her sons name because she is no longer qualified for another loan as she still has to pay off an existing loan; that she had
started paying off her sons loan but the cooperative refused to accept her payments after the cases were filed in court. [27] She also declared that one automatically
becomes a member when he deposits money with the cooperative.[28] When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to 1982, the cooperative did not have by-
laws yet.[29]

On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982, because the cooperative had been registered since 1967.[30]

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all the above-entitled case, she is sentenced in each of
the four cases to 4 months of ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2 months of PRISION CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify the PCCI in the total sum of P16,660.00 with
legal interest from the institution of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.[31]

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONILA BATULANON is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private
Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code; and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor
maximum, AS MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos;
and to indemnify the Polomolok Cooperative Credit , Inc. the sum of thirteen thousand one hundred sixty (P13,160.00), plus legal interests from the filing of the
complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.[32]

The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the person whose signature was allegedly forged, thus the prosecution should have presented Erlinda
Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the testimony of an unreliable and biased witness such as Medallo. [33] She avers that the crime
of falsification of private document requires as an element prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan transactions because
these loans are accounts receivable by the cooperative.[34]

The petition lacks merit.

Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of commercial document, appellant could be convicted of falsification of private
document under the well-settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the
preamble of the information. In Andaya v. People,[35] we held:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way
aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts
alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the
information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The real and important question to him is, Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged? not, Did you
commit a crime named murder? If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor.
x x x If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner alleged, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime
which those acts constitute.

The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2[36] of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of
falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to
a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.[37]

In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanons act[38] of falsification falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. This is because by signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in Cash Voucher
Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as payee of the amounts appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that they obtained a loan
and received its proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts reflected in the cash vouchers.

The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash Vouchers in the name of Omadlao and Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI
members and not qualified for a loan from the cooperative. In the case of Arroyo, Batulanon was aware that while the former is a member, she did not apply for a loan
with the cooperative.

Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in the vouchers and made it appear that the amounts stated therein
were actually received by these persons. As to the signature of Arroyo, Medallos credible testimony and her familiarity with the handwriting of Batulanon proved that
it was indeed the latter who signed the name of Arroyo. Contrary to Batulanons contention, the prosecution is not duty-bound to present the persons whose signatures
were forged as Medallos eyewitness account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover, under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person
may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon
which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.

Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There is no evidence showing that Medallo was prompted by any ill motive.

The claim that Batulanons letter to the cooperative asking for a compromise was not an admission of guilt is untenable. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by
the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

There is no merit in Batulanons assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the loan transactions are reflected in its books as accounts receivable. It has been
established that PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting loan. These alleged borrowers are not members of PCCI and neither are they
eligible for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that in Ferlyn Arroyos name was settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed to settle the loan to avoid legal prosecution
with the understanding however, that she will be reimbursed once the money is collected from Batulanon.[39]

The Court of Appeals[40] correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and not commercial documents because they are not documents used by
merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions[41] nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial
law.[42] Rather, they are private documents, which have been defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a public
notary or of other person legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth. [43]

In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and
every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. [44] The
prosecution in this case was able to discharge its burden completely.

As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, [45] it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with
falsification of a private document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is
falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes,[46] the
accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he
had worked only 11 days, and then charged the offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the wages
during which the laborer did not work for which he was convicted of falsification of private document.

In U.S. v. Infante,[47] the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the pawn ticket and made it appear that the article is of greatly
superior value, and thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of the true value of the article pawned. He was found
guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,[48] the accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the
payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified documents, succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of
falsification of a private document.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in Criminal
Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.
Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods with a duration of
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium
period, which is three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Taking into consideration the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulanon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which must be within the range of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. [49] Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 3625,
3626 and 3453, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, which is within the range of the allowed imposable penalty.

Since Batulanons conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private documents, she shall suffer the aforementioned penalties for each count of the offense charged.
She is also ordered to indemnify PCCI the amount of P11,660.00 representing the aggregate amount of the 3 loans without deducting the amount of P3,500.00 paid by
Ferlyn Arroyos mother as the same was settled with the understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former once the money is recovered. The amount shall earn
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the filing of the complaints on November 28, 1994 until the finality of this judgment. From the time the decision becomes
final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum until its satisfaction.

However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa and not falsification. Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the acts that may
constitute falsification are the following:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement
contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or;

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.

