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Perception of Duration
Presupposes Duration of
Perception – or Does it? Husserl
and Dainton on time
a
Dan Zahavi
a
University of Copenhagen, Denmark

Available online: 28 Aug 2007

To cite this article: Dan Zahavi (2007): Perception of Duration Presupposes Duration
of Perception – or Does it? Husserl and Dainton on time, International Journal of
Philosophical Studies, 15:3, 453-471

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 International Journal of Philosophical Studies Vol. 15(3), 453–471

Perception of Duration
Presupposes Duration of
Perception – or Does it? Husserl
and Dainton on time

International
10.1080/09672550701445464
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0967-2559
Original
Taylor
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zahavi@cfs.ku.dk
DanZahavi
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Dan Zahavi
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Abstract
In his recent book The Stream of Consciousness, Dainton provides what
must surely count as one of the most comprehensive discussions of time-
consciousness in analytical philosophy. In the course of doing so, he also
challenges Husserl’s classical account in a number of ways. In the following
contribution, I will compare Dainton’s and Husserl’s respective accounts.
Such a comparison will not only make it evident why an analysis of time-
consciousness is so important, but will also provide a neat opportunity to
appraise the contemporary relevance of Husserl’s analysis. How does it
measure up against one of the more recent analytical accounts?
Keywords: Husserl; Dainton; temporality; time-consciousness;
phenomenology

Time is the substance I am made of. Time is a river which sweeps me

along, but I am the river; it is a tiger which destroys me, but I am the
tiger; it is a fire which consumes me, but I am the fire.

(Jorge Luis Borges, Labyrinths)

Introduction
In the introduction to his Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren
Zeitbewusstseins, Husserl remarks that ‘we get entangled in the most pecu-
liar difficulties, contradictions, and confusions’ (Hua 10/4) the moment we
seek to account for time-consciousness. I think that most scholars of
Husserl’s writings on these issues would agree. Attempting to unravel the
inner workings of time-consciousness can indeed easily induce a kind of
intellectual vertigo. In order to minimize the peril, I will in the following

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

ISSN 0967–2559 print 1466–4542 online © 2007 Taylor & Francis
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/09672550701445464
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

adopt a strategy of simplification. The literature abounds with very sophis-

ticated and highly technical discussions of Husserl’s writings on time, but
I think that occasionally it can pay off to return to some of the quite simple
questions that motivated Husserl to commence his decades-long reflec-
tions on this topic. My somewhat indirect way of doing this will be by way
of a critical discussion of Barry Dainton’s recent book The Stream of
Consciousness. In his book, Dainton provides what must surely count as
one of the most comprehensive discussions of time-consciousness in
analytical philosophy, particularly within the last ten years. In the course of
doing so, he also challenges Husserl’s account in a number of ways. By
looking at these challenges I think that it is possible to gain a new perspec-
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tive on why an analysis of time-consciousness is so important. Moreover,

such a comparison might also provide us with an illuminating appraisal of
the contemporary relevance of Husserl’s analysis. How does it measure up
against one of the more recent analytical accounts?

1 Presenting the Problem

In his book Dainton sets out to provide an account of the unity and continuity
inherent in our stream of consciousness. Experiences never occur in isolation,
and a stream of consciousness is an ensemble of experiences that is unified
both at a given moment and over time, both synchronically and diachroni-
cally. Dainton considers his approach phenomenological – in the loose sense
of the word – since it is based on experiential findings; it is conducted from
the first-person perspective, and it disregards the various subpersonal
processes and mechanisms that might also be involved (Dainton, 2000: p. xiii).
Despite his appeal to phenomenology, Dainton defends a representative
theory of perception and denies that veridical perception is a direct unme-
diated awareness of outer objects (Dainton, 2000: pp. 14, 18). According to
the ‘projectivism’ he favours, my object of perception is in fact a mental
projection, i.e., an ‘internally generated and outwardly projected phenome-
nal image’ (Dainton, 2000: p. 16). As a consequence, ‘there is a sense in which
we are all enclosed in spheres of virtual reality, phenomenal spheres some-
how produced by activities within our brains: all we are directly aware of are
the contents within these spheres’ (Dainton, 2000: p. 18). Needless to say,
this is a position that classical phenomenology – with good reason – would
oppose. But although the merits of Dainton’s analysis of time-consciousness
are to some extent independent of his commitment to this projectivism, we
nevertheless need to keep this commitment in mind if we are to understand
Dainton’s somewhat idiosyncratic use of the terms phenomenal ‘content’
and phenomenal ‘object’. The terms are used more or less synonymously
(and when accounting for Dainton’s view, I will use them that way as well)
to refer to that which we are phenomenally aware of, be it melodies, spoken
lines of poetry, the blue sky, or approaching buses. All of these objects of
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 HUSSERL AND DAINTON ON TIME

