PEOPLE vs.
ASUNCION RJ: UPON MOTION OF THE ACCUSED: DISMISSED THE INFORMATION
DOCTRINES:
CRIMINAL LAW; PD 1866 (ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND
AMMUNITION); EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 107 AND 222 TEMPORARILY
LIFTED CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR MERE POSSESSION DURING THE PERIOD
COVERED. — It may be true that there is nothing in Executive Orders Nos. 107
and 222 that expressly legalizes the unlicensed possession of firearms and
ammunition, but this Court, applying statutes similar to the executive orders in
question, and which also provided for a period within which a holder or
possessor of unlicensed firearms and ammunition may surrender the same to
the proper authorities without incurring criminal liability, had ruled that a
criminal liability was temporarily lifted for mere possession of unlicensed
firearms and ammunition during the period covered, although such person is
not exempt from criminal liability if, within the period provided, he carries the
firearm and ammunition (unless it is for the purpose of surrendering the same)
or he commits any other offense with the use of such unlicensed firearm and
ammunition.
CASES OF PEOPLE VS. FELICIANO AND PEOPLE VS. LOPEZ, CITED; ACTS WHICH
WERE PUNISHABLE SHOULD BE ALLEGED AND PROVED. — In People vs.
Feliciano, the Court ruled that Republic Act No. 482 legalized mere unlicensed
possession of firearms and ammunition for the limited period specified in said
law, and punished only (1) the use of unlicensed firearm or ammunition, or (2)
the carrying of such firearm or ammunition on the person, except to surrender
them. In an earlier ruling held in People vs. Lopez, the Court already ruled that,
under Republic Act No. 4, the use or the carrying of firearms and/or
ammunition was an ingredient, if not the sole ingredient, of the offense; i.e. the
very acts which were punished, subject to certain conditions, and hence, should
be alleged and proved.
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE
CAN NOT HAVE EFFECT OF VALIDATING A VOID INFORMATION. — As the
Court had stated in People vs. Austria, the presentation of evidence
"cannot have the effect of validating a void information, or proving an
offense which does not legally exist. . . . The information was not merely
defective but it does not charge any offense at all. Technically speaking,
that information does not exist in contemplation of law."
---
ISSUE: WON PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE CAN HAVE EFFECT IN
VALIDATING A VOID INFORMATION
In an INFORMATION: Roland Abadilla was accused of the crime of Violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866.
 GROUND: It did not allege sufficient facts to constitute an offense, since
the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal per se, in
view of Executive Order No. 107 which gives holders or possessors of
unlicensed firearms and ammunition a period of six (6) months from its
effectivity, extended to 31 December 1987 by Executive Order No. 222,
within which to surrender the same to the proper authorities, without
incurring any criminal liability therefor, except if the unlicensed
firearm or ammunition is carried outside of one's residence, not for the
purpose of surrendering the same, or used in the commission of any
other offense, and there is no allegation in said Information that the
firearms and ammunition enumerated therein were carried outside the
accused's residence or used in the commission of some other crime
PROSECUTION: MR | MR: DENIED
PROSECUTION  SC:
 RJ erred in holding that the possession of loose firearms and explosives
is not illegal per se during the period covered by Executive Orders Nos.
107 and 222.
o Nothing is contained in said executive orders which legalizes
the possession of firearms and ammunition without a permit
o that said executive orders merely authorized holders or
possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammunition to
surrender the same within a specified period without incurring
criminal liability; and that illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition is still penalized under Pres. Decree No. 1866
which was not repealed by said Executive Order Nos. 107 and
222.
o RESPONSE OF COURT: Criminal liability was temporarily lifted
for mere possession of unlicensed firearms and ammunition
during the period covered, although such person is not exempt
from criminal liability if, within the period provided, he carries
the firearm and ammunition (unless it is for the purpose of
surrendering the same) or he commits any other offense with
the use of such unlicensed firearm and ammunition.