In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis Batulanons signature in the cash voucher based on the Information
charging her of signing the name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal that in Cash Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the
signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: by: lbatulanon to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any
of the modes of falsification under Article 171 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the
latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case.
As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification.
Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is also guilty of falsification of private document with respect to Criminal Case No. 3627
involving the cash voucher of Dennis.[50]

The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:

(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;

(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;

(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;

(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. (Note: The 4th element is not necessary when there is evidence of misappropriation of the goods
by the defendant)[51]

Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,[52] the Court convicted the appellant of estafa by misappropriation. The latter, a treasurer of the Manila Rail Road Company, took
the sum of P8,330.00 out of the funds of the company and used it for personal purposes. He replaced said cash with his personal check of the same amount drawn on
the Philippine National Bank (PNB), with instruction to his cashier not to deposit the same in the current account of the Manila Rail Road Company until the end of
the month. When an audit was conducted, the check of appellant was discovered to have been carried in the accounts as part of the cash on hand. An inquiry with the
PNB disclosed that he had only P125.66 in his account, although in the afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with the PNB sufficient sum to cover the
check. In handing down a judgment of conviction, the Court explained that:

Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very evidently not a necessary element of the form of estafa here discussed; the breach of confidence
involved in the conversion or diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense
is, comparatively few men misappropriate trust funds with the intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the offender hopes to be able to restore the funds before
the defalcation is discovered. x x x

Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we find all of the necessary elements of estafa x x x. That the money for which the appellant's checks
were substituted was received by him for safe-keeping or administration, or both, can hardly be disputed. He was the responsible financial officer of the corporation
and as such had immediate control of the current funds for the purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with the custody of the same. That he, in the exercise of such
control and custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter the case nor can the fact that one of the subordinates, the cashier, was a bonded employee who, if he had
acted on his own responsibility, might also have misappropriated the same funds and thus have become guilty of estafa.

Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal use, from the funds entrusted to him for safekeeping and substituting his personal checks therefor
with instructions that the checks were to be retained by the cashier for a certain period, the appellant misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period. The checks
did not constitute cash and as long as they were retained by the appellant or remained under his personal control they were of no value to the corporation; he might as
well have kept them in his pocket as to deliver them to his subordinate with instructions to retain them.

xxxx

But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the accused to permanently misappropriate the funds to himself. As we have already stated, such
intention rarely exists in cases of this nature and, as we have seen, it is not a necessary element of the crime. Though authorities have been cited who, at first sight,
appear to hold that misappropriation of trust funds for short periods does not always amount to estafa, we are not disposed to extend this interpretation of the law to
cases where officers of corporations convert corporate funds to their own use, especially where, as in this case, the corporation is of a quasi-public character. The
statute is clear and makes no distinction between permanent misappropriations and temporary ones. We can see no reason in the present case why it should not be
applied in its literal sense.

The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is injury to another. The appellant's counsel argues that the only injury in this case is the loss of
interest suffered by the Railroad Company during the period the funds were withheld by the appellant. It is, however, well settled by former adjudications of this court
that the disturbance in property rights caused by the misappropriation, though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of paragraph
5, supra. ( vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 vs. Malong, 36 Phil., 821.)[53]

In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for administration and in trust for PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer
qualified to obtain a loan, she fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount she
obtained from the loan is also not disputed as she even admitted receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by Batulanon is reflected in the
records as part of the receivables of PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter because the sum misappropriated by her could have been loaned by PCCI to qualified
members, or used in other productive undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in property rights caused by Batulaonos misappropriation is in itself sufficient to
constitute injury within the meaning of Article 315.

Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was P5,000.00, the applicable provision is paragraph (3) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which
imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, where the amount defrauded is over P200.00 but does not
exceed P6,000.00. There being no modifying circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. With the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, Batulaon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional,
as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of three counts of falsification of private documents and is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, for each count, and to
indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until
finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction; and

(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum. She is likewise ordered to indemnify Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the sum
of P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. T he interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed
from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON and FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.

Assailed in this special civil action for Certiorari is the order rendered by Judge Manuel Castañeda on January 28, 1976 dismissing Criminal Case No. D-868 of the
former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and the order rendered in the same case on March 22, 1976 by his successor, the herein public respondent, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order of dismissal.

Culled from the records, 1 it appears that complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother, Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Barrio Buenlag,
Binmaley, Pangasinan, registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682.

On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a special power of attorney before Notary Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico de
Guzman as his lawful attorney-in-fact. On February 13, 1964, private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land with the People's Bank and Trust Company in Dagupan
City using the said special power of attorney, and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the mortgagee bank. Both the special power of attorney
and the mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 13, 1964.:- nad

After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage account not having been paid, the mortgagee bank foreclosed said mortgage and the land was sold
to one Ramon Serafica and Vileta Quinto who were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85181 for said property. In January, 1972, complainant allegedly discovered
that their property was already registered in the name of said Ramon Serafica when the latter filed on said date an action for the ejectment of the former from the
premises.