perception seem to be out there in the world. According to Dainton,

however, they are in reality wholly experiential items; items that are part and
parcel of the stream of consciousness (Dainton, 2000: pp. 17, 24).
Now, to get us started, let me quickly sketch out what might be consid-
ered a simple default account of time-consciousness. Pre-theoretically we
all assume that we do have a direct experience of change and persistence.
We can hear an enduring tone or a melody, just as we can see a stationary
pyramid or the flight of a bird. However, if I at any given moment were
only aware of what was perceptually present to me right then and there,
how could I then ever perceive – in contradistinction to imagine, remem-
ber, or judge about – temporally extended objects? The solution is to
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recognize that our auditory and visual perceptions are themselves tempo-
rally extended processes. In fact, in the perception of a movement or a
melody, there will be a succession of perceptual presentations that runs in
parallel with the successive phases of the movement or melody. The
perception of the melody starts when the melody starts, and comes to an
end at exactly the same moment as the melody. Thus according to this
account, we should subscribe to what has occasionally been called the
Principle of Presentational Concurrence (Dainton, 2000: p. 134).
Unfortunately, however, things are not quite that simple. If a perception
has duration and temporal extension, it will contain temporal phases of its
own. But on closer consideration it is obvious that a mere succession of
such conscious phases will not as such provide us with consciousness of
succession. For that to happen, the succession of these phases must some-
how be united experientially. The decisive challenge is then to account for
this unification without giving rise to an explanatory regress. In order
to avoid that, many have been tempted to adopt what Dainton calls the
Principle of Simultaneous Awareness (Dainton, 2000: p. 133). According
to this principle, a sequence or succession of temporal phases is experi-
enced only as a sequence or succession if it is apprehended simultaneously
by a single momentary act of consciousness (Dainton, 2003: p. 17). Why do
we need to postulate a momentary act that embraces the full temporal
sequence? We need a momentary act, because if it were extended, we
would once again be confronted with the problem that an enduring
consciousness is not as such a consciousness of duration. When we are
aware of something temporally extended, something that includes the
immediate past, the awareness itself must consequently be located in
the present; it must be point-like and momentary (Dainton, 2000: p. 133).
The Principle of Simultaneous Awareness obviously doesn’t deny that
there is a difference between hearing three succeeding tones and hearing
the three tones simultaneously. The principle simply claims that the
succession in order to be apprehended as a succession must be appre-
hended as a whole in a single momentary awareness; an awareness that is
located in the pure now understood as an indivisible point or instant.
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If one opts for this model, one still has the choice between two different
versions of it. One option is to hold that a momentary act of awareness
apprehends a succession of content with real temporal extension. On this
view, an act of awareness may be momentary, but its scope is not. Since this
view holds that we are directly aware of temporally extended occurrences,
one can call it a form of temporal realism. However, one can also take the
view that the contents apprehended by momentary acts of awareness are
themselves momentary, but that these contents simply appear as temporally
extended. When one posits a momentary act, the content seized by this act
must be given simultaneously. However, the different temporal phases of a
temporally extended object are obviously not given simultaneously.
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Whereas the current phase of the object can be given perceptually, the
former phase of the object is no longer present, and must therefore instead
be re-presented when the current phase occurs. Thus, whereas we seem to
be directly aware of temporally extended occurrences, we are in reality only
aware of the representations of such occurrences (Dainton, 2003: p. 8). One
conclusion drawn by many advocates of this position – which might be
labelled representational anti-realism – is that a perception of a temporal
process is impossible. Our awareness of a temporal sequence is always
representational. It is based on the simultaneous givenness of a manifold of
contents that functions as representations of a temporally extended or
distributed object. Our representational awareness of temporally distrib-
uted objects consequently lacks the directness and immediacy that charac-
terize perceptual presentations.
According to Dainton, the realist version of the Principle of Simultaneous
Awareness is faced with a difficulty that he calls the problem of repeated
contents. The scope of any act of awareness must be limited. Let us for the
sake of the argument suppose that it is limited to the apprehension of two
succeeding notes, and let us then take the awareness of the sequence of the
three tones Do–Re–Mi as an example. First, we will have an act that appre-
hends Do–Re and then another act that apprehends Re–Mi. If we in line
with the Principle of Simultaneous Awareness suppose that these two
momentary acts are distinct, we will have to accept that the same content
ends up being experienced twice. But that is of course not true to experi-
ence. We don’t hear Re twice; we only hear it once (Dainton, 2000: p. 141).
The anti-realist version of the principle can avoid the problem of repeated
content by appealing to temporal modes of givenness. One and the same
content is never given twice in the same manner; rather every time it is given
in different temporal modes, first as now, then as just-past, then as further-
past etc., i.e., rather than being repeatedly experienced in the same temporal
mode of presentation, we will experience it as sinking smoothly into the past.
However, despite this attempt at a solution, Dainton still argues that the
anti-realist version must be rejected. It fails to provide us with a coherent
and believable account of phenomenal temporality since it denies that we
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have a direct experience of change and succession (Dainton, 2000: p. 115).

Moreover, it is ultimately paradoxical. In order to be aware of successive
objects, consciousness needs to compare the earlier and the later objects in
an operation that makes the earlier and later simultaneous. But how can
simultaneously presented objects be given as successive objects? How can
they be both simultaneous and successive (see Gallagher, 2003: p. 2)?