 Petitioner claims that it was not necessary for the prosecution to
allege in the information that the firearms and ammunition,
subject matter of this case, were brought out of the residence of
the accused or were used by him in the commission or another
offense, since these circumstances are not essential ingredients of
the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
o RESPONSE OF THE COURT: The contention is without merit.
o In People vs. Lopez:
  the Court already ruled that, under Republic Act No. 4,
the use or the carrying of firearms and/or ammunition
was an ingredient, if not the sole ingredient, of the
offense; i.e. the very acts which were punished, subject
to certain conditions, and hence, should be alleged and
proved.
o In People vs. Austria
 the Court also ruled that in order that an information
charging illegal possession of firearm and ammunition,
under Republic Act No. 482, may be deemed sufficient,
it must allege that the accused was using the
unlicensed firearm or carrying it in his person at the
time he was apprehended by the authorities with said
firearm. Said the Court.
o People vs. Santo Lopez y Jacinito
 It should be noted that the court dismissed the first
case for illegal possession of firearm upon the sole
ground that the information did not contain facts
sufficient to constitute an offense.
 In the meantime, private complainant Evelyn Alagon learned of respondent’s
 essential allegations not having been averred in
the information, the court rightly dismissed the
case on the ground that the information did not
allege facts sufficient to constitute an offense.
 Petitioner contends that under the allegation in the information
"that the accused without any authority of law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and
under his custody and control the firearms and ammunition
enumerated therein," the prosecution may prove that the accused
carried the firearms and ammunition outside of his residence.
o RESPONSE OF THE COURT: The contention is without merit.
o People vs. Austria:
 The presentation of evidence "cannot have the effect of
validating a void information, or proving an offense
which does not legally exist. . . . The information was
not merely defective but it does not charge any offense
at all. Technically speaking, that information does not
exist in contemplation of law."
The Court is not unaware that accused-respondent Abadilla, rightly or wrongly,
is identified with the violent arm of the past regime. To many, he is regarded
with unusual ease and facility as the "hit man" of that regime. The Court,
however, is not swayed by appellations or opprobriums. Its duty, as a temple of
justice, is to accord to every man who comes before it in appropriate
proceedings the right to due process and the equal protection of the laws.
The information, in this particular charge against accused-respondent
Abadilla, is fatally defective. It would be fatally defective against any other
accused charged with the same offense. Respondent judge, in dismissing
the information, committed no reversible error or grave abuse of
discretion. He acted correctly.
PEOPLE vs. ODTUHAN
ISSUE:
Respondent Odtuhan married Jasmin Modina.
He also married Eleanor Alagon.
He later filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina.
RTC: GRANTED ODTUHAN’s PETITION and DECLARED HIS FIRST MARRIAGE
VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE. The RTC granted
respondent’s petition
--- Eleanor Alagon died ---
previous marriage with Modina and thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging
respondent with Bigamy.
ODTUHAN: MOVED TO QUASH THE INFORMATION
 Grounds:
o That the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and
o That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished
RTC: FACTS = BIGAMY
 There was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and
without such marriage having been dissolved, respondent contracted a
second marriage with Alagon.
 Neither can the information be quashed on the ground that
criminal liability has been extinguished, because the declaration
of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of
extinguishing criminal liability.
ODTUHAN  CA: ON CERTIORATI
CA: RTC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING
RESPONDENT’S MQ considering that the facts alleged in the information do not
charge an offense
 There is cogent basis in looking into the motion to quash filed by
respondent, for if the evidence would establish that his first marriage
 was indeed void ab initio, one essential element of the crime of bigamy
would be lacking.
SUBSEQUENT MR DENIED
ODUHAN  SC
SC cited cases of Montañez v. Cipriano, Teves v. People, and Antone v. Beronilla
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an
accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information filed against
him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are
apparent in the face of the information."
 It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information.
 The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material
averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged
therein, which are hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or
matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered.
A Motion to Quash should be based on a defect in the information which is
evident on its fact.
 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct the defect
by amendment
 If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another
complaint or information be filed except when the information is
quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy.
An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the
sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it
contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:
(1) That the offender has been legally married;
(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity.
Here, the information contained the following allegations:
(1) that respondent is legally married to Modina;
(2) that without such marriage having been legally dissolved;
(3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a
second marriage with Alagon; and
(4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Odtuhan's evidence showing the court's declaration that his marriage to
Modina is null and void from the beginning because of the absence of a
marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary
to that alleged in the information that a first valid marriage was subsisting
at the time he contracted the second marriage.
 This should not be considered at all, because matters of defense
cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
 It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset
without the benefit of a full blown trial.
 The issues require a fuller examination and it would be unfair to
shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to
quash the information on the basis of the document presented by
respondent.
 With the presentation of the court decree, no facts have been
brought out which destroyed the prima facie truth accorded to the
allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission
thereof.