On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsification of a public document was filed against private respondent in the then Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, the information reading as follows:

"That on or about the 15th day of February, 1964, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the abovenamed accused FEDERICO
DE GUZMAN, being then a private individual, after having in his possession Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally falsify and forge the signature of one MARIANO F. CARRERA, in a Power of Attorney, causing and making it appear that the said MARIANO F.
CARRERA, signed and affixed his signature in the said Power of Attorney, which is a public document, when as a matter of fact and in truth, said MARIANO F.
CARRERA, did not in anyway (sic) participate in any acts thereof, nor gave his permission, and in order to make good the acts of falsification, with intent of gain and
by means of fraud and other deceits, the said accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the said falsified public document (Power of Attorney) did succeed in securing
the loan from the People's Bank and Trust Company in the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P8,500.00) Philippine currency, without the
knowledge and consent of said MARIANO F. CARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount of P4,250.00, and other consequential damages." 2

After arraignment where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the case proceeded to trial and the prosecution presented complainant Mariano F. Carrera and one
Melanio Esguig from the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan. Another witness, Col. Jose G. Fernandez, a handwriting expert, gave his
partial testimony but the same was not continued as counsel for private respondent moved for and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss.

On December 16, 1975, the motion to dismiss 3 was filed, wherein it was alleged that the crime charged would not lie due to the partial testimony of complainant
allegedly to the effect that he authorized private respondent to mortgage the said one-half portion of the land owned by him and his brother. Said partial testimony of
complainant was quoted, with the emphasized portions, as follows:

"Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to the title of your property at present?
A Yes, sir, I know.

Q Could you tell us what happened to your title?

A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.

Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the Bank. Do you know the reason why it was foreclosed by the Bank?

A Yes, sir.

Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was foreclosed by the Bank?

A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother Severo Carrera went to Manila and he asked me to sign a document as a witness and I asked him he interpreted that this
is an authorization to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said.

Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo Carrera went to you in Manila and asked you to sign a power of attorney authorizing de Guzman to mortgage the
one-half portion of that land owned by you and your brother. Do you have any document to show that?

xxx

ATTY. DIAZ:

Q Can you recognize that document which you signed in 1964 if shown to you?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now I am asking . . . I am showing here a document which is, your Honor, for the purpose of identification, and may we request that it be marked as Exhibit B for
the prosecution. This document consist (sic) of two pages, your Honor, and the first page be marked as Exhibit B and the second page be marked as Exhibit B-1, page
two. Will you tell this Honorable Court what is this?

A This is the document brought by my brother to Manila for me to sign, sir.

xxx

(Hearing of June 18, 1974, pp. 8-10; Emphasis supplied)" 4

Based on the aforequoted testimony, private respondent contends that there is no sufficient basis for the charge and this fact warrants the dismissal of the case.

Private respondent also claims that the crime has prescribed since more than ten (10) years had elapsed from the time the crime was committed. Since the information
charges the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a public document, then the penalty shall be that for the more serious crime which shall be applied in its
maximum period, as provided for by Article 48 of the Penal Code. The more serious crime in the present case is the falsification of the public document which is
punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum period and a fine not exceeding P5,000.00. Prision correccional being a correctional penalty, the
same prescribes in ten (10) years.

It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the information filed in the case merely alleged the date of the commission of the crime which was February 5, 1964 and the
information was filed only on March 29, 1974. This being the case, private respondent claims that more than ten (10) years has passed from the commission of the
crime to the filing of the information. No other allegation having been made as to the discovery of the alleged crime, private respondent claimed that the period of
prescription commenced on the day on which the crime was committed. He asserts that, from the date appearing in the transfer certificate of title covering the land
mortgaged with the bank, the mortgage documents were duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13, 1984, hence the alleged crime
became public knowledge on the same date. To support his theory, private respondent made the following citation:

"The period of prescription commences to run from the date of the commission of the crime if it is known at the time of its commission.:-cralaw

"Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or needed to be discovered, because the entire series of transactions was by public instruments, duly recorded, the crime
of estafa committed in connection with said transaction was known to the offended party when it was committed and the period of prescription commenced to run from
the date of its commission. People v. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp. 50 (The Revised Penal Code by Justice Luis B. Reyes, Revised Edition 1967, Vol. I, pp. 711-
712)." 5

The prosecution countered that the testimony of Mariano Carrera shows that what was intended was an authority to mortgage only the one-half portion pertaining to
his brother and he was only quoting what his brother told him when he said that ". . . this is an authority to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the bank on the half
portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said." 6

It further submitted that the information was not filed out of time since the date to be considered should not be the date of registration of the alleged power of attorney
on February 13, 1964. It argued that the crime was actually discovered only in January, 1972 when Ramon S. Serafica filed an action to eject complainant from the
premises, which fact was not alleged in the information because it was considered by the prosecution as a mere evidentiary matter which would not be in accord with
the legal truism that an "information must allege only ultimate facts and not evidentiary matters." 7

With regard to the case of People vs. Dinsay cited by private respondent, petitioner submits that "(t)he same has only a persuasive effect and not to be considered as an
interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code as the same is the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court." 8
As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel Castañeda of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III, dismissed the case on January 28, 1976 on the
ground that the crime had prescribed. The People's motion for reconsideration was denied by the succeeding Presiding Judge Felicidad Carandang Villalon.