2 Dainton’s Husserl Interpretation

Dainton now continues his analysis by discussing Husserl’s theory of time-
consciousness in some detail.1 To start with, Dainton readily acknowledges
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that by far the most sustained attempt to describe and understand temporal
awareness can be found in Husserl’s various writings (Dainton, 2000:
p. 150). However, Husserl never managed to formulate a definitive account
of his views on time-consciousness. His many writings on the topic are not
easily summarized, some of them are markedly obscure, and, as Dainton
openly admits, he has had to abstain from expounding those aspects of
Husserl’s work that he has been unable to understand (Dainton, 2000:
p. 137). But Dainton then sets out to describe one of Husserl’s accounts,
which he takes to exemplify a form of representational anti-realism (Dain-
ton, 2003: p. 53, 2000: p. 151).
In his criticism of Brentano, Husserl had made it clear that we need to
distinguish between directly experiencing change and duration and merely
imagining or remembering them. There is a manifest phenomenological
difference between seeing a shooting star and remembering or imagining
seeing a shooting star. At the same time, Husserl had also argued that
Brentano’s theory failed to explain how a representation that is appre-
hended in the present can make us aware of something in the past. But as
Dainton then points out, Husserl’s own theory is vulnerable to the very
same criticism (Dainton, 2000: p. 155). In his 1905 lectures, Husserl argued
that the stream of consciousness consists of a succession of momentary
experiences called primal impressions. According to Husserl, these
momentary impressions were accompanied by simultaneously occurring
sensory contents that were then supposed to be animated or imbued with
sense by an act of apprehension in such a way as to appear just-past. Since
Husserl took the animated content and the animating act to be simulta-
neous, we would on his model not be directly aware of the past even
though we seemed to be; rather each momentary experience would
contain a representation of the preceding stretch of the stream. To put it
differently, according to Dainton, Husserl took the scope of direct aware-
ness to be confined to the momentary present (Dainton, 2003: p. 54). In
order to experience phenomenal duration and continuity we need the
contribution of what Husserl calls the retention, but since the latter –
again according to Dainton – is representational in character, Husserl is
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effectively denying that we are as directly aware of change as we are of,

say, colour (Dainton, 2000: p. 155).
Dainton concludes his discussion of Husserl by conceding that the theory
he has just described was in fact one that Husserl became unhappy with, and
he admits that Husserl in his later writings abandoned the view that reten-
tions are present-occurring representations of just-past contents and that he
instead opted for the view that they provide us with direct, unmediated,
access to the past (Dainton, 2003: p. 55). But first of all, the retention of a
past phase of an object is still supposed to exist in an experience which
occurs after the phase in question, and how can something which is present
present us with something in the past? Husserl’s answer, of course, would
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be that retentions are unique. Unlike primary impressions, retentions

intend the past. Unlike memory, retentions present the past; they do not
merely re-present it (Dainton, 2000: p. 155). According to Dainton, this all
sounds too good to be true, and he argues that the explanation offered is
verbal rather than real. In his view, Husserl simply stipulates that the reten-
tions have the properties they need to have. Husserl tells us that something
that occurs in the present can directly intend something in the immediate
past, but he never explains in any detail or with any clarity how this is possi-
ble (Dainton, 2000: pp. 155–61).
Moreover, according to Dainton, even in his later writings Husserl contin-
ues to ascribe a central role to durationless acts of awareness. This is testi-
fied in his diagrams of time, which always feature continuous series of
momentary cross-sections of extended episodes of experiencing (Dainton,
2003: p. 57). At each instant we are aware of some extended parts of the
tone. Husserl does admit that these momentary cross-sections are nothing
but ideal limits, but Dainton suggests that although Husserl might have held
that momentary acts are dependent parts of extended phases of conscious-
ness, for which reason they cannot exist in isolation, he still believed them
to perform real functions within the extended acts. Thus, it is no coincidence
that Husserl continued to ascribe a central role to the momentary primal
impressions. The primal impressions must be momentary, because if they
had been temporally extended, there would have been no reason to intro-
duce the retentions and protentions (Dainton, 2003: p. 57). But if the primal
impressions are momentary, they cannot provide us with an experience of
change and duration. For that to happen, we need the full tripartite struc-
ture of retentions, protentions, and primal impressions. But, according to
Dainton, this prevents Husserl from doing full justice to the purely impres-
sional continuity of consciousness. Primal impressions are originally present
in a way that retentions and protentions are not. Consequently, on Husserl’s
view, change and duration cannot be experienced as directly and immedi-
ately as colour or shape (Dainton, 2003: p. 59).
Finally, Dainton presents two further objections to Husserl’s account,
which he calls the lingering content and the clogging of experience objection
458
 HUSSERL AND DAINTON ON TIME

respectively. In both cases, the basic problem concerns whether Husserl’s

analysis of the intricate play between complexes of retentions, primal
impressions, and protentions is the result of a proper phenomenological
description or rather the upshot of a theoretical construction.

Lingering Content
If I snap my fingers, I hear the sound of the snap and then it is gone. The
snap-sound does not linger on in my immediate experience. There may be a
faint echo of the snap, but the echo is itself a sound that I am directly expe-
riencing. According to Dainton, however, this is not what Husserl’s reten-
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tional model would lead us to expect. In Dainton’s reading, Husserl would

argue that momentary experiences enjoy their moment of full conscious-
ness, then they slowly slip away, gradually becoming less and less present
before they finally fade altogether. Only after they have left direct aware-
ness altogether can they appear in the guise of ordinary memory. But this
does not seem to be true, since experienced content departs from immediate
experience cleanly, leaving no residue, and it becomes immediately accessi-
ble to memory. Dainton admits that the lingering-content objection is
almost embarrassingly naïve, but he nevertheless insists that it should be
taken seriously (Dainton, 2000: pp. 156–7).

Clogging of Experience
Husserl realized that we are continuously aware of the continuity of our
experiences, and that this involves unity on two different levels. There is the
continuity of the content of experience, and there is the continuity of the
very awareness itself. Thus, at any given instant, we are aware not only of
the present and past temporal phases of the object, but also of our present
and past experience of the object (Dainton, 2000: p. 154). In order to accom-
modate this fact, Husserl has recourse to a very complex network of reten-
tional continua, and Dainton claims that a consciousness containing this
degree of internal complexity would be clogged with different contents to a
nightmarish degree (Dainton, 2000: p. 158). To put it differently, the
account provided by Husserl of the most basic temporal structure of
consciousness is in Dainton’s view a purely theoretical construction that
goes far beyond the phenomenological data.