Respondent's motion to quash was founded on the trial court's declaration
that his marriage with Modina is null and void ab initio. He claims that with
such declaration, one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the
allegations in the information do not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the
very least, such court decree extinguished his criminal liability. Both
respondent and the CA heavily relied on the Court's pronouncement in
Morigo v. People where the accused therein was acquitted because the
elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first
marriage was declared null and void, because the parties only signed the
marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of
the first marriage, the Court held that there was no marriage to speak of
when the accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused
was acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence
on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.
 It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of
nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
 contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
 Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.
 Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
 If we allow respondent's line of defense and the CA's
ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a
favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone
institutes a complaint against him.
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the
information against him, because he obtained the declaration of nullity of
marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again,
we cannot sustain such contention.
 Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender
upon the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability
appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and that the
time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material
only for determining prescription.
CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent.
RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to
quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus motion.
QUISAY vs. PEOPLE
INFORMATION  QUISAY: Violation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. (RA)
7610, 5 otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
QUISAY  MQ
 Ground of lack of authority of the person who filed the same before
the RTC.
 In support of her motion, petitioner pointed out that the
Resolution issued by the OCP-Makati which led to the Information
was penned by Assistant City Prosecutor Estefano H. De La Cruz
(ACP De La Cruz) and approved by Senior Assistant City Prosecutor
Edgardo G. Hirang (SACP Hirang), while the Pabatid Sakdal was
penned by ACP De La Cruz, without any approval from any higher
authority, albeit with a Certification claiming that ACP De La Cruz
has prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor in
filing the said Information.
o Odtuhanclaimed that nothing in the
aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would show that ACP
De La Cruz and/or SACP Hirang had prior written
authority or approval from the City Prosecutor to file or
approve the filing of the Information against her.
o As such, the Information must be quashed for being
tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot be
cured.
OCP-MAKATI COMMENT AND OPPOSITION: SACP Hirang, was authorized
to approve the Resolution pursuant to OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32.
Further, it maintained that the Pabatid Sakdal was filed with the prior
approval of the City Prosecutor as shown in the Certification in the
Information itself.
The RTC Ruling
 Denied petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit.
 It found the Certification attached to the Information to have
sufficiently complied with Section 4, Rule 112, ROC which requires
the prior written authority or approval by, among others, the City
Prosecutor, in the filing of Informations.
 MR DENIED.
 CA  CERTIORARI
The CA Ruling
 CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
 Pursuant to Section 9 of RA 10071, 17 otherwise known as the
"Prosecution Service Act of 2010," as well as OCP-Makati Office
Order No. 32, the City Prosecutor of Makati authorized SACP Hirang
to approve the issuance of, inter alia, resolutions finding probable
cause and the filing of Informations before the courts.
 As such, SACP Hirang may, on behalf of the City Prosecutor,
approve the Pasiya which found probable cause to indict petitioner
of violation of Section 10 of RA 7610.
  The Certification made by ACP De La Cruz in the Information
clearly indicated that the same was filed after the requisite
preliminary investigation and with the prior written authority or
approval of the City Prosecutor.
 In this regard, the CA opined that such Certification enjoys the
presumption of regularity accorded to a public officer's
performance of official functions, in the absence of convincing
evidence to the contrary.
 Quisay  MR | MR: Denied
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
held that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing
petitioner's motion to quash.
WON a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein
before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts – YES
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious
 Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or information
requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers
therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the
courts, viz.:
o SECTION 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its
review. — If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to
hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the
resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in
the information that he, or as shown by the record, an
authorized officer, has personally examined the
complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence
submitted against him; and that he was given an
opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise,
he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
o Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward
the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his
deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten
(10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately
inform the parties of such action.
o No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed
by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written
authority or approval of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman
or his deputy.
Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts
without the prior written authority or approval of the foregoing
authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore, subject to
quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the same Rules, to wit:
 SECTION 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority
to do so;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 .
 In view of the foregoing circumstances, the CA erred in according
the Pabatid Sakdal the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions solely on the basis of the
Certification made by ACP De La Cruz considering the absence of
any evidence on record clearly showing that ACP De La Cruz: (a)
had any authority to file the same on his own; or (b) did seek the
prior written approval from those authorized to do so before filing
the Information before the RTC.