On March 25, 1976, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal from both orders of the trial court. In a resolution dated May 13, 1976, this Court required the prosecution
to file a petition for review on Certiorari in accordance with Republic Act No. 5440. 9 Thereafter, said petition for review and the corresponding comment and reply of
the parties having been filed, on February 21, 1977 the Court resolved to treat said petition as a special civil action and required petitioner and private respondent to
submit their respective memoranda. 10

From the memoranda submitted, the Court is tasked with the resolution of the following issues:

1. Whether the People could appeal from the order of dismissal because the private respondent would thereby be placed in double jeopardy;

2. Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document filed against the private respondent has sufficient ground to exist in law and in fact; and,

3. Whether the offense charged in the aforementioned criminal case is already extinguished by prescription. 11

The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As enunciated in People vs. City Court of Manila, etc., et al.:

"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
complaint or information (Section 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not
constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based
upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal
be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant." 12

On the issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law, we hold in the affirmative. The
falsification of a public document may be a means of committing estafa because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial
documents. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document, hence, the falsification of the public, official or
commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa. 13

Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported by the fact that what was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half portion pertaining to Severo Carrera, not the
portion pertaining to complainant, otherwise complainant would not have quoted his brother's words. The theory of petitioner and the findings of public respondent are
substantially the same. We agree that the offense charged does exist in fact and in law, as explained in the findings of the court below:

"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial testimony of complainant Mariano Carrera and of the record, as regards the first ground, the court finds that
the contention of the defense that the authorization given to him to mortgage the whole property is not sustained by the evidence because a cursory study of the answer
made by the witness complainant clearly shows that what was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion pertaining only to Severo Carrera, excluding
that portion pertaining to said complainant. (T.S.N.. pp. 8-10, hearing on June 18, 1974). In other words, the alleged authorization given to Federico de Guzman to get
a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land referred to the share of Severo Carrera only. This finding is based on the following quoted answer:

'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which
belongs to me, my brother said.'

Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the above-quoted testimony. He merely quoted his brother Severo Carrera to whom the half portion of the land belongs.
Severo Carrera, as quoted by Mariano Carrera, did not use the phrase `which belongs to you.'" 14

Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the sufficiency of the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document, the resolution of the issue on prescription
is, however, determinative of the validity of the impugned orders of public respondent.: nad

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for a complex crime is that for the most serious component offense, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. In the crime of estafa thru falsification of a public document, the more serious crime is the falsification which carries with it the correctional penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not more than P5,000.00 imposed by Article 172 of the Code. Crimes punishable by
correctional penalties prescribe in ten (10) years pursuant to Article 90 of the Code, and Article 91 thereof states that the prescriptive period commences to run "from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . ."

The document which was allegedly falsified was a notarized special power of attorney registered in the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13, 1964
authorizing private respondent to mortgage a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682 in order to secure a loan of P8,500.00 from the People's
Bank and Trust Company. The information for estafa thru falsification of a public document was filed only on March 29, 1974. We reject petitioner's claim that the ten-
year period commenced when complainant supposedly discovered the crime in January, 1972 by reason of the ejectment suit against him.

People vs. Reyes 15 cites authorities on the well established rule that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of
its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains. On these considerations, it holds
that the prior ruling in Cabral vs. Puno, etc., et al., 16 to the effect that in the crime of falsification of a public document the prescriptive period commences from the
time the offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered with the Register of Deeds is not without legal basis.

It was also noted that in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al., 17 in interpreting the phrase "from the discovery" found in Article 1391 of the Civil Code which authorizes
annulment, in case of mistake or fraud, within four years from the time of the discovery of the same, the Court also held that the discovery must be reckoned to have
taken place from the time the document was registered in the Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice to the whole world and this should
apply to both criminal and civil cases.: nad

We are further in accord with the conclusion in Reyes that the application of said rule on constructive notice in the interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code would most certainly be favorable to private respondent herein, since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, that is, from the
time the questioned documents were recorded in the Registry of Deeds.In the instant case, the special power of attorney involved was registered on February 13, 1964.
The criminal information against private respondent having been filed only on March 29, 1974, or more than ten (10) years thereafter, the crime with which private
respondent was charged has indubitably prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the challenged orders of public respondent are AFFIRMED.