3 Dainton’s Overlap Model

According to Dainton, most philosophers – and this includes Husserl – who
have subscribed to the Principle of Simultaneous Awareness have also
subscribed to the awareness-content model. In fact, the two views are natu-
ral partners. According to the awareness–content (or act–object) model of
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consciousness, consciousness is inherently bi-polar. Any experiencing has

two components. On the one hand there is an empty and durationless pole
of awareness, a pure locus of bare apprehension, with no phenomenal prop-
erties of its own. On the other hand, there is the phenomenal content that is
presented to this awareness. These two components are situated on two
different levels of consciousness, and the unity of consciousness is then said
to consist in diverse contents falling under a single awareness (Dainton,
2000: pp. 41–2).
The awareness–content model is not without problems, however. If we
hold that phenomenal content cannot exist independently of awareness, this
awareness must in some sense be directly responsible for bringing the diver-
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sity of different phenomenal characteristics into being. But it is difficult to

understand how that is supposed to be possible, since the awareness is itself
without any such characteristics. In fact, if awareness is wholly without
phenomenal features, it is difficult to see what would be lost if it simply
disappeared (Dainton, 2000: pp. 49–50). More generally, Dainton warns
against the temptation to take experiences to be things we perceive or
observe in essentially the same way as we observe and perceive ordinary
physical things. Although we do have experiences, and although we are
aware of them, we don’t become so by directing some special internal
sensory organ onto them (Dainton, 2000: p. 45). This is where Dainton
presents his simple conception of experience. In his view, consciousness is
inseparable from phenomenal content. Mental processes with discernible
phenomenological characteristics are simply contents occurring in streams
of consciousness. As he writes

when a given phenomenal item comes into being, it comes into being
as a conscious experience; to be an experience it does not need to fall
under any separate awareness. […] In other words, contents are
themselves intrinsically conscious, and hence – in a manner of speak-
ing – they are self-revealing or self-intimating. […] I shall call this
non-dualistic model of consciousness, the Simple Conception of
experience.

(Dainton, 2000: p. 57)

In order to understand the unity we find within experience we do not have

to look at anything above, beyond or external to experience itself (Dainton,
2000: p. 236). A stream of water is a unified flowing whole, and so is the
stream of consciousness. Since awareness and content are not separate,
consciousness does not consist in an awareness of a passing stream; rather
consciousness is the stream itself. As Dainton puts it, consciousness does
not consist of a stream running beneath a spot of light, or of a spot of light
running along a stream; consciousness is the stream itself, and the light
460
 HUSSERL AND DAINTON ON TIME

extends through its entire length (Dainton, 2000: p. 237). We have a direct
experience of temporally extended phenomena, and successive phases of
the stream are welded together by nothing other than direct experience.
This inter-experiential relation is sufficient; there is no need to introduce a
separate act of awareness to bind the constituents of phenomenal presents
into experienced unities (Dainton, 2003: p. 26).
According to the simple conception there is no distinction between
consciousness and content (contents are intrinsically conscious), but since
these inherently conscious contents are temporally extended, conscious-
ness and content cannot fail to run concurrently.2 Thus, Dainton basically
proposes that we should return to and adopt a modified version of the
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Principle of Presentational Concurrence, i.e., the principle that acts of

awareness and their contents coincide in time (Dainton, 2003: p. 33; 2000:
p. 166). Only this principle can do justice to what Dainton considers a
basic phenomenological axiom, namely that our experience of motion and
change and endurance is just as direct and immediate as our experience
of colour and sound (Dainton, 2003: p. 5). To put it differently, Dainton
takes it to be impossible to have a direct perceptual presentation of a
temporal sequence if the content at the basis of this presentation and the
perceptual presentation itself are not temporally extended. In short,
Dainton takes us to be directly aware of duration and enduring content
because of the enduring character of the acts themselves. When we hear
the tonal sequence Do–Re, the content of this experience is the phenom-
eno-temporal pattern of Do-flowing-into-Re, and there is consequently
no need to posit a point-like awareness which encompasses both tones
(Dainton, 2000: p. 180).
This conception, which argues that acts overlap to the same extent as their
contents, supposedly allows Dainton’s realist model, which rejects the
Principle of Simultaneous Awareness, to avoid the problem of repeated
contents. Let us return to our awareness of a sequence of tones Do–Re–Mi.
The first act apprehends Do–Re, and the second act apprehends Re–Mi, but
the sub-phase of the first act that apprehends Re is numerically identical
with the sub-phase of the second act that apprehends Re. So Re is experi-
enced only once (Dainton, 2003: p. 18). Another way to make the same
point is to call attention to the sequence of notes Do–Re–Mi; you hear Do-
running-into-Re-running-into-Mi. Since we only hear Re once, we can
conclude that the experiencing of Re in the earlier phenomenal present is
numerically identical with the experiencing of Re in the later phenomenal
present. And hence that we have just experienced two phenomenal presents
that overlapped by virtue of possessing a common part (Dainton, 2003:
p. 39). It is consequently crucial to realize that the overlap model is not
an overlap by superposition, but an overlap by sharing of common parts
(Dainton, 2003: p. 23) (see Figure 1). By arguing in this fashion, Dainton
seeks to address the main weakness of the Principle of Presentational
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 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
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Figure 1: The overlap model (adapted from Dainton 2003)