 In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of
petitioner's motion to quash as the Pabatid Sakdal or Information
suffers from an incurable infirmity — that the officer who filed the
same before the RTC had no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid
Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal
case against petitioner.
 As a final note, it must be stressed that "[t]he Rules of
Court governs the pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts of
the Philippines. For the orderly administration of justice, the
provisions contained therein should be followed by all litigants, but
especially by the prosecution arm of the Government."

 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
October 10, 2014 and the Resolution dated January 30, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131968 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information
 against petitioner Girlie M. Quisay is QUASHED and the criminal
case against her is DISMISSED.
PEOPLE vs. CITY COURT OF MANILA
ISSUE: WON a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical injuries
thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be prosecuted
subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party
dies as a result of the same injuries he had suffered.
This is a petition to review the order, dated November 17, 1972, of the City
Court of Manila, Branch XI, dismissing the information for homicide thru
reckless imprudence filed against private respondent, Francisco Gapay y
Mallares on the ground of double jeopardy. Respondent court held that the
private respondent having been previously tried and convicted of serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence for the resulting death of the
victim would place the accused in double jeopardy.
In Melo vs. People, this Court held that "where after the first prosecution a
new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes
the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at a time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in
second jeopardy if indicted for the second offense."
However, the trial court held that the doctrine of Melo vs. People does
not apply in the case at bar in view of this Court's ruling in People vs.
Buan that Article 365 of the Penal Code punishes the negligent state of
mind and not the resulting injury. The trial court concluded that once
prosecuted for and convicted of negligence, the accused cannot again
be prosecuted for the same negligence although for a different
resulting injury.
In the case at bar, the incident occurred on October 17, 1971. The following
day, October 18, an information for serious physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence was filed against private respondent driver of the truck. On the
same day, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died.
On October 20, 1972, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty, was
sentenced to 1m1d of arresto mayor, and commenced serving sentence.
Information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against
private respondent.
City Court of Manila, upon motion of private respondent, issued an order
dismissing the homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of
double jeopardy.
Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged with an offense
cannot be charge again with the same or identical offense though the latter
be lesser or greater than the former.
However, as held in the case of Melo vs. People the rule of Identity does not
apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the reason that in such case there is no possibility for the
accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was
then inexistent.
"Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after
conviction, the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the
same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy."
Stated differently, where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes
for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the
offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new
and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if
indicted for the new offense.
As stated above, the victim Diolito dela Cruz died on the day the information
was filed, and the accused was arraigned 2 days after. When the
information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was, therefore, filed on
October 24, 1972, the accused-private respondent was already in jeopardy.
In his memorandum, the Solicitor General made mention of the fact that on
October 21, 1972, the City Fiscal filed an Urgent Motion asking that the
"hearing and arraignment of this case be held in abeyance for there is
information that the victim, Diolito dela Cruz died, and the information
would have to be amended." Be that as it may, the fact remains that the
victim Diolito dela Cruz died on October 18 "one (1) day after the accident
and the arrest of the respondent Gapay" and that and that on October 20,
1972,t he accused was arraigned, pleaded guilty and sentenced accordingly.
Thus, jeopardy had attached and no new fact supervened after the
arraignment and conviction of the accused.
IVLER vs. MODESTO-SAN PEDRO
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two
separate offenses: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2)
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for the
death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the
spouses Ponce’s vehicle.
Crimes charged:
1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries; and
2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property
On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries and was meted out the
penalty of public censure.
Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for placing him
in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.
MeTC: denied the motion to quash
RTC: denied Ivler’s Petition for Certiorari in dismissing his Motion to Quash
ISSUE: Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in the information charging
him with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property (YES)
Defense: Ivler argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property having
been previously convicted in reckless imprudence resulting in slight
physical injuries for injuries for the same offense. Ivler submits that the
multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his
penalty
HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s
conviction in the case of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injuries bars his prosecution in criminal reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property
1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its Consequences on
Persons and Property are Material Only to Determine the Penalty
Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,”
unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These
structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the
mass of intentional crimes.
2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-offense
Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of
the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus
the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the
penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless
act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or
several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code
Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple
felonies falling under either of two categories:
(1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
(thus excluding from its operation light felonies); and
(2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of
serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for
the most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as
a felony but the mental attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight, a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting
consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in
one or more consequences. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-
crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It
is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act
constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense
which is a necessary means for committing another.
Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing
penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article
365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no
splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be
filed in the same first level court.