Concurrence: its failure to provide an explanation of how the unity of a

temporally extended consciousness is established. Although the diachronic
unity supposedly established by the overlap is a very short-term affair, it is,
according to Dainton, capable of binding together the adjacent phases of
the stream of consciousness – just like tiny links in a chain – thereby consti-
tuting the stream as a temporally extended whole (Dainton, 2000: p. 113).
Figure 1 The overlap model (adapted from Dainton 2003)

4 The Temporality of Time-Consciousness

In Dainton’s view, Husserl subscribed to the Principle of Simultaneous
Awareness, and as result he had difficulty in developing an adequate
account of temporal experience (Dainton, 2000: p. 136). But is this
correct?
If we look at Husserl’s early writings on time-consciousness, we see that
while criticizing Brentano’s account (Hua 10/18) and while advocating the
possibility of an intuitive presentation of succession, Husserl also argued
that the sensed contents are neutral with regard to time. The contents are
devoid of temporal determinations, they are not now, past, or future, and
they receive their temporal character from the acts of apprehension. Thus,
the content might be considered as non-temporal material for the time-
constituting apprehensions (Hua 10/417). Whereas the present phase of a
temporal object is perceived by way of a present apprehension of a
present content, the past and future phases of the object are co-perceived
by way of present apprehensions of present, although modified and
thereby no longer sensuously given, contents of apprehension. In short,
whereas the perception of the now-phase of the object will be constituted
through the animation of a certain sensory content by means of a ‘now-
apprehension’ (Hua 10/230), this perceptual consciousness will be accom-
panied by retentional and protentional apprehensions of modified
content, thereby providing a consciousness of those phases of the object
that is no longer or not yet present.
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 HUSSERL AND DAINTON ON TIME

The weakness of this account is obvious. It remains too close to

Brentano’s account, and is vulnerable to similar objections. The manifold of
contents and apprehensions is part of the actual phase of consciousness. But
how, as Husserl himself asks, can a manifold of co-existing contents provide
us with awareness of succession (Hua 10/323)? How can a present apprehen-
sion of a present content provide us with intuitive awareness of something
just-past? Husserl eventually realized the deficiencies of his own model.
While continuing to affirm the retentional-protentional structure of aware-
ness, he ended up rejecting the content–apprehension schema. In order to
appreciate Husserl’s later view, we first need to realize that the retention is
not part of that which we are aware of, but a structural part of the very
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awareness itself. In short, the retention is not something we hear; rather we

hear the just-past tone because it is retained by the retention. Moreover, the
retention doesn’t accomplish this by retaining the tone in present conscious-
ness. There is no simultaneity between the retention and that which is
retained. The just-past tone doesn’t remain present in consciousness, like
some reverberation; rather it is presented to consciousness as just-past, or
as Brough has put it: ‘Retention does not transmute what is absent into
something present; it presents the absent in its absence’ (Brough, 1989:
p. 276). In short, the retention must be appreciated as a peculiar form of
intentionality. It provides us with a direct intuitive grasp of the just-past, and
is not a special apprehension of some present content. As Husserl writes,
‘retention is not a modification in which impressional data are really [reell]
preserved, only in modified form: on the contrary, it is an intentionality –
indeed, an intentionality with a specific character of its own’ (Hua 10/118;
see also 10/31). Thus, and this must be emphasized, being retentionally
aware of the just-past phase of the object doesn’t entail having the just-past
phase of the object sensuously co-present in some strange distorted way. To
take a concrete example: if we look at a pedestrian who is crossing the street,
our perception will not be restricted to capturing the durationless now-
phase of his movement. Perceptually, it will not be as if he has suddenly
appeared from nowhere and we do not have to engage in an explicit act of
remembering in order to establish the temporal context of his current posi-
tion. Nor, however, will it be the case that all the previous phases of his
movement are perceptually present in the same way as his current position.
Had that been the case, the pedestrian would perceptually fill the entire
space he had just traversed. But again, to exclude this is not to endorse the
idea that the past phases of his movement remain visually present in some
vague ghostly manner. Temporal ‘fading’ into the past is not equivalent to
the fading of an image that remains perceptually present. Rather, what we
see is embedded in a temporal horizon. And its meaning is influenced by
what went before and which is still intentionally retained. For the very same
reason, and this is something that Gallagher has pointed out, Husserl is not
vulnerable to the lingering content and the clogging of experience objections.
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Contrary to what Dainton is claiming, consciousness on the Husserlian

model is not overloaded with sensory content. Rather, for the just-past tone
to be intentionally retained is for its meaning or significance to be retained
as just-past (Gallagher, 1998: p. 51; Gallagher, 2003).
In so far as retention is not representational, in so far as it provides us with
an intuition of the just-past phase of the object, it can be considered part of
perceptual consciousness (Hua 10/41). Husserl would agree with Meinong
that the mere succession of conscious states doesn’t guarantee conscious-
ness of succession, but this doesn’t entail the impossibility of a perception of
duration and succession unless one also accepts the idea that perception is
reduced to the grasping of a mere now-point, and that is an idea that Husserl
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categorically rejects. A perception cannot merely be a perception of what is

now: rather any perception of the present phase of an object includes a
retention of the just-past phase and a protention of the phase of the object
about to occur (Hua 11/315). To put it differently (noematically), perceptual
presence is not punctual; it is a field in which now, not-now, and not-yet-now
are given in a horizonal gestalt. This is what is required if perception of
succession and duration is to be possible.
Given that the retention constitutes the temporal horizon of the present,
it should be considered as part of perceptual consciousness rather than as a
form of subsequent memory. As James once put it, memory proper entails
a recollection of what once was present but which has subsequently been
forgotten, and which is now ‘brought back, recalled, fished up, so to speak,
from a reservoir in which, with countless other objects, it lay buried and lost
from view’ (James, 1890: I.646). Given this narrow definition, retention
cannot be a form of memory since it by contrast is involved in the very
process of making something present for the first time.
Since Husserl would deny the simultaneity between the retention and that
which is retained, Husserl must be rejecting the Principle of Presentational
Concurrence. But does this rejection entail that Husserl would defend a
version of the Principle of Simultaneous Awareness? To put it differently,
how would Husserl answer the following question: ‘Is consciousness of a
temporal process itself temporally extended’? This is a deceptively simple
question. And it is a question that Husserl answered differently at different
stages of his thinking. In 1904, his answer was straightforward. As he writes
in text no. 21: ‘I see with evidence that the consciousness of a time itself
[requires] time; the consciousness of a duration, duration; and the conscious-
ness of a succession, succession’ (Hua 10/192; see also 10/22). But of course,
if the act of consciousness is not instantaneous and momentary, if it has
duration of its own, if it contains temporal phases of its own, then how are
these different successive phases synthesized in such a manner as to allow
for an experience of succession? If the duration and unity of a tonal
sequence are constituted by consciousness, and if our consciousness of the
tonal sequence is itself given with duration and unity, are we then not forced
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to posit yet another consciousness to account for the givenness of this dura-
tion and unity, and so forth ad infinitum(Hua 10/80)? Husserl eventually
became aware of these problems, and as he writes in text no. 50:

Is it inherently absurd to regard the flow of time as an objective move-

ment? Certainly! On the other hand, memory is surely something that
itself has its now, and the same now as a tone, for example. No. There
lurks the fundamental mistake. The flow of the modes of consciousness
is not a process; the consciousness of the now is not itself now. The
retention that exists ‘together’ with the consciousness of the now is not
‘now’, is not simultaneous with the now, and it would make no sense to
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say that it is.

(Hua 10/333)

Even if we ascribe some kind of temporality to the stream of consciousness

because of its dynamic and self-differentiating character, we should not
conflate the temporality that is intrinsic to consciousness itself with the kind
of temporality that pertains to the objects of consciousness. Husserl would
reject the suggestion that there is a temporal match between the stream of
consciousness and the temporal objects and events of which it is conscious.
The relations between protention, primal impression, and retention are not
relations among items located within the temporal flow; rather these rela-
tions constitute the flow in question. Just as my experience of a red circle is
neither circular nor red, there is a difference between the temporal given-
ness of the intentional object and the temporal givenness of the experience
itself. They are not temporal in the same manner. It was against this back-
ground that Husserl eventually came to distinguish three different layers of
temporality: the objective time of the appearing objects, the subjective,
immanent, or pre-empirical time of the acts, sensa, and appearances, and the
absolute, pre-phenomenal flow of time-constituting consciousness (Hua 10/
73, 10/76, 10/358). It has been a matter of controversy how exactly one
should understand Husserl’s account of the relationship between the subjec-
tive time and the absolute flow.3 But I think it is fair to say that most scholars
agree that Husserl would take it to be misleading to describe the most funda-
mental level of time-consciousness as a temporally extended process, as if it
were composed of a number of joined slices or building blocks:

Diese strömend lebendige Gegenwart ist nicht das, was wir sonst auch
schon transzendental-phänomenologisch als Bewusstseinsstrom oder
Erlebnisstrom bezeichneten. Es ist überhaupt kein ‘Strom’ gemäß
dem Bild, also ein eigentliches zeitliches (oder gar zeiträumliches)
Ganzes, das in der Einheit einer zeitlichen Extension ein kontinuier-
lich sukzessives individuelles Dasein hat (in seinen unterscheidbaren
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Strecken und Phasen durch diese Zeitformen individuiert). Die strö-

mend lebendige Gegenwart ist ‘kontinuierliches’ strömendes Sein und
doch nicht in einem Außereinandersein, nicht in raumzeitlicher
(welträumlicher), nicht in ‘immanent zeitlicher’ Extension Sein (also
in keinem Außereinander, das Nacheinander heißt, Nacheinander
in dem Sinne eines Stellenauseinander in einer eigentlich so zu
nennenden Zeit).

(Hua 34/187)

Let us return to Dainton’s criticism: Does Husserl subscribe to the

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Principle of Simultaneous Awareness? Husserl does not defend the view

that conscious awareness occurs in series of momentary glimpses. But he
also denies that it makes sense to say of the time-constituting phenomena
(the primal impressions, retentions, protentions) that they are present and
that they have endured, that they succeed each other, or are co-present, etc.
In short, in his view, they are not ‘present’, ‘past’, or ‘future’ in the way
empirical objects are (Hua 10/75, 10/333, 10/375–6). Thus, in a certain way
inner time-consciousness is quasi-temporal (Hua 10/82) or atemporal (Hua
10/112), but only in the sense that it is not intra-temporal (innerzeitlich).
Inner-time consciousness is not an object occurring in time, but neither is it
merely a consciousness of time; rather it is itself a form of temporality,4 and
ultimately the question is whether it makes sense to ascribe temporal
predicates to time itself. Perhaps this worry can explain some of Husserl’s
apparently enigmatic and aporetic statements.
To recapitulate: according to Husserl, it is absolutely mandatory to distin-
guish sharply between the primal impression, retention, and protention, i.e.,
the non-independent structures of time-consciousness, on the one hand,
and the now-phase, the past-phase, and the future-phase, i.e., the phases of
the temporal object, on the other hand. The primal impression, retention,
and protention are not related to each other as present, past, and future.
Rather it is their conjunction which makes possible the senses of present,
past, and future. In his writings, Husserl occasionally speaks of absolute
time-constituting consciousness as an unchangeable form of presence (as a
nunc stans) (Hua 34/384).5 It stands – to use James’ metaphor – permanent
like the rainbow on the waterfall with its own quality unchanged by the
events that stream through it (James, 1890: I.630). But it is noteworthy that
Husserl explicitly denies that this standing presence is to be understood as
referring to merely one of the three temporal modalities (Hua 34/384). The
presence in question is not the ‘now’, is not the Gegenwart, if by Gegenwart
one means Gegen-wart, that is, a now that one stands over against (Hua 14/
29). Inner time-consciousness is a field of experiencing, a dimension of
manifestation, which encompasses all three temporal modes. And while
from a first-person perspective it certainly makes sense to say that I had an
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experience of joy, or a perception of a flower, and that these experiences

endured and have now ceased and become past – after all, otherwise it
would hardly make sense to say that I can remember a former experience –
the very dimension of time-consciousness with its threefold structure
of protention–primal impression–retention, the very field of experiencing
that allows for presence and absence, cannot itself become past and absent
for me.
As Brough observes, the description of the absolute flow puts a funda-
mental strain upon language, since that which is to be described is unlike
any object, unlike all other phenomena (Brough, 1987: p. 23; cf. Hua 10/
371). Presumably Dainton would disagree. After all, he argues that the
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temporality of, say, a perceived movement and the temporality inherent in

the perception of that movement are one and the same. He would conse-
quently want to deny the difference between what Husserl occasionally calls
the noetic and the noematic-ontical temporalization (MS B III 9 23a).
Moreover, Dainton even seems to think that one can measure the extension
of the lived presence with a stop clock (Dainton, 2000: pp. 113, 171). Quite
regardless of the extent to which such an attempt to quantify the most
fundamental dimension of time-consciousness might miss its target, it is also
quite questionable – as many phenomenologists have pointed out – whether
the time on the clock can really do justice to lived time. To mention just one
simple example: think of the way in which the experience of time (for
instance the interplay between the three different temporal dimensions) is
differently articulated in such diverse states as hope, anxiety, insomnia, and
boredom. Think of the way in which the ‘same’ thirty minutes can be expe-
rienced differently depending on whether you are anxious, bored, or capti-
vated. This is not to say that a stop clock cannot measure something, but the
question is what precisely it is that is being measured. It is certainly possible
to transform our experiences into mental objects and to posit or inject them
into chronological time. But is this serial ‘time of the clock’ a form of tempo-
rality that is native to the experiences in question, or is it rather derivative,
the result of a subsequent objectification?

5 Conclusion
To what extent is Dainton’s criticism to the point? As I have already admit-
ted, I think that his criticism of Husserl’s early theory might be justified.
But when it comes to Husserl’s later view(s), Dainton’s criticism doesn’t
strike me as being very perceptive. Contrary to what Dainton is saying,
Husserl would not say that the scope of direct awareness is restricted to the
momentary present, nor would he deny that we are as immediately aware
of change or duration as we are of colour and sound.6 As for the idea that
Husserl because of his concept of primal impression remained focused on
durationless acts of awareness, I think that this objection fails not only
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because Husserl is very clear about the fact that the primal impression
cannot be thought independently of its horizon (Hua 11/315, 337–8) – it
never appears in isolation and is an abstract component that, by itself,
cannot provide us with awareness of a temporal object – but also because
Husserl would ultimately argue that the very alternative between ‘tempo-
rally extended’ and ‘durationless’ is inappropriate when it comes to
describing the fundamental dimension of time-consciousness. As for
Dainton’s lingering content and clogging of experience objections, I think
that both objections miss their target, and that this should be clear
the moment one recognizes the true intentional structure of the retention
(see Gallagher, 2003). What, then, about Dainton’s claim that Husserl
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simply stipulates that the retentions have the mysterious properties

they need to have in order to make his theory work, and that he doesn’t
really offer any explanation of how the retentions can provide us with an
intuitive access to the past? As far as I can see, Husserl has in fact provided
us with a painstaking analysis of retentional consciousness. Moreover, his
main aim is to provide an account of time-consciousness which is true to
the phenomena. And if that calls for ascribing unique features to the
retentions, then so be it. We should not forget that Dainton himself argues
that the unity of consciousness is a primitive feature of experience, one
which cannot be analysed or reduced to anything else (Dainton, 2000:
p. 26). And if he can employ that kind of argument, I fail to see why Husserl
can’t as well.
I have quite some sympathy for Dainton’s criticism of the awareness–
content model and for his general thesis, namely that we should be wary
of taking experiences to be things we perceive or observe in essentially
the same way as we observe and perceive ordinary physical things.
I would also endorse the claim that experiential processes are intrinsically
conscious and hence self-revealing or self-intimating. In fact, I have
argued elsewhere that this non-dualistic model of consciousness is one
that Husserl himself occasionally favoured.7 But as should already be
clear, I think that there is a problem in the way Dainton cashes out his
non-dualistic alternative. One can certainly reject the idea that phenome-
nal experiences become conscious by being taken as objects by some
higher-order monitoring awareness and still argue that it is necessary to
retain a distinction between the noetic and the noematic dimension. Thus,
from a Husserlian point of view, Dainton’s attempt to dispense with
conscious acts and to solve all problems by appealing to experiential
content can be seen as an attempt to do away with noetic structures alto-
gether in order to implement a purely noematic phenomenology. It also
shares the familiar weaknesses of such an attempt. Moreover, Husserlian
phenomenology would insist that we need to distinguish not only different
levels in consciousness but also different forms of lived temporality. There
is a difference between analysing consciousness in terms of different
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acts, such as acts of perception, judgment, imagination, etc., and analysing

consciousness in terms of the structure protention–primal impression–
retention. Simply to collapse these different levels into one involves an
oversimplification that is detrimental to a correct understanding of time-
consciousness. To put it differently, although I have some sympathy for
Dainton’s own simple conception of experience, I think that he goes too
far. To accept his argument would not merely be to opt for a simple
conception of experience but would be to opt for an oversimplified
model, and I don’t think that such a move would be phenomenologically
warranted.
What, then, about Dainton’s own alternative? How convincing is his
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overlap model? It is not a model that operates with anything resembling

retentions and protentions, nor does it accept the idea of temporal modes of
presentation. The overlap model would consequently deny that the first
note in a tonal sequence will first be experienced under the temporal mode
present, then under the temporal mode just-past, then further past, etc. Why
does it deny that? Because if the note were given with different temporal
characters as experience progressed, it would be incoherent to suppose that
two subsequent experiences that both intended the same note could actually
overlap in the sense of having common parts (Dainton, 2000: p. 174). To put
it differently, the overlap theory must reject the notion of temporal modes
of presentation since such modes would prevent the overlap theory from
accounting for diachronic unity by simply positing the numerical identity of
the overlapping parts. However, this seems to confront Dainton’s theory
with something of a problem. One might ask whether it can really do justice
to the difference between synchronic and diachronic unity.8 Dainton
himself argues that his aim is to establish that the diachronic unity of expe-
rience is not essentially different from synchronic unity. Given that Dainton
considers diachronic unity to be a very short-term affair, spanning at most a
second or so (Dainton, 2000: p. 112), and given that it hardly makes sense to
speak of an absolutely durationless synchronic unity, it is on his account
indeed hard to distinguish the two. But is this really satisfactory? Moreover,
how can it account for the dialectics between presence and absence that
seem so indelible to mark our awareness of temporal objects and events? To
solve the problem, Dainton occasionally appeals to what he calls phenome-
nal character. In his view, phenomenal contents all appear equally present
as and when they occur, but the reason why they nevertheless have an expe-
rienced direction is their dynamic flow-character, which must be considered
a phenomenal attribute just like colour or timbre (Dainton, 2003: p. 29).9
But is that convincing? What about our perception of an unchanging and
enduring tone, which on Dainton’s account would presumably lack the
phenomenal attribute of direction? This tone will certainly be perceived as
temporally extended, as something that has already persisted for a while,
and as something whose previous phases are no longer temporally present
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in the same manner as its current phase. But how is one supposed to do
justice to this simple example without recurring to something like temporal
modes of givenness? Ultimately, the overlap model’s inability to recognize
temporal modes of givenness strikes me as a reductio ad absurdum of the
theory. So I would obviously disagree with Dainton when he claims that the
overlap theory is superior to all other accounts of temporal experience
(Dainton, 2000: p. 181).
Dainton’s discussion of the structure of the stream of consciousness has
many virtues, but in the end, I would bet my money on Husserl’s sophisti-
cated account of the threefold structure of time-consciousness. It remains a
source of profound inspiration. This is especially so given that Husserl’s
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reflections on time-consciousness raise questions and address issues that are

not even mentioned by Dainton.10

University of Copenhagen, Denmark

Notes
1 Dainton discusses Broad’s theory in even greater detail, but I will ignore that
part of his discussion.
2 Given Dainton’s projectivism, given that he considers ordinary perceptual
objects to be part of the stream of consciousness, I find it hard to understand how
he is able to avoid the threat of solipsism. I also think that the extent of his
temporal realism can be questioned, but these are issues that I will be unable to
pursue further in this paper.
3 For my own contributions, see Zahavi 1999, 2003, 2004.
4 Cf. Kern, 1975: pp. 40–1; Bernet, 1994: p. 197; Merleau-Ponty, 1945: p. 483,
Heidegger, 1991: p. 192. Although the field of experiencing has neither a tempo-
ral location nor a temporal extension, and although it does not last and never
becomes past, it is not a static or momentary supra-temporal principle, but a
living pulse (Lebenspuls) with a certain articulation and variable width, i.e., it
might stretch. In fact, I would suggest that the metaphor of stretching – a meta-
phor used by both Husserl and Heidegger (Hua 10/376; Heidegger, 1986: §72) –
might be quite appropriate as a characterization of the ecstatic self-differentia-
tion of the constituting flow, since it avoids the potentially misleading talk of the
flow as a sequence or succession of changing impressions, slices, or phases. To
venture a more daring suggestion, perhaps a change of metaphor is really called
for. Rather than likening time-consciousness to a river or stream, we should
consider comparing it to a rubber band. As Claude Romano has pointed out to
me, this suggestion recalls Augustine’s notion of distentio animi.
5 For a meticulous investigation of Husserl’s concept of nunc stans, see Held’s clas-
sical work Lebendige Gegenwart (1966).
6 Regarding this specific objection, it might by the way be worthwhile recalling
that everything that can be perceived has temporal duration and that this
includes perceived colour.
7 See Zahavi, 1999, 2003, 2004, 2005.
8 I am indebted to Joakim Quistorff-Refn for this critical point.
9 Did anybody whisper ‘metaphysics of presence’?
10 This study has been funded by the Danish National Research Foundation.

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